Three-Way Power Dynamics in the ArcticAuthor(s): Rebecca Pincus

Source: Strategic Studies Quarterly , Vol. 14, No. 1 (SPRING 2020), pp. 40-63
Published by: Air University Press

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 PERSPECTIVE

Three-­Way Power Dynamics

in the Arctic
Rebecca Pincus

Abstract
The Arctic is an emerging region of great significance to US-­China-­
Russia great power competition. This is due to the concentration of natu-
ral resources in the Arctic, as well as its future use as a transportation
corridor between the Pacific and Atlantic. Russia’s dominant position in
the Arctic complicates the US-­China dyad. While most high-­level US
security strategies and discourse identify the return of great power com-
petition as the dominant current security paradigm, China and Russia are
generally treated in isolation from each other. However, when it comes to
the Arctic, China-­Russia cooperation is a crucial factor to consider when
formulating US strategy. This article places Chinese ambitions in the
Arctic in the context of Chinese grand strategy and assesses the basis of,
and prospects for, Chinese-­Russian Arctic cooperation. It also advances a
three-­track framework for understanding Chinese-­Russian cooperation
in the Arctic—economic, military, and political—in which issues of con-
trol and trust are contested.

*****

T
he Arctic is an important locus for great power competition and
triangular balancing between the US, China, and Russia. It is what
political science professor Rob Huebert has dubbed the “New
Arctic Strategic Triangle Environment” in which “the primary security
requirements of the three most powerful states are now overlapping in the
Arctic region,” raising tension.1 The Arctic is an emerging area of global
economic activity and a highly militarized and strategic region. The future
of Arctic development therefore will impact US grand strategic goals, in-
cluding the international rule of law, freedom of the seas, the safety of the
US homeland, and the future of NATO. Two US competitors, Russia and
China, appear to have overlapping—although not well-­aligned—interests
in the region. The emergence of a strategic triangle complicates US and
allied efforts to apply pressure to Russia in the high north, along with US
efforts to counter growing Chinese global influence.

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 Three-­Way Power Dynamics in the Arctic

The US National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense

Strategy (NDS) clearly identify great power competition as the dominant
current global paradigm with Russia and China as US competitors. These
strategies do not address the Arctic region, focusing instead on more tra-
ditional and higher-­priority areas of concern. Arctic-­specific discourse
centers on challenges to the US posed by Russia and China. However,
across both general and Arctic-­specific statements of US strategy, the po-
tential for Russia and China to cooperate in opposing US interests is
largely discounted. In the Arctic, Russia and China have fundamental se-
curity interests. Thus, in the triangular geopolitical context of the region,
US strategy must address the potential for China-­Russia cooperation to
avoid adverse policy choices.
In the 2017 National Security Strategy, the Trump administration laid
out a vision for US security that warned of a new threat paradigm from
states that are “steadily” implementing “long-­term plans to challenge
America and to advance agendas opposed to the United States, our allies,
and our partners.”2 The Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of
the United States of America elaborates on this vision of US security: “The
central challenge to US prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-­
term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies
as revisionist powers” (emphasis in original). It is increasingly clear that
China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian
model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic,
and security decisions.3
The two documents are signposts for a shift in US grand strategy. They
lay out holistic threats to US security and prosperity and to the global
order founded on liberal democratic values. Along with others, these
documents specifically identify China and Russia as peer or near-­peer
challengers to the US and characterize them as seeking to revise the global
order: “China and Russia are now undermining the international order . . .
undercutting its principles.”4 The collective emphasis, here and in other
foundational documents, is on the return of great power or long-­term
strategic competition. While US grand strategy appears to focus on the
two, the NSS and NDS documents establishing this emphasis do not ad-
dress the Arctic region. The Arctic has the potential to become a signifi-
cant area of Sino-­Russian cooperation, yet higher-­level US strategy does
not appear to incorporate this prospect. The core strategy documents
clearly identify Russia and China as threats to US and allied interests in
the Arctic but generally treat them separately.5 The National Security

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 Rebecca Pincus

Strategy hints at why: “China and Russia aspire to project power world-
wide, but they interact most with their neighbors.”6
Recent commentaries illustrate this interpretation. In May 2019, US
secretary of state Mike Pompeo delivered the speech “Looking North:
Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus” in advance of an Arctic Council min-
isterial meeting. In it, he sharply addresses both Chinese and Russian ac-
tions in the Arctic:
China’s words and actions raise doubts about its intentions. . . .
. . . China’s pattern of aggressive behavior elsewhere . . . should in-
form what we do and how it might treat the Arctic.
Let’s just ask ourselves: Do we want Arctic nations . . . ensnared by
debt and corruption? Do we want crucial Arctic infrastructure to end up
like Chinese-­constructed roads in Ethiopia, crumbling and dangerous . . . ?
Do we want the Arctic Ocean to transform into a new South China
Sea? . . .
Then there’s Russia.7
Secretary Pompeo directs stern language against both Russia and China,
but his remarks largely avoid the potential of meaningful cooperation be-
tween the two.
Similarly, Adm James Foggo, commander of US Naval Forces Europe–
Africa and commander of NATO’s Allied Joint Force Command Naples,
highlights the threats posed by Russian and Chinese actions in the Arctic.
His interpretation of Sino-­Russia cooperation is dismissive: “Russia and
China remain wary partners, with differing stances on proposed Arctic
governance and development.”8 In contrast, the 2019 Chinese Defense
White Paper extols Sino-­Russian military cooperation:
The military relationship between China and Russia continues to de-
velop at a high level, enriching the China-­Russia comprehensive strate-
gic partnership of coordination for a new era and playing a significant
role in maintaining global strategic stability. The Chinese and Russian
militaries have continued the sound development of exchange mecha-
nisms at all levels, expanded cooperation in high-­level exchanges, mili-
tary training, equipment, technology and counter-­terrorism, and realized
positive interaction and coordination on international and multilateral
occasions. Since 2012, Chinese and Russian militaries have held 7 rounds
of strategic consultations. From August to September 2018, at the invi-
tation of the Russian side, the PLA participated in Russia’s Vostok strate-
gic exercise for the first time.9
Recent indications suggest that the US security establishment is finally
beginning to consider Sino-­Russian cooperation and pay more attention

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 Three-­Way Power Dynamics in the Arctic

to the Arctic region. For example, in January 2019, the director of national
intelligence provided testimony specifically addressing the issue: “We
anticipate that [China and Russia] will collaborate to counter US objec-
tives. . . . The two countries have significantly expanded their cooperation,
especially in the energy, military and technology spheres, since 2014.”10
Recently, a series of documents explicitly connect great power competition
with China and Russia to the Arctic region. The June 2019 DOD Arctic
Strategy builds on the concept of great power competition outlined in the
NSS and NDS. The Arctic Strategy addresses China and Russia as major
concerns: “China and Russia pose discrete and different challenges in their
respective theaters. . . . In different ways, Russia and China are challenging
the rules-­based order in the Arctic.”11 Also in 2019, the US Coast Guard
issued an Arctic Strategic Outlook echoing the DOD’s emphasis on great
power competition in the Arctic.12
This article explores the extent of Chinese-­Russian cooperation in the
Arctic in three dimensions: economic, military, and political. They offer a
framework for understanding Russian and Chinese interests and activities
in the Arctic and for assessing what kinds of challenges may emerge for
the United States. While the term “great power competition” is helpful in
characterizing the overall geopolitical paradigm, it does not provide the
granularity needed for defining and responding to broad challenges—like
Russian and Chinese interest in Arctic development—that cut across
these dimensions.

