FACTS:

PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all
games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a
building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and
prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.

Then Mayor Magtajas together with the city legislators and civil organizations of the City of
Cagayan de Oro denounced such project.

In reaction to this project, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted two (2)
ordinances prohibiting the issuance of a business permit and canceling existing business permit
to establishment for the operation of casino (ORDINANCE NO. 3353) and an ordinance
prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for its violation. (ORDINANCE NO.
3375-93).

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor and supplemental petitioner.
Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied against petitioners.

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

WON Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:

NO. The ordinances enacted are invalid. Ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal
governments are merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils exercise only
delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal
powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As a statute, it
cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.

As to petitioners attack on gambling as harmful and immoral, the Court stressed that the
morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is
left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the
legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some
forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting, and horse-racing. In making
such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to
review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of
conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that
questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the
judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the
function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these
branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who
will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.

Lino Vs Pano
FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of
lotto.  He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to
open the lotto outlet.  This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996.
The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September 18, [Link] a
result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.  In the said complaint,
respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the
following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the
defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an
order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the
operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, T. [Link] February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated
his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE: WON  Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such
resolution is valid.  This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be
contrary to that of the national government’s.  However, this freedom to exercise contrary views
does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly
enacted by Congress.  Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and
should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our
system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances
and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress.  As held in Tatel vs. Virac,
ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress.  The reasons for
this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp

BASCO VS PANO

FACTS: The PH Amusement and Gaming Corp. was created by PD 1067-A and granted a
franchise under PD 1067-B. Subsequently, under PD 1869, the Government enabled it to
regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by
law, under declared policy. But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant
petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to
morals, public policy and order, and because of the following issues:

ISSUES:
(1) WON it waived the Manila City gov't's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is
recognized by law.

(2) WON it has intruded into the LGUs' right to impose local taxes and license fees, and thus
contrary to the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the Constitution.

(3) WON it violates the equal protection clause as it allows some gambling acts but also
prohibits other gaming acts.

(4) WON it violates the Cory gov't's policy of being away from monopolistic and crony economy,
and toward free enterprise and privatization.

HELD:
(1) No. The fact that PAGCOR, under its charter, is exempt from paying tax of any kind is not
violative of the principle of local autonomy. LGUs' have no inherent right to impose taxes. LGUs'
power to tax must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed by the
state itself which has the inherent power to tax. The charter of LGUs is subject to control by
Congress as they are mere creatures of Congress. Congress, therefore, has the power of
control over LGUs. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

(2) No. LGUs' right to impose license fees on "gambling", has long been revoked. As early as
1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses
or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National
Government. Furthermore, LGUs' have no power to tax instrumentalities of the gov't such as
PAGCOR which exercises governmental functions of regulating gambling activities.

(3) No. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A
law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution. The Constitution does not require situations which are different
in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.
(4) No. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is
and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the
domain of the political branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository
of all state power. On the issue of monopoly, the same is not necessarily prohibited by the
Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be
"regulated" or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide. The
judiciary can only intervene when there are violations of the statutes passed by Congress
regulating or prohibiting monopolies.

MMDA VS BELAIR VILLAGE

Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government　
Agency　tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village　Association
(BAVA),　respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune
Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for
the safe and　convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City.
This was　pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924.　On the same day, the
respondent was　appraised that the perimeter wall separating the　subdivision and Kalayaan
Avenue would be　demolished.
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a　
preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the　MMDA
had　no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner
appealed　the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open
Neptune Street to　public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can　practice police
power in the delivery of　basic services in Metro Manila.

Issue:　Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic
pursuant to
its regulatory and police powers.

Held:
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police
power　is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated
to　government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political
government　unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be
delegated to them.
It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the
MMDA　to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare
of the　inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police
power.　It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
various　national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the　private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services
in the vast metropolitan　area.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO VS FIRME

FACTS:

Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, is a municipality corporation. Respondent

Judge Romeo N. Firme is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge, while private
respondents are heirs of the deceased Laureano Banina, Sr.

On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeep, a gravel and sand
truck, and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union which was driven by
Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeep including Banina, Sr. died.
The heir of Banina, Sr. instituted a complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the
passenger jeep. However, the previously mentioned defendant filed a third party complaint
against the petitioner and the driver of the dump truck of the petitioner.
Thereafter, the private respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its
regular employee Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants.

Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-
suability of the state, prescription of cause of action, and the negligence of the owner and driver
of the passenger jeep as the proximate cause of the collision.
On October 10, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs, and defendants
Municipality of san Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs. The complaint against the driver and the owner of the passenger jeep
was dismissed.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial. However, respondent judge
issued another order denying the motion for reconsideration of the order for having been filed
out of time. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether the municipality is liable for the tort committed by its employee?

HELD:

NO. The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver acting in behalf
of the municipality is performing governmental or proprietary functions.

It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters
grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for
torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable
only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities
to be sued, the state merely gives the claimants the right to show the defendant was not acting
in its governmental capacity when the injury was inflicted or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimants cannot recover.

In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that he was on his way
to Naguilan River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of the San Fernando municipal
street.

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty
is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to
his office.

After careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, we arrive at the conclusion that the
municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then
engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger, tragic
and deplorable though, it may be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay the monetary
compensation.

LLDA VS CA
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It
was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for
any project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and
operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna
Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.

ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance
of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region?

HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the
Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a
general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is
a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be
taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a
contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code,
which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL

Facts:

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippin... es,...
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders No...
creating thirty-three (33)... municipalities... etitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice-President of the
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition
with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
representatives... and agents,... from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section
68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power.

Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present... action is premature and
that not all proper parties referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question
have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by
the aforementioned executive orders because the latter have... taken away from the former the
barrios composing the new political subdivision intervened in the case.

Hence, since

Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial
board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the... areas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio
is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even
create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is... composed of several barrios, since
barrios are units of municipalities?"

Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a municipality by executive order.

Issues:

Whether the President has power to create a municipality by executive order.

Ruling:

Wherefore the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Executive
Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to.

The power to create a municipality is legislative in character.

DRILON VS LIM
FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code or the Procedure For Approval And
Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings, Secretary of
Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No.
7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions
contrary to law and public policy.

In a petition, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained
the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. Instead, it
declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture
in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the
policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein
conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local
governments. By citing the distinction between control and supervision, the lower court’s
concluded that the challenged section gave the Secretary the power of control and not of
supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in
his view, a violation not only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the
taxing powers of local governments, 8 and the policy of local autonomy in general.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional.

HELD:

The judgment of the Regional Trial Court is reversed insofar as it declared Section 187 of the
Local Government Code unconstitutional and affirmed the findings of the procedural
requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of
the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he
alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon
did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what
the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for
its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that
it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local
Government Code.

The Court finds that Secretary Drilon had performed an act not of control but of mere
supervision. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he
may even decide to do it himself. While in supervision, it merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify
or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only
to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the
act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
BALAQUIT VS CFI
FACTS:
the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan pass an ordinance penalizing any person, group of
persons, entity, or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie
or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to require children between
seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets intended for
adults but should charge only one-half of the value of the said tickets.
The Petitioners, theater owners, aggrieved by said ordinance, they file a complaint before the
Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City assailing the constitutionalit of
Ordinance No. 640.
The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional
and valid.
ISSUE:
WON Ordinance No. 640 is a valid exercise of police power
HELD:
YES. Ordinance No. 640 infringes theater owners’ right to property.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be
within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its
provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or
calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation,
be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.33 A police measure for
the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the
legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights.34 The right of the owner to
fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself
and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a
theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission
they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay
away.

Municipality of Paranaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation

FACTS:

Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of
Parañaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against private
respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of
Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a combined area of about 10,000 square meters, located at
Wakas, San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila.

Private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a counterclaim, alleging
in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant
to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code);
and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata.

It turned out that the plaintiff had earlier filed a complaint for expropriation involving the same
parcels of land which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17939. Said case was ealier dismissed
with prejudice. The order of dismissal was not appealed, hence, the same became final.
The RTC then dismissed the second complaint, which the CA affirmed upon appeal.

Contentions of petitioner: (a) A resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of
initiating an expropriation case substantially complies with the requirements of the law; (b) The
principle of res judicata is not applicable.

ISSUES:

(1)

Whether or not a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and
effect of an ordinance insofar as filing a complaint for expropriation is concerned;

(2) Whether or not the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is applicable
under the circumstances.

RULING:

(1)

No. A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Parañaque, cannot authorize an
expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local
Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A
resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not
suffice.

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of
eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is
exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3.
There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to
the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. In the
case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant
to a resolution of the municipal council.
Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an
ordinance. We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that the terms “resolution” and
“ordinance” are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance
is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body
on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature.

Additionally, the two are enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but
not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or
private right of the people. Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language — from
“resolution” under BP 337 to “ordinance” under RA 7160 — demands a strict construction.

(2)

No. The principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings,
cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of
eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power
be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent
domain is plenary and, like police power, can “reach every form of property which the State
might need for public use.” All separate interests of individuals in property are held of the
government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Thus, the State or its authorized
agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-
compliance with any legal requirement. While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the
right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a
previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that
there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar
the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and
subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property. By the same
token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through
a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal
requirement and, for that matter, all others are properly complied with. To rule otherwise will not
only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice.

Torio vs. Fontanilla

FACTS: On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2
resolutions: one for management of the town fiesta celebration and the other for the creation of
the Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee. The Executive Committee, in turn, organized a
sub-committee on entertainment and stage with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The council
appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and
another for the cancionan. While the zarzuela was being held, the stage collapsed. Vicente
Fontanilla was pinned underneath and died in the afternoon of the following day. Fontanilla’s
heirs filed a complaint for damages with the CFI of Manila. The defendants were the
municipality, the municipal council and the municipal council members. In its Answer, defendant
municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign
functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from
which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents.
ISSUE:  Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be held liable. 
DECISION: Yes. The Municipality of Malasiqui was held liable.

RATIO DECIDENDI: Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is liable

for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to the
negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.

Caasi vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local elections of January 18,
1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by Mateo Caasi on the ground that under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code Miguel was not qualified because he is a green card
holder, hence, a permanent resident of the USA and not of Bolinao. Sec. 48 provides:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications - Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a

foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the
United States. He argued that he obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may
freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there.
He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan and that he voted in all
previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and the congressional elections on May 18, 1987.

After hearing, the Comelec dismissed the petition. It held that the possession of a green card by
the respondent Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in
the Philippines.
Issue: Whether a green card is proof that the holder thereof is a permanent resident of the
United States such that it would disqualify him to run for any elective local position.

Held: Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and
his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the United States. In the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien
Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in
Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21
therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was,
"Permanently." On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the US Department
of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters
as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is
printed: “Alien Registration Receipt Card. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside
permanently and work in the United States.”

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. He did not go to the United
States merely to visit his children or his doctor there. He entered the US with the intention to live
there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's)
visa.

Issue: Whether Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself
as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988 local elections, waived his status as
a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States

Held: No. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective
office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident
or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some
act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country.
Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office."

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent
resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such
immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he
made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the
appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January
18, 1988, the conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office.

Issue: Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.

Held: Yes. Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent
resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of
proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of
Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a
candidate for that office. Hence, his election was null and void.

Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year
at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy is one of the qualifications that a candidate for
elective public office must possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a
permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3)
months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for
mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.

● In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or
immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of
excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual
loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their
lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that
those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the
interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must
keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to
preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
– The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main
petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14,
RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

– The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually
prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted
by her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase “[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by
any court,” the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:
Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?

RULING: The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part
of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.

The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in
so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-
making authority. Through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that
was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both
integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to
the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation
of the separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional
injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the
constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its
functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no
provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same.
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or
findings” of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of
Section 27, RA 6770- attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also
unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should
squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that
they “cover the same specific or particular subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review
over issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the
existence of the CA’s subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition,
including all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has
developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily
rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in
which case it may be raised at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu
may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed.
The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.

Mariano vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7854 which sought to convert the
Municipality of Makati to a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati. Petitioners
contend that the special law did not properly identify, in metes and bounds with technical
descriptions, the territorial jurisdiction of Makati; that it attempted to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local elective officials; that it increased the legislative district of Makati
only by special law; that the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the
bill; and that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with the
population requirement, thus violative of the constitution and the LGC.

HELD:
(1) WON RA 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.

(2) WON it attempted to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective
officials.

(3) WON it is unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law
(the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law
to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census.
(4) WON it is unconstitutional for the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title
of the bill.

(5) WON it is unconstitutional for the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census),
the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative.

HELD:
(1) No. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed
City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not
change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. In
language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 of RA 7854 stated that, the city's land area "shall
comprise the present territory of the municipality." The court take judicial notice of the fact that
Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other
local government units with unsettled boundary dispute.

(2) No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied
with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events,
i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be
reelected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely
pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners
who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which
this Court has no jurisdiction.

(3) No. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty (250) members, "unless otherwise fixed by law". As thus worded, the Constitution
did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a
general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting
R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold
that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of
all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an
inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time.

(4) No. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully
index, or completely catalogue all its details. it should be sufficient compliance if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.

(5) No. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased
to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.

Sultan Camid vs. Office of the President

FACTS: Among the EOs annuled in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor General was EO No. 107
creating the Municipality of Andong. Petitioner herein contends that Andong is still in existence
and the same is evidenced by the presence chairmen in its 17 barangays, public officials, high
school, etc.

ISSUES:
(1) WON a municipality, such as Andong, whose creation by executive fiat was previously
voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing
statute.

(2) WON Andong is entitled to recognition as de facto municipal corporation.

HELD:
(1) No. The Municipality of Andong never existed as EO N0. 107 establishing Andong was
declared void ab initio (from inception) by the court in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor General.
Further, the Pelaez case was never reversed by the court but was rather affirmed in many
cases. Finally, No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of
Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist
as a duly constituted municipality.

(2) No. We have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later
impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be
questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the
following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the
Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in
Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the
municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo
warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality;
and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized
as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution
apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever
doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have
been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), 442(d) of which
provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."

Municipality of Jimenez vs. Baz, Jr.

Facts:

The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order No. 258 of then President
Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to §68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171,[2] dated November 22, 1988, Sinacaban laid
claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and
Sinara Alto,[3] based on the technical description... in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with
the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of Jimenez.

In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. No. 258 the disputed
area is part of Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had
with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement was approved by the

Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, in its Resolution No. 77, dated February 18, 1950,
which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez as follows:

In its decision dated October 11, 1989,[5] the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be
part of Sinacaban.

It held that the previous resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was
void because the Board had no power to... alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O.
No. 258, that power being vested in Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1983 (B.P. Blg. 337), §134

Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the Regional Trial Court of
Oroquieta City, Branch 14.

Jimenez alleged that, in accordance with the decision in Pelaez v. Auditor General,[8] the power
to create municipalities is essentially legislative and... consequently Sinacaban, which was
created by an executive order, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim
vis-à-vis Jimenez, of which it remains part.

The RTC, inter alia, held that Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely
organized itself even prior to the Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for forty years
before the existence was questioned; that Jimenez did not have the legal... standing to question
the existence of Sinacaban, the same being reserved to he State as represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General in a quo warranto proceeding; that Jimenez was estopped from
questioning the legal existence of Sinacaban by entering into an... agreement with it concerning
their common boundary; and that any question as to the legal existence of Sinacaban had been
rendered moot by §442 (d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160)

Issues:

(1) whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim, and (2) if it has, whether it is the
boundary... provided for in E.O. No. 258 or in resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of
Misamis Occidental which should be used as the basis for adjudicating Sinacaban's territorial
claim.

RTC erred in ordering a relocation survey of the boundary of Sinacaban because the barangays
which Sinacaban are claiming are not enumerated in E.O. No. 258 and that in any event in 1950
the parties entered into an agreement... whereby the barangays in question were considered
part of the territory of Jimenez.

Ruling:

If Sinacaban legally exist, then it has standing to bring a claim in the Provincial Board.
The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal
corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations
is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without power to... create by
executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban.

this Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of... a municipal
corporation, which, like the Municipallity of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the
President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor general: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the
validity of the creation of the municipality had never been... challenged; (2) the fact that
following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the
executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later
classified as a fifth class municipality,... organized as part of a municipal circuit court and
considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of
Representatives

"municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective sets of elective... officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."

Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de
facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and
acquiesced publicly and officially.

On the contrary, the State and even the municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized
Sinacaban's corporate existence.

For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an... agreement
with it regarding their common boundary.

Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered
Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental.

Since, as previously explained, Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987
Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, it is not subject to the plebiscite requirement.
E.O. no. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now called Barangays)
therein mentioned. What it say is that "Sinacaban contains" those barrios, without saying they
are the only ones comprising it.

Now, as already stated, in 1950 the two municipalities agreed that certain barrios bellonged to
Jimenez, while certain other ones belonged to Sinacaban. This agreement was subsequently
approved by the Provincial board of Misamis Occidental.

We hold it did not if effect would be to amend the area as described in

E.O no. 258 creating the Municipality of Sinacaban.

Principles:

in the Province of Misamis Occidental, a municipality to be known as the municipality of

Sinacaban,... which shall... consist of the southern portion of the municipality of Jimenez,... The
municipality of Jimenez shall have its present territory, minus the portion thereof included in the
municipality of Sinacaban.

Jimenez prayed that Sinacaban be enjoined from assuming control and supervision over the...
disputed barrios; that the Provincial Board be enjoined from assuming jurisdiction over the claim
of Sinacaban; that E.O. No. 258 be declared null and void; that the decision dated October 11,
1989 and Resolution No. 13-90 of the Provincial Board be set aside... the municipality of
Sinacaban shall continue to exist and operate as a regular municipality; declaring... the decision
dated October 11, 1989 rendered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan fixing the boundaries
between Sinacaban and Jimenez, Missamis Occi. as null and void, the same not being in
accordance with the boundaries provided for in Executive order No. 258

Jimenez claims, however, that R.A. No. 7160, §442(d) is invalid,

Andaya vs. Regional Trial Court

FACTS:

There was a vacancy in the position of chief of police in Cebu. The regional director of the Cebu
police Andaya submitted a list of 5 eligible appointees to the position to the mayor of Cebu.
However, the mayor refused to appoint one because he wanted a certain Sarmiento, who was
not on the list due to being disqualified. RTC ruled in favor of the mayor, granting the
appointment of Sarmiento.

