Archa Verbi 13 (2016) 68-102

Natura H um ana Relieta est Christo:

Thomas Aquinas on the Effects of Original Sin
by D a n ie l W. H o uck

Literary critic Alan Jacobs once observed that no religious teaching he knew of
generates as much hostility as original sin. 1 I wouldn’t disagree. A poll of the
bête noire of academic theologians, however, would more likely be topped by
“pure nature.” The idea that human beings, without grace, can live perfect,
autonomous lives is not only disbelieved but widely scorned, even consid­
ered a major contributor to the decline of Christianity in the West. If nature
suffices, what need is there for grace? Moreover, hasn’t the nouvelle théologie
shown that pure nature’s putative patron saint, Thomas Aquinas himself, had
no such concept? “The soul is naturally capable of grace. ” 2 Even if one grants
that pure nature is a hypothetical possibility—a point admitted even by de
Lubac—wouldn’t it be a massive interpretive blunder to claim, with Cajetan,
that Thomas thought human beings now are in a purely natural state? 3
Even the Thomists came around. Garrigou-Lagrange, for example, rejected
Cajetan’s view and argued that the wounds of original sin make us weaker than
we would be in pure nature. Thomas, after all, like Augustine, conceived of
original sin as a corruption of nature, akin to a disease. Adam and Eve were
created injustice, in health—nature in the Patristic sense—but after sin and the
consequent corruption of Adam’s seed, nature is sick with sin. Poisoned by
concupiscence, ìncuruatus in se, we now need grace to love God. Though there
are surely exceptions, it seems safe to say this view of Garrigou-Lagrange (to
which we will return) represents a consensus. A broad variety of contemporary
theologians, from neo-Thomists who argue that pure nature would be stronger
than nature now, to the historically-minded who deny Thomas had such a con­
cept, to ecumenists emphasizing the thirteenth-century’s Augustinian bona
hdes, all agree: for Thomas Aquinas, original sin has damaged human nature.

* I would like to thank Bruce D. Marshall, Thomas Joseph White, the audience of the
Thomas Aquinas Society at Western Michigan University, and an anonymous referee for
Archa Verbi for helpful feedback on this article.
1 J acobs 2009, ix.
2 T homas Summa theologiae (=STh) I-II, q. 113, a. 10. Unless otherwise noted, translations
in this paper are my own.
3 “Sicut enint persona nuda, et persona exspoliata, non distinguuntur in hoc quod una
sit magis aut minus nuda; ita natura in puris naturalibus, et natura exspoliata graita
et iustitia originali, non different per hoc quod altera earum sit magis aut minus in
naturalibus destituta.“ C aietani Commentarla in STh MI, q. 109, a. 2 (ed. cit. 292).
 Thomas Aquinas on the Effects of Original Sin 69

What I will show in this paper, however, is that Thomas taught what the con­
sensus denies: original sin leaves human beings with precisely the powers they
would have in “pure nature.”4 His reasons for claming this, however, are likely
to surprise.
We will start with Thomas’s commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences.
God created Adam and Eve in original justice. Original justice was “natural”
in three senses: it was good for nature; human beings can have it without su­
pernatural sanctifying grace; and it was sexually transmissible. Nevertheless,
Thomas argues that strictly speaking, original justice was not “due” to nature;
it was above nature’s intrinsic principles and God could have withheld it.
When Adam sinned, he forfeited original justice. Only a tyrant would punish
a child for the sins of her parent by depriving her of anything natural. Since
Scripture reveals both that God is just and that Adam’s children are punished
for his Fall, Thomas concludes that they have lost only supernatural gifts. This
is their original sin: to begin existence with nature and not grace. (In technical
terms: original sin is formally to lack the justice by which the will was subject to
God, materially to bave habitually ordered concupiscence.) Original sin is sin
secundum analogiam, inherited rather than committed; as such, it involves no
turn to the mutable good and the human being with it still loves God. Thomas
declares that infants who die with only original sin will, despite lacking the be­
atific vision, know and enjoy God forever in natural happiness.
In the second section we will see that Thomas’s mature discussion of origi­
nal sin’s effects is the same, only shorter. But what of the Prima Secundaes
treatise on grace, where many claim to find an altogether different view of origi­
nal sin? I propose in the third section that attention to Thomas’s account of
providence is the key to grasping the continuity between his views of original
sin and grace, as well as the motivation which led Thomas to his view of origi­
nal sin in the first place. Nature remains after sin only to be claimed by Christ.
The claim of continuity this paper advances—that Thomas held in his youth
and maturity that the human being in original sin, just as in “pure nature,”
lacks subjection to God, has disordered concupiscence but is nonetheless by
nature actively oriented to God—should not be mistaken for the claim that his
thought as a whole did not undergo significant development, even in areas
closely related to original sin’s effects, such as the relation between sanctifying
grace and original justice, or the ability to merit.

4 The position of this paper was defended by the Dominican J.B. Kors (Kors 1922),
whose monograph was frequently cited with approval during his lifetime (see Gaudel
1933; M agrath 1953; L ottin 1954; O ’Brien 1965). Kors’s work has been neglected in
recent decades, but it is still helpful. Its major weakness, however, was its failure to en­
gage with the passages that gave rise to the consensus view. In particular, Kors didn’t
discuss the treatise on grace, in which Thomas appears to teach that infants with origi­
nal sin have lost the natural love of God. This is the chief reason, it seems to me, why
Kors failed to convince many serious Thomists.
70 Daniel W. Houck

1. O riginal sin in the scriptum

The commentary {Scriptum) on Peter Lombard’s Book of Sentences stems from

Thomas’s lectures as a bachelor in Paris, delivered circa 1252-1256.5 The title
“commentary” can be misleading. Thomas, like his contemporaries, used the
Lombard as a point of departure but felt free to present his own views on the
question at hand. This was certainly the case in Thomas’s doctrine of origi­
nal sin, found in distinctions 30-33 of book II. We will see Thomas depart
from the Lombard as well as the other popular accounts of original sin in the
1250s, which we can only mention here. The Lombard himself represented
the common Augustinian view (filtered through Anselm of Laon): original
sin is concupiscence.6 Peter Abelard famously challenged this view, arguing
that original sin is infants’ inherited debt of punishment, involving no guilt.7
Anselm of Canterbury had criticized Augustine’s view from a different perspec­
tive. Infants are guilty, but concupiscence cannot be the seat of sin. Original
sin consists rather in the absence of due original justice in the rational will.8
Anselm’s work on original sin was written circa 1100 but wasn’t widely received
until later. As Lottin noted, the first thirteenth-century author to cite it was
Alexander of Hales, who combined Anselm’s definition (among others) with
the Lombard’s.9
Despite their different definitions of original sin, these predecessors of
Aquinas had two things in common. First, in their accounts of creation, they
tended to not sharply distinguish nature from grace; Adam and Eve’s original
righteousness was by turns natural and gracious. Thus they generally denied,

5 See Torrell 2002, 53-78, for a helpful overview of this period in Thomas’s life.
6 “Originale peccatum dicitur fomes peccati, scilicet concupiscentia vel concupiscibilitas,
quae dicitur lex membrorum, sive languor naturae, sive tyrannus qui est in membris
nostris, sive lex camis.” Lombardus Sententiae II, XXX, c. 8 (ed. cit. 500, 4-6). For
Anselm of Laon’s doctrine of original sin, his circle, and influence on the Lombard,
see L ottin 1954, 11-76. For the Lombard himself, see G ross 1971, 147-155. We
cannot deal with the relation between Augustine and his medieval heirs. It is common
knowledge that he called original sin concupiscence; what exactly he meant has been
debated since. For Augustine’s own views, see the classic article of Staffner 1957. For a
constructive engagement with Augustine and helpful review of the literature in English,
see Couenhoven 2013.
7 “Cum itaque dicimus homines cum originali peccato procreati et nasci atque hoc
ipsum originale peccatum ex primo parente contrahere, magis hoc ad poenam peccati,
cui uidelicet poenae obnoxii tenentur, quam ad culpam animi et contemptum Dei
referendum uidetur.” A baelaruus Ad Romanos (ed. cit. 164, 368-372).
8 “Nec impotentia excusat earn in ipsis infantibus, quia in illis non solvit quod debet,
quoniam ipsa sibi earn fecit deserendo iustitiam in primis parentibus in quibus tota
erat, et semper debitrix est habere potestatem, quam ad semper servandum iustitiam
accepit. Hoc esse videri potest in infantibus originale peccatum.”
[Link] De conceptu virginali, c. 2 (ed. cit. 142, 1-5). He argues concupiscence cannot
be sinful in A nselmus De conceptu virginali c. 4 (ed. cit. 143-145). See G ross 1971, 14-28
for a discussion of Anselm’s views.
9 For Alexander Hales and his conglomeration of definitions, see Lottin 1954, 171-173.
 Thomas Aquinas on the Effects of Original Sin 71

as Anselm did explicitly, that God could create human beings in corruption,
without justice (anymore than he could create sin).10 Second, while agreeing
with Augustine that infants who die unbaptized go to hell, they stressed the
Bishop of Hippo’s teaching that such infants will suffer the lightest punish­
ment there. Anselm argued that although damned infants lack all happiness,
their punishment is lighter than those who sin personally. Abelard, followed
by the Lombard, clearly argued that infants’ sole punishment is to lack the be­
atific vision, without any hellfire. Still, all assumed that lacking the visio Dei is a
sorry state and would be experienced as such.11
Thomas would be influenced by each of these twelfth-century predecessors,
as well as the newly translated Aristotelian corpus. He would nonetheless offer
a bold account of original sin. To grasp his originality, we first need to investi­
gate his view of original justice. For one thing, Thomas will define original sin
as the lack of original justice. Equally important for our purposes, however, his
treatment of original justice stipulates two senses in which it is “natural,” basic
to his account of original sin.

a. Originaljustice
Thomas’s treatment of original justice in the Scriptum is scattered throughout
book II.12 The transmission of original justice (d. 20) is discussed before the
state of originaljustice (d. 29), for example. Much of the material in these two
distinctions overlaps, however, and for our purposes we can focus on d. 20, q.
2, a. 3. This article, which addresses the question of whether Adam’s children
would have been born with sanctifying grace if Adam hadn’t sinned, tells us
what Thomas thinks originaljustice is.

10 “[E]tiam si purum hominem sic faceret deus, ut dictum est: necesse esset eum non
minori praeditum iustitia et beatitudine, quam fuit ADAM cum primum factus fuit.”
Anselmus De conceptu virginali, c. 13 (ed. cit. 155, 27-29). See also A nselmus Cur Deus
homoll, c. 1 (ed. cit. 197f.).
11 Anselmus , in De conceptu virginali, c. 26-28 (ed. cit. 169-171), argues, without directly
citing Augustine, that infants who are damned deserve lighter punishments in
proportion to their lighter sin. A baelardus cites Augustine directly. “Scimus quippe
hanc esse mitissimam poenam, beato in Enchiridion Augustino sic attestante (...)
Quam quidem poenam non aliam arbitro:' quam pati tenebras, id est carere uisione
diuinae maiestatis sine omni spe récupérations.” Ad Romanos (ed. cit. 169f., 541-547).
L ombardus, despite rejecting Abelard’s denial of original sin’s culpability, follows
him in arguing that damned infants will experience “nullam aliam ignis materialis vel
conscientiae vermis poenam sensuri, nisi quod Dei vision carebunt in perpetuum.”
L ombardus SententiaeH , XXXIII, c. 2 (ed. cit. 520, 14-16).
12 For an overview of Thomas’s account of the creation of the first human beings in dia­
logue with historical-critical biblical scholarship, see P esch 2012.
72 Daniel W. Houck

Before stating his own view, Thomas raises five objections arguing that be­
cause postlapsarian Adam transmitted original sin, prelapsarian Adam would
have transmitted original justice and sanctifying grace, the grace that enables
merit. 13 Thomas then poses an objection on the other extreme: neither sancti­
fying grace nor the rational soul can he transmitted: therefore, neither original
justice nor grace can be transmitted . 14 Thomas posits a via media, the first part
of which is worth quoting at length.

