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Gorbachev's Greatest Hits

 Mikhail Sergeyevich Turns 90; Archive marks milestone with new publication
of Gorbachev memcons with Castro, Mitterrand, and Shamir; compilation of
dozens of Gorbachev primary sources.
Gorbachev made history, then freed history by opening his documents
Click on images to read the postings

 
Published: Mar 2, 2021
Briefing Book #
747
Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton
For more information, contact:
202-994-7000 or [email protected]
Project
Russia Programs

Mikhail Gorbachev and his wife Raisa Gorbacheva on their way to Iceland, October 1986
(courtesy Gorbachev Foundation archive)
 
Undated photo of Gorbachev in the car [source: www.pastdaily.com]
 
Gorbachev and his wife Raisa at home. (Photo credit SputnikImages.com)
 
Gorbachev and his wife Raisa return from their fateful vacation in Foros in August 1991
(courtesy Gorbachev Foundation archive)
 
Gorbachev: His Life and Times Paperback
by William Taubman
September 11, 2018
Gold standard biography of Gorbachev
Washington, D.C., March 2, 2021 – The first and only president of the Soviet
Union, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, is turning 90 years old today in Moscow.  
On the occasion of his anniversary, the National Security Archive has compiled a
collection of postings called “Gorbachev’s Greatest Hits.”  These documents help
illuminate the story of the end of the Cold War, political reform of the Soviet
system, and the vision of a world built on universal human values. 
This compendium, accompanied by a collection of Russian-language documents on
the Archive’s Russia Page, is intended to encourage scholars and others to revisit
and study those miraculous years in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the global
confrontation stopped, walls fell, peoples found freedom, and Europe was seen as
a common home.  Though not for long.
Gorbachev made history, and to a remarkable degree he also freed history from
the usual constraints of security classifications and archival restrictions that often
go on needlessly for decades.  Only a year or two out of office, he had already
started publishing the transcripts of his head-of-state meetings through the
Gorbachev Foundation; and he liberated top aides like Anatoly Chernyaev to
publish their memos and their diaries from which the international scholarly
community has benefited enormously, and from which the National Security
Archive has built dozens of Web postings, including the selections highlighted here,
and published two award-winning books, Masterpieces of History and The Last
Superpower Summits.
From the very beginning, Gorbachev engaged with U.S. and European leaders,
believing that if only they met face-to-face and explained their beliefs to each other,
they would no longer see each other as enemies.  Gorbachev arguably saved
Ronald Reagan’s presidency – without Gorbachev, Reagan would be remembered
today mostly for the Iran-contra scandal and for selling the national debt to China. 
But in Geneva in 1985, Reagan met Gorbachev, and there the Soviet and the U.S.
leaders proclaimed “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”(EBB
172). 
A year later in Reykjavik, Reagan and Gorbachev came very close to abolishing
nuclear weapons altogether – a dream they shared. (EBB 203).  No matter how one
views Gorbachev’s policies, it is undeniable that no leader before or after him even
came close to this achievement, all noble aspirations notwithstanding. 
Breaking the Kremlin mold, Gorbachev went around the world, talking, persuading,
and changing his own views along the way.  He could hold a wide-ranging,
passionate but respectful conversation with leaders as different as Margaret
Thatcher, with whom he discussed revolutionary movements in the Third World
(EBB 422), and Fidel Castro, with whom he conversed about U.S. politics (Document
1).  The first and only Soviet leader to do so, he met with the Pope and found
common ground as they deliberated over matters of peace and socialist choice
(Document 8, EBB 298). 
Gorbachev believed that together with his former opponents they could end all
regional conflicts, starting with the war in Afghanistan.  He announced the date for
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and completed it exactly on that date –
February 15, 1989, ending a bitter Soviet war that had gone on for almost ten
years.  Under his leadership, the Soviet Union cut military aid to third world
dictatorships, even those who were considered “good” allies; he supported the
United States in the Persian Gulf War even though his peaceful approach did not
prevail. (EBB 745).
Of course he ran out of time.  His domestic opponents – the hardliners in August
1991 seeking the old Soviet Union, and his “democratic” denunciator Boris Yeltsin
afterwards, seeking his own power – brought Gorbachev down.  Left behind were
many global problems, not least the U.S.-Cuban confrontation that Gorbachev
hoped to solve.  He played behind-the-scenes mediator, telling George H. W. Bush
he was mistaken about Castro, and telling Castro he needed to open to the U.S. 
Gorbachev passed messages between the two sides, but did not have time to
complete the project.
Today the National Security Archive publishes three new memcons translated from
the Russian, never posted before in any language, that reflect three important
aspects of Gorbachev’s policy and aspirations.  In his first trip to Cuba in 1989,
Gorbachev spent long hours with Castro, whom he considered a legendary
revolutionary leader but also hardheaded and mildly hostile to perestroika.  Trying
to explain perestroika to him, Gorbachev softly suggested that Cuba also needed to
change and improve relations with the United States. (Document 1). 
Meeting with Yitzhak Shamir of Israel, right before the beginning of the 1991
Madrid Conference on the Middle East, Gorbachev celebrated the new era he had
just opened in Soviet-Israeli relations, re-establishing diplomatic ties, and aspiring
to find a solution to the Palestinian issue within an international framework.
(Document 2). 
The last conversation published here is with Francois Mitterrand of France, right
after the opening of the Madrid conference (Document 3).  Gorbachev, on the high
note of a successful start of the conference, was hoping to talk to Mitterrand about
building the “common European home.”  He believed the French leader shared his
vision of Europe.  There were many common features between the “European
confederation” and “common European home” that the two leaders had discussed
many times before.  Now, however, after German unification in NATO, the war in
the Gulf, and the August coup in the Soviet Union, the French leader wanted to talk
about integration only on “his” side of the European continent. 
Gorbachev did not have time to realize many of his ideas, chief among them the
creation of a new voluntary and democratic and demilitarized Soviet Union.  But
the seven years he spent as leader of the Soviet Union changed the world to an
extent nobody imagined before.  Gorbachev, more than any other figure, ended
the Cold War, then worked to ensure the story could be told.
Happy birthday, Mikhail Sergeyevich! 
 