Economic Dimension of Sino-­Russian Cooperation

Aligning with the overall thrust of Chinese grand strategy, Beijing’s
primary strategic interest in the Arctic is economic—natural resources
and potential shipping lanes. Chinese-­Russian cooperation centers around
these two axes, both of which also align with Russian economic interests
in developing its Arctic resources. In seeking to develop these resources,
Russia needs foreign capital. Following the imposition of Western sanc-
tions in 2014, Moscow clearly pivoted East and began to court Chinese
investment—to the point of inviting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to
include Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR). However, Russian-­Chinese
economic partnership in the Arctic has foundered over issues of control.
Under the broad umbrella of economic cooperation fall two linked
objectives. First is the development of the Northern Sea Route, the great
shipping lane across Russia’s northern coast that connects northeast
Asian ports to northern ports in Europe and North America. Second is
the extraction of renewable and nonrenewable resources from the Rus-

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 Rebecca Pincus

sian Arctic Zone. (Although China is ultimately interested in trans-­Arctic

shipping, its ships will rely on Russian ports for refueling, resupplying,
and emergency stops.)
China experts concur that economics are at the center of Chinese grand
strategy. A CSIS net assessment report concludes as much, stating that
“China’s economic progress, and regional economic outreach, will often be
more of the central focus of its grand strategy than the modernization and
expansion of its military forces.”13 This interpretation is supported by Chi-
nese documents as well. For example, China’s 2015 Military Strategy
states, “Subsistence and development security concerns, as well as tradi-
tional and non-­ traditional security threats are interwoven. Therefore,
China has an arduous task to safeguard its national unification, territorial
integrity and development interests.” The strategy goes on to note that
“with the growth of China’s national interests, its national security is more
vulnerable to international and regional turmoil, . . . and the security of
overseas interests concerning energy and resources [and] strategic sea lines
of communication (SLOCs) . . . has become an imminent issue.”14
Rather than promoting a values-­based agenda, Beijing appears to be
positioning itself as a good partner for mutually beneficial investment
and global prosperity, particularly in less-­developed regions—including
the Arctic. China does not appear to be intent on spreading communism,
although Andrew Erickson, professor of strategy at the US Naval War
College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, draws attention to some
statements that indicate otherwise.15 Instead, it has pursued a global
agenda of win-­win development in which Chinese investment, and infra-
structure development in particular, provides shared prosperity. China
appears to be pursuing a grand strategy based on economics rather than
on values. Military strength appears to follow, rather than lead, invest-
ment. Such a development-­focused path also enables China to highlight
its past as a victim of imperialism and build common identity with other
postcolonial states. As its 2019 Defense White Paper explains, “China
has grown from a poor and weak country to be the world’s second largest
economy neither by receiving handouts from others nor by engaging in
military expansion or colonial plunder. . . . China has made every effort to
create favorable conditions for its development through maintaining
world peace, and has equally endeavored to promote world peace through
its own development.”16 In this way, official Chinese language connects
peace and development and emphasizes identity differences between
China and Western nations.

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 Three-­Way Power Dynamics in the Arctic

It would be sensible for an economics-­based grand strategy to spread

globally along trade routes and toward resource-­rich areas. Indeed, this is
apparent from the global pattern of Chinese investment. President Xi’s
emphasis on the BRI as a keystone of his foreign policy is an indication of
Chinese grand strategy. The crown jewel in China’s grand strategy is the
BRI. A massive system of transportation and infrastructure corridors link-
ing China with adjacent regions, the BRI promises to grow trade through
increasing interconnectivity and market access. Erickson argues that Xi’s
signature BRI is an integral element of operationalizing current Chinese
grand strategy: “[The] BRI leverages infrastructure and trade to integrate
Eurasia and its periphery, perhaps ultimately within a Sinocentric geo­
economic and geopolitical order.”17 Beyond spurring growth in target
countries, the BRI will improve the flow of raw materials to China and
provide new markets for Chinese goods. Of course, linking the world to
China through the BRI will increase Chinese influence and position it as
the go-­to partner. As observes Ashley Tellis, a senior fellow at the Carn-
egie Endowment for International Peace, if the BRI is successful, “it will
have secured political influence by serving as a new source of infrastruc-
ture investment around the world, while also acquiring new facilities for
military operations along the way.”18
The BRI frames China’s approach to the world, including the Arctic
region. China is naturally drawn to the Arctic for many reasons, such as
natural resources, trade corridors (and supply route diversity), and climate
change. China’s grand strategy is economics-­based and therefore naturally
follows along global trade routes and toward natural resources. Therefore,
it is not at all surprising that China should express distinct interest in the
Arctic region since the Arctic basin is resource-­rich. Elizabeth Wishnick,
associate professor of political science at Montclair State University, points
to a report from a Chinese institute affiliated with the PLA that described
the Arctic “as a potential ‘lifeline’ for the growing Chinese economy.”19 As
the sea ice retreats, shipping routes across the Arctic are increasingly fea-
sible, offering desirable alternatives to current routes between China,
northern Europe, and North America. While Arctic coastal states are
generally high-­income countries, the region as a whole suffers from a sig-
nificant lack of infrastructure, further aligning the Arctic well within Chi-
nese grand strategic parameters.
In early 2018, it was announced that Russia’s Northern Sea Route
would be folded into China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative. Sometimes
called the Arctic Silk Road or Ice Silk Road, this new crossover project has
received widespread attention. According to an analysis by Yun Sun of the

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 Rebecca Pincus

Stimson Center, contrary to widespread opinion, the Russians originally

proposed the Polar Silk Road.20 Sun traces Russian proposals regarding
the Polar Silk Road to 2015, with a follow-­up proposal made by President
Putin himself in 2017. Sun notes, “The pre-2014 cold-­shoulder by Russia
forms a sharp contrast to its enthusiasm to cooperate with China on the
Northern Sea Route after the Ukraine Crisis.”21 In addition, scholars Olga
Alexeevna and Frederic Lasserre state that China’s BRI was perceived as a
threat to Russian interests and influence in Central Asia previous to 2014,
and “so the decision to officially link the Russian Arctic” to the BRI “marks
an important change” and the recognition by Moscow of “the necessity to
deepen Sino-­Russian cooperation in the Arctic.”22
In June 2018, the China Development Bank and Russia’s Vneshecon­
ombank (VEB) signed a deal intended to facilitate investment in Belt and
Road initiatives and tie together the BRI with the Russia-­led Eurasian
Economic Union. The Northern Sea Route received special emphasis in
the announcement of the banking agreement: while the partnership cov-
ers about 70 projects, the NSR was the only project discussed in the press
release.23
Understanding the Belt and Road Initiative also benefits from an ex-
tended consideration of shipping and maritime activity in the northwest-
ern Pacific area. An interesting aspect of Sino-­Russian cooperation is the
potential development of origination points for shipping from Asia. The
North Korean port of Rajin has been identified as possibly a strategically
critical port for China.24 Other alternatives include the Russian port of
Zarubino, in the process of being upgraded through combined Chinese-­
Russian investment. Less than a dozen miles from Chinese territory, Za-
rubino is less politically fraught than Rajin and also offers year-­round ac-
cess to the northern Pacific.25 The future trajectory of Sino-­ Russian
cooperation in the economic and military domains may intersect here.
Despite these cooperative adventures, expert opinion varies on the ex-
tent of Sino-­Russian partnership regarding the NSR and the integration
of the NSR into the BRI. Yun Sun, co-­director of the Stimson Center
East Asia Program, contends that Sino-­Russian cooperation on the NSR
has been held back by “divergent interests, conflicting calculations and
vastly different cost-­benefit analyses.”26 At the same time that Chinese
observers point to Russian recalcitrance, Russian commentary often
pushes back. For example, Alexander Vorotnikov states that while there is
shared interest in Arctic development and cooperation, “Russia takes a
firm position here” (твердую позицию) and that “priority must remain
with Russia, since the Arctic is the most important region” (Арктика

