The Honorable Lina M.

Khan
Page 1

April 12, 2022

The Honorable Lina M. Khan

Chair
Federal Trade Commission
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20580

Dear Chair Khan:

We are writing to share evidence of concerning business practices by the Washington

Commanders uncovered during the Committee’s ongoing investigation into workplace
misconduct at the team. Evidence obtained by the Committee, including emails, documents, and
statements from former employees, indicate senior executives and the team’s owner, Daniel
Snyder, may have engaged in a troubling, long-running, and potentially unlawful pattern of
financial conduct that victimized thousands of team fans and the National Football League
(NFL).

According to information and documents obtained by the Committee, for over a decade,
Commanders executives may have withheld millions of dollars in refundable security deposits
owed to customers upon the expiration of their multi-year seat leases and may have taken steps
to prevent customers from collecting these deposits. According to a former team executive, the
Commanders “failed to properly refund those security deposits intentionally and took various
steps to retain as much of that money as possible.”1 Documents indicate that as of 2016, the
team may have retained up to $5 million in deposits from approximately 2,000 customers.

Information and documents obtained by the Committee further suggest that the
Commanders concealed revenues that were owed to the NFL as part of a revenue-sharing
agreement that redistributes revenues to 32 teams in the League and helps set salaries for the
League’s football players. According to the former executive, the team maintained “two sets of
books”—one that was shared with the NFL but underreported certain ticket revenue, and another
internal set of books that included the complete and accurate revenue and was “shown to Mr.
Snyder.” 2 Another former team employee informed the Committee that “it was known and/or

1
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022).
2
Id.
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 2

rumored in the office that there was ‘moving around’ of money regarding tickets,” and stated that
she told an outside investigator hired by the Washington Commanders about this issue in 2020. 3

Documents indicate that the revenue gained by the team through these practices was
known internally as “juice.”4

Given the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) authority to investigate unfair or deceptive
business practices, we are providing the information and documents uncovered by the
Committee for your review, to determine if the Commanders violated any provision of law
enforced by FTC and whether further action is warranted. 5 We request that you take any other
action you deem necessary to ensure that all funds are returned to their rightful owners and that
those responsible are held accountable for their conduct.

The Committee’s Investigation

On October 21, 2021, the Committee on Oversight and Reform launched an investigation
into allegations of a decades-long hostile workplace culture at the Commanders, the NFL’s
handling of this matter, and the NFL’s role in setting and enforcing workplace standards across
the League.

In July 2020, Daniel Snyder announced the hiring of Beth Wilkinson, a prominent D.C.
attorney and former federal prosecutor, and her law firm Wilkinson Stekloff, to conduct an
internal investigation into “all forms of workplace misconduct” at the Commanders, including
sexual harassment as well as “bullying, abusive actions and an employee’s inability to report
inappropriate behavior.”6 One month later, the NFL took over the investigation, purportedly to
ensure that “the results are thorough, complete, and trusted by the fans, the players, our
employees and the public.”7

In a break with recent precedent on handling matters of public interest, the NFL refused
to release the full findings of Ms. Wilkinson’s investigation. Instead, after Ms. Wilkinson and

3
Letter from Rachel Engleson to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform
(Apr. 8, 2022) (online at
[Link]
leson%20to%20CBM%20%28Redacted%[Link]).
4
Email from Stephen Choi to Jason Friedman et al. (May 6, 2014) (online at
[Link]
[Link]).
5
Federal Trade Commission, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law
Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority (May 2021) (online at [Link]/about-ftc/mission/enforcement-
authority).
6
How Can the Washington NFL Team’s Internal Review Be Independent? Legal Experts Weigh In,
Washington Post (July 22, 2020) (online at [Link]/sports/2020/07/22/washington-nfl-internal-
review-daniel-snyder-beth-wilkinson).
7
NFL Takes Over Investigation into Washington Football Team, Sports Illustrated (Aug. 31, 2020) (online
at [Link]/nfl/2020/09/01/nfl-takes-over-washington-football-team-investigation-sexual-harrassment).
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 3

her team interviewed more than 150 witnesses and collected hundreds of thousands of
documents over the course of ten months, the NFL issued a four-page press release that
contained vague and conclusory findings of the investigation, including that the Commanders’
workplace was “highly unprofessional,” that “[b]ullying and intimidation frequently took place,”
and that “senior executives engaged in inappropriate conduct themselves.” In releasing these
findings, the NFL asserted that “[n]one of the managers or executives identified as having
engaged in misconduct is still employed at the club.”8 To date, the NFL has refused to provide
the Committee with the full findings of Ms. Wilkinson’s investigation, and both the NFL and the
Commanders have taken steps to withhold key documents and information from the Committee.