READ THE DOCUMENTS

Document 1
Record of Main Content of Conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and F.
Castro (Havana, Cuba)
Apr 3, 1989
Source
Archive of Gorbachev Foundation, Fond 1, opis 1
Mikhail Gorbachev visits Cuba right after the first Soviet multicandidate elections in
March 1989, which ushered in the era of increasingly free elections in the socialist
bloc. His earlier planned trip to Havana in December 1988 had to be scrapped
because of the earthquake in Armenia. Although Fidel Castro was critical
of perestroika, the two leaders quickly found a common language based on deep
mutual respect and commitment to the Soviet-Cuban relationship. Gorbachev tries
to explain the ideas of perestroika to Castro and tactfully suggests that Cuba needs
to change as well: “We are faced with the task of adapting socialism to the current
realities, of opening [fully] the potential of our social order so that it reflects the
imperatives of the time adequately.” Gorbachev talks about individual paths for
individual socialist countries and his respect for their approaches. 

A large part of the conversation focuses on U.S. politics and foreign policy.
Gorbachev complains to Castro about George H.W. Bush’s “pause” and Castro calls
that policy “sluggish.” Gorbachev sees the influence of the military-industrial
complex behind Bush’s “vacillations.” Castro shares some astute observations
about Reagan saying that the Iran-Contra scandal undermined his standing, and
that he “would never have been able to achieve such popularity and respect in the
international arena had he not signed the [INF] treaty with the Soviet Union.” 

The main focus of the conversation is Latin America. Here, it is mainly Castro
talking and Gorbachev listening. He notes the debt crisis, the new problem of
narcotics, and narcobusiness serving the U.S. market.

Document 2
Record of Conversation Between M.S. Gorbachev and Prime Minister of Israel
Y. Shamir 29 October 1991 [with attached Shamir letter to Bush and
Gorbachev dated 23 October]
Oct 29, 1991
Source
Archive of Gorbachev Foundation, Fond 1, opis 1, copy donated to the National
Security Archive by Andrey S. Grachev
Gorbachev holds this historic meeting with Yitzhak Shamir on the eve of the
opening of the Madrid Conference on the Middle East. The Soviet Union had just
reestablished diplomatic relations with the Jewish state on October 18. Shamir
thanks Gorbachev for his role in convening the conference and his efforts to
improve relations with Israel. Gorbachev tells him about recent progress in the
Soviet Union regarding the treatment of Jews—they are now allowed to emigrate
to Israel, and there are “already 22 schools in Moscow where Jewish religion and
culture are studied.” Gorbachev asserts that there is no anti-Semitism in the USSR
now (an overstatement), and that even during the difficult changes “society is not
susceptible to this disease.” 

