Property Lecture 4 – 2019

CHAPTER 4

Co-ownership, Partition, Possession

Civil Law Review Lecture Series

CO-OWNERSHIP; PARTITION

1. Two stages in Partition proceedings

“The first phase of a partition and/ or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is
proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-
ownership does not exist or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other
hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is
proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order. X x x

The second phase commences when it appears that “the parties are unable to
agree upon the partition” directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be
done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the
accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been
accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the
party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the
real estate in question. X x x”[1]

SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG AND FRANCISCO VILLAFRIA, SUBSTITUTED

BY DR. RUEL B. VILLAFRIA, Petitioners, v. MA. GRACIA RIÑOZA PLAZO
AND MA. FE RIÑOZA ALARAS, G.R. No. 187524, August 05, 2015

2. State of Co-ownership NOT favored by law

“On a final note, partition is a right much favoured, because it not only secures
peace, but also promotes industry and enterprise. The rule of civil law and
common law is that no one should be compelled to hold property in common with
another grew out of a purpose to prevent strife and disagreement, to facilitate
transmission of titles and avoid the inconvenience of joint holding x x x”. Elpidio
Magno etc. v. Lorenzo Magno, G.R. No. 206451, August 17, 2016

3. Prescription does not run in favor of, and against a co-owner; Exception

“Prescription may nevertheless run against a co-owner if there is adverse, open,

continuous and exclusive possession of the co-owned property by the co-owner.
In order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que
trust or other co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui
que trust or other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence
thereon must be clear and convincing.

The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and clear
repudiation of any trust. In such a case, an action to demand partition among co-
owners prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of the
issuance of title over the property. But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is
not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner
thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to demand partition does
not prescribe. Heirs of Feliciano Yambao, namely etc. v. Heirs of
Hermogenes Yambao et al., G.R. No. 194260, April 13, 2016 

Petition for Surrender of Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of Title; Partial

Factual Partition

Preliminarily, it is well to point out that the subject land was an undivided co-
owned property when Julian sold different portions thereof to various persons.
However, a perusal of the pertinent deeds of absolute sale reveals that definite
portions of the subject land were eventually sold, and the buyers took possession
and introduced improvements thereon, 33 declared the same in their names, and
paid the realty taxes thereon,34 all without any objection from respondents who
never disputed the sales in favor of the buyers. Consequently, the Court finds
that there is, in this case, a partial factual partition or termination of the co-
ownership, which entitles the buyers to the segregation of their respective
portions, and the issuance of new certificates of title in their names  upon
compliance with the requirements of law. Section 58 of PD 1529, otherwise
known as the “Property Registration Decree,” provides the procedure for the
registration of deeds or conveyances, and the issuance of new certificates of
titles involving only certain portions of a registered land, as in this case.