ISSUE:

Whether the mayor can require the Regional Director to include the mayor’s protégé in the list?

HELD

NO. The mayor has only the power to choose from the list. It it’s the prerogative of the regional
director of the police to choose the eligible person who should be included in the list without
intervention from local executives – based on the National Police Commission (NPC)
memorandum, which provides the qualifications of a chief of police. In case of disagreement,
the issue should be elevated to the regional director of the NPC who shall resolve the issue
within 5 working days.
The authority of the mayor is limited, no power to appoint but basically power to choose from the
list. The purpose is to enhance professionalism and isolate police service from political
domination

Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on
grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued
several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against
him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the
Court of Appeals and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted
that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend
and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and
strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory
power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can
suspend and or remove local officials.

HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her
control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because
legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.

The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the
President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over
executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and
supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In
administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be
reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government
officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public
service so requires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is
exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.

Manila International Airport Authority vs. Court of Appeals

MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the
taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million.

The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on
the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public
auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.

MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with
prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to restrain
the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for
public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.

Paranaque’s Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax
exemption privileges of “government-owned and-controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of
the Local Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction
is that the express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international
airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code.
Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are
exempt from real estate tax.

MIAA’s contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government
cannot tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not
inure to any public advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.

Issue:

WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under existing laws?
Yes. Ergo, the real estate tax assessments issued by the City of Parañaque, and all
proceedings taken pursuant to such assessments, are void.

Held:

1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation

MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National

Government and thus exempt from local taxation.

MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has
no stockholders or voting shares.

MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. A non-stock corporation
must have members.

MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its
governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference
is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.

When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does
not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental
but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain,
police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises “all the
powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order.”

2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic

a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned
by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code,
like “roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,” are owned by
the State. The term “ports” includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and
Buildings constitute a “port” constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the
MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the
State or the Republic of the Philippines.

The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public
for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal
fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and
Buildings as properties for public use.

The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is
of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as
one “intended for public use.” The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the
landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the
operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the character of MIAA as an
airport for public use. Such fees are often termed user’s tax. This means taxing those among
the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the public including those who
never use the particular public facility.

b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man

The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man,
cannot be the subject of an auction sale.
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale
of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public
services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and
auction sale. This will happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose and compel the auction
sale of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.

c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic

MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust for the Republic. Section
48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title
to real properties owned by the Republic. n MIAA’s case, its status as a mere trustee of the
Airport Lands and Buildings is clearer because even its executive head cannot sign the deed of
conveyance on behalf of the Republic. Only the President of the Republic can sign such deed of
conveyance.

d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a Reorganization

The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA
was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the Republic to MIAA. The
purpose was merely toreorganize a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation into a separate
and autonomous body. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and
Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. No party claims any ownership rights
over MIAA’s assets adverse to the Republic.

e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable

Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any
of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person following are exempted from payment of the real
property tax.

However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not
exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases
to private corporations is subject to real estate tax.

Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. Vs. City Mayor of Manila
Facts:
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of its members, Hotel
del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and general manager of the second petitioner, filed a
petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the City of
Manila who was sued in his capacity as such charged with the general power and duty to
enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the execution and
enforcement of such ordinances.

It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and
protection of the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels and motels, characterized as
legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities and regularly paying
taxes. It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting City Mayor, Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in
detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City
of Manila to enact insofar as it regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the
City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels. it also being provided that the
premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be
open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized
representatives. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8,
1963.

Issue:
Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, therefore, null and
void.

Held:
No. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have
admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged
ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has been the
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
“The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not lightly set
aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under
the guise of police regulation.

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the
increase in the licensing fees was intended to discourage “establishments of the kind from
operating for a purpose other than legal” and at the same time, to increase “the income of the
city government.”

Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good
order, safety, and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process,
equal protection, and other applicable constitutional guarantees, however, the power must not
be unreasonable or violative of due process. There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the
standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided.

What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting,
but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of
establishments, and the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the generalities about
not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common
sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean.”

Tano vs. Socrates

FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance
banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1,
1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government
of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling,
and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in
and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare
the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances
deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of
the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged
ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal
fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence
fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The
so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to
the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development
and utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery
laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the
enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In
light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers
granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity
of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

Moday vs. Court of Appeals,

Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan
of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against
a 1 hectare portion of Moday’s land. Purpose of which was to erect a gymnasium and other
public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is
not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such
purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal
resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the
instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is
government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power
of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and
public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must
be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground upon which a
provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such
resolution, ordinance, or order is “beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president
making the same.” This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there
are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB
resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

Favis vs. City of Baguio

Antonio Favis owns a parcel of land fronting Lapu-Lapu street in Baguio City. There is an 8-
meter wide passage from his property to the street. In 1961, the city authorized a new contract
of lease between it and Shell. The contract stipulated a widened lot for Shell to build its structure
and this necessitates the taking of at least 4 meters from the 8 meter wide passage being used
by Favis. Favis assailed this contract.

There was also a law in place that time stating that streets and roads should be not less than 10
meters (but existing roads which are less than 10 meters are retained to avoid massive
expenses in expropriation cases in case the 10 meter is strictly imposed). Favis averred that the
contract between Shell and Baguio violated the said ordinance.

Favis also argues that the city council does not have the power to close city streets like Lapu-
Lapu Street. He asserts that since municipal bodies have no inherent power to vacate or
withdraw a street from public use, there must be a specific grant by the legislative body to the
city or municipality concerned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the City can withdraw parts of a street from public use and use the
remainder as a mere alley.

HELD: Yes. Looking at the city’s charter, Section 2558 of the Review Administrative Code
(Baguio Charter), the city is empowered to close a city street. Considering that “municipal
corporations in the Philippines are mere creatures of Congress; that, as such, said corporations
possessed, and may exercise, only such power as Congress may deem fit to grant thereto”, as
what actually happened in the case at bar, the city was granted such power via its charter.

Favis may not challenge the city council’s act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its
dead end from public use and converting the remainder thereof into an alley. These are acts
well within the ambit of the power to close a city street. The city council is the authority
competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use or
public service (patrimonial property). Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary.
And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain
case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Favis, being a property owner in city, recognizes when he
bought said property that is after such buying of property the city authorities abandon a portion
of the street to which his property is not immediately adjacent, he may suffer loss because of
the inconvenience imposed, but the public treasury cannot be required to recompense him.
Such case is damnum absque injuria.

Rabuco vs. Villegas

Facts

The constitutionality of RA No. 3120 was assailed by the city officials of the City of Manila
contending that the conversion of the lots in Malate area into disposable and alienable lands of
the state and placing its administration and disposal to the LTA to be subdivided into lots and
selling it to bona fide occupants thereof in installments constitutes a deprivation of the City of
Manila of its property by providing for its sale without the payment of just compensation.

Issue
Whether or not the properties in dispute may be disposed without paying just compensation to
the City of Manila?

Held

The court held that the assailed RA 3120 is constitutional. The lots in question are owned by the
City of Manila in its public and governmental capacity and are therefore public property over
which Congress has absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it
which cannot be deprived from the City without just compensation and without due process. RA
3120 expressly provides that the properties are reserved for the purpose of communal property
and ordered its conversion into disposable and alienable lands of the state to be sold to its bona
fide occupants. It has been an established doctrine that the state reserves its rights to classify
its property under its legislative prerogative and the court cannot interfere on such power of the
state.

Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan

Facts:

herein plaintiff, a Court Interpreter of Branch III, CFI -- Dagupan City, while she was about to
board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the...
control and supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell into a manhole located on said
sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured.

As a result thereof, she had to be hospitalized,... She also incurred hospitalization, medication
and other expenses,... plaintiff suffered severe or excruciating pain not only on her right leg
which was... fractured but also on all parts of her body; the pain has persisted even after her
discharge from the Medical City General Hospital on October 9, 1978 to the present.

Despite her discharge from the Hospital plaintiff is presently still wearing crutches and the

Court has actually observed that she has difficulty in locomotion.

From the time of the mishap on July 25, 1978 up to the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for
duty as court interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotion in... going up the stairs of her office,
located near the city hall in Dagupan City.
Dr. Norberto Felix and Dr. Dominado Manzano of the Provincial Hospital, as well as Dr. Antonio
Sison of the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong Rizal (Exh. 1; see also

Exhs. F, G, G-1 to G-19) have confirmed beyond shadow of any doubt the extent of the fracture
and injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the mishap.

On the other hand, Patrolman Claveria, De Asis and

Cerezo corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff regarding the mishap and they have confirmed
the existence of the manhole

Defendant Alfredo Tangco, City Engineer of Dagupan City and admittedly ex-officio Highway
Engineer, City Engineer of the Public Works and Building Official for Dagupan City, admitted the
existence of said manhole along the... sidewalk in Perez Blvd., admittedly a National Road in
front of the Luzon Colleges. He also admitted that said manhole (there are at least 11 in all in
Perez Blvd.) is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are found
along Perez Blvd.

are also owned by the National Government. But as City Engineer of Dagupan City, he
supervises the maintenance of said manholes or drainage system and sees to it that they are
properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his... subordinates, Mr. Santiago de Vera
(Maintenance Foreman) and Engr. Ernesto Solermo, also a maintenance Engineer. In his
answer defendant Tangco expressly admitted in par. 7-1 thereof, that in his capacity as ex-
officio

Highway Engineer for Dagupan City he exercises supervision and control over National roads,
including the Perez Blvd. where the incident happened.

On appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan, the appellate court[4] reversed the lower court
findings on the ground that no evidence was presented by the plaintiff-appellee to prove that the
City of

Dagupan had "control or supervision" over Perez Boulevard.[5

The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole is located, is a national
road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan.
Hence, no liability should attach to the city.

Issues:

whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in
effect binding the city to answer for damages in... accordance with article 2189 of the Civil
Code.

Ruling:

After examination of the findings and conclusions of the trial court and those of the appellate
court, as well as the arguments presented by the parties, we agree with those of the trial court
and of the petitioner.

The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from
the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:

Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or... supervision.

It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city, or
municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is
exercised over the defective road or... street.[6]

In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is
exercised through the City Engineer who has the following duties:

Sec. 22. The City Engineer -- His powers, duties and compensation -- There shall be a city
engineer, who shall be in charge of the department of Engineering and Public Works. He shall
receive a salary of not exceeding three thousand pesos per... annum. He shall have the
following duties:... x x x
(j) He shall have the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers, and all
sources of water supply, and shall control, maintain and regulate the use of the same, in
accordance with the ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect and regulate the... use of all private
systems for supplying water to the city and its inhabitants, and all private sewers, and their
connection with the public sewer system.

he same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out, construction and improvement of
streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated
by the Municipal Board.[7] Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision
and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.

The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries sustained
by persons or property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the
charter, can not be used to exempt the city, as in the case at... bar.[8]

The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other hand
article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from "defective streets, public buildings
and other public works."[9]... no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision
over the public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article
2189 of the Civil Code is clear.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
respondent Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the
trial court, dated March 12, 1979 and amended on March 13, 1979, is hereby

REINSTATED with the indicated modifications as regards the amounts awarded:

(1) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the amount of
P15,924 (namely P8,054.00 as hospital, medical and other expenses; P7,420.00 as lost income
for one (1) year and P450.00 as bonus); P20,000.00 as moral... damages and P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

The attorney's fees of P3,000.00 remain the same.

FACTS:
Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar.
He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was
subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the
Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after his retirement from the
U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.

On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate,
although he continued making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on
July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation
under R.A. No. 81715 to the Special Committee on Naturalization. His application was approved
on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000
and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 on November 13, 2000.

On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern
Samar. His application was approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001.
On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a
resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two (2) years.”

His opponent sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that
the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he
had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six
months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla can be considered to have resided in Oras, Eastern Samar for more
than one (1) year.

RULING:
No. The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to
“dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a
party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).”

Coquillo lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S.
Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine
citizenship, he was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our
immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien. Until his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his
legal residence in this country.
Grego vs. Commission on Elections

FACTS:

In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff for serious misconduct.
Subsequently, he ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila
during the 1988, local elections. He won and assumed office. After his term, Basco sought re-
election. Again, he won. However, he found himself facing lawsuits filed by his opponents who
wanted to dislodge him from his position.

Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective position since
he had been “removed from office as a result of an administrative case” pursuant to Section 40
(b) of Republic Act No. 7160.

For a third time, Basco was elected councilor in 1995. Expectedly, his right to office was again
contested. In 1995, petitioner Grego filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification. The
COMELEC conducted a hearing and ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

However, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco in May 1995, as a duly elected councilor for
the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied for the seats.
Basco immediately took his oath of office.

COMELEC resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of said resolution was later denied by the COMELEC,, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC acted in with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for
disqualification.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in
dismissing the petition for disqualification, however, the Court noted that they do not agree with
its conclusions and reasons in the assailed resolution.

The Court reiterated that being merely an implementing rule, Sec 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure must not override, but instead remain consistent with and in harmony with the law it
seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out,
neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. The law itself cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said
law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the basic law. Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule
25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word “may,” it is,
therefore, improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall”
in its rules.

Still, the Court DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit.

Pamil vs. Teleron

FACTS : Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of municipal mayor
of Alburquerque, Bohol. Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit for quo warranto was then
filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification based on this
Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal
office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from
provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." The suit did not
prosper, respondent Judge sustaining the right of Father Gonzaga to the office of municipal
mayor. He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of
1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner. It is his contention that there
was no such implied repeal, that it is still in full force and effect. Thus was the specific question
raised.

ISSUE” WON the disqualification of the respondent based on Administrative Code provision
Constitutional

HELD: The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible
ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious
freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test. Here
being an ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public
office. There is thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision relied upon by
petitioner and an express constitutional mandate.

Felicidad Uy vs. Honorable Maximo-Contreras

FACTS:
Uy subleased from Atayde the other half of the second floor of a building, operated and
maintained as a beauty parlor. The sublease contract expired on 15 April 1993. However, the
petitioner was not able to remove all her movable properties. On 17 April 1993, an argument
arose between the Uy and Atayde when the former sought to withdraw from the subleased
premises her remaining movable [Link] argument degenerated into a scuffle between
the Uy and Atayde, and several of Atayde’s employees including Winnie Javier.

Atayde and Javier had themselves medically examined for the alleged injuries inflicted on them
by the Uy and subsequently filed a complaint with the barangay captain. The confrontation of
the parties was scheduled for 28 April 1993. On the said date, only the Uy appeared. The
barangay captain then reset the confrontation to 26 May 1993.

On 11 May 1993, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed two informations for slight physical
injuries against Uy. Uy submitted the counter-affidavits, specifically alleging the prematurity of
the filing of the criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings and led to the filing
of a motion to dismiss the two charges for non-compliance with the requirement of P.D. No.
1508 on prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa and pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Judge Contreras handed down an order denying the
motion to dismiss. A motion to reconsider the above order was also denied. Hence, this special
civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the motion to dismiss the complaint, grounded on the failure of Atayde and Javier to
comply with the mandatory requirement of prior referral of disputes to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of the proper barangay, was properly denied.

RULING:
NO. In view of the private respondents’ failure to appear at the first scheduled mediation on 28
April 1993 for which the mediation was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for slight physical
injuries could be validly filed with the MTC at any time before such date. The filing then of the
two criminal cases with the said court on 11 May 1993 was premature and, pursuant to
paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local Government Code, Judge Contreras should have
granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge
under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government
Code of 1991) which states that the parties may go directly to court where the action is about to
prescribe. This is because, as earlier stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the
Code, the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days
from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed their complaints with the lupon.

Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and
145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the prescriptive period therefor would have
expired two months thereafter. Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the filing of the private
respondents’ complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April 1993 and
automatically suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22 June 1993. If no mediation or
conciliation could be reached within the said period of suspension and, accordingly, a
certification to file action is issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six days within
which to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense. Evidently, there was no basis
for the invocation by the respondent judge of the exception provided for in paragraph (b),
Section 412 of the Local Government Code.

Lansangan vs. Caisip

FACTS
:This case stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages dated June 27, 2012 filed beforethe 2nd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, Tarlac (MCTC) by petitioner against AntonioCaisip,
docketed as Civil Case No. [Link], a resident of Camanse Street, Purok 4, Rose Park,
Concepcion, Tarlac, alleged thatrespondent, a resident of Barangay Sto. Niño, Concepcion, Tarlac,
executed a promissory note in her favor in
the amount of €2,522.00 payable in three (3) installments. As respondent defaulted in his obligation under the
promissory note and refused to heed petitioner's demands to comply therewith, the latter was constrained to
filethe said [Link] respondent failed to file any responsive pleading, petitioner moved to declare him in
default andfor the MCTC to render judgment, which was granted in an Order dated August 28, 2012.
Accordingly, the casewas submitted for [Link]
motu proprio
 dismissed without prejudice the complaint for failure to comply with the provisions
ofRepublic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known as "The Local Government Code of 1991," which requirest
he prior referral of the dispute between residents of the same barangay for conciliation proceedings before
thefiling of a case in court. RTC and CA affirmed.
ISSUES
:

 WoN the CA erred in upholding the
motu proprio
 dismissal of petitioner's complaint
 
o
 YES. Here, the ground of non-compliance with a condition precedent,
i.e.,
undergoing priorbarangay conciliation proceedings, was not invoked at the earliest opportunity, as
in fact,respondent was declared in default for failure to file a responsive pleading despite due [Link], it
was grave error for the courts
a quo
to order the dismissal of petitioner's complaint

 
on said ground. Hence, in order to rectify the situation, the Court finds it proper that the case
bereinstated and remanded to the MCTC, which is the court of origin, for its resolution on the merits.
NOTES
: Petition
GRANTED
. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 2738-12 is hereby
REINSTATED
and
REMANDED
to the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas- Bamban-Concepcion, Tarlac for resolution on the merits,
with reasonable dispatch

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. City of Lapu-Lapu and Pacaldo

Facts:

Petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by Congress on

July 31, 1990 under Republic Act No. 6958... to “undertake the economical, efficient and
effective control, management and supervision of the Mactan

International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City x x x and such
other airports as may be established in the Province of Cebu.

Upon its creation, petitioner enjoyed exemption from realty taxes under the following provision
of Republic Act No. 6958:

Section 14. Tax Exemptions. – The Authority shall be exempt from realty taxes imposed by the
National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities:
Provided, That no tax exemption herein granted shall extend to... any subsidiary which may be
organized by the Authority.
On September 11, 1996, however, this Court rendered a decision in Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority v. Marcos... declaring that upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7160 (The
Local Government Code of 1991),... petitioner was no longer exempt from real estate taxes.