Shamir is very grateful but also very cautious, especially as it comes to the format
of negotiations. Gorbachev and Secretary of State James Baker’s understanding
was that after the opening ceremony, the first round of bilateral negotiations
would be held in Madrid in the international framework. Shamir, however, wants
bilateral negotiations to take place locally, in the Middle East.

Document 3
Record of Conversation Between M.S. Gorbachev and F. Mitterrand in the
evening in Latche (south of France), 30 October 1991
Oct 30, 1991
Source
Archive of Gorbachev Foundation, Fond 1, opis 1, copy donated to the National
Security Archive by Andrey S. Grachev
National Security Archive by Andrey S. Grachev] On his way back from the Madrid
conference, Gorbachev stops at Francois Mitterrand’s country house in Latche. In
the evening, the two leaders discuss their vision of Europe after the Cold War. From
the very beginning of the conversation, Mitterrand makes it very clear that he is
primarily concerned about “Europe on our side,” which for him is the “community
of 12 states.” He is against expanding NATO functions, especially into those
spheres that fall under the scope of the CSCE, and feels that NATO should keep to
its original limited role. Gorbachev wants to talk about the pan-European process,
the “two pillars” of it, which are the European Community and the new Soviet
Union, but Mitterrand responds coldly that “one of the pillars has already been
created. As for the other pillar, it is not known what is happening to it.” Gone are
the days when he talked about European confederation. Mitterrand emphasizes
that he is in favor of a strong, federally bound Soviet Union; he believes that
Europe will take shape gradually. They switch to the discussion of foreign aid to the
USSR and Soviet internal affairs. Raisa Gorbacheva intervenes to point out that the
“nomenklatura bites,” describing the great resistance of the Soviet bureaucracy to
Gorbachev’s reforms, which culminated in the coup of August 1991.
  
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The Gorbachev File

 British and CIA Assessments, Presidential Letters and Summit
Conversations Illuminate Perestroika and the End of the Cold War
First and Last President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Sergeyevich
Gorbachev Turns 85 Today
Published: Mar 2, 2016
Briefing Book #
544
Compiled and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton

For more information, contact: National Security Archive

202.994.7000 or [email protected]
Subjects
Policy Making and Diplomacy
Regions
Russia and Former Soviet Union
Secretary of State James Baker, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Raisa Gorbacheva, Adviser Anatoly
Chernyaev, President Mikhail Gorbachev at Camp David, June 1990 (from A.S. Chernyaev's personal archive)

Alexander Yakovlev, Mikhail Gorbachev, Eduard Shevardnadze walking in the Kremlin, 1989 (personal archive of
Anatoly Chernyaev)

 
 
