ALCANAR, Bernalyn D.

Civil Law Review I

Doctrine: Quieting of Title; For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must be present,
namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy."

Case Title: Residents of Lower Atab & Teacher’s Village, Barangay Sto. Tomas Proper, Baguio City vs. Sta.
Monica Industrial and Development Corp., GR. No. 198878 (J. Del Castillo); (October 15, 2014)

Facts: The residents of Lower Atab & Teachers’ Village, Sto. Tomas Proper Barangay, Baguio City filed a civil case
for quieting of title with damages against respondent Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation. They
alleged that they are successors and transferees-in-interest of Torres, the supposed owner of the subject property in
Baguio City which Torres possessed and declared for tax purposes in 1918; that they are in possession of the
subject property in the concept of owner, declared their respective lots and homes for tax purposes, and paid the real
estate taxes thereon; that in May 2000, respondent began to erect a fence on the subject property, claiming that it is
the owner of a large portion thereof by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-63184 that said TCT No. T-63184 is
null and void, as it was derived from Original Certificate of Title No. O-281, which was declared void pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1271 and in the decided case of Republic v. Marcos; and that TCT No. T-63184 is a cloud
upon their title and interests and should therefore be cancelled.

RTC: The trial court rendered a decision against the petitioners because the case constitutes a collateral attack upon
respondent’s TCT No. T-63184, which became indefeasible after one year from the entry of the decree of registration
thereof. It held that if it is claimed that respondent’s title is void, then a direct proceeding should have been filed by
the State to annul it and to secure reversion of the land; petitioners have no standing to do so through a quieting of
title case. 

CA: The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether the RTC and the CA erred in finding that petitioners have no cause of action.

Held: No, the RTC and the CA did not err in finding that petitioners have no cause of action.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must be present, namely: "(1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy."

"Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership."

Beneficial ownership has been defined as ownership recognized by law and capable of being enforced in the courts
at the suit of the beneficial owner. Black’s Law Dictionary indicates that the term is used in two senses: first, to
indicate the interest of a beneficiary in trust property (also called "equitable ownership"); and second, to refer to the
power of a corporate shareholder to buy or sell the shares, though the shareholder is not registered in the
corporation’s books as the owner. Usually, beneficial ownership is distinguished from naked ownership, which is the
enjoyment of all the benefits and privileges of ownership, as against possession of the bare title to property.

Petitioners do not have legal or equitable title to the subject property. Evidently, there are no certificates of title in
their respective names. And by their own admission in their pleadings, specifically in their pre-trial brief and
memorandum before the trial court, they acknowledged that they applied for the purchase of the property from the
government, through townsite sales applications coursed through the DENR. In their Petition before this Court, they
particularly prayed that TCT No. T-63184 be nullified in order that the said title would not hinder the approval of their
townsite sales applications pending with the DENR. Thus, petitioners admitted that they are not the owners of the
subject property; the same constitutes state or government land which they would like to acquire by purchase. It
would have been different if they were directly claiming the property as their own as a result of acquisitive
prescription, which would then give them the requisite equitable title. By stating that they were in the process of
applying to purchase the subject property from the government, they admitted that they had no such equitable title, at
the very least, which should allow them to prosecute a case for quieting of title.

In short, petitioners recognize that legal and equitable title to the subject property lies in the State. Thus, as to them,
quieting of title is not an available remedy.

Lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation are public land. Laws and decrees such as PD 1271 were passed
recognizing ownership acquired by individuals over portions of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, but evidently, those
who do not fall within the coverage of said laws and decrees – the petitioners included – cannot claim ownership over
property falling within the said reservation. This explains why they have pending applications to purchase the portions
of the subject property which they occupy; they have no legal or equitable claim to the same, unless ownership by
acquisitive prescription is specifically authorized with respect to such lands, in which case they may prove their
adverse possession, if so. As far as this case is concerned, the extent of petitioners’ possession has not been
sufficiently shown, and by their application to purchase the subject property, it appears that they are not claiming the
same through acquisitive prescription.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed August 5, 2011 Decision and October 3, 2011 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84561 are AFFIRMED.
Doctrine: Quieting of Title; In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for "an adjudication that a claim
of title or interest in property adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger of hostile claim, and to
remove a cloud upon or quiet title to land where stale or unenforceable claims or demands exist."

Case Title: Heirs of Pacifico Pocido vs. Arsenia Avila and Emelinda Chua, GR. No. 199146 (J. Carpio); (March 19,
2014)

Facts: In 1894, Pocdo Pool, who died in 1942, began his occupation and claim on three lots that were eventually
surveyed in his name as Lot 43, TS 39-SWO-36431, Lot 44, TS 39-SWO-36420, and Lot 45 TS 39-SWO- 36429 with
an area of 144,623 [sq.m.], 64,112 [sq.m.], and 9,427 square meters, respectively, and situated at Residence Section
4, Baguio City.

The registration of the lots in the names of the petitioners was granted in October 1964, but since the decision was
not implemented within the 10 years prescribed period, the Heirs filed their ancestral land claims with the DENR.

In August 1991, Certificates of Ancestral Lands Claims (CALS) were issued by the DENR for Lots 44 and 45, but Lot
43 was not approved due to Memorandum Order 98-15 issued by the DENR Secretary in September 1998 for being
part of Baguio Townsite Reservation (public land).

In the meantime, Lot 43 had been subjected to several agreements: On 1960- One hectare of Lot 43 was exchanged
on a cession of Polon Pocdo's (one of Pocdo Pool's heirs) rights to Pacifico Pocdo over Lots 43, 44, 45. Then on
1980 Amicable settlement between Pacifico and Polon aiming to segregate the one-hectare portion of Lot 43.
Subsequently on 1981 Catulagan (Agreement in Ilocano) with herein respondent Arsenia Avila for the segregation of
a said one-hectare portion of Lot 43 and on 1987 Polon's Waiver of Rights over a portion of Lot 43.

Subdivided lots were declared for tax purposes and the corresponding tax declaration issued to Polon and Arsenia

CENRO of Baguio City issued in favor of Avila a Certificate of Exclusion of 993 square meters from the Ancestral
Land Claim of the Heirs of Pocdo Pool over Lot 43.

However, the Heirs of Polon Pocdo and his wife Konon filed an affidavit of cancellation with OIC CENRO which was
granted
Avila complained to the Regional Executive Director or RED the unlawful cancellation of her Certificate of Exclusion,
and on June 1, 2000, the RED issued a memorandum setting aside the revocation and restoring the Certificate of
Exclusion.

The Affidavit of Cancellation dated April 27, 2002 filed by the heirs of Polon Pocdo was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, and the validity of the Amicable Settlement, Catulagan, and Deed of Waiver of Rights were recognized.

The DENR Secretary affirmed his Order in [his] Decision of May 14, 2004 in DENR Case 5599, with the modification
that the TSAs fo[r] the appellee Avila could now be made the basis of disposition through public bidding and the
appellant may participate in the bidding if qualified.

Pacifico Pocdo, as the appellant, went on appeal to the Office of the President which resulted in an affirmance of
DENR Secretary’s decision on April 19, 2005 in OP Case 04-H-360.
As mentioned, having exhausted administrative remedies, the Heirs of Pacifico Pocdo challenged the OP resolution
before the Court of Appeals, but this petition was dismissed for having been filed late. The Supreme Court dismissed
the Heirs ‘appeal from this decision

RTC: In a Resolution dated 14 January 2008, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It held that the
DENR had already declared the disputed property as public land, which the State, through the DENR, has the sole
power to dispose. Thus, the claim of petitioners to quiet title is not proper since they do not have title over the
disputed property. 

CA: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s resolution. Hence the petition.

Issue: Whether the petitioners can validly quiet title over public land.

Held: No, the petitioners cannot validly quiet title over public land.

Lot 43 is public land and part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation. This has already been settled by the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Benguet and Mountain Province dated 13 November 1922 in Civil Reservation Case
No. 1. The fact that the heirs of Pocdo Pool were able to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, LRC Case No. 211
and secure a decision in their favor for registration of Lot 43 is of no moment.

The DENR Decision was affirmed by the Office of the President which held that lands within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation belong to the public domain and are no longer registrable under the Land Registration Act. The Office of
the President ordered the disposition of the disputed property in accordance with the applicable rules of procedure for
the disposition of alienable public lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation, particularly Chapter X of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 on Townsite Reservations and other applicable rules.

Having established that the disputed property is public land, the trial court was therefore correct in dismissing the
complaint to quiet title for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had no jurisdiction to determine who among the parties
have better right over the disputed property which is admittedly still part of the public domain. 

In sum, the decision rendered in civil case 1218 on October 28, 1968 is a patent nullity. The court below did not have
power to determine who (the Firmalos or the Tarucs) were entitled to an award of free patent title over that piece of
property that yet belonged to the public domain. Neither did it have power to adjudge the Tarucs as entitled to the
"true equitable ownership" thereof, the latter’s effect being the same: the exclusion of the Firmalos in favor of the
Tarucs.

In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for "an adjudication that a claim of title or interest in
property adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger of hostile claim, and to remove a cloud upon
or quiet title to land where stale or unenforceable claims or demands exist." Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil
Code, the two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title
to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that there is a cloud on his title by reason of any
instrument, record, deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity.