On January 7, 1997, respondent City issued to petitioner a Statement of Real Estate Tax
assessing the lots comprising the Mactan International Airport in the amount of
P162,058,959.52

Petitioner complained that there were discrepancies in said Statement of Real Estate

Tax as follows:

(a) [T]he statement included lots and buildings not found in the inventory of petitioner’s real
properties;

(b) [S]ome of the lots were covered by two separate tax declarations which resulted in double
assessment;

(c) [There were] double entries pertaining to the same lots; and

(d) [T]he statement included lots utilized exclusively for governmental purposes.

Respondent City amended its billing and sent a new Statement of Real Estate Tax to petitioner
in the amount of P151,376,134.66.

Petitioner averred that this amount covered real estate taxes on the lots utilized solely and
exclusively for public or governmental purposes such as... the airfield, runway and taxiway, and
the lots on which they are situated.

Petitioner paid respondent City the amount of four million pesos (P4,000,000.00) monthly, which
was later increased to six million pesos (P6,000,000.00) monthly.

As of December 2003, petitioner had paid respondent City a total of P275,728,313.36... the
Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued Opinion No. 50, Series of 1998,... Based
on the foregoing, it is our considered opinion that the properties used for airport purposes, such
as the airfield, runway and taxiway and the lots on which the runway and taxiway are located,
are owned by the State or by the Republic of the Philippines and are merely... held in trust by
the MCIAA, notwithstanding that certificates of titles thereto may have been issued in the name
of the MCIAA... the Department of Finance issued a 2nd Indorsement to the City Treasurer of
Lapu-Lapu dated August 3, 1998... which reads:

“this Department (DOF) interposes no objection to the request of Mactan Cebu International
Airport Authority... for exemption from payment of real property tax on the property used for
airport purposes” mentioned above.

The City Assessor, therefore, is hereby instructed to transfer the assessment of the subject
airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which the runway and taxiway are situated, from the
“Taxable Roll” to the “Exempt Roll” of real properties.

Respondent City Treasurer... sent petitioner a Statement of Real Property Tax Balances up to
the year 2002 reflecting the amount of P246,395,477

Petitioner claimed that the statement again included the lots utilized solely and exclusively for
public purpose... such as the airfield, runway, and taxiway and the lots on which these are built.

Respondent Pacaldo then issued Notices of Levy on 18 sets of real properties of petitioner

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition... with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu
City... sought to enjoin respondent City from issuing a warrant of levy against petitioner’s
properties and from selling them at public auction for delinquency in realty tax obligations.

petition likewise prayed... for a declaration that the airport terminal building, the airfield, runway,
taxiway and the lots on which they are situated are exempted from real estate taxes after due
hearing.

based... of exemption on DOJ Opinion No. 50.

The RTC... denying the motion

Thus... respondent City auctioned 27 of petitioner’s properties. As there was no interested
bidder who participated in the auction sale, respondent City forfeited and purchased said...
properties. The corresponding Certificates of Sale of Delinquent Property were issued to
respondent City.

Petitioner claimed before the RTC that it had discovered that respondent City did not pass any
ordinance authorizing the collection of real property tax, a tax for the special education fund
(SEF), and a penalty interest for its nonpayment

Petitioner argued that without the... corresponding tax ordinances, respondent City could not
impose and collect real property tax, an additional tax for the SEF, and penalty interest from
petitioner.

The RTC issued an Order... granting petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

However, upon motion of respondents, the RTC lifted the writ of preliminary injunction

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[16] with the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals (Cebu City) promulgated the questioned Decision on October 8, 2007,
holding that petitioner is a government-owned or controlled corporation and its properties are
subject to realty tax.

in the 2006 MIAA case, had expressly declared that petitioner, while vested with corporate
powers, is not considered a government-owned or controlled corporation, but is a government
instrumentality like the Manila

International Airport Authority (MIAA), Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), University of the
Philippines, and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).

Republic Act No. 6958 placed “a limitation on petitioner’s administration of its assets and
properties” as it provides under Section 4(e) that “any asset in the international airport important
to national security cannot be alienated or mortgaged by... petitioner or transferred to any entity
other than the National Government.
PETITIONER IS A GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY AS EXPRESSLY DECLARED BY
THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE MIAA CASE. AS SUCH, IT IS EXEMPT FROM PAYING
REAL ESTATE TAXES IMPOSED BY RESPONDENT CITY OF LAPU-LAPU.

II

THE PROPERTIES OF PETITIONER CONSISTING OF THE AIRPORT TERMINAL BUILDING,

AIRFIELD, RUNWAY, TAXIWAY, INCLUDING THE LOTS ON WHICH THEY ARE SITUATED,
ARE EXEMPT FROM REAL PROPERTY TAXES.

III

RESPONDENT CITY OF LAPU-LAPU CANNOT IMPOSE REAL PROPERTY TAX WITHOUT

ANY APPROPRIATE ORDINANCE.

IV

RESPONDENT CITY OF LAPU-LAPU CANNOT IMPOSE AN ADDITIONAL 1% TAX FOR THE

SPECIAL EDUCATION FUND IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CORRESPONDING ORDINANCE.

RESPONDENT CITY OF LAPU-LAPU CANNOT IMPOSE ANY INTEREST SANS ANY

ORDINANCE MANDATING ITS IMPOSITION

Petitioner insists that its properties consisting of the airport terminal building, airfield, runway,
taxiway and the lots on which they are situated are not subject to real property tax because they
are actually, solely and exclusively used for public purposes.

They are indispensable to the operation of the Mactan International Airport and by their very
nature, these properties are exempt from tax. Said properties belong to the State and are
merely held by petitioner in trust
Petitioner likewise claims that the enactment of Ordinance No. 070-2007 is an admission on
respondent City’s part that it must have a tax measure to be able to impose a tax or special
assessment. Petitioner avers that assuming that it is a non-exempt entity or that its airport...
lands and buildings are not exempt, it was only upon the effectivity of Ordinance No. 070-2007
on January 1, 2008 that respondent City could properly impose the basic real property tax, the
additional tax for the SEF, and the interest in case of nonpayment... respondents point out that
petitioner partially moved for a reconsideration of the questioned Decision only as to the issue of
whether petitioner is a GOCC or not. Thus, respondents declare that the other portions of the
questioned... decision had already attained finality and ought not to be placed in issue in this
petition for certiorari.

Issues:

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS A GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY EXEMPT FROM

PAYING REAL PROPERTY TAXES

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CITY CAN [IMPOSE] REALTY TAX, SPECIAL

EDUCATION FUND AND PENALTY INTEREST

WHETHER OR NOT THE AIRPORT TERMINAL BUILDING, AIRFIELD, RUNWAY, TAXIWAY

INCLUDING THE LOTS ON WHICH THEY ARE SITUATED ARE EXEMPT FROM REALTY
TAXES

Ruling:

To recall, in the 2006 MIAA case, we held that MIAA’s airport lands and buildings are exempt
from real estate tax imposed by local governments; that it is not a GOCC but an instrumentality
of the national government, with its real properties being owned by the Republic of... the
Philippines, and these are exempt from real estate tax. Specifically referring to petitioner,...
Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do not become
stock or non-stock corporations, which is a necessary condition before an agency or
instrumentality is deemed a government-owned or controlled corporation. Examples are the

Mactan International Airport Authority... government corporate entities. However, they are not
government-owned or controlled corporations in the... strict sense as understood under the
Administrative Code, which is the governing law defining the legal relationship and status of
government entities
In the 2006 MIAA case

MIAA’s lands... and buildings were exempt from real estate tax imposed by local governments:

First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the

National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA
are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from... real estate tax.

MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its
governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference
is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.

When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does
not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only...
governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of
eminent domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA
exercises “all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers
are... not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order.”

Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do not become
stock or non-stock corporations, which is a necessary condition before an agency or
instrumentality is deemed a government-owned or controlled corporation. Examples are the
Mactan

International Airport Authority,... All these government instrumentalities exercise corporate

powers but they are not organized as stock or non-stock corporations as... required by Section
2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. These government
instrumentalities are sometimes loosely called government corporate entities. However, they are
not government-owned or controlled corporations in the strict sense as understood... under the
Administrative Code, which is the governing law defining the legal relationship and status of
government entities.

When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such
power is construed strictly against local governments.
There is, moreover, no point in national and local governments taxing each other, unless a
sound and compelling policy requires such transfer of public funds from one government pocket
to another.

There is also no reason for local governments to tax national government instrumentalities for
rendering essential public services to inhabitants of local governments.

The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public
for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal
fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport

Lands and Buildings as properties for public use.

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA x x x are properties of public dominion because they
are intended for public use. As properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong to the
State or the Republic of the Philippines.

Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale
of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy.

Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances,
foreclosures and auction sale.

Thus, unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the Airport Lands and Buildings
from public use, these properties remain properties of public dominion and are inalienable.
Since the Airport Lands and Buildings are inalienable in their present status as properties... of
public dominion, they are not subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale. As long as the
Airport Lands and Buildings are reserved for public use, their ownership remains with the State
or the Republic of the Philippines.

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are intended for public use, and at the very least
intended for public service. Whether intended for public use or public service, the Airport Lands
and
Buildings are properties of public dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands
and Buildings are owned by the Republic and thus exempt from real estate tax under Section
234(a) of the Local Government Code.

Thus, only portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings leased to taxable persons like private
parties... are subject to real estate tax by the City of Parañaque.

This Court has also repeatedly ruled that properties of public dominion are not subject to
execution or foreclosure sale.

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision
dated October 8, 2007 and the Resolution dated February 12, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(Cebu City)

Principles:

The petitioner is an instrumentality of the government; thus, its properties actually, solely and
exclusively used for public purposes, consisting of the airport terminal building, airfield, runway,
taxiway and the lots on which they are situated, are not... subject to real property tax and
respondent City is not justified in collecting taxes from petitioner over said properties.

Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City

FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks
exemption from real property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the land
and the hospital building. Petitioner predicted on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The
request was denied, and a petition hereafter filed before the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. Petitioner
alleged that as a charitable institution, is exempted from real property taxes under Sec 28(3) Art
VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the petition and the decision was likewise affirmed
on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the CBAA.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of PD 1823 and the 1973
and 1987 Constitution and Section 234(b) of RA 7160.

2. Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes.

RULING:
1. Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973
and 1987 Constitution. Under PD 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation
which, subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the
President with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. The purpose for
which it was created was to render medical services to the public in general including those who
are poor and also the rich, and become a subject of charity. Under PD 1823, petitioner is
entitled to receive donations, even if the gift or donation is in the form of subsidies granted by
the government.

2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption
privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon.
The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the property taxes
only. This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA [Link] provides that in order to be
entitled to the exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution
and; its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purpose.
Accordingly, the portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt from real
property taxes while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.

Salalima v. Guingona

Salalima v. GuingonaGR No. 117589-92, May 22 1996FACTS: This Supreme Court case
involves four administrative complaints filed against AlbayGovernor Salalima and the members
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay. The complaintsseek to hold the petitioners liable for
a) wanton disregard of law amounting to abuse of authorityin OP case 5470; b) grave abuse of
authority under Section 60 (e) of the Local Government Codein OP cae 5649; c) oppression and
abuse of authority under Section 60 (c) and (e) of the LocalGovernment Code in OP case 5471
and d) abuse of authority and negligence in OP case [Link] to our discussion on
whether or not LGUs can hire private lawyers in cases filed againstit is OP case [Link]
Province of Albay imposed real property tax against the National
PowerCorporation. The latter, claiming that it is tax exempt, refused to pay the said tax liability.
Due toits refusal to pay, the Province of Albay took over the properties of NPC and sold them in
anauction sale. The Province was the sole bidder. Upon the failure of NPC to redeem the
property,the Province sought the issuance of a writ of possession from the Regional Trial Court.
The NPCchallenged this in a petition filed with the Supreme Court. The Province, through its
legal officeAtty. Ricaforte, filed its comment on the said petition on May 17, 1989. On June 2,
1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No. 129-89,authorizing
Salalima to engage the services of a Manila-based law firm to handle the case. Assuch, on
August 25, 1989, Atty. Jesus Carnago entered his appearance with the SC as acollaborating
counsel. On November 14, 1989, Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes of Cortes and ReynaLaw Firm sent
a letter to Salalima, informing him that Atty. Carnago had filed a memorandum inthe SC. He
then proposed that his law firm and that of Atty. Carnago enter into a retaineragreement with the
Province in connection with the case. He charged 50, 000 as acceptance feeand a contingency
fee of 18%. In response to this, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan passedResolution No. 01-90
authorizing Salalima to sign a retainer contract with Cortes and ReynaLaw Firm. On June 4,
1990, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Province. The latter then paidthe lawyers
amounting to around 7 million. However, on May 31, 1993, the Provincial Auditorinformed the
Province that COA had disallowed the payments for lack of prior writtenconformity
of the Solicitor General and a written concurrence of COA. An administrativecomplaint was later
on filed against the petitioners with the Office of the [Link] OP found that the petitioners
incurred administrative liability in hiring privatelawyers to defend it in the NPC case.
OP’s [Link] 481 of the LGC states that the legal officer of the province has the duty
torepresent the LGU in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the LGU or anyofficial
thereof, in his official capacity, is a [Link] the case Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok, the
Supreme Court ruled that the LGUcannot be represented by private lawyers and it is solely the
Provincial legal officer orprovincial fiscal who can represent it. A private lawyer has no standing
in such a [Link]. 481 and Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok are applicable in this case. In
hiring theprivate lawyers, the petitioners violated the LGC and the doctrine laid down by
theSupreme court. [Link], the transaction was also full of irregularities. [Link]
disbursement of 7M as payment was disallowed by COA for failure to complywith the
prerequisite conformity from the SolGen and the [Link] 01-90 authorized Salalima
to contract with Cortes and Reyna Law Firmand NOT with Atty. Carnago. Salalima exceeded
the authority given to him in doingso. [Link] Atty. Carnago appeared as counsel in the NPC
case. It appears that Cortes andReyna did not render any form of legal service in relation
[Link] provincial legal officer had already filed a comment in the SC. What Carnagofiled
was merely a memorandum. The total attorney’s fees of 38 Million is
[Link] of these findings, the OP imposed the penalty of suspension for
6 monthsagainst Gov. Salalima and Vice governor Azana, while the members of the SP
weresuspended for 4 months. The petitioners appealed the case to the SC. In
themeantime, the 1992 elections took place wherein the petitioners were reelected.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners incurred administrative liabilities in hiring private lawyers
torepresent the Province

HELD: Whether or not they incurred liabilities, they can no longer be held to answer for these
inview of the fact that they have already been reelected. Their reelection operates as
condonationof any misconduct committed in their prior term.
RATIO
In Pascual v. Pascual, the SC ruled that offenses committed or acts done in a previousterm are
generally held not to furnish a cause for removal in the current term of office. This isbecause
each term is separate from other terms and that the reelection operates as a condonationof the
officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove himtherefore. Such
a rule is founded on the theory that an official’s reelection expresses thesovereign will of the
electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a groundfor administrative
discipline which was committed during the previous term. Also, sound policydictates such a rule.
A contrary rule would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisancontests between
reelected officials and their political enemies who may not stop to hound theformer during his
new term with administrative cases for acts alleged to have been committedduring his previous
term. RULING: OP Decision imposing penalties is reversed and set aside

Alvarez v. Guingona
In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the House of
Representatives.

In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was
introduced in the Senate.

In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate
conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local
Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same
with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720).

Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the
ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that City of
Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to
be a city. That in the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA
(Internal Revenue Allotment) was included which should not be.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.
2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGU’s income.

HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further,
the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1st, 2nd and
3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1st hearing on the said SB one month
after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well).

2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGU’s average annual income as
was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross
accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue
to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit.
They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source
of much needed funds.

To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the
same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its
own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special
funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of “funding support from the national
government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.

White Light Corporation v. City of Manila

Facts:

Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed an Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels,
motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.

The City claims that it is a legitimate exercise of police power.

Herein petitioners, assails the validity and constitutionality of the ordinance arguing that it
violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police
power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

The RTC declared the ordinance null and void, thus, the City of Manila elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the RTC ruling.
Issue:

Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

Ruling:

The court ruled in the negative.

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) must not be unreasonable.

The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those
means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its
guarantees to the people.

Binay v. Domingo

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends
P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed
P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the
municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the
municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the
program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement
of funds for the implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the resolution has no
connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2)
government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal
protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals.

Issues:

1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare
clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

Held:

1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was
born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum
non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general
welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the
legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto
they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as
shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience,
maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of
the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.

2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate
with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health,
safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all
the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function
of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially
occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the
community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as
to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or
general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the
inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition
which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards
social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the
promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human
rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor
has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified.
Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down
to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving
rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil,
housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the
Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social
justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss
of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be
financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late
President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This
decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or
otherwise.

Lourdes de la Paz Masikip v. City of Pasig

Facts:

Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of
4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila.
In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent,
notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to
be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents... of Barangay
Caniogan.

On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of
her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither
sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our...
community."

In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of
petitioner's property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents."

Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for
expropriation

On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint

On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss,[5] on the ground
that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recreational
activities of the residents of Pasig.

Issues:

whether there is indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of the property

Ruling:

The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the necessity"
and the taking must be limited to such necessity.

the very foundation of... the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that
necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must
precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land.
necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does
not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the
greatest benefit to the public... with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning
party and the property owner consistent with such benefit.

Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is
a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner's property.

Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification[14] issued by the Caniogan Barangay

Council

, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association,
a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It... can be gleaned that the
members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and
recreational facility. Petitioner's lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is,
therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not... been shown, especially
considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community
recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City,
including those of Caniogan.

Marquez v. Commission on Elections,

Facts:

Bienvenido Marquez and Eduardo Rodriguez were candidates for Governor of the province of
Quezon in 1992. Rodriguez won, and this prompted Marquez to file a quo warranto proceedings
against Marquez for being disqualified as a candidate because he is a “fugitive from justice”
which is against Sec. 40 (e) of the Local Government Code.

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad
Allegedly, at the time Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him
for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the
Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant was issued for his arrest, but which remained
unserved because he already went to the Philippines then.

Marquez argued that Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear. "Fugitive from justice" includes
not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged flee to avoid prosecution.