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 Three-­Way Power Dynamics in the Arctic

является важнейшим регионом).27 The imposition of sanctions appears

to have spurred Russia to more eagerly seek Chinese investment, although
Russia remains a difficult partner and there are fewer tangible results than
might be expected, given the level of rhetoric. One expert notes that Eu-
ropean firms are using Chinese intermediaries to finance investments in
Russia, bypassing the Western financial system altogether.28
In addition to NSR infrastructure development, Moscow and Beijing
have trumpeted cooperation in the sphere of Arctic resource development,
especially in oil and gas projects. In 2014, Gazprom and the China Na-
tional Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a contract—in the pres-
ence of Presidents Putin and Xi—obligating Gazprom to supply 38 bil-
lion cubic meters of gas annually to China for 30 years. According to
Gazprom’s Alexey Miller, this is “the biggest contract in the entire history
of the USSR and Gazprom.”29 As a resource-­extractive economy, Russia
depends on development of raw materials to sustain its economy. As of
2017, oil and gas exports still made up 59 percent of export goods and
about 25 percent of fiscal revenue, making Russia overly reliant on these
exports.30 China is a resource-­importing state, and therefore the marriage
of Russian resources and Chinese demand might appear to be a sound
basis for economic partnership.
However, like the underdevelopment of the NSR, Sino-­Russian co­
operation on Arctic resource projects has not yet matched the high expec-
tations and rhetoric. A 2018 analysis by Alexeevna and Lasserre, based on
Russian and Chinese data on Arctic development cooperation, reveals two
interesting patterns. The first is that Sino-­Russian projects in the Arctic
“are frequently misrepresented” in each country and by different publica-
tions. The second is that actual projects are fewer and less successful than
might be expected given the level of publicity for Sino-­Russian coopera-
tion in the Arctic. The authors note that “moving beyond political declara-
tions is very difficult.”31 They suggest that the lower-­than-­expected level of
actual partnership is due to a mismatch of expectations: on one hand, Rus-
sians want to retain full control over Arctic development, given its strategic
importance to national interests, and therefore want Chinese investment
funds—without Chinese involvement in decision-­making. On the other
hand, Chinese investors “are reluctant to invest in very expensive and risky
projects, unless they can secure a role in the management and have a voice
and voting rights.” In addition, China is interested in participating in Arc-
tic development projects to increase technological expertise and industrial
capabilities, whereas Russia is generally protective of its expertise.32

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 Rebecca Pincus

Anemic development can also be partially explained by the investment

climate in Russia. Analysts suggest that Russian investment protocols are
neither transparent nor consistent and that regulations are frequently
changed.33 As one Chinese scholar observed, “the environment for invest-
ment in Russia is unfriendly. The legal system functions poorly and cor-
ruption is rampant. Russia usually pays lip service but exhibits little action
in cooperation.”34 Experts indicate that while Russian laws on foreign
investment are very strong—“a model of clarity,” implementation is gener-
ally uneven, and “there is not much evidence regarding the effectiveness of
the agencies that implement” the law.35
It appears that Russian-­Chinese cooperation in the Arctic may hinge
on the question of control and trust. With this in mind, the Yamal mega-
project becomes especially interesting. As Alexeevna and Lasserre note,
“Yamal LNG [liquefied natural gas] is a national flagship project” for
Moscow, “with both economic and political implications not only for
Moscow’s foreign policy but also for domestic strategy.” In a bit of un-
comfortable contrast, the Yamal project is also “a showcase for China’s
skills and competence in the development of Arctic resources that, in
turn, will strengthen the Chinese presence in the region.”36 The Yamal
LNG project, which came online in 2018, made a major contribution to
Russia’s economy; it increased Russian LNG production by 70.1 percent,
according to Bloomberg.37 Statistics reveal that “about 90% of Russia’s
natural gas and about 12% of oil is today produced in the Yamal Nenets
region,” and the region is anticipated to hold large additional fields, in-
cluding Tambey, with more than 7 trillion cubic meters of gas.38 A new
giant gas project is in the works, Arctic LNG 2, located in the Gydan
peninsula near the existing Yamal megaproject.39 Production for the new
project is estimated at nearly 20 million tons of LNG per year, most of
which will be shipped via ice-­capable tankers east to Asian markets.
According to expert assessments, the Russian zone of the Arctic con-
tains potentially 48 billion barrels of oil and 43 trillion cubic meters of gas,
both significant shares of total Russian reserves.40 Another estimate of the
overall Russian endowment is 287 billion barrels of oil equivalent.41 Ac-
cording to data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), Russia is one of the top three oil-­producing
countries in the world along with Saudi Arabia and the United States.42
In 2017, Russia became the largest exporter of oil in the world, surpassing
both Saudi Arabia and the US.43 Further, Russia is the world’s largest ex-
porter of natural gas. The Russian companies Rosneft and Gazprom
dominate the region and have exploration plans in Shtokman, near Novaya

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 Three-­Way Power Dynamics in the Arctic

Zemlya, as well as Yuzhno-­Kirinskoye in the Far East and Leningradskoye

in the Kara Sea (Gazprom). Rosneft has plans in Khatanga as well as the
Barents and the Kara Seas.44
However, Beijing does not simply want to exchange cash for energy in
the Arctic. China is using cooperation with Russia in the Arctic to gain
expertise and know-­how in the critical energy sector. Chinese firms are
beginning to move into the Arctic offshore oil and gas sector, reflecting
advancing technological savvy. In 2017 and 2018, a Chinese offshore oil
rig, the Nan Hai Ba Hao, explored for oil in the Russian far north.45 In
2017, the rig made a significant discovery in the Leningradskoye field,
and in 2018 it explored the Rusanovskoye field, both under development
by Gazprom. Guangzhou Shipyard International just completed an ice-
breaking tanker with an Arc7 (highest) ice class rating, designed by Aker
Arctic.46 The tanker, Boris Sokolov, will carry LNG from Sabetta in the
Yamal Peninsula to markets in Asia and Europe. It is capable of breaking
up to 2 meters of ice and sailed the Northern Sea Route in January 2019
without icebreaker escort.47 These signs of increasing Chinese technical
capacities to operate in Arctic conditions—without dependency on
Russia—may eventually change the dynamics of their relationship.
In addition to oil and gas and technical expertise in polar operations,
China has a strategic interest in Russian minerals in the Arctic. Jiayu Bai
of the Ocean University of China, and Alexandr Voronenko, now execu-
tive director, Research Center for Shanghai Cooperation Organization
and Asia Pacific Region, also highlight potential Russian-­Chinese co­
operation on rare earths mining in the Arctic. These strategic minerals are
important to many advanced electronics and military systems. Rare earth
deposits have been identified in the Kola and Taimyr Peninsulas and in
Yakutia, and talks between Nornickel and General Nice Group (which is
also developing rare earths in Greenland) are “in progress.”48 A 2017 CNA
report detailed Russian mining prospects and deposits.49 Mining in the
Russian Arctic connects to broader strategic resource goals for Beijing,
which has global interests in rare earth elements.
Another Arctic resource that may be of interest to China is seafood. The
world’s two most productive fisheries are found in the region: the Barents
Sea and the Bering Sea fisheries. As yet, there is no commercial fishery in
the central Arctic Ocean; in fact, in 2017, a group of Arctic and non-­
Arctic states, including China, signed an agreement to hold off on fishing
in the central Arctic.50 The moratorium is intended to give scientists
enough time to adequately understand the structure of Arctic fisheries and
prepare sustainable fisheries management plans. Chinese influence has