In this case, petitioners, claiming to be owners of the disputed property, allege that respondents are unlawfully
claiming the disputed property by using void documents, namely the "Catulagan" and the Deed of Waiver of Rights.
However, the records reveal that petitioners do not have legal or equitable title over the disputed property, which
forms part of Lot 43, a public land within the Baguio Townsite Reservation. It is clear from the facts of the case that
petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, the heirs of Pocdo Pool, were not even granted a Certificate of Ancestral Land
Claim over Lot 43, which remains public land. Thus, the trial court had no other recourse but to dismiss the case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 12 October 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 91039.
Doctrine: Quieting of Title; An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10)
years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. There is, however, an exception to this rule where the
filing of such action does not prescribe, i.e. when the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property, the action,
being in effect that of quieting of title to the property, does not prescribe.

Case Title: Juanario G. Campit vs. Isidra B. Gripa, GR. No. 195443 (J. Brion) (September 17, 2014)

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals wherein it
dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Juanario Campit to the decision of the Regional Trial Court, which ordered
him to surrender a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) that was found to have been fraudulently issued in his name.

Subject of this case is a 2. 7360-hectare agricultural land situated in Umangan, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, presently
occupied by respondents Isidra B. Gripa, Pedro Bardiaga, and Severino Bardiaga, represented by his son Rolando
Bardiaga, but covered by TCT No. 122237 issued in the petitioner’s name. The petitioner claimed to have purchased
the property from his father Jose Campit in 1977.

On the other hand, respondents Isidra Gripa, Pedro Bardiaga and Severino Bardiaga (as represented by his son,
Rolando Bardiaga) claimed to be the rightful owners of the subject property, as earlier adjudged by the court in Civil
CaseNo. 11858 decided on June 12, 1961, and in Civil Case No. 15357 decided on August 8, 1978.

The Court, in these cases, cancelled the titles of the petitioner and his father Jose because they were obtained
through the misrepresentation of the petitioner’s grandfather, Isidro Campit. The respondents further contended that
they have long desired to divide the subject property among themselves, but the petitioner adamantly refused to
surrender his title to the property to them, or to the Register of Deeds, despite their formal demand.

Due to the petitioner’s continued refusal to surrender the subject TCT, the respondents filed anewan action for
annulment and cancellation of title with the RTC on August 15, 2003, docketed as Civil Case No. 18421.

The petitioner opposed the respondents’ action and argued that the August 8, 1978 decision in Civil Case No. 15357,
which declared his title null and void, could no longer be enforcedbecause its execution was already barred by the
Statute of Limitations, as the said decision was never executed within 10 years from July 19, 1979 - the date of
finality of the judgment.

RTC: Ruled against the petitioners.

CA: Affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision.

HELD: No, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC’s decision.

The issue on the validity of the petitioner’s title to the subject property has long been settled in Civil Case No. 15357,
where the court, in its decision dated August 8, 1978, which became final and executory on July 19, 1979, had found
and declared the petitioner’s title null and void by reason of fraud and misrepresentation. It appears that no motion or
action to revive judgment was ever filed by the respondents - the prevailing party in Civil Case No. 15357, to execute
and enforce the August 8,1978 decision. The title to the subject property, therefore, remained registered under the
petitioner’s name. As the petitioner argued, his title had already become incontrovertible since the Torrens system of
land registration provides for the indefeasibility of the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued upon the
expiration of one (1) year from the date of entry of the registration decree.

We cannot, however, allow the petitioner to maintain his title and benefit from the fruit of his and his predecessors’
fraudulent acts at the expense of the respondents who are the rightful owners of the subject property. The Torrens
system of registration cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud,or to permit one to enrich oneself at the expense of others.

Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner can still be compelled under the law to
reconvey the property registered to the rightful owner under the principle that the property registered is deemed to be
held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered. The party seeking to recover title to
property wrongfully registered in another person’s name must file an action for reconveyance within the allowed
period of time.

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance
of the Torrens title over the property. There is, however, an exception to this rule where the filing of such action does
not prescribe, i.e. when the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property, the action, being in effect that of quieting
of title to the property, does not prescribe.

In the present case, the respondents, who are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 18421 (the action for annulment and
cancellation of title filed in 2013), have always been in possession of the subject property. Worth noting are the CA’s
findings on this respect:

xxx Of course, the defendant-appellant (petitioner herein) has a certificate of title in his favor. But it
cannot be denied that he has never been in possession of the subject property. Neither did he
exercise acts of ownership over the said land since the time he allegedly purchased it from his father
in 1977. Similarly, the defendant-appellant was not able to show that his predecessor-ininterest, Jose
Campit, claimed ownership or was ever in possession of the said land. The defendant-appellant has
admitted that he has paid realty tax covering the subject landonly once when he applied for the
issuance of title in his favor.

xxxx

On the other hand, the continuous possession of the subject premises by the plaintiffs-appellees has
not been denied or disputed by the defendants-appellants (sic). The possession in the concept of an
owner by the plaintiffs-appellees has also been confirmed by witness Charlie Martin.

Considering that the action for annulment and cancellation of title filed by the respondents is substantially in the
nature of an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, combined with the fact that the
respondents have always been in possession of the subject property, we shall treat Civil Case No. 18421 as an
action to quiet title, the filing of which does not prescribe. Thus, we find the respondents’ filing of Civil Case No.
18421 to be proper and not barred by the time limitations set forth under the Rules of Court in enforcing or executing
a final and executory judgment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the present petition for review on certiorari and consequently
AFFIRM the decision dated May 13, 2010 and resolution dated January 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 92356.
Doctrine: Quieting of Title; A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or
claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription; and (4)
and may be prejudicial to the title.

Case Title: Jose S. Ocampo vs. Ricardo S. Ocampo, Sr., GR. No. 227894 (J. Velasco Jr.) (July 5, 2017)

Facts: Petitioner and respondent are full-blooded brothers being sons of the late Basilio Ocampo and Juliana
Sunglao. A complaint was filed by respondent against petitioner for partition and annulment of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 102822.

Respondent claimed that petitioner and his wife, Andrea Mejia Ocampo, conspired in falsifying his signature on a
notarized Extra-Judicial Settlement with Waiver ("ESW") dated September 1970, and effecting the transfer of the
property in the name of petitioner under TCT No. 102822, which was issued on November 24, 1970. Based on a
finding by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that respondent's signature was forged, an Information was filed
against petitioner, the notary public, and two others. Respondent requested for partition of the property, but petitioner
refused to do so and secretly mortgaged the property for ₱200,000.00.

In their Answer, petitioner and his wife claimed that their parents executed a Deed of Donation Propter Nuptias  of the
Subject Property in their favor as they were getting married, with a promise on their part to demolish the old house
and replace it with a new two-storey house, which they did. To build the new house, they obtained a ₱l0,000.00 loan
from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), with petitioner and his parents as borrowers.

Petitioner further alleged that his parents gave respondent several properties outside Metro Manila, which
respondent eventually lost. Petitioner and his wife then allowed respondent to stay at the second floor of the house.
Petitioner was able to pay the DBP loan through a loan secured from the Social Security System (SSS) with the
consent of his father. He claimed that on September 30, 1970, their father executed the ESW and secured
respondent's signature. By virtue of the ESW, petitioner was able to have TCT No. 36869 cancelled and have TCT
No. 102822 issued in favor of himself and his wife.

The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. The CA, which declared the RTC's January 21,
1994 Order null and void. Thereafter, respondent filed a motion for writ of execution before the RTC. However, the
motion was denied on the ground that there is nothing to execute since the setting aside of the R TC Order dated
January 21, 1994 calls for the case to be tried on the merits. Thus, the RTC set the case for pre-trial.

RTC ruled against the petitioner. CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. Hence the petition.

Issue: Whether the action for annulment of title and partition has already prescribed.

Held: No, the action for annulment of title and partition has not prescribed

Given the falsity of the ESW, it becomes apparent that petitioner obtained the registration through fraud. This
wrongful registration gives occasion to the creation of an implied or constructive trust under Article 1456 of the New
Civil Code. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust generally prescribes in ten years. However, if the
plaintiff remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title of possession does not run
against him. In such case, his action is deemed in the nature of a quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.

In the case before us, the certificate of title over the subject property was issued on November 24, 1970. Yet, the
complaint for partition and annulment of the title was only filed on July 1, 1992, more than twenty (20) years since the
assailed title was issued. Respondent's complaint before the RTC would have been barred by prescription. However,
based on respondent's submission before the trial court, both petitioner and respondent were residing at the subject
property at the time the complaint was filed.