 
Washington, D.C., March 2, 2016 – Marking the 85th birthday of former Soviet
leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the National Security Archive at George Washington
University (www.nsarchive.org) today posted a series of previously classified British
and American documents containing Western assessments of Gorbachev starting
before he took office in March 1985, and continuing through the end of the Soviet
Union in 1991.
The documents show that conservative British politicians were ahead of the curve
predicting great things for rising Soviet star Gorbachev in 1984 and 1985, but the
CIA soon caught on, describing the new Soviet leader only three months into his
tenure as “the new broom,” while Ronald Reagan greeted Gorbachev’s ascension
with an immediate invitation for a summit. The documents posted today include
positive early assessments by Margaret Thatcher and MP John Browne, CIA
intelligence reports that bookend Gorbachev’s tenure from 1985 to 1991, the first
letters exchanged by Reagan and Gorbachev, the American versions of key
conversations with Gorbachev at the Geneva, Reykjavik and Malta summits,
German chancellor Helmut Kohl’s credit to Gorbachev in 1989 for the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, and the U.S. transcript of the G-7 summit
in 1990 that turned down Gorbachev’s request for financial aid.
The Archive gathered the Gorbachev documentation for two books, the Link-Kuehl-
Award-winning “Masterpieces of History”: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in
Europe 1989 (Central European University Press, 2010), and the forthcoming Last
Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan and Bush (CEU Press, 2016). The sources
include the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library,
the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, and Freedom of Information and
Mandatory Declassification Review requests to the CIA and the State Department.
Leading today’s Gorbachev briefing book is British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher’s “discovery” of Gorbachev in December 1984 during his trip to Britain as
head of a Soviet parliamentary delegation. In contrast to his elderly and infirm
predecessors who slowly read dry notes prepared for them, Gorbachev launched
into animated free discussion and left an indelible impression on Lady Thatcher.
The Prime Minister, charmed by the Soviet leader, quickly shared her impressions
with her closest ally and friend, Ronald Reagan. She commented famously, “I like
Mr. Gorbachev. We can do business together.”
Soon after Gorbachev became the Soviet General Secretary, a Conservative
member of the British parliament, John Browne, who observed Gorbachev during
his visit to Britain and then followed information on Gorbachev’s every early step,
compared him to “Kennedy in the Kremlin” in terms of his charisma. By June 1985,
the CIA told senior U.S. officials in a classified assessment that Gorbachev was “the
new broom” that was attempting to clean up the years of debris that accumulated
in the Soviet Union during the era of stagnation.
But Reagan had to see for himself. For four years before Gorbachev, as the
American president complained in his diary, he had been trying to meet with a
Soviet leader face to face, but “they keep dying on me.” In his first letter to
Gorbachev, which Vice President George H.W. Bush carried to Moscow for the
funeral of Gorbachev’s predecessor, Reagan invited Gorbachev to meet. Gorbachev
and Reagan became pen-pals who wrote long letters – sometimes personally
dictated, even handwritten – explaining their positions on arms control, strategic
defenses, and the need for nuclear abolition. 
Their first meeting took place in Geneva in November 1985, where in an informal
atmosphere of “fireside chats” they began realizing that the other was not a
warmonger but a human being with a very similar dream—to rid the world of
nuclear weapons. That dream came very close to a breakthrough during
Gorbachev and Reagan’s summit in Reykjavik; but Reagan’s stubborn insistence on
SDI and Gorbachev’s stubborn unwillingness to take Reagan at his word on
technology sharing prevented them from reaching their common goal.
Through a series of unprecedented superpower summits, Gorbachev made Reagan
and Bush understand that the Soviet leader was serious about transforming his
country not to threaten others, but to help its own citizens live fuller and happier
lives, and to be fully integrated into the “family of nations.” Gorbachev also learned
from his foreign counterparts, establishing a kind of peer group with France’s
Mitterrand, Germany’s Kohl, Britain’s Thatcher, and Spain’s Gonzalez, which
developed his reformist positions further and further. By the time George H.W.
Bush as president finally met Gorbachev in Malta, the Soviet Union was having free
elections, freedom of speech was blossoming, velvet revolutions had brought
reformers to power in Eastern Europe, and the Berlin Wall had fallen to cheers of
citizens but severe anxieties in other world capitals. 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl wrote in his letter to Bush at the end of November
1989: “Regarding the reform process in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, the CSSR
[Czechoslovakia], and not least the GDR [East Germany], we have General Secretary
Gorbachev’s policies to thank. His perestroika has let loose, made easier, or
accelerated these reforms. He pushed governments unwilling to make reforms
toward openness and toward acceptance of the people’s wishes; and he accepted
developments that in some instances far surpassed the Soviet Union’s own
standards.”
In 1989, the dream of what Gorbachev called “the common European home” was in
the air and Gorbachev was the most popular politician in the world. When he was
faced with discontent and opposition in his country, he refused to use force, like his
Chinese neighbors did at Tiananmen Square. And yet, the West consistently applied
harsher standards to Gorbachev’s Soviet Union than to China, resulting in feet
dragging on financial aid, credits, and trade. As Francois Mitterrand pointed out
during the G-7 summit in Houston in 1990: “the argument put forth for helping
China is just the reverse when we are dealing with the USSR. We are too timid […]
regarding aid to the USSR. […].”
What Gorbachev started in March 1985 made his country and the world better. In
cooperation with Reagan and Bush, he ended the Cold War, pulled Soviet troops
out of Afghanistan, helped resolve local conflicts around the globe, and gave Russia
the hope and the opportunity to develop as a normal democratic country. As with
many great reformers, he did not achieve everything he was striving for – he
certainly never intended for the Soviet Union to collapse – but his glasnost, his non-
violence, and his “new thinking” for an interdependent world created a legacy that
few statesmen or women can match. Happy birthday, Mikhail Sergeyevich!

