NDC Policy Brief

No.07 - April 2022

Cool change ahead?

NATO’s Strategic Concept and the High North
Elizabeth Buchanan *

R ussia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine not

only revived NATO unity, it also bolstered
the case for NATO’s enduring mission of
deterrence and defence. In the High North, NATO’s
mission objectives are precariously balanced. For the
member or PfP states (Iceland as a member, Sweden
and Finland as PfP states) have territory on or above
the Arctic Circle. By virtue of Article 5 of the Wash-
ington Treaty, NATO has a commitment to defend
“every inch” of NATO member territory, also in the
Alliance, the High North is an enduring component High North.
of Cold War history, as well as a flank in terms of Beyond NATO membership, the Alliance has en-
NATO’s 360-degree security thinking. Of course, the during strategic interests in the High North across
High North is also a strategic frontier for renewed challenges related to climate change, critical infrastruc-
NATO-Russia competition. This Policy Brief examines ture (in)security, data and sea cable security, fisheries,
NATO’s High North challenges and considers strate- as well as the security of sea lines of communication.
gic priorities for the Alliance’s forthcoming Strategic Revived great power competition between NATO and
Concept. Russia, as well as the rise of China, are also compo-
nents of the Alliance’s High North challenge.
“High North, Low Tensions” For NATO, the region is a tinderbox of potential
conflict, enduring competition and selective (albeit
increasingly tenuous) cooperation with Russia. It is
The High North is largely a political definition refer- therefore no surprise that the maxim of “High North,
ring to the Nordic region above the Arctic Circle (see Low Tension” is rather
map), whereas the “Arctic” is a geographical defini- intrenched in NATO
tion of the circumpolar region above the Arctic Cir- Keywords
policy. However, with
cle. Allied use of “High North” to define the north- the latest developments
ernmost region of the North Atlantic Ocean is also a
High North
in Ukraine, NATO will
political message to signal more “conservative” polar find it increasingly diffi-
Strategic Concept
intentions: NATO is not about to arrive at the North cult to secure “low ten- Arctic
Pole any time soon. sion” in the High North. Polar Region
The High North has enduring strategic significance Coupled with enhanced
for NATO, with four of the five Arctic Ocean litto- Chinese interest in the region, economic linkages to
ral states being NATO member states (United States, some states in the High North region and an evident
Canada, Denmark, and Norway). The fifth state, Rus- appetite to develop its European links further, Beijing
sia, is technically a Partnership for Peace (PfP) state, poses a fresh challenge to NATO in the High North.
yet the current situation precludes any kind of co- In this context, NATO’s lack of clear policy guide-
operation in this framework. A further three NATO lines for the High North is problematic and must be
addressed in the new Strategic Concept to adequately
navigate revived strategic competition in the region.
* Head of Research for the Royal Australian Navy at the Sea Power Cen-
tre – Australia.
2 NDC Policy Brief – No. 07 – April 2022

