THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF 

               G.R. No.  180206
BAGUIO CITY, represented by                                   
REINALDO BAUTISTA, JR.,                    Present:
City Mayor; THE ANTI-SQUATTING
COMMITTEE, represented by ATTY.       QUISUMBING, J.,
MELCHOR CARLOS R. RAGANES,                 Chairperson,
CITY BUILDINGS and                     CARPIO MORALES,
ARCHITECTURE office, represented     TINGA,
by OSCAR FLORES; and PUBLIC            VELASCO, JR., and
ORDER and SAFETY OFFICE,                BRION,  JJ.
Represented by EMMANUEL REYES,
                      Petitioners.
 
                      
           -  versus  -
                                                                    Promulgated:
       
                                                                    February 4, 2009
ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, Regional
Officer-National Commission on
Indigenous People-CAR, ELVIN
GUMANGAN, NARCISO BASATAN
and LAZARO BAWAS,
                     Respondents.
 
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
 
DECISION
 
TINGA, J.:
 
Petitioners, the City Government of Baguio City, represented by its Mayor, Reinaldo Bautista, Jr., the Anti-
Squatting Committee, represented by Atty. Melchor Carlos R. Rabanes; the City Buildings and Architecture Office,
represented by Oscar Flores; and the Public Order and Safety Office, represented by Emmanuel Reyes and later
substituted by Gregorio Deligero, assail the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 96895, dated April
16, 2007, and its Resolution [2] dated September 11, 2007, which affirmed the injunctive writ issued by the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) against the demolition orders of petitioners.
 
The following undisputed facts are culled from the assailed Decision:
 
The case stemmed from the three (3) Demolition Orders issued by the City Mayor of Baguio
City, Braulio D. Yaranon, ordering the demolition of the illegal structures constructed by Lazaro
Bawas, Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. and a certain Mr. Basatan on a portion of the Busol Watershed
Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City, without the required building permits and in violation
of Section 69 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 1096 and
Republic Act No. 7279.
 
Pursuant thereto, the corresponding demolition advices dated September 19, 2006 were
issued informing the occupants thereon of the intended demolition of the erected structures on
October 17 to 20, 2006. Consequently, Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro Bawas
(hereinafter private respondents) filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the Office of the City Mayor
of Baguio City through its Acting City Mayor, Reynaldo Bautista, the City Building and Architecture
Office, the Anti-Squatting Task Force, and the Public Order and Safety Division, among others,
(collectively called petitioners) before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera
Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR), Regional Hearing Office, La Trinidad, Benguet, docketed as
Case No. 31-CAR-06.
 
In their petition, private respondents basically claimed that the lands where their residential
houses stand are their ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing openly and
continuously since time immemorial; that their ownership thereof have been expressly recognized in
Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922 and recommended by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion from the coverage of the Busol Forest Reserve. They, thus,
contended that the demolition of their residential houses is a violation of their right of possession and
ownership of ancestral lands accorded by the Constitution and the law, perforce, must be restrained.
 
On October 16 and 19, 2006, Regional Hearing Officer Atty. Brain S. Masweng of the NCIP
issued the two (2) assailed temporary restraining orders (TRO) directing the petitioners and all
persons acting for and in their behalf to refrain from enforcing Demolition Advice dated September
18, 2006; Demolition Order dated September 19, 2006; Demolition Order No. 25, Series of 2004;
 Demolition Order No. 33, Series of 2005; and Demolition Order No. 28, Series of 2004, for a total
period of twenty (20) days.
 
Subsequently, the NCIP issued the other assailed Resolution dated November 10,
2006 granting the private respondents’ application for preliminary injunction subject to the posting of
an injunctive bond each in the amount of P10,000.00.[3]
 
 
Acting on the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners, [4] the Court of Appeals upheld the jurisdiction of the
NCIP over the action filed by private respondents and affirmed the temporary restraining orders dated October
16[5] and 19, 2006,[6] and the Resolution dated November 10, 2006,[7] granting the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, issued by the NCIP. The appellate court also ruled that Baguio City is not exempt from the coverage of
Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA).
 
