SYMBIOSIS LAW SCHOOL, PUNE

Care | Courage | Competence | Collaboration

CONSTITUENT OF
SYMBIOSIS INTERNATIONAL (DEEMED UNIVERSITY)
Reaccredited by NAAC with 'A' Grade

Symbiosis Campus, Opp. Pune International Airport,

Symbiosis Road, Viman Nagar, Pune 411 014.

CLINICAL COURSE - IV - JOURNAL

(MOOT COURT EXERCISE AND
INTERNSHIP)
V YEAR OF BA./BB.A. LL.B. (Hons.)

Academic Year : 2021-2022

SEMESTER - X

Name of Student : Luca George Naduvila Veettil Antony

Exam. Seat No. : 17010125060

Roll No. :17010125060 Div. : A

Batch :2017-22 Programme : BA. LL.B. (Hons.)

PRN No.:17010125060 Mobile No. : 9011534422

E-mail ID : [email protected]
 CLINICAL COURSE - IV
(MOOT COURT EXERCISE AND INTERNSHIP)

Learning Objectives:
1. To enable the student to understand not only the application of law in practice, but also the
citation of relevant rulings and the art of convincing the judges.
2. To train the students in methodical preparation of the case for achieving success as a
lawyer and further train in proper presentation of the case and come out with a clear
statement of points in controversy.
3. To facilitate the students to attend Civil Case and Criminal Trial Proceedings and observe
the proceedings in the court so as to understand the functional aspects of the components of
the Indian legal justice system.
4. To make the students understand how to deal with the client and collect the relevant
information.
5. To understand the nature of the case, issues involved in the case through the method of
interview technique.
6. To understand and apply the formats of the memorials and other documents submitted to
the court.
7. To study and understand pre-trail preparations and preparation of documents and court
papers by the advocates.

Learning Outcomes:
At the end of the course the student will:
1. understand not only the application of low in practice, but also the citation of relevant
ruling and the art of convincing the judges.
2. be also to prepare the case for achieving success as a lawyer and further the student will
able to present the case and come out with a clear statement of points in controversy.
3. be able to understand working of the Civil Case and Criminal Trial Proceedings.
4. be able to deal with the client and collect the relevant information.
5. be in position to understand the nature of the case, issues involved in the case using
interview technique.
6. be able to understand and apply formats of memorial and other documents in the court practice.
7. be able to prepare memorial and other documents required for court proceedings.

1) Moot Courts (30 Marks)

Every student will do at least 3 moot courts in this semester with 10 marks for each. The
moot courts work will be on assigned problems and it will be evaluated for 5 marks for
written submission and 5 marks for oral advocacy.

2) Observation of Civil Proceedings (15 Marks)

Students will attend one Civil Case Proceeding in this semester. A student will submit a
report for the work done in this semester and all submissions and assignments will be
written in the format provided by the SLS, Pune. A student will maintain a record of all the
steps observed in the trial (including the facts of the case, arguments and orders) and the
days of court attendance in the report.

3) Observation of Trial (15 Marks)

Students will attend one Criminal Trial in this semester. A student will submit a report for
the work done in this semester and all submissions and assignments will be made as per the
format provided by SLS, Pune. A student will maintain a record of all the steps observed in
the trial (including the facts of the case, arguments and orders) and the days of court
attendance in the report.

1
4) Interviewing Techniques and Pre-trial Preparations & Internships (30 Marks)
4.1 Interviewing sessions
4.1.1. Interviewing session-I
4.1.2. Interviewing session - II
A report should be prepared as per the format provided by SLS, Pune
4.1.3. Preparation of Documents and Court Papers by the Advocates and Procedures for
filing Petition/ Suit etc. A report should be prepared as per the format provided by SLS,
Pune.

5) Internships (30 Marks)

4.2.1. Internship I (10 Marks)
4.2.2. Internship II (10 Marks)
4.2.3. Internship III (10 Marks)

6) Viva-Voce (30 Marks)

Books Recommended :
— Sue Painter - Thorne, Karen J. Sneddon, Moot Court Workbook: Finding Educational
Success and Competition Glory, Wolters Khuwer (2017)
— John Snape, Gary Watt, How to Moot : A Student Guide to Mooting, Oxford University
Press (2010)
— Sarah L. Cooper, Scarlett McArdle, Preparing to Moot : A Step-by-Step Guide to
Mooting, Routledge(Taylor& Francis Group) (2017)

2
 INDEX
Sr. No. Description of Practical Training Page No. Marks Obtained

1. MOOT COURTS (30 Marks)

a) Moot Court - I (10 Marks)
b) Moot Court - II (10 Marks)
c) Moot Court - III (10 Marks)

2. OBSERVATION OF CIVIL CASE PROCEEDINGS:

(15 Marks)

3. OBSERVATION OF CRIMINAL TRIAL :

(15 Marks)

4. INTERVIEWING TECHNIQUES AND PRE-TRIAL

PREPARATIONS & INTERNSHIPS: (30 Marks)
4.1 Interviewing Sessions
4.1.1. Interviewing Session - I
4.1.2. Interviewing Session - II
4.1.3. Preparation of Documents and Court Papers by the
Advocates & the Procedure for filing Petition/ Suit
etc.

5. Internships (30 Marks)

5.1 Internship I (10 Marks)
5.2 Internship II (10 Marks)
5.3 Internship III (10 Marks)

6. VIVA-VOCE (30 Marks)

3
 INDEX
Sr. No. Description of Practical Training Page No. Marks Obtained

4
 MOOT COURT - I

TITLE:

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Writ Petition No. ___ of 2022

IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

Mr. Rohan …..Petitioner

Versus

State of Maharashtra …..Respondent

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE JUDGES OF THE HIGH COURT OF

JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

JURISDICTION:

The petitioner has filed the present petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. The relevant provision read as under:
Article 226 of the Constitution of India
“226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall
have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it can
exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including
in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories
directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas
corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or
any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by
by Part III and for any other purpose.”
FACTS:

The murder trial of Ms. Surahi, the daughter of Mr. Kodi, a political
leader attracted a lot of media attention and limelight. Mr. Rohan
the accused, was charged with negligent driving and murder.

KAB, a channel owned by BK Corporation, prepared a special

report on the trial highlighting pieces of evidence, problems in the
investigation and the possibility of a corrupt investigating officer.

Based on KAB’s report, the District and Sessions Court suo motu
ordered a fresh investigation calling for evidences mentioned in the
report such as CCTV footage and other additional evidences. The
judge also visited the location of the crime to discover probable
evidences.

During the trial, the CCTV footage was not scrutinized by either
party so there was no argument regarding its reliability and validity.
Further, the judge suo motu summoned one Mr. Kompraj and
recorded his statement based on the report by KAB. The prosecution
had not called him as a prosecution witness.

Highly relying on the evidences ordered and the CCTV footage

submitted by the municipal corporation, the court convicted Mr.
Rohan for culpable homicide amounting to murder for the death of
Ms. Surahi.

In a press conference, Mr. Romul, a leader of the opposition made a

statement that Mr. Kodi could have used his strategy of managing
the press to get favours in the case.

Mr. Rohan alleged that the report by KAB was not scrutinized by
any reliable authority and that the court had relied on an unauthentic
report of the media. Further, he alleged that the judge had acted
on a media trial and provided undue weightage to evidences
mentioned in KAB’s report.
In furtherance of the above, Mr. Rohan filed a petition before the
Bombay High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
ISSUE (S) :

ISSUE 1:

Whether there exist limitations on media trial when a case is

sub-judice.

ISSUE 2:

Whether the suo motu actions and activism by the Trial Court judge
violates the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and Common Law
system tenets.

ISSUE 3:

Whether a judgement in the absence of argument on evidences is

valid.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS:

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THERE EXIST LIMITATIONS ON MEDIA

TRIALS WHEN A CASE IS SUB-JUDICE.

It is submitted before this Hon’ble court that there exist limitations

on
Media Trials regarding sub-judice cases as they firstly, violate the
fundamental rights as enshrined in our Constitution [1.1]; and
secondly, they go against the basic tenets of rule of law [1.2].

[1.1] Media Trial of sub-judice cases violate fundamental rights

Media Trials is understood as media coverage or publications that
create a widespread perception of guilt or innocence. [R.K. Anand
v.
Registrar, Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106]. It also includes
publication of facts or information yet to be produced in trial
[M.P. Lohia v. State of West Bengal, (2005) 2 SCC 686] and the
conducting of parallel investigations by the media [Nilesh
Navalakha v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 2 AIR Bom R 179].

An accused has the right to free and fair trial under Article 21 of the
Constitution, which requires no prejudice for or against the accused
[Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158].
Media Trials or investigations are often conducted without any
regulation, or are falsified or exaggerated, making them unreliable.
Further, they destroy the presumption of innocence, which is a basic
precept of fair trial available to the accused [Manu Sharma v. State
(NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1].

Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India bestows the right of

freedom of speech and expression to its citizens. However, when
such
freedom leads to incitement to conduct a parallel unsupervised and
unregulated media trial, it should be restrained by law [Shreya
Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1].

In summation, it is settled law that when a conflict arises between

fair trial and freedom of speech, the former prevails because the
compromise of fair trial for a particular accused will cause them
permanent harm whereas the inhibition of media freedom ends with
conclusion of legal proceedings. In the present case, the report by
KAB on the petitioner’s case amounts to a Media Trial as it was
a parallel investigation conducted when the case was sub-judice and
published evidences relied upon during proceedings. Further, the
information released by KAB was detrimental to the accused,
as while Judges may generally be impervious to influence, the
possibility of such influence could not be ruled out altogether.