Faced with the NFL’s and the team’s obstruction, the Committee has obtained
information and documents from other sources, including numerous former employees. The
Committee’s investigation has revealed a longstanding culture of impunity among top executives
at the Commanders—from pervasive sexual harassment and other workplace misconduct to
potential financial misconduct. 9

The purpose of the Committee’s ongoing investigation is to inform legislative efforts to

strengthen protections for employees across all workplaces. In particular, the Committee’s
investigation will inform legislative efforts to prevent and address toxic work environments and
workplace investigation processes; strengthen protections for women in the workplace; and
address the use of non-disclosure agreements to prevent the disclosure of unlawful employment
practices, including sexual harassment.

Interview of Former Team Executive

As part of its investigation, on March 14, 2022, the Committee conducted a transcribed
interview with former Commanders sales executive Jason Friedman, a 24-year veteran of the
organization—and one of Mr. Snyder’s longest serving employees—who began his employment
in 1996. Mr. Friedman, who started as an intern under former owner Jack Kent Cooke, described
working for his hometown team as “a childhood dream.” He was promoted, first by Mr. Cooke
and then repeatedly by Mr. Snyder, eventually becoming Vice President of Sales and Customer
Service—the position he held at the time of his separation in October 2020. In this capacity, Mr.
Friedman oversaw sales and customer service for all regular and premium seating at FedEx
Field, including club, dream, and loge seats. 10

During his transcribed interview with Committee staff, Mr. Friedman provided a detailed
account of the Commanders’ toxic work environment, culture of impunity, and lack of

National Football League, Press Release: NFL Announces Outcome of Washington Football Team
8

Workplace Review (July 1, 2021) (online at [Link]/news/nfl-announces-outcome-of-washington-football-

team-workplace-review).
9
See, e.g., Committee on Oversight and Reform, Press Release: At Committee Roundtable, Former
Washington Commanders Employees Detail Widespread Sexual Harassment by Top Executives (Feb. 3, 2022)
(online at [Link]
commanders-employees-detail-widespread).
10
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022).
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 4

accountability by Commanders executives. He also described a pattern of deeply concerning

business practices that were directed by senior leadership, including Mr. Snyder. He explained:

You know, the team through our roller coaster were—we were on top of NFL attendance
and revenues from 1997 to 2005 or 2006, and then things started to slowly go downhill.
And some of these practices really started when things started to get a little tougher for
the team financially. 11

According to Mr. Friedman, team executives began encouraging potentially deceptive

practices to generate non-sharable revenue when “[g]ross season ticket sales started to decline
around 2009 creating a smaller top line” for the Commanders.12 Mr. Friedman also provided
contemporaneous documents and a letter to the Committee with additional information.

Failing to Return Security Deposits to Customers

Mr. Friedman provided the Committee with information and documents indicating that
the Commanders routinely withheld security deposits that should have been returned to
customers who had purchased multi-year season tickets for specific seats, referred to as seat
leases.

According to Mr. Friedman, in 1997, to help finance the new FedEx Field stadium under
then-owner Jack Kent Cooke, the Commanders began requiring fans to enter into multi-year
leases for certain premium seating, including club and loge seats, as well as private skybox
suites. 13 In order to secure these leases, fans were required to pay a one-time refundable security
deposit of 25% of the price of the seats for one year. 14

Internal documents obtained by the Committee reveal that at least some of the
Commanders’ lease agreements provided that security deposits “shall be returned to Licensee
within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the term of this Agreement, or any renewal term.”15

11
Id.
12
Letter from Jason Friedman to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform
(Apr. 8, 2022) (online at
[Link]
dman%20to%20CBM%20%28Redacted%[Link]).
13
E.g., Redskins Raise Ticket Prices, Washington Post (Feb. 15, 2001) (online at
[Link]/archive/sports/2001/02/15/redskins-raise-ticket-prices/df3e9577-321f-4869-9e5b-
d9cc31d6d06d/); The Pie in the Skyboxes Is Definitely a La Mode, Washington Post (Oct. 18, 1987) (online at
[Link]/archive/sports/1987/10/18/the-pie-in-the-skyboxes-is-definitely-a-la-mode/f3c98b80-
91f3-4ded-a324-308203b519cb/). FedEx Field consists of general admission seats and premium seats, including
club seats, dream seats, loge seats, and private skybox suites.
14
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022).
15
Contract for Executive Suite between WFI Stadium, Inc. and redacted licensee (Oct. 17, 2005) (NFL-
00141591 to NFL-00141594) (online
at [Link]
Suite%20%28Redacted%[Link]).
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 5

Mr. Friedman stated that after Mr. Snyder purchased the team in 1999, rather than return
the security deposits to customers at the end of the lease term, team executives directed
employees to establish roadblocks to prevent customers from obtaining the security deposits they
were due—effectively allowing the team to retain that money. Mr. Friedman explained:

Those security deposits, per the terms of the contract, are refundable at the end of the
contract provided that the licensee has met their obligations, i.e., paid their bill each
year and not damaged their seat.

