Mathew Joseph v.

Johny Sunny
Mathew, who was under the employment of the respondents died on account of an attack made
against him when he was about to leave the premises wherein he was working as a salesman in
the arrack shop. His legal heirs filed a petition for Workmen's Compensation.
Issues:
 Whether Mathew was a workman as contemplated under Section 2(1)(n) of the
Workmen's Compensation Act 1923?
 Whether the homicidal attack made on Mathew can be termed as an 'accident' as
contemplated under Section 3 of the Act?
Mathew was a ‘workman’
Under the Act workman means any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual
nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purpose of the employer's trade or business)
who is employed in any such capacity, as is specified in Schedule II. The Schedule appended to
the Act states that a person employed for the purpose of making, altering, repairing,
ornamenting, finishing or otherwise adapting for use, transport or sale of any article or part of an
article in any premises where in or within the precincts where of twenty or more persons are so
employed. An explanation further clarifies that for the purposes of this clause persons employed
outside such premises or precincts but in any work incidental to, or connected with, the work
relating to making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing or otherwise adapting for use,
transport or sale of any article or part of an article shall be deemed to be employed within such
premises or precincts. 
It is submitted that Mathew was a salesman in the arrack shop of the respondents. Clause (iii) of
Schedule II makes clear that to be a workman a person must be employed for the purposes of
making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, and finishing. It also further says that if any article or
part of an article in any premises was otherwise adapted for use, transport or sale by the person
employed then such person becomes a workman. Once it is agreed that Mathew was a salesman
in the arrack shop it is clear that he was adapting for sale of an article, viz. the arrack in the said
shop. There can be no doubt in view of Clause (iii) of Schedule II that Mathew was a workman
as defined under Section 2(1) (n) of the Act.
 In Savlaram Vithoba v. Salubai Vithoba, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court took the
view that where the whole process of work on which or part of which the workman is employed
comes within the description of "adapting goods for transport or sale" the workman falls within
Schedule II Clause (iii), although it may not be shown that he himself actually took part in that
portion of the process which involves any physical work on or alteration of the article in
question. The workman concerned in the above said Bombay case was employed as a salesman
in a godown where the practice was for purchasers of cotton bales to go down to the godown in
order to take delivery of the bales and the purchaser was given a delivery order in respect of the
number of unascertained bales which he has purchased. 
The homicidal attack which was perpetrated upon Mathew on the fateful night can be termed as
an ‘accident’

Section 3 the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 runs as follows:

"If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions
of this Chapter:"
When there is a lack of design on the part of a person who suffered that injury then the act which
caused that injury on that person is certainly an accident. Here Mathew did not certainly have
any design to suffer a homicidal attack though it can be said that there was design on the part of
the attackers to cause injuries on Mathew.
In Varkeyachan v. Thomman the Court took the view that the term 'accident' for the purpose of
the law relating to compensation for personal injuries sustained by workmen and the employer's
liability in that behalf includes any injury which is not designed by the workman himself, and it
is of no consequence that the injury was designed and intended by the person inflicting the
same. 

G. Amsaveni v. Mrs. V. Komala 

The deceased was working as a watchman under the appellant-Amsaveni. While the deceased
was on watchman duty, in the appellant's brick's chamber, he was murdered.
Issues:
 Murder, whether tantamount to accident?
 If so, whether the accident (of murder) arose out of and in the course of employment?
Murder is an accident

Four conditions are to be fulfilled before a claimant is entitled to compensation, and the claimant
has to prove the existence of all four conditions. These conditions are as follows:-

(i) there must be personal injury to the workman;

(ii) personal injury must have been occasioned by an accident;

(iii) accident must have arisen out of and in course of employment; and

(iv) injury must have resulted either in the death of the workman, or his total or partial
disablement for a period exceeding three days.

The term 'accident' is neither defined under Employees Compensation Act nor under The
General Clauses Act. According to the Black's Law Dictionary, the term 'accident' means,
unforeseen untoward incident, which was not reasonably anticipated. The deceased workman
could not and did not reasonably could have anticipated that the unforeseen incident (murder)
would happen to him and therefore, it is an accident, as per the definition.

In the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Kanshi Ram, it was held that the murder
occurred to the driver of the truck, arose out of and in the course of employment, and that the
murder would tantamount to accident.

The accident (of murder) arose out of and in the course of employment

When the incident of murder had taken place, in the work place, then the presumption would be
that the murder would have been on account of the employment, in the absence of any other
evidence pointing out that the murder was out of private dispute between the deceased and
somebody else or out of some other motive like murder for gain or sex or property dispute and
considering the fact that the incident had taken place in the workplace, then the inference is that
the murder should have been out of and in the course of employment.