Said provision reads: Section 58. Procedure Where Conveyance Involves Portion
of Land. – If a deed or conveyance is for a part only of the land described in a
certificate of title, the Register of Deeds shall not enter any transfer certificate to
the grantee until a plan of such land showing all the portions or lots into which it
bas been subdivided and the corresponding technical descriptions shall have
been verified and approved pursuant to Section 50 of this Decree. Meanwhile,
such deed may only be annotated by way of memorandum upon the grantor’s
certificate of title, original and duplicate, said memorandum to serve as a notice
to third persons of the fact that certain unsegregated portion of the land
described therein has been conveyed, and every certificate with such
memorandum shall be effectual for the purpose of showing the grantee’s title to
the portion conveyed to him, pending the actual issuance of the corresponding
certificate in his name. Upon the approval of the plan and technical descriptions,
the original of the plan, together with a certified copy of the technical descriptions
shall be filed with the Register of Deeds for annotation in the corresponding
certificate of title and thereupon said officer shall issue a new certificate of title to
the grantee for the portion conveyed, and at the same time cancel the grantor’s
certificate partially with respect only to said portion conveyed, or, if the grantor so
desires, his certificate may be cancelled totally and a new one issued to him
describing therein the remaining portion: Provided, however, that pending
approval of said plan, no further registration or annotation of any subsequent
deed or other voluntary instrument involving the unsegregated portion conveyed
shall be effected by the Register of Deeds, except where such unsegregated
portion was purchased from the Government or any of its instrumentalities. If the
land has been subdivided into several lots, designated by numbers or letters, the
Register of Deeds may, if desired by the grantor, instead of cancelling the latter’s
certificate and issuing a new one to the same for the remaining unconveyed lots,
enter on said certificate and on its owner’s duplicate a memorandum of such
deed of conveyance and of the issuance of the transfer certificate to the grantee
for the lot or lots thus conveyed, and that the grantor’s certificate is canceled as
to such lot or lots. (Emphases supplied) In this relation, Section 5336 of PD 1529
requires the presentation of the owner’s duplicate title for the annotation of deeds
of sale. Records show that the subject owner’s duplicate title had already been
surrendered to the RD-Naga on September 13, 2013, and some of the buyers
had secured Certificates Authorizing Registration37 and paid the 36 Section 53.
Presentation of Owner’s Duplicate Upon Entry of New Certificate. – No voluntary
instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds, unless the owner’s
duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument, except in cases expressly
provided for in this Decree or upon order of the court, for cause shown. The
production of the owner’s duplicate certificate, whenever any voluntary
instrument is presented for registration, shall be conclusive authority from the
registered owner to the Register of Deeds to enter a new certificate or to make a
memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument and the new
certificate or memorandum shall be binding upon the registered owner and upon
all persons claiming under him, in favor of every purchases for value and in good
faith. x x x x (Emphases supplied) 37 Rollo, pp. 130, 132, 134, 136, 138, 140,
142, 144, and 148. J Decision 6 G.R. No. 224515 corresponding fees38 for the
registration of the sales in their favor. Nonetheless, while the rights of the buyers
over the portions respectively sold to them had already been recognized by the
RTC of Naga City in its July 17, 1998 Decision in Civil Case No. RTC ’96-3526
which had attained finality on September 10, 2006,39 there is no showing that
the other affected buyers have similarly complied with the necessary registration
requirements. Notably, from the time petitioner received possession of the
subject owner’s duplicate title in 2009, a considerable amount of time had passed
until she submitted the same to the RD-Naga on September 13, 2013. But even
up to the time she filed the instant petition before the Court on May 6, 2016, 40
she failed to show any sufficient justification for the continued failure of the
concerned buyers to comply with the requirements for the registration of their
respective deeds of sale and the issuance of certificates of title in their names to
warrant a preferential right to the possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title
as against respondents who undisputedly own the bigger portion of the subject
land. Consequently, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in
affirming the RTC Decision directing petitioner or the RD-Naga to deliver or
surrender the subject owner’s duplicate title to respondents. Moreover, it bears to
stress that the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of
deeds is only ministerial in nature.41 Thus, the RD-Naga cannot be expected to
retain possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title longer than what is
reasonable to perform its duty. In the absence of a verified and approved
subdivision plan and technical description duly submitted for registration on TCT
No. 8027, it must return the same to the presenter, in this case, petitioner who,
as aforesaid, failed to establish a better right to the possession of the said
owner’s duplicate title as against respondents. As a final point, it must, however,
be clarified that the above pronounced delivery or surrender is without prejudice
to the rights of the concerned buyers who would be able to subsequently
complete the necessary registration requirements and thereupon, duly request
the surrender of the subject owner’s duplicate title anew to the RD-Naga.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 7, 2015 and
the Resolution dated April 12, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 103591 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Remedios V. Gefiorga or the Register of
Deeds of Naga City is hereby DIRECTED to deliver or surrender the owner’s
duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8027 to respondents Heirs. ~
REMEDIOS V. GENORGA, Petitioner, – versus – HEIRS OF JULIAN
MELITON, Represented by ROBERTO MELITON as Attorney-in-Fact, IRENE
MELITON, HENRY MELITON, ROBERTO MELITON, HAIDE* MELITON, and
MARIA FE MELITON G.R. No. 224515, July 03, 2017. 
 TITLE V

POSSESSION

CHAPTER 1

Possession and the Kinds Thereof

Article 523. Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.