READ THE DOCUMENTS

Document-01
Memorandum of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Margaret
Thatcher. December 16, 1984, Chequers.
Dec 16, 1984
This face-to-face encounter between British Prime Minister and the leader of a
Soviet parliamentary delegation produced a conversation that both Thatcher and
Gorbachev would refer to many times in the future. Gorbachev engaged Thatcher
on all the issues that she raised, did not duck hard questions, but did not appear
combative. He spoke about the low point then evident in East-West relations and
the need to stop the arms race before it was too late. He especially expressed
himself strongly against the Strategic Defense Initiative promoted by the Reagan
administration. Soon after this conversation Thatcher flew to Washington to share
her enthusiastic assessment with Gorbachev with Reagan and encourage him to
engage the Soviet leader in trying to lower the East-West tensions. She told her
friend and ally what she had told the BBC, "I like Mr. Gorbachev. We can do
business together" - and described him to Reagan as an "unusual Russian.... [m]uch
less constrained, more charming," and not defensive in the usual Soviet way about
human rights.

Document-02
Letter from Reagan to Gorbachev. March 11, 1985
Mar 11, 1985
Vice President George H.W. Bush hand delivered this first letter from President
Reagan to the new leader of the Soviet Union, after the state funeral for Konstantin
Chernenko in March 1985 ("you die, I fly" as Bush memorably remarked about his
job as the ceremonial U.S. mourner for world leaders). The letter contains two
especially noteworthy passages, one inviting Mikhail Gorbachev to come to
Washington for a summit, and the second expressing Reagan's hope that arms
control negotiations "provide us with a genuine chance to make progress toward
our common ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons." Reagan is reaching for
a pen-pal, just as he did as early as 1981, when he hand-wrote a heartfelt letter
during his recovery from an assassination attempt, to then-General Secretary
Leonid Brezhnev suggesting face-to-face meetings and referring to the existential
danger of nuclear weapons - only to get a formalistic reply. Subsequent letters
between Reagan and the whole series of Soviet leaders ("they keep dying on me,"
Reagan complained) contain extensive language on many of the themes - such as
the ultimate threat of nuclear annihilation - that would come up over and over
again when Reagan finally found a partner on the Soviet side in Gorbachev. Even
Chernenko had received a hand-written add-on by Reagan appreciating Soviet
losses in World War II and crediting Moscow with a consequent aversion to war.

Document-03
Gorbachev Letter to Reagan, March 24, 1985
Mar 24, 1985
This lengthy first letter from the new Soviet General Secretary to the U.S. President
displays Gorbachev's characteristic verbal style with an emphasis on persuasion.
The Soviet leader eagerly takes on the new mode of communication proposed by
Reagan in his March 11 letter, and plunges into a voluminous and wide-ranging
correspondence between the two leaders - often quite formal and stiff, occasionally
very personal and expressive, and always designed for effect, such as when Reagan
would laboriously copy out by hand his official texts. Here Gorbachev emphasizes
the need to improve relations between the two countries on the basis of peaceful
competition and respect for each other's economic and social choices. He notes the
responsibility of the two superpowers for world peace, and their common interest
"not to let things come to the outbreak of nuclear war, which would inevitably have
catastrophic consequences for both sides." Underscoring the importance of
building trust, the Soviet leader accepts Reagan's invitation in the March 11 letter
to visit at the highest level and proposes that such a visit should "not necessarily be
concluded by signing some major documents." Rather, "it should be a meeting to
search for mutual understanding."
Document-04
Reagan Letter to Gorbachev. April 30, 1985
Apr 30, 1985
Perhaps as a reflection of the internal debates in Washington (and even in Reagan's
own head), it would take more than a month for the administration to produce a
detailed response to Gorbachev's March 24 letter. The first two pages rehash the
issues around the tragic killing of American Major Arthur Nicholson by a Soviet
guard, before moving to the sore subject of Afghanistan. Reagan vows, "I am
prepared to work with you to move the region toward peace, if you desire"; at the
same time, U.S. and Saudi aid to the mujahedin fighting the Soviets was rapidly
expanding. Reagan objects to Gorbachev's unilateral April 7 announcement of a
moratorium on deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, since the
Soviet deployment was largely complete while NATO's was still underway. The
heart of the letter addresses Gorbachev's objections to SDI, and Reagan mentions
that he was struck by Gorbachev's characterization of SDI as having "an offensive
purpose for an attack on the Soviet Union. I can assure you that you are profoundly
mistaken on this point." Interestingly, the Reagan letter tries to reassure
Gorbachev by citing the necessity of "some years of further research" and "further
years" before deployment (Reagan could not have suspected decades rather than
years). This back-and-forth on SDI would be a constant in the two leaders'
correspondence and conversations at the summits to come, but the consistency of
Reagan's position on this (in contrast to that of Pentagon advocates of "space
dominance"), not only to Gorbachev but to Thatcher and to his own staff, suggests
some room for Gorbachev to take up the President on his assurances - which never
happened.