The team failed to properly refund those security deposits intentionally and took
various steps to retain as much of that money as possible mainly by taking advantage
of the passage of time. 16

Mr. Friedman described how the Commanders created artificial barriers to discourage
customers from requesting the return of their deposits—harming both current and former
ticketholders. For example, Mr. Friedman stated that team executives instructed him to avoid
conversations regarding security deposits with customers otherwise entitled to a refund.
Although the team routinely allowed customers to use email to facilitate other transactions, it
would not accept refund requests by email and instead required leaseholders to submit their
refund requests through “U.S. mail or FedEx.” According to Mr. Friedman, after 2000, the
Commanders no longer required security deposits for new club seat lease agreements but failed
to inform all leaseholders of the change. Rather than inform customers who were unaware of the
policy change at the time of their seat lease renewal or refund or credit the deposits to customers’
accounts upon renewal, the team would collect full payment for the renewed leases while
retaining the security deposits. 17

Mr. Friedman, who oversaw the processing of security deposits and refunds, explained
how the Commanders also took advantage of customers who mistakenly believed the deposits
were non-refundable or who forgot or were unaware of deposits on their account. He stated:

[M]any of them [customers] forgot about it. In many cases, with corporate accounts,
the attention name on the account would change over time. So the person who entered
into the lease and agreed to pay the security deposit would be different from the
person who was managing the account when the lease expired ten years later, and the
new point of contact wouldn’t know to ask for the security deposit.

One of the other reasons the team was able to do this is because people would pass
tickets down in their family. So, you know, a mother passes the tickets down to her
daughter, and as she does that, doesn’t tell her that there’s a security deposit on the
account. And then when the daughter decides not to renew the tickets, she doesn’t

16
Id.
17
Letter from Jason Friedman to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform
(Apr. 8, 2022) (online at
[Link]
dman%20to%20CBM%20%28Redacted%[Link]).
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 6

know to ask for her security deposit back. And, again, the team just keeps it and
doesn’t go out of their way to try and refund the money.18

He continued:

Another reason that these security deposits would be retained is someone might pass
away and their heirs or relatives don’t know to ask for the security deposit in return.

So basically, the team is holding on to these security deposits, many of which should
be back in the hands of the customers or former customers.19

Mr. Friedman recalled only one instance in his 24-year tenure when the Commanders
took affirmative steps to return the security deposits to their rightful owners. Mr. Friedman
explained that the team’s leadership realized one of the team’s three local jurisdictions—the
District of Columbia, Maryland, or Virginia—had amended its laws to require notice to
leaseholders of security deposits available for refund. As a result, the team attempted to provide
notice to leaseholders in that single jurisdiction as “passively” as possible. He explained:

I remember at one point over the last probably eight years, there was a scramble to
reach out as passively as possible to everybody that had a security deposit on file that
was refundable in one of the three local jurisdictions, DC, Maryland, or Virginia; that
somebody had figured out that the laws were different in one from the other two, and
we batched out letters to the last address we had on file saying that if you wanted your
security deposit back, that you needed to call. 20

However, according to Mr. Friedman, even when leaseholders called to request refunds
from the team, the Commanders intentionally created additional obstacles to reduce the
likelihood that the leaseholders would follow through on their requests—resulting in only a small
fraction of the deposits being returned to customers.21 Mr. Friedman explained:

18
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022); see also
Letter from Jason Friedman to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform (Apr. 8,
2022) (online at
[Link]
dman%20to%20CBM%20%28Redacted%[Link]).
19
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022).
20
Id.; see also Letter from Jason Friedman to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight
and Reform (Apr. 8, 2022) (online at
[Link]
dman%20to%20CBM%20%28Redacted%[Link]).
21
Letter from Jason Friedman to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform
(Apr. 8, 2022) (online at
[Link]
dman%20to%20CBM%20%28Redacted%[Link]).
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 7

And then when you called, we told you that you needed to send us a letter. But that
didn’t—that didn’t make a large dent in the security deposit universe. That may have
impacted what was left there by 5 to 10 percent. 22

The Commanders’ practice of collecting deposits for most categories of seats ended
approximately one year after Mr. Snyder acquired the team from Mr. Cooke in 1999.
Nonetheless, according to Mr. Friedman, and consistent with documents he provided to the
Committee, as of July 2016 the team had unreturned security deposits for “around 2,000
accounts” belonging to customers and fans totaling “approximately $5 million.” 23

Converting Security Deposits into Non-shareable Revenue

According to Mr. Friedman, the Commanders would also improperly convert certain
unclaimed security deposits into revenue for the team to use for other purposes. 24 Mr. Friedman
stated that some team executives used the term “juice” to describe this practice, which entailed
identifying revenue to be intentionally misallocated in its accounting system and applied to
unrelated events. When asked to explain the meaning of “juice,” Mr. Friedman responded:

A: Juice is a term we used in the office for extra money for the company.

