G.R. No.

170180               November 23, 2007

ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only ancient. It is also
zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.1 Any evidence
obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed,
while the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of the citizens, for
the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government. (DOCTRINE)

On appeal is the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July 2005, affirming the Judgment 4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La Union dated 31 March 2004 finding petitioner Arsenio
Vergara Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A.
No. 9165)5 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum and ordering him to pay a fine of ₱350,000.00.6

I.

On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2(2) of R.A. No. 9165 in an
Information7 which reads:

That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of La Union,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody dried marijuana
leaves wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper page, weighing more or less twenty-five (25) grams,
without first securing the necessary permit, license or prescription from the proper government agency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the
prosecution presenting the three (3) barangay  tanods of San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union namely,
Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor Aratas (Aratas) and Eduardo Ordoño (Ordoño), who arrested
petitioner.

_________________________TESTIMONIES OF THE 3 WITNESSES

_______________________________
Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was conducting the routine
patrol along the National Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union together with Aratas
and Ordoño when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods  observed
that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something. They thus
approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They chased him, put him under
arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where
he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioner’s bag allegedly
contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in
newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the police station for further
investigation.9

Aratas and Ordoño corroborated Bautista’s testimony on most material points. On cross-examination,
however, Aratas admitted that he himself brought out the contents of petitioner’s bag before
petitioner was taken to the house of Mercado.10 Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercado’s house, it
was petitioner himself who brought out the contents of his bag upon orders from Mercado. For his
part, Ordoño testified that it was he who was ordered by Mercado to open petitioner’s bag and that it
was then that they saw the purported contents thereof.11

The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II (Laya), the forensic chemist who
conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from petitioner. Laya maintained that
the specimen submitted to him for analysis, a sachet of the substance weighing 23.10 grams and
contained in a plastic bag, tested positive of marijuana. He disclosed on cross-examination, however,
that he had knowledge neither of how the marijuana was taken from petitioner nor of how the said
substance reached the police officers. Moreover, he could not identify whose marking was on the
inside of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves. 12

The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defense’s sole witness, he testified that at around 8:30
p.m. on 17 March 2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in Curro-oy, Santol, La Union. After
alighting from the bus, petitioner claimed that he went to the house of a friend to drink water and then
proceeded to walk to his brother’s house. As he was walking, prosecution witness Ordoño, a cousin of
his brother’s wife, allegedly approached him and asked where he was going. Petitioner replied that he
was going to his brother’s house. Ordoño then purportedly requested to see the contents of his bag
and appellant acceded. It was at this point that Bautista and Aratas joined them. After inspecting all
the contents of his bag, petitioner testified that he was restrained by the  tanod and taken to the house
of Mercado. It was Aratas who carried the bag until they reached their destination. 13

Petitioner maintained that at Mercado’s house, his bag was opened by the tanod and Mercado
himself. They took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to be marijuana leaves.
Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He claimed to have been threatened with imprisonment by his
arrestors if he did not give the prohibited drugs to someone from the east in order for them to
apprehend such person. As petitioner declined, he was brought to the police station and charged with
the instant offense. Although petitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took out the contents
of his bag at his friend’s house, he averred that it was one of the tanod who did so at Mercado’s house
and that it was only there that they saw the marijuana for the first time. 14

e. replied that he was going to his brother'en proceeded to walk to his brother'w
Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered
judgment against him and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate imprisonment ranging from eight (8)
years and one (1) day of  prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal
medium as maximum and ordered him to pay a fine of ₱350,000.00. 15

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals.1âwphi1 On 28 July
2005, the appellate court affirmed the challenged decision. The Court of Appeals, finding no cogent
reason to overturn the presumption of regularity in favor of the barangay tanod in the absence of
evidence of ill-motive on their part, agreed with the trial court that there was probable cause to arrest
petitioner. It observed further:

That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana is of no moment.
Such circumstance finds prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited drugs is denied. In
this case, accused-appellant himself testified that the marijuana wrapped in a newspaper was taken
from his bag. The corpus delicti of the crime, i.e.[,] the existence of the marijuana and his possession
thereof, was amply proven by accused-appellant Valdez’s own testimony.16

In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the crime charged had not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the first time on appeal, that the
warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay   tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless
search of his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law. Consequently, he maintains, the
marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit of a
poisonous tree.

Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are accorded great respect and weight, in the absence of any clear showing that some facts
and circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case have been
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied.17

After meticulous examination of the records and evidence on hand, however, the Court finds and so
holds that a reversal of the decision a quo under review is in order.

II.

At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any objection by petitioner to the
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial
of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of
the court over his person.18 Petitioner’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of
his acquittal.

However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain
whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it
was without a warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest. 19 Evaluating the
evidence on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of
petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well.
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by the tanod and asked to show the
contents of his bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken to the house of the
barangay captain. On their way there, it was Aratas who carried his bag. He denies ownership over the
contraband allegedly found in his bag and asserts that he saw it for the first time at the barangay
captain’s house.

Even casting aside petitioner’s version and basing the resolution of this case on the general thrust of
the prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioner’s arrest stands out just the same.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions on which a person
may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

xxx

It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of these
circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was
not committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then
committing an offense.20 The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify petitioner’s warrantless
arrest.

For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must
be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.21 Here, petitioner’s act of looking around
after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his destination. That he
purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be
construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged
in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly,
petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the barangay  tanod  when they
approached him.

Even taking the prosecution’s version generally as the truth, in line with our assumption from the start,
the conclusion will not be any different. It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the
street at night, after being closely observed and then later tailed by three unknown persons, would
attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be
attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt.22 Of persuasion was the Michigan Supreme Court when it
ruled in People v. Shabaz23 that "[f]light alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other
circumstances because flight alone is inherently ambiguous." Alone, and under the circumstances of this
case, petitioner’s flight lends itself just as easily to an innocent explanation as it does to a nefarious one.

Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud,24 "[t]he phrase ‘in his presence’ therein, connot[es]
penal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be secure against any
unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most
basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of
arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond the cases specifically provided by
law."25

Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed
as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless arrest.26 If at all, the
search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-
and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring based on petitioner’s behavior. However, a
stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio,27 must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the
person’s outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officer’s
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.28

Accordingly, petitioner’s waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana
leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were
seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful.29 As we pronounced in People v. Bacla-an —

A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches and seizures are deemed permissible
by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver
or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful
arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless
arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2)
arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.30

When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto committing
a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that
the warrantless search conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest.

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that apart from the warrantless search being
incidental to his lawful arrest, petitioner had consented to the search. We are not convinced. As we
explained in Caballes v. Court of Appeals31 —

Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in
fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant
to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment
in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded
location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence
of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no
incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in
which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.32

In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution— albeit based on conflicting testimonies on
when petitioner’s bag was actually opened, it is apparent that petitioner was already under the coercive
control of the public officials who had custody of him when the search of his bag was demanded.
Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove any specific statement as to how the consent was asked and
how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." Even
granting that petitioner admitted to opening his bag when Ordoño asked to see its contents, his implied
acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or
intimidating circumstances and hence, is considered no consent at all within the contemplation of the
constitutional guarantee.33 As a result, petitioner’s lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search
and seizure.34

III.

Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for being the fruit of an unlawful
search is not the lone cause that militates against the case of the prosecution. We likewise find that it
has failed to convincingly establish the identity of the marijuana leaves purportedly taken from
petitioner’s bag.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following elements must concur: (1)
proof that the transaction took place; and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit
drug as evidence.35 The existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crime.36

In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecution’s case its failure to prove that the specimen
submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from the accused.37 There
can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the
item confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug.38 As we
discussed in People v. Orteza39 , where we deemed the prosecution to have failed in establishing all the
elements necessary for conviction of appellant for illegal sale of shabu –

First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police officers complied with the proper
procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team
having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or
confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if
there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with the requirement raises doubt whether
what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually recovered from
appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police
officers.