This was unqualifiedly admitted by petitioner in his Amended Answer and no denial was interposed therefrom.
Petitioner's failure to refute respondent's possession of the subject property may be deemed as a judicial admission.
A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial, either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. A judicial admission conclusively binds
the party making it and he cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with his pleadings. Acts or
facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted, unless it is shown that the admission was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

Considering that respondent was in actual possession of the disputed land at the time of the filing of the complaint,
the present case may be treated as an action for quieting of title.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real
property. In Heirs of Delfin and Maria Tappa v. Heirs of Jose Bacud,  this Court reiterated the requisites for an action
for quieting of title:

The action filed by Spouses Tappa was one for quieting of title and recovery of possession.
In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, an action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy
grounded on equity, to wit:

x x x Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure "…an adjudication that a claim of title
to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and
those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim. 11 In an
action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and other claimants, "…not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who
has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so
that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could
afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the
property as he deems best. x x x."

In our jurisdiction, the remedy is governed by Article 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, which state:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in
truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an
action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any
interest therein.
 Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the
subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.

From the foregoing provisions, we reiterate the rule that for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable
requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on
his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie  appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.

A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or claim or encumbrance or
proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to
the title.

Since it was already established that respondent's signature on the ESW, which was the basis of petitioner's title over
the property, was forged, then it is only necessary for the cloud on respondent's title to be removed. Thus, the trial
court's order to cancel TCT No. 102822 and uphold the parties' co-ownership was proper.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 3 0, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 55, Manila in Civil Case No. 92-61716, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated
June 28, 2016 in CA-G.R. CV No. 99908, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Doctrine: Quieting of Title; As a general rule, a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet title is not created by
mere verbal or parol assertion of ownership of or an interest in property. This rule is subject to qualification, where
there is a written or factual basis for the asserted right. Thus, a claim of right based on acquisitive prescription or
adverse possession has been held to constitute a removable cloud on title.

Case Title: Efren Tandog vs. Renato Macapagal, GR. No. 144208; (J. Sandoval-Gutierrez) (September 11, 2007)

Facts: The petitioners claim that they have been in actual, open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
the land since time immemorial. Their predecessor-in-interest Policarpio, died in 1945. He was survived by his
nephews and nephews and nieces, now deceased, except Catanyag. She and Casimiro’s grand nieces and grand
nephews have continued possessing and cultivating the land.

When petitioners applied for the judicial registration of the property, they found that portions of the land have been
occupied by the respondents. According to them, the respondents used falsified documents to justify their possession
of a parcel of land which they sold to the government. For his part, respondent was granted a free patent which led to
the issuance of the OCT. Because of these, petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for quieting of title.

Respondent specifically denied petitioners’ allegations, contending that she and her husband bought their property in
1958 and since then, have been in possession of the same. They entered into a Compromise Agreement and was
approved by the RTC. The respondents filed a demurrer to evidence and was likewise granted by the trial court and
dismissed the same. On appeal, the CA affirmed the order of the trial court and dismissed their complaint. The
appellate court held that the claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner’s title to or interest in real
property. The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be an instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding. These grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of
these reasons may not be considered valid for the same action.

Issue: Whether the free patent are judicial admissions and may be considered as cloud.

Held: No, the free patent are not judicial admissions and may not be considered as cloud.

Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth
and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may
be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.

As a general rule, a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet title is not created by mere verbal or parol assertion
of ownership of or an interest in property. This rule is subject to qualification, where there is a written or factual basis
for the asserted right. Thus, a claim of right based on acquisitive prescription or adverse possession has been held to
constitute a removable cloud on title.
While petitioners alleged that respondents’ claim of adverse possession is a cloud on their (petitioners’) interest in the
land, however, such allegation has not been proved. The alleged falsified documents relied upon by respondents to
justify their possession were merely marked as exhibits but were never formally offered in evidence by petitioners.
We have consistently ruled that documents which may have been marked as exhibits during the hearing, but which
were not formally offered in evidence, cannot be considered as evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary
value.

It is important that petitioners must first establish their legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which
is the subject matter of the action. Petitioners failed to do so. Parenthetically, they did not present any evidence to
prove that Casimiro Policarpio "existed" and that he is their predecessor-in-interest. Their testimonies can not be
considered declarations about pedigree. In order that pedigree may be proved by acts or declarations of relatives
under Section 39 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, it is necessary that (a) the actor or declarant is dead or unable to
testify; (b) the act or declaration is made by a person related to the subject by birth or marriage; (c) the relationship
between the declarant or the actor and the subject is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration; and (d)
the act or declaration was made ante litem motam, or prior to the controversy.

Records show that petitioners failed to establish by evidence any or all the above requisites.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
57812. Costs against petitioners.
Doctrine: Quieting of Title; An action to quiet title is a real action over immovables, which prescribes after thirty years.

Case Title: Antonio James vs. Eurem Realty Development Corp. GR. No. 190650, (J. Reyes) (October 14, 2013)

Facts: In 2003, the heirs of Gorgonio James, which are the petitioners in this case filed a civil case against the
respondents. The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they are the registered owners of a property in Dipolog
City, while the respondent is the registered owner of a portion of the same property owned by the same petitioners,
where the respondent derived its title from Lopez who executed in its favor a Deed of Assignment and Exchange,
who in turn Lopez derived his title from Primitivo, who was Gorgonio’s brother; in the same title, there is an
annotation made due to a final decision by the CA, declaring the titles in the name of Primitivo as null and void and
ordering the partition of the lots among the heirs of Butler James, and the said annotation was not carried on to the
TCT in the respondent’s name, the respondent’s title is void ab initio as its predecessor-in-interest Lopez derived his
title from Primitivo’s void title; Lopez acted in bad faith in assigning the property to the respondent as he knew fully
well that he had no right over said property; the respondent has knowledge of Lopez’s bad faith since it is a
corporation organized by Lopez; and there is a need to declare the TCT in the respondent’s name as null and void,
and petitioners be declared as lawful owner of the entire Lot, among others.

In its Answer, the respondent argued that the complaint is barred by prior judgment and that prescription has already
set in. The RTC sustained the respondent’s defenses and dismissed the complaint. According to the RTC, res
judicata does not apply because the causes of action involved in the civil cases are different. On the ground of
prescription, the RTC agreed with the respondent that the petitioners’ action had already prescribed. This was
affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether petitioners’ action is barred by prescription.

HELD: No, petitioners’ action is not barred by prescription.

The Court notes that the RTC’s dismissal was triggered by the defenses raised by the respondent in its answer.
There was yet to be a trial on the merits but the RTC merely relied on the averments in the complaint and answer
and forthwith dismissed the case. On this point, the Court has already ruled that the "affirmative defense of
prescription does not automatically warrant the dismissal of a complaint, x x x. " While trial courts have authority and
discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription, it may only do so when the parties’ pleadings or other
facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred.24 "If the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters
requiring a full-blown trial on the merits, it cannot be determined in a motion to dismiss."

Parenthetically, there are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, i.e., the acquisition
of a right by the lapse of time; the other is extinctive, whereby rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time. The
kind of prescription raised by the respondent pertains to extinctive prescription.

As previously noted, Civil Case No. 5877 is one for the declaration of nullity of TCT No. T-10713 in the name of the
respondent, which covers a portion of Lot 1, Pcs-09-02753 under TCT No. T-18833 in the name of the petitioners,
and for the declaration of the petitioners’ absolute ownership over said property. As basis for their claim, the
petitioners claimed that the respondent’s title over the property is void ab initio, having acquired the same from Lopez
who, in turn, acquired it from Primitivo with the knowledge that the latter’s title was void. An action to declare the
nullity of a void title does not prescribe.

Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is essentially one for quieting of title. An action to quiet title is a common
law remedy designed for the removal of any cloud upon, or doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. The
pleadings filed in this case show that both the petitioners and respondent have title over the same property, albeit the
petitioners’ title covers 448 sq m, while that of the respondent’s covers a 344-sq m portion thereof. It likewise appears
from the records that both parties are in possession of their respective portions of the property. In an action for
quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other
claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to the immovable,
respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see
every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired
improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property.

An action to quiet title is a real action over immovables, which prescribes after thirty years. Thus, even assuming that
the petitioners action is subject to extinctive prescription, it was error for the RTC to reckon the date when
prescription began to run solely on the date of the issuance of Lopez s title on October 11 1972. The petitioners
cannot be expected to file the action after the issuance of Lopez s title since at that time, the appeal in Civil Case No.
1447, the case between their predecessor Gorgonio and his siblings as against their other sibling Primitivo, was still
pending and was only resolved with finality by the CA only on November 7 1978. The appeal in Civil Case No. 2503
between Lopez and Gorgonio, meanwhile, was dismissed by the CA with finality only on August 17, 1978. t should
also be noted that what is being· attacked is the respondent s TCT No. T-10713, which was issued on March .2
1992. Thus, reckoning the prescriptive period from said date, the 30-year period clearly has not yet lapsed since the
complaint was filed only on September 17, 2003.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2009 and Resolution dated November 17,
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 00 119-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, Civil
Case No. 5877 is REINSTATED. Let records of the case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City,
Branch 6, which is DIRECTED to proceed with the case with dispatch.
Doctrine: Quieting of Title; One who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait
until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule
being that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed
only by one who is in possession.