Q: What do you mean by extra money?

A: Money that wasn’t being used to pay for something or wasn’t—money that
wasn’t being used on our accounting ledger to match up with a product or
service that was actually being provided. 25

Mr. Friedman stated that Mr. Snyder and Mitch Gershman, Mr. Friedman’s former
supervisor and then-Chief Operating Officer for the Commanders, would specifically instruct
him to:

Go identify security deposits that are on dormant accounts where, in my estimation, the
likelihood of the customer coming forward and asking for their deposit back is as close to
zero as possible, and then return the security deposit in the system and convert the credit
that would then be on the customer’s account into juice.

. ..

22
Id.
23
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022).
24
Letter from Jason Friedman to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform
(Apr. 8, 2022) (online at
[Link]
dman%20to%20CBM%20%28Redacted%[Link]).
25
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022).
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 8

The money would then be allocated to a similar license fee, handling fee, interest fee. It
would get converted into something where, A, we didn’t have to share it with the league,
and B, there was no outstanding obligation related to it. Meaning we didn’t have to issue
out a ticket to a customer related to that line item. 26

According to Mr. Friedman, the practice of “juicing” security deposits occurred over the
course of several years. He recalled at least one occasion where Mr. Gershman instructed him to
identify a significant amount of money in unclaimed deposits to convert into “juice.” He stated:

There was one particular season where towards the end of the season, Mitch Gershman
came to me and said, go get us another 100 grand in juice out of the security deposits.27

Mr. Friedman understood that the practice of requesting “juice” from security deposits
would occur when team executives believed the Commanders “were a little bit behind on our
sales numbers.” 28 He stated that this practice was done at the direction and for the benefit of Mr.
Snyder:

Q: Who would instruct you to identify juice related to security deposits?

A: Mitch Gershman.

Q: And how would he instruct you to do so?

A: Verbally. And with the topic of the security deposits, this one I am—you know,
these orders that would come from Mitch would come with the attachment, you
know, Dan wants this, Dan wants that.

Q: Dan Snyder?

A: Dan Snyder. Dan doesn’t want to give the money back.

. ..

Q: Did you stand to personally benefit from the practice of failing to return security
deposits to accountholders?

A: Absolutely not.

Q: Was your compensation in any way tied to the failure to return security deposits
to accountholders?

26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 9

A: Absolutely not.

Q: To your knowledge, who, if anyone, would stand to benefit from the practice of
failing to return security deposits to accountholders?

A: Redskins ownership, including Daniel Snyder. 29

According to Mr. Friedman, the practice of “juicing” security deposits ended in or around
2017 after Mr. Snyder, through Stephen Choi, the Commanders’ former Chief Financial Officer
(CFO), directed Mr. Friedman to stop. Specifically, Mr. Friedman stated that Mr. Choi
instructed him:

Dan doesn’t want us to mess with it anymore. Just leave it alone. Don’t touch any of the
money. Don’t try and get it back to the customers, don’t try and convert it into juice, just
leave it alone. 30

Mr. Friedman explained:

I think that they had gotten a little bit concerned that maybe some people were onto
them here. And that really—that stopped en masse, you know, I would say probably
three, four years ago, maybe five years ago. 31

Documentation of Retained Security Deposits

According to information and documents collected by Mr. Friedman, the Commanders

tracked and stored information related to customers’ security deposits in an electronic ticketing
and accounting database. This database included customer contact information, the seats
purchased under customers’ multi-year contracts, the types of seats purchased, the amount of the
deposit paid, and other information.

The Committee has reviewed internal information provided by Mr. Friedman that he
exported from the Commanders’ electronic database. This information appears to reflect the
following categories of information: the names and contact information of approximately 2,000
customers, including companies, who paid security deposits; the security deposits collected by
the team that had not been returned to customers or converted into “juice;” and the security
deposits that the Commanders had either returned to customers, retained due to customer default
or for other reasons, or that had been converted into “juice.” The following is an excerpt from
the spreadsheet that reflects customers whose security deposits had not been refunded or turned
into “juice” by the Commanders as of July 2016:

29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 10

As illustrated in the spreadsheet, customer names are reflected under the “owner_name”
column, and the amount of unreturned security deposits per customer is reflected in the
“paid_amount” column.

According to the spreadsheet, one customer name that corresponds to two season tickets
appears to have been registered in the name of current NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell as of
July 2016. The amount of the unreturned deposit is approximately $1,000. The address for this
account is listed as the NFL’s corporate address in New York. According to the spreadsheets,
the security deposit appears to have been collected prior to Mr. Goodell’s election as NFL
Commissioner in 2006. The Committee has not determined when the security deposit was paid
or whether it has since been returned.