(430a)

In Civil law, there are two concepts involving possession. It could be possession
as a necessary feature of ownership; or, independent right of possession
regardless of ownership. The former is known as jus possessionis, the latter jus
possidendi. Thus:

“Viewpoints of Possession

 Right TO possession (jus possidendi) – This is a right or incident of

ownership (Example: I own a house; therefore, I am entitled to possess it.)
 Right OF possession (jus possessionis)- This is an independent right of
itself, independent of ownership. (Example: I am renting a house from X.
Although I am not the owner, still by virtue of the lease agreement, I am
entitled to possess the house for the period of lease.)[1] See p. 449, Civil
Code of the Philippines Annotated, Fifteenth Edition 2008 Book II by Paras

Article 524. Possession may be exercised in one’s own name or in that of

another. (413a)

Article 525. The possession of things or rights may be had in one of two

concepts: either in the concept of owner, or in that of the holder of the thing or
right to keep or enjoy it, the ownership pertaining to another person. (432)

Article 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

Mode and title must concur to acquire ownership.

(See Art. 712. Modes of acquisition: Occupation; Intellectual Creation; Law;

Tradition or Delivery; Donation; Acquisitive Prescription and Succession).

Title: – Juridical or legal justification for the acquisition or transfer of ownership or

other real right. – Remote cause of acquisition.

 
Mode of acquisition: Specific cause which gives rise to ownership. PROXIMATE
CAUSE.

Title is the “legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the
property itself.

It is clear from the foregoing that while respondents claim that their amended
complaint before the RTC is denominated as one for the declaration of validity of
the Deed of Sale and for specific performance, the averments in their amended
complaint and the character of the reliefs sought therein reveal that the action
primarily involves title to or possession of real property. An action “involving title
to real property” means that the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a claim that
he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive control,
possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same. Title is the “legal link
between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the property itself. ~~~
Heirs of the Late Spouses Alejandro Ramiro and Felicisima Llamada, v Sps.
Eleodoro and Verna Bacaron, G.R. No. 196874, February 06, 2019

Recall:

Thus, in DESAMPARADOS M. SOLIVA, Substituted by Sole Heir PERLITA

SOLIVA GALDO, petitioner, vs. The INTESTATE ESTATE of MARCELO M.
VILLALBA and VALENTA BALICUA VILLALBA, respondents (December 08,
2003).[4] it was held that:

“Moreover, we find that the RTC and the CA correctly appreciated the operation
of ordinary acquisitive prescription in respondent’s favor. To acquire ownership
and other real rights over immovables under Article 1134 of the Civil Code,
possession must be for 10 years. It must also be in good faith and with just title.

Good faith consists of the reasonable belief that the person from whom the
possessor received the thing was its owner, but could not transmit the
ownership thereof. On the other hand, there is just title when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but
the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.

The RTC and the CA held that the Villalbas had continuously possessed the
property from January 4, 1966 until May 5, 1982 or for a total of 16 years. Capt.
Villalba came into possession through a sale by petitioner, whom he believed
was the owner, though — at the time of the sale — she was not. Clearly, all the
elements of ordinary acquisitive prescription were present.
Petitioner is thus precluded from invoking the 30-year prescriptive period for
commencing real action over immovables. Prescription of the action is without
prejudice to acquisitive prescription, according to Article 1141 of the Civil Code,
which we quote:

Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of

ownership and other real rights by prescription. (Italics supplied)”

He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to

the foregoing.

Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good
faith. (433a)

Article 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith
on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. (434)

Article 528. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character
except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the
possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
(435a)

Article 529. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same

character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is proved. (436)

Article 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated
may be the object of possession. (437)

CHAPTER 2
Acquisition of Possession

Article 531. Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or

the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our
will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
such right. (438a)

Comments:

“Possession for purposes of forcible entry cases are deemed to include

those by symbolic delivery. Anacleto C. Mangasar v. Dionisio Ugay, G.R. No.
204926, December 7, 2014

 
 

Hypothetical Facts:
A buys land from B. A is in the States while B’s property is in Iloilo City. A pays the full price via
wire transfer. There is already meeting of the minds and the sale is perfected and even fully paid.
Only the execution of the Deed of Sale will be done at some future time when A returns to the
Philippines.