[1.2] Media Trial of sub-judice cases go against the basic tenets of

rule of law
One of the cardinal principles of rule of law in a free democratic
country which has also been construed under Article 20(3) of the
Constitution of India, is the presumption of innocence of the accused
until proven guilty. Criticism or even reporting particularly in sub
judice matters must be subjected to check and balances so as not to
interfere with the administration of justice [State of Maharashtra v.
Rajendra Jawanmal Gandhi, (1997) 8 SCC 386].

Independence of judiciary, another facet of rule of law, requires

judges to be free from any influence [High Court of Judicature at
Bombay v. Shirishkumar R. Patil, (1997) 6 SCC 339]. Media Trials
create a situation wherein public agitation pressurizes the judge to
view the case with bias and can lead to miscarriage of justice.

Furthermore, Media Trials also usurp the role of the judiciary as the
adjudicatory authority by pre-empting decisions [Reliance
Petrochemicals v. Indian Express Newspapers, Bombay, (1988) 4
SCC 592] and can result in diminished public faith in the judicial
system [Prashant Bhushan, In Re, Contempt Matter, (2021) 3
SCC
9
 In the present case, the Media Trial surrounding the petitioner’s
case affected his right to free and fair trial under Article 21 as the
Sessions Court highly relied on the information broadcast in KAB’s
report in convicting the petitioner. The Courts have observed that
self
regulation failed to curb media trials and judiciary must intervene
to ensure lawful reporting of criminal trials by the media [Nilesh
Navalakha v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 2 AIR Bom R 179].
Therefore, it is submitted that media trials in sub-judice matters are
violative of fundamental rights, contrary to the rule of law and that
limitations must be placed on them.

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE SUO-MOTU ACTIONS AND ACTIVISM BY

THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE CONTRAVENE THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CODE, 1973 AND COMMON LAW SYSTEM TENETS

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the suo-motu

actions and activism by the Sessions Court judge, firstly,
violate the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (“CrPC”) [2.1]; and
secondly, are against the basic tenets of common law [2.2.].

[2.1] Suo-motu actions and activism by the judge contravene the

provisions of the CrPC

The scheme of CrPC does not authorize a judge to interfere with

investigation or direct the police how the investigation is to be
conducted [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604].
Section 310 of CrPC permits local inspection by the judge only to
appraise the evidence already presented before court [State of H.P.
v.
Mast Ram, (2004) 8 SCC 660]. In the present case, the Judge
ordered
a fresh investigation and directed the police to collect specific
evidences. The Judge also visited the scene of the crime to search
for
probable evidences. It is submitted that these actions breach the
independence of police investigation envisioned under the CrPC and
also violate the common law tenet of the burden being on the
prosecution to gather evidence and prove the guilt of the accused
[Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417].

Section 311 of the CrPC enables a judge to summon any witness or

document to be recorded into evidence to serve the ends of justice.
This power should be exercised with great caution and where such
evidence is given against a party, that party has the right to cross
examine the witness or document [Iddar v. Aabida, (2007) 11 SCC
211]. Denial of this right violates the CrPC and the principle of Audi
Alteram Partem [Rameshwar Dayal v. State of U.P, (1978) 2 SCC
518]. In the present case, the evidence from the CCTV footage and
Mr. Kompraj, the witness summoned by the Judge were not
scrutinized or cross examined by the petitioner. It is submitted that
this amounts to a violation of procedure under CrPC and of natural

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS:

justice.

Additionally, as per the ruling in [Rajat Prasad v. CBI (2014) 6

SCC
495], media reports must be carefully scrutinized through
examination to ascertain whether they are a journalistic exercise or a
sham before relying on them in court. The Judge’s suo-motu actions
were based on the media report from KAB channel. It is submitted
that this report was not scrutinized in court to ascertain its reliability
and the same amounts to a violation of the Doctrine of Precedent
which requires subordinate courts to follow the decisions of
superior courts [ICICI Bank v. Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay, (2005) 6 SCC 404].

Lastly, from a plain reading of Section 173 (2) and (8) of the CrPC,
it is evident that even after submission of the police report on
completion of the investigation, the police have a right to 'further'
investigation under 173(8) of Section 173 but not 'fresh investigation'
or 'reinvestigation' [Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar (2009) 6
SCC
346]. The meaning of 'further’ is additional, more or supplemental.
'Further' investigation, therefore, is the continuation of the earlier
investigation and not a fresh investigation or reinvestigation to be
started ab initio wiping out the earlier investigation altogether.
The power to order a fresh investigation vests exclusively with the
High Courts and the Supreme Court under their inherent powers, and
is not permitted by the CrPC to be exercised by any courts
subordinate
to it [State of Punjab v. CBI (2011) 9 SCC 182].
Therefore, in the present case, the Session and District Court is
not empowered to order a suo moto fresh investigation and ask for
evidences pointed out by the KAB television channel under Section
173 (8).

[2. 2] Suo-motu actions and activism by the judge contravene the

basic tenets of common law.

The Indian legal regime, more specifically the CrPC prescribes

to the adversarial system as oppose to the inquisitorial System.
In the adversarial system the responsibility for the production of
evidence is placed on the party that seeks to establish guilt with the
judge acting as a neutral referee between the opposing parties, both
of
which are allowed to introduce evidence and cross examine
witnesses
[Ram Chandra v. State of Haryana 1981 SCC (3) 191]. On the
contrary, in an inquisitorial system, a preliminary investigation
conducted by an investigating magistrate act as a means of seeking
truth. Therefore, the judge’s role in an adversarial system is to hold
the balance between the contending parties without himself taking
part
in their disputations. It is not an inquisitorial role in which he seeks
himself to remedy the deficiencies of the case on either side [R v.
Whithorn (1983) 152 CLR 657]. In the present case, the judge
visited
the scene of crime to search for probable evidences, and the
evidence from the CCTV footage and Mr. Kompraj, the witness
summoned by the Judge were not scrutinized or cross examined by
the
petitioner. Therefore, it is submitted that this violates the basic tenets
of common law.

Subsequently, it is an accepted principle in common law that when

the foundation is removed the superstructure, that is all subsequent
actions fall as invalid, or Subla Fundamento Cedit Opus [Lily
Thomas v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1650]. Accordingly, since
the Judge’s actions and activisms stem from an inauthentic,
scrutinized media report, it is submitted that they are all completely
invalid. Therefore, the suo-motu actions and activisms of the Judge
amount to a violation of CrPC and common law system tenets.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS:

ISSUE 3: WHETHER A JUDGEMENT IN ABSENCE OF ARGUMENT

ON EVIDENCES IS VALID.
It is submitted that a judgement in absence of argument on evidence
is invalid as firstly, the provisions of CrPC require that there be
argument on evidence for it to be admissible and, secondly, evidence
without argument goes against the principles of natural justice.

[3. 1] CrPC and Arguments on Evidence

Section 207 and Section 208 of the CrPC provides that a copy of any
evidence that is being used against the accused, shall be produced
before him including statement of witnesses [Ranjeet Singh v. State
of U.P., 1998 Cr LJ 1297 (ALL)] and audio-visual cassettes [Sadhvi
Ritambhara v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1997 Cr LJ 1232 (MP)].
Non-supply of the aforementioned will be considered prejudicial to
the accused and a conviction in such a case, cannot be sustained
[Gayadhar v. State, 1985 Cr LJ (NOC) 108 (Ori)].

Section 310 of the CrPC empowers the court for local inspection.
However, the object of local inspection is to enable a Magistrate to
understand correctly the topography of the spot to be able to
appreciate the evidence offered in court. A Magistrate cannot use
Section 310 to find out for himself the facts of a case or collect
evidence [Ram Saran v. Ram Das, 1965 (1) Cr LJ 698 (J&K)].
Further, under Section 311 of the CrPc, if a witness called by Court
gives evidence against the complainant, he should be allowed an
opportunity to cross-examine [Jagat Ravi v. State of Maharashtra,
AIR 1968 SC 178].

In the present case, there was no argument on evidence as the CCTV

footage was not scrutinized by the accused, hence, the judgement
convicting the accused cannot be sustained. Consequently, the
judge’s visit to the location of the murder in order to find out the
probable evidences are not supported by Section 310 of CrPC, nor is
the lack of cross-examination supported by Section 311 of CrPC.

[3. 2] Principles of Natural Justice

The culpability of any accused cannot be decided on the basis of any
evidence, which was not recorded in his or his pleader’s presence
and for which he did not get an opportunity of cross-examination
[A.T. Mydeen and Another v. Assistant Commissioner, Customs
Department, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 107]. The principle of audi
alteram partem embodies that no person should be judged without a
fair hearing in which each party is given the opportunity to respond
to the evidence against them [Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Limited v
Commr of Income Tax, AIR 1955 SC 65].

In the present case, the Judge placed high reliance on evidences not
properly scrutinized and conducted proceedings based on media trial
without any fair chance of cross-examination. Therefore, it is
submitted that judgements in absence of arguments on evidence are
contrary to law and the judgement passed convicting the petitioner is
invalid.

PRAYER :

Wherefore in light of the issues raised, authorities cited and arguments

advanced, it is most humbly and respectfully prayed that the Hon’ble
High Court of Bombay be pleased to:

ALLOW the writ petition.