Rodriguez, on the other hand, cites the Congressional Oversight Committee who drafted the
IRR for the Local Government Code. In the deliberations, it could be seen that there was
confusion as to the implications of defining what a fugitive from justice really is. There was a
pronouncement from the Chairman that fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final
judgment, and this was adapted verbatim in Art. 73 of the IRR.

Issue:

What is the definition of “fugitive from justice” that should be followed?

Held:

"Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but
likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds
support from jurisprudence and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary
connotation of the term.

Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to
the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive)
"who has been convicted by final judgment" is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the
law.
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of
its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight. The Court certainly agrees; however,
when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to
apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the
law but must remain congruent to it.

There was no clear ruling on the instance of Rodriguez because Comelec never made a
determination as to his status as a fugitive from justice. Case was remanded to Comelec.

ERNESTO MERCADO VS MANZANO

FACTS:
Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano to hold elective office on the ground
that he is both an American citizen and a Filipino citizen, having been born in the United States
of Filipino parents. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Manzano for being a dual
citizen pursuant to the Local Government Code RA 7160, that those with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running any public position.

ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in the local
position.

RULING:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship per
se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood
as referring to “dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification.

Ledesma v. Court of Appeals

FACTS: A college student was scheduled to graduate with magna cum laude honors. However,
this was deprived of her because her lending of money to members of an organization of which
she was a member, purportedly in violation of existing school rules and regulations, according to
the President of the State College. This was done although the Bureau of Public Schools
already intervened and instructed give her said honors. Despite this, she was made to graduate
as a plain student. The Supreme Court held the President liable for damages.

ISSUE: IS THE PRESIDENT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES?

HELD: Yes, the President is liable for damages.

We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be reversed. It
cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought about
by the petitioner’s neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper. As we
have affirmed in the case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440,
448):

"There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongful act or omission." (People v. Bayln, 129
SCRA 62, 1984)

Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez

FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections
68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353
creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of
San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy,
Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.
EO No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed through the
Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon
By virtue of EO No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the
municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a
fifth class municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No.
1515. 2 The executive order added that “(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a)
municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of
Representatives.”
Petitioner Municipality of San Narciso: filed a petition for quo warranto with RTC which petition
sought the declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v.
Auditor General.
Respondent San Andres: San Narciso is estopped from questioning the creation of the new
municipality and that the case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic
Act No. 7160 (Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .(d) Municipalities existing as of the date
of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.)
Petitioner: The above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since
the enactment referred to legally existing municipalities and not to those whose mode of
creation had been void ab initio.

ISSUE: W/N Municipality of San Andres is a de jure or de facto municipal corporation.

HELD: Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20
August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the
municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this
case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at
least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a
de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in
1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in
existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was
promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary,
certain governmental acts all pointed to the State’s recognition of the continued existence of the
Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive
Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having
surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled.
Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of
Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been
considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the
province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the
effect that municipal districts “organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders
and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”

All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon
must now be conceded.
Mejia v. Balolong
FACTS
Petitioner filed an action of quo warranto against respondents on the the ground that the
appointments of the letter of the president as councilors of Dagupan were null and void

ISSUE:
Whether the appointment of the respondents as councilors of Dagpan was valid

Ruling
No, A public corporation is created from the moment the law of charter creating it becomes
effective
The city came into existence as a legal entity upon the approval of ACT No, 170 on June 20
1947 since a statute is only operative from the exact instance of its approval or becoming of law.
The date of the organization of the city government which the president authorized to fix is not
and cannot be the date of the creation of the city, because what was to be organized is the city
government and not the city as an entity.

Ordillo v. Commission on Elections

Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao,
Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.”
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the
creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province
and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-
mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that
the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast
only in the province of Ifugao.
the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for
the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in
only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be
composed of more than one constituent unit.
Issue: The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only
province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone,
legally and validly constitute such Region.

Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords — provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This
is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To
become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional
requirements are not present in this case.

Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera Autonomous
Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional
Government and local government units. It further provides that:
“SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the
proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili
within the Autonomous Region . . .”
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may
constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of
having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials
exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.

The National Liga ng mga Barangay v. Paredes

Facts: DILG, appointed as interim caretaker to administer and manage the affairs of the Liga ng
mga Barangay in giving remedy to alleged violations made by the incumbent officer of the Liga
in the conduct of their elections, issued 2 memorandum circulars which alter, modify, nullify or
set aside the actions of the Liga.

Petitioner contends that DILG’s appointment constitutes undue interference in the internal
affairs of the Liga, since the latter is not subject to DILG control and supervision. Respondent
judge contends that DILG exercises general supervisory jurisdiction over LGUs including the
different leagues based on sec. 1 of Admin. Order No. 267 providing for a broad premise of the
supervisory power of the DILG.
Issue: WON DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President has power of control over the Liga ng
mga Barangay.

Held: No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President of the Philippines shall
exercise general supervision over local government, which exclude the power of control. As the
entity exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILG’s authority is limited to seeing to it that the
rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself nor does it have the discretion to
modify or replace the same.

City of Iloilo v. Smart Communications, Inc

Facts:

SMART received a letter of assessment dated February 12, 2002 from petitioner requiring it to
pay deficiency local franchise and business taxes

P764,545.29... incurred for the years

1997 to 2001

SMART protested the assessment... to the City Treasurer

It claimed exemption from payment of local franchise and business taxes based on Section 9 of
its legislative franchise under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7294

(SMART's franchise)

SMART similarly invoked R.A. No. 7925 or the Public Telecommunications Policy Act

Section 23 declares that any existing privilege, incentive, advantage, or exemption granted
under existing franchises shall ipso facto become part of... previously granted-
telecommunications franchise
SMART contends that by virtue of Section 23, tax exemptions granted by the legislature to other
holders of telecommunications franchise may be extended to and availed of by SMART.

petitioner denied SMART's protest, citing the failure of SMART to comply with Section 252 of
R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code

Section 252 of the LGC requires payment of... the tax before any protest against the tax
assessment can be made.

SMART objected to the petitioner's denial of its protest by instituting a case against petitioner
before the RTC of Iloilo City.

trial court ruled in favour of SMART and declared the telecommunications firm exempt from the
payment of local franchise... and business taxes... it agreed with SMART's claim of exemption
under Section 9 of its franchise and Section 23 of the Public Telecoms Act

Section 9. Tax provisions. -- The grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the
same taxes on their real estate buildings and personal property, exclusive of' this franchise, as
other persons or corporations which are now or hereafter may be... required by law to pay. In
addition thereto, the grantee, its successors or assigns shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to
three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of the business transacted under this franchise by the
grantee, its successors or assigns and the said... percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this
franchise or earnings thereof: Provided, That the grantee, its successors or assigns shall
continue to be liable for income taxes payable under Title II of the National Internal Revenue
Code pursuant to Section 2... of Executive Order No. 72 unless the latter enactment is amended
or repealed, in which case the amendment or repeal shall be applicable thereto.

petitioner posits that SMART's claim for exemption under its franchise is not equivocal enough
to prevail over the specific grant of power to local government units to exact taxes from
businesses operating within its territorial jurisdiction under Section 137 in relation to

Section 151 of the LGC

Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. -- Unless otherwise provided in this Code,
tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including government-owned or controlled... corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under RA No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and
educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
petitioner argues, too, that SMART's claim for exemption from taxes under Section 9 of its
franchise is not couched in plain and unequivocal language such that it restored the withdrawal
of tax exemptions under Section 193 above... claims that "if Congress intended that the... tax
exemption privileges withdrawn by Section 193 of RA 7160 [LGC] were to be restored in
respondent's [SMART's] franchise, it would have so expressly provided therein and not merely
[restored the exemption] by the simple expedient of including the `in lieu of all taxes'... provision
in said franchise."

SMART additionally invokes the "equality clause" under Section 23 of the Public Telecoms Act

SECTION 23. Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry. -- Any advantage,

favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted under existing franchises, or may hereafter be
granted, shall ipso facto become part of previously granted... telecommunications franchise and
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises: Provided,
however, That the foregoing shall neither apply to nor affect provisions of telecommunications
franchises concerning territory covered by the... franchise, the life span of the franchise, or the
type of service authorized by the franchise

SMART posits that since the franchise of telecommunications companies granted after the
enactment of its franchise contained provisions exempting these companies from both national
and local taxes, these... privileges should extend to and benefit SMART, applying the "equality
clause" above

The petitioner, on the other hand, believes that the claimed exemption under Section 23 of the
Public Telecoms Act is similarly unfounded.

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and REVERSE the decision of the RTC

SMART liable to pay the local franchise and business taxes amounting to P764,545.29,
assessed against it by petitioner,... plus the surcharges and interest due thereon.

Issues:

whether SMART is exempt from the payment of local franchise and business taxes.
Ruling:

Claim for Exemption under

SMART's franchise... by virtue of Section 193 of the LGC, all tax exemption privileges then
enjoyed by all persons, save those expressly mentioned, have been withdrawn effective
January 1, 1992 - the date of effectivity of the LGC

However, the withdrawal of exemptions, whether under Section 193 or 137 of the LGC, pertains
only to those already existing when the LGC was enacted... intention of the legislature was to
remove all tax... exemptions or incentives granted prior to the LGC.

As SMART's franchise was made effective on March 27, 1992 - after the effectivity of the LGC -
Section 193 will therefore not apply in this case.

But while Section 193 of the LGC will not affect the claimed tax exemption under SMART's
franchise, we fail to find a categorical and encompassing grant of tax exemption to SMART
covering exemption from both national and local taxes

R.A. No 7294 does not expressly provide what kind of taxes SMART is exempted from.

What is clear is that SMART shall pay... franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all
gross receipts of the business transacted under its franchise. But whether the franchise tax
exemption would include exemption from exactions by both the local and the national
government is not unequivocal.

The uncertainty in the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in R.A. No. 7294 on whether SMART is
exempted from both local and national franchise tax must be construed strictly against SMART
which claims the exemption

Justice Carpio, in his Separate Opinion in PLDT v. City of Davao

The proviso in the first paragraph of Section 9 of Smart's franchise states that the grantee shall
"continue to be liable for income taxes payable under Title II of the National Internal Revenue
Code." Also, the second paragraph of Section 9 speaks of tax returns... filed and taxes paid to
the "Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative in accordance with
the National Internal Revenue Code." Moreover, the same paragraph declares that the tax
returns "shall be subject to audit by the Bureau of Internal Revenue."

Nothing is mentioned in Section 9 about local taxes. The clear intent is for the "in lieu of all
taxes" clause to apply only to taxes under the National Internal Revenue Code and not to local
taxes.

Nonetheless, even if Section 9 of SMART's franchise can be construed as covering local taxes
as well, reliance thereon would now be unavailing.

The "in lieu of all taxes" clause basically exempts SMART from paying all other kinds of taxes
for as long as it pays the 3% franchise... tax; it is the franchise tax that shall be in lieu of all
taxes, and not any other form of tax.

Franchise taxes on telecommunications companies, however, have been abolished by R.A. No.
7716 or the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law

To replace the franchise tax, the E-VAT Law imposed a 10%... value-added tax on
telecommunications companies

The "in lieu of all taxes" clause in the legislative franchise of SMART has thus become functus
officio, made inoperative for lack of a franchise tax

Claim for Exemption

Under Public Telecoms Act

The term "exemption" in Section 23 of the Public

Telecoms Act does not mean tax exemption; rather, it refers to exemption from certain
regulatory or reporting requirements imposed by government agencies such as the National
Telecommunications Commission.
The thrust of the Public Telecoms Act is to promote the gradual... deregulation of entry, pricing,
and operations of all public telecommunications entities, and thus to level the playing field in the
telecommunications industry

Intent to grant tax exemption cannot therefore be discerned from the law; the term "exemption"
is too general to include tax exemption and runs counter to the requirement that the grant of...
tax exemption should be stated in clear and unequivocal language too plain to be beyond doubt
or mistake.

Surcharge and Interests

Since SMART cannot validly claim any tax exemption based either on Section 9 of its franchise
or Section 23 of the Public Telecoms Act, it follows that petitioner can impose and collect the
local franchise and business taxes

Fernando v. St. Scholastica's College,

Facts:

Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of 56,306.80 square
meters, located in Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537.
Located within the property are SSA-Marikina, the residence of the sisters of the Benedictine
Order, the formation house of the novices, and the retirement house for the elderly sisters. The
property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting
the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other improvements.3

The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina. On September 30, 1994, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192,4 entitled “Regulating the
Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina.

On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering
them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru, and,
at the same time, to move it back about six (6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to
park
The respondents asserted that the implementation of the ordinance on their property would be
tantamount to an appropriation of property without due process of law; and that the petitioners
could only appropriate a portion of their property through eminent domain.

The RTC rendered a Decision,15 dated October 2, 2002, granting the petition and ordering the
issuance of a writ of prohibition commanding the petitioners to permanently desist from
enforcing or implementing Ordinance No. 192 on the respondents’ property.

In its December 1, 2003 Decision, the CA dismissed the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the
RTC decision. The CA reasoned out that the objectives stated in Ordinance No. 192 did not
justify the exercise of police power, as it did not only seek to regulate, but also involved the
taking of the respondents’ property without due process of law

Issue:

Whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid exercises of police power by the
City Government of Marikina.

Held:

No, because the enforcement of Sect.3.1 and 5 would result in an undue interference with the
respondents’ right to property and privacy.

Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of Marikina in the apparent exercise of its
police power. “Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people.” The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police
power to local government units, as agencies of the State. This delegation of police power is
embodied in Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), known as the
General Welfare Clause.

Hence, Sect.3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are not valid exercise of police power.
Zoomzat, Inc. v. People

Facts

Petitioner Zoomzat, Inc. alleged that on December 20, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Gingoog City passed Resolution No. 2613 which resolved "to express the willingness of the City
of Gingoog to allow Zoomzat to install and operate a cable TV system." Thereupon, petitioner
applied for a mayor's permit but the same was not acted upon by the mayor's office.

Subsequently, or on April 6, 1993, respondents enacted Ordinance No. 194 which granted a
franchise to Gingoog Spacelink Cable TV, Inc. to operate a cable television for a period of ten
(10) years, subject to automatic renewal.

On December 20, 1994, Graft Investigation Officer I Virginia Tehano-Ang, recommended the
indictment of the respondents under Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019,5 which recommendation was
affirmed on review by Special Prosecution Officer II Rolando Ines.6

Accordingly, a criminal information for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, was filed against
the respondents before the Sandiganbayan. The case was docketed as Crim. Case No. 22026.

However, upon directive by the Sandiganbayan to restudy the instant case, Special Prosecution
Officer II Antonio Manzano recommended the dismissal of the case and the Information
withdrawn for lack of probable cause.7 On further investigation, Special Prosecution Officer III
Victor Pascual also recommended that the case be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Issue
Whether NTC is the licensing and regulatory body, nonetheless, the actual operations of cable
television entails other activities, which may be regulated by the local government unit pursuant
to the general welfare clause or subject to its revenue generating powers.

Held
There is no dispute that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, like other local legislative
bodies, has been empowered to enact ordinances and approve resolutions under the general
welfare clause of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code of 1983. That it continues to
possess such power is clear under the new law, R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of
1991).
Indeed, under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code, the local government
unit can regulate the operation of cable television but only when it encroaches on public
properties, such as the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the
parceling of large regions.13 Beyond these parameters, its acts, such as the grant of the
franchise to Spacelink, would be ultra vires. Not being a bona fide franchise holder, petitioner
could not claim prior right on the strength of Resolution No. 261.

Republic v. Roque

On July 17, 2007, private respondents filed a Petition[6] for declaratory relief before the RTC,
assailing the constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3,[7] for being
void for vagueness;[8] (b) Section 7,[9] for violating the right to privacy of communication and
due process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent relationships;[10] (c) Section 18,[11] for
violating due process, the prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, as well as for contradicting Article 125[12] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;[13]
(d) Section 26,[14] for violating the right to travel;[15] and (e) Section 27,[16] for violating the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.[17]

Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings,[18] averring that certain petitions (SC petitions)
raising the issue of RA 9372's constitutionality have been lodged before the Court.[19] The said
motion was granted in an Order dated October 19, 2007

Issue
whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the subject motion to
dismiss.

Ruling
The petition is meritorious.

An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such
act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.[28] It is wellsettled that the abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so
patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.[29] In this relation, case law states that not every
error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse
of discretion.[30] The degree of gravity, as above-described, must be met.
Applying these principles, the Court observes that while no grave abuse of discretion could be
ascribed on the part of the RTC when it found that the Court did not pass upon the
constitutionality of RA 9372 in the Southern Hemisphere cases, it, however, exceeded its
jurisdiction when it ruled that private respondents' petition had met all the requisites for an
action for declaratory relief. Consequently, its denial of the subject motion to dismiss was
altogether improper.

Macasiano v. Diokno

Facts: On June 13, 1990, the municipality of Paranaque passed an ordinance authorizing the
closure of some streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of
a flea market thereon. By virtue of this Paranaque Mayor Ferrer was authorized to enter into a
contract to any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and
management of flea market and/or vending areas. Because of this purpose, respondent
Palanyag entered into an agreement with the municipality of Paranaque with the obligation to
remit dues to the treasury. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on
the said streets.

On September 30, 1990, Brig. Gen Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of Metropolitan

Traffic Command ordered the destruction and confiscation of the stalls. These stalls were later
returned to Palanyag. Petitioner then sent a letter to Palanyag giving the latter 10 days to
discontinue the flea market otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled. Hence, respondents
filed with the court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for
preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition to the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction. The court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin
petitioner from enforcing his letter pending the hearing on the motion for writ of preliminary
injunction.

Issue: Whether an ordinance issued by the municipality of Paranaque authorizing the lease and
use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea market is valid?

Held: Article 424 lays down the basic principle that properties of public domain devoted to public
use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot
be disposed or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the
requirement of due process, the closure of the road should be for the sole purpose of
withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that
such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is
already withdrawn from public use, the property becomes patrimonial property of the local
government unit concerned. It is only then that respondent municipality can use or convey them
for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might lawfully
used or conveyed.
 Those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used
for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the
local government has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to
private persons. Hence the ordinance is null and void.