C, by FISTS, enters into possession of the land. May A file a forcible entry case?

“As a rule, the word “possession” in forcible entry suits indeed refers to nothing
more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de
Jure or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Title is not the
issue, and the absence of it “is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from
the parties in an ejectment case.”

The Court, however, has consistently ruled in a number of cases that while prior
physical possession is an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the
dearth of merit in respondent’s position is evident from the principle that
possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact
that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right. The case of Quizon v. Juan,
which surprisingly was relied on by the CA, also stressed this doctrine.

Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the
law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations,
succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of
possessory information titles and the like. The reason for this exceptional
rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has
to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that
he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the
property to the action of his will.  Here, respondent failed to show that he
falls under any of these circumstances. He could not even say that the subject
property was leased to him except that he promised that he would vacate it if
petitioner would be able to show the boundaries of the titled lot.

In the case of Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., the subject parcel was
acquired by the respondent by virtue of the June 4, 1999 Deed of Assignment
executed in its favor by Spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng. The
petitioner in the said case argued that, aside from the admission in the complaint
that the subject parcel was left idle and unguarded, the respondent’s claim of
prior possession was clearly negated by the fact that he had been in occupancy
thereof since 1999. The Court disagreed with the petitioner and said: Although it
did not immediately put the same to active use, respondent appears to have
additionally caused the property to be registered in its name as of February 27,
2002 and to have paid the real property taxes due thereon alongside the sundry
expenses incidental thereto. Viewed in the light of the foregoing juridical acts, it
consequently did not matter that, by the time respondent conducted its ocular
inspection in October 2003, petitioner hml already been occupying the land since
1999.

[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

Hence, in that case, the Court ruled that such juridical acts were sufficient
to establish the respondent’s prior possession of the subject property.

The case of Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., also involves

an action for forcible entry. On June 11, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. acquired a
residential lot situated in Matina, Davao City, which was covered by TCT No. T-
82338. On June 13, 1981, it transferred the said lot to respondent DMC. Alleging
that the petitioner forcibly entered the property in December 1993, the
respondent filed on March 28, 1994 a complaint for forcible entry. One of the
issues raised therein was whether respondent DMC had prior possession of the
subject property, to which the Court answered in the affirmative. It ruled that:

Prior possession of the lot by respondent’s predecessor was sufficiently proven

by evidence of the execution and registration of public instruments and by the
fact that the lot was subject to its will from then until December 1, 1993, when
petitioner unlawfully entered the premises and deprived the former of possession
thereof.

[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

In the case at bench, the Court finds that petitioner acquired possession of the
subject property by juridical act, specifically, through the issuance of a free patent
under Commonwealth Act No. 141 and its subsequent registration with the
Register of Deeds on March 18, 1987.

Before the Court continues any further, it must be determined first whether the
issue of ownership is material and relevant in resolving the issue of possession.
The Rules of Court in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court provides that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the
issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of
ownership. But this provision is only an exception and is allowed only in this
limited instance – to determine the issue of possession and only if the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.

This Court is of the strong view that the issue of ownership should be
provisionally determined in this case. First, the juridical act from which the right of
ownership of petitioner arise would be the registration of the free patent and the
issuance of OCT No. RP-174(13789). Apparently, the Torrens title suggests
ownership over the land. Second, respondent also asserts ownership over the
land based on his prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and
peaceful possession in the concept of an owner of the property in
dispute. Because there are conflicting claims of ownership, then it is proper to
provisionally determine the issue of ownership to settle the issue of possession
de facto.(citations omitted)~ ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his
Attorney-in-fact EUSTAQUIO DUGENIA, vs. DIONISIO UGAY, G.R. No.
204926               December 3, 2014

 But, what is the DEGREE OF FORCE that would constitute as “force” in

“forcible entry”?

“The word “Force” in forcible entry is an oxymoron.