Case Title: Imelda Syjuco vs. Felisa Bonifacio, GR. No. 148748, (J. Leonardo-De Castro); (January 14, 2015)

Facts: Petitioners are the registered co-owners of the subject land, located in Rizal. The TCT was issued by the
Register of Deeds in 1984. Petitioners have been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the subject
land, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest since 1926. Petitioners traced back their title over the
subject land to the TCT issued in 1926 to Monica Galauran. Thereafter, a new TCT was issued to replace the former
under the names of Martin and Manuel Syjuco.

Among the annotations on the title are two encumbrances constituted by petitioners on the subject land, particularly:

1. A lease agreement in favor of Manufacturer’s Bank and Trust Company over a portion of the subject land,
with the condition that the buildings which the lessee had constructed thereon shall become the property of
the lessor/s after the expiration of the lease agreement; and

2. Another lease agreement in favor of a certain Chan Heng, over the remaining portion of the subject land.

In 1994, petitioners learned that a broker named Exequiel Fajardo through a Letter, offered for sale the subject land
along with the improvements thereon to a certain Luis Ong. Also, they found out that the purpoted owner of the
subject land, respondent Bonifacio, was the sub-lessee of Kalayaan Development corporation, which in turn, was the
sub-lessee of Manufacturer’s Bank, which was the direct lessee of petitioners.

To protect their rights and interest over the land, petitioners filed a petition with the RTC, praying for the declaration
of nullity and cancellation of respondent Bonifacio’s TCT over the subject land in view of petitioner’s subsisting TCT
over the very same property. The RTC deemed the civil case as a special civil action for quieting of title and not an
ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership of land.

Subsequently, petitioners discovered that respondent Bonifacio sold the subject land in favor of respondent VSD
Realty, and that the TCT in the name of Bonifacio had already been cancelled and replaced. Thus, VSD Realty was
impleaded in the civil case. The RTC dismissed the petition, after brushing aside petitioners’ claim of continuous
possession of the subject property because such fact alone could not defeat respondents’ title over said property
registered under the Torrens system. Absent any showing by clear and convincing proof that the TCT of respondent
Bonifacio was irregularly issued, the RTC accorded said titles the conclusive presumption of validity. This was
affirmed by the CA, holding that the petitioners’ possession of the subject land cannot defeat respondent’s title
thereto, because while it recognized that petitioners have been in 44 years of contiuous possession, it could not lose
the sight of the fact that respondent is an owner of an earlier issued title. The imprescriptibility of Bonifacio’s title
cannot be defeated by the petitioners’ continuous possession of the question lot.

Issue: Whether the action for quieting of title is proper.

The instituted action in this case is clearly a direct attack on a certificate of title to real property. In their complaint for
quieting of title, petitioners specifically pray for the declaration of nullity and/or cancellation of respondents’ TCT Nos.
265778 and 285313 over the subject land. The relief sought by petitioners is certainly feasible since the objective of
an action to quiet title, as provided under Article 476 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, is precisely to quiet, remove,
invalidate, annul, and/or nullify" a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title."

The Court also finds bereft of merit the contentions that petitioners’ action to quiet title had already prescribed and/or
that the titles of respondents over the subject land have already become incontrovertible and indefeasible based on
Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:

Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value.- The decree of registration shall not be
reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor
by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the
government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and
review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has
acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser
for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall
become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by
action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud. (Emphases added.)

The above-quoted rule has well-settled exceptions.

It is an established doctrine in land ownership disputes that the filing of an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the
disputed real property is in the possession of the plaintiff. One who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming
to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate
his right, the reason for the rule being that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of
a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own
title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.46

In this case, petitioners have duly established during the trial that they and/or their predecessors-in-interest have
been in uninterrupted possession of the subject land since 1926 and that it was only in 1994 when they found out that
respondent Bonifacio was able to register the said property in her name in another title. It was also only in 1995 when
petitioners learned that respondent Bonifacio was able to sell and transfer her title over the subject land in favor of
respondent VSD Realty.
Moreover, the rule on the incontrovertibility or indefeasibility of title has no application in this case given the fact that
the contending parties claim ownership over the subject land based on their respective certificates of title thereon
which originated from different sources. Certainly, there cannot be two or even several certificates of title on the
same parcel of real property because "a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land
already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case" and "a second decree for the same land
would be null and void, since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once." 47 The
indefeasibility of a title under the Torrens system could be claimed only if a previous valid title to the same parcel of
land does not exist. Where the issuance of the title was attended by fraud, the same cannot vest in the titled owner
any valid legal title to the land covered by it; and the person in whose name the title was issued cannot transmit the
same, for he has no true title thereto. This ruling is a mere affirmation of the recognized principle that a certificate is
not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and that an earlier
certificate for the same land is in existence.48

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated February 23, 2001,
as well as the Resolution dated June 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 57777 which affirmed in
toto the Decision dated January 9, 1998 of Branch 126 of the RTC of the City of Caloocan in Civil Case No. C-366,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. TCT No. 265778 in the name of Felisa D. Bonifacio and TCT No. 285313 in the
name of VSD Realty & Development Corporation are declared NULL and VOID. The Registry of Deeds of Caloocan
City is DIRECTED to CANCEL the said certificates of title.
Doctrine: Co-ownership; Co-ownership is the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a
spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided.

Case Title: Wilfredo A. Vagilidad vs. Gabino Vagilidad, Jr., GR. No. 161136, (J. Puno); (November 16, 2006)

Facts: A parcel of land in Antique was owned by Zoilo as per an OCT issued in 1931. When Zoilo died, a portion of
the lot was sold to respondent by Loreto as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Subsequently, Loreto, Efren, and
Priscilla was issued a TCT of the entire lot, in view of the death of Zoilo.

In 1987, Gabino filed a Petition for the Surrender of TCT with the RTC against Loreto. The plaintiff alleged that being
the owner of the lot, he is entitled to ask for the surrender of the owner’s copy of TCT to the Register of Deeds to
effect the transfer of title and to name the petitioner. However, as per motion, since the parties seemed to have
already reached an amicable settlement without the knowledge of their counsels, the trial court archived the case.
Meanwhile, Gabino paid real estate taxes on the land he brought from Loreto. He thereafter sold the same lot to
petitioner.

In 1990, the sale of the lot to the petitioner was registered. Subsequently, petitioner obtained another loan from the
DBP and mortgaged the lot as collateral of the loan. A few years later, the spouses Gabino and Dorothy Vagilidad
filed a Complaint for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Damages with the RTC against the petitioners.
The plaintiffs claimed that they are the true and lawful owners of the lot which was sold to him by Loreto; that When
Gabino Sr. died, the defendant Wilfredo requested Gabino Jr. to transfer ownership of the lot to the former’s name for
loaning purposes with the agreement that the land will be returned when the plaintiffs need the same. They added
that, pursuant to the mentioned agreement, the plaintiff, without his knowledge and consent, Dorothy executed the
Deed of Sale in favor of defendant Wilfredo, receiving nothing as payment therefor. They pointed out that the
defendant was able to mortgage the property. The plaintiffs demanded the return of the property but was refused by
the defendants. Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that the same document is null and void for want of consideration and
the same does not bind the non-consenting spouse.

In their Answers, the defendants denied material allegations of the plaintiffs, and claimed that they are the lawful
owners of the lot. They alleged that Loreto, with conformity of his wife, sold the lot to them in 1989 and the
transaction was registered with the Register of Deeds. They added that a TCT was issued in favor of them.

RTC: The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners, ruling that Loreto could only sell at the time his aliquot share in
the inheritance. He could not have sold a divided part thereof designated by meters and bounds. Thus, it held that
Loreto remained the owner of the subject lot when he sold it to Wilfredo.

CA: On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC ruling, holding that the sale made by Loreto in favor of the respondents
were valid. The rights of Loreto to succession are transmitted from the moment of Zoilo’s death in 1931. Thus, when
Loreto sold the portion of the lot to respondent, he already had the right as co-owner to his share, even if at the time
the property had not yet been partitioned.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the contract of sale between Loreto and Gabino is valid.

Held: No, the CA did not err in ruling that the contract of sale between Loreto and Gabino is valid.
Petitioners likewise err in their argument that the contract of sale between LORETO and GABINO, JR. is void on the
ground that at the time of the sale on May 12, 1986, LORETO had a right to dispose only an aliquot part of the yet
undivided property of ZOILO. The subject parcel, being an inherited property, is subject to the rules of co-ownership
under the Civil Code.

Co-ownership is the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not
materially or physically divided. Before the partition of the property held in common, no individual or co-owner can
claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share
in the entire property.

LORETO sold the subject property to GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986 as a co-owner. LORETO had a right, even
before the partition of the property on January 19, 1987, to transfer in whole or in part his undivided interest in the lot
even without the consent of his co-heirs. This right is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-
owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute
another person for its enjoyment. Thus, what GABINO, JR. obtained by virtue of the sale on May 12, 1986 were the
same rights as the vendor LORETO had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under
their transaction.

LORETO sold some 1,604 square meters of Lot No. 1253 to GABINO, JR. Consequently, when LORETO purportedly
sold to WILFREDO on December 7, 1989 the same portion of the lot, he was no longer the owner of Lot No. 1253-B.
Based on the principle that "no one can give what he does not have," LORETO could not have validly sold to
WILFREDO on December 7, 1989 what he no longer had. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, the sale
made by LORETO in favor of WILFREDO is void as LORETO did not have the right to transfer the ownership of the
subject property at the time of sale.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. CV-68318 dated March 19, 2003 and November 13, 2003, respectively, are AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against petitioners.
Doctrine: Co-ownership; The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b)
unity of or material indivision, which means that there is a single object which is not materially divided, and which is
the element which binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and
obligations of the co-owners.