Petitioners assert that the NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear and decide main actions for injunction such as
the one filed by private respondents. They claim that the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining
orders and writs of preliminary injunction only as auxiliary remedies to cases pending before it. 
 
Further, the IPRA provides that Baguio City shall be governed by its Charter. Thus, private respondents
cannot claim their alleged ancestral lands under the provisions of the IPRA.
 
Petitioners contend that private respondents are not entitled to the protection of an injunctive writ because
they encroached upon the Busol Forest Reservation and built structures thereon without the requisite permit.
Moreover, this Court, in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals,[8] had already declared that the Busol Forest
Reservation is inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the same into private
property.  Even assuming that private respondents have a pending application for ancestral land claim, their right is
at best contingent and cannot come under the protective mantle of injunction.
 
Petitioners also claim that the Busol Forest Reservation is exempt from ancestral claims as it is needed for
public welfare. It is allegedly one of the few remaining forests in Baguio City and is the city’s main watershed.
 
Finally, petitioners contend that the demolition orders were issued pursuant to the police power of the local
government.
 
In their Comment[9] dated March 1, 2007, private respondents defend the jurisdiction of the NCIP to take
cognizance of and decide main actions for injunction arguing that the IPRA does not state that the NCIP may only
issue such writs of injunction as auxiliary remedies. Private respondents also contend that the IPRA does not
exempt Baguio City from its coverage nor does it state that there are no ancestral lands in Baguio City.
 
As members of the Ibaloi Indigenous Community native to Baguio City, private respondents are treated as
squatters despite the fact that they hold native title to their ancestral land.   The IPRA allegedly now recognizes
ancestral lands held by native title as never to have been public lands.
 
Private respondents aver that the Busol Forest Reservation is subject to ancestral land claims. In fact,
Proclamation No. 15[10] dated April 27, 1922, which declared the area a forest reserve, allegedly did not nullify the
vested rights of private respondents over their ancestral lands and even identified the claimants of the particular
portions within the forest reserve. This claim of ownership is an exception to the government’s contention that the
whole area is a forest reservation.
 
Lastly, private respondents assert that the power of the city mayor to order the demolition of certain
structures is not absolute. Regard should be taken of the fact that private respondents cannot be issued building
permits precisely because they do not have paper titles over their ancestral lands, a requirement for the issuance of
a building permit under the National Building Code.
 
Petitioners’ Reply to Comment [11] dated June 11, 2008 merely reiterates their previous arguments.
 
We shall first dispose of the elemental issue of the NCIP’s jurisdiction.
 
The NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies,
plans and programs to protect and promote the rights and well-being of indigenous cultural communities/indigenous
peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto. [12]  In order to fully
effectuate its mandate, the NCIP is vested with jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving the rights of
ICCs/IPs.  The only condition precedent to the NCIP’s assumption of jurisdiction over such disputes is that the
parties thereto shall have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws and have obtained a
certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same
has not been resolved.[13]
 
In addition, NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings,
Practice and Procedure Before the NCIP, reiterates the jurisdiction of the NCIP over claims and disputes involving
ancestral lands and enumerates the actions that may be brought before the commission.  Sec. 5, Rule III thereof
provides:
  
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.—The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall
exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining
to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the
following:
 
(1)   Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):
 
a.       Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
b.      Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of
ICCs/IPs;
c.       Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or
desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;
d.      Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and
e.       Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
 
(2)   Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:
 
a.       Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and
settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under
customary laws; and
b.      Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371.
 
 
 
(3)   Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:
 
a.   Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land
Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any
person or community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that such
action is filed within one (1) year from the date of registration.
 
In order to determine whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over the dispute in accordance with the foregoing
provisions, it is necessary to resolve, on the basis of the allegations in their petition, whether private respondents
are members of ICCs/IPs.  In their petition[14] filed before the NCIP, private respondents, members of the Ibaloi tribe
who first settled in Baguio City, were asserting ownership of portions of the Busol Forest Reservation which they
claim to be their ancestral lands. Correctly denominated as a petition for injunction as it sought to prevent the
enforcement of the demolition orders issued by the City Mayor, the petition traced private respondents’ ancestry to
Molintas and Gumangan and asserted their possession, occupation and utilization of their ancestral lands. The
petition also alleged that private respondents’ claim over these lands had been recognized by Proclamation No. 15
which mentions the names of Molintas and Gumangan as having claims over portions of the Busol Forest
Reservation.[15]
 
 
 
 
 
Clearly then, the allegations in the petition, which axiomatically determine the nature of the action and the
jurisdiction of a particular tribunal, [16] squarely qualify it as a “dispute(s) or controversy(s) over ancestral
lands/domains of ICCs/IPs” within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO.
 