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 Rebecca Pincus

been identified in the process of negotiating the moratorium.51 As global

fisheries decline, the as yet untapped seafood resources of the central Arc-
tic Ocean may be increasingly in demand.52
While their interests align (Russia as a resource vendor, China as a re-
source client), their cooperation has been impeded by each partner’s desire
to maintain control or a leading position in projects. Russian interests in
partnering with China were clearly given a boost following the 2014 sanc-
tions. The stakes for US strategy are clear: in a triangular context, US ef-
forts to weaken Russia’s economy may strengthen China’s economic influ-
ence in Moscow and its political cooperation.

Political Dimension
China is building relationships with all the Arctic states to increase its
influence over decisions about the future of the Arctic region. The political
dimension offers a relatively direct collision between Chinese and Russian
long-­term grand strategic objectives. Russia has traditionally been jeal-
ously protective of its special position in the Arctic region. In contrast,
Beijing is seeking to legitimate its interest in the region and gain a shaping
role in the future of Arctic development. Partnering with Russia, the
dominant Arctic power, is unmistakably desirable although complicated.
In this, Russia is made less vulnerable by its status as the Arctic super-
power; however, the underdeveloped and brittle Russian economy acts as
a constraint on Moscow’s freedom of action. Chinese-­Russian coopera-
tion was given a jolt in 2014 when Western countries imposed sanctions
on Russia in response to its annexation of Crimea. Suddenly cut off from
access to Western capital and partnering for Arctic energy projects, Russia
pivoted East.
In the short term, Arctic cooperation suits both Chinese and Russian
strategic interests and complicates US objectives. From a geographic per-
spective, Russia dominates the Arctic basin. The prospect of effective
Sino-­Russian cooperation therefore raises the possibility of a localized
sphere in which the capacity of the PRC could operate in conjunction
with Russian geography to create an Arctic trajectory outside the system
of international rule of law.
The Chinese journal Advances in Polar Science published an article co-­
authored by Russian and Chinese scholars directly addressing Sino-­
Russian cooperation in the Arctic region. The authors summed up the
alignment of Russian and Chinese interests in the Arctic: “Russia is inter-
ested in Chinese investments and technology; in turn, Russia can grant
China access to mineral resources and the NSR. . . . Furthermore, through

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 Three-­Way Power Dynamics in the Arctic

cooperation with Russia, China can expand its role in the Arctic [C]oun-
cil and the process of formulating the regional agenda.” The authors ob-
served that Russia and China “can play a major role in forming the system
of international relations in the Arctic using their advantages and author-
ity.” In addition, “cooperation with Russia will give Chinese actions in the
region more validity.”53
Beijing is clearly aware that its efforts to gain a seat at the Arctic table
have not been uniformly welcomed and that Russia in particular has mixed
opinions. The executive director for the Institute for China-­ America
Studies, Nong Hong, observes that “unfortunately, China’s intentions
have been met with suspicion by Arctic states” and identifies Russia,
Canada, and Iceland as the most “vigilant”; she specifically cites “the vigi-
lance of the Russian military” regarding Chinese interest in the Arctic.54
One means of gaining entrée into Arctic governance is through par-
ticipation in the Arctic Council: China was granted observer status at that
forum in 2013 after some years of effort. In part, the delay in admitting
China to the Arctic Council as an observer was due to Russian reluctance:
“the Russian government initially expressed wariness about allowing Bei-
jing any formal role within the organization,” according to Marc Lan-
teigne (Massey University, Auckland).55 However, other observers also
point to Canadian reluctance to admit China and other observers.56 Es-
tablished in 1996, the Arctic Council is the highest-­level intergovernmen-
tal forum and de facto governance organization for the region. While only
the eight Arctic states have votes at the Arctic Council, the indigenous
peoples of the Arctic region are represented by their organizations as Per-
manent Participants and can fully participate in discussions. In addition to
these participatory categories, there is a category of Observer states and
organizations. Observers do not have equal right to participate in council
discussions but may attend meetings and participate on invitation.
In January 2018, the State Council Information Office of China pub-
lished the white paper “China’s Arctic Policy.” This long-­anticipated state-
ment of China’s official Arctic policy has received a great deal of analysis.
A helpful explanation came in March 2018 from the Washington-­based,
Chinese-­funded Institute for China-­America Studies. This report clearly
states China’s approach to gaining influence in Arctic decision-­making:
China is also active in promoting bilateral relations with Arctic states for
strategic purposes. . . . China should deal with Arctic states on an indi-
vidual basis. . . . This way, China will have much more leeway for strategic
operations. This one-­on-­one model is similar to China’s stance in the

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 Rebecca Pincus

South China Sea issue, where China insists on bilateral rather than
multi­lateral negotiation. . . .
China is also focusing on improving diplomatic relations with the five
North European nations: Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Fin-
land. Cooperation with these countries is not only aimed at acquiring
resources, but also to expand[ing] China’s influence in the Arctic. . . . .
The Northern European states are not strong enough to compete with
Russia or with their ally the United States—both state parties in the
Arctic region—so these states are willing to turn to China for help. If
China can establish a long-­term strategic cooperation mechanism on
Arctic affairs with the Northern European states, it will achieve a greater
say in Arctic affairs.57
As this quote illustrates, Russia is not the only focus of Chinese interest in
the Arctic. In fact, China’s influence-­seeking strategy may be even more of
a problem for the United States vis-­a-­vis the small Nordic countries,
which may be more vulnerable.
The example of Norwegian-­Chinese relations is illustrative. In 2010,
following the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu
Xiaobo “for his long and non-­violent struggle for fundamental human
rights in China,” the Chinese government retaliated by imposing import
controls on Norwegian salmon that effectively closed the market.58 For six
years, Norway worked to restore relations with Beijing, finally succeeding
in 2016—at the cost of an extraordinary joint declaration:59
Due to the Nobel Peace Prize award and events connected to the Prize,
China-­Norway relations have deteriorated. The Norwegian side is fully
conscious of the position and concerns of the Chinese side and has
worked actively to bring the bilateral relations back to the right track. . . .
The Norwegian Government reiterates its commitment to the one-­
China policy, fully respects China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,
attaches high importance to China’s core interests and major concerns,
will not support actions that undermine them, and will do its best to
avoid any future damage to the bilateral relations.60
As the Norwegian example demonstrates, Beijing is willing to use its
advantageous trade position relative to smaller states—even formidable
small states like Norway—to extract significant political concessions and
deference. Therefore, economic leverage may pave the way for political
goals to be achieved. The hallmark of grand strategy is the leveraging of all
means of state power toward overarching objectives, and Norway’s experi-
ence provides a clear example of Beijing’s capabilities. This instance also
gives a clear warning to Russia about the possible consequences of over-

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 Three-­Way Power Dynamics in the Arctic

reliance on China for capital and markets. Moscow has been making clear
efforts to diversify its sources of investment into Arctic oil and gas projects,
possibly to backstop against this danger.
Chinese-­Russian cooperation in the Arctic can be understood as an
unresolved balancing act between the two states. Russia needs outside
capital to fund Arctic development but seeks to maintain control—both
politically and over specific investment projects. China wants access to
both Arctic resources and the political decision-­making process and is
willing to use economic tools as leverage. A third dimension is important
to understanding the prospects for Russian-­Chinese cooperation in the
Arctic: military security. While this is the least-­developed area of co­
operation, it also has the potential to pose the most direct threat to the
United States.