Charting the High North in NATO policy This said, the 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué
introduced the High North into NATO Communi-
qué lexicon. This was the first time the geostrategic
Since the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, calls for the
space of the High North was specifically referred to
Alliance to develop a specific High North presence
in a NATO Communiqué. However, the Communi-
have resulted in increased exercises and yet overall,
qué was carefully crafted to underscore the delicate
a noncommittal approach. NATO’s current Strategic
political environment in the High North (read: Russia
Concept makes no mention of the High North, nor
legitimately holding the lion share of the region), with
the Arctic, due largely to an inability to reach con-
Allies aware of the potential implications of any en-
sensus amongst the Alliance on NATO’s role in the
hanced NATO presence up there.
region. Of interest is the central role the maritime
domain plays in the transatlantic relationship, and yet
the complete absence of “maritime” references in the Military dimensions: defence of the High
2010 Strategic Concept. North
Of course, political misalignments within the Alli-
ance are further highlighted by the 2011 Alliance Mar-
Besides the strategic interests already mentioned, the
itime Strategy which also excludes any mention of
High North is squarely of military interest to NATO,
the High North.1 This
simply because a large proportion of Russia’s nuclear
despite the Northern
For NATO, the region is reaches of the North forces are in this region. Likewise, the High North’s
a tinderbox of potential Atlantic quite literally GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) Gap as
well as the Bear Gap (between Svalbard and Norway)
conflict, enduring linking North America
are maritime chokepoints increasingly under pressure.
competition and selective to Europe. Overall, the Congestion of these sea lines of communication is in-
(albeit increasingly absence of any refer- creasing, and with a hostile Russia in eastern Europe,
ence to the High North
tenuous) cooperation in strategic documents there are expectations of potential spillover of Mos-
with Russia is problematic given cow’s military might into its High North and Arctic
regions. Indeed, since the 2010 Strategic Concept, the
NATO’s consistent ref-
High North has increasingly featured in allied train-
erence to its commitment to “deter [in] and defend”
ing operations and exercises. Likewise, Norway has
the North Atlantic, a region of which the High North
enhanced its role and leadership within the Alliance
is squarely within.
when it comes to securing the High North and deliv-
Alliance messaging via formal statements also ering situational awareness of its High North neigh-
avoids featuring the High North (and more specifi- bor – Russia.
cally, the Arctic). This is particularly the case with
But the High North represents a capability gap for
NATO Summit Communiqués and Declarations. The
NATO. This was not always the case – the Alliance
2016 Warsaw Summit Communiqué made a general
once had significant capacity to defend the North At-
reference to the North Atlantic “sea lines of com-
lantic region. Indeed, the region once “held a central
munication and maritime approaches of NATO ter-
place in NATO strategy and operations”.4 During the
ritory”, stating a commitment to “further strengthen
Cold War, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SA-
our maritime posture and comprehensive situational
CLANT) area of responsibility included the North
awareness” in the region.2 The High North was not
Atlantic. This clearly delineated operational boundary
specifically referenced; however, it is to be inferred
extended from the North Pole to the Tropic of Can-
that the North Atlantic maritime space is inclusive of
cer, and from the West Coast of Africa to the East
the polar area. NATO’s 2018 Brussels Summit Dec-
Coast of North America. During NATO reforms in
laration reinforced this collective resolve to improve
2002, SACLANT became the Supreme Allied Com-
“overall maritime situational awareness” in the North
mander Transformation (SACT) and the second post,
Atlantic. Again, no specific mention of the High
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR),
North frontier was included.3
absorbed SACLANT’s responsibilities to cover all
NATO operations, regardless of geographical loca-
tion. This also meant, however, that clear geograph-
1  Alliance Maritime Strategy, 17 June 2011.
ical boundaries, inclusive of the High North, were
2  Warsaw Summit Communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Gov-
ernment participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Warsaw, 9 July 2016.
3  Brussels Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Gov- 4  G. L. Dyndal, “How the High North became central in NATO strate-
ernment participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in gy: revelations from the NATO archives”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.34,
Brussels, 11 July 2018. Iss.4, 2011, pp.557-585.
NDC Policy Brief – No. 07 – April 2022
3

somewhat lost. “NATO [should] focus on measures that

Today, Norway continues to lead the Alliance’s will strengthen all domain awareness, con-
High North effort. Denmark’s Greenland is home duct extended cold-weather operations
to another NATO linkage via the Thule US military among interested Allies and share a com-
airbase. Likewise, Iceland hosts NATO’s air defence mon Arctic operating picture […] When the
system, the US Keflavik airbase and is geographically political environment is more favorable, the
“a vital bridge between North America and Europe”.5 scope of the NATO-Russia Council could
Indeed, a few NATO member states have formal be extended to include an Arctic security
High North and/or Arctic strategies, namely the UK working group”.7
and France. Arctic Ocean-rim NATO members Can- A further point of departure for the next genera-
ada and the United States diverge somewhat when it tion of NATO policy makers appears to be the inter-
comes to what NATO’s role in the region ought to est in cultivating NATO-Russia dialogue in the region.
be. Canada prefers NATO to stay out of the region, Whereas, the seasoned expert group recommended a
while Washington seems to envision a formal Arctic more restrained focus on the High North for NATO
agenda for the Alliance. – given the sensitivities of High North allied states.
A medium between the two must be found. Indeed,
it may be time for NATO to return to key lessons of
Political dimensions: deterrence in the the 1967 Harmel Report: defence and dialogue can
High North coexist, in fact they must. When it comes to the High
North, owing to the legitimate territorial and mari-
Overall, despite the litany of unilateral state interests time stake Russia holds in the region, the Alliance’s
in the High North theater, consensus within the Alli- new Strategic Concept can include the High North
ance as to NATO’s role in the region is rather elusive. in terms of specifically heeding the Harmel Report’s
But it does not need to be. Indeed, the 2022 Stra- key takeaway that “military security and a policy of
tegic Concept has a unique opportunity to articulate détente are not contradictory”.8
and signal NATO’s enduring High North interest.
Ahead of the tabling of the 2022 Strategic Concept, Towards the Madrid Strategic Concept
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg undertook
a series of public engagements meeting with subject
matter experts and the policy community to craft a The High North failed to feature in the 2010 Strategic
clear “2030 vision” for the Alliance. Of interest is the Concept. This is not a reflection of strategic interest,
fact that the High North did feature predominately but a product of transatlantic attention and priorities
in these discussions. The final report tabled by the resting elsewhere, at the time. Of course, the collapse
NATO 2030 Reflection Group noted that of the Soviet Union resulted in the reorientation of
“NATO should enhance its situational the Alliance away from
awareness across the High North and the the High North fron- The 2021 Brussels
Arctic and, for the High North that falls tier, and this position Summit Communiqué
was bolstered by the
“War on Terror” era introduced the High
within SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility,
should develop a strategy that takes into ac-
count broader deterrence and defence plans. following events of North into NATO
This regional strategy should be built in September 11, 2001. Communiqué lexicon.
close coordination with, and with sensitivity That said, strategic This was the first time
to the perspectives of, NATO Allies that are planning is not static, the geostrategic space
Brussels was always
Arctic littoral states”.6
acutely aware of North
of the High North was
Likewise, the NATO 2030 Young Leaders Expert Atlantic challenges on specifically referred to in
Group final report grappled with the role of NATO the horizon. For Mos- a NATO Communiqué
in the High North. As a point of departure however, cow, two decades of
this group focused on the Arctic in lieu of the polit- Putin have resulted in a modernized Russian military
ical construct of the High North. The report noted: and sustained age of Arctic military industrialization.
NATO’s northern flank has thus reawakened and this
5  NATO, Press point by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Prime
Minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir of Iceland, 2 March 2022. 7  “NATO 2030 embrace the change, guard the values: a report by the
6  “NATO 2030 united for a new era: analysis and recommendations NATO 2030 Young Leaders Group – for this generation and the next”,
of the Reflection Group appointed by the NATO Secretary General”, 25 4 February 2021.
November 2020. 8 NATO, Harmel Report, 16 November 1967.
4 NDC Policy Brief – No. 07 – April 2022