ISSUE directions restraining the media from publishing material
prejudicing the fairness of the case while the matter is sub judice;
AND
ISSUE a writ of CERTIORARI to QUASH the decision of the
Sessions Court.

AND/OR

Pass any order as the Court may deem fit in the interests of Justice,
Equity and Good Conscience.

All of which is respectfully affirmed and submitted.

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES :
CASE LAWS
R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106.
M.P. Lohia v. State of West Bengal, (2005) 2 SCC 686.
Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158.
Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1.
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shirishkumar R. Patil,
(1997) 6 SCC 339.
Reliance Petrochemicals v. Indian Express Newspapers, Bombay,
(1988) 4 SCC 592.
Prashant Bhushan, In Re, Contempt Matter, (2021) 3 SCC 160.
State of Maharashtra v. Rajendra Gandhi, (1997) 8 SCC 386.
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604.
State of H.P. v. Mast Ram, (2004) 8 SCC 660.
Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417.
Iddar v. Aabida, (2007) 11 SCC 211.
Rameshwar Dayal v. State of U.P, (1978) 2 SCC 518.
Rajat Prasad v. CBI (2014) 6 SCC 495.
ICICI Bank v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (2005) 6
SCC 404.
Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar (2009) 6 SCC 346
Ram Chandra v. State of Haryana 1981 SCC (3) 191
R v. Whithorn (1983) 152 CLR 657
Lily Thomas v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1650.
Ranjeet Singh v. State of U.P., 1998 Cr LJ 1297 (ALL).
Sadhvi Ritambhara v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1997 Cr LJ 1232.
Gayadhar v. State, 1985 Cr LJ (NOC) 108 (Ori).
Ram Saran v. Ram Das, 1965 (1) Cr LJ 698 (J&K).
Jagat Ravi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 178.
A.T. Mydeen and Another v. Assistant Commissioner, Customs
Department, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1017.
Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Limited v. Commr of Income Tax, AIR
1955 SC 65.
State of Punjab v. CBI, (2011) 9 SCC 182.

STATUTES
Constitution of India, 1950.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

MOOT COURT HELD ON:

23rd March 2022

MOOT COURT JUDGES :

Adv. Bhushan Kulkarni

STUDENT ADVOCATE FOR :

Petitioner

MOOT COURT - II

TITLE :

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION (EPHP)

…PETITIONER 1
RANANGAON POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD (RPCB)
…PETITIONER 2
VERSUS

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

…RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION :

The instant writ petition has been preferred by the Petitioner under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India:
“Article 226: Power of High Courts to issue certain writs-
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have
powers, throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any
person or authority,
including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories
directions, orders or
writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibitions, quo warranto and
certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III and for any other purpose
(2) The power conferred by clause ( 1 ) to issue directions, orders or
writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by
any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories
within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the
exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such
Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within
those territories.
(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of
injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any
proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without
(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in
support of the plea for such interim order; and
(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an
application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and
furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such
order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall
dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on
which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such
application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court
is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day
afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not
so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as
the case may be, the expiry of the aid next day, stand vacated
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in
derogation of the power conferred on the SC by clause ( 2 ) of Article
32”

FACTS:

Establishment of Manufacturing Unit

ASPA, a France-based Private Limited Company, established its
manufacturing unit in 2012 with all the environment clearances at
Ranangaon. The Company had also obtained the Consent for
Establishment (CFE) and the Consent for Operation (CFO) from the
Maharashtra Pollution Control Board (MPCB). MPCB initially provided
the CFE and CFO for a decade from Jan. 2012 to Jan. 2023 subject to
review of the pollution level in the Ranangaon after 2019.
Alleged Pollution by ASPA
MPCB empowered the Ranangaon Pollution Control Board (RPCB) to
issue any order to control/decrease the pollution levels in the city. The
expert committee appointed by RPCB found that ASPA is one of the
most polluting companies. RPCB issued three notices to ASPA and
ordered to install advanced machinery so as to reduce air and water
pollution in Ranangaon, which has been complied with by the ASPA.
Mr. Khushbu, a counsel for ASPA responded stating that ASPA had got
the requisite permissions from higher authorities, and it received Consent
for Operation (CFO) till 2023.
Impugned Order Against ASPA
On 09 Jan. 2020, RPCB issued an order asking ASPA to shut down or
relocate its unit within a month from the date of the issuance of the order.
Meanwhile, the Central Government and Government of Maharashtra
jointly issued a Government Order (GO) no. 333 prohibiting various
industrial developments in and around Ranangaon. Environment and
Public Health Protection (EPHP), an unregistered NGO founded to
protect the environment and health of the people in Ranangaon, filed a
petition in the High Court of Bombay and requested the Court to order
ASPA to implement the order issued by RPCB.
Reply By ASPA
ASPA in its reply stated that since it had started operations with all
required permits and had invested a large sum in creating infrastructure,
and it should not be ordered to relocate or shut down. ASPA further
stated that since it is an International Company, any such order would be
in conflict with the State’s international obligations.
ISSUE (S) :
WHETHER THE PETITION FILED BY EPHP IS MAINTAINABLE.
WHETHER THE SUB-DELEGATION OF POWERS BY THE
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF RANAGAON IS ULTRA VIRES.
WHETHER THE ORDER ISSUED BY RPCB TO SHUT DOWN AND
RELOCATE ASPA IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH DOMESTIC LAWS.
WHETHER THE ORDER ISSUED BY RPCB TO SHUT DOWN AND
RELOCATE ASPA IN CONFLICT WITH INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAWS.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS:

ISSUE 1. WHETHER THE PETITION FILED BY EPHP IS

MAINTAINABLE
It is contended before this Hon’ble Court that the petition filed by
Environment and Public Health Protection (“EPHP”) is not maintainable
as firstly, an unregistered body cannot file a Public Interest Litigation
(“PIL”) [1.1]; and secondly, the Bombay High Court Public Interest
Litigation Rules, 2010 do not recognise an unregistered organization
[1.2].

ISSUE 2. WHETHER THE SUB-DELEGATION OF POWERS BY

THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF RANAGAON IS ULTRA
VIRES
It is contended before this Hon’ble Court that the sub-delegation of
powers by the Municipal Corporation of Ranagaon (“MPCB”) is ultra
vires as firstly, RCPB is not authorised to issue directions to shut down
ASPA’s manufacturing unit [2.1]; and secondly, in any event, the
municipality is not authorised to delegate the power to shut down
ASPA’s manufacturing unit [2.2]

ISSUE 3. WHETHER THE ORDER ISSUED BY RPCB TO SHUT

DOWN AND RELOCATE ASPA IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH
DOMESTIC LAWS
Assuming but not admitting that RPCB had the power to order the
shutdown of ASPA’s manufacturing unit, it is humbly contended before
this Hon’ble Court that the present order passed by RPCB ordering
ASPA to shut down and relocate is invalid. This contention has three
prongs: firstly, ASPA established its unit in Ranagaon after obtaining all
the required environmental clearances [3.1.]; secondly, the order issued
by the RPCB violates the principles of natural justice [3.2.]; and lastly,
the order to shut down violates the principle of proportionality [3.3.]

ISSUE 4. WHETHER RPCB’S ORDER IS IN CONFLICT WITH

INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
It is contended before this Hon’ble Court that RPCB’s order is in conflict
with international obligations between France and India as firstly, it is
violative of the international minimum standards to be maintained under
customary international law [4.1]; and secondly, it is in breach of the Fair
and Equitable Treatment (“FET”) clause in the Bilateral Investment
Treaty (“BIT”) between France and India [4.2].

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS:

ISSUE 1. WHETHER THE PETITION FILED BY EPHP IS

MAINTAINABLE
1. It is contended before this Hon’ble Court that the petition filed by
Environment and Public Health Protection (“EPHP”) is not maintainable
as firstly, an unregistered body cannot file a Public Interest Litigation
(“PIL”) [1.1]; and secondly, the Bombay High Court Public Interest
Litigation Rules, 2010 do not recognise an unregistered organization
[1.2].
[1.1] An unregistered body cannot file a PIL
2. It is a well-established principle that any person, natural or legal,
can approach any Court to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution [Sand Carrier's Owner's Union and Ors. v. Board of Trustees
for the Port of Calcutta and Ors, AIR 1990 Cal 176]. However,
unregistered associations that lack independent legal existence, are
debarred from utilizing Article 226 to file a writ petition [Shri Maninder
Kumar Gupta v. Union of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas
(1995) 1 SCC 85; The North Arcot District Pawn Brokers' Association
and Ors. v. The Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Finance
(Department of Revenue and Insurance) and Ors (1975) 1 MLJ 290].
Further, even if the members of such unregistered association have a
common grievance for the purpose of enforcing the rights of its members,
the writ petition shall not be maintainable under law [Tamil Nadu
Panchayat Development Officers Association, Madras v. Secretary to
Govt. of Tamil Nadu, Rural Development and Local Administration
Dept., Madras and Ors. AIR W.P(C).36372/2017 1989 Mad 224].
3. In the present instance, EPHP, the NGO in question is an
unregistered body that fails to satisfy the required threshold to allow the
body to file a writ petition under Article 226 before this Court.
[1.2] The petition is not maintainable under the Bombay High Court
Public Interest Litigation Rules, 2010
4. No suit is maintainable before any Court if it fails to abide by the
rules governing its proceedings [Prem Chand Garg v. Excise
Commissioner, U.P. Allahabad, 1963 AIR 996]. Consequently, no public
interest litigation by a society/group that is not registered under any valid
act, is deemed to be a valid petition under the rules of the Bombay High
Court as provided under Rule 4 (4) of the Bombay High Court Public
Interest Litigation Rules, 2010. It is pertinent to note that the same rule is
also reflected in the rules of other High Courts such as the Kerala High
Court, Rajasthan High Court, Calcutta High Court and the Madras High
Court [Prathyasa Mental Health Counselling Forum v. State of Kerala,
2020 SCC OnLine Ker 2314; Jalore District Teachers' Association, Jalore
v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., RLW 1997(2) Raj 1091].
5. In the present case, the petitioner EPHP, is an unregistered non-
governmental organization. Therefore, even though it may be engaged in
protection of the people and health of Ranangaon, the writ petition filed
by it as a general rule is not maintainable.