Military Dimension
Many signs point to a growing security partnership between China and
Russia. In October 2019, President Putin stated that Russia is “helping
our Chinese partners” develop an antimissile early warning system.61 He
also described Russian-­Chinese relations as “an allied relationship in the
full sense of a multifaceted strategic partnership.”62 While China has no
Arctic military presence, it maintains interests in the region as stated
above. Therefore, assessing the current level of, and prospects for, Chinese-­
Russian security cooperation is crucial to understanding the overall pros-
pects for great power competition in the Arctic.
The Arctic is a security bastion for Russia, and therefore this dimension
of potential Russia-­China cooperation is of great sensitivity. The Russian
navy and some other elements of the Russian military have been hawkish
on China, and in some parts of Russia—particularly the Far East—Chi-
nese influence is perceived as a potential threat. China appears to be seek-
ing polar capabilities, including icebreakers and polar-­capable submarines.
The two countries have been ramping up joint military exercises and op-
erations recently, including in near-­ Arctic areas. The future of Sino-­
Russian military cooperation in the Arctic will directly affect the security
position of the US and its NATO allies in the region. As in the economic
dimension, while security cooperation serves Chinese and Russian inter-
ests in balancing against the US, there is deep-­rooted friction that may
ultimately sink cooperation.
Some observers note the strategic military interest China may have in
the Arctic. The Fort Greely missile complex could potentially be directed
against China, and northern deep-­water routes might offer desirable sub-

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 Rebecca Pincus

marine routes.63 Arctic routes also offer China an alternative to the Ma-
lacca dilemma and would bolster its security by having Russian oil as a
strategic alternative to the Middle East. Yang Zhirong of the People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Naval War College states that China
should develop a military component to its Arctic strategy. It would in-
clude “dedicating naval staff to Arctic affairs, as well as information-­
gathering, developing Arctic-­capable equipment, improving communica-
tion in the region, making ports of call visits,” and recognizing the strategic
importance of the Arctic.64 The journey of PLAN vessels to the Baltic Sea,
including port calls in Finland and exercises with Russian navy ships in
2017, can be interpreted through this lens.
Sino-­Russian military cooperation outside the Arctic region has grown
in recent years and received widespread attention. Relevant PRC-­Russia
military cooperation includes arms sales and a growing number of live
exercises. According to a recent DOD report, in September 2017 the Chi-
nese and Russian navies conducted exercises—including antisubmarine,
submarine rescue, and joint air defense—in the Baltic Sea and Sea of Ok-
hotsk, both adjacent to the Arctic region.65 These were the sixth joint ex-
ercises since 2012. The Sea of Okhotsk is interesting in that it is also a
“Russian lake” that is key to Russian Arctic and Asian strategy, as Stephen
Blank of the American Foreign Policy Council has argued, and therefore
Russian-­Chinese joint exercises there are suggestive of a closer function-
ing relationship.66
PLAN submarine operations already include the North Atlantic, and
observers maintain that Arctic operations are likely to soon become an
element of PLAN missions.67 One of the joint Sino-­Russian military de-
sign and construction programs underway is focused on diesel-­electric
submarines.68 While a Chinese submarine has not yet surfaced in the Arc-
tic Ocean, that achievement is considered likely within a decade, accord-
ing to Lyle Goldstein of the China Maritime Studies Institute.69 In sup-
port of this belief, he points to an April 2018 paper in a leading Chinese
scientific journal, the Chinese Journal of Ship Research, on submarine hull
design for surfacing through ice. The abstract for this paper notes, “With
deepening research on the geographical and climatic environment of the
Arctic, the political and military value of submarines in the region has
been well recognized.”70
The Chinese navy is increasingly focused on long-­range missions that
will take its platforms farther and for longer periods. By 2020, according
to a 2018 OSD assessment, China will likely field between 69–78 subma-
rines, mostly diesel attack but with some SSBNs and SSNs.71 By the early

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 Three-­Way Power Dynamics in the Arctic

2020s, China will begin construction on its next-­generation SSBNs, the

Type 096, to be armed with JL-3 SLBMs. A 2015 Office of Naval Intel-
ligence report, while not mentioning the Arctic specifically, comments
that the PLAN is increasingly “expected to defend major SLOCs” and
that this new and expanding role for the Chinese Navy will demand “the
capability to sustain a maritime presence in strategic locations, in hostile
conditions, and for extended periods.”72 China and the PLAN are moving
purposefully in the direction of multimission naval capabilities in service
of grand strategic objectives “to preserve China’s interests and commensu-
rate with its role as an emerging major power.” In addition, Chinese ocean
science in support of military operations and seabed mining is highly ad-
vanced and may surpass US efforts.73 China’s military spending has in-
creased in recent years in line with its economic growth. President Xi has
made public declarations of his intent to modernize the Chinese military
into a multi-­theater force.74
China has recently embarked on an icebreaker building program: its
first icebreaker, the Xue Long, was purchased; it recently completed do-
mestic construction of its second, the Xue Long 2; and in June 2018, the
Chinese nuclear corporation opened a call for bids for the country’s first
nuclear-­powered icebreaker.75 While China has two icebreakers already, a
nuclear-­powered icebreaker would mark both a significant advance in po-
lar capabilities and a step toward fielding a nuclear-­powered carrier. The
construction of the nuclear-­powered icebreaker appears to be part of a
broader Chinese effort to develop domestic nuclear propulsion and reac-
tor technology expertise.76
The military cooperation between China and Russia has been described
as “a more balanced (though limited) security partnership between two
countries that are neither adversaries nor allies, but share certain security
concerns such as . . . balancing the United States and its allies.”77 The ex-
tent to which Russia is willing to share its expertise in Arctic submarine
operations with China may indicate the limits of their security partner-
ship. Cooperation on joint submarine production and joint exercises on
submarine rescue suggest that Russia is sharing expertise with the PLAN.
Any Sino-­Russian security partnership in the Arctic will be vastly
complicated by the high priority of the Arctic in Russia’s overall grand
strategy. The Arctic region is a core national interest for Russia. A NATO
analysis of Russian Arctic strategy and policy concluded in 2018 that Rus-
sian policy language reflects an increased emphasis on national security in
the Arctic and a growing belief that “security is a precondition for success-
ful resource development” in the Russian Arctic.78 In recent years, Moscow