Document-05
"Mr. Gorbachev-a Kennedy in the Kremlin?" By John Browne (Member of
Parliament from Winchester, England). Impressions of the Man, His Style and
his Likely Impact Upon East West Relations. May 20, 1985.
May 20, 1985
British MP John Browne, member of the Conservative party, was part of the
Receiving Committee for Gorbachev's visit to London in December 1984 and spend
considerable time with him during his trips (including to the Lenin museum). This
long essay, sent to President Reagan, and summarized for him by his National
Security Adviser, describes Gorbachev as an unusual Soviet politician-"intelligent,
alert and inquisitive." Browne notes "that Gorbachev's charisma was so striking
that, if permitted by the Communist Party system, Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev could
well become the Soviet equivalent of the Jack and Jacqueline Kennedy team." On
the basis of his observations in 1984 and after Gorbachev was elected General
Secretary, Browne concludes that politicians of Western democracies are likely to
face an increasingly sophisticated political challenge from Mr. Gorbachev both at
home and abroad.

Document-06
Letter from Gorbachev to Reagan. June 10, 1985
Jun 10, 1985
In this long and wide-ranging response to Reagan's letter of April 30, the Soviet
leader makes a real push for improvement of relations on numerous issues. The
date June 10 is significant because on this day in Washington Reagan finally took
the action (deactivating a Poseidon submarine) necessary to keep the U.S. in
compliance with the unratified (but observed by both sides) SALT II treaty. Here
Gorbachev raises the issue of equality and reciprocity in U.S.-Soviet relations,
noting that it is the Soviet Union that is "surrounded by American military bases
stuffed also by nuclear weapons, rather than the U.S. - by Soviet bases." He
suggests that all previous important treaties between the United States and the
Soviet Union were possible on the assumption of parity, and that Reagan's recent
focus on SDI threatens to destabilize the strategic balance - yet again
demonstrating Gorbachev's deep apprehension about Reagan's position on
strategic defenses. The Soviet leader believes that the development of ABM
systems would lead to a radical destabilization of the situation and the
militarization of space. At the heart of the Soviet visceral rejection of SDI is the
image of "attack space weapons capable of performing purely offensive missions."
Gorbachev proposes energizing negotiations on conventional weapons in Europe,
chemical weapons, the nuclear test ban, and regional issues, especially
Afghanistan. He calls for a moratorium on nuclear tests "as soon as possible" - the
Soviets would end up doing this unilaterally, never understanding that the issue is
a non-starter in Reagan's eyes. Here, the Soviet leader also welcomes horizontal
exchanges between government ministers and even members of legislatures.
However, Gorbachev's position on human rights remains quite rigid-"we do not
intend and will not conduct any negotiations relating to human rights in the Soviet
Union." That would change.

Document-07
Dinner Hosted by the Gorbachevs in Geneva. November 19, 1985.
Nov 19, 1985
In their first face-to-face meeting at Geneva, which both of them anticipated
eagerly, Reagan and Gorbachev both spoke about the mistrust and suspicions of
the past and of the need to begin a new stage in U.S.-Soviet relations. Gorbachev
described his view of the international situation to Reagan, stressing the need to
end the arms race. Reagan expressed his concern with Soviet activity in the third
world--helping the socialist revolutions in the developing countries. They both
spoke about their aversion to nuclear weapons. During this first dinner of the
Geneva summit, Gorbachev used a quote from the Bible that there was a time to
throw stones and a time to gather stones which have been cast in the past to
indicate that now the President and he should move to resolve their practical
disagreements in the last day of meetings remaining. In response, Reagan
remarked that "if the people of the world were to find out that there was some
alien life form that was going to attack the Earth approaching on Halley's Comet,
then that knowledge would unite all peoples of the world." The aliens had landed,
in Reagan's view, in the form of nuclear weapons; and Gorbachev would remember
this phrase, quoting it directly in his famous "new thinking" speech at the 27 th Party
Congress in February 1986.