The justice befitting the first human being was twofold. One original justice was
according to the due order of body under the soul, the inferior powers under the
superior powers, and the superior powers under God. This justice was appoint­
ed to human nature itself in its commencement from a divine gift. Such justice
would have been transferred to children. There is another, gratuitous justice,
which elicits meritorious acts, concerning which there are two opinions. Some
say that the first human being was created in natural conditions alone and not
in grace. On this view, gratuitous justice requires a certain preparation through
personal acts. Grace, therefore, is a personal property in the soul, and would in
no way be transferred, except according to a certain aptitude. Others, however,
say that the human being was created in grace. According to this view, the gift of
gratuitous justice was given to human nature itself; thus with the transfusion of
nature grace would have been infused simultaneously.15

Original justice is twofold; Adam could have received it in one of two ways. The
first original justice is “natural original justice,” characterized by three condi­
tions. We need to briefly discuss each one.
First, the human being with natural original justice is subjected to God in
her “higher powers” of reason (her intellect and will). This means that Adam
and Eve followed God’s law and did so easily, without being prone to disobey.
This was an axiom of medieval theology, though disagreement as to what this

13 “[Hjomo corruptus per peccatum transmisit peccatum in posteros. Ergo etiam et

gratiam et justitiam quam habuit in posteras transmisisset.” T h o m a s Scriptum II, d . 20,
q. 2, a. 3, ob 1.
14 “[VJidetur quod justitiam vel gratiam non transfudisset.” T homas Scriptum II, d. 20, q.
2, a. 3, sc.
15 “Sciendum est ergo quod duplex justitia primo homini poterat convenire. Una
originalis, quae erat secundum debitum ordinem corporis sub anima, et inferiorum
virium sub superiori, et superioris sub Deo; et haec quidem justitia ipsam naturam
humanam ordinabat in sui primordio ex divino munere; et ideo talem justitiam in filios
transfudisset. Est etiam alia justitia gratuita quae actus meritorios elicit; et de hac est
duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod primus homo in naturalibus tantum creatus
est, et non in gratuitis; et secundum hoc videtur quod ad talem justitiam requirebatur
quaedam praeparatio per actus personales; unde secundum hoc tabs gratia proprietas
personalis erat ex parte animae; et ideo nullo modo transfusa fuisset, nisi secundum
aptitudinem tantum. Alii vero dicunt quod homo in gratia creatus est; et secundum
hoc videtur quod donum gratuitae justitiae ipsi humanae naturae collatura sit; unde
cum transfusione naturae simul etiam infusa fuisset gratia.” T homas Scriptum II, d. 20,
q. 2, a. 3.
 Thomas Aquinas on the Effects of Original Sin 73

rectitude involved abounded. Some argued the original rectitude required

sanctifying grace; others claimed Adam needed to merit sanctifying grace be­
fore receiving it. Thomas, at this point in his career, argues that justice does
not require grace, though God could have given justice and grace when he cre­
ated the human being.
The second condition of natural original justice, tightly linked to the first,
was that the soul’s “lower powers” were subjected to reason. Thomas inter­
changeably calls these the “sensual powers” or refers to them synecdochically
by the name “concupiscence.” We don’t need to discuss them in-depth . 16 Suf­
fice it to say they enable human beings to desire or move away from things in
a physical way (to lust for sex, for example, or to sweat in fear). That the lower
powers were subjected to reason implied, among other things, that Adam and
Eve wouldn’t have spontaneously felt any irrational pangs of anger or lust to­
ward each other. Each of them was able to sin only through a fully conscious,
deliberate choice. Finally, the third condition of natural original justice was
the subjection of the body to the soul. This meant that Adam and Eve were
immortal and free from suffering, as long as they remained obedient to God.
After his summary of these three basic conditions, Aquinas makes a crucial
point: God did not give natural original justice to Adam and Eve as individu­
als only but to human nature, to the human species. Therefore it would have
been transmitted to Adam’s children along with other features of the species.
The other form ofjustice, “gratuitous original justice,” is simply natural origi­
nal justice plus supernatural sanctifying grace. Gratuitousjustice involves all of
the features of natural original justice, with the addition of sanctifying grace,
which enables merit of the beatific vision. Sanctifying grace, in contrast to origi­
nal justice, is properly speaking a personal accidental quality or property. It is
not transmissible through sexual intercourse . 17 Natural original justice, then,
though possessed by individuals, was given to human nature, to be transmit­
ted through sexual reproduction . 18 Original sin is a sin of nature, because the
specific nature lacks the natural justice it ought to have. “Original sin is, in the
first place and in itself, a sin of nature. Secondarily, it is a sin of the person.
Actual sin, however, is properly speaking a sin of the person occurring through

16 For Thomas’s discussion of the passions (the sensual powers in act), see L ombardo
2011 .
17 Thomas’s argument is Christological. To claim that sanctifying grace is natural,
transmissible via intercourse, is to ascribe to Adam a power proper to Christ, the power
to save the human race. “[N]on enim unius personae actus toti naturae mereri vel
demereri potest, nisi limites humanae naturae transcendat, ut patet in Christo, qui
Deus et homo est: unde a Christo nascuntur filii gratiae non per carnis traductionem,
sed per meritimi actionis; ab Adam vero nascimur filii irae per propagationem, non per
demeritum.” T homas Scriptum II, d. 20, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3.
18 Adam and Five could form a pre-human body with a disposition to original justice,
a body that would have caused justice upon God infusing the rational soul. Due to
Adam’s sinful act, it causes original sin instead. See T homas Scriptum II, d. 30, q. 1, a. 2,
ad 3. This was Thomas’s consistent view of original sin’s transmission (see T homas STh
I-II, q. 83, a. l ,ad 4).
74 Daniel W. Houck

a personal act. Thus, as original sin is transferred and not actual sin, so too
natural original justice would have been transferred and not gratuitous origi­
nal justice.”19
This treatment in d. 20 is largely repeated in d. 29.20 Thomas’s early view,
to sum up, is that original justice is a state of moral righteousness by which a
human being is submitted to God, has rightly ordered concupiscence, and is
conditionally immortal. Original justice is natural in two senses thus far. First,
human beings can have it without sanctifying grace. Second, human beings
can transmit it through sexual intercourse. Sanctifying grace can be added to
original justice but only as a personal, supernatural gift.21

b. Original sin and human nature

Thomas’s teaching on the sense in which original justice is natural leaves open
another question. How does original justice relate to Aristotle’s concept of na­
ture? Aristotle famously opposed Plato by arguing that universals exist only in
particulars, and that as such, human nature is all around us. We see human
nature every time we see a human being, as we see redness every time we see
something red. From a Catholic point of view, was Aristotle simply wrong? Was
human nature fully present only in Eden, remaining now only in corrupted
form? If this is the case, in what sense are human beings still human? Alterna­
tively, since human beings still exist, should we say that nature remains after
the Fall, only without the divinely bestowed gifts of grace? If nature remains,
though, can we truly say it suffered any penalty for sin? This cluster of ques­
tions is, at the most basic level, the question of the relation between the effects
of original sin and human nature. It is precisely this question with which
Thomas begins the Scriptum ’s treatise on original sin. Are “the defects which we
feel penalties in us for the sin of the first human being”?22
Thomas’s answer synthesizes Dionysian, Augustinian, and Aristotelian
teaching to unpack Scripture’s teaching that human beings after Adam are
born in sin. As Aristotle says, whatever is ordained to a given end must be dis­
posed to that end. The end to which humanity is ordained, the beatific vision,

19 “[P]eccatum originale est primo et per se peccatum naturae, et per posterius personae;
actuale autem est proprie peccatum personae quod per actum personalem incurritur:
et ideo, sicut peccatum originale transfunditur, et non peccatum actuale, ita edam
justifia originalis naturalis transfusa fuisset, et forte non gratuita.” T homas Scriptum II,
d. 20, q. 2, a. 3, a dì .
20 T homas Scriptum II, d. 29, q. 1, a. 2. By d. 29, however, Thomas argues it is more prob­
able that Adam turned to God and received sanctifying grace immediately upon being
created.
21 Insofar as God has offered sanctifying grace to humanity through Christ, Thomas can
also call sanctifying grace a gift to human nature. Properly speaking, he thinks it is a
personal gift. See T homas STh III, q. 69, a. 3, ad 3.
22 “Utrum defectus quos sentimus sint nobis quasi poena pro peccato primi hominis.”
T homas Scriptum II, d. 30, q. 1, a. 1.
 T hom as Aquinas on th e Effects o f O riginal Sin 75

requires supernatural help .23 Humanity needed to be given something beyond

its natural power, beyond that which follows from the principles of human na­
ture, in order to reach this end. This was the gift of original justice. What are
those basic principles of human nature, the principles to which original jus­
tice was added as a gift?
They are precisely what remain when we subtract the gift of original justice
that ordered them rightly. Adam forfeited the gift of original justice on human­
ity’s behalf; he passed on bare human nature instead. Humanity in its fallen
state is humanity in its natural state, shorn of the gift of original justice: “De-
ordained from the sin through sin (...) the human being is left with only those
goods following from the principles of human nature . ” 24
How can these natural principles be penalties for sin? Aren’t the principles
of human nature (the animal body and rational soul) and what follows these
principles (like the powers of the soul) intrinsically good? Here is Thomas’s
answer.

T hese defects can be com pared to hum an n atu re in two ways. First, they can be
com pared to h u m an n atu re in its natural principles alone. In this respect, such
defects are certainly n o t penalties b u t natural defects (...) Alternatively, they can
be com pared to h u m an n atu re as it was first instituted. In this respect, they are
w ithout doubt penalties.25

The defects of human beings—their lack of subjection to God, disordered con­

cupiscence, and mortality—are natural. In what sense? They flow from human
nature, which has these defects when left to itself. If we consider our first par­
ents, however, who had the gift of original justice added to their nature, we
realize that the lack of these gifts is a penalty for Adam’s sin.
Thomas knew his position would be perceived as paradoxical. Shouldn’t
we say simply that the original gifts were gracious as opposed to natural? 26 Isn’t
simultaneously calling original justice natural, claiming that we lose nothing
natural from sin, and claiming that we lose original justice unnecessarily con­
fusing? Thomas defends his multipronged use of the word “natural” by arguing

23 “R espondeo d icen d u m , q u o d ea quae sunt ad finem , d isp o n u n tu r secundum

necessitatem finis, ut ex II Physicor., tex. 78, patet. Finis autem ad quern h o m o ordinatus
est, est ultra facultatem n atu rae creatae, scilicet beatitudo, quae in visione Dei consistit;
soli enim Deo hoc conn atu rale est (...) U nde o p o rtu it n atu ram h u m an am taliter
instim i ut non solum haberet illud quod sibi ex p rincipiis n aturalibus debebatur, sed
etiam aliquid ultra, p er quod facile in finem perveniret.” T homas Scriptum II, d. 30, q.
1, a. 1.
24 “[F]acta deo rd in atio n e a fine p e r peccatum (...) relictus est h o m o in illis tan tu m bonis
quae eum ex naturalibus principiis co n seq u u n tu r.” T homas Scriptum II, d. 30, q. 1, a. 1.
25 “[I]sti defectus possunt ad naturam h u m an am d u p liciler com parari: vel ad earn,
secundum quo d in principiis n aturalibus suis tantum consideram i', et sic proculdubio
non sunt poen ae ejus, sed naturales defectus (...) vel ad earn, p ro u t instituta est, et sic
proculdubio po en a su n t.” T homas Scriptum II, d. 30, q. 1, a 1.
26 T homas ScriptumII, d. 30, q. 1, a. l,o b .3 .
76 Daniel W. Houck

that we can speak of natural goods either in terms of the principles of nature or
in terms of their ordination to the ultimate end .27 Considered in themselves,
the natural principles due to human beings have not been forfeited by sin; they
haven’t even been diminished. Yet we can also speak of natural principles vis-à-
vis their ordination to the ultimate end. In this sense they can be diminished,
insofar as original justice is forfeited. This is how Thomas explains the famous
statement on nature’s wounds from the Gloss ordinaria (generally attributed to
Bede). The human being is in naturalibus vulneratus in the sense that she lost
the good for her nature that helped her reach the ultimate end; but ultimately,
with Denys, we must affirm that the natural gifts have neither been lost nor
diminished.
We now have a third sense in which original justice is natural. In addition
to the fact that God can give it without sanctifying grace and in addition to the
fact that it is transmissible through sexual intercourse, original justice is natu­
ral in that it is good for human nature. It is bad to lose it, then, even though it
does not follow from the principles of nature.
How serious is Thomas? Does original sin really leave human nature with
its principles and all that follows from them? Would a human being created by
God without original justice and without original sin (in “pure nature”) be as
morally weak as a human being with original sin in corrupt nature ? 28 Thomas
anticipates this question, answering it in the context of discussing whether
original sin passes to all human beings. It does (Christ excepted), even though
God has the power to make a human being without original sin and without
original justice. What would such a human being be like?