must be reflected in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept. Re-engage with the Cold War High North
While the need for a NATO High North policy is strategy
evident, it is politically divisive within the Alliance,
and by no means a short-term feat. An apt first step
would be to feature the Alliance’s High North identity On March 3, 2022, seven of the eight permanent Arc-
in the 2022 Strategic Concept. tic Council member states (NATO members Canada,
Denmark, Iceland, Norway, the United States and PfP
This could be framed as an area of overall strategic
members Finland and Sweden) released a joint state-
interest for the Alliance, or as a “special interest zone”
ment outlining their intention to ‘pause’ participation
in which some member states take the lead. Here,
in the Arctic Council. Russia’s response essentially
Nordic member states Norway, Iceland and Denmark
underscored Moscow’s unilateral plans to refocus on
could spearhead Alliance efforts to maintain situa-
domestic Arctic interests in lieu of regional coopera-
tional awareness and bolster regional resilience in the
tion. While it is not in the economic interest for Rus-
High North. Sweden and Finland, as Partnership for
sia to draw conflict into the region, it is impossible to
Peace countries, could further enhance the Alliance’s
rule out further spillover of Russia-West tension into
High North agenda as articulated in the new Strategic
the High North. How NATO navigates this evolving
Concept.
challenge will rely not only on renewed dialogue and
Second, based on the NATO’s Center of Excellence deterrence measures, but the Alliance must also re-
(CoE) concept, the Alliance might consider establish- turn to the history books and reengage with the suc-
ing a robust policy and research group at Maritime Al- cesses (and failures) of its High North strategy of the
lied Command (MARCOM). Committed to research Cold War era.
and advocacy of the High North strategic challenge,
including academic research output, a NATO High
North CoE would essentially synthesize situational
awareness of regional security affairs. The Centre
could fund cutting-edge research agendas, host policy
round tables, and educate member state personnel on
the ever-evolving High North strategic environment.
Third, NATO should develop a 2030 Alliance Mar-
itime Strategy. Last updated in 2011, the Alliance
Maritime Strategy reflects a different strategic era.
NATO’s 2017 decision to revive the Cold War-era At-
lantic Command is a step in the right direction, but
there is now an opportunity to reinvigorate NATO’s
maritime strategy. Featuring the High North as a key
maritime domain in the North Atlantic theater would
underscore the centrality of NATO maritime interest
in the region to resurgent Russia and rising China. In-
deed, recent Russian activity highlights the need for
a revised Maritime Strategy for allied maritime areas
of interest including the Black Sea, and the Mediter-
ranean, should more than one maritime zone require
already quite stretched fleet capabilities.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book, 2009.

The views expressed in Research Division Follow us on Twitter and Facebook

this NDC Policy Brief are Thierry Tardy, PhD, Series Editor at https://twitter.com/NDC_Research
the responsibility of the @thierrytardy at https://facebook.com/NDC_Research
author(s) and do not NATO Defense College NDC Policy Brief
necessarily reflect the Via Giorgio Pelosi 1, 00143 Rome – Italy ISSN 2617-6009
opinions of the NATO www.ndc.nato.int
Defense College, NATO,
or any government or
The NATO Defense College applies the Creative Common Licence “Attribution-Non
institution represented by
the contributors. Commercial-NoDerivs” (CC BY-NC-ND)