The foregoing opinion of Maura is applicable to the case under consideration because in both cases

there was an acquittal in the criminal prosecution. It is to be specially noted that in the Spanish case
on which Maura gave his "dictamen", the criminal prosecution was for simple negligence only, so
that the acquittal established that there had not been even simple negligence under the penal code.
In the instant case, where the criminal action was for reckless negligence, there is greater reason to
hold that the dismissal in this case does not bar a civil action for culpa-aquiliana.

It should also be specially noted that in the case treated of in the foregoing "dictamen" of Maura, the
employer, Ferrocarril del Norte, had been made a party in the criminal action because of its
subsidiary civil liability, and that said railroad company had been absolved in the criminal
proceeding, together with its employee. In the present case, the Acro Taxi Cab Co. Inc. was not
made a party in the criminal action and was not exonerated; so with greater reason it could be made
liable in an action based on culpa aquiliana.

Attention is likewise invited to Maura's interpretation of Art. 116 of the Spanish Code of Criminal
Procedure, as to when a subsequent civil action is barred. He says in effect the meaning of said
provision is that no civil action can be brought later if the court's decision in the criminal case
declared that the event complained of did not take place at all, as when the supposed wounded man
suffered no wounds whatsoever, or when the alleged victim of homicide is alive, or when the
supposed stolen article was always in the possession of the owner. It seems that the purpose of Art.
116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is reproduce in sec. 1, par. (d) of Rule 107 of the Rules
of Court is to avoid a conflict between such declaration in the criminal case and a judgment for
plaintiff in a subsequent civil case. On the other hand, there can be no conflict where there is no
such declaration. Thus, in the instant case, the definite dismissal of the information on action of the
fiscal, after arraignment, for insufficiency of evidence — there being no declaration of the Court that
Agapito Sudario had not been run over at all — does not perforce signify that in a later action
on culpa aquiliana, a finding of negligence based on Arts. 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code, after
both parties have presented all their respective proofs, would be incompatible with the aforesaid
dismissal of the criminal prosecution. For the sake of clarity, the two provisions under examination
will now be quoted:

Art 116, Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure:

La extincion de la accion penal no lleva consigo la de lo civil, a no ser que la extincion

En los demas casos, la persona a quien corresponda la accion civil podra ejercitarlo, ante la
jurisdiccion y por la via civil que procede, contra quien estuviere obligado a la restitucion del
a cosa, reparacion del dano o indeminzacion del perjuicio sufrido. (Emphasis supplied.)

Rules 107, sec. 1 (d) of the Rules of Court reads:

Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise
did not exist. In the other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the
jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for
restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered;

It should be observed that the latter part of these two provisions is broad enough to include and
warrant a subsequent civil action on culpa aquiliana.
We shall now examine the case relied upon by the trial court.

The case of Wise and Co. vs. Larion, 45 Phil. 514, refers to an acquittal in a criminal case for estafa,
which, being a malicious act, can not, after acquittal, come under Article 1902 of the Civil Code.

Almeida vs. Abarca, 8 Phil. 178 was different because the civil liability therein claimed was predicted
on the crime of arson, and not on culpa aquiliana. In the following passage this court impliedly
recognized that if the civil action had been based on the theory of quasi-delito, the complaint might
have been meritorious:

It has not been alleged or shown by the plaintiffs, as a cause of action instituted civilly
against the defendant, that the aforesaid fire was caused through any fault or negligence on
the part of the defendant, nor is there shown any motive or cause distinct from that act, the
object of the case already terminated, in accordance with the provisions of articles 1893,
1902, and 1903 of the Civil Code; . . . .

And when the case was appealed to the Federal Supreme Court, that tribunal said:

First, by the positive legislation of the Philippine Codes, civil and criminal, a distinction is
drawn between a civil liability which results from the mere negligence of the defendant and a
liability for the civil consequence of a crime by which another has sustained loss or injury.

The case of Francisco vs. Onrubia, (46 Phil. 327), is also founded on the civil liability under the
Penal Code. Hence it is likewise different from the case under review.

The case of Gonzales vs. Judge of First Instance of Bulacan et al., G.R. No. 48233 concerned the
right of the offended party to exact civil responsibility as the result of a penal offense. There was no
question of culpa aquiliana.

Finally, we must reiterate our belief expressed in Barredo vs. Garcia et al., (73 Phil., 607), that the
remedy for culpa aquiliana should be given its due importance in the Philippines for the better
protection of private rights. The legal profession in this country has by habit relied mostly on the civil
liability resulting from a crime and has almost entirely forgotten the remedy for culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. In consequence, many civil
wrongs have been entirely without indemnity or have been inadequately redressed, for it is harder to
secure conviction in a criminal case for reckless negligence because the guilt of the accused must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt, whereas culpa aquiliana can be shown by a mere
preponderance of evidence in a civil case under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. It is also
known that there has grown up a practice of the trial courts of uniformity awarding only P1,000.00 (at
present P2,000.00) for the death of a person brought about by the negligence of the defendant in a
criminal case. For failure of the party concerned to appeal from this often inadequate amount of
damages, the appellate courts have had an opportunity to review this question. If the remedy
for culpa aquiliana were availed of more frequently, justice would be more likely to be achieved by
the victims or their heirs.