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 Rebecca Pincus

has made strong statements of its intentions to build out the military
infra­structure required to fully secure the Russian Arctic. While these
declarations of intent have not yet been fully funded, some construction
has indeed moved ahead.79
Of note, in December 2014 Russia established the Arctic Joint Strate-
gic Command (AJSC). In addition, Russia has moved ahead with upgrad-
ing and extending its airfields along its northern perimeter. To the west, on
Franz Josef Land, the Nagurskoye air base was shown off in 2017 with
great fanfare.80 The base has a 2,500-meter airfield that was recently resur-
faced to accommodate heavy planes year-­round.81 In December 2015, the
AJSC received its own air force and army with the formation of the 45th
Air Force and Air Defense Army of the Northern Fleet. According to
Russian sources, 50 bases are expected to be built across the Arctic.82 Rus-
sia is reportedly developing polar-­adapted versions of the Pantsir surface-­
to-­air missile and the S-400 antiaircraft system.83 The AJSC controls all of
these resources, in addition to other combat units, radar stations, and other
units in the region. As one expert remarks, “Rebuilding and upgrading
regional military infrastructure and enhancing command and control have
emerged as consistent themes in Russia’s strategic thinking on the Arctic.
[Creating] the [AJSC] as the fifth military district of Russia, with the
Northern Fleet as its mainstay, reflected the priority that Russia began to
attach to the defense of the Arctic.”84
It is important to underline that the Arctic is a core national interest for
Russia. If Russia’s leaders indeed have a grand strategy, developing the
Arctic is one of its objectives. In addition, the bulk of Russia’s strategic
forces are concentrated in the Kola Peninsula in the western Arctic. As a
result, the Arctic is among the most sensitive parts of Russia and among
its top security priorities.
Chinese experts appear to recognize that Russia perceives a security
problem in the Arctic. One of China’s leading scholars of international
politics wrote, “Russia’s northern border is no longer peaceful. As for
China, developing strategic ties with Russia can help it in ‘stabilizing its
northern border so that it can turn to the ocean’—in other words it can
give it more space to deal with maritime disputes with its southern
neighbors.”85 In the context of a strategic triangle in the Arctic, China
benefits from a Russian security focus on the US and NATO.
Deepening Chinese and Russian military cooperation may be in re-
sponse to increasing tension with the United States. While China does
not yet have a military presence in the Arctic, it appears to be pursuing
both icebreaker and Arctic submarine capabilities. China’s interest in ac-

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 Three-­Way Power Dynamics in the Arctic

cessing and protecting strategic Arctic SLOCs, which provide it access to

strategic resources and an alternative to Malacca, makes sense in a Russia
partnership context. In seeking to secure its Arctic resources and territory,
Russia may welcome Chinese arms purchases and the counterbalance a
Chinese partnership provides against the US. However, a great deal of
tension is inherent in this developing partnership. As China becomes in-
creasingly Arctic-­capable, how will Beijing and Moscow manage their
relationship? How can the US best manage competition without provid-
ing more impetus for Chinese-­Russian alignment?

Conclusion
Many analysts point to 2014 as a turning point in Russia-­China rela-
tions overall and in Arctic cooperation more specifically.86 Frankly, many
observers identify a downturn in US/West–Russia relations—particularly
the sanctions—as pushing Russia toward China.87 Multiple scholars, in-
cluding Evan Medeiros and Michael Chase, have observed that “for
China, the Western sanctions on Russia . . . were a welcome buying op-
portunity.” China was happy to fill the market gap created by sanctions.88
Liu Fenghua of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences remarked in
2016 that “since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the US has once again
chosen to contain China and Russia simultaneously, thus greatly enhanc-
ing a China-­Russia strategic partnership.”89 While the sanctions are an
important element of the broader US-­Russia relationship, their effect on
Sino-­Russian cooperation in the Arctic may be an unintended outcome.
While US discourse frequently lumps China and Russia together, it
generally does not follow through to consider the implications or effects
of this pairing. There is not yet clear evidence that US strategists are taking
seriously the prospect of cooperation between China and Russia in the
Arctic region. By symbolically grouping China and Russia together as
competitors, the US may inadvertently provide impetus for more substan-
tive Sino-­Russian cooperation. Given Russia’s influence and dominant
geographic position in the Arctic region, this consequence may be costly.
This article has argued for the importance of the Arctic to China at a
grand strategic level, including economic, political, and military elements.
Russia’s dominant position in the Arctic region and avowed interest in
challenging American global leadership make Russia a natural partner of
interest for China. Sino-­Russian cooperation in the Arctic serves the
short-­term interests of both states as well as longer-­term Chinese goals.
However, Russia does not want to be a junior partner to China. Moreover,
Russia’s strategic military position in the Arctic region would be chal-

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 Rebecca Pincus

lenged by a Chinese military presence there, and therefore significant

questions remain about the long-­term viability of Sino-­Russian partner-
ship as China moves further toward its goal of fielding a multi-­theater
modern military force.
The central position of Russia in the Arctic lays bare the discontinuities
in US strategy: at least in the Arctic, it is problematic to treat China and
Russia as separate strategic rivals. Their emerging partnership in the re-
gion is fitful and laced with fissures, but current US policies of applying
pressure drive them closer together—as the aftereffects of the sanctions
regime demonstrate. In the context of a strategic triangle in the Arctic, US
strategy toward either China or Russia must be considered in tandem.
Actions taken toward one will invariably affect the other given the close
linkages in the region.
In July 2019, the first-­ever China-­Russia joint air patrol made headlines
around the world when one of the Russian A-50s violated South Korean
airspace over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands.90 As one commentator con-
cluded, “the Russo-­Chinese ‘strategic partnership’ is now a force to be
reckoned with. . . . Seoul and Tokyo should no longer see the US as the
sole military hegemon in the region.”91 The bold actions taken in concert
by Russia and China may reflect growing confidence in their strategic
partnership. Under pressure from the US, both China and Russia may
determine that continuing to work together may be advantageous. The
Arctic is a natural place for this cooperation to grow.
The future contours of Arctic development and governance are elastic.
While the extent to which China and Russia will be able to meaningfully
cooperate to shape the region is unclear, the US has begun to actively
grapple with the concept of great power competition with both. However,
it appears that US strategy has not yet fully engaged the ramifications of
growing Sino-­Russian cooperation across economic, military, and political
dimensions in the Arctic region. Without a linked strategic approach, the
US runs the risk of strategic misstep.

Rebecca Pincus
Dr. Pincus is an assistant professor in the Strategic and Operational Research Department at the US Na-
val War College and focuses on Arctic security and politics. The views and opinions presented here are
her own and do not represent the official position of the Naval War College, United States Navy, or DOD.
This article refines ideas first presented in her testimony before the US-­China Economic and Security
Review Commission on 21 March 2019 (see report at https://www.uscc.gov/). Dr. Pincus thanks the
China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College for helpful suggestions and feedback.