If, by divine power, someone were formed from a finger, she would not have origi­
nal sin. Nevertheless, she would have all the defects of those bom in original sin, without
the character of guilt. This is clear from the following. When God created human­
ity in the beginning, he could have formed a different human being from the
mud of the earth—left to the condition of her nature, mortal and passible, feeling
concupiscence rage against her reason. In this state nothing would be subtracted

27 “Bona naturalia dicuntur dupliciter. Vel prout sunt in se considerata, secundum quod
naturae debentur ex propriis principiis; et sic nec homo nec angelus per peccatum
aliquid naturalium amisit; vel in aliquo diminutus est: quia Dionysius etiam integra data
naturalia in angelis peccantibus permanere dicit ... Vel secundum quod ordinantur
in finem ultimum; et hoc modo in utroque bona naturalia diminuta sunt quidem,
non penitus atnissa, inquantum uterque factus est minus habilis et magis distans a
finis consecutione: et propter hoc etiam homo gratuitis spoliatus dicitur et in naturalibus
vulneratus, Luc., X, in Glossa.” T homas Scriptumll, d. 30, q. 1, a 1, ad 3, emphasis mine.
28 As Torrell 2001, 180f. observes, the thirteenth-century concept of humanity “in puris
naturalibus” is not equivalent to the modern “statu naturae purae." I would add, however,
that the reason this is the case is not because Thomas had no concept of human nature
without justice, sanctifying grace, and sin; this is precisely what Thomas discusses here
and elsewhere (see infra n. 59). The reason is rather, as de Lubac forcefully argued in
many works, that modern theologians came to think that human beings in this “purely
natural” state would have far greater power than Thomas ever dreamed. See, for ex­
ample, the sixth chapter of de L ubac 2008, 183-223.
 T hom as Aquinas on th e Effects o f O riginal Sin 77

from h um an n ature, because these defects follow th e principles o f h u m an nature.

Still, as this defect would n o t be caused th ro u g h [hum an] will, it would n o t have
had the character o f guilt o r penalty.29

If God were to make a human being without original justice and without origi­
nal sin—either from the body of a human being in corrupt nature or from the
dust—this human being would have everything that follows from human na­
ture, including the defects of original sin. She simply wouldn’t have original
sin. She would lack original sin because she would not have received the lack
of original justice from Adam’s sinful will. Original sin just is the due lack of
original justice, the lack of justice that ought to be present by Adam’s will. In
itself, “materially” speaking, lacking original justice is not a sin, because the
principles of nature themselves are not sinful. The debt or obligation to have
justice stems from nature as instituted, from historical nature; the sinful lack
of justice comes from Adam’s sinful will.
In fact, the sinful lack of justice can only come from a sinful human will: sin
must be voluntary in some sense. Original sin is partially voluntary in infants
(not voluntary by their own will) because it was fully voluntary in Adam (volun­
tary by his proper will) . 30 Thomas, accordingly, defines original sin the lack of
due justice by which the will was subjected to God; materially, it is lite lack of
due justice by which concupiscence was rightly ordered . 31 The guilt of original
sin is comparable to a disease. Adam’s seminal power is incapable of passing
on justice, just as a leper’s seminal power is incapable of passing on health . 32

29 “ [S] i aliquis divina virtute ex digito form aretur, originale n o n haberet; haberet
nihilominus omnes defectus quos habent qui in originali nascuntur, tarnen sine ratione
culpae: quod sic patet. Poterat Deus a prin cip io q u an d o hom inem condidit, etiam
alium hom in em ex lim o terrae form are, q uem in co n d itio n e n atu rae suae relinqueret,
ut scilicet m ortalis et passibilis esset, et p u g n am concupiscentiae ad rationem sentiens;
in quo nihil hu m an ae n atu rae derogaretur, quia hoc ex principiis n atu rae consequitur.
N on tarnen iste defectus in eo rationem culpae et p o en ae habuisset; q uia n o n p e r
voluntatem iste defectus causants esset.” T homas Scriptum. II, d. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3,
em phasis m ine.
30 “[I]n quolibet h o m in e rationem culpae habet ex hoc quod p e r voluntatem principii
naturae, id est prim i hom inis, ind u ctu s est talis defectus.” T homas Scriptum II, d. 30, q.
1, a. 2.
31 “[I]psae vires d eo rd in atae, vel d eo rd in atio virium sint sicut m ateriale in peccato origi­
nali, et ipsa d eo rd in atio a fine sit ibi sicut form ale.” T homas Scriptumll, d. 30, q. 1, a. 3.
32 “[L ]icet sem en n o n habeat in se infectionem culpae in actu, habet tam ii in virtute:
sicut etiam patet q u o d ex sem ine leprosi g en erato r filius leprosus, quamvis in ipso
sem ine non sit lepra in actu: est enfin in sem ine virtus aliqua deficiens.” T homas Scrip­
tu m ll, d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4.
78 Daniel W. Houck

It would be difficult to overstate Thomas’s boldness. His predecessors (not

to mention his thirteenth-century critics) 33 rejected the idea that God could
create human beings without justice, with sickness and death and concupis­
cence. Why would Thomas claim God could do this? To answer this question
we need to understand Thomas’s view of human nature’s relation to God.
Without justice, is the human being by nature hostile to God, an idolater, full
of the amor sui over the amor dei? If not, then how can Thomas deny that justice
is from nature? It would seem that if nature implies a right relation to God,
nature implies justice; conversely, that if nature does not imply right relation
to God, nature implies injustice. The clearest way to see Thomas’s answer to
this question is to move to the final distinction of the treatise, on original sin’s
punishment.

c. God and the analogy of sin

Although God permits infants to suffer certain temporal, bodily punishments
in this life, they do not deserve any spiritual punishment on the part of their
souls, which are immediately created by God. 34 Because the “crime” of origi­
nal sin is merely receiving a nature deprived of original justice, and we know
from scripture that God is just, we can infer that he would not unjustly punish
infants by depriving them of anything belonging to their nature. 35 Therefore,
Thomas argues, their punishment cannot consist of any sense pain; it can only
be the loss of the end to which the gift of justice ordained them, the beatific
vision.31’ What follows from this loss?
Not sorrow. Because they did not lose the beatific vision through any action
of their own, they will not be sad. 37 Infants who die unbaptized will be “joined

33 See Kaup 1967 for a discussion of Peckham and Olivi’s criticisms of Aquinas.
34 “Sed quantum ad animam, quae immediate a Deo creatur, non est res parentis, sed
ipsius Dei (...) Sciendum est ergo quod (...) hujusmodi poena [of the soul] nunquam
filius pro peccato patris punitur, quia ista poena non attingit ipsum secundum quod est
res patris.” T homas Scriptum II, d. 33, q. 1, a. 2.
35 “[P]oena debet esse proportionata culpae, ut dicitur Isa., XXVII, 8: In mensura contra
mensuram, cum abjecta fuerit judicabis earn. Defectus autem qui per originem traducitur,
rationem culpae habens, non est per subtractionem vel corruptionem alicujus boni
quod naturam humanam consequitur ex principiis suis, sed per subtractionem vel cor­
ruptionem alicujus quod naturae superadditum erat.” T homas ScriptumU, d. 33, q. 2, a.
1.
36 “[N]ulla alia poena sibi debetur nisi privatio illius finis ad quem donum subtractum
ordinabat; ad quod per se natura fiumana attingere non potest. Hoc autem est divina
visio; et ideo carentia hujus visionis est propria et sola poena originalis peccati post
mortem.” T homas Scriptum II, d. 33, q. 2, a. 1.
37 “Pueri (...) nunquam fuerunt proportionati ad hoc quod vitam aeternam haberent;
quia nec eis debebatur ex principiis naturae, cum omnem facultatem naturae excedat,
nec actus proprios habere potuerunt quibus tantum bonum consequerentur; et ideo
nihil omnino dolebunt de carentia visionis divinae.” T homas Scriptum II, d. 33, q. 2, a.
1.
 Thomas Aquinas on the Effects of Original Sin 79

to God through participation in natural goods; they will even be able to enjoy
him by natural knowledge and love. ” 38 Hell for them is a place of happiness.
We do not have time to explore the tension between Thomas’s affirmation of
a natural happiness in limbo and his teaching that there is a natural desire for
the beatific vision. 39 Suffice it to say that, although limbo is not a purely natural
state, it shows that Thomas thought human beings who have original sin and
their natural principles are rightly related to God by nature.40 We do need to
address a different difficult question. Why does Thomas think he is giving an
account of original sin? Wouldn’t Pelagius himself have been perfectly happy
to subscribe to this “defense” of the dogma?
The reason, in short, is that Thomas holds that original sin is called “sin”
by analogy.41 It shares certain features with personally committed “actual” sins

38 “[S]ibi [Deo] conjunguntur per participationem naturalium bonorum; et ita edam de

ipso guadere potuerunt naturali cognitione et dilectione.” T homas Scriptum II, d. 33, q.
2, a. 2, ad 5.
39 On the reading 1 am offering, there is no need to choose between affirming that
Thomas held (1) there is both a penultimate natural end (enjoyed in limbo) and an
ultimate supernatural end; (2) there is a natural desire for the ultimate end; and (3)
in God’s providence all human beings in via with the use of reason are in a state of
sanctifying grace or mortal sin. Readers who deny (1) in light of (2) or (3) have a diffi­
cult time understanding Thomas’s account of original sin. Denis Bradley, for example,
claims that “[i]nsofar as no natural end —including a life combining contemplation
and action —adequately satisfies man’s desire for beatitude, man is naturally endless.”
B radley 1999, 512. He leaves limbo unexplained, only noting that it is a “restricted
category.” B radley 1999, 479. Bradley leaves us with the impression that limbo was a
purely ad hoc hypothesis, arising perhaps from Thomas’s compassionate personality, as
opposed to what it was: a theologoumenon stemming directly from his views of divine
justice, the analogical character of original sin, and the intelligibility of human nature
without sanctifying grace. I am not affirming that (1) and (2) are ultimately coher­
ent, however. How can happiness worthy of the name leave any desire unfulfilled? As
Fein g o ld 2010 has argued, it is this dilemma that led Thomists to speculate about what
a “wish” (velleity) for the beatific vision, compatible with natural happiness, might be.
As we will see later, however, inattention to (3) has caused modern Thomists to miss
Thomas’s doctrine of original sin.
40 For theological reasons, Thomas always held that the human being’s destiny is sealed
at death; the infant who dies is immediately confirmed in her default natural goodness
and cannot sin. If Thomas had speculated about the fate of infants not so confirmed,
perhaps he would have argued that the will of the separate soul would be like the an­
gel’s first moment of existence: possessing natural happiness yet still able to sin (see
T homas .STAI, q. 62, a. 1). In any case, Thomas’s view of limbo is a helpful example of
his teaching that human beings do not lose their natural right relation to God by origi­
nal sin. If Thomas didn’t think this, he would have affirmed the common medieval
view that infants will be sorrowful over the loss of the vino.
41 “[P]eccatum non dicitur univoce de omnibus generibus peccatorum, sed per prius de
peccato actuali mortali, a quo peccatum veniale deficit ex hoc quod non omnino a fine
deordinat. Sed aliquo modo a fine retardai, ordine ad fìnem salvalo; unde deficit ex
parte illa ex qua peccatum formaliter rationem mali habet. Originale autem deficit ab
eo ex parte ipsius substantiae actus; actuale enim mortale est voluntarium voluntate
80 Daniel W. Houck