In addition, the spreadsheets also appear to reflect security deposits for 28 seats held at
various times by the NFL (in blocks of four and six seats). The amount of unreturned security
deposits for these seats as of 2016 is listed as approximately $13,000. Below is sample of those
accounts:

Based on Mr. Friedman’s interview and the information reviewed by the Committee, it
appears that Mr. Friedman has identified approximately 2,000 customers who paid deposits
totaling approximately $5 million whose money the Commanders appear to not have returned as
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 11

of 2016. The spreadsheets reviewed by the Committee do not indicate why these deposits were
unreturned as of 2016 or whether each of these customers was entitled to a refund.32

When asked why he collected this information in 2016, Mr. Friedman stated:

It’s for a similar reason that I collected this other information. I knew what we were
doing was wrong, and I wanted to have record of it in case something went sideways.33

The Committee will provide the Excel spreadsheets obtained from Mr. Friedman to the
FTC upon request.

Concealing Ticket Revenue from the NFL

Mr. Friedman also provided information and documents indicating that Commanders
executives repeatedly concealed ticket sales revenue that should have been shared with the NFL.
He explained that, in or around 2012, as the team approached the end of a 15-year waiver of the
NFL’s revenue-sharing requirements, Commanders executives began implementing additional
business practices to conceal revenue that would become subject to revenue-sharing. 34

According to Mr. Friedman, in 1997, two years prior to Mr. Snyder’s purchase of the
Washington Commanders, the NFL granted former owner Jack Kent Cooke a 15-year club
seat revenue-sharing waiver that capped the amount of revenue the team was required to share
with the League. Mr. Friedman further explained, consistent with documents he provided,
that after the waiver expired, Commanders executives began intentionally underreporting
ticket revenue in the team’s electronic database that should have been shared with the League.
The executives apparently accomplished this by falsely processing or misassigning a portion
of ticket revenues from Commanders games as fees related to special events, such as concerts
or college football games, which were not subject to revenue sharing with the NFL. 35

In a May 6, 2014, email, Commanders executives appear to discuss a plan to process a

portion of the revenue from Commanders game tickets as bogus licensing fees related to a

32
Mr. Friedman explained in his interview that the team may have retained deposits from a small portion of
these customers due to default, but that the approximately $5 million in unreturned deposits also excludes amounts
that were retained and converted into “juice.” He stated: “So some of that $5 million the team is entitled to retain
because the licensee defaulted. But over the years, there was a scheme where we took security deposits from
dormant accounts and turned it into juice. And that’s not reflected in that $5 million, because the file, the list of the
$5 million doesn’t show money that’s been taken out of the security deposit and converted into juice.” Committee
on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022).
33
Id.
34
Letter from Jason Friedman to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform
(Apr. 8, 2022) (online at
[Link]
dman%20to%20CBM%20%28Redacted%[Link]).
35
Id.; Committee on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022).
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 12

Navy-Notre Dame college football game at FedEx Field. 36 In the email, Mr. Friedman
requested guidance from Mr. Choi on how to process the additional ticket sales revenue,
writing:

(Stephen – can you reply all with processing guidance? This is the bulk club sro
[standing room only] order where I am charging $55 per ticket, but the tickets are
priced at $44 in the system. There are a total of 14,760 game tickets being sold here
with $11 per ticket of juice = $162,360)

Mr. Choi responded, “The juice goes to Navy vs ND game,” which according to Mr.
Friedman meant that a portion of the revenue from the Commanders game tickets—
$162,360—should be falsely processed as a non-shareable revenue from the Navy vs. Notre
Dame college football game. 37

Mr. Friedman explained that this was a recurring practice by Commanders executives:

A: Well, in this particular case and other cases similar to this, $162,360 was
shielded from the NFL revenue sharing program; that even though we sold
$811,800 worth of tickets, we reported that sale to the NFL at a total of
$721,600, leaving $162,360 of juice, of money that would just go right into the
owner’s pocket and didn’t have to be exposed to the NFL revenue sharing
program.
Q: Was this the only time that you identified juice for the company?

A: No.

Q: Do you recall how often this would happen?