Municipality of Paoay v. Manaois

Facts:
For many years the minucipality was leasing fishery lots on municipal waters. The waters have
been parceled out in lots and rented after the public bidding to the highest bidder. The
municipality leased 6 lots to Francisco Duque for a period of 4 years. However Duque was not
able to comply with the terms of the contract. Therefore the municipality confiscated the lots
from him. They then advertised the lease for public bidding and was then awarded to Manaois
as the highest bidder. However he was able to exercise the right of possession because Duque
continued to claim possession. Manaois brought action to Paoay to recover the sum paid by him
for the lease. He then obtained judgement in his favor in the CFI of Pangasinan

Issue
Whether fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay or its usufruct may be levied upon and
subject to execution

Ruling
No, Properties of public use held by municipal corporations are not subject to levy and
execution. Even public revenues destined for the expenses or the municipality are exempt from
execution. The reason is that they are held in trust of the people, intended and used for the
accomplishment of the purpose of which municipal corporations are created, and that subject to
said properties and public funds to which is patrimonial and is held by tth municipality in its
proprietary capacity is treated as a private asset of the town.

Talaga v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

Nobody assumes office, since his CoC is void ab initio

In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the disqualification of a substitute who
was proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election; and the ascertainment of who should
assume the office following the substitute's disqualification.

Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo... respectively filed their certificates of
candidacy... for the position of Mayor of Lucena City

Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition

He alleged therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three
consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City... in the
May 10, 2010 national and local elections

Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office
during his second and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not then apply to him
pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence... the Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections... holding that

When respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor of Lucena City, the
rule that 'where the separation from office is caused by reasons beyond the control of the officer
i.e. involuntary the service of term is deemed interrupted'... has not yet been overturned by the
new ruling of the Supreme Court.

the prevailing rule then of the Honorable Commission in [sic] respect of the three (3)-term
limitation was its decision in the case of Aldovino, et al. vs. Asilo where it... stated

COMELEC First Division issued... the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED... the name of
Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of
Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited
with 44,099 votes as against Castillo's

39,615 votes

Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the
suspension of Barbara Ruby's proclamation.
Having been disqualified only, the doctrine laid down in Miranda v. Abaya is not applicable.
Ramon was rightly substituted by Ruby. As such, the votes for Ramon cannot be considered as
stray votes but should be counted in favor of Ruby since the substituted and the substitute...
carry the same surname Talaga, as provided in Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006

Even though he wasn't. This is in violation of Section 78 of the OEC

It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she
seeks.

Issues:

The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the
position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband.

Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of who among the contending parties should
assume the contested elective position.

Ruling:

Declaration of Ramon's disqualification... rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not... a valid
candidate to be properly substituted

A person who is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a

person whose CoC is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not considered as a
candidate at all because his status is that of a person who has not... filed a CoC.

To be sure, the cause of Ramon's ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both by the
Constitution and statutory law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the... office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code reiterates the constitutional three-term limit for all
elective local officials

We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions in these consolidated cases

Garcia v. Mojica

Facts:

placed under preventive suspension without pay for the maximum period of six months and told
to cease and desist from holding office immediately.

Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of
asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.[1]

Allan Francisco S. Garciano, the graft investigating officer... recommended the preventive
suspension of petitioner and the others.

June 25, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman issued the questioned preventive suspension
order.

une 29, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, which motion was
denied in an... order dated July 5, 1999.

certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.

we directed the parties to maintain the status quo until further orders from this Court.
Respondents claimed that the status quo referred to in the order should be that where petitioner
is already suspended and vice mayor Renato Osmeña is... the acting city mayor.

Further, respondents point out that the contract in question was signed just four days before the
date of the 1998 election and so it could not be presumed that when the people of Cebu City
voted petitioner to office, they did so with full knowledge of petitioner's... character.

the power to investigate... distinct... he power to suspend preventively an erring public officer.

Petitioner argues that before an inquiry may be converted into a full-blown administrative
investigation, the official concerned must be given 72 hours to answer the charges against him.
In his case, petitioner says the inquiry was converted into an administrative investigation...
without him being given the required number of hours to answer.

Indeed, it does not appear that petitioner was given the requisite 72 hours to submit a written
answer to the complaint against him. This, however, does not make invalid the preventive
suspension order issued against him. As we have earlier stated, a preventive suspension
order... may be issued even before the charges against the official concerned is heard.

Issues:

preventive suspension order issued on June 25, 1999

Petitioner is now before this Court assailing the validity of the said order.

whether or not the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation over a particular act or omission...
whether or not petitioner, after investigation, may be held administratively liable

Ruling:

placed under preventive suspension without pay for the maximum period of six months and told
to cease and desist from holding office immediately.

criminal and administrative cases... against petitioner and the other city officials involved.
Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this
recommendation.

We have previously interpreted the phrase "under his authority" to mean that the Ombudsman
can preventively suspend all officials under investigation by his office, regardless of the branch
of government in which they are employed,[11] excepting of course... those removable by
impeachment, members of Congress and the Judiciary.

The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the
Deputy Ombudsman. This is the clear import of Section 24 of R.A. 6770 abovecited.

There can be no question in this case as to the power and authority of respondent Deputy
Ombudsman to issue an order of preventive suspension against an official like the petitioner, to
prevent that official from using his office to intimidate or influence witnesses[12] or to tamper
with records that might be vital to the prosecution of the case against him.

Preventive suspension under Sec. 24, R.A. 6770, to repeat, may be imposed when, among
other factors, the evidence of guilt is strong. The period for which an official may be preventively
suspended must not exceed six months. In this case, petitioner was preventively suspended...
and ordered to cease and desist from holding office for the entire period of six months, which is
the maximum provided by law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED insofar as it seeks to declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion in conducting an inquiry on complaints against petitioner,
and ordering their investigation pursuant to respondents' mandate under the

Constitution and the Ombudsman Law. But the petition is hereby GRANTED insofar as it seeks
to declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion concerning the period of
preventive suspension imposed on petitioner, which is the maximum of six months, it...
appearing that 24 days the number of days from the date petitioner was suspended on June 25,
1999, to the date of our status quo order on July 19, 1999 were sufficient for the purpose.
Accordingly, petitioner's preventive suspension, embodied in the order of respondent Deputy

Ombudsman, dated June 25, 1999, should now be, as it is hereby, LIFTED immediately.
Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation v. Heirs of Angel Teves,

Facts:
Andres Abanto's heirs executed an “Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased
Andres Abanto
and Simultaneous Sale.”[2] In this document, Abanto's heirs adjudicated unto themselves the
two lots and sold the
(a) unregistered lot of 193,789 square meters to the United Planters Sugar Milling
Company, Inc. (UPSUMCO), and
(b) the registered lot covered by TCT No. H-37 to Angel M. Teves, for a total sum of
P115,000.00. The sale was not registered.
Out of respect for his uncle Ignacio Montenegro, who was UPSUMCO's founder and president,
Teves verbally allowed UPSUMCO to use the lot covered by TCT No H-37 for pier and loading
facilities, free of charge subject to the condition that UPSUMCO shall shoulder the payment of
real property taxes and that its occupation shall be co- terminus with its corporate existence.
UPSUMCO then built a guesthouse and pier facilities on the property.
Years later, UPSUMCO’s properties were acquired by the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
Later, PNB transferred the same properties to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) which, in turn,
sold the same to the Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation (URSUMCO). URSUMCO then
took possession of UPSUMCO’s properties, including Teves' lot covered by TCT No. H-37.
Upon learning of URSUMCO's acquisition of his lot, Teves formally asked the corporation to turn
over to him possession thereof or the corresponding rentals. He stated in his demand letters
that he merely allowed UPSUMCO to use his property until its corporate dissolution; and that it
was not mortgaged by UPSUMCO with the PNB and, therefore, not included among the
foreclosed properties acquired by URSUMCO.
URSUMCO refused to heed Teves' demand, claiming that it acquired the right to occupy the
property from UPSUMCO which purchased it from Andres Abanto; and that it was merely
placed in the name of Angel Teves, as shown by the “Deed of Transfer and Waiver of Rights
and Possession” dated November 26, 1987.[7] Under this document, UPSUMCO transferred to
URSUMCO its application for agricultural and foreshore lease. The same document partly
states that the lands subject of the foreshore and agricultural lease applications are bounded on
the north by the "titled property of Andres Abanto bought by the transferor (UPSUMCO) but
placed in the name of Angel Teves". URSUMCO further claimed that it was UPSUMCO, not
Teves, which has been paying the corresponding realty taxes.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner herein has the legal capacity to question the validity of the sale
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that An innocent purchaser is one who acquired the property for a
valuable consideration, not knowing that the title of the vendor or grantor is null and void. He is
also one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to,
or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.
The concept underscores two important factors: (1) the property which is bought for
consideration, and (2) the lack of knowledge or notice of adverse claim or interest prior to the
sale. Both factors are not present insofar as petitioner URSUMCO is concerned.
For one, petitioner acquired almost all of UPSUMCO’S properties for a consideration but failed
to prove that the lot covered by TCT No. H - 37 was included therein. In fact, the lot was not
among the properties acquired by petitioner from the APT whose holdings were limited only to
those UPSUMCO properties foreclosed by the PNB. Also, the “Deed of Transfer and Waiver of
Rights and Possession” shows that only the following properties and rights of UPSUMCO were
transferred to petitioner URSUMCO:
1. The guest house and pier at Campuyo site in the Municipality of Manjuyod, Negros
Oriental;

2. A parcel of land consisting of twenty five (25) hectares, more or less, leading to the
Campuyo pier which is the subject matter of UPSUMCO's agricultural lease application pending
with the Bureau of Lands and Land District Officer, Dumaguete City; and

3. Pending application for an industrial or foreshore lease of that portion of the adjacent
government land approximately 270,000 square meters, later amended to be 16,000 square
meters.

The foregoing list does not specifically include the subject lot. Admittedly, the same “Deed of
Transfer and Waiver of Rights and Possession” states that a “titled property of Andres Abanto
bought by the transferor (UPSUMCO) but placed in the name of Angel Teves” is on the northern
boundary of the above-mentioned lands subject of the foreshore and agricultural lease
applications.[26] However, such description is insufficient to establish that the “titled property” is
indeed owned by UPSUMCO.

Municipality of Kapalong vs. Moya

FACTS: From portions of the Municipality of Kapalong, President Carlos P. Garcia created
respondent Municipality of Santo Tomas, and the latter now asserts jurisdiction over eight (8)
barrios of petitioner. For many years and on several occasions, this conflict of boundaries
between the two municipalities was brought, at the instance of private respondent, to the
Provincial Board of Davao for it to consider and decide. However, it appears that no action was
taken on the same. Private respondent then filed a complaint with the then Court of First
Instance of Davao, presided over by herein public respondent Judge Felix L. Moya against the
Municipality of Kapalong, for settlement of the municipal boundary dispute, recovery of collected
taxes and damages, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 475
ISSUE: whether or not the Municipality of Santo Tomas legally exists.

HELD: Petitioner contends that the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General (15 SCRA
569) is clear that the President has no power to create municipalities. Thus, there is no
Municipality of Santo Tomas to speak of It has no right to assert, no cause of action, no
corporate existence at all, and it must perforce remain part and parcel of Kapalong. Based on
this premise, it submits that respondent Judge should have dismissed the case.

On the ground of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the settlement of boundary disputes is
administrative in nature and should originate in the political or administrative agencies of the
government, and not in the courts whose power is limited to judicial review on appropriate
occasions (Ibid., pp. 73-74).

Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that only “entities authorized by law
may be patties in a civil action.” Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has
no power to create a municipality. Since private respondent has no legal personality, it can not
be a party to any civil action, and as such, respondent Judge should have dismissed the case,
since further proceedings would be pointless.

Tan vs. Commission on Elections

FACTS: Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, Petitioners
herein, who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and
municipalities therein, filed a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents from
conducting the plebiscite which was scheduled "to be conducted in the proposed new province
which are the areas affected, excluding the original province."

ISSUES: WON the law is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the LGC as in
Art. XI, Sec. 3, of the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The cited provision plainly provides that, "no province, city, municipality or barrio
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." The phrase "the
unit or units affected" refers to both the original province and the new province sought to be
created as these political groups will both be affected. Hence, the two must be included in the
plebiscite contemplated therein.

Joson vs. Torres

FACTS

Petitioner Governor Joson was filed a complaint before the Office of the President for barging
violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men.
The case was endorsed to the DILG. For failure to file an answer after three (3) extensions,
petitioner was declared in default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive suspension.
Petitioner later “Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation”. DILG denied the motion declaring that
the submission of position papers substantially complies with the requirements of procedural
due process in administrative proceedings. Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the
President, adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. The former
imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without pay.

ISSUES

Whether or not:

(a) Preventive suspension is proper;

(b) Procedural due process is violated;
(c) The resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue delegation; that it is the
President who is the Disciplining Authority, not the Secretary of DILG;
RULING

“(a) Yes. Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a)
after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of
the offense, there is great probability that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence. The act of respondent in allegedly barging violently into the session hall of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men constitutes grave misconduct. The
allegations of complainants are bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two (2) employees of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Respondent who is the chief executive of the province is in a
position to influence the witnesses. Further, the history of violent confrontational politics in the
province dictates that extreme precautionary measures be taken.

“(b) Yes. The rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due
process. Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference, the
Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal
investigation. This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to
determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted. The records show that petitioner
filed a motion for formal investigation. There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases
against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O. No. 23
states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and hearing.

“(c) No. The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is
delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline. The power to discipline
evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the
power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government
officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special
Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue
delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson’s claim.

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency “…which recognizes the establishment of a
single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution
or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”

This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President provided in the Constitution.
Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive
Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members
except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the
President in certain matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control
(and supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of a department is, and must be,
the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by
law to exercise authority.

Malinao vs. Reyes

FACTS Virginia Malinao is Human Resource Manager III of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. Respondent Mayor
filed a case against her in the Office of the Ombudsman for gross neglect of duty, inefficiency and
incompetence. While the case was pending, he appointed a replacement for petitioner. Petitioner then
filed an administrative case against respondent Mayor in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque,
charging him with abuse of authority and denial of due process. In an executive session of the
Sanggunian, a vote of 5-3 found respondent Mayor guilty of the charge and imposed on him the penalty
of one-month suspension, which decision was signed by only one member, Rodrigo Sotto, who was also
the Presiding Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Committee of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. As a result,
respondent Mayor questioned said decision and alleged that since only Sotto alone signed the decision it
can only be considered as a recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Committee and he was not bound by it.
Respondent Mayor also sent a letter to the Secretary of the DILG regarding the decision of the committee
to which the Secretary opined that it does not appear to be in accordance with Section 66 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. On the other hand, petitioner sent a letter to respondent Governor Reyes,
demanding that the "Decision" suspending respondent Mayor from office be implemented without further
delay, but Reyes declined since he agreed with the opinion of the Secretary. Thus, respondent Mayor was
acquitted from the charges by the Sanggunian in a vote of 7-2.

ISSUE Whether or not the "Decision" had become final and executory, for failure of respondent Mayor to
appeal, thus it was beyond the power of the Sanggunian to render another decision.

RULING These contentions are without merit. What petitioner claims to be the "Decision" of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan bore the signature of only one member (Rodrigo V. Sotto) who signed the
"Decision" as "Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee, Sangguniang Panlalawigan.” Contrary to
petitioner's claim, what the minutes only show is that on August 12, 1994 the Sanggunian took a vote on
the administrative case of respondent Mayor and not that it then rendered a decision as required by
Section 66(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) which provides as follows: Section 66.
Form and Notice of Decision. — (a) The investigation of the case shall be terminated within ninety (90)
days from the start thereof. Within thirty (30) days after the end of the investigation, the Office of the
President or the sanggunian concerned shall render a decision in writing stating clearly and distinctly the
facts and the reasons for such decision. Copies of said decision shall immediately be furnished the
respondent and all interested parties. In order to render a decision in administrative cases involving
elective local officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must thus be "in writing stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision." What the Sanggunian, therefore, did on August 12,
1994 was not to render a decision. Neither may the so-called "Decision" prepared by Sanggunian Member
Rodrigo V. Sotto on September 5, 1994 be regarded as the decision of the Sanggunian for lack of the
signatures of the requisite majority.
Sangguniang Bayan of Don Mariano Marcos vs. Martinez,

Facts:

the trial court ruled that the Sangguniang Bayan of Bayombong, Neuva Vizcaya (Sangguniang
Bayan), exceeded its jurisdiction when it imposed upon respondent Severino Martinez the
administrative... penalty of removal from office.

Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay is the legislative body of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos,
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, a local government unit created, organized and existing as such
under pertinent laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

Petitioner alleged that Martinez committed the following acts:

Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the income of their solid waste
management project since 2001 particularly the sale of fertilizer derived from composting.

Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer the sale of recyclable materials taken from
garbage collection.

Using the garbage truck for other purposes like hauling sand and gravel for private persons
without monetary benefit to the barangay because no income from this source appears in the
year end report even if payments were collected x x x.

Using/spending barangay funds for repair, gasoline, lubricants, wheels and other spare parts of
the garbage truck instead of using the money or income of said truck from the garbage fees
collected as income from its Sold Waste Management Project. x x x.

Unliquidated traveling expenses for Seminar/Lakbay-Aral in 2003 because although a cash

advance was made by the respondent for the said purpose, he, however, did not attend said
seminar because on the dates when he was supposed to be on seminar they saw him in the
barangay.

x x x.
That several attempts to discuss said problem during sessions were all in vain because
respondent declined to discuss it and would adjourn the session.x x x.

Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the income of their solid waste
management project since 2001 particularly the sale of fertilizer derived from composting.

Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer the sale of recyclable materials taken from
garbage collection.

Using the garbage truck for other purposes like hauling sand and gravel for private persons
without monetary benefit to the barangay because no income from this source appears in the
year end report even if payments were collected x x x.

Using/spending barangay funds for repair, gasoline, lubricants, wheels and other spare parts of
the garbage truck instead of using the money or income of said truck from the garbage fees
collected as income from its Sold Waste Management Project. x x x.

Unliquidated traveling expenses for Seminar/Lakbay-Aral in 2003 because although a cash

advance was made by the respondent for the said purpose, he, however, did not attend said
seminar because on the dates when he was supposed to be on seminar they saw him in the
barangay.

x x x.

That several attempts to discuss said problem during sessions were all in vain because
respondent declined to discuss it and would adjourn the session.x x x.[

December

2004

Upon his failure to file an Answer to the Amended Administrative Complaint dated 6 December
2004, Martinez was declared by the Sangguniang Bayan as in default. Pending the
administrative proceedings, Martinez was placed under preventive suspension for 60 days or
until 8 August
Upon his failure to file an Answer to the Amended Administrative Complaint dated 6 December
2004, Martinez was declared by the Sangguniang Bayan as in default. Pending the
administrative proceedings, Martinez was placed under preventive suspension for 60 days or
until 8 August

2005.[7]

Issues:

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez,
an elective local official, from office. The pertinent legal provisions and cases decided by this
Court firmly establish that the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to do so.