ISSUE 2. WHETHER THE SUB-DELEGATION OF POWERS BY

THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF RANAGAON IS ULTRA
VIRES
It is contended before this Hon’ble Court that the sub-delegation of
powers by the Municipal Corporation of Ranagaon (“MPCB”) is ultra
vires as firstly, RCPB is not authorised to issue directions to shut down
ASPA’s manufacturing unit [2.1]; and secondly, in any event, the
municipality is not authorised to delegate the power to shut down
ASPA’s manufacturing unit [2.2]
[2.1] RCPB lacks the authority to shut down ASPA’s industrial plant
6. Section 31A of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,
1981 (“Air Act”) and Section 33A of the Water (Prevention and Control
of Pollution) Act, 1974 (“Water Act”) empowers only the Central Board
or a State board as defined under Section 2(f) of the Air Act and Section
2(a) of the Water Act to issue directions in prevention of action or
omission, in contravention of any statutory provisions of environmental
laws. Any other authority invoking any directions or orders would be
ultra vires in nature [Sterlite Industries v. Union of India, Civil Appeal
Nos. 2776-2783 of 2013].
7. In the present instance, RCPB is merely a body established by the
Municipality of Ranangaon. It does not qualify as a State Board or a
Central Board that is eligible to issue such a direction. Therefore, the
order passed by RPCB stands vitiated.
[2.2] In any event, the Municipality is not authorised to delegate its
powers to RCPB
8. The doctrine of delegatus non potest delegare provides that an
administrative body will not, in the absence of a statutory provision,
further delegate its powers [Democratic Bar Association v. High Court of
Judicature 2000 (3) AWC 2383; A.K. Roy v. State of Punjab and Ors.,
1986 AIR 2160]. Section 15 of the Air Act allows for delegation of
powers, however, the same is extended to only Chairman or the member-
secretary or any other officer of the Board. In the absence of the stated
positions of authority, any contrary form of delegation of power shall
stand invalid [State Pollution Control Board v. M/S Swastik Ispat Pvt.
Ltd, National Green Tribunal Principal Bench Appeal No. 68 Of 2012].
Moreover, the Delhi High Court in the case of Splendor Landbase Ltd. v.
Delhi Pollution Control Committee, 2010 (173) DLT 52, has
categorically held that no powers of sub-delegation exist on the delegate
under either the Air Act or the Water Act.
9. In the present case, as RCPB does not qualify as a State or Central
Board, and the municipality is not legally empowered to delegate its
powers, the sub delegation of powers by MPCB is ultra vires.
ISSUE 3. WHETHER THE ORDER ISSUED BY RPCB TO SHUT
DOWN AND RELOCATE ASPA IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH
DOMESTIC LAWS
10. Assuming but not admitting that RPCB had the power to order the
shutdown of ASPA’s manufacturing unit, it is humbly contended before
this Hon’ble Court that the present order passed by RPCB ordering
ASPA to shut down and relocate is invalid. This contention has three
prongs: firstly, ASPA established its unit in Ranagaon after obtaining all
the required environmental clearances [3.1.]; secondly, the order issued
by the RPCB violates the principles of natural justice [3.2.]; and lastly,
the order to shut down violates the principle of proportionality [3.3.]
[3.1] ASPA established its unit in Ranagaon after obtaining all the
required environmental clearances prescribed by law
11. In order to establish or operate any industrial plant in an air
pollution control area, Section 21 of the Air Act requires a person to take
consent from the State Pollution Control Board. Similarly, Section 25 of
the Water Act, stipulates that that no person shall, without the previous
consent of the State Board, establish any industry, operation or process,
which is likely to discharge sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well
or sewer on land.
12. In the present case, ASPA established its manufacturing unit with
all the environment clearances at Ranangaon. This also includes the
Consent for Establishment (CFE) and the Consent for Operation (CFO)
from the MPCB under the aforementioned sections. Moreover, the CFE
and CFO were granted for a decade from January, 2012 to January, 2023,
making them still valid. Accordingly, the establishment and the
operations of the Company are in compliance with environmental
clearance required under the law.
[3.2.] The order issued by the RPCB violates the Principles of Natural
Justice
13. The principle of Audi Alteram Partem states that no one shall be
condemned unheard and ensures a fair hearing as well as fair justice to
both the parties [Maneka Gandhi v. The Union of India, AIR 1978 SC
597]. With this background, firstly, a notice must be provided to the other
party in order to present a cause against the proposed action and pursue
his application. If an order is passed without giving such notice, it shall
be in violation of the principles of natural justice and would be deemed
void ab initio [Punjab National Bank v. All India Bank Employees
Federation, (1997) 10 SCC 627].
14. Secondly, both parties have the right to be heard. If the order is
passed by the authority without hearing the party or without giving him
an opportunity of being heard, then it will be considered as an invalid.
[Harbans Lal v. Commissioner 2002 (80) ECC 97; Ajay Kumar and
Fateh Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1994 SC 39].
15. Lastly, the proviso to Section 21(4) of the Air Act also stipulates
that before cancelling a consent or refusing a further consent, a
reasonable opportunity of being heard shall be provided to the person
concerned.
16. In the present case, ASPA established its manufacturing unit with
all the environment clearances at Ranangaon including the CFE and the
CFO from the MPCB valid until January 2023. Moreover, ASPA also
installed the advanced machinery to reduce air and water pollution, in
respect of which RPCB issued three notices to them. Even after such
compliance, on January 2020, RPCB issued order to ASPA to shut down
or relocate unit of ASPA within a month from the date of the issuance of
the order. It is submitted that this order was issued in an arbitrary manner
without giving ASPA any reasonable notice or opportunity to defend
themselves. Such actions are violative of the Respondents right to natural
justice.
[3.3.] RPCB’s order of shutdown and relocation violates the Principle of
Proportionality
17. When undertaking administrative action, the body should bear in
mind the goal it is pursuing and the methods it is employing to achieve it.
If its actions depart from the goal, then it is discriminatory, or
disproportionate.
18. The Court is concerned with the process, method or manner in
which the decision-maker has ordered his priorities and reached a
conclusion or arrived at a decision [Coimbatore District Central Coop.
Bank v. Employees Assn, (2007) 4 SCC 669; Chairman cum Managing
Director, Coal India Limited v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, AIR 2010 SC
75]. If the Court finds the measures “strikingly disproportionate” to the
offence, it has the powers to alter the punishment or measures taken by
the administration [Om Kumar v. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 3689].
19. In the present case, the order of closure and relocation was arbitrary
as no reason or scientific explanation was given to support such order.
Furthermore, APSA in consonance with the previous notices issued by
the RPCB, installed advanced machinery to reduce air and water
pollution. As ASPA had started operations with all required permits and
had invested a large sum in creating infrastructure and it should not be
ordered to relocate or shut down since it would not be proportional to the
allegations levied by the RPCB.

ISSUE 4. WHETHER RPCB’S ORDER IS IN CONFLICT WITH

INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
20. It is contended before this Hon’ble Court that RPCB’s order is in
conflict with international obligations between France and India as
firstly, it is violative of the international minimum standards to be
maintained under customary international law [4.1]; and secondly, it is in
breach of the Fair and Equitable Treatment (“FET”) clause in the
Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) between France and India [4.2].
[4.1] International Minimum Standards
21. International minimum standard is a norm of customary
international law which governs the treatment of aliens, by providing for
a minimum set of principles which States, regardless of their domestic
legislation and practices, must respect when dealing with foreign
nationals and their property [Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Tanzania,
ICSID Case no ARB/05/22, Award, 24 July 2008]. The standard for
actions being assessed as fair and equitable are not to be determined by
the acting authority in accordance with the standard used for its own
nationals but instead as standards acceptable under international law
[CME v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Partial Award, 13
September 2001 9 ICSID Rep 121]. Violation of the aforementioned
norm engenders the international responsibility of the host State and may
open the way for international action on behalf of the injured alien.
22. In the present case, despite ASPA acquiring all the necessary
consents and standards, it was asked to shut down and relocate without
being provided a reasonable opportunity to be heard. As aforementioned,
reasonable opportunity to be heard is a right provided even to nationals.
Foreigners, who lack political rights, are more exposed than domestic
investors to arbitrary actions of the host State and therefore should be
granted a wider scope of protection [Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine,
ICSID Case no ARB/06/18, Award, 14 January 2010] which is lacking in
the present matter.
[4.2] Fair and Equitable Treatment of Investment under BIT
23. The jurisprudence surrounding the standard of international
minimum standards, is also reflected in fair and equitable treatment of
investment clauses [Muhammet Cap & Sehil Inşaat Endustri Ve Ticaret
Ltd. Sti. v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case no. ARB/12/6, Award, 13
February 2015]. Consequently, in Waste Management v. US (II), ICSID
Additional Facility Case no ARB(AF)/00/3, Final Award, 30 April 2004
(2004) 43 ILM 967, it was noted that the conduct of the host state
infringes the minimum standard of FET when it is arbitrary, violates the
principle of natural justice and lacks transparency and candor in
administrative process.
24. Article 4 of the Bilateral Investment Treaty entered into between
France and India dated September 2, 1997, provides that each
Contracting Party shall extend fair and equitable treatment in accordance
with internationally established principles to investments made by
investors of the other Contracting Party in its area and shall permit the
full exercise of this right in principle and in practice. It is pertinent to
note that though the BIT between France and India was terminated in
2017, Article 13 of the BIT provides that investments made while the
BITT was in force, shall continue to enjoy the protection of its provisions
for a period of fifteen years thereafter.
25. In the present case, ASPA is a France-based Private Limited
Company that has invested Rs. 500 crores worth of physical
infrastructure. Furthermore, it has ensured that it has the requisite
approvals and upgraded technology to reduce air and water pollution in
Ranangaon. Despite all of the above, ASPA has been treated in an unfair
and arbitary manner breaching the tenets of the BIT entered into between
France and India. Further, the lacuna in the administrative process has
also been established in the form of wrongful sub-delegation of authority
to RPCB and the violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, the
RPCB's order is in clear violation of India's binding obligations under the
BIT.