A: Frequently. I don’t know if—well, each time it happened related to this type
of activity, it was substantial, hundreds of thousands of dollars usually. How
many times it happened, I would estimate that this exact type of activity
happened probably at least a dozen times. 38

According to Mr. Friedman, the Commanders avoided detection of these practices by

failing to adjust in their ticket manifests the higher prices charged for tickets—here $55 rather

36
Email from Jason Friedman to Stephen Choi et al. (May 6, 2014) (describing the bulk sale of
Commanders’ full season and home game tickets against New York Giants, Seattle Seahawks, Philadelphia Eagles,
and Dallas Cowboys) (online at
[Link]
[Link]); see also FedEx Field to Host Navy vs. Notre Dame in 2014, SB Nation (Dec. 13, 2012) (online at
[Link]
37
Email from Stephen Choi to Jason Friedman et al. (May 6, 2014) (online at
[Link]
[Link]).
38
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022).
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 13

than the $44 reflected in the manifest. 39 The unreported revenue collected by the
Commanders, or “juice,” would then be assigned as non-sharable revenue in its accounting
systems and concealed from the NFL. Mr. Friedman explained:

A: So our stadium has a manifest similar to a manifest that you would see for
airplane seating, and each seat has a dollar amount assigned to it. In this
particular case, the dollar amount assigned to each one of these seats in the
manifest was $44; but in fact we collected $55 per seat from this customer,
times 14,760 seats times $11 per seat equals $162,360, which that amount
would then be allocated to a different type of line item in our database, a line
item that was not exposed to NFL revenue sharing.

Q: What types of line items would the team use to disguise that revenue?

A: Primarily, license fees, interest fees, and handling fees.40

As part of this scheme, the Commanders reportedly maintained two sets of books: one
that was shared with the NFL but underreported certain ticket revenue, and another internal
set of books that included the complete and accurate revenue and was “shown to Mr.
Snyder.” 41

This practice appears to be reflected in the May 6, 2014, email chain discussed above.
In one email, Mr. Choi wrote to a senior finance employee: “[Redacted]—I would start the
list of adjustments for FY [fiscal year] 15 (reclass Navy game to PSS [premium seat sales]
dept).” 42 Mr. Friedman explained this accounting practice during his interview:

Q: What do you understand Mr. Choi to be referring to when he says “start the list
of adjustments for FY15”?

A: So this is the two sets of books. So in this particular case, there’s a set of
books that’s submitted to the NFL that doesn’t include the $162,000, but then
there’s a set of books that’s kept internally shown to Mr. Snyder and Mr.
Snyder’s—I believe just Mr. Snyder, actually, and the people in his inner circle
maybe, that shows what we actually did, which would include the $162,000 of

39
See also Letter from Jason Friedman to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and
Reform (Apr. 8, 2022) (explaining that NFL auditors would likely focus their audits on information in the system
related to game tickets rather than other events that are not subject to revenue-sharing requirements such as college
football games) (online at
[Link]
dman%20to%20CBM%20%28Redacted%[Link]).
40
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022).
41
Id.
42
Email from Stephen Choi to Jason Friedman et al. (May 6, 2014) (online at
[Link]
[Link]).
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 14

juice.

Q: Who maintained these books?

A: Stephen Choi and [redacted].

Q: So when he is instructing [redacted] to start the list of adjustments, he’s

referring to the books that would reflect juice; is that correct?

A: Well, there’s going to be a set of files that’s submitted to the NFL that is going
to be, in this case, $162,000 light.

Q: Okay.

A: Then there’s the set of books that we keep that are for us only that will reflect
the $162,000 of Redskins ticket money and at the same time also reduce the
inflated Navy Notre Dame license fee number.

Q: So the list of adjustments is referring to both of those?

A: Yes.

Q: When Mr. Choi says “reclass Navy game to PSS department,” what is PSS?

A: Premium seat sales.

Q: Your department?

A: Yes.

Q: What’s the significance, if any?

A: Well, there was a department in charge of selling special event tickets, a very
small department, that had this adjustment not been made internally, their
number would have been inflated and the premium seating sales number would
have been deflated. So because this was a semi regular practice, we wanted to
make sure that we were keeping track of what was actually happening, and that
we didn’t want to be referring back to the tainted books that had been
submitted to the NFL. 43

In an April 1, 2013, email obtained by the Committee, Commanders executives appear

to discuss intentionally processing $88,000 in shareable revenue from Commanders’ game
tickets as bogus, non-shareable licensing fees for an unrelated May 25, 2013, Kenny Chesney

43
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022).
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 15

concert at FedEx Field. 44 In the email, Mr. Friedman confirmed that the $88,000 would be
processed as Kenny Chesney licensing fees even though the accountholder had not purchased
Kenny Chesney tickets. Mr. Friedman wrote:

I ran a large payment for account 2837245 today. Per our last email exchange, I paid
off the 88K of KC LI FEE (even though he is not getting any KC tickets). 45

During his interview with Committee staff, Mr. Friedman explained:

Q: In the body of the email, it refers to account 2837245. What is that referring
to?

A: That’s going to be a—sorry, that’s going to be a ticket broker account.

Q: In the same email, KC, is that referring to Kenny Chesney?

A: It is.

Q: The LI fee, is that referring to licensing fee?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: At the end of the sentence, you say, “(even though he is not getting any KC
tickets).” What do you mean by that?