Said the SC in a 2016 case,

“This case would have to fall under the concept of forcible entry as it has been
long settled that in forcible entry cases, no force is really necessary. The act of
going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily
implies the exertion of force over property, and that is all that is necessary.
~BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. AND PHILIPPINE BAPTIST
S.B.C., INC.,  v. FAITH IN CHRIST JESUS BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. AND
REYNALDO GALVAN, G.R. No. 191527, August 22, 2016

Relevant concepts on Tradition or Delivery.

Tradition or Delivery- Pursuant to Art. 1497 NCC, “When the thing sold is  placed
in the control and possession of the vendee”.

Arts. 1497 to 1501. Actual v. Constructive delivery.

The “mere execution of the deed of conveyance in a public instrument is

equivalent to the delivery of the property. (Sabio v. International Corporate Bank.
364 SCRA 365 [2001]; Also, Ignacio Wong v. Carpio, G.R. No. 50264, October
21, 1991

Exceptions: 1. “When there is a stipulation in the instrument to the contrary.

Doctrine in Addison v. Felix (38 Phil. 404 (1918). “it is the duty of the seller to
deliver the thing sold, and that symbolic delivery by the execution of public
instrument is equivalent to actual delivery only when the thing sold is subject to
the control of the seller, so that ‘at the moment of sale, its material delivery could
have been made’. This doctrine was reiterated in Power Commercial and
Industrial Corp. v. CA, 274 SCRA 597, (1997)

Exception to the exception. If the sale had been made under the express
agreement of imposing upon the buyer the obligation of recovering possession
from third party possessors.

This discussion should be co-related with discussion on MODE and TITLE and
PRESCRIPTION as also amplified in this lecture series

Article 532. Possession may be acquired by the same person who is to

enjoy it, by his legal representative, by his agent, or by any person without
any power whatever: but in the last case, the possession shall not be
considered as acquired until the person in whose name the act of
possession was executed has ratified the same, without prejudice to the
juridical consequences of negotiorum gestio in a proper case. (439a)

Article 533. The possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to

the heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the
decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted.

One who validly renounces an inheritance is deemed never to have

possessed the same. (440)

Article 534. One who succeeds by hereditary title shall not suffer the
consequences of the wrongful possession of the decedent, if it is not
shown that he was aware of the flaws affecting it; but the effects of
possession in good faith shall not benefit him except from the date of
death of the decedent. (442)

Article 535. Minors and incapacitated persons may acquire the possession

of things; but they need the assistance of their legal representatives in
order to exercise the rights which from the possession arise in their favor.
(443)

Article 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or

intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who
believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of
a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should
refuse to deliver the thing. (441a)

Article 537. Acts merely tolerated, and those executed clandestinely and

without the knowledge of the possessor of a thing, or by violence, do not
affect possession. (444)
Comment:

Relate to Article 555.

What Art. 537 really means is that when a person who is in peaceful possession
and is counting on his possession for purposes of acquisitive prescription, and
then he either allows another person BY TOLERANCE, or the other person
EMPLOYS VIOLENCE, such will NOT AFFECT OR INTERRUPT the peaceful
possessor’s counting of acquisitive prescription because he is still deemed to be
in possession after all. Neither will the usurper take advantage of acquisitive
prescription. But, the peaceful possessor may be barred by extinctive
prescription.

Bar Question 2016

Joven and Juliana are the owners of a 30-hectare plantation in Cotabato, covered by a title. One
day, a group of armed men forcibly entered their house and, at gun point, forced them to sign a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Romeo. Romeo got the title from them and they were ejected
from the house and threatened not to come back or else they will be killed. The spouses went to
Manila and resided there for more than 35 years. They never went back to Cotabato for fear of their
lives. Word came to them that peace and order have been restored in their former place of residence
and they decided to reclaim their land for the benefit of their grandchildren. Joven and Juliana filed
a suit for reconveyance of their property. This was opposed by the grandson of Romeo to whom the
title was eventually transferred, on the ground of laches and prescription. Decide the case and rule
on the defenses of laches and prescription. Explain your answer. (5%).

“Reconveyance action” is equated by case law with “Action for Quieting of Title”.