PRAYER :

Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, authorities cited and arguments

advanced, the Respondent most humbly and respectfully prays that this
Hon’ble Court be pleased to:
1. DISMISS the petition as being not maintainable;
2. QUASH the order issued by Ranangaon Pollution Control Board;
3. DECLARE that the RPCB doesn’t have the powers to order
closure or relocation of industries;
In alternative,
4. ORDER payment of fair compensation to ASPA as per the
provisions of the BIT

AND/OR
Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of justice, equity and
good conscience.
All of which is respectfully affirmed and submitted.
Sd/-

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES :

INDIAN CASES:
1. Sand Carrier's Owner's Union and Ors. v. Board of Trustees for the
Port of Calcutta and Ors, AIR 1990 Cal 176.
2. Shri Maninder Kumar Gupta v. Union of India, Ministry of
Petroleum and Natural Gas (1995) 1 SCC 85.
3. The North Arcot District Pawn Brokers' Association and Ors. v.
The Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Department
of Revenue and Insurance) and Ors (1975) 1 MLJ 290.
4. Tamil Nadu Panchayat Development Officers Association, Madras
v. Secretary to Govt. of Tamil Nadu, Rural Development and Local
Administration Dept., Madras and Ors. AIR W.P(C).36372/2017 1989
Mad 224.
5. Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P. Allahabad, 1963
AIR 996.
6. Prathyasa Mental Health Counselling Forum v. State of Kerala,
2020 SCC OnLine Ker 2314.
7. Jalore District Teachers' Association, Jalore v. State of Rajasthan
and Ors., RLW 1997(2) Raj 1091.
8. Sterlite Industries v. Union of India, Civil Appeal Nos. 2776-2783
of 2013.
9. Democratic Bar Association v. High Court of Judicature 2000 (3)
AWC 2383.
10. A.K. Roy v. State of Punjab and Ors., 1986 AIR 2160.
11. State Pollution Control Board v. M/S Swastik Ispat Pvt. Ltd,
National Green Tribunal Principal Bench Appeal No. 68 Of 2012.
12. Splendor Landbase Ltd. v. Delhi Pollution Control Committee,
2010 (173) DLT 52.
13. Maneka Gandhi v. The Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
14. Punjab National Bank v. All India Bank Employees Federation,
(1997) 10 SCC 627.
15. Harbans Lal v Commissioner 2002 (80) ECC 97.
16. Ajay Kumar and Fateh Singh v State of Rajasthan AIR 1994 SC 39.
17. Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn,
(2007) 4 SCC 669.
18. Chairman cum Managing Director, Coal India Limited v. Mukul
Kumar Choudhuri, AIR 2010 SC 75.
19. Om Kumar v. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 3689.
INTERNATIONAL CASES:
20. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID Case no
ARB/05/22, Award, 24 July 2008.
21. CME v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Partial Award, 13
September 2001 9 ICSID Rep 121.
22. Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case no ARB/06/18,
Award, 14 January 2010.
23. Muhammet Cap & Sehil Inşaat Endustri Ve Ticaret Ltd. Sti. v.
Turkmenistan, ICSID Case no. ARB/12/6, Award, 13 February 2015.
24. Waste Management v. US (II), ICSID Additional Facility Case no
ARB(AF)/00/3, Final Award, 30 April 2004 (2004) 43 ILM 967.
25. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID
Additional Facility Case no ARB(AF)/00/02, Award, 29 May 2003 CO
ICSID Rep 134.
STATUTES:
1. Constitution of India
2. Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981
3. Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974
4. Bombay High Court Public Interest Litigation Rules, 2010
5. Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888
MOOT COURT HELD ON:

29th March 2022

MOOT COURT JUDGES :

Adv. Bhushan Kulkarni

STUDENT ADVOCATE FOR :

Petitioner

MOOT COURT - III

TITLE :
INTERNATIONAL

COURT OF JUSTICE THE

PEACE PALACE

THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS

THE CASE CONCERNING THE MILITARY OPERATION BY

RUSSIA IN UKRAINE AND ALLEGATIONS OF GENOCIDE
UNDER THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE

UKRAINE……………………………………APPLICANT
VERSUS
RUSSIAN FEDERATION……………….RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION :

The State of Ukraine (“Ukraine/Applicant”) hereby submits the

present dispute concerning the military operations by the Russian
Federation (“Russia/Respondent”) in Ukraine and allegations of
genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, 1948 (“Genocide Convention/Convention”)
to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ/the Court”) by a written
application, signed on the twenty-ninth day of March in the year two
thousand and twenty-two, pursuant to Article 40(1) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, which states:

“(1) Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be,
either by the notification of the special agreement or by a written
application addressed to the Registrar. In either case the subject
of the dispute and the parties shall be indicated.

(2) The Registrar shall forthwith communicate the application to

all concerned.

(3) He shall also notify the Members of the United Nations

through the Secretary-General, and also any other states entitled
to appear before the Court. The jurisdiction of the Court
comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters
specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in
treaties and conventions in force.”

Ukraine and the Russian Federation are both Members of the United
Nations and therefore bound by the Statute of the Court, including
Article 36 (1), which provides:

“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the

parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions
in force.”

Ukraine and the Russian Federation are both parties to the Genocide
Convention, Article IX
whereof provides:
“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a
State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated
in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of
 Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.”

A dispute has arisen relating to the interpretation and application of the

Genocide Convention, as Ukraine and Russia hold opposite views on
whether genocide has been committed in Ukraine, and whether Article
I of the Convention provides a basis for Russia to use military force
against Ukraine to “prevent and to punish” this alleged genocide.

Accordingly, upon adjudication, each party shall accept the judgement

of the Court as final and binding and shall execute it in good faith.
FACTS:

1. The Soviet Union was dissolved into 15 independent states

including Russia and Ukraine. Post the World War II, the European
Countries and America established the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (“NATO”) in 1949 which is an intergovernmental
military alliance among 28 European countries and 2 North
American countries.
2. In 1999 Russia signed the Charter for European Security, Charter for
European Security which “reaffirmed the inherent right of each and
every participating State to be free to choose or change its security
arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve”.

3. Ukraine has shown interest in joining NATO from time and again;
Russia criticized the move of Ukraine. According to President of
Russia Mr. Vladimir Putin enlargement of NATO is a threat to
Russia and demanded Ukraine be barred from ever joining the
military alliance.
4. In 2021 Russia built up a large military presence on the borders of
Ukraine. Considering the possibility of the threat from Russia, the
Ukrainian President Mr. Zelensky requested the American President
to speed up Ukraine's request for membership.
5. On February 24, 2022 Russia launched a full-scale invasion in
Ukraine. The various rounds of dialogs between Ukraine and Russia
 have failed due to the unwillingness of Russia. The Russian military
attacked different civilian areas of Ukraine, citizens are injured and
killed. There was a large scale of migration from Ukraine to
neighbouring countries.

6. Ukraine approached the International Court of Justice against Russia

to hold Russia accountable for its actions against Ukraine. Ukraine
claimed that Russia must be accountable for “manipulating the
notion of genocide to justify aggression”. Ukraine urged for an
urgent decision ordering Russia to cease military activity
immediately.
7. The Russian President said that the Russian military has ceasefire
temporarily and opened humanitarian corridors in several Ukrainian
cities, including the capital Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mariupol and Sumy.

ISSUE (S) :

ISSUE I.
WHETHER THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE HAS THE
JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE OVER THE PRESENT DISPUTE?

ISSUE II.
WHETHER RUSSIA’S MILITARY INVASION IN UKRAINE IS
LAWFUL UNDER THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION.

ISSUE III.
WHETHER RUSSIA’S MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE TERRITORY
OF UKRAINE CONSTITUTED AN UNLAWFUL USE OF FORCE AS
AN ACT OF AGGRESSION.