Document-08
Last Session of the Reykjavik Summit. October 12, 1986.
Oct 12, 1986
The last session at Reykjavik is the one that inspires Gorbachev's comment in his
memoirs about "Shakespearean passions." The transcript shows lots of confusion
between just proposals on reducing ballistic missiles versus those reducing all
nuclear weapons, but finally Reagan says, as he always wanted, nuclear abolition.
"We can do that. Let's eliminate them," says Gorbachev, and Secretary of State
George Shultz reinforces, "Let's do it." But then they circle back around to SDI and
the ABM Treaty issue, and Gorbachev insists on the word "laboratory" as in testing
confined there, and Reagan, already hostile to the ABM Treaty, keeps seeing that as
giving up SDI. Gorbachev says he cannot go back to Moscow to say he let testing
go on outside the lab, which could lead to a functioning system in the future. The
transcript shows Reagan asking Gorbachev for agreement as a personal favor, and
Gorbachev saying well if that was about agriculture, maybe, but this is fundamental
national security. Finally at around 6:30 p.m. Reagan closes his briefing book and
stands up. The American and the Russian transcripts differ on the last words, the
Russian version has more detail [see the forthcoming book, Last Superpower
Summits], but the sense is the same. Their faces reflect the disappointment,
Gorbachev had helped Reagan to say nyet, but Gorbachev probably lost more from
the failure.

Document-09
Letter to Reagan from Thatcher About Her Meetings with Gorbachev in
Moscow. April 1, 1987
Apr 1, 1987
Again, Margaret Thatcher informs her ally Reagan about her conversations with
Gorbachev. The cover note from National Security Advisor Carlucci (prepared by
NSC staffer Fritz Ermarth) states that "she has been greatly impressed by
Gorbachev personally." Thatcher describes Gorbachev as "fully in charge,"
"determined to press ahead with his internal reform," and "talk[ing] about his aims
with almost messianic fervor." She believes in the seriousness of his reformist
thinking and wants to support him. However, they differ on one most crucial issue,
which actually unites Gorbachev and Reagan-nuclear abolition. Thatcher writes,
"[h]is aim is patently the denuclearization of Europe. I left him with no doubt that I
would never accept that."

Document-10
Letter to Bush from Chancellor Helmut Kohl. November 28, 1989.
Nov 28, 1989
This remarkable letter arrives at the White House at the very moment when Kohl is
presenting his "10 points" speech to the Bundestag about future German
unification, much to the surprise of the White House, the Kremlin, and even Kohl's
own coalition partners in Germany (such as his foreign minister). Here, just weeks
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the German leader encourages Bush to engage with
Gorbachev across the board and to contribute to peaceful change in Europe. Kohl
points that Gorbachev "wants to continue his policies resolutely, consistently and
dynamically, but is meeting internal resistance and is dependent on external
support." He hopes Bush's upcoming meeting with Gorbachev in Malta will "give
strong stimulus to the arms control negotiations." Kohl also reminds Bush that
"regarding the reform process in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, the CSSR
[Czechoslovakia], and not least the GDR [East Germany], we have General Secretary
Gorbachev's policies to thank. His perestroika has let loose, made easier, or
accelerated these reforms. He pushed governments unwilling to make reforms
toward openness and toward acceptance of the people's wishes; and he accepted
developments that in some instances far surpassed the Soviet Union's own
standards."