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 Three-­Way Power Dynamics in the Arctic

Notes
1.  Rob Huebert, “The New Arctic Strategic Triangle Environment (NASTE),” in
Breaking the Ice Curtain: Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar
World, eds. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Suzanne Lalonde (Calgary: Canadian Global
Affairs Institute, 2019), 76, https://www.academia.edu/.
2.  President Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America
(Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 2, https://www.whitehouse.gov/.
3.  Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United
States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, 2018), 2, https://dod.defense.gov/.
4.  Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 2.
5.  A December 2018 DOD report focused on China, although it listed expanding
military cooperation between China and Russia and noted that the Belt and Road Ini-
tiative includes the Arctic Ocean. Department of Defense, Assessment on U.S. Defense
Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access (Washington, DC: Department of De-
fense, December 2018), 12, https://media.defense.gov/.
6. Trump, National Security Strategy, 45.
7.  Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, “Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Fo-
cus” (speech, Rovaniemi, Finland, 6 May 2019), https://www.state.gov/.
8.  Adm James Foggo III, “Russia, China Offer Challenges in the Arctic,” Defense
One, 10 July 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/.
9.  State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Na-
tional Defense in the New Era, Defense White Paper (Beijing: State Council Information
Office, People’s Republic of China, July 2019), full text posted by Andrew S. Erickson on
his website, http://www.andrewerickson.com/.
10. Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record:
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, 29 January 2019), 24, https://www.odni.gov.
11.  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Report to Congress: Depart-
ment of Defense Arctic Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2019), 6,
https://media.defense.gov/.
12.  United States Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook: The United States Coast Guard’s
Vision for the Arctic Region (Washington, DC: US Coast Guard, April 2019), https://
www.uscg.mil/.
13.  Anthony H. Cordesman, with Max Molot, “China and the U.S.: Cooperation,
Competition and/or Conflict: An Experimental Assessment,” working draft (Wash-
ington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1 October 2019), https://
www.csis.org/.
14.  The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s
Military Strategy 2015, white paper (Beijing: State Council Information Office of the
People’s Republic of China, 2015), Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, 4–6, https://
jamestown.org/.
15.  He quotes Xi, “China’s success proves that socialism can prevail and be a path for
other developing countries to emulate and achieve modernization.” Andrew S. Erickson,
“China,” in Comparative Grand Strategy: A Framework and Cases, eds. Thierry Balzacq,

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 Rebecca Pincus

Peter Dombrowski, and Simon Reich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 86,
http://www.andrewerickson.com/.
16.  State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Na-
tional Defense in the New Era, 8.
17.  Erickson, “China,” 83–84.
18.  Ashley J. Tellis, “Pursuing Global Reach: China’s Not So Long March toward
Preeminence,” in Strategic Asia 2019: China’s Expanding Strategic Ambitions, eds. Ashley
J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of
Asian Research, 2019), 34.
19.  Elizabeth Wishnick, China’s Interests and Goals in the Arctic: Implications for the
United States, The Letort Papers (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War
College, 2017), 37.
20.  Yun Sun, The Northern Sea Route: The Myth of Sino-­Russian Cooperation (Wash-
ington, DC: Stimson Center, East Asia Program, 5 December 2018), 2–3, https://
www.stimson.org/.
21.  Sun, 7.
22.  Olga Alexeevna and Frederic Lasserre, “An Analysis on Sino-­Russian Cooperation
in the Arctic in the BRI Era, Advances in Polar Science 29, no. 4 (30 December 2018): 276.
23.  Atle Staalesen, “Chinese Money for Northern Sea Route,” The Barents Observer,
12 June 2018, https://thebarentsobserver.com/.
24.  For more on Rajin/Rason, see Salvatore Babones, “If North Korea Opens Up, Rason
Could Become North Korea’s Shenzhen.” Forbes, 2 May 2018. https://www.forbes.com/.
25.  For more on Zarabino, see Michael Lipin, “China’s Landlocked Northeast Turns
to Russian Port as Trade Outlet,” Voice of America (VOA) News, 28 September 2014,
https://www.voanews.com/.
26.  Yun Sun, The Northern Sea Route: The Myth of Sino-­Russian Cooperation (Washington,
DC: Stimson Center, East Asia Program, 5 December 2018), https://www.stimson.org/.
27. Aleksander Vorotnikov, “Чем выгодно России сотрудничество с Китаем по
Арктике? [How does Russia benefit from cooperation with China in the Arctic?”], Re-
gions, 9 July 2018. Thanks to Dr. Lyle Goldstein for highlighting this article. Quotation
originally appeared in testimony from Dr. Rebecca Pincus in An Emerging China-­Russia
Axis? Implications for the United States in an Era of Strategic Competition: Hearing before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 116th Cong., 1st sess., 21 March
2019, 197, https://www.uscc.gov/.
28.  Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “How Europe and Russia Are Fighting U.S. Sanctions,” The
National Interest, 6 October 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/.
29.  “Alexey Miller: Russia and China Signed the Biggest Contract in the History of
Gazprom,” Gazprom, press release, 21 May 2014, http://www.gazprom.com/. The Rus-
sian company Gasprom also noted that “USD $55 billion will be invested in construction
of production and transmission facilities in Russia” (ibid.).
30.  In addition, metals made up another 10.4 percent of exports; overall, raw materi-
als (including energy products, metals, wood products, precious metals and stones, and
other minerals) comprised well over three-­fourths of Russia’s exports. World Bank
Group, Preserving Stability; Doubling Growth; Halving Poverty—How?, Russia Eco-
nomic Report No. 40 (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, November 2018), 20.
31.  Alexeevna and Lasserre, “An Analysis on Sino-­Russian Cooperation,” 274.
32.  Alexeevna and Lasserre, 276.

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 Three-­Way Power Dynamics in the Arctic

33.  Alexeevna and Lasserre, 271.

34.  Chen Yu, “On ‘Pivot to East’ in Russian Diplomacy,” Contemporary International
Relations 26, no. 6 (2016): 22.
35.  Mark E. Rosen and Cara B. Thuringer, Unconstrained Foreign Direct Investment:
An Emerging Challenge to Arctic Security (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, No-
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36.  Alexeevna and Lasserre, “An Analysis on Sino-­Russian Cooperation,” 277.
37.  Leonid Bershidsky, “Russia’s Growth Expectations Fall Back to Earth,” Bloom-
berg, 13 February 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/.
38.  Atle Staalesen, “Under the Surface of Russia’s Arctic Super-­Region Is a Looming
Disaster,” The Barents Observer, 17 January 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/.
39.  Atle Staalesen, “Frenchmen Sign Landmark Deal with Novatek, Boost Presence
in Russian Arctic,” The Barents Observer, 5 March 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/.
40.  Stanislav Pritchin, “Russia’s Untapped Arctic Potential,” Chatham House, 29
January 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/.
41.  Rosen and Thuringer, Unconstrained Foreign Direct Investment, 20.
42.  OECD, Crude oil production (indicator), accessed 7 March 2019, https://doi
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43. Apurva Sanghi et al., Russia Economic Report: Preserving Stability; Doubling
Growth; Halving Poverty—How?, Russia Economic Report no. 40 (Washington, DC:
World Bank Group, November 2018), 17, http://documents.worldbank.org/.
44.  Jason Corcoran, “Russia Seeks to Revive Offshore Arctic Ambitions,” Petroleum
Economist, 6 March 2018, https://www.petroleum-­economist.com/.
45.  The Chinese rig was brought to Russia by the Chinese heavy-lift vessel Hai Yang Shi
You 278. Atle Staalesen, “Chinese Oilmen Ready to Go Home after 5 Months in Russian
Arctic,” The Barents Observer, 22 November 2018, https://thebarentsobserver.com/.
46.  Atle Staalesen, “New Condensate Tanker Sails North, Gets Ready to Break Ice
on Northern Sea Route,” The Barents Observer, 6 December 2018. https://thebarents
observer.com/.
47.  Atle Staalesen, “Two New-­Built Tankers Are Crossing the Arctic in Midwinter,”
The Barents Observer, 11 January 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/.
48.  Jiayu Bai and Alexandr Voronenko, “Lessons and Prospects of Sino-­Russian Arc-
tic Cooperation, Advances in Polar Science 27, no. 3 (September 2016): 188, http://www
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49.  Rosen and Thuringer, Unconstrained Foreign Direct Investment, 25.
50.  See NOAA Fisheries, “U.S. Signs Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Commer-
cial Fishing on the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean,” 3 October 2018, https://
www.fisheries.noaa.gov/.
51.  Nengye Liu, “How Has China Shaped Arctic Fisheries Governance?,” The Diplo-
mat, 20 June 2018, https://thediplomat.com/.
52. According to a study by the European Commission’s Joint Research Center,
China is the world’s largest consumer of seafood on a total basis, at 65 million tons an-
nually, although it is ranked only seventh in per capita seafood consumption. European
Commission, “How Much Fish Do We Consume? First Global Seafood Consumption
Footprint Published,” EU Science Hub, 27 September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/
53.  Bai and Voronenko, “Lessons and Prospects,” 185–91.