Regional Director, ESI. Corpn. v. K.P. Gopi

A workman got injured in the course of his employment. When he returned for work he was
found unfit to do the same work, but his request for assignment of lighter work was not granted.
E.S.I. Corporation accepted his case as "employment injury" and referred him to the Medical
Board for assessing his disability. The Medical Board examined him and assessed his loss of
earning capacity as 20%. The question involved in this appeal was whether the employment
injury sustained by a workman had resulted in permanent total disablement?

Difference between "permanent partial disablement" and "permanent total disablement"

Section 2(15-A) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 defines permanent partial
disablement as such disablement of a permanent nature, as reduces the earning capacity of an
employee in every employment which he was capable of undertaking at the time of the accident
resulting in the disablement.
Section 2(15-B) of the ESI Act defines permanent total disablement as such disablement of a
permanent nature as incapacitates an employee for all work which he was capable of
performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement.
That the difference between "permanent partial disablement" and "permanent total
disablement" was subtle but discernible. In "partial disablement” the consequence of injury
only reduces the earning capacity in the employment, whereas in total disability, the injury
should have rendered the body incapacitated to do the work which a person was earlier capable
of doing. Such incapacity is only in reference to all work which he was capable of performing
at the time of accident, which means that it does not matter while deciding incapacity if the
person can still acquire new skill to do some other work.
What is permanent total disablement
Section 2(15-B) of the ESI Act defines permanent total disablement as such disablement of a
permanent nature as incapacitates an employee for all work which he was capable of
performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement.
The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 also contains a definition of 'total disablement'
in Section 2(1) (l) of the Act. It means "such disablement, whether of a permanent or temporary
nature, as incapacitates a workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time
of the accident resulting in such disablement".
In Pratab Narain Singh v. Shrinivas, the Supreme Court had dealt with the case of carpenter
whose left hand was amputated from above the elbow. It was found to be a case of permanent
total disablement as the carpenter could not do his carpentry work at all. The fact that the
employee could have done some other work with the right hand did not persuade the Supreme
Court to hold that the disablement was anything less. Much later Madhya Pradesh High Court
had to consider the same question in Chotelal v. Regt.Dir.E.S.I. Corporation. Learned Single
Judge who delivered the judgment took the view that the "permanent total disablement is to be
judged from the nature of the job which the workman was doing and if the disablement so caused
renders him unfit to do that job it will be deemed to be total and not partial disablement."
Hence the court in Regional Director, ESI. Corpn. v. K.P. Gopi, held that it is not necessary
that the employment injury should render the employee totally unfit to do any work
whatsoever for holding that he is suffering permanent total disablement as understood in
the E.S.I.Act. It is enough that he was incapacitated from doing the work which he was
capable of doing at the time of accident. If he can do the work which he was performing
just before the accident in a reduced form, the result is only permanent partial
disablement. If he cannot do that work at all, then the consequence is permanent total
disablement.

Doctrine of notional extension

Section 3(1) the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 reads as follows:
“If personal injury is caused to an employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions
of this Chapter”
The liability for the employer to pay compensation arises only if the accident arose out of and in
the course of his employment.
In India, the courts have recognized the doctrine of notional extension of time and place while
determining whether the injury has been caused out of or in the course of the employment of the
workman. The courts have held consistently that the employment does not necessarily end, when
the tool down signal is given and when the workman actually leaves his place of work. The
doctrine of ‘notional extension’ of employment provides for the extension of the employer’s
premises so as to include those areas which the workman passes and re-passes in going to and
leaving the actual place of work. The doctrine of notional extension has been mostly applied to
four types of cases of injury to workmen employed in: (i) workshops, factories or other such
establishments; (ii) harbours or on ships; (iii) transport services; (iv) mines. In some cases, the
basis of the notional extension is considered to be an implied term of the contract, while in others
it is the proved a practical necessity.
Saurashtra Salt Mfg Co. v. B.V. Raja:
The Saurashtra Salt Co. employed certain workmen for salt manufacturing. The workmen
employed in the company, while returning home after finishing their work had to go by public
path, then through a sandy area in the open public land and finally across a creek through a ferry
boat. The workmen while crossing the creek in a public ferryboat, which capsized due to bad
weather, were drowned.
The Supreme Court considered the circumstances of the case and held that as a rule, the
employment of a workman does not commence until he has reached the place of employment
and does not continue when he has left the place of employment, the journey to and from the
place of employment being excluded. It is now well-settled, however, that this is subject to
theory of notional extension of the employers' premises so as to include an area which the
workman passes and repasses in going to, and in leaving the actual place of work.
General Manager, B. E.S.T Undertaking, Bombay v Mrs. Agnes:
The deceased P. Nanu Raman was a bus driver of the appellant corporation and after finishing
the work for the day, he left the bus in the depot, boarded another bus to go to his residence and
the bus met with an accident and, as a result of the injuries received in that accident, he died. His
widow claimed compensation by reason of the death of her husband in an accident alleged to
have arisen "out of and in the course of his employment.