but lacks others. Unlike personal sin, original sin is not committed by the will
of the one who has it. Because it is not committed but inherited, Thomas ar­
gues that it is the lightest of all sins. “[A]mong all sins, original sin is the least,
for it is the least voluntary. ” 42 Yet unlike venial sin, original sin does involve
deordination from the beatific vision. The human being with original sin lacks
sanctifying grace and justice; thus, she has true sin. For Thomas, the problem
with Pelagianism is its refusal to acknowledge the supernatural status of grace.
Yet he thinks it would be Manichaean to deny that God is the natural end of
the rational creature. Thus, without original justice, not only is the human be­
ing not endless: she does not have a created good as her end either. God is the
goal, the telos, the end, the for-the-sake-of-which of her life. I will call this te­
leological feature Thomas thinks follows from the principles of human nature
the “natural orientation” to God, in order to clearly distinguish it from the sub­
jection to God in original justice.
We can summarize Thomas’s position from the Scriptum as follows. Human
beings were created in original justice, with wills subjected to God, rightly
ordered concupiscence, and an immortality contingent upon continued
obedience. The gift of original justice was natural in three senses: it was trans­
missible through sexual intercourse; it did not require supernatural grace; and
it was good for nature, a natural good. Nevertheless, original justice was above
nature considered in its intrinsic principles. When Adam forfeited original jus­
tice for humanity, he passed on bare human nature instead, which is to say
he passed on original sin. All the defects of original sin would be present if
God were to create a human being without original justice, without sanctifying
grace, and without original sin: yet all the goodness of human nature would
also be present, including the orientation to God.
Thomas would never again discuss original sin in the detail he did in the
Scriptum. Pedagogically speaking, this choice would prove unfortunate. The
great advantage of the Summa, its avoidance of the “multiplication of use­
less questions, articles and arguments, ” 43 was a double-edged sword: at times
it involved a terseness inevitably leading to misunderstandings. The brevity
of Thomas’s mature articulation of original sin, it seems to me, is the single
greatest factor explaining the widespread confusion surrounding it. There is
another reason, however, that has led even careful readers to suppose Thomas
held a different view by the end of his life; a reason which stems, in the first
place, from the following intuition.

propria illius in quo est; sed originale est voluntarium voluntate alterius; unde deficit
ex parte ilia ex qua peccatum habet rationem culpae.” T homas Scriptum II, d. 35, q. 1, a.
2, ad 2. Cf. T homas Scriptum II, d. 42, q. 1, a. 3.
42 “[I]nter omnia peccata minimum est originale, eo quod minimum habet de volun-
tario.” T homas Scriptum II, d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2.
43 T homas STh, prologus.
 Thomas Aquinas on the Effects of Original Sin 81

2. O r ig in a l sin in t h e later w orks

H asn ’t scholarship shown that Thom as underw ent an Augustinian trans­

form ation, a transform ation that belies any claim o f continuity between the
anthropologies o f the Scriptum and the Summa} H enri Bouillard, for exam ple,
influentially argued that after T hom as’s encounter with the late Augustine and
th e C ouncil o f O range, he repudiated the overly optim istic account o f hum an
n a tu re ’s power held in his youth. In the Scriptum, the hum an being with origi­
nal sin not only retains the orientation to God: she can avoid all m ortal sin,
fulfill th e n atural law, an d even m erit G o d ’s grace if she tries h ard enough.
T hom as appears to com pletely reverse him self in the Summa, em phasizing in­
stead “th e divine initiative and the intim ate d ep en d en ce o f the will on divine
h elp .”44 Surely for the m ature Thom as, at least, nature itself is harm ed by sin?
We can be m ore precise. As Garrigou-Lagrange argued, d o esn ’t the clearest
p ro o f com e from T hom as’s argum ent that the hum an being in corrupt nature
has lost th e natural powers to love God and fulfill the natural law (STh ITI,
q. 109, aa. 3-4)?45 D on’t these powers belong by definition to hum an nature?
Moreover, d o esn ’t Thom as argue that the wounds o f original sin affect all parts
o f th e h u m an being, causing an unnatural concupiscence and w ounding even
th e natural inclination to virtue (STh ITI, q. 85)? O tto Pesch, in an influential
ecum enical study o f Thom as and Luther, argues that the disordered concupis­
cence o f original sin explains the hum an will’s idolatrous aversion from G od.46

44 Bouillard 1944, 92. See the first chapter of the second part, “Découverte du Semi-Pé­
lagianisme,” 92-121. Bouillard shows that in Thomas’s Scriptum II, d. 28, aa. 2-4. the
human being with original sin can, without sanctifying grace, avoid all mortal sin, ful­
fill the natural law, and prepare herself for gr ace by doing what is in herself. As Lawler
1971,607 noted, however, Thomas only admits that those who do what is in themselves
can be said to merit their grace de congruo in a certain sense (“quoddamodo"), namely, it
is not unfittingior God to give them grace (T homas Scriptum II, d. 27, a. 4, ad 4).
45 “[L]’homme, dans l’état de déchéance non réparée, a moins de forces pour faire
le bien moral naturel qu’il n ’en aurait eu dans l'état de nature pure” (G arrigou -
Lagrange 1925, 24). “[0 ]n peut s’en rendre compte surtout par ce qu’il enseigne sur
la nécessité de la grâce pour aimer Dieu par-dessus toutet pour observer la loi natu­
relle. La saint Docteur, parlant de l’état purement naturel où l’homme aurait pu être
créé, dit: “L’homme par ses seules forces naturelles peut aimer Dieu (auteur de sa na­
ture) plus que soi et par-dessus tout.” Mais dans l’état de nature corrumpue, ajoute-t-il,
l’homme ne le peut pas, car, par suite de la corruption de la nature, la volunté se porte vers son
bien propre, à moins qu’elle ne soit guérie par la grâce de Dieu. Pour la même raison l’homme,
dans l’état de déchéance, ne peut observer toute la loi naturelle” (G arrigou -Lagrange
1925, 25f.).
46 “Daß der Wille, das Ich-Zentrum, durch die Erbsünde Gott nicht unterworfen ist,
sich der Hinordnung auf Gott entzieht, ist sachlich nichts anderes als die Abkehr von
Gott, das formelle Moment jeder Sünde. Daß die niederen Kräfte gegen die Vernunft
rebellieren und auseinanderstrebend nur noch ihre Eigenziele zu verfolgen suchen,
ist nichts anderes als die ungeordnete, das heißt nicht auf Gott bezogene Hinkehr
zum geschaffenen Gut. Diese doppelte Identifikation ist aber nicht nur sachlich zwin­
gend, sondern wird von Thomas auch expressis verbis mehrfach vollzogen, indem er die
82 Daniel W. Houck

Both of these theologians hold that at least for the mature Thomas, both the
higher and lower powers of the soul are worse in corrupt nature than pure na­
ture. Others, like J.P. Torrell, focus on the higher powers, such as the will’s loss
of love of God.47
To sort through this tangled web of issues, we need to begin with Thomas’s
discussion of original sin in the Summa. Thomas announces his plan for dis­
cussing original sin early in the Prima Secundae: “As will be explained later,
through the sin of the first parent the supernatural gift divinely given to hu­
manity was subtracted, and nature was left to itself. Thus we need to consider
the natural reason why the motion of these members especially does not obey
reason.”48 In other words, Thomas promises to explain later in the Summa how
original sin can leave human beings with the natural disorders of human na­
ture, including disordered concupiscence (the disobedience of the genitals
being an example). He keeps his promise near the end of the Prima Secundae,
in the midst of a treatise on sin and vice more generally (qq. 71-89). Only the
thirteen articles of questions 81-83 are devoted to original sin itself.
Thomas defines original sin, just as he did in the Scriptum, as the loss of
original justice by which the will was subject to God (formally) and disordered
concupiscence (materially).49 Thomas also maintains his biological explana­
tion of original sin’s transmission, which grounds the distinction between
original sin, the inherited sin of nature, and actual sin, the committed sin of
the person. If Adam had not sinned, he would have passed on original justice.
Adam ought not to have sinned and thus he ought to have transmitted original
justice. Because he sinned, he passed on human nature deprived of original

Wesenskonstituentinnen der Erbsünde mit den aus der allgemeinen Sündenlehre be­
kannten Begriffen erklärt.” P esch 1967, 492. Pesch cites T homas De maio q. 4, a. 2 and
T homas STh ITI, q. 82, a. 3 as the expressis verbis proving that the disordered concupis­
cence of original sin is what causes the will to be turned away from God to the mutable
good.
47 “[L]a perte de l’état d ’innocence n ’a pas ramené la premier homme à un chimérique
état de nature pure qu’il n’a jamais connu. La nature qui demeure après le péché est
celle d ’un homme qui, dès son premier instant, avait Dieu pour seule fin dernière, qui
était donc capable de le connaître et de l’aimer au plan surnaturel, et qui était appelé
à vivre en sa communion la plus intime dans la beatitude. La fait d ’être privé de la
possibilité même de rejoindre sa fin le laisse dans un douloureux état d ’incomplétude
auquel seul le don renouvelé de la grâce pourra porter remède, comme seule elle pour­
ra rétablir l’équilibre interne que le péché a rompu.” Torrell 2001, 192. Torrell is cited
frequently in this connection. See, for example, D ecosimo 2014, 247.
48 “[P]er peccatum primi parentis, ut infra dicetur, natura est sibi relieta, subtracto
supernaturali dono quod homini divinitus erat collatura; ideo consideranda est ratio
naturalis quare motus huiusmodi membrorum specialiter rationi non obedit.” T homas
STAITI, q. 17, a. 9, ad 3.
49 See T homas STh I-II, q. 82, a. 3. Thomas frequently calls originai sin simply the lack
of original justice (see STh q. 81, a. 5, ad 2); I follow a Thomist custom of calling it the
lack of due original justice. This is somewhat imprecise, however, because conditional
immortality is part of original justice, whereas mortality and the death that inevitably
follows are original sin’s penalties.
 Thomas Aquinas on the Effects of Original Sin 83

justice, which caused original sin when God infused the rational soul. 50 It is
important not to confuse this biological explanation of original sin’s transmis­
sion—which Thomas always assumes—with the question of whether Thomas
thought that the guilt of original sin is best explained by comparison to a he­
reditary disease.
In the Scriptum we saw Thomas compare the transmission of leprosy to the
transmission of original sin. By the time of the Summa, Thomas found this
comparison inapt: it does not do justice to the link between Adam’s will and
ours. Original sin is better compared to a murderer moving his hand for the
kill. The hand, in itself, is not guilty; it is guilty only insofar as it is moved to
the act of sin. Likewise, the infant, in herself—simply lacking original justice—is
not guilty; she is guilty only insofar as she is moved to lack justice by Adam .51
Nevertheless, the very point of the article is that original sin must be sexual­
ly transmitted. “[Tjhrough the power of semen human nature is transferred
from parent to child, and with nature the infection of nature . ” 52 Thomas held
both of these points—original sin’s biological transmission and the inadequacy
of explaining its guilt by comparison to a disease—together.53
Despite his denial that disease analogies do not explain the guilt of origi­
nal sin, Thomas continued to think that original justice is a good of nature,
nature’s health; and that, correspondingly, the lack of original justice is bad
for nature, nature’s sickness and defect. The defect, however, follows from
the principles of human nature. Thus Thomas reaffirms, in the Summa Theo-
logiae and many other places, that habitual disordered concupiscence is
natural and requires the gift of original justice to restrain it.54 There is no in­
dication that the disordered concupiscence of original sin is somehow more