Case Title: Lilia Sanchez vs. CA, [Link]. 152766, (J. Bellosillo); (June 20, 2003)

Facts: Petitioner constructed a house on a lot owned by her parents in law. The lot was registered with the following
co-owners: Eliseo, married to Celia; Marilyn, married to Nicanor, Lilian, widow; Nenita, single; Susana, married to
Fernando; and Felipe Sanchez. In 1995, the lot was registered in the name of private respondent Virginia Teria by
Deed of Absolute Sale, supposed to have been executed in 1995 by all 6 co-owners in her favor. Petitioner claimed
that she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting the
private respondent to file an action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the MeTC, where she obtained
favorable judgment. The MeTC declared that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6
remained as the property of petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been
established as a forgery. This was affirmed by the RTC, because of the inaction of petitioner’s counsel.

In 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution and a year later, a Notice to Vacate by the
sheriff upon the petitioner who refused to heed the Notice. Subsequently, the respondent started demolishing
petitioner’s house without any special permit of demolition. Due to the demolition of her house, petitioner was forced
to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to serve as the house’s toilet and laundry area.

Petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC, on the ground that she was not bound by the
inaction of her counsel who failed to submit petitioner’s appeal memorandum. However, the RTC denied the same.

On appeal with the CA, the appellate court denied the petition for lack of merit.

Issue: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case.

Held: Yes, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case.

This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law: co-ownership. Throughout the proceedings from the
MeTC to the Court of Appeals, the notion of co-ownership  was not sufficiently dealt with. We attempt to address this
controversy in the interest of substantial justice. Certiorari should therefore be granted to cure this grave abuse of
discretion.

Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as "the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a
spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided. Manresa defines it as the "manifestation of the private
right of ownership, which instead of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the things subject to it,
is exercised by two or more owners and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the same."

The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material
indivision, which means that there is a single object which is not materially divided, and which is the element which
binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and obligations of the co-
owners.

In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute.
Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed
with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do
any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.

Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to create an express trust among
the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the
others.

Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion
thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.

Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and
dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of
the other co-owners. But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned
in common because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical
adjudication.

Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and bounds of petitioner’s lot has not been
designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her
right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her definite share
and determine the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private
respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well as its
Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A survey of the
questioned lot with TCT No. 289216 (formerly TCT No. 263624) by a duly licensed geodetic engineer and the
PARTITION of the aforesaid lot are ORDERED.

Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br. 49, Caloocan City to effect the aforementioned survey and
partition, as well as segregate the 1/6 portion appertaining to petitioner Lilia Sanchez.

The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to Virginia Teria shall be RESPECTED insofar as the other
undivided 5/6 portion of the property is concerned.
Doctrine: Co-ownership; No individual can claim title to a definite or concrete portion before partition of co-owned
property. Each co-owner only possesses a right to sell or alienate his ideal share after partition. However, in case he
disposes his share before partition, such disposition does not make the sale or alienation null and void.

Case Title: Vicente Torres, Jr. vs. Lorenzo Lapinid, GR. No. 187987, (J. Perez); (November 26, 2014)

Facts: In 2006, petitioners Vicente Torres, Mariano Velez and Carlos Velez filed a complaint with the RTC, praying
for the nullification of the sale of real property by respondent Jesus Velez in favor of Lapinid, the recovery of
possession and ownership of the property, and payment of damages. They alleged that they, including Jesus, are co-
owners of several parcels of land including the disputed property in Cebu. In 1993, Jesus filed an action for partition
of the parcels of land against the petitioners and other co-owners, where a judgment was rendered based on a
compromise agreement signed by the parties where they agreed that Jesus, Mariano and Vicente were jointly
authorized to sell the said properties and receive the proceeds and distribute the same to the co-owners. However,
the agreement was later amended to exclude Jesus as an authorized seller. When they inspected the property, they
discovered that Lapinid was occupying a portion of the property in question, by virtue of a deed of sale executed by
Jesus.

The petitioners prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void, arguing that the sale of a definite portion of a
co-owned property without notice to the other co-owners is without force and effect. In its Answer, Jesus admitted
that there was a partition case between him and the petitioners. However, he insisted that a motion was signed by
the co-owners wherein the lot was agreed to be adjudicated to the co-owners belonging to the group of Jesus and
the other lots be divided to the owners belonging to the petitioners. Jesus further alleged that even prior to the
partition, several co-owners in his group had already sold their shares. The trial court dismissed the case, and
nullified the site assignment made by Jesus in the Deed of Sale of Lapinid’s portion, where the exact location of
which still has to be determined either by agreement or by the Court. This was affirmed by the CA on appeal, holding
that it validated the sale and ruled that the compromise agreement did not affect the validity of the sale previously
executed by Jesus and Lapinid. It likewise dismissed the claim for rental payments, attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses of the petitioners.

Issue: Whether the sale of the portion of the property to Lapinid was valid.

Held: Yes, the sale of the portion of the property to Lapinid was valid.

Admittedly, Jesus sold an area ofland to Lapinid on 9 November 1997. To simplify, the question now iswhether
Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the property heco-owns in favor of another person. We answer in
the affirmative.

A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and pro indiviso share in the co-owned property. He has the
right to alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to the extent of substituting a third person in its enjoyment provided
that no personal rights will be affected. This is evident from the provision of the Civil Code:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same
time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. Hence, his co-owners have no right to enjoin a co-owner who
intends to alienate or substitute his abstract portion or substitute a third person in its enjoyment.

In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of Lapinid, free from any opposition from the
co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly obtained the same rights of Jesus from the date of the execution of a
valid sale. Absent any proof that the sale was not perfected, the validity of sale subsists. In essence, Lapinid steps
into the shoes of Jesus as co-owner of an ideal and proportionate share in the property held in common. Thus, from
the perfection of contract on 9 November 1997, Lapinid eventually became a co-owner of the property.

Even assuming that the petitioners are correct in their allegation that the disposition in favor of Lapinid before
partition was a concrete or definite portion, the validity of sale still prevails.

In a catena of decisions, the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that no individual can claim title to a definite or
concrete portion before partition of co-owned property. Each co-owner only possesses a right to sell or alienate his
ideal share after partition. However, in case he disposes his share before partition, such disposition does not make
the sale or alienation null and void. What will be affected on the sale is only his proportionate share, subject to the
results of the partition. The co-owners who did not give their consent to the sale stand to be unaffected by the
alienation.

The validity of sale being settled, it follows that the subsequent compromise agreement between the other co-owners
did not affect the rights of Lapinid as a co-owner.

Records show that on 13 August 2001, a judgment based on compromise agreement was rendered with regard to
the previous partition case involving the same parties pertaining to several parcels of land, including the disputed lot.
The words of the compromise state that: COME NOW[,] the parties and to this Honorable Court, most respectfully
state that instead of partitioning the properties, subject matter of litigation, that they will just sell the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 25796, 25797 and 25798 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu and divide the
proceeds among themselves.

That Jesus Velez, Mariano Velez and Vicente Torres, Jr. are currently authorized to sell said properties, receive the
proceeds thereof and distribute them to the parties.

Be that as it may, the compromise agreement failed to defeat the already accrued right of ownership of Lapinid over
the share sold by Jesus. As early as 9 November 1997, Lapinid already became a co-owner of the property and thus,
vested with all the rights enjoyed by the other co-owners. The judgment based on the compromise agreement, which
is to have the covered properties sold, is valid and effectual provided as it does not affect the proportionate share of
the non-consenting party. Accordingly, when the compromise agreement was executed without Lapinid’s consent,
said agreement could not have affected his ideal and undivided share. Petitioners cannot sell Lapinid’s share absent
his consent. Nemo dat quod non habet – "no one can give what he does not have."
This Court has ruled in many cases that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his
own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent tothe sale. This is because the sale or other
disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his
grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.

We find unacceptable the argument that Lapinid must pay rental payments to the other co-owners.

As previously discussed, Lapinid, from the execution of sale, became a co-owner vested with rights to enjoy the
property held in common.

Clearly specified in the Civil Code are the following rights:

Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose
for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-
owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement,
express or implied.

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 30
January 2009 and 14 May 2009 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Doctrine: Co-ownership; Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that any of the co-owners may bring an
action for ejectment, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. 

Case Title: Lourdes C. Fernandez vs. Norma Villegas, GR. No. 200191, (J. Perlas-Bernabe) (August 20, 2014)

Facts: In 2008, petitioner and her sister Cecilia filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the MTCC against
respondents, seeking to recover possession of a parcel of land in Dagupan City. In the complaint, they alleged that
they are the registered owners of the subject property, on which the parties previously lived under one roof. However,
when their house was destroyed by a typhoon, Lourdes transferred to a nipa hut on the same lot, while Norma,
Cecilia’s daughter-in-law were advised to relocate but, in the meantime, allowed to use a portion thereof. Instead,
respondents erected a house thereon over plaintiffs’ objections and despite demands, refused to vacate and
surrender possession of the subject property. The dispute was referred to the barangay, but no settlement was
reached.