It was observed by the Supreme Court that under Section 3(1) of the Act, injury must be caused
to the workman by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The question about
when an employment begins and when it ceases depends upon the facts of each case. But the
courts have agreed that the employment does not necessarily end when the "down tool" signal is
given or when the workman leaves the actual workshop where he is working. There is a notional
extension at both the entry and exit by time and space. The scope of such extension must
necessarily depend on the circumstances of a given case. An employment may end or may begin
not only when the employee begins to work or leaves his tools but also when he uses the means
of ingress and egress to and from the place of employment. Though the doctrine of reasonable or
notional extension of, employment developed in the context of specific workshops, factories or
harbours, it applies equally to a bus service (B.E.S.T.). While in a case of a factory, the premises
of the employer which gives ingress or egress to the factory is a limited one, in the case of a city
transport service, the entire fleet of buses forming the service would be the "premises". A driver
is given the facility in his capacity as a driver to travel in any bus belonging to the undertaking to
enable him to keep up punctuality and to discharge his onerous 0bligations. It is given to him not
as a grace, but because efficiency of the service demands it. Hence, a driver when going home
from the depot or coming to the depot uses the bus; any accident that happens to him is an
accident in the course of his employment.

Arising out of and in the course of employment

The liability of the employer to pay compensation was basically based on the principle of
personal injury from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Initially the
condition was interpreted in narrow sense, as the workman present at the work site and injury
resulted while working on the machine or equipment, otherwise no compensation was payable to
them. The Supreme Court broadly interpreted the concept of the accident arising out of and in
the course of employment in some cases. The Supreme Court in Mackinnon Mackenzie and
Company Private Limited v. Ibrahim Mohammad Issak decided on the subject matter in wider
aspect.
Mackinnon Mackenzie case was the case of a seaman/deck-hand who was missing on board a
ship.  The body was not found despite search and there was no proof available to show how the
seaman died.  Nobody saw the missing seaman at the so called place of accident. The
Commissioner held a local inspection of the ship also. The evidence available did not show that
it was a stormy night for the seaman to fall overboard. In these circumstances, the Additional
Commissioner held that there was no material to hold that the death of the seaman took place on
account of an accident which arose out of his employment.  This finding of the Commissioner
was upheld by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the term
“arising out of and in the course of employment.” The Supreme Court held that the words “in the
course of employment” meant in the course of work which the workman is employed to do and
which is incidental to it and the words “arising out of employment” are understood to mean that
during the course of employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of
the service. There must be a casual relationship between the accident and the employment. If
the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim
for compensation must succeed unless of course the workman has exposed himself to do an
added peril by his own imprudence. The Supreme Court in Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. (P.)
Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mohammed Issak, approving the observation of Lord Summer made in
Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. v. Highley, observed that the test is: was it part of the
injured person’s employment to hazard, to suffer or to do that which caused his injury? If yes,
the accident arose out of his employment, if not it did not.

Mst. Param Pal Singh through father v. National Insurance Co.

Section 3(1) the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 reads as follows:
“If personal injury is caused to an employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions
of this Chapter”
The first requisite of this section is whether there was any accident. The second requisite is
whether this accident arose out of and in the course of the deceased workman's employment. 
The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Smt. Sundarbai v. The General Manager, Ordnance
Factory, observed that ‘accident’ means an untoward mishap which is not expected or designed
by the workman.
In Mallikarjuna G. Hiremath v. Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. the principles to
attract Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act have been stated as
1. There must be a causal connection between the injury and the accident and the accident
and the work done in the course of employment.
2. The onus is upon the applicant to show that it was the work and the resulting strain which
contributed to or aggravated the injury.
3. If the evidence brought on records establishes a greater probability which satisfies a
reasonable man that the work contributed to the causing of the personal injury, it would
be enough for the workman to succeed, but the same would depend upon the fact of each
case.
In Shakuntala Chandrakant v. Prabhakar Maruti, the factors to be established to prove that an
accident has taken place have been stated as:
 1. stress and strain arising during the course of employment
2. nature of employment
3. injury aggravated due to stress and strain