In Ney v. Quijano, GR No. 178609, (2010), it was ruled that:

An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property,

wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. Indeed,
reconveyance is an action distinct from an action for quieting of title, which is filed
whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title for purposes of
removing such cloud or to quiet title.  However, we find nothing erroneous in the
CAs ruling treating respondents action for reconveyance as an action to quiet
title.

In Mendizabel v. Apao, we treated a similar action for reconveyance as an action

to quiet title, explaining, thus:
The Court has ruled that the 10-year prescriptive period applies only when the
person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a person
claiming to be its owner is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe. The reason is that the one who is in actual possession of the land
claiming to be its owner may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession
gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his
own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.

The ruling was reiterated in Lasquite v. Victory Hills, Inc., viz.:

An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The

reference point of the 10-year prescriptive period is the date of registration of the
deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there
is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in
possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of
the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive
period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against
him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in
the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.

Answer to Hypothetical: Since, pursuant to Art. 537 in tandem with Art. 555,
that possession “by violence” does not affect possession, Joven and
Juliana are still deemed in possession hence they can still file an action for
reconveyance or quieting of title and their right to do so is imprescriptible.

Article 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in

two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a
question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor
shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in
possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who
presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be
placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings. (445)

CHAPTER 3
Effects of Possession

Article 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession;

and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to
said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of
Court.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may within
ten days from the filing of the complaint present a motion to secure from
the competent court, in the action for forcible entry, a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall
decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. (446a)

Comments:

Note; 2nd para. of Article 539 is confined to “Forcible Entry”. However, this being a
procedural rule, this was expanded by the Supreme Court also to “Unlawful
Detainer” cases per Sec. 15, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which states that:

“A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful

detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a
motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The
court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from filing thereof.”

“As a rule, injunction cannot substitute for the other actions to recover
possession. This is because in the meantime, the possessor has in his favor, the
presumption of rightful possession, at least, till the case is finally decided (See
Devesa v. Arbes, 13 Phil, 273; see also Rustia v. Franco, 41 Phil. 280). The
exception of course is a very clear case of usurpation.” (Paras, Civil Code of the
Philippines Annotated, Fourteenth Edition 1999 Book II)

BUT, the Civil Code allows in the meantime, the “writ of preliminary injunction
between the owner and the usurper, and the former is frequently deprived of his
possession even when he has an immediate right thereto. (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 98).

2)    It should be emphasized that Article 539 is confined to “forcible entry”.

However, in an accion publiciana case[7] Semirara Coal Corporation v. HGL
Development, G.R. No. 166854, December 6, 2006, the Supreme Court upheld
the grant of preliminary mandatory injunction by an RTC in Antique to restore the
plaintiff in possession. Thus,

“Under Article 539 of the New Civil Code, a lawful possessor is entitled to be

respected in his possession and any disturbance of possession is a ground for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore the
possession. Thus, petitioners claim that the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction is improper because the instant case is allegedly one
for accion publiciana deserves no consideration. This Court has already ruled
in Torre, et al. v. Hon. J. Querubin, et al. that prior to the promulgation of the
New Civil Code, it was deemed improper to issue a writ of preliminary injunction
where the party to be enjoined had already taken complete material possession
of the property involved. However, with the enactment of Article 539, the plaintiff
is now allowed to avail of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him
in his possession during the pendency of his action to recover possession.

It is likewise established that a writ of mandatory injunction is granted upon a

showing that (a) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; (b) the right
of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and
permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.” 

Article 540. Only the possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of

owner can serve as a title for acquiring dominion. (447)

 Article 541. A possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal
presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to
show or prove it. (448a)

 Article 542. The possession of real property presumes that of the

movables therein, so long as it is not shown or proved that they should be
excluded. (449)

 Article 543. Each one of the participants of a thing possessed in common

shall be deemed to have exclusively possessed the part which may be
allotted to him upon the division thereof, for the entire period during which
the co-possession lasted. Interruption in the possession of the whole or a
part of a thing possessed in common shall be to the prejudice of all the
possessors. However, in case of civil interruption, the Rules of Court shall
apply. (450a)

Article 544. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received

before the possession is legally interrupted.