A: Well, I don’t have a record of us—this next type of transaction, I don’t have a
document. But there would be times where a ticket broker would come
forward to buy $100,000 worth of Redskins tickets, let’s say as an example,
and we would give that ticket broker $100,000 of Redskins tickets. But then
we would also give them, say, $50,000 of special event tickets that we were
having maybe a tough time selling, a college football game or a soccer game or
something like that.

And we would actually give those special event tickets to the ticket broker
because it was of no cost to us. That would allow us then to book in our
system $50,000 of Redskins tickets and $50,000 of special event tickets, thus
shielding $50,000 from league revenue sharing. And in those cases, we would
actually issue the tickets out to the ticket broker, as an example. But in this

44
Email from Jason Friedman to Jeff Ritter et al. (Apr. 1, 2013) (online at
[Link]
9%[Link]); see also Washington Commanders, Chesney Returns to FedEx Field in 2013 (Nov. 8, 2013) (online
at [Link]/news/chesney-returns-to-fedexfield-in-2013-8782001).
45
Email from Jason Friedman to Jeff Ritter et al. (Apr. 1, 2013) (online at
[Link]
9%[Link]).
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 16

case, we allocated money to Kenny Chesney license fee, not Kenny Chesney
tickets, and didn’t give the customer any Kenny Chesney tickets. That’s why I
was explicit there in explaining that.

. ..

A: And, in short, the practice here is exactly the same as the prior email we were
just reviewing with a lot less detail. But the net result in this case is 88,000 of
juice, and the event was a Kenny Chesney concert instead of a Navy Notre
Dame college football game. 46

When asked by Committee staff why he copied team executives on emails involving
the Commander’s “juicing” revenue schemes, Mr. Friedman candidly explained:

A: Well, because Mitch was my supervisor at the time, Stephen was our CFO.
And I wanted there to be a paper trail. If I were to one day get accused again
of being a lazy, rogue employee, I wanted to make sure I had something that
showed that I was just doing what I was told. 47

Mr. Friedman further explained why he retained the documents provided to the
Committee. He stated:

A: Well, again, I retained these emails because I did not want to be—I knew what
was happening in these emails was wrong, and I did not want to be hung out to
dry by the team again and have someone come back and make the claim that I
was doing this on my own. 48

Mr. Friedman also provided that, despite his lengthy tenure with the team, he remained
concerned that he would lose his job if he failed to perform his job duties in a manner consistent
with Mr. Snyder’s expectations:

I was always worried about losing my job there, always. You would think working
someplace for 24 years that you would gain some sort of comfort in job security. But
I was very paranoid just because I saw so many people over the years get fired that I—
I was always worried that I would be next. 49

Mr. Friedman’s practice of retaining documents was confirmed by Rachel Engleson,

the team’s former Director of Marketing and Client Relations, who wrote to the Committee
that during the period from 2012 to 2018 when she reported to Mr. Friedman, he repeatedly
informed her that he had “started to keep printed emails and/or other materials to show that, in

46
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 17

performing certain parts of his job, he was acting under orders of his supervisor and Dan
Snyder.” Ms. Engleson continued:

He explained to me that he had been made into a scapegoat by the company for other
things he and others had done under orders of the team’s leaders, and so after that he
started keeping records whenever he was asked to do tasks that he and/or the team
could potentially be sued for.50

Ms. Engleson also confirmed that “it was known and/or rumored in the office that
there was ‘moving around’ of money regarding tickets,” and stated that she had informed
Beth Wilkinson’s team of this during an interview in 2020. 51

Misleading Customers to Sell Higher-Priced Tickets

According to Mr. Friedman, his concerns about being used as a scapegoat by the team
and blamed for the Commanders’ financial improprieties were based on an earlier experience.
During his interview, he stated that in 2009, former General Counsel Dave Donavan accused him
of being a “rogue employee” after he had followed directives to mislead Commanders fans about
ticket availability and steer fans to buy more costly seating. 52

Specifically, according to Mr. Friedman, team executives including Mr. Gershman and
Mr. Choi had routinely instructed him to misrepresent the availability of affordable general
admission tickets to fans seeking to attend Commanders’ games. Mr. Friedman would inform
these customers that the team had sold out of general admission tickets while at the same time,
he would sell those tickets to ticket brokers in bulk. He would then direct fans to the team’s
purported 160,000-name waitlist. 53 The apparent intent of this practice was to trick customers
into believing that they had two choices: join the waiting list or purchase premium-priced tickets
for access to immediate seating in FedEx Field. 54

50
Letter from Rachel Engleson to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform
(Apr. 8, 2022) (online at
[Link]
leson%20to%20CBM%20%28Redacted%[Link]).
51
Id.
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022);
52