The IPRA, furthermore, endows the NCIP with the power to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of
injunction.  Sec. 69 thereof states:
 
Sec. 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP.—The NCIP shall have the power and authority:
 
a)      To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed
before it as well as those pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;
 
b)      To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records,
agreements, and other document of similar nature as may be material to a just determination of the
matter under investigation or hearing conducted in pursuance of this Act;
 
c)      To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties
therefor; and
 
d)      To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending before it which,
if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any of the parties to the
case or seriously affect social or economic activity. [Emphasis supplied]
 NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 echoes the above-quoted provision in Sec. 82, Rule XV, which
provides:
 
Sec. 82. Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.—A writ of preliminary
injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of
Sections 59 and 69 of R.A. [No.] 8371 when it is established, on the basis of sworn allegations in a
petition, that the acts complained of involving or arising from any case, if not restrained forthwith,
may cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to any of the parties, or seriously affect social or
economic activity. This power may also be exercised by RHOs in cases pending before them in
order to preserve the rights of the parties.
 
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP may issue temporary restraining orders and writs
of injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main action is for injunction. The
power to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of injunction allows parties to a dispute over which the NCIP
has jurisdiction to seek relief against any action which may cause them grave or irreparable damage or injury.   In
this case, the Regional Hearing Officer issued the injunctive writ because its jurisdiction was called upon to protect
and preserve the rights of private respondents who are undoubtedly members of ICCs/IPs.
 
Parenthetically, in order to reinforce the powers of the NCIP, the IPRA even provides that no restraining
order or preliminary injunction may be issued by any inferior court against the NCIP in any
case,   dispute   or   controversy   arising   from   or   necessary  to  the interpretation of the IPRA and other laws
relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.[17]
 
Petitioners argue that Baguio City is exempt from the provisions of the IPRA, and necessarily the jurisdiction
of the NCIP, by virtue of Sec. 78 thereof, which states:
 
SEC. 78. Special Provision.—The City of Baguio shall remain to be governed by its Charter and
all lands proclaimed as part of its townsite reservation shall remain as such until otherwise
reclassified by appropriate legislation: Provided, That prior land rights and titles recognized
and/or acquired through any judicial, administrative or other processes before the effectivity
of this Act shall remain valid: Provided, further,That this provision shall not apply to any territory
which becomes part of the City of Baguio after the effectivity of this Act. [Emphasis supplied]
 
 
          The foregoing provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its own charter.  Its exemption from the
IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized
or acquired through any process before its effectivity.  The IPRA demands that the city’s charter respect the validity
of these recognized land rights and titles. 
 
The crucial question to be asked then is whether private respondents’ ancestral land claim was indeed
recognized by Proclamation No. 15, in which  case,  their  right  thereto  may be protected by an injunctive
writ.  After all, before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must show that there exists a right to
be protected and that the acts against which injunction is directed are violative of said right. [18]
 
Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private respondents’
ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families, the predecessors-in-
interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge
vested rights over the same.  In fact, Proclamation No. 15 explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest Reservation from
sale or settlement. It provides:
 
Pursuant to the provisions of section eighteen hundred and twenty-six of Act Numbered
Twenty-seven Hundred and eleven[,] I hereby establish the  Busol Forest Reservation to be
administered by the Bureau of Forestry for the purpose of conserving and protecting water and
timber, the protection of the water supply being of primary importance and all other uses of the forest
are to be subordinated to that purpose.  I therefore withdraw from sale or settlement the following
described parcels of the public domain situated in the Township of La Trinidad, City
of Baguio, Mountain Province, Island of Luzon, to wit:
 
The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as inalienable in  Heirs of
Gumangan v. Court of Appeals. [19] The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such precludes its conversion
into private property. Relatedly, the courts are not endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest
lands. 
 