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after
the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure in
anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court
concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.

The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to place
markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the procedure
and take custody of the drug.

More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard to
when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs
created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused
due to the prosecution’s failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.

In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the barangay tanod, the records only show that he
was taken to the house of the barangay captain and thereafter to the police station. The Joint
Affidavit40 executed by the tanod merely states that they confiscated the marijuana leaves which they
brought to the police station together with petitioner. Likewise, the Receipt41 issued by the Aringay
Police Station merely acknowledged receipt of the suspected drugs supposedly confiscated from
petitioner.

Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the matter of when petitioner’s bag was
opened, they also gave conflicting testimony on who actually opened the same. The prosecution,
despite these material inconsistencies, neglected to explain the discrepancies. Even more damning to its
cause was the admission by Laya, the forensic chemist, that he did not know how the specimen was
taken from petitioner, how it reached the police authorities or whose marking was on the cellophane
wrapping of the marijuana. The non-presentation, without justifiable reason, of the police officers
who conducted the inquest proceedings and marked the seized drugs, if such was the case, is fatal to
the case. Plainly, the prosecution neglected to establish the crucial link in the chain of custody of the
seized marijuana leaves from the time they were first allegedly discovered until they were brought for
examination by Laya.

The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody
over the seized marijuana as such "[f]inds prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited
drug is denied."42 We cannot agree.

To buttress its ratiocination, the appellate court narrowed on petitioner’s testimony that the marijuana
was taken from his bag, without taking the statement in full context.43 Contrary to the Court of Appeals’
findings, although petitioner testified that the marijuana was taken from his bag, he consistently denied
ownership thereof.44 Furthermore, it defies logic to require a denial of ownership of the seized drugs
before the principle of chain of custody comes into play.
The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State. In conjunction with this, law
enforcers and public officers alike have the corollary duty to preserve the chain of custody over the
seized drugs. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and
recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence.
Each person who takes possession of the specimen is duty-bound to detail how it was cared for,
safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control to prevent alteration or replacement while in
custody. This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes to the very
heart of his fundamental rights.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty invoked by the prosecution and relied
upon by the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.45 Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most
primordial yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This elementary principle accords
every accused the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the prosecution.

Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this "[c]annot be
used to advance the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense." 46 Moreover, where the
circumstances are shown to yield two or more inferences, one inconsistent with the presumption of
innocence and the other compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused for the
reason that the evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is inadequate to support a
judgment of conviction.47

Drug addiction has been invariably denounced as "an especially vicious crime," 48 and "one of the most
pernicious evils that has ever crept into our society," 49 for those who become addicted to it "not only
slide into the ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of law-
abiding members of society,"50 whereas "peddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction."51 Indeed,
the havoc created by the ruinous effects of prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of society cannot be
underscored enough. However, in the rightfully vigorous campaign of the government to eradicate the
hazards of drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted to run roughshod over an accused’s
right to be presumed innocent until proven to the contrary and neither can it shirk from its corollary
obligation to establish such guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the presumption of
innocence which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the
offense beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result in petitioner’s exoneration from criminal
liability.

IV.

A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind the courts to exercise the highest degree
of diligence and prudence in deliberating upon the guilt of accused persons brought before them,
especially in light of the fundamental rights at stake. Here, we note that the courts a quo neglected to
give more serious consideration to certain material issues in the determination of the merits of the case.
We are not oblivious to the fact that in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting
evidence to extract information or even harass civilians. Accordingly, courts are duty-bound to be
"[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses."52 In the same vein, let this serve as an admonition to police officers and
public officials alike to perform their mandated duties with commitment to the highest degree of
diligence, righteousness and respect for the law.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez is
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the
immediate release of petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform
the Court of

the date of his release, or the reasons for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.