50 “Unde sicut ilia originalis iustitia traducta fuisset in posteras simul cum natura, ita
edam inordinatio opposita.” T homas STAMI, q. 81, a. 2.
51 “[P]eccatum originale non est peccatum huius personae, nisi inquantum haec persona
recipit naturam a primo parente.” T homas STh ITI, q. 81, a. 1.
52 T homas STh MI, q. 81, a. 1, ad 2. “[S]ecundum fidern catholicam est tenendum quod
primum peccatum primi hominis originaliter transit in posteras.” T homas STh I-II, q.
81, a. 1.
53 Thomas’s rejection of disease analogies in favor of the murderous hand analogy is of­
ten mistaken for a rejection of original sin’s biological transmission. Rudi te Velde (in
an otherwise helpful article) wrongly suggests that for Thomas, “ [i] t is not appropri­
ate to speak about original sin in terms of a defect that is passed on biologically from
parents to children, because this would cancel the moral character of sin.” te Velde
2005, 154. This is to ignore the biological underpinnings of original sin’s transmission.
For Thomas, the moral unity of humanity in sin is founded on its biological unity. This
is why Thomas argues that if Eve alone had sinned, original sin would not have been
transmitted (T homas STh MI, q. 81, a. 5). It is impossible for an infant to have original
sin unless she inherits the lack of justice from corrupted semen.
54 Thomas’s argument in the STh I, q. 95, a. 1, is the argument of this paper in a nutshell.
The rightly ordered concupiscence with which Adam and Eve were created was from
grace, not from nature, because if it were from nature it would have remained after
sin. Thomas regularly states that disordered concupiscence is natural in his mature
writings: in addition to the aforementioned STh ITI, q. 17, a. 9, ad 3, see T homas De
84 Daniel W. Houck

severe in Thomas’s mature works. It is not an act. It’s not even a vice. 55 It does
not directly incline one to act badly, only indirectly, insofar as original justice
is removed.56
What does Thomas mean, then, when he says that concupiscence is natural
to the human being only insofar as it is regulated by reason ? 57 The objection to
which Thomas is responding argues that concupiscence could not be part of
original sin because it is natural to the human being. Thomas responds by ar­
guing that concupiscence, insofar as it is regulated by reason, is a natural good.
Insofar as concupiscence is not regulated by reason, it is against nature, a nat­
ural evil. Thus, because it is a natural defect, it can be the material cause of
original sin. As we saw in the Scriptum, however, the natural evil of disordered
concupiscence is not a moral evil per se, not the material cause of original sin,
unless it is inherited from Adam.
Thomas comes close to explicitly repeating this point of original sin’s mate­
rial identity with the principles of human nature left to themselves by posing
the same question from the Scriptum: would a human being created directly by
God from the flesh of a human being with original sin contract original sin?
His answer is the same—“No”—but here all Thomas notes is that such a human
being would not be moved by Adam’s generative power.56 He does not spell out
what he did in the Scriptum: the material defects of original sin would be pres­
ent but not the sin. It would take a very strained interpretation of this passage,
however, to deny that the earlier teaching is implied. Why else would Thomas
raise this question? Obviously if God created a human being with original jus-

malo q. 5, a. 1, T homas Compendium theologiael, c. 186, an d T homas De anima, a. 8, corpus

and ad 8.
55 “[D]uplex est habitus. Unus quidem quo inclinatur potentia ad agendum: sicut scientiae et
virtutes habitus dicuntur. Et hoc modo peccatum originale non est habitus.—Mio modo dicitur
habitus dispositio alicuius naturae ex multis compositae, secundum quam bene se ha­
bet vel male ad aliquid, et praecipue cum tabs dispositio versa fuerit quasi in naturami
ut patet de aegritudine et sanitate. Et hoc modo peccatum originale est habitus. Est
enim quaedam inordinata dispositio proveniens ex dissolutione illius harmoniae in
qua consistebat ratio originalis iustitiae: sicut edam aegritudo corporalis est quaedam
inordinata dispositio corporis, secundum quam solvitur aequalitas in qua consistit ra­
tio sanitatis. Unde peccatum originale languor naturae dicitur.” T homas STAITI, q. 82, a.
1, emphasis mine.
56 “ [E]x peccato originali sequatur aliqua inclinatio in actum inordinatum, non directe, sed
indirecte, scilicet per remodonem prohibends, idest originalis iustitiae, quae prohibebat
inordinatos motus: sicut edam aegritudine corporali indirecte sequitur inclinatio ad
motus corporales inordinatos. Nec debet dici quod peccatum originale sit habitus
infusus; aut acquisitus per actum nisi primi parentis, non autem huius personae; sed
per vidatam originem innatus.” T homas .STAITI, q. 82, a. 1, ad 3, emphasis mine.
57 “[Q]uia in homine concupiscibilis naturaliter regitur radone, intantum concupiscere
est homini naturale, inquantum est secundum rationis ordinem: concupiscentia autem
quae transcendit limites rationis, est homini contra naturam. Et tabs est concupiscentia
originalis peccati.” T homas .STAHI, q. 82, a. 3, ad 1. See also T homas STh HI, q. 85, a.
3, ad 3.
58 T homas STAMI, q. 81, a. 4.
 T hom as Aquinas on th e Effects o f O riginal Sin 85

tice she would not have original sin (even the dullest of Dominicans for whom
the Summa was written would have known that). And there is no evidence
Thomas ever thought something less than natural original justice would pre­
vent the material defects of original sin. It seems he declined to elaborate for
the sake of space.
We can now turn to q. 85, on the effects of sin. It is imperative to remember,
however, that the treatise on original sin ends in q. 83. What this means is that
question 85 is not a discussion of the effects of original sin. It is a discussion of
the effects of sin in general—mortal, venial, and original. When Thomas asks in
a. 1 of q. 85, then, whether sin diminishes the good of nature, he is not asking
about the effects of original sin. This becomes clear when we read the article
carefully.
Thomas notes that the phrase “good of human nature” can refer to three
things: the principles of nature and that which flows therefrom, the natural in­
clination to virtue, and the gift of original justice to human nature.59 He then
explains that sin relates to each good of nature in a different way.

T he first good o f n atu re is n e ith e r destroyed n o r dim in ish ed th ro u g h sin. T h e

th ird good o f natu re was entirely destroyed by th e sin o f th e first p arent. But the
m iddle good o f n ature, nam ely th e natural inclination to virtue, is d im inished by
sin. T he reason for this is that thro u g h h u m an acts a certain inclination to like acts
is form ed (as we said earlier). W hen som eone is inclined to one o f two contraries,
her inclination to th e o th e r is dim inished. T herefore, because sin is contrary to
virtue, it follows from th e fact th at th e hum an being sins that h e r good o f natu re
that is h e r inclination to virtue is dim in ish ed .“

The third good of nature, original justice, is destroyed by original sin. What
about the hrst two goods? Neither original sin nor actual sin affects the first
good, the principles of human nature, at a root level. The reason is that these
principles are necessary for human existence. What about the second good of
human nature, the natural inclination to virtue? This good is diminished by sin.
Does Thomas mean that it is diminished by original sin? Context is crucial.

59 “R espondeo d icen d u m quod b o n u m n atu rae h u m an ae potest trip liciter dici. Prim o,
ipsa principia n atu rae, ex quibus n atu ra constituitur, et p roprietates ex his causatae,
sicut potentiae anim ae et alia huiusm odi. Secundo, quia hom o a n atu ra habet
inclinationem ad virtutem , ut supra habitum est, ipsa inclin an o ad v irtutem est
qu o d d am bonum naturae. Tertio m o d o potest dici b onum n atu rae d o n u m originalis
iustitiae, quod fuit in p rim o h o m in e collatum toti h u m an ae n atu rae.” T homas STh ITI,
q. 85, a. 1.
60 “Prim um igitur b onum naturae nec to llitur nec d im in u itu r p e r peccatum . Tertium
vero bonum n atu rae totaliter est ablatum p e r peccatum p rim i parentis. Sed m edium
b o n u m naturae, scilicet ipsa naturalis inclin an o ad virtutem , d im in u itu r p e r peccatum .
Per actus enim h u m an o s fit quaedam inclinatio ad similes actus, ut supra habitum
est. O p o rtet autem q u o d ex hoc quod aliquid in clin atu r ad u n u m con trario ru m ,
d im in u atu r inclinatio eius ad aliud. U nde cum peccatum sit co n trariu tn virtuti, ex hoc
ipso quod hom o peccat, d im in u itu r b o n u m n atu rae quod est inclinatio ad virtu tem .”
T homas STh H I, q. 85, a. 1.
86 Daniel W. Houck

Thomas is not speaking about the effects of original sin but of sin in general.
He states that the natural inclination to virtue is diminished because human acts
produce an inclination to like acts. This implies that the natural inclination is
affected by personal, actual sin. He does not state that the natural inclination
to virtue is diminished by original sin. In the reply to the second objection, he
emphasizes that the diminution of the natural inclination to virtue is damaged
by the variation of voluntary action/’1
Article 2 clarifies the sense in which the natural inclination to virtue is
founded in the principles of nature. Thomas argues that the inclination to vir­
tue can be understood in respect to the end or in respect to the root. Nature
is at root (in radice), radically speaking, unaffected by sin but is diminished
on the part of the end (ex parte termini), teleologically speaking/2 Actual sin
hampers ex parte termini, because human beings can turn away from the end
and sin. Even when one has already turned from the end, one can continue to
sin and place further obstacles between oneself and the end. The radical incli­
nation to virtue remains after one has damaged it ex parte termini, even in the
lowest levels of hell, just as a blind man’s inclination to vision remains.63 There
is no indication whatsoever that original sin affects the natural inclination to
virtue, either radically or ex parte termini. In a. 3, however, we see a different
sense in which the human being’s relation to virtue is affected by original sin.
Thomas argues that the natural ordination to virtue is damaged when the
third good of nature from a. 1, original justice, is destroyed. The question of
article three is whether weakness, ignorance, malice, and concupiscence are
suitably called the wounds of nature following sin. Here is the first part of
Thomas’s answer:

Through original justice reason perfectly restrained the soul’s lower powers, and
reason itself was perfected by God and subjected to him. But this original justice
was subtracted through the sin of the first parent, as was already said. And there­
fore all the powers of the soul were, in a sense, destitute of their proper order, by
which they are naturally ordained to virtue, and this destitution is called a wound
of nature...64

61 “[Njatura, estisit prior quam voluntaria actio, tarnen habet inclinationem ad quandam
voluntariam actionem. Unde ipsa natura secundum se non variatiti' propter Variatio­
n e n voluntariae actionis: sed ipsa inclinatio variatur ex ilia parte qua ordinatiti' ad
terminimi.” T homas .STAITI, q. 85, a. 1, ad 2.
62 “[IJnclinatio intelligitur ut media inter duo: fundatur enfin sicut in radice in natura
rationali, et tendit in bonum virtutis sicut in terminum et finem. Dupliciter igitur
potest intelligi eius diminutio, uno modo, ex parte radicis; alio modo, ex parte termini.
Primo quidem modo non diminuitur per peccatum: eo quod peccatum non diminuit
ipsam naturam, ut supra dictum est.” T homas STAITI, q. 85, a. 2.
63 T homas .STAMI, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3.
64 “[P]er iustitiam originalem perfecte ratio continebat inferiores animae vires, et ipsa
ratio a Deo perficiebatur, ei subiecta. Haec autem originalis iustitia subtracta est per
peccatum primi parentis, sicut iam dictum est. Et ideo omîtes vires animae remanent
 T hom as Aquinas o n th e Effects o f O riginal Sin 87