All told, although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction, we
are not convinced that private respondents are entitled to the relief granted by the Commission. 
 
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.  The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No.
96895 dated April 16, 2007 and its Resolution dated September 11, 2007 are
REVERSED  and  SET  ASIDE.  Case  No. 31-CAR-06 entitled, Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro
Bawas v. Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City, et al. is DISMISSED.  No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 80916 November 9, 1990

C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, 

The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out
of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this function by
virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as
an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their particular
expertise.

In the Solid Homes case, for example, the Court affirmed the competence of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board to award damages although this is an essentially judicial power exercisable ordinarily only by the courts of
justice. This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified by expediency, or the need
of the government to respond swiftly and competently to the pressing problems of the modem world.

Thus we have held:

It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform
adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or
quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g. the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the National Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically
because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the
resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition
that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. 3

xxx xxx xxx

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more
and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the
particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and
dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the
increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unquestionably
called the fourth department of the government. 4

xxx xxx xxx

There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative
agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The
very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The
ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the
need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge
and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts. 5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987

ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, 

It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers
and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to
administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations
Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction,  7 basically because the need for special competence and experience
has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a
companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. In Spouses Jose
Abejo and Aurora Abejo, et al. vs. Hon. Rafael dela Cruz, etc., et al., 8 the Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Teehankee,
said:

In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in administrative
commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes in the field of labor (as in
corporations, public transportation and public utilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the Industrial
 Court's intervention in the resolution of labor management controversies likely to cause strikes or
lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law. The
Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction
of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with
the purposes of the regulatory statute administered" (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar
Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil, 932, 941 [1954]).

In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions
with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on
technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of
discretion has become well nigh indispensable. Thus, in 1984, the Court noted that 'between the
power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakeable trend has been to refer it to
the former, "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks
clearly and unequivocably, the choice should fall on fan administrative agency]" ' (NFL v. Eisma, 127
SCRA 419, 428, citing precedents). The Court in the earlier case of Ebon vs. De Guzman (113
SCRA 52, 56 [1982]), noted that the lawmaking authority, in restoring to the labor arbiters and the
NLRC their jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in labor cases, as against the previous P.D.
amendment splitting their jurisdiction with the regular courts, "evidently, . . . had second thoughts
about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases
because that setup would mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible
conflicting findings and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim."

In an even more recent case, Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. National Housing Authority, et al., 9 Mr. Justice Gutierrez,
speaking for the Court, observed that:

There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative
agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The
very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The
ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the
need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge
and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts.

In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in
the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such
powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. 10 In the
exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts.
One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a
uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts.

G.R. Nos. 154470-71               September 24, 2012

BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner, 
vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. Nos. 154589-90

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner, 

A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. The very definition of an administrative
agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and functions
given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in
matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by
regular courts. A "quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature.
While the very nature of an administrative agency and the raison d'être for its creation 103 and proliferation dictate a
grant of quasi-judicial power to it, the matters over which it may exercise this power must find sufficient anchorage
on its enabling law, either by express provision or by necessary implication. Once found, the quasi-judicial power
partakes of the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, to hear and determine a class of cases within its
peculiar competence and expertise. In other words, the provisions of the enabling statute are the yardsticks by
which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers an administrative agency may exercise, as
defined in the enabling act of such agency.104

G.R. No. 148106             July 17, 2006

EURO-MED LABORATORIES, PHIL., INC., represented by LEONARDO H. TORIBIO, petitioner, 

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. 10 It
applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may
suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view 11 or, if the parties
would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice. 12

G.R. No. 88550 April 18, 1990

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, 

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases
involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character.
However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the
proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the
matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim
is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution
of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative
body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for
its view" (United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, Emphasis supplied).

The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It
need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined.
Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.

Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to an administrative agency are
secured, and the limited function of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by
preliminary resort, for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues, to
agencies that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through
experience, and by more flexible procedure (Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570).