In its Answer, respondents averred that the complaint stated no cause of action, considering that Lourdes (petitioner)
has no standing to question their possession of the subject property as she had already donated her portion in favor
of Cecilia. Respondents further asserted that there was no compliance with the required conciliation under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law as no Certificate to File action was attached to the complaint.

The MTCC found that respondents failed to impugn the validity of plaintiff’s ownership of the subject property. On
appeal with the RTC, the action was granted on the ground that there was no substantial compliance with the
mandatory conciliation and mediation, and the respondents are builders in good faith and cannot be summarily
ejected.

On appeal, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, on the ground that Cecilia failed to personally verify the
petition; and the appeal is dilatory. In their comment, plaintiffs maintained that Lourdes, as co-owner, has the right to
file an ejectment case by herself, without joining her co-owner, Cecilia, as provided under Art. 487 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, Lourdes was specially authorized by Imelda to file the CA petition. The CA granted the respondents’
Motion, holding that there was also no showing that Lourdes was authorized by her co-plaintiff, Cecilia, to represent
the latter and to sign the said certification, and neither did the submission of the special powers of attorney of Cecilia
and Imelda to that effect constitute substantial compliance with the rules.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing outright the petition.

Held: Yes, the CA erred in dismissing outright the petition.

It is undisputed that Lourdes is not only a resident of the subject property but is a co-owner thereof together with her
co-plaintiff/sister, Cecilia. As such, she is "one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in
the x x x [CA] petition" and is therefore qualified to "sign x x x the verification" attached thereto in view of paragraph 3
of the above-said guidelines.

In fact, Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that any of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment,
without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for
the benefit of all. To reiterate, both Lourdes and Cecilia are co-plaintiffs in the ejectment suit. Thus, they share a
commonality of interest and cause of action as against respondents. Notably, even the petition for review filed before
the CA indicated that they are the petitioners therein and that the same was filed on their behalf. Hence, the lone
signature of Lourdes on the verification attached to the CA petition constituted substantial compliance with the
rules. As held in the case of Medado v. Heirs of the Late Antonio Consing:

[W]here the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property subject of the action,
the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the
court from proceeding with the action.41 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Besides, it is settled that the verification of a pleading is only a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement intended to
secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Therefore, the courts may simply
order the correction of the pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules, as in this case.

Following paragraph 5 of the guidelines as aforestated, there was also substantial compliance with the certification
against forum shopping requirement, notwithstanding the fact that only Lourdes signed the same.

It has been held that under reasonable or justifiable circumstances - as in this case where the plaintiffs or petitioners
share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense - the rule requiring all such plaintiffs or
petitioners to sign the certification against forum shopping may be relaxed. Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing
the petition on this score.

Similar to the rules on verification, the rules on forum shopping are designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice; hence, it should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objectives. The requirement of strict compliance with the provisions on certification against
forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature to the effect that the certification cannot altogether be
dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not prohibit substantial compliance with the rules
under justifiable circumstances, as also in this case.

As there was substantial compliance with the above-discussed procedural requirements at the onset, plaintiffs'
subsequent failure to file an amended verification and certification, as directed by the October 11, 2010 CA
Resolution, should not have warranted the dismissal of the CA petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 22, 2011 and December 28, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 116143 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case is
REINSTATED and REMANDED to the CA for proper and immediate disposition.
Doctrine: Co-ownership; A co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to
partition among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in
case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. The vendee steps into the shoes of the
vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.

Case Title: Extraordinary Development Corp. vs. Herminia F. Samson-Bico, GR. No. 191090 (J. Perez) (October 13,
2014)

Facts: Apolonio Ballesteros (Apolonio) and Maria Membrebe (Maria) were husband and wife. They begot two (2)
children, namely, Juan M. Ballesteros (Juan) and Irenea Ballesteros (Irenea). 

During his lifetime, Apolonio owned a parcel of land consisting of 29,748 square meters situated at Barangay Pantok,
Binangonan, Rizal covered by Tax Declaration No. BI-030-1509.  When Apolonio and Maria died, the property was
inherited by Juan and Irenea.  When the latter died, the heirs of Juan and Irenea became co-owners of the property.

On 16 April 2002, the heirs of Juan, without the consent of respondents, the heirs of Irenea executed in favor of
petitioner EDC a Deed of Absolute Sale4 covering the subject property for P2,974,800.00.  Prior to the sale,
respondents claimed that they learned that the property had been the subject of a contract to sell between the heirs
of Juan and EDC. On 7 March 2000, respondents wrote to EDC informing it of the existence of co-ownership over the
subject property.

EDC was able to cause the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Office of the Provincial Assessor Rizal
and transfer the tax declaration over the subject property in its name. EDC alleged that it is a buyer in good faith and
for value of the subject property because it was of the honest belief that the heirs of Juan are the only heirs of the late
Apolonio.

On the other hand, the heirs of Juan asserted that respondents were aware of and were parties to the contract to sell
entered into by them and EDC.

The trial court warned the defendants, petitioner here, and the heirs of Juan that if they fail to do so, their right to
present evidence would be waived.12 On 5 November 2007, the lawyer of the heirs of Juan still failed to appear,
while the counsel of the plaintiffs sent a representative to move for the resetting of the case.13  Finally, on 5
December 2007, the counsel of the heirs of Juan once again failed to appear so upon motion of respondent’s
counsel, the case was submitted for resolution.

On 3 January 2008, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents. The trial court found that respondents and the heirs of
Juan are co-owners of the subject property; that at the time of sale, the heirs of Juan did not have the right to sell the
one half share of the heirs of Irenea; that the sale did not bind the heirs of Irenea; that there was fraud in the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale when the heirs of Juan failed to disclose to EDC that one half of the property
sold is owned by respondents; and that EDC was not a buyer in good faith because it knew that respondents were
co-owners of the subject property because Herminia informed EDC of such fact through a letter dated 9 March 2000.

EDC appealed to the Court of Appeals. 

The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents were able to establish their co-ownership over one-half of the subject
property.  The appellate court pointed out that the heirs of Juan categorically admitted in their Answer, as well as
during the hearing the existence of co-ownership.  The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s finding that the
heirs of Juan, as co-owners, could only alienate or convey to EDC their one-half portion of the subject property which
may be allotted to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.  Thus, the sale will affect only their
share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.

Aggrieved, EDC filed this present petition.

Interestingly, it was EDC who pursued this petition and insist that respondents failed to prove co-ownership
presumably to validate in its entirety the Deed of Absolute Sale it entered into with the heirs of Juan.  EDC reiterates
its argument that the testimony of Herminia is insufficient to prove that respondents are entitled to inherit one-half of
the subject property from Apolonio.  According to EDC, respondents should have established that Irenea is a
legitimate child of Apolonio; that Irenea and Juan are the only legitimate compulsory heirs of Apolonio; that Apolonio
predeceased Irenea and Juan; that Hermina and Merlita are the legitimate children of Irenea; and that Irenea
predeceased Herminia.  EDC also maintains that it is a buyer in good faith and that it was respondents who acted in
bad faith, thus it prays for damages.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave error in ruling that the Respondents are entitled to ½ of the
Subject Property. 

Held: No, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave error in ruling that the Respondents are entitled to ½ of the
Subject Property. 

Having established respondents’ co-ownership rights over the subject property, we find no error in the appellate
court’s ruling sustaining the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale but only with respect to the rights of the heirs of
Juan over one-half of the property.

Article 493 of the Civil Code recognizes the absolute right of a co-owner to freely dispose of his pro indiviso share as
well as the fruits and other benefits arising from that share, independently of the other co-owners, thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.

We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned
property prior to partition among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire
anything at all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the
co-owner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what
the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share
equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the
vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.

We are also in full accord with the appellate court’s order for the heirs of Juan to return one-half of the purchase price
to EDC.  There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person
retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience.30 Therefore, it is correct for the Court of Appeals to order the heirs of Juan to return the amount of
P1,487,400.00, representing one-half of the purchase price to prevent unjust enrichment at the expense of EDC.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 31 July 2009 and Resolution dated 22
January 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 91358 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Doctrine: Co-ownership; No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Case Title: Fortunato Anzures vs. Erlinda Ventanilla, GR. No. 222297 (J. Gesmundo) (July 9, 2018)

Facts: On Oct. 12, 2012, respondents filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Fortunato Anzures. In their
complaint, respondents alleged, among others, that they were the owners of a residential house situated in Barangay
Sta. Ines, Bulakan, Bulacan; that the house had been declared for taxation purposes in their names for the year
2012; that the property stands on a 289 square meters parcel of land under OCT No. 2011000008 registered in the
names of petitioner and his wife Carolina Anzures (Carolina); that later, by virtue of a Deed of Donation, petitioner
and his wife Carolina donated 144 square meters portion of the land in favor of respondents; that Erlinda Ventanilla
“indicated to partition the said property,” but the house situated on said property constitutes a stumbling block on the
partition of the said property; that being the owners of the property, respondents merely tolerated the occupation of
the property by petitioner; that they demanded he vacate the house to give way to the subdivision and partition of the
property but to no avail.