Ruling
The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from
office is intended as a check against partisan activity. Vesting the local legislative body with the
power to remove from office a local chief executive, and only relegating to the courts a
mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of the case from
partisanship. 5. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official would merit the
penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed with the RTC. Once the court assumes
jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during
the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most
extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the
elective official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official from service is
warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court.

Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts: August 12, 1977, the municipal officials of Makati, destroyed and removed the gates
constructed/located at the corner of Reposo Street and Jupiter Street as well as the gates/fences
located/constructed at Jupiter Street and Makati Avenue forcibly, and then opened the entire length of
Jupiter Street to public traffic. Subsequently, Petitioners brought the present action for damages against
the defendant-appellant Ayala Corporation predicated on both breach of contract and on tort or quasi-
delict A supplemental complaint was later filed by said Petitioners seeking to augment the reliefs prayed
for in the original complaint because of alleged supervening events which occurred during the trial of the
case. That the exclusivity of the said village was adversely affected and diminished due to the opening of
the said streets to the public. That the exclusivity of the said village was guaranteed in the restrictions of
TCT.

Issue: Whether the Right to Non-Impairment of Contracts of the complainants was violated by the
Respondents in an resolution promoting the welfare of the general public?

Held: No, while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since
it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., “the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people.’ Invariably described as “the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers” and “in a
sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government,” the exercise of the power may be
judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there
having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. Police
power is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow
circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a
democratic way of life. The court do not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to
property should not be made to prevail through the state’s exercise of its police power.

Undoubtedly, the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police
power. The petitioners have not shown why we should hold otherwise other than for the supposed “non-
impairment” guaranty of the Constitution, which, as we have declared, is secondary to the more
compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary
or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed. In that connection, we find no
reversible error to have been committed by the Court of Appeals.

Albon vs. Fernando

Facts:

In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen, clear and repair the existing
sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. It was undertaken by the city government pursuant to
Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993 like other infrastructure projects relating to roads, streets and sidewalks
previously undertaken by the city.

On June 14, 1999, petitioner Aniano A. Albon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina a taxpayer’s
suit for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with damages against respondents, City Mayor Bayani F.
Fernando, et al. Petitioner claimed that it was unconstitutional and unlawful for respondents to use
government equipment and property, and to disburse public funds, of the City of Marikina for the grading,
widening, clearing, repair and maintenance of the existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights
Subdivision. He alleged that the sidewalks were private property because Marikina Greenheights
Subdivision was owned by V.V. Soliven, Inc. Hence, the city government could not use public resources on
them. In undertaking the project, therefore, respondents allegedly violated the constitutional proscription
against the use of public funds for private purposes as well as Sections 335 and 336 of RA 7160 and the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner further alleged that there was no appropriation for the
project.

Ruling:

Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes set forth in the
Local Government Code (RA 7160). It is expressly vested with police powers delegated to LGUs under the
general welfare clause of RA 7160. With this power, LGUs may prescribe reasonable regulations to
protect the lives, health, and property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their
respective territorial jurisdictions.

Cities and municipalities also have the power to exercise such powers and discharge such functions and
responsibilities as may be necessary, appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the
basic services and facilities, including infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of
their residents and which are financed by their own funds. These infrastructure facilities include
municipal or city roads and bridges and similar facilities.

There is no question about the public nature and use of the sidewalks in the Marikina Greenheights
Subdivision. One of the “whereas clauses” of PD 1216 (which amended PD 957) declares that open
spaces, roads, alleys and sidewalks in a residential subdivision are for public use and beyond the
commerce of man. In conjunction herewith, PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, mandates subdivision
owners to set aside open spaces which shall be devoted exclusively for the use of the general public.

Thus, the trial and appellate courts were correct in upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993. It
was enacted in the exercise of the City of Marikina’s police powers to regulate the use of sidewalks.
However, both the trial and appellate courts erred when they invoked our 1991 decision in White Plains
Association and automatically applied it in this case.

The ruling in the 1991 White Plains Association decision relied on by both the trial and appellate courts
was modified by this Court in 1998 in White Plains Association v. Court of Appeals. Citing Young v. City of
Manila, this Court held in its 1998 decision that subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated to
the government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation.
The word “street,” in its correct and ordinary usage, includes not only the roadway used for carriages and
vehicular traffic generally but also the portion used for pedestrian travel. The part of the street set aside
for the use of pedestrians is known as a sidewalk. Ownership of the sidewalks in a private subdivision
belongs to the subdivision owner/developer until it is either transferred to the government by way of
donation or acquired by the government through expropriation.

Section 335 of RA 7160 is clear and specific that no public money or property shall be appropriated or
applied for private purposes. This is in consonance with the fundamental principle in local fiscal
administration that local government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes.

In Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, the Court laid down the test of validity of a public expenditure: it
is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity and not
the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the
community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental
advantage to the public or to the State resulting from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity
of private enterprises or business does not justify their aid by the use of public money.

In Pascual, the validity of RA 920 (“An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works”) which appropriated
P85,000 for the construction, repair, extension and improvement of feeder roads within a privately-owned
subdivision was questioned. The Court held that where the land on which the projected feeder roads
were to be constructed belonged to a private person, an appropriation made by Congress for that purpose
was null and void.

Velasco vs. Villegas

Facts: In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of Manila,
petitioners challenge the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, which
prohibited the business of massaging customers of a barber shop. They contend that it amounts to a
deprivation of property of their means of livelihood without due process of law.

Issue: Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an improper exercise of police power

Held: No. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondents-
appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: “(1) To be able to
impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No.
3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the
business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the
construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.”

The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far
back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the
significance and scope of such a clause, which “delegates in statutory form the police power to a
municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and
has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such,
it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence.”

Rural Bank of Makati Inc. vs. Municipality of Makati

Facts:

Upon the request of the municipal treasurer, in August 1990, Atty. Victor A.L. Valero, then the municipal
attorney of the Municipality of Makati, went to the Rural Bank of Makati to inquire about the bank’s
payments of taxes and fees to the municipality. Petitioner Magdalena V. Landicho, corporate secretary of
the bank, said that the bank was exempt from paying taxes under Republic Act No. 720, as amended.

On November 19, 1990, the municipality filed complaint with the Prosecutor’s Office, charging petitioners
Esteban S. Silva, president and general manager of the bank and Magdalena V. Landicho for violation of
Section 21(a), Chapter II, Article 3 in relation to Sections 105 and 169 of the Metropolitan Tax Code. On
April 5, 1991, the municipality submitted two (2) Information with the MTC against the respondent bank:
1) for non-payment of the mayor’s permit fee and 2) for non-payment of annual business tax. While said
cases were pending with the municipal court, respondent municipality ordered the closure of the bank.
This prompted petitioners to pay, under protest, the mayor’s permit fee and the annual fixed tax in the
amount of P82,408.66.

On October 18, 1991, petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages.
Petitioners alleged that they were constrained to pay the amount of P82,408.66 because of the closure
order, issued despite the pendency of the criminal cases and the lack of any notice or assessment of the
fees to be paid. They averred that the collection of the taxes/fees was oppressive, arbitrary, unjust and
illegal. Additionally, they alleged that respondent Atty. Valero had no power to enforce laws and
ordinances, thus his action in enforcing the collection of the permit fees and business taxes was ultra
vires.

Respondent municipality asserted that petitioners’ payment of P82,408.66 was for a legal obligation
because the payment of the mayor’s permit fee as well as the municipal business license was required of
all business concerns. According to respondent, said requirement was in furtherance of the police power
of the municipality to regulate businesses.

RTC rules in favor of the municipal of Makati. According to the trial court, the bank was engaged in
business as a rural bank. Hence, it should secure the necessary permit and business license, as well as
pay the corresponding charges and fees. It found that the municipality had authority to impose licenses
and permit fees on persons engaging in business, under its police power embodied under the general
welfare clause. Also, the RTC declared unmeritorious petitioners’ claim for exemption under Rep. Act No.
720 since said exemption had been withdrawn by Executive Order No. 93 and the Rural Bank Act of 1992.
These statutes no longer exempted rural banks from paying corporate income taxes and local taxes, fees
and charges.

The CA affirmed RTC’s decision in toto. CA also brushed aside petitioners’ claim that the general welfare
clause is limited only to legislative action. It declared that the exercise of police power by the municipality
was mandated by the general welfare clause, which authorizes the local government units to enact
ordinances, not only to carry into effect and discharge such duties as are conferred upon them by law, but
also those for the good of the municipality and its inhabitants. This mandate includes the regulation of
useful occupations and enterprises. Hence the present complaint.

Petitioner bank claims that the closure of the bank was an improper exercise of police power because a
municipal corporation has no inherent but only delegated police power, which must be exercised not by
the municipal mayor but by the municipal council through the enactment of ordinances. It also assailed
the Court of Appeals for invoking the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which took effect in 1992, when the closure of the bank was actually done on
July 31, 1991.

ISSUE: Whether or not the municipality’s police power covers the power to tax and the power to order the
respondent’s bank closure.

HELD:

Rep. Act No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 4106, approved on July 19, 1964, had exempted rural
banks with net assets not exceeding one million pesos (P1,000,000) from the payment of all taxes,
charges and fees. The records show that as of December 29, 1986, petitioner bank’s net assets
amounted only to P745,432.29. Hence, petitioner bank could claim to be exempt from payment of all
taxes, charges and fees under the aforementioned provision. However, EO 93 was issued by then
President Aquino, withdrawing all tax and duty incentives with certain exceptions. Notably, not included
among the exceptions were those granted to rural banks under Rep. Act No. 720. With the passage of
said law, petitioner could no longer claim any exemption from payment of business taxes and permit
fees.

Indeed the Local Government Code of 1991 was not yet in effect when the municipality ordered petitioner
bank’s closure on July 31, 1991. However, the general welfare clause invoked by the Court of Appeals is
not found on the provisions of said law alone. Even under the old Local Government Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337) which was then in effect, a general welfare clause was provided for in Section 7
thereof.

Municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-
government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out
the declared objects of their creation. The authority of a local government unit to exercise police power
under a general welfare clause is not a recent development. This was already provided for as early as the
Administrative Code of 1917. Thus, the closure of the bank was a valid exercise of police power pursuant
to the general welfare clause contained in and restated by B.P. Blg. 337, which was then the law
governing local government units. No reversible error arises in this instance insofar as the validity of
respondent municipality’s exercise of police power for the general welfare is concerned.

The general welfare clause has two branches. The first, known as the general legislative power,
authorizes the municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may
be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal
council by law. The second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact
ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their
property.

In the present case, the ordinances imposing licenses and requiring permits for any business
establishment, for purposes of regulation enacted by the municipal council of Makati, fall within the
purview of the first branch of the general welfare clause. Moreover, the ordinance of the municipality
imposing the annual business tax is part of the power of taxation vested upon local governments as
provided for under Section 8 of B.P. Blg. 337.

Consequently, the municipal mayor, as chief executive, was clothed with authority to create a Special
Task Force headed by respondent Atty. Victor A.L. Valero to enforce and implement said ordinances and
resolutions and to file appropriate charges and prosecute violators. Respondent Valero could hardly be
faulted for performing his official duties under the cited circumstances.

Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao

FACTS:

On February 22, 1968, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 6537. The ordinace was
signed by Mayor Antonio Villegas.

Section 1 of said Ordinance prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any
position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without
first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00.
Exempted are persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the
technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those
working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or
denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
In May 1968, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a petition for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well
as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. He cited the following grounds:

As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is
discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;

As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing
a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to
prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental
principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers:

It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their
rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Constitution.

The trial court ruled in Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho's favor, declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether Ordinance No. 6537 is unconstitutional. -- YES.

HELD:

The SC upheld the ruling of the trial court that Ordinance No. 6537 is null and void, for the following
reasons:
Ordinance No. 6537 is a tax measure.

Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it
violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely
tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise
of the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature.

But the SC said tha while it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an
employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing
and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in
character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a
revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared
for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of
regulation.

Ordinance No. 6537 is unreasonable.

The Ordinance is excessive because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among
individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does
not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial
differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of
P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full
time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive

Ordinance No. 6537 does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the
exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.

Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his
discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up
any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a
permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring
upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such
ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity
per se lawful.

Ordinance o. 6537 violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to
engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit
aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of
law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and
equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

City of Manila vs. Laguio, Jr.

FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in
the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in
Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993,
MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila
(City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled–

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING

CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-
MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling:

(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and
oppressive exercise of police power;

(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all
kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and

(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.

HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance,
as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the
City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC,
known as the general welfare clause.

The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

A. The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution

The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.

The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the
people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the
law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Requisites for the valid exercise

of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance,
and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even
under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral
values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Council’s police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof
were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community’s social ills can be
achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions
rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion
into businesses “allowed” under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its
purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills
of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of
the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that
reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a
mere likelihood or a naked assumption.

If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead
impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for
these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to
reasonably accomplish the desired end.

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the
governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental
right to liberty and property.
Modality employed is

unlawful taking

It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without
just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the
government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking.

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three (3) months from
its approval within which to “wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area.” The
directive to “wind up business operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent
deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to
accommodate an “allowed” business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty
and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of
property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.

The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into
allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent
violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a “taking” of private property.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance,
although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a “wholesome” property to a use which can not
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Private
property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without
compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The police
powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be
stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down
establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon
no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities
as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should
have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance
does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to disturb the community,”
“annoy the inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.”

The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide
the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the
due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on
their business.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause

In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting
motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights

conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a
just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-
Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if
located outside the area.

The standard “where women are used as tools for entertainment” is also discriminatory as
prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession exclusive to women.
Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is
invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant

to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local government
units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and
other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate
them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and
prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing
the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or
comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven
in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.

Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499.
As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a
commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial
establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an
ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to
enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.

Conclusion

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to
enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Petition Denied.
Monteverde vs. Generoso

Facts:

Tomas Monteverde is an owner of a parcel of land in Davao. He has a torrens titile obtained in 1921

The land was bounded by the Agdao River. The tmbongon Creek is a branch of the river and runs through
the Monteverde land. He then constructed 2 dams across the river and 4 dams across the creek. The 2
dams were destroyed by th order of the district engineer. The provincial governor also threatened to
destroy the other dams in the creek. The motive was to safeguard public health

To prevent the contemplated action, Monteverde sought in CFI of Davao an injunction to restrain the
respondents from destroying the dams

Issue

May the Government be authorized to destroy a private property without any judicial proceedings whatso
ever under the pretense that such property constitutes nuisance

Held

No , It should be added that the fishponds were constructed in 1921 and 1922 and did not exist as a result
of a concession in Spanish times. The Dreek is navigable and such is of public ownership

The reason for the contemplated action of the go=vernor and the legal authority on which he relied are
apparent in the leetr sent by the governor to Monteverde.

Admin Code Grants the minucipal council the power by ordinance or resolution to declare prevent and
abate nuisance. Water Law on the other hand says any person may construct on his property ponds for
bathing commercial or recreative purpose with notice to the governor. The governor may have the power
to suspend work if after consultation with experts, it appears the project will be prejudicial to public
interest. Thus privete party may appeal to the government

Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Polo Coconut Plantation Co. Inc

FACTS:

Sometime in 2003, a parcel of land owned by Polo Coconut Plantation, Inc. (Polo Coconut) in Tanjay,
Negros Oriental was placed under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. A Notice of Coverage
was sent to Polo Coconut.
Meanwhile, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) received from the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) a Memorandum of Valuation, indicating the amount of P85,491,784.60 as just compensation for
the Polo Coconut property. A Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition was then sent to Polo Coconut.
Subsequently, a Certificate of Deposit was issued to Polo Coconut for the said amount.

After Polo Coconut failed to reply to the Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition, the DAR, after it
conducted summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation, affirmed the valuation
offered by LBP in the amount of P85,491,784.60.

Meanwhile, Polo Coconut’s title was canceled. Thus, a collective Certificate of Land Ownership Award,
with CLOA No. 00114438, was issued and was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
802, in favor of POPARMUCO members whom the Department of Agrarian Reform identified as agrarian
reform beneficiaries.

Polo Coconut filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari questioning the propriety of
subjecting its property to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program assailing, among others, the
eligibility of the identified agrarian reform beneficiaries.

The CA ruled in favor of Polo Coconut. It held that the identified beneficiaries were not qualified as
beneficiaries, as they were not tenants of Polo Coconut.

When appealed to the Supreme Court (SC), in its September 3, 2008 Decision, in Department of Agrarian
Reform v. Polo Coconut Plantation Company, Inc. (586 Phil. 69) it reversed the CA Decision. It declared
the issuance of TCT No. T-802 and CLOA No. 00114438 as valid. The Court further recognized the DAR as
the proper authority to identify and select agrarian reform beneficiaries.

The September 3, 2008 Decision became final and executory on November 26, 2008.

Seven (7) months later, on June 30, 2009, Alcantara, et al. filed the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion. They
questioned the inclusion of POPARMUCO’s members as beneficiaries and recipients of Certificates of
Land Ownership Award. They alleged that the beneficiaries are not qualified under Section 22 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

On July 1, 2009, Alcantara, et al. also filed a Petition for Immediate Issuance of a Cease and Desist Order
and/or Injunction. Thus, they sought a Cease and Desist Order to preserve their legal rights while the
administrative proceedings for the inclusion/exclusion of farmer beneficiaries were pending resolution.

Acting on the Petition, Regional Director Inson issued a Cease and Desist Order directing the Certificate of
Land Ownership Award holders to CEASE and DESIST from entering or taking possession of the property
pending final determination of the inclusion-exclusion proceedings.
POPARMUCO members, who are Certificate of Land Ownership Award holders, filed a Motion to Quash
the Cease and Desist Order. They alleged that the Cease and Desist Order defied the Supreme Court’s
September 3, 2008 Decision.

POPARMUCO also filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Contempt against Regional Director
Inson, praying that a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued, directing him to cease:
(1) from enforcing the Cease and Desist Order in light of the Petition; and (2) from reviewing the
beneficiaries, as the SC had decided with finality on the issue. It further prayed that this Court hold
Regional Director Inson guilty of contempt of court.

ISSUES:

A. Whether or not Alcantara et. al. may question the validity of the collective Certificate of Land
Ownership Award with CLOA No. 00114438 issued to POPARMUCO.