Redskins Sold Brokers Tickets Despite Wait List, Washington Post (Sept. 2, 2009) (online at
[Link]/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/09/01/[Link]?hpid=topnews&sid=ST2009090104025) (describing Mr.
Friedman as one of the employees responsible for selling general admission tickets to ticket brokers).
53
Letter from Jason Friedman to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform
(Apr. 8, 2022) (explaining that the waitlist was used as a marketing tool and in many cases did not reflect customers
interested in purchasing tickets) (online at
[Link]
dman%20to%20CBM%20%28Redacted%[Link]).
54
Id. (“At many points, for extended periods of time, reasonably priced, upper and lower-level seats would
be unsold, but this information was deliberately withheld from fans as a tactic to force fans to buy much more
expensive premium club seats.”).
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 18

Around the same time, the Commanders, led by Mr. Donovan, sued hundreds of fans and
other leaseholders who fell behind on payments despite recouping potential losses by reselling
the same seats to brokers. When these questionable practices were subsequently exposed in
public reports, team executives, including Mr. Donovan, openly blamed employees like Mr.
Friedman. 55 Mr. Friedman explained:

So when questioned about the act of selling tickets to ticket brokers, which was part of
my assigned duties, Mr. Donovan referred to me as a rogue employee and that I was
doing that because I was lazy, which is not true. I was doing that because that was
what I was told to do. And the selling of tickets to ticket brokers was something that
was a sanctioned activity, but the team at that time wanted to portray it as something
that the team had no knowledge of. 56

Publicly, Commanders’ leadership stated “that the sales were made but said they were
against team policy” and that “the ticket sales employees involved were disciplined.”57
However, Mr. Friedman told Committee staff that privately, Commanders leadership
rewarded him. When asked if he was ever disciplined for his actions, he stated: “No. In fact,
shortly thereafter I received a raise” from Mr. Gershman and Mr. Donovan. 58 According to
Mr. Friedman, Mr. Gershman subsequently informed him that Mr. Snyder wanted him to
resume selling tickets to brokers using the same deceptive tactics he had previously
employed. 59

Mr. Friedman further explained that, although he had not acted on his own, Mr.
Gershman advised him to send Mr. Snyder a letter claiming to take full responsibility for the
directives of team executives:

Q: Did you ever communicate with Mr. Snyder about the accusations that were
detailed in that Washington Post story?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: How so?

55
Redskins Sold Brokers Tickets Despite Wait List, Washington Post (Sept. 2, 2009) (online at
[Link]/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/09/01/[Link]?hpid=topnews&sid=ST2009090104025).
56
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022).
57
Redskins Sold Brokers Tickets Despite Wait List, Washington Post (Sept. 2, 2009) (online at
[Link]/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/09/01/[Link]?hpid=topnews&sid=ST2009090104025).
58
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022).
59
Id.; see also Letter from Jason Friedman to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight
and Reform (Apr. 8, 2022) (online at
[Link]
dman%20to%20CBM%20%28Redacted%[Link]).
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 19

A: In the following weeks, Mitch suggested that I send Mr. Snyder an apology
letter taking full responsibility for what had happened and claiming that I acted
alone.

Q: And do you recall what you said in the letter?

A: I do. The main points were I acted alone, and my intentions were good, but my
judgment was bad and that I was very sorry.

Q: And I believe you just said that you didn’t believe that you acted alone.

A: No, I didn’t act alone. 60

Request for Review

Mr. Friedman, who worked for the Commanders for more than two decades, explained
that he provided information to the Committee because he viewed it as his duty to inform the
public about the Commanders’ potentially unlawful business practices under the leadership of
Dan Snyder. He explained:

But I am here today because when the government approached me, I decided that I
wanted to tell the truth and that I was not going to lie to protect Daniel Snyder
anymore. 61

He added:

I’d like those folks to get their money back. That through—and this is just my
opinion—that through all of this, at the top of the priority list is the victimized women,
and a close second are these customers that had their hard-earned money stolen from
them. 62

Based on the troubling practices described herein, we are sharing the information and
documents provided to the Committee and will make available upon request the spreadsheets
provided by Mr. Friedman to determine whether additional investigation is warranted and, if so,
take any appropriate measures to ensure that the thousands of potential victims of this conduct
receive any compensation they are due.

Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

60
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Transcribed Interview of Jason Friedman (Mar. 14, 2022).
61
Id.
62
Id.
The Honorable Lina M. Khan
Page 20

Sincerely,

_________________________ _________________________
Carolyn B. Maloney Raja Krishnamoorthi
Chairwoman Chairman
Committee on Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on Economic and
Consumer Policy

cc: The Honorable James Comer, Ranking Member

Committee on Oversight and Reform

The Honorable Michael Cloud, Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Economic and Consumer Policy

Mr. Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General

Commonwealth of Virginia

Mr. Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General

State of Maryland

Mr. Karl A. Racine, Attorney General

District of Columbia

Mr. Roger Goodell, Commissioner

National Football League, Inc.