Document-11
Malta First Expanded Bilateral with George Bush. December 2, 1989.
Dec 2, 1989
Being rocked by the waves on the Soviet ship Maxim Gorky, President Bush greets
his Russian counterpart for the first time as President. A lot has changed in the
world since they last saw each other on Governor's Island in December 1988-
elections had been held in the Soviet Union and in Poland, where a non-communist
government came to power, and the Iron Curtain fell together with the Berlin Wall.
After Bush's initial presentation from notes, Gorbachev remarks almost bemusedly
that now he sees the American administration has made up its mind (finally) what
to do, and that includes "specific steps" or at least "plans for such steps" to
support perestroika, not to doubt it. Gorbachev compliments Bush for not sharing
the old Cold War thinking that "The only thing the U.S. needs to do is to keep its
baskets ready to gather the fruit" from the changes in Eastern Europe and the
USSR. Bush responds, "I have been called cautious or timid. I am cautious, but not
timid. But I have conducted myself in ways not to complicate your life. That's why I
have not jumped up and down on the Berlin Wall." Gorbachev says, "Yes, we have
seen that, and appreciate that." The Soviet leader goes on to welcome Bush's
economic and trade points as a "signal of a new U.S. policy" that U.S. business was
waiting for. Gorbachev responds positively to each of Bush's overtures on arms
control, chemical weapons, conventional forces, next summits and so forth, but
pushes back on Bush's Cuba and Central America obsessions.

Document-12
First Main Plenary of the G-7 Summit in Houston. July 10, 1990.
Jul 10, 1990
The bulk of discussion at this first session of the summit of the industrialized
nations is devoted to the issue of how the club of the rich countries should react to
the events unfolding in the Soviet Union and how much aid and investment could
be directed to the support of perestroika. The summit is taking place at the time
when Gorbachev is engaged in an increasingly desperate search for scenarios for
radical economic reform, and fast political democratization, but he needs external
financial support and integration into global financial institutions in order to
succeed - or even to survive, as the events of August 1991 would show. Just before
this 1990 G-7, Gorbachev wrote in a letter to George Bush that he needs "long-term
credit assistance, attraction of foreign capital, transfer of managerial experience
and personnel training" to create a competitive economy. Yet, the U.S. president
throws only a bone or two, like "step up the pace of our negotiations with the
Soviets on the Tsarist and Kerensky debts [!] to the U.S. government" (instead of
forgiving or at least restructuring the debt), and "expand our existing technical
cooperation." Bush concludes his speech by stating flatly "It is impossible for the
U.S. to loan money to the USSR at this time. I know, however, that others won't
agree." The leaders who do not agree are Helmut Kohl (in the middle of providing
billions of deutschmarks to the USSR to lubricate German unification) and Francois
Mitterrand. The latter decries the double standards being applied to the Soviet
Union and China, even after the Tiananmen massacre. Mitterrand criticizes the
proposed political declaration of the G-7 as "timid" and "hesitant," imposing "harsh
political conditions as a preliminary to extending aid." He believes the EC countries
are in favor of contributing aid to the USSR but that other members, like the U.S.
and Japan, have effectively vetoed such assistance.

Document-13
CIA Memorandum, The Gorbachev Succession. April 1991.
Apr 1, 1991
On April 10, 1991, the National Security Council staff asked the CIA for an analysis
of the Gorbachev succession, who the main actors would be, and the likely
scenarios. The assessment opens quite drastically: "The Gorbachev era is effectively
over." The scenarios offered have an eerie resemblance to the actual coup that
would come in August 1991. This might be the most prescient of all the CIA
analyses of the perestroika years. The report finds that Gorbachev is likely to be
replaced either by the reformers or the hard-liners, with the latter being more
likely. The authors point out that "there is no love between Gorbachev and his
current allies and they could well move to try to dump him." They then list possible
conspirators for such a move-- Vice President Yanaev, KGB Chief Kryuchkov, and
Defense Minister Yazov, among others, all of whom whom participate in the August
coup. The report predicts that the "traditionalists" are likely to find a "legal veneer"
for removing Gorbachev: "most likely they would present Gorbachev with an
ultimatum to comply or face arrest or death." If he agreed, Yanaev would step in as
president, the conspirators would declare a state of emergency and install "some
kind of a National Salvation Committee." However, the memo concludes that "time
is working against the traditionalists." This turned out to be both prescient and
correct - the August coup followed the process outlined in this document and the
plot foundered because the security forces themselves were fractured and the
democratic movements were gaining strength. But indeed, the coup, the
resurgence of Boris Yeltsin as leader of the Russian republic, and the secession of
Russia from the Soviet Union during the fall of 1991 did mark the end of the
Gorbachev era.