B. Whether or not Director Inson’s cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion of farmer
beneficiaries, and his subsequent issuance of the Cease and Desist Order constitute contempt of court.

RULING:

A. No. The September 3, 2008 Decision had already become final and executory. The finality of this
Decision meant that:

Nothing is more settled in law than that a judgment, once it attains finality, becomes immutable and
unalterable, and can no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. This
rule rests on the principle that all litigation must come to an end, however unjust the result of error may
appear; otherwise, litigation will become even more intolerable than the wrong or injustice it is designed
to correct [Land Bank of the Philippines v. Suntay, 678 Phil. 879, 908-909 (2011)].

In Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform [526 Phil. 700 (2006)], the Court held that certificates of
title issued pursuant to emancipation patents are as indefeasible as transfer certificates of title issued in
registration proceedings. Further, it ruled that the transfer certificates of title issued to the petitioners
became indefeasible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the issuance of the emancipation patents.

Here, by the time the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion was filed on June 30, 2009, the September 3, 2008
Decision declaring the validity of CLOA No. 00114438 had attained finality and TCT No. T-802 had already
become incontrovertible. As registered property owners, POPARMUCO’s members were entitled to the
protection given to every Torrens title holder. Their rights may only be forfeited in case of violations of
agrarian laws, as well as noncompliance with the restrictions and conditions under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law.

B. Regional Director Inson’s cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion does not constitute
defiance of the September 3, 2008 Decision.

In Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Paruñgao [701 Phil. 444 (2013)], the SC explained the concept of
contempt of court:
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice,
and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the court’s order, hut such conduct which tends to
bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede
the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or
prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of
an order of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly
defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is
forbidden or required.

Here, Regional Director Inson justified his cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion based on the
Department’s exclusive prerogative in the identification, selection, and subsequent re-evaluation of
agrarian reform beneficiaries.

However, as earlier stated, the issue on the qualification of the existing Certificate of Land Ownership
Award holders had long been laid to rest in this Court’s final and executory September 3, 2008 Decision.

Still, Regional Director Inson’s erroneous cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion can only be
deemed as grave abuse of discretion, which is more properly the subject of a petition for certiorari, not a
petition for contempt.

At any rate, whether Regional Director Inson’s actions were improper is not an issue here. What is crucial
in contempt proceedings is the intent of the alleged contemnor to disobey or defy the court as held in St.
Louis University, Inc. v. Olairez [730 Phil. 444 (2014)]:

In contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith or lack of it, of the
alleged contemnor is considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show on
its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the
presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be determinative of its
character. . . . To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper
purpose.

There is no clear and contumacious conduct on the part of Regional Director Inson. His acts do not
qualify as a willful disobedience to this Court nor a willful disregard of its authority.

Philippine Petroleum Corporation vs. Municipality of Pililia,

FACTS:

Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC for short) is a business enterprise engaged in the manufacture of
a petroleum product, with its refinery plant situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal, conducting its business
activities within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Pililla, Rizal

Under Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1939, manufactured oils and other fuels are
subject to specific tax.
Respondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, through Municipal Council Resolution No. 25, S-1974 enacted
Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1, S-1974 otherwise known as “The Pililla Tax Code of 1974”. Sections 9 and
10 of the said ordinance imposed a tax on business, except for those for which fixed taxes are provided in
the Local Tax Code

The respondents then filed a complaint for the collection of business tax, storage permit fees, mayor’s
permit and sanitary inspection fees.

ISSUE 1:

WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC, is still liable to pay tax on
business unto the respondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal

HELD 1: YES, a tax on business is distinct from a tax on the article itself.

RATIO 1: While Section 2 of P.D. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products, said
decree did not amend Sections 19 and 19 (a) of P.D. 231 as amended by P.D. 426, wherein the
municipality is granted the right to levy taxes on business of manufacturers, importers, producers of any
article of commerce of whatever kind or nature.

The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present Constitution. To allow
the continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC No. 26-73 (1) would be tantamount to
restricting their power to tax by mere administrative issuances. Under Section 5, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, only guidelines and limitations that may be established by Congress can define and limit
such power of local governments.

ISSUE 2: WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC, is still liable to pay the
storage fee unto the respondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal

HELD 2: NO, Provincial Circular No. 6-77 enjoining all city and municipal treasurers to refrain from
collecting the so-called storage fee on flammable or combustible materials imposed in the local tax
ordinance of their respective locality frees petitioner PPC from the payment of storage permit fee.
RATIO 2: The storage permit fee being imposed by Pililla’s tax ordinance is a fee for the installation and
keeping in storage of any flammable, combustible or explosive substances. Inasmuch as said storage
makes use of tanks owned not by the municipality of Pililla, but by petitioner PPC, same is obviously not a
charge for any service rendered by the municipality as what is envisioned in Section 37 of the same Code.

ISSUE 3: WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC, is still liable to pay the
permit fees unto the respondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal

HELD 3: YES.

RATIO 3: Section 10 (z) (13) of Pililla’s Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 prescribing a permit fee is a permit
fee allowed under Section 36 of the amended Code.

ISSUE 4: WON the mayor has authority to waive payment of the mayor’s permit and sanitary inspection
fees

HELD 4: NO HE DOES NOT, it is the law-making body, and not an executive like the mayor, who can make
an exemption.

RATIO 4: The trial court did not err in holding that “since the power to tax includes the power to exempt
thereof which is essentially a legislative prerogative, it follows that a municipal mayor who is an executive
officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an expression of a policy thru the enactment of a tax.”

In the absence of a clear and express exemption from the payment of said fees, the waiver cannot be
recognized. Under Section 36 of the Code, a permit fee like the mayor’s permit, shall be required before
any individual or juridical entity shall engage in any business or occupation under the provisions of the
Code.

Ortigas and Co. Limited Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust Company

Facts:
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to
Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma
Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use
of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate
of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from
Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted
for banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop
construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according to the
zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to
be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and commercial
zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

Held:

Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act
empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality should be “liberally
construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power to the local government in promoting economic conditions,
social welfare, and material progress in the community”. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of
the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since
it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was
obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general
welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area considering the
amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial
establishments.

Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.

Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
An expropriation proceeding was initiated by petitioner Municipality of Makati against private respondent
Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium Inc., Home Building System and Reality Corp., and Arceli P. Jo
involving a parcel of land and improvements thereon located at San Antonio Village, Makati.

An action for eminent domain was filed. Attached to the petitioner‘s complaint was a certification that a
bank account had been opened with the PNB. After the decision has become final and executory, a writ of
execution was issued and a notice of garnishment was served upon the manager of PNB where the
petitioner had bank accounts. However, the sheriff was informed that a hold code was placed on the
account of the petitioner.

The petitioner contended that its funds at the PNB cocked neither be garnished nor levied upon execution
for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required
under the law.

In a petition with the Court of Appeals, petitioner alleges for the first time that it has actually two accounts
with the PNB, one exclusively for the expropriation of the subject property with the outstanding balance of
P99, 743. 94. The other account was for the obligations and other purposes of the municipal government
with a balance of P170,098,421.72.

ISSUE:

Whether the bank account of a municipality may be levied on execution to satisfy a money judgment
against it absent showing that the municipal council has passed an ordinance appropriating from its
public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due to the RTC decision?

HELD:
YES. Since the first PNB account was specifically opened for expropriation proceedings it has initiated
over the subject property, there is no objection to the garnishment or levy under execution of funds
therein amounting to P4,965,506.40, the funds garnished in excess of P99,743.94, which are public funds
earmarked for the municipal government. Other statutory obligations are exempted from execution
without the proper appropriation required under the law.

The funds deposited in the 2nd PNB account are public funds of the municipal government. The rule is
well-settled that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided by the
statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary
for public use cannot be attached and sold on execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the
municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended
primarily and exclusively for financing governmental activities and functions of the municipality are
exempt from execution. The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar.

This is not to say that private respondents are left with no legal recourse. When a municipality fails or
refuses without justifiable reason to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the
claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the
necessary appropriation ordinance and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds. The court
will not condone petitioner‘s blatant refusal to settle its obligation arising from an expropriation
proceeding it has in fact initiated.

Within the context of the state‘s inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation means not only
the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the
land within a reasonable time from its taking. The state‘s power of eminent domain should be exercised
within the bounds of fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been
taken, the compensation to be paid is fixed, and the municipal has had more than reasonable time to pay
full compensation.

Verceles vs. Commission on Audit

Facts

The Provincial Government of Catanduanes (the province), represented by then Governor Leandro B.
Verceles, Jr. (Verceles), engaged the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) to
carry out the province's tree seedlings production project (the project).[4] The province and PENRO
entered into several Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) to implement the project.

On June 11, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP), through Resolution No. 067-2001, gave blanket
authority to the governor to enter into contracts on behalf of the province.[6] The SP reaffirmed the
authority given to the governor through Resolution Nos. 068-2001 and 069-2001.[7] On the same date, the
SP also resolved to give the governor the power to realign, revise, or modify items in the provincial
budget.[

On February 4, 2003, the COA Audit Team Leader issued an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM),
finding that Verceles should have sought prior authority from the SP pursuant to Sections 22 (c)[14] and
465 (b) (1) (vi)[15] of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code (LGC) before executing any
MOA after the issuance of Resolution No. 104-A-2001.[16]

Verceles filed his comments. The Audit Team Leader forwarded the AOM to the COA Regional Office.[17]
The Regional Office affirmed the AOM and issued Notices of Disallowance in the total amount of
P7,528,175.46.[18]

Verceles moved but failed to obtain reconsideration of the Notices of Disallowance. The Legal and
Adjudication Office also denied his appeal and motion for reconsideration. Verceles elevated the case to
the COA proper (national office) to challenge the disallowed payments. The COA denied Verceles' petition
for lack of merit.

According to Verceles, while prior authorization to enter into a contract is the general rule, the LGC
identifies an exception, i.e., when the contract entered into is pursuant to a law or ordinance. He points
out that the funding for the first and third MOAs were approved and included in the budget of the province
for CYs 2001 and 2002.

Verceles posits that even granting that Resolution No. 104-A-2001 had revoked the governor's blanket
authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the province, the MOAs merely implemented the items
already identified in the appropriation ordinances for CYs 2001 and 2002. Thus, he could (as he did) enter
into the MOAs to implement the approved items in the budget

Verceles claims that the first and third MOAs were covered by appropriations under the EDF of the
Province's CY 2001 and CY 2002 budgets.

The COA, through the Office of the Solicitor General, denies that it gravely abused its discretion when it
affirmed the Notices of Disallowance.
The COA maintains that it correctly disallowed the cost of the project based on the grounds discussed in
the assailed decision.[48] The COA emphasizes that when the local chief executive enters into contracts,
the law requires prior authority from the SP.[49] The COA insists that Verceles executed the MOAs
without the prior authorization from the SP. The appropriation ordinances for CYs 2001 and 2002 did not
specifically authorize Verceles to enter into MOAs with the PENRO

Having affirmed the Notices of Disallowance on legal grounds, the COA insists that it did not abuse, much
less gravely abuse, its discretion. The abuse of discretion that warrants the issuance of the writ of
certiorari must be grave, which means that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner, or that the respondent tribunal refused to perform the duty enjoined or to
act in contemplation of law.[51]

Finally, the COA submits that the right to the speedy disposition of cases is a flexible concept such that a
mere mathematical counting of the time involved is not sufficient; the right is deemed violated only when
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.

The Issue

The issue is whether the COA gravely abused its discretion when it disallowed the payments for the
questioned MOAs and held Verceles[53] liable for the amount disallowed.

Ruling

We partly grant the petition.

Notwithstanding the number of arguments raised by the parties, the Court focuses its attention on two
concepts decisive in the resolution of the present case: (1) the authority of the governor as the local chief
executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the province; and (2) the power of the governor to augment
items in the provincial budget.

The authority of the governor to enter into contracts on behalf of the province

We partly agree with Verceles.

The prior authorization for the local chief executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the local
government unit may be in the form of an appropriation ordinance passed for the year which specifically
covers the project, cost, or contract to be entered into by the local government unit

Quisumbing vs. Garcia

Facts:

(COA) conducted a financial audit on the Province of Cebu for the period ending December 2004. Its
audit team rendered a report, Part II of which states: "Several contracts in the total amount of

P102,092,841.47 were not supported with a Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution authorizing... the
Provincial Governor to enter into a contract, as required under Section 22 of R.A. No. 7160."[2] The audit
team then recommended that, "Henceforth, the local chief executive must secure a sanggunian resolution
authorizing the former to... enter into a contract as provided under Section 22 of R.A. No. 7160."[3]

Gov. Garcia, in her capacity as the Provincial Governor of Cebu, sought the reconsideration of the findings
and recommendation of the COA.

without waiting for the resolution of the reconsideration sought, she instituted an action for Declaratory
Relief before the RTC of

Cebu City

Impleaded as respondents were Delfin P. Aguilar, Helen S. Hilayo and Roy L. Ursal in their official
capacities as Cluster Director IV, Regional Cluster Director and Regional Legal and Adjudication Director
of the COA

The Sangguniang

Panlalawigan of the Province of Cebu, represented by Vice-Governor Gregorio Sanchez, Jr., was also
impleaded as respondent.
Alleging that the infrastructure contracts[4] subject of the audit report complied with the bidding
procedures provided under R.A. No. 9184 and were entered into pursuant to the general and/or
supplemental appropriation ordinances passed by the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Gov. Garcia alleged that a separate authority to enter into such contracts was
no longer necessary.

the trial court rendered the assailed Decision dated July 11, 2006, declaring that Gov. Garcia need not
secure prior authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu before entering into the
questioned contracts.

The dispositive portion of the Decision provides:... the trial court declared that the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan does not have juridical personality nor is it vested by R.A. No. 7160 with authority to sue
and be sued.

On the question of the remedy of declaratory relief being improper because a breach had already been
committed, the trial court held that the case would ripen into and be treated as an ordinary civil action.

In this case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu had already given its... prior authorization when it
passed the appropriation ordinances which authorized the expenditures in the questioned contracts.

The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration[6] filed by Quisumbing, Bacaltos, Carmiano Kintanar,
Jose Ma. Gastardo, and Agnes Magpale, in their capacities as members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Cebu,... In the Petition for Review[8] dated November 22, 2006, petitioners insisted that
the RTC committed reversible error in granting due course to Gov. Garcia's petition for declaratory relief
despite a breach of the law subject of the petition having already... been committed.

Gov. Garcia, in her Comment[9] dated April 10, 2007, notes that the RTC had already dismissed the case
against the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu on the ground that they did not have legal
personality to sue and be sued.

Since... the COA officials also named as respondents in the petition for declaratory relief neither filed a
motion for reconsideration nor appealed the RTC Decision, the said Decision became final and executory.
respondent COA officials in their Comment[10] dated March 8, 2007, maintain that Sections 306 and 346
of R.A. No. 7160 cannot be considered exceptions to Sec.

22(c) of R.A. No. 7160.

Issues:

whether the appropriation ordinance referred to in Sec. 346 in relation to Sec. 306 of R.A. No. 7160 is the
same prior authorization required under Sec. 22(c) of the same law.

Ruling:

To uphold the assailed

Decision would allegedly give the local chief executive unbridled authority to enter into any contract as
long as an appropriation ordinance or budget has been passed by the sanggunian concerned.

the OSG goes on to discuss that Sec. 323 of R.A. No. 7160 allows disbursements for salaries and wages
of existing positions, statutory and contractual obligations and essential operating expenses authorized
in the annual and supplemental budgets of the preceding... year

Although we agree with the OSG that there are factual matters that have yet to be settled in this case, the
records disclose enough facts for the Court to be able to make a definitive ruling on the basic legal
arguments of the parties.

contrary to the trial court's finding, there was no agreement among the parties with regard to the
operative facts under which the case was to be resolved. Nonetheless, we can gather from Gov. Garcia's
silence on the matter and the OSG's own discussion on the effect... of a reenacted budget on the local
chief executive's ability to enter into contracts, that during the year in question, the Province of Cebu was
indeed operating under a reenacted budget.

Note should be taken of the fact that Gov. Garcia, both in her petition for declaratory relief and in her
Comment on the instant petition, has failed to point out the specific provisions in the general and
supplemental appropriation ordinances copiously mentioned in her... pleadings which supposedly
authorized her to enter into the questioned contracts.

prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned is required before the local chief executive may enter
into contracts on behalf of the local government unit.

ov. Garcia posits that Sections 306 and 346 of R.A. No. 7160 are the exceptions to Sec. 22(c) and operate
to allow her to enter into contracts on behalf of the Province of Cebu without further authority from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan other than that already granted in... the appropriation ordinance for 2003 and
the supplemental ordinances which, however, she did not care to elucidate o

Sec. 306 of R.A. No. 7160 merely contains a definition of terms. Read in conjunction with Sec. 346, Sec.
306 authorizes the local chief executive to make disbursements of funds in accordance with the
ordinance authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations. The

"ordinance" referred to in Sec. 346 pertains to that which enacts the local government unit's budget, for
which reason no further authorization from the local council is required, the ordinance functioning, as it
does, as the legislative authorization of the budget.[17]

To construe Sections 306 and 346 of R.A. No. 7160 as exceptions to Sec. 22(c) would render the
requirement of prior sanggunian authorization superfluous, useless and irrelevant. There would be no
instance when such prior authorization would be required, as in... contracts involving the disbursement of
appropriated funds.

this is obviously not the effect Congress had in mind when it required, as a condition to the local chief
executive's representation of the local government unit in business transactions, the prior... authorization
of the sanggunian concerned. The requirement was deliberately added as a measure of check and
balance, to temper the authority of the local chief executive, and in recognition of the fact that the
corporate powers of the local government unit are... wielded as much by its chief executive as by its
council.[

The fact that the Province of Cebu operated under a reenacted budget in 2004 lent a complexion to this
case which the trial court did not apprehend. Sec. 323 of R.A. No. 7160 provides that in case of a
reenacted budget, "only the annual appropriations for salaries and wages of... existing positions, statutory
and contractual obligations, and essential operating expenses authorized in the annual and supplemental
budgets for the preceding year shall be deemed reenacted and disbursement of funds shall be in
accordance therewith."[19]
It should be observed that, as indicated by the word "only" preceding the above enumeration in Sec. 323,
the items for which disbursements may be made under a reenacted budget are exclusive. Clearly,
contractual obligations which were not included in the previous year's... annual and supplemental
budgets cannot be disbursed by the local government unit. It follows, too, that new contracts entered into
by the local chief executive require the prior approval of the sanggunian.