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 Rebecca Pincus

54.  Nong Hong, China’s Interests in the Arctic: Opportunities and Challenges; Examin-
ing the Implications of China’s Arctic Policy White Paper (Washington, DC: Institute for
China-­America Studies, March 2018), 17–18, https://chinaus-­icas.org/.
55.  Marc Lanteigne, “Northern Crossroads: Sino-­Russian Cooperation in the Arc-
tic,” National Bureau of Asian Research, 27 March 2018, https://www.nbr.org/.
56. Wishnick, China’s Interests and Goals in the Arctic, 33.
57. Hong, China’s Interests in the Arctic.
58.  The Norwegian Nobel Committee, “The Nobel Peace Prize for 2010,” 8 October
2010, https://www.nobelprize.org/. For example, see Mark Lewis, “Norway’s Salmon
Rot as China Takes Revenge for Dissident’s Nobel Prize,” Independent, 6 October 2011,
https://www.independent.co.uk/.
59.  For additional coverage, see Sewell Chan, “Norway and China Restore Ties, 6
Years after Nobel Prize Dispute,” The New York Times, 19 December 2016, https://www
.nytimes.com/.
60.  Government of Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Full Normalisation of Rela-
tions with China,” press release, 19 December 2016, with link to joint statement: Statement
of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the King-
dom of Norway on Normalization of Bilateral Relations, https://www.regjeringen.no/.
61.  Stepan Kravchenko, “Putin Says Russia Is Helping China Build Missile Warning
System,” Bloomberg, 3 October 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/.
62.  Vasily Kashin, “Russia and China Take Military Partnership to New Level,” Mos-
cow Times, 23 October 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/.
63.  Elizabeth Wishnick, China’s Interests and Goals in the Arctic, 29.
64.  Wishnick, 32.
65.  Department of Defense, Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access, 8.
66.  Stephen Blank, “The Arctic and Asia in Russian Naval Strategy,” The Korean Jour-
nal of Defense Analysis 29, no. 4 (2017): 575–97.
67.  Joseph Trevithick, “The Scope, Not the Scale, of Russian and Chinese Naval Ops
in the Atlantic Is Worrisome,” The Drive, 10 August 2018, http://www.thedrive.com/.
68.  Department of Defense, Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access, 15.
69.  For more on Sino-­Russian security cooperation, see Lyle J. Goldstein, “A China-­
Russia Alliance?,” The National Interest, 25 April 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/; Lyle
J. Goldstein, “The Real Russia-­China Connection That Should Worry America,” The Na-
tional Interest, 22 January 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/; and Lyle J. Goldstein, “Does
China Need Allies?,” The National Interest, 31 March 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/.
70.  Ye Liyu et al., “Peridynamic Model for Submarine Surfacing through Ice,” Chinese
Journal of Ship Research 13, no. 2 (April 2018). Thanks to Lyle Goldstein for bringing this
paper to light.
71.  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018 (Arlington, VA: Department of
Defense, 16 August 2018), 28–29, https://media.defense.gov/.
72.  Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the
21st Century (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015), 9, https://fas.org/.
73.  Ryan D. Martinson and Peter A. Dutton, China Maritime Report No. 3: China’s
Distant-­Ocean Survey Activities: Implications for U.S. National Security, CMSI China
Maritime Reports (Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, US Naval War Col-
lege, November 2018), 3, https://digital-­commons.usnwc.edu/.

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 Three-­Way Power Dynamics in the Arctic

74.  To that end, in 2019 China plans to grow its defense spending by 7.5 percent;
SIPRI estimates that Beijing devotes roughly 2 percent of GDP to military spending.
After the US, China is now the second-­largest military spender in the world. David
Tweed, “China Defense Spending Set to Rise 7.5% as Xi Builds Up Military,” Bloom-
berg, 4 March 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/.
75.  Kyle Mizokami, “China Is Planning a Nuclear-­Powered Icebreaker,” Popular Me-
chanics, 25 June 2018, https://www.popularmechanics.com/.
76. Trym Aleksander Eiterjord, “Checking in on China’s Nuclear Icebreaker,” The
Diplomat, 5 September 2019, https://thediplomat.com.
77. Richard Weitz, Parsing Chinese-­Russian Military Exercises, the Letort Papers
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, April 2015),
2, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/.
78.  Nazrin Mehdiyeva, Russia’s Arctic Papers: The Evolution of Strategic Thinking on the
High North, Russian Studies Series 4/18 (Rome: NATO Defense College, 19 November
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79.  For a full analysis, see Mathieu Boulègue, Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic:
Managing Hard Power in a ‘Low Tension’ Environment (London: Chatham House [the
Royal Institute of International Affairs], June 2019), https://www.chathamhouse.org/.
80.  For example, see Thomas Nilsen, “Take a Look Inside Russia’s Northernmost Arc-
tic Military Base,” The Barents Observer, 18 April 2017, https://thebarentsobserver.com/.
81.  Atle Staalesen, “Russia Giving Major Upgrade to Airstrip in High Arctic,” Eye on
the Arctic, 27 September 2018, http://www.rcinet.ca/.
82.  See Mehdiyeva, Russia’s Arctic Papers.
83.  Mary Ilyushina and Frederik Pleitgen, “Inside the Military Base at the Heart of
Putin’s Arctic Ambitions,” CNN, 5 April 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/.
84. Mehdiyeva, Russia’s Arctic Papers.
85.  Wang Sheng and Luo Xiao, “Building a New Type of Sino-­Russian Relation-
ship,” Contemporary International Relations 23, no. 5 (2013): 91.
86. For example, see Alexeevna and Lasserre, “An Analysis on Sino-­ Russian
Cooperation.”
87.  See Alexeevna and Lasserre.
88.  Michael S. Chase et al., Russia-­China Relations: Assessing Common Ground and
Strategic Fault Lines, Special Report #66 (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian
Research, 2017), 9, https://www.nbr.org/.
89.  Liu Fenghua, “China-­Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Formation,
Features, and Prospects,” China International Studies, July/August 2016. 67.
90.  BBC News, “Russia and South Korea Spar over Airspace ‘Intrusion,’ ” July 2019,
https://www.bbc.com/.
91.  Artyom Lukin (@ArtyonLukin), Twitter, 23 July 2019, https://twitter.com/, in re-
sponse to Ben Westcott, Brad Lendon, and Yoojung Seo, “Warplanes from Four Countries
Face Off in Asian Confrontation,” CNN World, 23 July 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/.

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