ISSUE IV.
WHETHER RUSSIA’S CONDUCT IN UKRAINE VIOLATED THE
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS:

1. It is humbly contended the ICJ has the jurisdiction to adjudicate

 over the case at hand because [I.1] ICJ has jurisdiction pursuant to
Article 36, Para. 1, of the Statute of the ICJ, and [I.2] jurisdiction can
be exercised to settle the dispute arising out of Article IX of the
Genocide Convention.
[I.1] ICJ HAS JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36(1)
OF THE STATUTE.
2. The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations,
and functions in accordance with the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (“Statute”). The Statute forms an integral part of the
UN Charter. All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto
parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
3. Article 36 (1) of the Statute, provides that the jurisdiction of the
Court comprises all matters that (i) parties refer to it, and (ii) are
specially provided for in either the United Nations Charter or the
treaties and conventions in force. Such matters can be brought before
the Court by means of a “written application instituting proceedings”
i.e., a unilateral document in accordance with Article 40 and Article
38 of the Statute (Case Concerning the Territorial and Maritime
Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 832).
4. In the case at hand, firstly, both Ukraine and Russia are
Members of the United Nations, secondly, an application for
adjudication of dispute has been filed by Ukraine, and thirdly, the
dispute concerns the unlawful use of force, acts of aggression,
genocide, and illegal humanitarian intervention conducted by Russia,
which falls under the ambit of UN Charter and various international
treaties and conventions which grant authority to the ICJ to
adjudicate over this dispute.
5. Therefore, both the Parties are inevitably bound by the Statute
of the Court, which has the jurisdiction to adjudicate over the present
dispute.
[I.2] JURISDICTION CAN BE BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE IX OF
THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION.
6. Article IX of the Genocide Convention provides that the
disputes arising between the contracting parties relating to the
interpretation, application, or fulfilment of the Convention shall be
submitted to the ICJ at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.
(Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the
Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands
v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2016, p. 849, para. 37 (quoting Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 11).
7. The ICJ can exercise contentious jurisdiction if the States
concerned have accepted its jurisdiction by virtue of a jurisdictional
clause, i.e., typically, when they are parties to a treaty containing a
provision whereby, in the event of a dispute of a given type or
disagreement over the interpretation or application of the treaty, one
of them may refer the dispute to the Court.
8. In the case at hand, both Ukraine and the Russian Federation
are parties to the Genocide Convention and bound by Article IX.
Ukraine contests both Russia’s factual lie and its legal lie – Firstly,
the factual dispute is whether genocide, as defined by Article II of
the Convention, has occurred or is occurring in Ukraine. Secondly,
the legal dispute is whether, as a consequence of Russia’s unilateral
assertion that genocide is occurring, Russia has any lawful basis to
take unilateral military action in and against Ukraine pursuant to
Article I and Article VIII of the Convention. Notably, these disputes
concern the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Genocide
Convention.
9. Therefore, the disagreement concerning the scope and
applicability of the Convention prima facie allows the ICJ to exercise
jurisdiction over the present dispute.

ISSUE II. WHETHER RUSSIA’S MILITARY INVASION IN

UKRAINE IS LAWFUL UNDER THE
GENOCIDE CONVENTION.

10. Pursuant to Article I of the Genocide Convention, all States

Parties thereto have undertaken “to prevent and to punish” the crime
of genocide. To this end, Russia claims that in order to stop a non-
existent genocide, it can invade a sovereign State – Ukraine.
11. It is humbly contended that albeit both the Parties are bound by
this obligation, Russia’s military operations on the Ukrainian
territory cannot be legally justified on the basis of Article I of the
Genocide Convention because [II.1] there is no factual or evidentiary
basis claiming the occurrence of a genocide in Ukraine, [II.2] even if
such basis confirms the occurrence of genocide in Ukraine, there are
alternate measures that Russia ought to have undertaken to fulfill its
obligations under Article I.

[II.1] THERE EXISTS NO FACTUAL OR EVIDENTIARY BASIS

FOR CLAIMING THE OCCURRENCE OF A GENOCIDE IN
UKRAINE.
12. The Genocide Convention defines ‘genocide’ under Article II
as inter alia the killing of members of a protected group or
deliberately inflicting on a group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction, “with intent to destroy it in
whole or in part.” Further, it is well-established in customary law
that the party asserting a particular fact bears the burden of proving it
((Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. USA), Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, para.101).
Where the offences alleged are of exceptional gravity, they must be
proved by the production of fully conclusive evidence (Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 221, para. 276)
13. Further, OHCHR’s reports on the human rights situation in
Ukraine make no mention of evidence of genocide in the country.
The human rights report published on 23 September 2021, covering a
period from 1 February to 31 July 2021, does not mention any
evidence of genocide. The most recent update on the human rights
situation in Ukraine, covering the period from 1 August to 31
October 2021 “focuses on key human rights developments in
Ukraine” and does not mention any evidence of genocide.
14. Moreover, it would be an understatement to say that Russia has
provided no evidence for acts of genocide in the course of this
conflict. The closest President Putin has come to even explaining his
allegation of genocide is to assert, as he did on 21 February of this
year, that “not a single day goes by without Donbass communities
coming under shelling attacks”. This is another flagrant lie, for
which Russia has offered no support.
15. Therefore, there is no evidence or factual basis to ascertain the
existence of genocide in Ukraine and thus, there is no ground for
Russia to assert its obligation under Article 1 of the Convention.

[II.2] IN ARGUENDO, RUSSIA SHOULD HAVE UNDERTAKEN

ALTERNATE MEASURES AVAILABLE UNDER THE
GENOCIDE CONVENTION.
16. Article I of the Convention does not specify the kinds of
measures that a Contracting Party may take to fulfil its obligation the
provision. However, Parties must implement this obligation in good
faith, considering other parts of the Convention, in particular Article
VIII and Article IX, as well as its Preamble.
17. Firstly, pursuant to Article VIII of the Convention, if a
Contracting Party considers that genocide is taking place in the
territory of another Contracting Party, it “may call upon the
competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the
Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other
acts enumerated in article III” (Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2007 (I), p. 221, para. 430). Secondly, pursuant to Article IX, such a
Contracting Party may submit to the ICJ a dispute relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention.
18. In the case at hand, Russia alleged that acts of genocide have
occurred in the Ukrainian territory, and then declared and
implemented a “special military operation” against Ukraine with the
express purpose of preventing and punishing purported acts of
genocide. However, at the outset, Russia ought to have made
reference to the United Nations or other international organisations
to take cognizance of the alleged genocide and implement
appropriate actions under Article II of the United Nations Charter or
file an application before this Court to consider the concerned
allegation.

ISSUE III. WHETHER RUSSIA’S MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE

TERRITORY OF UKRAINE
CONSTITUTED AN UNLAWFUL USE OF FORCE AS AN ACT
OF AGGRESSION.
23. It is contended that the military invasion by Russia constitutes
an ‘act of aggression’ within the meaning of Article 1 of the UNGA
Resolution No. 3314 (“Definition of Aggression”) and of Article
2(4) of the Charter, according to which, aggression is the ‘use of
armed force’ or ‘use of force’ by a State against the ‘sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State’.
(Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 254, para. 38; Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, para. 87).
24. This is because Russian military invasion in the territory of
Ukraine constitutes an ‘act of aggression’ under international law as
it duly fulfils the two thresholds for the same: firstly, [III.1] it
amounts to unlawful ‘use of armed force’ and [III.2] it violates the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of
Ukraine.

[III.1] RUSSIA’S MILITARY INVASION AMOUNTS TO

UNLAWFUL ‘USE OF ARMED FORCE’.
25. The scope of ‘force’ under the definition includes military and
armed force. Forms of force which are less grave in nature than
invasions with armed force have been recognized by the Court as use
of force. Even military action that is limited in time and space has
been recognized by the court to constitute use of armed force
(Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. USA), Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, para. 176).
27. In the case at hand, Russia’s use of force was in the form of an
invasion undertaken by the Russian military, thereby befitting the
description of the use of armed force and thus categorizing as an act
of aggression.

[III.2] RUSSIA’S MILITARY INVASION VIOLATES THE

SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL
INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE.
28. ‘Sovereignty’ includes the state territory within which the state
exercises its supreme and exclusive authority, to the exclusion of all
other States (Corfu Channel Case, (United Kingdom v. Albania), ICJ
Rep. 1949, p.4). As enshrined under Article 2(1) of the UN Charter,
the sovereign equality of states is the basic principle of international
law (United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (1945), 1
U.N.T.S. XVI). The rule required a state’s consent in respect of any
incursion onto its territory. Thus, any form of interference, including
armed intervention, is condemned.

ISSUE IV. WHETHER RUSSIA’S CONDUCT IN UKRAINE

VIOLATED THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.
32. International Human Rights Law (“IHRL”) governs the
obligations of States towards citizens and other individuals within
their jurisdiction. Accordingly, Article 6(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (“ICCPR”) and Article
3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (“UDHR”)
grant every human right to life, liberty and security, which can only
be taken away by the procedure established by law. This is
peremptory norm of jus cogens from which no derogation is
permissible (B. Ramcharan, The Right to Life in International Law
(1983); Karen Parker, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human
Rights, Hastings International Comparative Law Review (1989);
A.V. Ribero, Report on the Implementation of the Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based
on Religion or Belief, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/35 (1987)).
33. Further, Article 13(1) of the UDHR and Article 12(1) of the
ICCPR grant every person who is lawfully within the territory of a
State, the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose the
residence. Violence has devastating consequences on human health,
affecting both combatants and civilians, the impact and morbidity
can result due to both direct and indirect consequences of violence
(UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Art.25, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III)).
34. In the case at hand, the Russian military attacked different
civilian areas of Ukraine, as a result of which Ukrainian citizens are
injured and killed and there has been a large scale migration from
Ukraine to neighboring countries.