And so, to give life to the obvious intendment of the law and to avoid a construction which would render
Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160 meaningless,[22] disbursement, as used in Sec. 346, should be understood to
pertain to payments for statutory and... contractual obligations which the sanggunian has already
authorized thru ordinances enacting the annual budget and are therefore already subsisting obligations of
the local government unit. Contracts, as used in Sec. 22(c) on the other hand, are those which bind the
local... government unit to new obligations, with their corresponding terms and conditions, for which the
local chief executive needs prior authority from the sanggunian.

The foregoing inexorably confirms the indispensability of the sanggunian's authorization in the execution
of contracts which bind the local government unit to new obligations.

Gov. Garcia's petition for declaratory relief should have been dismissed because it was instituted after the
COA had already found her in violation of Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision dated July 11, 2006, of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 9, in Civil Case No. CEB-31560, and its Order dated October 25, 2006, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court a quo for... further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.

Pililia Rizal vs. Court of Appeals

Municipality of Pililla, Rizal v. Court of Appeals Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a judgment of
the CA Facts: The RTC of Tanay, Rizal rendered judgment ordering the Philippine Petroleum Corporation
(PPC) to pay the Municipality of Pililla (municipality) business taxes and other fees. The judgment was
affirmed by the SC and became final and executor. The case was remanded to the RTC for execution. In
connection with the execution of judgment, Atty. Felix Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of the
municipality for the examination of PPC’s gross sales for the purpose of computing its business taxes.
PPC filed a manifestation before the RTC to the effect that Mayor Patenia of Pililla received from it
P11.5M as full satisfaction of the judgment as evidenced by the release and quit claim documents
executed by the said mayor. The RTC issued an order denying Atty. Mendiola’s motionfor examination
and execution of judgment. Atty. Mendiola filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the total
liability amounted to P24.2M while the amount received by the mayor was only P12.7M. He asserted that
the mayor cannot waive the balance of the judgment over which his law firm had registered two liens for
alleged consultancy services and attorney’s fees amounting to more than P12M. The RTC, however,
denied his MR. A petition for certiorari was filed by Atty. Mendiola which was referred to the CA for
appropriate action. PPC filed a motion questioning the authority of Atty. Mendiola to represent the
municipality. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in violation of the
law and jurisprudence but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the municipality thru the
proper provincial or municipal legal officer. Atty. Mendiola filed a petition before the SC to assail the
decision of the CA.

Issue: WON Atty. Mendiola, a private counsel, has authority can file an action in court for and in behalf of
the municipality of Pililla

Held: No. Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file an action in court in behalf and in the name of the
Municipality of Pililla. 1. Private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits. Sec.
1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that the provincial fiscal shall represent the province or
any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court except (a) in cases whereof original jurisdiction
is vested in the SC or (b) in cases where the municipality or municipal district is a party adverse to the
provincial government or to some municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the
provincial fiscal is disqualified, a special attorney may be employed by the municipal council. Hence, only
the provincial fiscal or municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The
provision is mandatory. The municipality’s authority to employ a private lawyer is limited only to
situations where the

provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. For this exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal
was disqualified must appear on record. 2. The fiscal’s refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal
justification for employing the services of private counsel. Unlike a practicing lawyer who has a right to
refuse employment, fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law
without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal
council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the
provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court. 3. The legality of a private
counsel’s representation can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings

Congressman Mandanas vs. Ochoa

FACTS:
The fiscal autonomy guaranteed to local governments under Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
means the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the
"national taxes" released by the National Government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities.

Pursuant to this Constitutional dictum, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code (LGC). Sec. 284 of the LGC provides that LGUs shall have an allotment equivalent
to 40% of the the national internal revenue taxes.

The share of the LGUs, known as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), has been regularly released to the
LGUs. According to the implementing rules and regulations of the LGC, the IRA is determined on the basis
of the actual collections of the National Internal Revenue Taxes (NIRTs) as certified by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR).

Two petitions were filed to challenge the base figure for the computation of the IRA.

In G.R. No. 199802, Cong. Hermilando Mandanas, et al., alleged that the NIRTs certified by the BIR
excluded the NIRTs collected by the Bureau of Customs, specifically excise taxes, value added taxes
(VATs), and documentary stamp taxes (DSTs). Such exclusion resulted in LGUs being deprived of
₱60,750,000,000.00 for FY 2012. Further, the petitioners argued that since this mistake in computation
was happening since 1992, then the National Government has effectively deprived LGUs of
₱438,103,906,675.73 in their IRA.

Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 208488, Cong. Enrique Garcia, Jr. sought the issuance of the writ of mandamus to
compel respondents to compute the just share of the LGUs on the basis of all national taxes. He argued
that the insertion by Congress of the words "internal revenue" in the phrase "national taxes" found in
Section 284 of the LGC caused the diminution of the base for determining the just share of the LGUs, and
should be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 284 of the LGC is unconstitutional for being repugnant to Section 6, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution. -- YES.

HELD:

Section 6 of the Constitution mentions "national taxes" as the source of the just share of the LGUs while
Section 284 of the LGC ordains that the share of the LGUs be taken from "national internal revenue taxes"
instead. Congress thereby infringed the constitutional provision.

Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature, congressional lawmaking remains
subject to the limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution.

The phrase "national internal revenue taxes" in Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term
"national taxes" written in Section 6 of the Constitution. As such, Congress has actually departed from the
letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national taxes should be the base from which the just share of
the LGU comes. Such departure is impermissible. Verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of a
statute there should be no departure).

Equally impermissible is that Congress has also thereby curtailed the guarantee of fiscal autonomy in
favor of the LGUs under the 1987 Constitution.

What the phrase "national internal revenue taxes" as used in Section 284 of the LGC included are all the
taxes enumerated in Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended by R.A. No.
8424, namely: income tax, estate and donor's taxes, VAT, other percentage taxes, excise taxes,
documentary stamp taxes, and such other taxes as may be imposed and collected by the BIR.

In view of the foregoing enumeration of what are the national internal revenue taxes, Section 284 of the
LGC has effectively deprived the LGUs from deriving their just share from other national taxes, like the
customs duties.
Moving forward, the BIR and the BOC are directed certify all national tax collections. This ruling, also
known as the "Mandanas Ruling," is to be applied prospectively.

Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Company vs. Bercilles

FACTS: This is a petition for review of an order dismissing petitioner's application for registration of title
over a parcel of land. The parcel of land sought to be registered was only a portion of M. Borces Street,
Mabolo, Cebu City. The City Council of Cebu, through a resolution, declared the terminal portion of said
street abandoned road. Subsequently, the City Council of Cebu passed another resolution, authorizing the
Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the
herein petitioner. The City of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the
herein petitioner. The petitioner filed an application with the Court of First instance of Cebu to have its
title to the land registered. However, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the
application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public
use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man. Consequently, it
cannot be subject to registration by any private individual.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the City Charter of Cebu City (RA 3857) give the City of Cebu the valid right to declare a road as
abandoned.

(2) WON the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property of the City of Cebu
which may be the object of a common contract.

(3) WON the property in question is registrable by the petitioner.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The pertinent portions of the Revised Charter of Cebu City provides that the city council has the
authority "to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus
withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed." From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear that
the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street.

(2) Yes. Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." Since
that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was withdrawn
from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the
object of an ordinary contract.

(3) Yes. Since the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the
petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question.

City of Manila vs. Teotico

FACTS: Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue,
Manila as he was trying to board a jeepney, causing injuries which required him to incur medical
expenses.

Teotico filed, with the CFI of Manila, a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city
engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police.

The CFI of Manila rendered a decision in favor of Teotico and dismissing the amended complaint, without
costs.

On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the CA, except insofar as the City of Manila is
concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal
for certiorari by the City of Manila.

ISSUE: WON the City of Manila should be held liable as the incident happened on a NATIONAL highway

HELD: the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed

YES

The question to be determined is if present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409
(Charter of the City of Manila) reading:

The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure
of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or
any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.

or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:

Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by,
any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.

Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a
special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable
to the entire Philippines.

The CA , however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial
application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation;
but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409
establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: “damages or injury to persons or
property … Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making
“provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any
person by reason” — specifically — “of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other-public works under their control or supervision.”

In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object
thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to “defective streets,” in particular. Since the present
action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

xxxxx

Teotico alleged in his complaint his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is “under
the supervision and control” of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged
that “the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly
inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers
concerned” who “have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective functions and
duties as imposed upon them by law.“ Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was
and is under its control and supervision.

Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for the first time,
in its MR of the decision of the CA . Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not
been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the
rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.

At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to
attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either
“control or supervision” over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national
highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its “control or supervision” by the City of
Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:

Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out, construction and improvement,
and to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other
public places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . … the
building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and under the same …to provide for
and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, . . … and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and
culverts; … to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . .

Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of
the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of
said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of
said Court thereon are not subject to our review.

City of Manila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried in North Cemetery which lotwas leased by the city
to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. The wife paid the full amount of
the lease. Apart, however from thereceipt, no other document embodied such lease over the lot. Believing
that thelease was only for five years, the city certified the lot as ready for [Link] the basis of the
certification, Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumationand removal of the remains of Vicencio. His
bones were placed in a bag and kept inthe bodega of the cemetery. The lot was also leased to another
lessee. During thenext all souls day, the private respondents were shocked to find out that
Vicencio’sremains were removed. The cemetery told Irene to look for the bones of thehusband in the
[Link], the widow and the children brought an action for damages againstthe City of Manila;
Evangeline Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery; and
Joseph Helmuth, the latter's predecessor asofficer-in-charge of the said burial grounds owned and
operated by the CityGovernment of Manila. The court ordered defendants to give plaintiffs the right
tomake use of another lot. The CA affirmed and included the award of damages infavor of the private
respondents.

Issue:WON the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental,or a corporate or
proprietary function of the City of Manila.

Held:ProprietaryRatio: Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusivelydevoted
for public use or purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of theOrdinances of the City of Manila.
They conclude that since the City is a politicalsubdivision in the performance of its governmental
function, it is immune from tortliability which may be caused by its public officers and subordinate
[Link] respondents maintain that the City of Manila entered into a contract of leasewhich
involve the exercise of proprietary functions with Irene Sto. Domingo. The cityand its officers therefore
can be sued for any-violation of the contract of lease.

City of Manila vs. Arellano Law Colleges

City of Manila vs The Arellano Law Colleges Inc. Facts: RA 267 provides that cities and municipalities are
authorized to contract loans from Reconstruction Finance Corporation for the purpose of purchasing or
expropriating homesites within their territorial jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to residents. The
court below ruled that this provision empowers cities to purchase but not expropriate and so dismissed
the present action, which seeks to condemn several parcels of land situated in Legarda St. Manila.

ISSUE: WON the necessity for condemnation is shown to justify the expropriation.

HELD: No The SC is inclined to believe that Act No. 267 empowers cities to expropriate as well as to
purchase lands for homesites. The word "expropriating," taken singly or with the text, is susceptible of
only meaning. But this power to expropriate is necessarily subject to the limitations and conditions noted
in the decisions above cited. The National Government may not confer its instrumentalities authority
which itself may not exercise. A stream can not run higher than its source. To authorize the
condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of the power of eminent domain, a necessity must exist
for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and purposes. Necessity within the rule that the particular
property to be expropriated must be necessary. does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or
practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience
and expense to the condemning party and property owner consistent with such benefits. The land in
question has cost the owner P140,000. The people for whose benefit the condemnation is being
undertaken are so poor they could ill afford to meet this high price, unless they intend to borrow the
money with a view to disposing of the property later for a profits. Cheaper lands not dedicated to a
purpose so worthy as a school and more suited to the occupants' needs and means, if really they only
want to own their own homes, are plenty elsewhere the defendant not only has invested a considerable
amount for its property but had the plans for construction ready and would have completed the project a
long time ago had it not been stopped by the city authorities.

Lagcao vs. Labra

Facts:

the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu.

One of these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City, with an area of 4,048 square meters...
petitioners purchased Lot 1029 on installment basis.

But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots,... including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu.

Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This
prompted the latter to sue the province for specific performance and damages in the then

Court of First Instance.

the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the final deed of
sale in favor of petitioners.
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already
occupied by squatters.

petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters.

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1,... Cebu City, rendered a decision on April 1, 1998,
ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC's decision and issued a
writ of execution and order of demolition.

when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two
letters[4] to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still
looking for a relocation site for the squatters.

Acting on the mayor's request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120
days

Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu
City passed a resolution which... identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.

Then,... the SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772[6] which included Lot 1029 among the identified
sites for socialized housing.

Ordinance No. 1843[7] was enacted by the SP of Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate
expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered in the name of petitioners.
The intended acquisition was to be used... for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to
the actual occupants thereof.

petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being
unconstitutional.
The trial court... dismissing the complaint... petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional
as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an
endeavor contrary to the concept of "public use" contemplated in the Constitution.

Issues:

validity of the City of Cebu's Ordinance No. 1843,... whether or not the intended expropriation by the City
of Cebu of a 4,048-square-meter parcel of land owned by petitioners contravenes the Constitution and
applicable laws.

Ruling:

Under Section 48 of RA 7160,[9] otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,[10] local
legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the city. The legislative acts of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod in the... exercise of its lawmaking authority are denominated ordinances.

Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when
expressly authorized by the legislature.

Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners' lot was enacted by the SP of Cebu
City to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of the City.

local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in
seeking solutions to this problem.

There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws;[12] and (2) private property... shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

The exercise of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a landowner's right to private property,
which is as much a constitutionally-protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of
personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and... liberty.
Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In
this case, there was no... showing at all why petitioners' property was singled out for expropriation by the
city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no
reason for the choice of petitioners' property as the site of a socialized housing... project.

This is depriving a citizen of... his property for the convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the
public.

We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu complied strictly with Sections 9
and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners' property without any attempt to
first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279.

Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were
first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid
and definite offer to buy petitioners' property as required by

Section 19 of RA 7160.[20] We therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being
violative of the petitioners' right to due process.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

Principles:

By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate.
Ordinance No. 1843 was... enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160:

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant
to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the
benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just... compensation, pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution and pertinent laws xxx.

In De Knecht vs. Bautista,[16] we said:

It is obvious then that a land-owner is covered by the mantle of protection due process affords. It is a
mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it is the antithesis of any governmental act that smacks of
whim or caprice. It negates state power to act in an... oppressive manner.

RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban land reform and
housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof provide:

SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following
order:

(a)

Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(b)

Alienable lands of the public domain;

(c)

Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;

(d)

Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum
Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;

(e)

Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have not yet been acquired; and
(f)

Privately-owned lands.

Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the
priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary
priority to on-site development of government lands. (Emphasis supplied).

SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include,
among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking,
donation to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated... purchase, and expropriation: Provided,
however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small
property owners shall be exempted for... purposes of this Act: xxx.

limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government... units, especially with
respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for socialized housing and (2) the resort to
expropriation proceedings as a means to acquiring it.

Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes
helpless owners of private property against what may be a tyrannical... violation of due process when
their property is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use.

Lim vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Spouses Manuel Lim and Rosita Lim were charged before the RTC of Malabon with estafa. The
informations alleged that the spouses, conspiring together, purchased goods from Linton Commercial
Company and with deceit issued 7 Solidbank Checks simultaneously with the delivery as payment
therefor. When presented to the drawee bank the checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.
Despite repeated notice and demand the Lim spouses failed and refused to pay the checks or the value of
the goods.
On the same basis of the same checks, 7 counts of BP 22 were also filed against the spouses. Manuel
Lim admitted having issued the 7 checks but denied that his company had insufficient funds to cover the
amount of the checks. He presented the bank ledger showing a balance of 65,752.75 php. Also, he
claimed that he ordered Solidbank to stop payment because the supplies delivered by Linton were not in
accordance with the specifications of the purchase orders. The RTC of Malabon found the spouses guilty
of the cases (estafa and BP 22) filed against them.

The spouses appealed to the CA. On appeal, the accused assailed the decision as they imputed error to
the trial court as follows: (a) the Regional Trial Court of Malabon had no jurisdiction over the cases
because the offenses charged are committed outside its territory; (b) they could not be held liable for
estafa because the seven (7) checks were issued by them several weeks after the deliveries of the goods;
and, (c) neither could they be held liable for violating B.P. Blg. 22 as they ordered payment of the checks
to be stopped because the goods delivered were not those specified by them, besides they had sufficient
funds to pay the checks.

The CA then rendered a decision acquitting the spouses in their case of estafa on the ground that indeed
the checks were not made in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of their issuance but
affirming the RTC’s ruling on the BP 22. Aggrieved, the spouses elevated the case to the Supreme Court

In the case at bench petitioners maintain that the prosecution failed to prove that any of the essential
elements of the crime punishable under B.P. Blg. 22 was committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court of Malabon. They claim that what was proved was that all the elements of the offense were
committed in Kalookan City. The checks were issued at their place of business, received by a collector of
LINTON, and dishonored by the drawee bank, all in Kalookan City. In fine, considering that the checks
were all issued, delivered, and dishonored in Kalookan City, the trial court of Malabon exceeded its
jurisdiction when it tried the case and rendered judgment thereon.

Issues:

Whether or not the RTC of Malabon has jurisdiction over the case

Ruling: Petition denied. Judgement Affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi:

B.P. 22 is a transitory crime and may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was
in part committed.

In determining proper venue in these cases, the following acts material and essential to each crime and
requisite to its consummation must be considered: (a) the seven (7) checks were issued to LINTON at its
place of business in Balut, Navotas; (b) they were delivered to LINTON at the same place; (c) they were
dishonored in Kalookan City; and, (d) petitioners had knowledge of the insufficiency of their funds in
SOLIDBANK at the time the checks were issued. Since there is no dispute that the checks were
dishonored in Kaloocan City, it is no longer necessary to discuss where the checks were dishonored.

Berces vs. Guingona

FACTS:

Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases against respondent
incumbent Mayor and obtained favorable decision suspending the latter. Respondent Mayor appealed to
the Office of the President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of
execution in accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC). The Office of the President
thru the Executive Secretary directed “stay of execution”. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
was dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the
President as having been issued with grave abuses of discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC
(1991) impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 (1987).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18.

HELD:

NO. Petition was dismissed. “Stay of execution” applied.

RATIO:

The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an “appeal shall not prevent a decision from
becoming final or executory.” As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to
the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom
that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the
intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more
direct language expressive of such intention.

An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be
found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be
construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the
terms of the new and old laws.