The Supreme Court in Mst. Param Pal Singh through father v. National Insurance Co. decided
the issue, namely, whether death of deceased in the course of employment while driving the
truck continuously over a period of time had any casual connection with his employment? In that
case the deceased who was employed as a truck driver, was assigned the duty of driving the truck
for trade purposes from Delhi to Nimiaghat near Jharkhand. The said truck was insured with the
National Insurance Company. When the vehicle reached near destination the deceased suffered a
health setback and therefore parked the vehicle on the roadside near a hotel. Immediately after
parking the vehicle he fainted. The person nearby took him to the hospital where the doctor
declared that he was brought dead. On the issue of death arising out of and course of
employment, the Supreme Court referred to its earlier decisions and applying the principles laid
down therein to facts of this case and observed that (i) The unexpected death, may be due to
heart failure while driving the vehicle which is about 1152 kms from Delhi and he would have
definitely undertaken grave strain and stress due to such long distance driving. (ii) Constant
driving of heavy vehicle as his regular avocation can be safely held to be the contributory factor
if not sole cause of his unexpected death.(iii) Such an untoward mishap can be reasonably
described as an accident as having been caused solely due to nature of employment which was in
course of such employer’s trade or business.
The court accordingly held that there was a casual connection to the death of the deceased with
his employment.
The House of Lords in Clover Clayton & Co. V. Hughes also held that even if a workman dies
from a pre-existing disease, if the disease is aggravated or accelerated under the circumstances
which can be said to be accidental, his death results from injury by accident. In this case, the
deceased while tightening a nut with a spanner, fell back on his hand and died. A post mortem
examination showed that there was a large aneurism of the aorta, and that death was caused by a
rupture of the aorta. The aneurism was in such an advanced condition that it might have burst
while the man was asleep, and very slight exertion or strain would have been sufficient to bring
about a rupture. The House of Lords found that the death was caused by a strain arising out of
the ordinary work of the deceased operating upon a condition of body which was such as to
render the strain fatal, and held that this was an accident.

In Executive Engineer v. Janaki, the Court observed that the employer is bound to give
compensation in cases where the workman had an illness already but the employment furnished a
contributory cause to his death or if the employment caused aggravation of the illness and
accelerated his death. If it was a natural result of a disease which the workman already had that
he died and his employment did not furnish a contributory cause to his death or, if the
employment had really nothing to do with the aggravation of his disease and acceleration of his
death, then it cannot be said that there was a casual connection between his employment and
subsequent death.

Wilful disobedience
Section 3(1) the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 reads as follows:
“If personal injury is caused to an employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions
of this Chapter”
The proviso to Section 3(1) of the Act saves the employer from liability where the workman
(a) was at the time of the accident under the influence of drink or drugs or
(b) wilfully disobeyed any order or rule expressly made for the safety of workman, or
(c) wilfully removed or disregarded any safety guard or other device knowing to have
been provided for the safety of workman.

This proviso applies only to those cases where injury has not resulted in death.

The Court in Janaki Ammal and Ors. v. Divisional Engineer explained the term ‘wilful
disobedience’:
 Firstly, an order or rule must have been given or framed; a mere warning or disclaimer of
responsibility is not enough.
 Secondly, its substantial purpose must have been that of securing the safety of workmen
as such.
  Thirdly, the order or rule must contain words which, on the face of them, fairly and
clearly indicate that its purpose is that of securing the safety of workmen; otherwise it is
not "expressly" so given or framed.
 Fourthly, its terms must have been brought to the notice of the individual workman who
is injured.
 Fifthly, it must have been disobeyed.
 Sixthly, the disobedience must have been wilful, neither, for example, merely negligent
nor due to a mistaken mode of doing a particular task, nor due to a wrong decision in an
emergency, but deliberate.
 Seventhly the accident (causing the injury, not resulting in death) must have been directly
attributable to the disobedience

Where any of the aforesaid conditions is absent, this proviso shall not apply.

Lord Summer observed in Lanchashire and Yorkshire Railway v. Highley L.R. that if an accident
arises out of the injured person's employment, although he has conducted himself in it carelessly
or improperly, or, arises not out of his employment but out of the fact that he has gone outside
the scope of it, or has added to it some extraneous peril of his own making, then in such cases,
the employer should be exempted from liability. Lord Summer observed that the test is: was it
part of the injured person’s employment to hazard, to suffer or to do that which caused his
injury? If yes, the accident arose out of his employment, if not it did not.

In Alla Baksh v. Mohammed, it was held that the term "wilful disobedience" shows that mere
disobedience is not sufficient because it may be the result of forgetfulness or the result of the
impulse of the moment. The statute only exempts the employer from liability when the
disobedience is wilful, that is, deliberate and intended.

In Janaki Ammal and Ors. v. Divisional Engineer, Highways, the deceased workman was sitting
on the hand rail of the lorry against instructions. Then, when the lorry was taking a sharp curve at
mile 23/2, the deceased had let go his hold of the rails and was making funny signs with his
hands to a dumb friend who was going by the road at that time. It was contended by the
contractor that the deceased acted in a negligent and careless manner and brought about an added
peril, exonerating the employer from liability to compensate. It was held that, the proviso
to Section 3(1) would not save the contractor from liability, because first of all the personal
injury had resulted in the death of the workman, and secondly even if he had been alive, a mere
negligence or carelessness on the part of the workman would not amount to wilful disobedience
of the workman to an order expressly given or a rule expressly framed for the purpose of
securing the safety of workmen