PRAYER :

Wherefore in light of the issues raised, authorities cited and arguments

advanced, it is most humbly and respectfully prayed that the International
Court of Justice be pleased to:

1. DECLARE that Russia’s military invasion amounts to an act of

aggression;
2. ADJUDGE and declare that Russian cannot lawfully take any
action under the Genocide Convention in or against Ukraine aimed at
preventing or punishing an alleged genocide, on the basis of its false
claims of genocide;
3. DECLARE that Russia has violated general international law,
human rights and international humanitarian law; and
4. INDICATE provisional measures requiring that Russia take no
steps in furtherance of the military operations which have as their stated
purpose and objective preventing or punishing Ukraine for committing
genocide;
AND/OR

Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of justice, equity and
good conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.
Respectfully submitted,
AGENT FOR UKRAINE

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES :

A. CASES:
1. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bos. & Herz. v. Serb. &
Montenegro), Judgement, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 47 (Feb. 26)
2. Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo.
v. Uganda), Judgement, 2005 I.C.J. Rep 168 (Dec. 19)
3. Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
(Djib. v. Fr.), Judgement, 2008
I.C.J. Rep. 177 (June 4)
4. Corfu Channel (U.K./Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4 (Apr.
9)
5. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgement, 1974 I.C.J.
Rep. 3 (July 25)
6. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226 (Jul. 8)
7. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 141 (June 27)
8. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgement, 1973 I.C.J. Rep. 457
(Dec. 20)
9. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgement, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 183
(Nov. 6)
10. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), Judgment (Merits), 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (May 24)
B. STATUTES:
1. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (1945), 1
U.N.T.S. XVI
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966),
999 U.N.T.S. 171
3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), G.A. Res.
217A (III)A
4. Genocide Convention, 1948
5. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Jun. 26, 1945, 33
U.N.T.S. 993
6. Geneva Conventions I, II, III and IV of 1949
7. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3

MOOT COURT HELD ON:

27th April 2022

MOOT COURT JUDGES :

Adv. Bhushan Kulkarni

STUDENT ADVOCATE FOR :

 Applicant

OBSERVATION OF CIVIL CASE PROCEEDINGS :

1. TITLE OF THE CASE :

Shri. Mathuro Raina Plaintiff V/S Sri. Vedanti Sharma Respondent

2. PARTICULARS OF APPELLANT / PLAINTIFF :

Shri. Mathuro Raina, S/o. Anganelu, Hindu, aged about 37 years

working in T.T.
Devasthanam and residing at No.14 ‘E’ type quarters N.G.O.
Colony, Tirupati

3. PARTICULARS OF RESPONDENT:

Sri Vedanta Sharma, S/o. Ramachandra Reddy, Hindu, aged about

52 years, businessman and
residing at No.101, R.R. Colony, Tirupati

4. ADVOCATE OF THE APPELLANT / PLAINTIFF :

Adv. Bhushan Sharma

5. ADVOCATE OF THE RESPONDENT:

Adv. Tripti Sharma

6. IN THE COURT OF:

N THE COURT OF DISTRICT MUNSIF : TIRUPATI

7. CONTENTS OF THE PLAINT IN BRIEF :
(COPY OF PLAINT MAY BE ATTACHED INADDITION)

The defendant is running a business on provisions and is having his

shop at Bazar
Street, Tirupati to run the business to purchase provisions for his
shop from the wholesale
dealer he was in urgent need of some funds. Hence the approached
the plaintiff demanding
some loan from him. Both are known to each other for many years.
(4) The defendant borrowed a sum of Rs.50000/- (fifty thousands
only) from the plaintiff
on 16-09-1992 for his family business and to discharge some sundry
debts, agreeing to repay
the some on demand either to the plaintiff or to his agent with an
interest at the rate of 24%
p.a. and executed the suit promissory note on the same date at
Tirupati. The suit pro-note is
marked herewith as DOC.No.1.
(5) Later on, inspite of severa oral demands made by the plaintiff and
his servants, agents,
the defendant did not paid a single pie either towards interest or
towards Principal.
(6) Hence the plaintiff issued a registered notice through his counsel
to the defendant, on
5
th June 1995 calling upon the defendant to repay the said debt with
the accused interest,
through the defendant duly received the notice on 8th June 1995 he
failed to reply nor to pay.
The office copy of the lawyer notice along with the postal receipt
and acknowledgement are
marked herewith as Doc.NO.2 and 3 respectively.
(7) The cause or action for this suit has arisen on and from 16th
September 92 when the
suit debt is borrowed by the defendant and executed the suit pro-note
on and from 5th June 95
when the notice was sent calling the defendant to repay on and 8th
June, 95. When the
defendant duly received notice at Tirupati with in the jurisdiction of
this Hon’ble Court

8. OBSERVATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS :

On 12th Feb. 1996 we went to District Munisif Court Tirupati where

 this above stated
case O.S.234/95 was taken for evidence, Defandant was called out
and set exparte.
Plaintiff was as PW1 exparte examination.
PW1 : on his examination spoke about the loan he advance to the
defendant, the
execution of the suit pronote which was marked as “A1” his issuance
of notice through
his counsel office and copy of the notice with postal receipt was
marked as “ExA2”. The
postal acknowledgement is also marked as “ExA3”. Further he
prayed to the court to
decree the suit as prayed for.
OBSERVATION OF CRIMINAL TRIAL:

1. TITLE OF THE CASE :

State of Telegana V/S X

2. PARTICULARS OF COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT:

N/A

3. PARTICULARS OF THE RESPONDENT:

N/A

4. ADVOCATE OF THE COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT :

N/A

5. ADVOCATE OF THE RESPONDENT:

 Adv. Vadeebdra Joshi

6. IN THE COURT OF:

Chief Magistrate Court of Hyderabad

7. CONTENTS OF THE COMPLAINT / APPEAL ETC. IN BRIEF :

(COPY OF COMPLAINANT / APPEAL MAY BE ATTACHED INADDITION)

Accused has opened Company, majority shareholders are accused..

Started in 2000, 1 lakh shares of 25 rs, 25 lakhs was authorized capital
Company started operating 2007. It is an English magazine/newspaper
In 2008, shares purchased at high prices. Valuation done by Deloitte and
other companies from 2009-2013. CBI claims that shares were never
worth so much people defrauded. Allegation of Corruption in charge
sheet, Claimed that investors were government contractors.

8. OBSERVATION OF THE TRIAL IN BRIEF :

11th of April 2022

Case of fraud against shareholders
I1: Whether CBI court has same powers as the Sessions Court?
SC: CBI court has the power to discharge the accused where elements of
discharge are true.
Prosecutions Charges: 420 (fraud), and criminal breach of trust
Whether selling bloated shares, as written above, amount to fraud?
Also done in private placement of shares not IPO.
Rough calculations of gross income of the the newspaper in case in a
year is more than the total share values.
Share valuations not just based on income, revenue expected to come
after 15-16 years, examples given of economies of scale
SC Judgments: Share valuation is the prerogative of the company, share
purchaser should do a due diligence check.
CBI court has reserved the case for order
CBI Court Powers:
Ferticko Investments v. Central Bureau of Investigation - Date of Order -
06.04.2022
 4.1) INTERVIEWING TECHNIQUES
4.1.1) INTERVIEWING SESSIONS - 1

1. IN THE CHAMBER OF :

Adv. Vadeendra Joshi

2. PARTICULARS OF THE CLIENT :

N/A

3. DATE :

4th April 2022

4. INTERVIEWING METHODS FOLLOWED BY THE ADVOCATE FOR HIS/HER

CLIENT :
(MODE OF CONDUCTING INTERVIEW)
The purpose of interviews is to get and give information and decide what you are going
to do with the information you have got. It is also an opportunity to establish and maintain
high standards of client care
Non-verbal communication (NVC) consists of a combination of posture, gesture,
facial expression, relative position and touch. While the words you use convey
information, your NVC communicates mood, attitude and emotion. If you want an
example of the power of NVC you need only look at the early days of the cinema,
where long and complex stories were told on screen by silent actors with only very
limited on-screen written words.
The advocate ensured the following;
- To speak in private without our conversation being overheard by others in the
- room, passers-by, people in an outer offi ce, etc.
- Not to be interrupted by other people, telephones ringing etc.
- To have enough time to discuss the matter without others wanting that room,
- for example.
- To have the solicitor’s full attention.
- To sit in reasonable comfort.
- No physical barriers between us and our solicitor to impede communication.
Not to be kept waiting.

5. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

Inquired about possibility of eviction
Land owned by client, 50-50 after construction
Third floor let out to apparel shop – Owners friend, who offered to
construct, because wife used to run a shop somewhere else
Person who constructed the building passed away in 2019
 Land owner continued the arrangement with wife, wife wanted the record
on the paper, 2020 lease agreement entered into (jan 2020)
Separate agreement for sharing of rent of the first two floors
Lease agreement recorded that the property to be used for selling clothes,
apparel shop
She wanted to handover the property back in December 2021
Rents irregular
In 2021, after covid receded, wife said agreement for 5 years
Prior to termination of agreement, son wanted to convert the entire shop
to a gym
Wife and owner wanted to stop the son from converting it to a gym, and
wanted to share the rent
Son per se never entered into an agreement
If purpose recorded in lease agreement, any other use might void the
agreement, under TOPA
The parties discussed making the wife a party to the suit
Even tenant can be in possession
DOCS: to show ownership and possession, and tax returns to show
contrustion of building, they prefer paying rent in cash and collect
receipts of payment, to show a 50-50, electricity bills to show that the
wife was paying the bills,
first course of action to terminate the agreement

6. LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS ESSENTIAL FOR THE PURPOSE OF

EVIDENCE :

N/A

7. COURSE OF ACTION ENVISAGED / SUGGESTED BY THE ADVOCATE :

The first course of action suggested by the Advocate is to terminate the agreement.
The advocate suggested to subsequently file a suit making the wife a party.