The serious inadequacy of the remedy of civil liability derived from a crime springs from the inherent
absurdity and injustice of the plan of the Penal Code, which makes civil indemnity depend upon the
result of the criminal action. In the realm of principles, the idea is wrong, for there are fundamental
differences between the criminal prosecution and the civil action arising from a crime. Among these
differences are: (1) the former is for public vindication because of the disturbance of the social order,
while the latter is for the defense of a private right or interest; (2) the plaintiff in the former is the
State while in the latter an individual person: (3) in the former, the plaintiff is at a disadvantage
because, among other reason, the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt,
penal laws are strictly construed, and the accused enjoys certain special rights, while in the latter,
plaintiff and defendant stand on equal footing. So the civil liability resulting from a criminal offense is
but a mirage and can not quench the plaintiff's thirst for justice and relief. But the wonder of it al is
why the legal profession has cherished the futility of such remedy and ignored the effectiveness of
an action on culpa aquiliana, which has its own important place in the scheme of our legal system.
The trouble does not lie in our laws but in the failure of our lawyers and judges to apply them
properly.

The mission of the courts is not merely passive, by limiting themselves to the precise issues of law
presented to them. They must see to it that the legal system of the country is understood as a
unified, integral whole, with the relations of the various parts clearly envisaged by the legal
profession. It is thus a significant function and duty of the courts to enhance the sound development
of jurisprudence. One of the means for the purpose is to restore into full efficacy those juridical
institutions whose force has been overlooked. Therefore, we must voice our opinion that would make
for a stronger safeguard of private rights if remedies for private wrongs were sought in a civil action,
absolutely without any connection with any criminal proceedings. The civil liability arising from a
crime depends upon the result of the criminal case, which is under the control of the public
prosecutor whose main concern is the penalty prescribed for the offense, the civil indemnity being
incidental so far as he is concerned. In fact, certain practices in criminal cases have developed
which reduce the civil aspect to a mere routine. On the other hand, if damages caused by culpa or
negligence are sought under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code, the civil action is separate and
independent; the plaintiff alone controls the pleadings and the presentation of proofs; there will be
more opportunity to show the real amount of damages; and judgment may be secured by a simple
preponderance of evidence.

Consequently, we contemplate with grave concern the relegation of the remedy for culpa
aquiliana, a weapon which in the Philippines has for generations been rusting in the armory of the
law, while the many victims of personal injuries and the heirs of numerous persons who have died as
a result of other's negligence had to suffer from the almost complete uselessness of another
weapon: the civil liability arising from a crime. It is thus that in countless cases of extra contractual
negligence, there has been a failure, through the oversight of the legal profession, to render every
one his due — cum quious tribuere — which is the very marrow of justice. In the interest of right and
for the wholesome growth of the Philippine legal system, it is hoped that the members of the bench
and bar will turn their attention more and more to the remedy for culpa aquiliana.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from should be and is hereby reversed, and the case shall be
remanded to the trial court which shall determine from the evidence whether or not defendants are
liable for culpa aquiliana under Arts. 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code, and render judgment
accordingly.

With costs against defendant-appellees. So ordered.

Moran, Horrilleno, and Paras, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

OZAETA, J., concurring and dissenting:

(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. In the other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may
institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may
be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered;

Under this rule the civil liability of the defendants arising from the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence was not extinguished by the dismissal of the criminal case without trial on the merits,
although such dismissal, having been made after the arraignment of the accused, extinguished the
penal action.

The pertinent allegations of plaintiffs' complaint in this case are as follows:

3 — Que a eso de las 6:30 de la manana del 5 de abril, 1939, un automovil Taxi No. 941 de
la propiedad de la corporacion demandada y entonces manejado por el demandado
Lamberto Yuson, uno de los chauffeurs de la misma, por la notoria negligencia de dicho
chofer, atropello, apabullo a Agapito Sudario, padre de los mencionados menores
demandantes, que entonces pasaba por la Calle Dominga, municipio de San Juan,
Provincia de Rizal, Islas Filipinas, estrellandolo contra un tronco de acacia, de cuyas
resultas dicho Agapito Sudario fallecio casi instantaneamente;

xxx     xxx     xxx

5 — Que como resultado de la muerte del mencionado Agapito Sudario, causada por la
grave imprudencia y negligencia de parte del demandado Lamberto Yuson, chofer de la
Corporacion demandada, dichos menores demandantes han quedado desamparados y
privados de su unico sosten en la vida, causandoles danos y perjuicios por la cantidad de
DIEZ MIL PESOS (P10,000).

These allegations comprehend an obligation ex delicto; and although the liability therefor of the Acro
Taxi Cab Co., Inc., is subsidiary, the joining of the said corporation in this same action against the
principal obligor is permissible.

I concur in the reversal of the judgment appealed from and in the remand of the case to the Court of
origin for decision on the merits.

Yulo, C.J., concurs.