In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner averred that he and his late spouse Carolina were the owners of the
residential house; that he was also the registered owner of the 289 square meters parcel of land, having bought the
same from Erlinda Ventanilla for P150,000.00; that his possession and ownership of the land was evidenced by OCT
No. 2011000008; that he was the rightful owner of the residential house as shown by the tax receipts confirming the
religious payments he made from 1998 to 2011.

Petitioner also denied the genuineness and authenticity of the deed of donation because at that time, Carolina was
mentally and physically incompetent to execute the same. He contended that he had no knowledge of the deed and
he never affixed his signature thereon.

Evidence shows that the property was originally owned by one Vicenta Galvez, who died intestate on October 6,
1967. After her death, her sole heirs, executed a “Waiver of Rights over the Unregistered Parcel of Land” in favor of
their nieces, Erlinda Rodriguez and Carolina Rodriguez on May 31, 2000.

To confirm and firm up the waiver and transfer, they also executed a “Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land” in
favor of Erlinda and Carolina. In said document, the three sold, transferred and conveyed, absolutely and
unconditionally, the subject “parcel of land with improvements” to the two, “their heirs or assigns, free from all liens
and encumbrances.”

On October 31, 2008, Carolina and Erlinda executed a “Pagkakaloob ng Bahagi ng Lupa na may Kasunduan,”
whereby the two gave 1/3 of the subject property to their brother, Emiliano; the three siblings agreed to place the
property in the name of Carolina; and that they stated that although the property would be registered in her name, the
three of them would still be the co-owners of the property. Emiliano later waived his right over the property in favor of
Carolina and Erlinda, thus, cementing the co-ownership of the 2 sisters.

On September 23, 2010, the property was placed under the operation of the Torrens system of land registration.
Pursuant to their agreement, it was registered in the name of “Carolina R. Anzures, Filipino, na may sapat na gulang,
kasal kay Fortunato Anzures.”

On March 21, 2011, Carolina executed a deed of donation, which donated 144 square meters of the subject property
to Erlinda as an acknowledgement of their co-ownership thereof. The donation does not appear to have been
registered, but it is a recognition that they are both co -owners with equal shares.
On October 11, 2011, Filomena and Rosalina executed an “Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights,”
whereby they waived their rights over the house in favor of Erlinda.

On the basis of this extrajudicial settlement of estate with waiver of rights, the respondents claim that they are the
owners of the house; that the petitioner is occupying the house by virtue of their tolerance; that they have demanded
that he vacate the same; and that despite demands, he refused to do so. As petitioner refuses to vacate the
premises, respondents claim they were constrained to file an action for unlawful detainer.

Issue: Whether respondents have a cause of action to eject petitioner from the subject property. 

Held: From the documentary records, the property is co-owned by Carolina and Erlinda. Being co-owners of the
property, they are also the co- owners of the improvement thereon, including the subject house. This is clear from the
Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land dated August 2, 2000, executed in favor of Erlinda and Carolina,
whereby the three heirs of Vicenta Galvez, namely, Filomena Rodriguez Rivera, Enriqueta Rodriguez and Rosalina
Rodriguez sold, transferred and conveyed, absolutely and unconditionally, the subject “parcel of land, with
improvements” to the “two,” “their heirs or assigns, free from all liens and encumbrances.”

Respondents cannot rely on the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights dated October 11, 2011,
whereby Filomena and Rosalina waived their rights over the house in favor of Erlinda. On said date, Filomena and
Rosalina no longer had the right to convey the house as they were no longer the owners thereof. As evidenced by
the August 2, 2000 deed of sale of unregistered land, they already sold the property together with the improvements
to the two sisters, Carolina and Erlinda. In fact, the title has been placed in Carolina’s name, pursuant to their
agreement.

Being a co-owner of the property as heir of Carolina, petitioner cannot be ejected from the subject property. In a co-
ownership, the undivided thing or right belong to different persons, with each of them holding the property pro indiviso
and exercising [his] rights over the whole property. Each co owner may use and enjoy the property with no other
limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is
actually made, the respective share of each cannot be determined, and every co-owner exercises, together with his
co-participants, joint ownership of the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of it.

Ultimately, respondents do not have a cause of action to eject petitioner based on tolerance because the latter is also
entitled to possess and enjoy the subject property. Corollarily, neither of the parties can assert exclusive ownership
and possession of the same prior to any partition. If at all, the action for unlawful detainer only resulted in the
recognition of co-ownership between the parties over the residential house.

The parties, being co-owners of both the land and the building, the remedy of the respondents is to file an action for
partition. Article 494 of the New Civil Code reads:

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 24, 2015 Decision and the December 18, 2015 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 136514, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for unlawful detainer
is DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action.
Doctrine: Co-ownership; Article 498 of the Civil Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the
co–owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its
proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (a) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of
the co–owners but because of the nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice
the interests of the co–owners, and (b) the co–owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted
or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co–owners.

Case Title: Raul V. Arambulo vs. Genaro Nolasco, GR. No. 189420 (J. Perez) (March 26, 2014)

Facts: Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela Cruz, along with their mother Rosita Vda. De Arambulo,
and siblings Primo V. Arambulo, Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez, Ana Maria V. Arambulo, Maximiano V. Arambulo, Julio V.
Arambulo and Iraida Arambulo Nolasco (Iraida) are co–owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila,
with an aggregate size of 233 square meters.

On 8 January 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief under Article 491 of the Civil Code with the RTC of Manila,
alleging that all of the co–owners, except for respondents, have authorized petitioners to sell their respective shares
to the subject properties; that only respondents are withholding their consent to the sale of their shares; that in case
the sale pushes through, their mother and siblings will get their respective 1/9 share of the proceeds of the sale, while
respondents will get ¼ share each of the 1/9 share of Iraida; that the sale of subject properties constitutes alteration;
and that under Article 491 of the Civil Code, if one or more co–owners shall withhold their consent to the alterations
in the thing owned in common, the courts may afford adequate relief.

Respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for being premature. Respondent averred that they were not aware
of the intention of petitioners to sell the properties they co-owned because they were not called to participate in any
negotiations regarding the disposition of the property. 

On 19 September 2002, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to give their consent to
the sale.

Going along with petitioners’ reliance on Article 491 of the Civil Code, the trial court found that respondents’
withholding of their consent to the sale of their shares is prejudicial to the common interest of the co–owners.
Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal and the trial court gave due course to the appeal and the entire records of the
case were elevated to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals granted the appeal and reversed the trial court’s decision. The CA held that the respondents
had the full ownership of their undivided interest in the subject properties, thus, they cannot be compelled to sell their
undivided shares in the properties. 

However, the Court of Appeals, implying applicability of Article 491 also observed that petitioners failed to show how
respondents’ withholding of their consent would prejudice the common interest over the subject properties. Hence,
the instant petition. 

Issue: Whether respondents, as co–owners, can be compelled by the court to give their consent to the sale of their
shares in the co–owned properties.

Held: The Court of Appeals correctly applied the provision of Article 493 of the Civil Code, which states:
 Art. 493. Each co–owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co–owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co–ownership.

Upon the other hand, Article 491 states:

Art. 491. None of the co–owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in
common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one
or more of the co–owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief.

As intimated above, the erroneous application of Article 491 is, in this case, an innate infirmity. The very initiatory
pleading below was captioned Petition For Relief Under Article 491 of the New Civil Code.

The Court of Appeals correctly relied on Article 493 in support of the finding that respondents cannot be compelled to
agree with the sale. We affirm the reversal by the Court of Appeals of the judgment of the trial court.

There is co–ownership whenever, as in this case, the ownership of an undivided thing, belongs to different
persons. Article 493 of the Code defines the ownership of the co–owner, clearly establishing that each co–owner
shall have full ownership of his part and of its fruits and benefits.

Pertinent to this case, Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as co–owners with full ownership of
their parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by
the respondents of the part that belongs to them. Their part which petitioners will sell shall be that which may be
apportioned to them in the division upon the termination of the co–ownership. With the full ownership of the
respondents remaining unaffected by petitioners’ sale of their parts, the nature of the property, as co–owned, likewise
stays. In lieu of the petitioners, their vendees shall be co–owners with the respondents.

This Court has ruled that even if a co–owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share
but not those of the other co–owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because under the
aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets
only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.

A sale of the entire property by one co–owner without the consent of the other co–owners is not null and void.
However, only the rights of the co–owner–seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co–owner of the
property.

To be a co–owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every recognition of the disposal of the thing,
of the free use of his right within the circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it necessary, for the use
and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the previous consent of all the interested parties be obtained.

The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as such by the Court, agree that co–owners such as respondents
have over their part, the right of full and absolute ownership. Such right is the same as that of individual owners
which is not diminished by the fact that the entire property is co–owned with others.

When respondents disagreed to the sale, they merely asserted their individual ownership rights. Without unanimity,
there is no common interest.
Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co–owners may bring a suit for partition, which is one of the modes
of extinguishing co–ownership.