4.1) INTERVIEWING TECHNIQUES

4.1.2) INTERVIEWING SESSIONS - II
1. IN THE CHAMBER OF:

Adv. Vadeendra Joshi

2. PARTICULARS OF THE CLIENT :

N/A

3. DATE :

13th April

4. INTERVIEWING METHODS FOLLOWED BY THE ADVOCATE FOR HIS/HER

CLIENT :
(MODE OF CONDUCTING INTERVIEW)

The purpose of interviews is to get and give information and decide what you are going
to do with the information you have got. It is also an opportunity to establish and maintain
high standards of client care
Non-verbal communication (NVC) consists of a combination of posture, gesture,
facial expression, relative position and touch. While the words you use convey
information, your NVC communicates mood, attitude and emotion. If you want an
example of the power of NVC you need only look at the early days of the cinema,
where long and complex stories were told on screen by silent actors with only very
limited on-screen written words.
The advocate ensured the following;
- To speak in private without our conversation being overheard by others in the
- room, passers-by, people in an outer offi ce, etc.
- Not to be interrupted by other people, telephones ringing etc.
- To have enough time to discuss the matter without others wanting that room,
- for example.
- To have the solicitor’s full attention.
- To sit in reasonable comfort.
- No physical barriers between us and our solicitor to impede communication.
- Not to be kept waiting.

5. FACTS OF THE CASE IN BRIEF :

Indian journalist XX had faced up to two years in jail for criminal defamation over an
article she had written accusing YY, a former foreign minister and newspaper editor, of
sexually assaulting her in a hotel room during a job interview.
XX had initially written the article for zxc in 2017 without naming YY, but decided to go
public in 2018 at the height of the #MeToo movement.
Following XX’s statement, over 20 other women came forward with allegations against
YY, ranging from rape and assault to systematically using his senior position to harass
young female journalists.
YY was the founder and editor of several Indian newspapers as well as serving as a
politician in the FF party government between 1989 and 1991 before joining the DD
government in 2014 when they took power.
 In the aftermath of the allegations, YY resigned as a junior external affairs minister, one
of the most high profile #MeToo resignations in India. He dismissed the allegations as
“false, baseless and wild” and in 2018 filed a criminal defamation suit against XX.
As the case continued for over two years, XX refused to settle with YY out of court and in
September 2020 told the Delhi court she had shared her experience in order to encourage
other women to speak out.
N/A

7. COURSE OF ACTION ENVISAGED / SUGGESTED BY THE ADVOCATE :

File a complaint of sexual harassment

Defend the defamation case brought by YY

9. SIGN AND SEAL OF THE ADVOCATE

Annexure

5 INTERNSHIP:
INTERNSHIP - I (10 MARKS) :
5.1 SUMMARY OF INTERNSHIP - I:
I have been associated with the NGO Jazz Hands Foundation since 2016
and have taken
up various roles in my long tenure such as teaching volunteer,
administrative3 executive
And intern. In all my roles, I have interacted with various stakeholders,
taken up
significant responsibility and completed my tasks with an eye on efficient
problem solving

2 Name & Address of Organisation / Employer:

Jazz Hands Foundation
502, Success Heritage, Panchvati, Pashan, Pune - 41008

3 Duration of Internship :
September 2017 – October 2017 (Volunteer)
April 2018 – May 2018 (Administrative Executive)
May 2020 – June 2020 (Intern)

4 Work done during Internship :

- Teaching English to students of marathi medium schools located in
Pune through
 the means of drama;
- Organizing drama showcase and handling food and beverages
- Preparation of curriculum
- Obtaining 80G certificate for the NGO
- Attending periodical meetings

5 What do you learn during internship? List Skills & Knowledge you have
gained:
- Liaising with government officials in the IT department
- Teambuilding and moral support
- Being an effective mentor to students and juniors
- Punctuality and handling responsibilities

Name, Signature & Seal of Employer

(Alternatively, you may attach certificate of
Internship)

5. INTERNSHIP - II (10 MARKS) :

2
2 SUMMARY OF INTERNSHIP - II :
I was given the chance to intern with Bose&Mitra&Co as part of the
prize conferred to me
And my moot team for the awards of best speaker and winning team.
Eager to gain reak
Life experience in the maritime law sector, I arrived at their office in
August of 2021 and
Spent a whole month dealing with the aspects of the niche field. During
my memorable
Internship at the firm, I assisted the team with research on novel and
precedent setting
Matters, drafted various documents and generally assisted everyone in
my capacity as
intern.

2 Name & Address of Organisation / Employer:

Bose & Mitra & Co.
3 Duration of Internship :
1 month starting from the 1st of August 2021

4 Work done during Internship :

- Conducted research on the proposition of simultaneous enforcement
of arbitral
awards in multiple jurisdictions
- Conducted research on the proposition of Indian courts refusing
enforcement of
foreign awards on the grounds of exorbitant interests being awarded.
- Conducted research on the proposition of third party appeals under
Section 37 of
the Arbitration Act, 1996.
- Conducted research on the proposition of Court fees being
exempted by Courts
when Plaintiff has failed to file application under Order XXXIII as
indigent person.
- Conducted research on the applicability of Workmen’s
Compensation Act, 1923 to
Seafarers who are injured during service onboard foreign vessels.
- Conducted research on the scope of Courts interference under
Section 45 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996.
- Conducted research on the Suo moto order of the Supreme Court
extending
limitation and the implications of the same with respect to Section 138
proceedings under
the Negotiable instruments Act, 1881.
- Assistance in the preparation for legal proceeding by way of
reading case files and
making chronological lists of events, indexes, compilation and bundling
of documents

5 What do you learn during internship? List Skills & Knowledge you have
gained:
- Nitty gritty of Maritime Law practice.
- Forming part of a team in a large law firm.
- Bombay High Court practice and its admiralty law division.
- How to deal with conflicts and being a good team player
- Networking
 Name, Signature & Seal of Employer
(Alternatively, you may attach certificate of
Internship)

5. INTERNSHIP - III (10 MARKS) :

3
3 SUMMARY OF INTERNSHIP - III :
EPTALEX GARZIA GASPERI & PARTNERS in collaboration with
TITUS & CO.
Over the course of the last year, Luca Antony has been inducted in the
firm’s practice with
India being the principal focus of his relationship with the firm. We have
invested in this
long term plan with the objective of strengthening the firm’s ties with
India. Considering
the long term nature of this plan, we have broadly divided the plan in
three phases.
The first phase of the plan is the professional formation of Luca by
involving him in the
day-to-day activities here in Milan and subsequently at your office in
Delhi. In doing so,
we aim to prepare him to deal with the Italian and Indian aspects of
practice.
The second phase of the plan is directed towards marketing and business
development
efforts, with Luca assuming the role of a representative of ours in
relationships with the
Italian embassy, the consulates, chambers of commerce, trade agencies
and potential clients.
With a regular and dedicated presence in India, our objective is that of
consistently
increasing clients on both ends of the India-Italy portal. In this third
phase of our plan,
Luca would act as a point of contact for the two firms, facilitate and be
actively involved in professional affairs.
We hope that Luca’s presence in Delhi would allow us to fulfil our
combined objectives of
phase one and two of the plan. Here follows a brief synthesis of the
particulars and aims of the discussed period.

2 Name & Address of Organisation / Employer :

EPTALEX GARZIA GASPERI & PARTNERS in collaboration with
TITUS & CO.
3 Duration of Internship :
1 month

4 Work done during Internship :

Strengthening ties with the Italian embassy, all Italian consulates, Indo-
Italian Chambers of Commerce, the Italian Trade Agency and other
foreign organizations, introducing Luca as our point of contact in India.
Attend any events hosted by the above stated organizations with an
objective of furthering the presence of the collaboration.
Connecting with potential clients and organizing meetings at which
Cristina and I will be present. Should the situation allow it, organize
physical meetings with potential clients in a specific period in which
Cristina and I can travel to India.
Conduct marketing and business development activities including but not
limited to webinars, in-person conferences, presentation of articles on
pertinent subjects, conducted in collaboration with the chambers of
commerce, trade agency, universities or any other relevant entity.
Help Luca build practical experience by involving him in practices
deemed by you appropriate and helpful.
All other activities that may be beneficial to business development and/or
building experience.
Mergers and extraordinary activities of restructuring
Drafting legal notices, contracts, term sheets, memos, legal opinions, etc.
Client building
Client advising in respect of firm’s Indian practice.

5 What do you learn during internship? List Skills & Knowledge you have
gained:
- Fluency in Italian legal language
- Cross border considerations in assisting clients
- Team building, taking responsibilities
- Doing my best to be of assistance to my colleagues, clients and
collaborators

Name, Signature & Seal of Employer

(Alternatively, you may attach certificate of Internship)
1. NAME OF EXAMINERS :

a)
b)

2. DATE :

3. REMARKS BY THE EXAMINERS :

DATE : (SIGNATURE OF THE EXAMINER)

(SIGNATURE OF THE EXAMINER)