O riginal ju stice subjected the lower powers o f the soul to the higher powers
and reason to God. It was also that by hum an beings are naturally ordained
(o rd in a n tu r)—T hom as does not say “inclined” ( inclinanlur) —to virtue. By the
sin o f th e first parent, original justice was destroyed. All the powers o f the soul
were w ounded, because original justice rightly ordered all the powers o f the
soul. They are destitute o f the p ro p er o rd er in which original justice consist­
ed, th e p ro p e r o rd e r that naturally ordained them to virtue. T hom as is not
claim ing th at nature is w ounded with reference to a purely natural state; he has
already stated th at the principles o f nature are at root unaffected by original
and actual sin an d im plied that, ex parte term ini , they are only affected by actual
sin. O riginal sin wounds nature with reference to the gracious state o f original
justice, by destroying the graced ordination to virtue.
T hom as th en argues, again, that because the natural inclination to virtue is
dim inished by actual sin, the same wounds o f nature from original sin can also
be caused by actual sins . 65 For exam ple, concupiscence is a w ound o f nature
from original sin, aggravated by actual sin, thus w ounding the inclination to
virtue. T hom as uses the word aordinatici” to describe the effect original sin has
on hu m an virtue as opposed to “inclinatio” because he denies original sin has
any effect on th e inclination to virtue, eith er radically o r teleologically . 66 It is
also worth noting that T hom as would claim Jo b had both original sin and the
natural inclination to virtue in the wom b . 67

qu o d am m o d o destitutae p ro p rio ord in e, quo n atu raliter ordinantur ad virtutem , et ipsa

destitutio vulnerario n atu rae dicitur. Sunt autem q u a tu o r p o tentiae anim ae quae pos-
su n t esse subiecta v irtutum , ut su p ra d ictum est: scilicet ratio, in qua est p rudentia;
voluntas, in qua est iustitia; irascibilis, in qua est fortitudo; concupiscibilis, in qua est
tem perantia. In q u an tu m ergo ratio d estitu itu r suo o rd in e ad verum , est vulnus igno-
rantiae; in q u an tu m vero voluntas d estitu itu r o rd in e ad b o n u m , est vulnus malitiae;
in q u an tu m vero irascibilis d estitu itu r suo o rd in e ad a rd u u m , est vulnus infirm itatis;
in q u an tu m vero concupiscentia d estitu itu r o rd in e ad delectabile m oderatim i ratione,
est vulnus concupiscentiae. Sic ig itu r ita q u a tu o r sunt vulnera inflicta toti h u m an ae na­
tu rae ex peccato p rim i paren tis.” T homas STh ITI, q. 85, a. 3, em phasis m ine.
65 “Sed quia inclinatio ad b o n u m virtutis in u n o q u o q u e dim inuititi' p er peccatum actuate, ut
ex dictis patet, et ista sunt q u a tu o r vulnera ex aliis peccatis consequentia, in q u an tu m
scilicet p er peccatum et ratio hebetatur, praecipue in agendis; et voluntas in d u ra tu r
ad bonum ; et m aior difficultas bene agen d i accrescit; et concupiscentia magis
exardescit." T homas STh ITI, q. 85, a. 3, em phasis m ine.
66 Kors rightly argued th at q. 85 does n o t im ply th a t original sin causes a d im in u tio n o f
the inclination to virtue that would be presen t in p u re nature. Kors’s argum ent was
stronger than he knew, however: he d id n ’t notice that T hom as refused to speak o f
original sin harm in g th e inclination to virtue. Kors thus posited a “d o u b le inclination
naturelle à la vertu, l’u n e résultant de la p u re n ature, l’au tre qui provient d ’un d o n
surajouté,” arguing th at only th e latter is h arm ed by original sin. K o r s 1922, 161.
67 “[M Jiseratio de qua lob loquitur, n o n significat virtutem infusant: sed q u an d u m incli-
nationem naturalem ad actum huius virtutis.” T homas STh III, q. 27, a. 6, ad 3. The
objection claim ed th at because Jo b speaks o f receiving mercy in th e womb (Job 31:18
in the Vulgate), we should say he was sanctified there. T hom as denies th a t Jo b was sanc­
tified but affirms his possession o f th e inclination to virtue.
88 D aniel W. H ouck

Question 85 ends with Thomas arguing that although death is natural to

the human being on the part of matter, God fixed the defects of nature at
nature’s institution by giving the gift of justice.08 Since Thomas retired from
theology before writing the eschatology of the Summa, he didn’t address origi­
nal sin’s punishment in infants. Still, there is noteworthy material in two later
works.69 In the Compendium theologiae, Thomas argues that it is just for God to
permit Adam’s children to suffer for his sin because he has only allowed them
to suffer the loss of supernatural gifts.70 Any stricter punishment, Thomas im­
plies, would be contrary to the order of justice. The effect of Adam’s sin on
his posterity is only their loss of the supernatural gift of original justice, which
results in their original sin. In the De malo, Thomas argues that the eternal pun­
ishment of this inherited privation should correspond to the privation itself.
The eternal punishment of original sin is the lightest of all punishments,
the loss of what original justice disposed the human being to receive: the su­
pernatural beatific vision.71 There are three reasons, moreover, why infants do
not deserve any sense pain for original sin. Because original sin is only the sin
of nature, infants lose nothing that is theirs by nature; they only lose things
that are above their nature, like grace.72 The second reason Thomas gives is
especially illuminating:

T h e pu n ish m en t is p ro p o rtio n e d to th e crim e. Actual m ortal sin, in w hich is

found an aversion from th e im m utable good an d conversion to th e m utable good,
deserves both th e p u n ish m en t o f co n d em n a tio n (nam ely th e loss o f th e divine vi­
sion corresp o n d in g to th e aversion) an d th e p u n ish m en t o f sense (corresponding
to th e conversion). But in original sin there is no conversion, only aversion, o r rath er
som ething like aversion, nam ely th e so u l’s loss o f original ju stice.”

68 T homas STh I II, q. 85, a. 6.

69 Torrk.i .l 2002, 293-298 discusses th e difficulty o f d ating th e De m ah exactly b u t argues
that th e first fifteen questions were pub lish ed in 1270, stem m ing from questions T hom as
disputed in Paris starting in 1269. T h e Compendium theologiae is also difficult to date;
To r r e i .l 2002, 240 suggests th e mid-1260s.
70 “Nec hoc est co n tra o rd in em iustitie, quasi Deo p u n ie n te in filiis q u o d prim us parens
deliquit, quia ista p e n a n o n est nisi subtractio eo ru m que su p ern atu raliter prim o
hom ini divinitus sunt concessa.” T homas Compendium theologiael, c. 195.
71 T homas De malo q. 5, a. 1. O riginal sin ’s penalty is th e “m itissim a o m n iu m p en aru m
sola carentia uisionis d iu in e, in q u an tu m uisio d iu in e essende est q u o d d am b onum
om n in o sup ern atu rale.” T homas De Malo q. 5, a. 1, ad 3.
72 “Q u o d igitu r d e trim en tu m aliquod p atiatu r aliqua p erso n a in his q u e sunt supra
naturam , potest contingere uel ex uitio n atu re uel etiam ex uitio persone; q u o d autem
d etrim en tu m p atiatu r in his que sunt n atu re, hoc non u id e tu r posse contingere nisi
p ro p ter uitium p ro p riu m p erso n e.” T homas De M a h q. 5, a. 2.
73 “[P ]ena p ro p o rtio n a tu r culpe; et ideo peccato actuali m ortali, in q u o in u e n itu r auersio
ab incom m utabili b o n o et conuersio ad bo n u m com m utabile, d e b e tu r et p en a dam pni,
scilicet carentia uisionis d iu in e respondens auersioni, et p e n a sensus respondens
conuersioni. Set in peccato originali non est conuersio, set sola auersio, uel aliquid auersioni
 T hom as Aquinas on th e Effects o f O riginal Sin 89

In original sin, unlike actual mortal sin, there is no act of aversion from God
and conversion to the mutable good. There is something like or analogous to
aversion, namely the loss of original justice, by which the will was subjected
to God and ordered to the beatific vision. But there is no conversion to the
mutable good; the natural orientation to God remains.74 Thomas proceeds to
repeat roughly the same account of infants’ natural happiness in hell as he did
in the Scriptum. With a natural knowledge of God, infants will not be sad at all;
they will instead enjoy beatitude in general.75 The principal difference is that
now Thomas argues infants will not know they lack the lumen glorine.1*'
Those who die without sanctifying grace are not the only human beings
with original sin to avoid actual sin. Thomas’s view of Maty in the Tertia Pars is
a helpful case study. Maty must have contracted original sin, Thomas argues,
but she was sanctified in the womb. Just like those sanctified by baptism, the
personal effects of her original sin were removed by the bestowal of grace,
while the corruption of her nature remained. Until Christ’s conception Mary’s

respondens, scilicet d estia m o anim e a iustitia originali.” T homas De Malo q. 5, a. 2,

em phasis m ine.
74 T hus although it is tru e, as Pesch claim ed (see supra n. 46), that T hom as speaks at
tim es o f th e diso rd ered concupiscence o f original sin “converting” th e h u m an b eing to
the m utable good—such statem ents should be u n d ersto o d in light o f T h o m as’s analogy
betw een original an d actual sin. T he act o f m ortal sin involves p rioritizing a created
good over G od (the “form al” aversion) an d th e created good itself (the “m aterial” con­
version). T here is som ething sim ilar in original sin: th e will lacks rectitu d e and grace;
th e lower powers are n o t subject to th e will. T he lack o f rectitu d e and grace is, as it
were, the form; th e habitual diso rd ered concupiscence is, as it were, th e matter. This
is not because habitual d isordered concupiscence has actually tu rn e d th e will to the
created good. If this were th e case th ere would be n o analogy; original sin would be sin
univocally. H abitual diso rd ered concupiscence is an indirect in clination to bad action
received as soon as G od infuses th e rational soul; th e h u m an b eing is now open to actual
d isordered desires later in life, desires w hich are inevitable if she lives long en o u g h
w ithout divine intervention.
75 “[A jnim e p u ero ru m n aturali quidem cognitione non carent, qualis d e b e tu r anim e
separate secundum suam naturarti, sed carent su p ern atu rali cognitione que hic in
hobis per fidem plantatur, eo q u o d nec hie h d em h a b u e ru n t in actu, nec sacram entum
fidei susceperunt. Pertinet autem ad naturalem cognitionem q u o d anim a sciât se
p ro p te r beatitu d in em creatam , et q u o d b eatitu d o consistit in ad ep tio n e perfecti boni.
Sed quod illud b o n u m perfectum ad q u o d h o m o factus est, sit ilia gloria quam sancti
possident, est supra cognitionem n atu ralem (...) Q ue q uidem reuelatio ad fidem
pertinet. Et ideo se p riu ari tali b o n o anim e p u ero ru m n o n cognoscunt, et p ro p ter
hoc non dolent; set hoc q u o d p e r naturam h abent, absque dolore p o ssident.” T homas
De Malo q. 5, a. 3. “[A jnim e p u ero ru m in peccato originali d eced en tiu m cognoscunt
q uidem b eatitu d in em in generali secundum co m m u n em rationem , n o n autem in
speciali. Et ideo de eius am issione n o n d o len t.” T homas De Malo q. 5, a. 3, ad 1.
76 They are separated from G od “q u an tu m ad am issionem glorie quem ignorant, non
tarnen q uantum ad particip atio n em natu raliu m b o n o ru m que cognoscunt.” T homas
De Mato q. 5, a. 3, ad 4. For helpful account o f T h o m as’s developm ent o n this point,
see B eitin g 1998. For a discussion o f T h o m as’s view o f lim bo in its b ro ad er medieval
context see B o n in o 2001.
90 Daniel W. Houck

concupiscence was “bound” by God so that she had no actual sin or impulse
toward it.7' Even very late in life, then, Thomas denied any necessary link be­
tween original and actual sin, whether venial or (still less) mortal.78If Thomas’s
mature treatment implies the same view of original sin’s effects as the Scriptum,
why does Thomas seem to assume a different account in the treatise on grace?

3. G race and originai, sin

Thomas devotes nineteen questions to law after finishing his discussion of sin.
The treatise on law ends with the new law of the gospel, written on the hearts
of believers by the Holy Spirit.79 The treatise on grace ( f 09-114) is a deeper
exploration of the grace of the new law, sanctifying grace (gratia gratumfaciens).
The primary sense of the word “grace” in this treatise is sanctifying grace;
Thomas defines it as such.8“ The treatise begins with a question on the need
for grace. Thomas frequently adverts to the distinction between the prelapsar-
ian powers human beings had in the state of integral nature (statu naturae
integrae) and their vitiated powers in the state of corrupt nature (statu naturae
conruptae). As a result, many commentators have assumed that the question is a
discussion, in greater detail, of the effects of original sin. The powers in inte­
gral nature are thought to be “purely natural,” though forfeited by original sin,
whereas the moral ability in corrupt nature is thought to be what remains after
original sin in the unbaptized. This assumption is doubly wrong.
Integral nature is not pure nature and corrupt nature is not nature with
original sin. To understand this, we need to establish a more fundamental
point, frequently ignored by commentators on the treatise on grace, perhaps
because it comes in the treatise on sin. In the latter’s last article, Thomas asks
whether a human being can have original sin and venial sin without mortal sin.