Natural and industrial fruits are considered received from the time they are
gathered or severed.

Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily and belong to the possessor in good
faith in that proportion. (451)

Article 545. If at the time the good faith ceases, there should be any natural
or industrial fruits, the possessor shall have a right to a part of the
expenses of cultivation, and to a part of the net harvest, both in proportion
to the time of the possession.

The charges shall be divided on the same basis by the two possessors.
The owner of the thing may, should he so desire, give the possessor in
good faith the right to finish the cultivation and gathering of the growing
fruits, as an indemnity for his part of the expenses of cultivation and the
net proceeds; the possessor in good faith who for any reason whatever
should refuse to accept this concession, shall lose the right to be
indemnified in any other manner. (452a)

Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but

only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been
reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with
the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the
possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or
of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by
reason thereof. (453a)

Article 547. If the useful improvements can be removed without damage to

the principal thing, the possessor in good faith may remove them, unless
the person who recovers the possession exercises the option under
paragraph 2 of the preceding article. (n)

ARTICLE 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be
refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments
with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury
thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund
the amount expended. (454)

Article 549. The possessor in bad faith shall reimburse the fruits received
and those which the legitimate possessor could have received, and shall
have a right only to the expenses mentioned in paragraph 1 of article 546
and in article 443. The expenses incurred in improvements for pure luxury
or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in bad faith, but he
may remove the objects for which such expenses have been incurred,
provided that the thing suffers no injury thereby, and that the lawful
possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they may
have at the time he enters into possession. (445a)

Article 550. The costs of litigation over the property shall be borne by every
possessor. (n)

Article 551. Improvements caused by nature or time shall always inure to

the benefit of the person who has succeeded in recovering possession.
(456)
Article 552. A possessor in good faith shall not be liable for the
deterioration or loss of the thing possessed, except in cases in which it is
proved that he has acted with fraudulent intent or negligence, after the
judicial summons.

A possessor in bad faith shall be liable for deterioration or loss in every

case, even if caused by a fortuitous event. (457a)

Article 553. One who recovers possession shall not be obliged to pay for
improvements which have ceased to exist at the time he takes possession
of the thing. (458)

Article 554. A present possessor who shows his possession at some

previous time, is presumed to have held possession also during the
intermediate period, in the absence of proof to the contrary. (459)

Article 555. A possessor may lose his possession:

(1) By the abandonment of the thing;

(2) By an assignment made to another either by onerous or gratuitous title;

(3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing, or because it goes out of
commerce;

(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of article 537, if

the new possession has lasted longer than one year. But the real right of
possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. (460a)

Article 556. The possession of movables is not deemed lost so long as they

remain under the control of the possessor, even though for the time being
he may not know their whereabouts. (461)

Article 557. The possession of immovables and of real rights is not deemed

lost, or transferred for purposes of prescription to the prejudice of third
persons, except in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law
and the Land Registration laws. (462a)

Article 558. Acts relating to possession, executed or agreed to by one who

possesses a thing belonging to another as a mere holder to enjoy or keep
it, in any character, do not bind or prejudice the owner, unless he gave said
holder express authority to do such acts, or ratifies them subsequently.
(463)
Article 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has
been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.

If the possessor of a movable lost or which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot
obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. (464a)

Gen Rule: Actual possession of movable acquired in good faith is equivalent to

title.

 Exception: Anyone who has lost a movable or has been unlawfully deprived
thereof may recover without reimbursement

 Exception to exception: When movable was acquired through public auction

sale, no recovery unless there is reimbursement.

But when sold through a merchant’s store, no recovery even with reimbursement
under the Code of Commerce.

Article 560. Wild animals are possessed only while they are under one’s
control; domesticated or tamed animals are considered domestic or tame if
they retain the habit of returning to the premises of the possessor. (465)

Article 561. One who recovers, according to law, possession unjustly lost,

shall be deemed for all purposes which may redound to his benefit, to have
enjoyed it without interruption. (466)