77 For Thomas’s argument that Mary was sanctified in the womb after having contracted
original sin, see T homas STA III, q. 27, aa. 1-2. He goes on to argue that it would be
somewhat derogatory to the dignity of Christ for Mary’s nature to be healed before
the incarnation; thus Mary’s nature was corrupt until Christ’s conception. She lacked
original justice: she still had materially disordered concupiscence, the forties peccati. Her
concupiscence was “bound” (ligatus) by a special divine gift, so that she had neither
actual sin nor any disordered impulse toward sin (T homas STA III, q. 27, a. 3).
78 If the natural love for God is lost, then the state of mortal sin follows. There is no mo­
ment of existence when one could stand teleologically aloof, deliberating between
ultimate ends without acting for one. To exist is to act for an end. “Every agent acts for
an end,” as Thomas says in q. 109, a. 6 (and throughout his work). The end is the
proper object of the will (T homas .VTATU, q. 8, a. 2); the end is always presupposed in
choice, which is of the means (T homas STh I-II, q. 13, a. 3). For Thomas, there are no
demigods between God and creature: the end must be either God (by nature or grace)
or a creature.
79 The treatise on law presupposes that only gracious gifts have been forfeited by original
sin. See T homas STh ITI, q. 98, a. 4, ad 3.
80 T homas STAITI, q. 110, a. 2.
 Thomas Aquinas on the Effects of Original Sin 91

His concern is eschatological: we know that infants who die unbaptized will be
excluded from heaven, though they will enjoy a natural happiness in limbo.
But what of the unbaptized who reach the age of reason? If they do their best
can they too have a happy stay in hell? Or, given their disordered concupis­
cence, will they commit (at least) venial sin and suffer sensibly in the inferno?
Despite his belief that venial sins deserve sense punishment, Thomas argues
no one in hell suffers for venial sin without mortal sin. But this is not due to
nature. Grace intervenes.
Human beings with only original sin will not commit any venial sins. 81
Before the use of reason no one commits sin properly speaking, even if she
commits a generically sinful act (as a toddler who tells a lie, for example).
Then the situation changes:

When the human being begins to have the use of reason, she is no longer excused
from the guilt of mortal and venial sin. At that time, the first thing that occurs
to the thinking human being is self-deliberation. If she orders herself to her due
end, through grace the remission of original sin follows. If she does not order her­
self to her due end when she reaches the age of reason, however, she sins mortally,
not doing what is in herself (faciens quod in se est).s2

Upon reaching the age of reason, the human being is at a crossroads: she ei­
ther pursues her due end or she does not. It is so obvious to Thomas the due
end is God that he doesn’t bother to state it in the corpus, but he does in the
reply to the third objection . 83 If she follows God, she will be given sanctifying
grace. If not, she sins mortally. Other than claiming they ought to order their

81 The human being with sanctifying grace but without original justice is able to commit
venial sin (T homas STh ITI, q. 88, a. 1), though in original justice venial sin was impos­
sible (T homas STAITI, q. 89, a. 3).
82 “Cum vero usum rationis habere inceperit, non omnino excusatur a culpa venialis et
mortalis peccati. Sed primum quod tunc homini cogitandum occurrit, est deliberare
de seipso. Et si quidem seipsum ordinaverit ad debitum finem, per gratiam conseque-
tur remissionem originalis peccati. Si vero non ordinet seipsum ad debitum finem,
secundum quod in illa aetate est capax discretionis, peccabit mortaliter, non faciens
quod in se est.” T homas STh ITI, q. 89, a. 6. See also T homas Scriptum II, d. 42, q. 1, a. 5,
ad 7.
83 “[A]b aliis peccatis mortalibus potest puer incipiens habere usum rationis, per aliquod
tempus abstinere: sed a peccato omissionis praedictae non liberami', nisi quam cito po­
test, se convertat ad Deum. Primum enim quod occurrit homini discretionem habenti
est quod de seipso cogitet, ad quem alia ordinet sicut ad finem: finis enim est prior in
intentione. Et ideo hoc est tempus pro quo obligatur ex Dei praecepto affermativo.”
T homas STh ITI, q. 89, a. 6, ad 3. Cf. T homas De malo q. 5, a. 2, ad 8. Readers who as­
sume there is no sense in which God is the natural end or that original sin has ruptured
the orientation to God tend to miss this. For example, Shanley 1999, 572-577 argues
that Thomas thinks the civic good is the due end. Thomas, though, states that it is God.
92 Daniel W. Houck

lives to God, Thomas doesn’t say precisely what human beings with reason are
supposed to do. Commentators, however, have proposed a cornucopia of pro­
posals, corresponding to their diverse views of Thomas’s take on original sin
and the possibility (or lack thereof) of congruous merit and natural theology.
For the purposes of this paper, it matters little whether the ability of fa cien s quod
in se est is from nature or sanctifying grace , 84 whether it involves a conscious
knowledge of God, or indeed any “natural theology” properly so-called.85 Also
irrelevant is whether the faith resulting from such grace is implicit or explicit,
or how many people Thomas thinks receive grace.86 What matters for us is the
assumption this passage reveals.
No one in v ia has only original sin for long. No one who reaches the age of
reason remains without mortal sin or sanctifying grace. This is not the because
of some metaphysical impossibility stemming from the effects of original sin,
as if original sin rendered mortal sin necessary, or venial sin without mortal
sin impossible. No, first and foremost it follows from God’s global providen­
tial care: the effects of original sin are curtailed by grace. This is why Thomas,
despite his belief that original sin does not rupture the natural orientation

84 O liva 2012, 610f. attributes it to nature. Against Oliva, one could note (with, among
others, W awrykow 1995, 199, passim) that Thomas later attributes the whole ordo sa-
lutis to grace, including the faciens quod in se est and the preparation for grace. Thus
Thomas denies that anyone can merit the first grace for herself in STh MI, q. 114, a. 5
(implying that the denial applies to both condign and congruous merit). One could
defend Oliva, though, by arguing as follows. Thomas only attributes the ability to faciens
quod in se est to “grace” in a broad sense, the grace of creation. Congruous merit pre­
supposes sanctifying grace; it is fitting for God to reward his friends beyond what they
truly deserve (T homas STh ITI, q. 114, a. 6). Those with original sin who do their best
are not God’s friends; they cannot merit congruously or otherwise. In Thomas’s view,
therefore, God’s decision to give sanctifying grace to the one naturally faciens quod in se
er«does not imply such a person merited it. However, as far as I can tell, there’s nothing
to prove Thomas didn’t envisage the offer of sanctifying grace coming immediately to
those who reach the age of reason.
85 Lawrence Dewan, in dialogue with Cajetan and Maritain, suggests that this obligation
to follow God stems from a conscious, explicit knowledge of God, because Thomas
“envisages the young human mind as capable of knowing God in a conscious way, and
of considering God as a source of law.” D ewan 2008, 241. Yet he indecisively admits
that in the first act of freedom, “such a person is doing not only what is natural but also
what is supernatural.” 489, n. 97. Bruce Marshall has argued that for Thomas, strictly
speaking, there is no natural knowledge of God apart from faith in via (see M arshall
2005). It seems to me that his view is compatible with the reading of Thomas I offer,
though perhaps Marshall’s reading (as well as “thin” views of the obligations gener­
ated by natural law, like that of B ow lin 2004) would require viewing the offer of grace
coming immediately to the one who reaches reason. Alternatively, perhaps one could
agree with Marshall, hold that the obligation does come from nature, yet deny that the
“knowledge” required to fulfill it meets the bar required for a genuine natural theology.
86 Citing II-II, q. 2, a. 7, ad 3, O ’Meara 1997, 235 argues that Thomas thinks those who
have never explicitly heard the gospel or received a special revelation can be saved
through an implicit faith in Christ. See also T homas STh II-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3, where
Thomas claims Cornelius exemplifies implicit faith in Acts 10.
 Thomas Aquinas on the Effects of Original Sin 93

to God, is profoundly uninterested in speculating about original sinners’ fol­

lowing him by nature. De facto, the population enjoying the natural but not
supernatural end is limited to limbo: those who die with only original sin.
De facto, the population pursuing the natural end without mortal sin is lim­
ited to unbaptized infants and—if the faciens quod in se est is natural—to whoever
has reached the age of reason and is in the process of “self-deliberation.” Alter­
natively, if the faciens quod in se est is from supernatural grace, then no human
with reason ever acts for the natural end alone, for grace can be freely received
instantaneously. 87 Either way, Thomas’s theology assumes for all practical pur­
poses that the population pursuing the natural end is zero.
This assumption underlies Thomas’s entire moral theology, which treats
distinctively human action, action with reason and “free choice . ” 88 His account
of unbelievers’ imperfect happiness and acquired virtue, for example, as­
sumes their imperfection arises not only from lacking supernatural gifts: they
have turned to mortal sin, damaging their natural inclination to virtue . 89 This
assumption is also essential to understanding the treatise on grace. Because
grace providentially restricts sin’s effects, we won’t find Thomas speaking of
human beings with only original sin. Indeed, the treatise on grace has nothing
to do with the effects of original sin. It does, however, discuss human nature
before and after original sin.
“Human nature can be considered in two ways. In one way, in its integrity,
as it was in the first parent before sin. In another way, as it is corrupted in us
after the sin of the first parent . ” 90 Integral nature refers to human nature as it
was in our first parents. Since their nature had the gift of original justice, it’s
clear that integral nature is not equivalent to pure nature. Moreover, in inte­
gral nature, due to the right regulation of concupiscence, all mortal and venial
sin could be avoided.91 In pure nature, however, concupiscence would not be

87 See T homas Scriptum II cl. 29, q. 1, a. 2, T homas STh I, q. 62, a. 3, an d T homas STh I, q.
95, a. 1.
88 T homas STh I-II, prologus. “[A]ctionum quae ab homine aguntur, illae solae proprie
dicuntur humanae, quae sunt propriae hominis inquantum est homo.” T homas STh
I-II, q. l,a . 1.
89 For Thomas's discussion of imperfect happiness, see T homas STh I-II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 4.
See also T homas STh ITI, q. 5, a. 5, where Thomas links imperfect happiness to the
achievement of virtue. Thomas’s account of the virtues assumes that unbelievers have
turned to mortal sin: the imperfection of natural virtue is not only due to original sin.
In Thomas’s discussion of prudence, for example, the imperfect prudence in sinners
can be directed to particular goods only, not the common good of the universe, God.
See T homas STh II-II, q. 47, a. 13.
90 “ [N] attira hominis dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo, in sui integritate, sicut fuit
in primo parente ante peccatum; alio modo, secundum quod est corrupta in nobis post
peccatimi primi parentis.” T homas STh I-II, q. 109, a. 2.
91 “Secundum statum quidem naturae integrae, etiam sine gratia habituali, poterat homo
non peccare mortaliter nec venialiter.” T homas STh I-II, q. 109, a. 8. Thomas consis­
tently taught that disordered concupiscence and the (ordinary) necessity of venial sin
are on a par; the latter follows the former necessarily unless God intervenes, as he did
94 Daniel W. Houck

rightly regulated. Is the state of integral nature identical to original justice,

then? No, Adam and Eve received sanctifying grace as the root cause of their
original justice. What does Thomas mean by integral nature then, if not Adam
and Eve’s original justice or pure nature?
Integral nature probably refers to human nature with the powers of natural
original justice. Because he is now confident that the historical state of original
justice included sanctifying grace—natural original justice was never a reality—
Thomas, for the sake of clarity, calls nature with rightly ordered concupiscence
and subjection to God but without sanctifying grace “integral nature.”92 He
speculates about the powers of such a state because it allows him to give an
account of the precise need for sanctifying grace. Thus articles 2, 4 and 8 ar­
gue that the human being in integral nature, without sanctifying grace, can do
the proportionate good, fulfill the law, and avoid all sin. To do these things in
chanty requires sanctifying grace. Since integral nature (as natural justice) does
not follow from the principles of human nature, Thomas has not claimed that
original sin causes human beings to lose any goods following the principles of
human nature.
Still, however, there is a difficulty. Article 3 seems to argue that the natu­
ral love for God following nature’s principles has been forfeited by original
sin. The question of q. 109, a. 3 is whether the human being without sancti-

with Mary. This is clear from a. 8 and numerous other places. See T homas De ventate, q.
25, a. 7, sc.
92 Discussion of Thomas’s mature view of the formal cause of original justice is beyond
the scope of this paper. As we have seen, in the Scriptum, Thomas argues that justice
does not follow from nature yet is distinct from supernatural sanctifying grace. Later
Thomists would thus call the formal cause of natural original justice “preternatural,” in
order to distinguish it from both the natural orientation to God and sanctifying grace.
Yet texts like T homas STh I, q. 95 seem to imply that the formal cause of original justice
must be sanctifying grace. The question of whether Thomas changed his mind on this
issue was the subject of intense debate in the early twentieth century. Until 1915, most
post-Tridentine Thomists assumed that the mature Aquinas (in precise agreement with
the Council of Trent) held that original justice’s formal cause is sanctifying grace, just
as original sin’s formal cause is the lack of grace. M artin 1915 influentially challenged
this consensus, arguing that Aquinas held that the sexually transmitted sin of nature
requires a corresponding preternatural justice Adam could have passed on. The issue
was hotly debated for several decades but cooled off after de Lubac’s Surnaturel. (One
can still find a helpful bibliography in van R oo 1955.) Either way this much is certain:
Thomas always denied that rightly ordered concupiscence follows the principles of
nature, and thus integral nature cannot be pure nature. Consider the reasoning of
Thomas’s apparent affirmation of the necessity of sanctifying grace for original justice
in the STh I, q. 95. Sanctifying grace is required to regulate concupiscence because no
preternatural rectitude would suffice. A fortiori, no “purely natural rectitude” would be
enough.
 T hom as Aquinas on th e Effects o f O riginal Sin 95

lying grace can love God above all things by her natural powers. The answer
is yes: the human being can love God above all things ex solis n a tu r a lib u s,93
In the corpus Thomas explains how nature’s corruption interferes with this
love. Thomas begins by referring us to his discussion of love in his angelology:
angels and human beings can love God above all by nature, without sanctifying
grace. Otherwise natural love would be perverse and charity would not perfect
but destroy nature . 94 Every created nature naturally loves its partial good for
the sake of the common good, God. At this point, Thomas is speaking of a
natural power to love God. He then changes the terms of the discussion and
refers us to integral nature:

T he h um an being in th e state o f integral n atu re referred th e love o f self and all

o th er things to th e love o f God as end. In this way she loved G od m ore th an h e r­
self and above all. But in th e state o f c o rru p t n atu re th e h u m an being recedes
from this love according to th e app etite o f h e r rational will, which, because o f the
co rru p tio n o f h e r n ature, follows its private good, unless it is healed by th e grace
o f G od. A nd thus th e h u m an being in th e state o f integral n atu re d id not need
the gift o f grace su p erad d ed to h e r n atural goods to love G od naturally above all
(though she n e e d e d th e help o f God m oving h e r to this n atural love). B ut in the
state o f corrupt n atu re, th e h u m an b eing needs th e h elp o f grace healing h e r na­
tu re to do even this.95

93 “[P]rim us hom o in solis n aturalibus constitutus fuit, u t a quibusdam ponitur. In quo

statu m anifestum est q u o d aliqualiter D eum dilexit. Sed non dilexit D eum aequali-
ter sibi, vel m inus se: quia secundum hoc peccasset. Ergo dilexit D eum supra se. Ergo
hom o ex solis naturalibus potest D eum diligere plus quam se, et su p er om n ia.” T homas
STh ITI, q. 109, a. 3, sc. H ere in th e sed contra, T hom as argues from a view th at is
not his own: Adam was m ade in solis naturalibus. T hom as him self thinks Adam was cre­
ated in grace. His p o in t is th at regardless o f o n e ’s position on th e deb ated question o f
w hether Adam had sanctifying grace at th e very beginning o f his existence, th e hum an
being by nature loves G od above all.
94 “[Sjicut supra d ictum est (...) circa n aturalem dilectionem angelorum diversae
opiniones sunt positae; h o m o in statu n atu rae integrae po terat op erari virtute suae
n atu rae b o n u m q u o d est sibi con n atu rale, absque su p erad d itio n e gratuiti d o n i, licet
n o n absque auxilio Dei moventis. Diligere autem D eum su p er o m nia est quiddam
connaturale hom ini; et edam cuilibet creaturae non solum rationali, sed irrationali
et etiam inanim atae, secundum m o d u m am oris qui u nicuique creatu rae com petere
potest. C uius ratio est quia unicuique n aturale est quod app etat et am et aliquid,
secundum quo d ap tu m natum est esse: « c e n im agit unumquodque prout aptum natum es
(...) M anifestum est autem quod bo n u m partis est p ro p ter b o n u m totius. U nde etiam
naturali ap p etitu vel am ore u n aq u aeq u e res particularis am at b o n u m suum p ro p riu m
p ro p ter bonum com m une totius universi, q u o d est Deus. U nde et Dionysius dicit (...)
q u o d Deus convertit omnia a d amorem sui ipsius." T homas .STAITI, q. 109, a. 3. See T homas
STh I, q. 60, a. 5 for T h o m as’s discussion o f angelic love.
95 ”[H ]om o in statu n atu rae integrae dilectionem sui ipsius referebat ad am orem Dei
sicut ad fuient, et sim iliter dilectionem o m nium aliarum rerum . Et ita D eum diligebat
plus quam seipsum , et su p er om nia. Sed in statu n atu rae co rru p tae hom o ab hoc
deficit secundum ap p etitu m voluntatis rationalis, quae p ro p ter co rru p tio n e m n atu rae
96 Daniel W. Houck

The human being in integral nature did love God above all; the human being
in corrupt nature does not-unless she is healed by grace. Is Thomas implying
that because of original sin, the natural orientation to God is lost and every
human being begins existence following her private good, in a state of mortal
sin? Reading Thomas this way is not impossible. He does state that in corrupt
nature the human being needs sanctifying grace to love God with a natural
love. The first difhculty with this reading should be clear from the first two sec­
tions of this paper: if Thomas had taught this, as Adriano Oliva observes, “his
entire doctrine of original sin would have been subverted.”96 I would argue,
moreover, that the context we’ve established in this third section allows us to
see that this article is not concerned with the effects of original sin.
The Secunda Pars is not concerned with infant action but human action with
reason. As we have seen, only twenty questions earlier Thomas claimed that all
the unbaptized with the use of reason either turn to God, receiving sanctifying
grace, or commit mortal sin. Here, Thomas speaks of human beings with rea­
son in corrupt nature: each one has turned away from God by personal mortal
sin, unless she is healed by grace (nisi sanetur). Thomas’s wording implies he is
speaking of personal sin: the will recedes ( deficit) from God to follow its private
good. If the will in corrupt nature were automatically following its private good
by virtue of original sin, there would be no need to recede from God; it would
already be following its private good. Moreover, the healing Thomas speaks of
need not only refer to the human being who has already sunk into mortal sin.
As we have seen, Thomas frequently speaks of original sin itself as analogous
to a sickness (STh I-II, q. 82, a. 1). Thomas has not argued that loving God in
corrupt nature is metaphysically impossible, as though infants with original sin
already follow their private good in mortal sin. No, loving God without grace is
providentially impossible for those with reason in via: whoever lacks grace has
committed mortal sin.

sequitur bonum privatum, nisi sanetur per gratiam Dei. Et ideo dicendum est quod
homo in statu naturae integrae non indigebat dono gratiae superadditae naturalibus
bonis ad diligendum Deum naturaiiter super omnia; licet indigeret auxilio Dei ad
hoc eum moventis. Sed in statu naturae corruptae indiget homo edam ad hoc auxilio
gratiae naturam sanantis.” T h o m a s STh I-II, q. 109, a. 3.
96 O liva 2012, 609.1 agree that the natural love for God remains in those with only origi­
nal sin. It seems to me, however, that Oliva’s explanation muddies the waters a bit. He
suggests that for Thomas, human beings with original sin normally (“normalement”)
do not love God by nature, though they still can with difficulty (“bien que difficile­
ment”). As such, Thomas thinks the exercise (“l’exercise”) of loving God naturally is
rare but possible, because the root capacity (“capacité radicale”) remains. All from
O liva 2012, 609. The problem is that Thomas argues that everyone either sins mortally
or receives grace before venial sin, implying a quick, if not immediate division between
those in mortal sin and sanctifying grace. The numerical percentage of those who turn
to God in the first act of freedom is not at issue (why would Thomas have claimed to
know such a thing?). Moreover, it is not enough to say the radical capacity to love God
remains in original sin. Garrigou-Lagrange, et al. would agree, despite their conflation
of original and mortal sin. The question is whether the capacity remains ex parte termini.
 Thomas Aquinas on the Effects of Original Sin 97

This reading helps make sense of the rest of the treatise, which assumes
that all with reason in this life are either in mortal sin or sanctifying grace
and that those in mortal sin are there by personal fault. Thomas’s discussion of
whether grace is necessary to avoid sin is instructive. In integral nature all sin
could be avoided. In corrupt nature before grace, each individual mortal sin
can be avoided, but it is impossible to avoid every mortal sin for a long time.
Why? As the hrst objection has it, it seems that mortal sin must be avoidable.
Thomas, in the corpus, assumes that the human being without grace is in a
state of mortal sin, though she can avoid individual mortal sins. In the reply to
the hrst objection, though, he argues that it is the personal fault of the one who
has not received grace for not preparing for grace.97 The implication is that the
hrst free act need not have been a mortal sin—even after turning to mortal sin,
the sinner can avoid individual mortal sins—but that those who do not commit
mortal sin receive grace.
If the reading I am offering here is broadly correct, Thomas’s teaching was
destined to be controversial. Prima facie, the view that postlapsarian human
beings retain a natural love for God seems Pelagian. Yet Thomas did not draw
the “optimistic” conclusions we might have expected. As Richard Shenk notes,
“The nature that is not destroyed by grace, far from being the self-glorifying
nature that the critics of analogy feared, was the nature that would experience
its own failings.”9* As we have seen, the person with original sin cannot nor­
mally avoid all personal sin, and she thus cannot fulfill the natural law. Later
thinkers, inspired perhaps by isolated parts of Thomas’s teaching, would veer
toward a more autonomous conception of nature. If human nature survives
sin, surely we can fulfill the good proportioned to it? Surely—of course with
the auxilium Dei moventis—if we ought to obey God perfectly, we can? If many
do not consciously know or desire God, well, it simply follows that God can be
obeyed without being known or desired. This sort of reasoning, which gave
the impression that this earth is our true home, is a large part of the reason
pure nature came to be seen as the ground floor of “two-tier” Thomism, now
held in such low esteem. Thomas, though he did teach that there is a concept
of nature without grace and sin (“pure nature”), though he did teach that
original sin leaves human nature to itself (“natura est sibi relieta"), never denied
our vocation to the new earth. Indeed, we might say that for him, humanity’s

97 “[A]ntequam hominis ratio, in qua est peccatum mortale, reparetur per gratiam
iustificantem, potest singula peccata mortalia vitare, et secundum aliquod tempus: quia
non est necesse quod continuo peccet in actu. Sed quod diu maneat absque peccato
mortali, esse non potest.” T homas STh I-II, q. 109, a. 8. “[H]omo potest vitare singulos
actus peccati: non tarnen omnes, nisi per gratiam, ut dictum est. Et tarnen quia ex eius
defectu est quod homo se ad gratiam habendam non praeparet, per hoc a peccato non
excusatur, quod sine gratia peccatum vitare non potest.” T homas STh ITI, q. 109, a. 8,
ad 1. What we said about the facials quod in se est (see n. 84) applies, mutatis mutandis, to
the preparation for grace. Whether the preparation itself is from sanctifying grace or
not, it is personal, not original fault that leads to mortal sin.
98 Schenk 2011, 188.
98 Daniel W. Houck

heavenly calling constitutes its original sin. By creation’s grace, we are actively
oriented to God. But we are not rightly related without the Holy Spirit. Thus,
although Thomas does say that God left human nature to itself, his words can
be misleading. Nature truly left to itself would be a vain vale of sin, desire, and
death. In conclusion, it seems equally true to Thomas’s thought to say—and,
given the obscurity of the doctrine’s connection to the gospel in modernity,
necessary to say—that by original sin natura relieta est Christo. Left by Christ, the
God who permitted the greatest sin for the greatest good, we are left to Christ,
the man who shared our corruption to redeem us from it. Ultimately, we are
left for Christ, the good greater than our sin. “Ofelix culpa, quae talem ac tantum
meruit habere RedemptoremVm

99 T homas SThHI, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.
 Thomas Aquinas on the Effects of Original Sin 99

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