Corollary to this rule, Article 498 of the Civil Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co–
owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (a) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co–
owners but because of the nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the
interests of the co–owners, and (b) the co–owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or
assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co–owners. This is the result obviously aimed at by
petitioners at the outset. As already shown, this cannot be done while the co–ownership exists.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is DENIED without prejudice to the filing of an action for partition.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CV No. 76449 is AFFIRMED.
Doctrine: Co-ownership; Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others. Before the
partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All
that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota proportionate share in the entire land or thing. In case of
foreclosure, a sale would result in the transmission only of whatever rights the seller had over of the thing sold.

Case Title: Spouses Primo Inalvez vs. Bayang Nool, [Link]. 188145 (J. Reyes) (April 18, 2016)

Facts: The subject property was originally covered by TCT No. 583986 originally registered in the names of Spouses
Nicolas and Francisca Nool and Spouses Comelio and Bayang, with an area of 15.1441 ha. On May 3, 1965,
Spouses Cornelio and Bayang sold a large portion of their one-half share of the landholding to the petitioners and
Maria Zamora (Zamora), which sale was inscribed on the title as Entry No. 5-4972.

On June 4, 1979, Spouses Nicolas and Francisca sold their entire one-half share over the property in favor of
Spouses Abraham and Olivia Macayanan (Spouses Macayanan), which sale was inscribed on the title. Then, on
April 16, 1980, the new set of owners, namely, Spouses Macayanan, Zamora, Spouses Cornelio and Bayang, and
the petitioners executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over the whole property in favor of Tarlac Development Bank
(TDB) to secure a loan of P10,000.00.

Unfortunately, the mortgage was foreclosed, and the title to the subject property was consolidated with TDB, together
with the corresponding issuance of TCT No. 188251. Hence, TCT No. 188251 was cancelled and TCT No.
188252 was issued in the names of the petitioners and Spouses Baluyot. Meanwhile, the respondents continued
possession of the subject lot.

On October 3, 1991, pursuant to an Agreement of Subdivision, the property was subdivided. On March 24, 1998, the
petitioners caused their property to be subdivided into nine sub-lots. 

On June 16, 2000, the petitioners instituted a complaint for ejectment, collection of shares and damages, against the
respondents before the DARAB-Region III docketed as DARAB Case No. III-T-1952-00. The respondents' cultivation
thereof was purportedly conditioned upon the payment to the petitioners of a rightful share in the produce.

For her part, Bayang averred that she and her late husband were the actual and registered co-owners of the subject
property, which they inherited from her father, together with the petitioners. She further denied having signed any
document consenting to the mortgage of the subject property and refuted the genuineness of her husband's
signature as appearing on the REM executed with TDB. Lastly, the respondents argued that they are deemed to
have already acquired the subject property through ordinary acquisitive prescription since they have been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property for more than 30 years.

On January 14, 2002, the DARAB dismissed the case upon finding that no tenancy relationship exists between the
parties.

The trial court dismissed the respondents' claim of ownership over the subject property taking note of the sale and
transfer effected by Spouses Cornelio and Bayang over a large portion of their inherited property in favor of Zamora
and the petitioners.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint for recovery of possession
upon finding that a co-ownership existed between the parties. The CA faulted the trial court for relying on the fact that
the petitioners are the present registered owners of the property and in consequently ruling that they can recover
possession of the portion occupied by the respondents ratiocinating that registration does not vest ownership but is
intended to merely confirm and register title which one may have on the land. The CA also gave credence to the
respondents' claim of forgery with respect to the signature of Spouses Cornelio and Bayang on the REM.

Issue: Whether a co-ownership exists between the petitioners and the respondents. 

Held: At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that no tenancy or
agricultural leasehold relationship existed between the parties whether express or implied since the petitioners have
failed to overcome the burden of proving their affirmative allegation of tenancy.

Essentially, the issues raised center on the core question of whether or not the subject property pertains to the
exclusive ownership of the petitioners. Hence, the pertinent point of inquiry is whether co-ownership by the
petitioners and the respondents over the subject property continued even after the subject property was purchased
by TDB and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the petitioners from
TDB.

In this case, the petitioners' cause of action for recovery of possession is grounded on their alleged exclusive
ownership of the subject property which they merely purchased from TDB. They contend that TDB's consolidation of
ownership over the subject property effectively ended and terminated the co-ownership.

"Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others." "Before the partition of a land or thing
held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is
an ideal or abstract quota proportionate share in the entire land or thing." "Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage
the co-owned property itself, the alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but only to the extent of the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership." "In case of foreclosure, a sale would
result in the transmission only of whatever rights the seller had over of the thing sold."

Indeed, a co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-owned property when his share is mortgaged by another
co-owner without the former's knowledge and consent as in the case at bar.

Be that as it may, the rights of the respondents as co-owners of the subject property were never alienated despite
TDB's consolidation of ownership over the subject property. Neither does the fact that the petitioners succeeded in
acquiring back the property from TDB and having a new title issued in their name terminate the existing co-
ownership. Besides, it seems that petitioners knew of the fact that they did not have a title to the entire lot and could
not, therefore, have validly mortgaged the same, because of the respondents' possession of the subject portion.

The trial court's reliance on the doctrine that mere possession cannot defeat the right of a holder of a
registered Torrens title over property is misplaced, considering that the respondents were almost deprived of their
dominical rights over the said lot through fraud and with evident bad faith on the part of the petitioners.

In Vda. de Cabrera v. CA,45 the Court held that where the transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a
co-owner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the same for a period too long to
be ignored, the possessor is in a better condition or right than said transferees.

From the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that the CA did not err in declaring that the petitioners have no legal basis
to recover possession of the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 19, 2008 and the Resolution dated May 26, 2009 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89378 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Doctrine: Co-ownership; A solitary, self-serving testimony cannot successfully overturn petitioner Logrosa's prima
facie status as co-owner brought about by the execution of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale and the issuance of
the certificates of title.

Case Title: Rogelio Logrosa vs. Spouses Cleofe and Cesar Azares, GR. No. 217611 (J. Caguioa) (March 27, 2019)

Facts: In a verified complaint for partition filed before the RTC, Petitioner Logrosa alleged that he, together with the
respondents are co-owners of eight (8) parcels of lands in Tagum City, Davao del Norte. The subject properties are
all covered under TCTs. The TCTs all indicate that petitioner Logrosa, together with the respondents, are co-owners
of the subject properties. 

Petitioner Logrosa alleged that in 1987, the original owner of the subject properties, one Benjamin A. Gonzales, sold
the subject properties collectively to petitioner Logrosa and the other respondents. The records show that a notarized
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by the parties, bearing the signatures of Gonzales, petitioner Logrosa,
respondents Cleofe, Nelson, Bonifacio, and Abundio. 

Respondents Sps. Azares contended that while it may be true that petitioner Logrosa's name appeared in the titles of
the properties aforementioned, however, they belied petitioner Logrosa's claim that he is a co-owner of the same, as
he never contributed as to its acquisition and never contributed for their maintenance, much less paid the taxes due
thereon. 

They further alleged that petitioner Logrosa, being their cousin, used to work for them as their trusted laborer
together with the other respondents at their gold mining tunnel. They also allowed petitioner Logrosa to construct his
house upon condition that petitioner Logrosa would pay and reimburse them for all his expenses thereto when
petitioner Logrosa's finances allow. It is the main contention of respondents Sps. Azares that despite the inclusion in
the documents of title of petitioner Logrosa and the other parties. 

Issue: Whether petitioner Logrosa is a co-owner of the subject property. 

Held: No, petitioner Logrosa is not a co-owner of the subject property. 

It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. 

It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. Such principle of indefeasibility has long been well-settled
in this jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine
finds no application. 

In the instant case, there is no accusation whatsoever that petitioner Logrosa was included as co-owner in the TCTs
through means of fraud or bad faith. Aside from the foregoing, it is also not disputed by any party that a  duly
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by all the parties, wherein it clearly states without ambiguity that one
of the vendees of the subject properties is petitioner Logrosa. It must be stressed that respondents Sps. Azares do
not deny whatsoever that petitioner Logrosa is a co-vendee under the Deed of Absolute Sale. 
The Court has previously held that a document evidencing a sale transaction, such as a deed of sale, which is duly
notarized is considered a public document and therefore enjoys the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and
due execution. It is not disputed that petitioner Logrosa possesses a portion of the subject property with no
opposition by the other parties, aside from respondents Sps. Azares, who disclaimed petitioner Logrosa's status as
co-owner only after more than two decades since the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and only as a mere
reaction to the Complaint for Partition filed by petitioner Logrosa. 

To controvert the strong legal presumption in favor of petitioner Logrosa's co-ownership over the subject properties,
respondents Sps. Azares can only muster the sole testimony of respondent Cesar. A solitary, self-serving testimony
cannot successfully overturn petitioner Logrosa's prima facie status as co-owner brought about by the execution of a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale and the issuance of the certificates of title.

Hence, with the strong legal presumption created by the eight certificates of title and duly notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale that petitioner Logrosa is a co-buyer and co-owner of the subject properties, the burden to prove otherwise was
shifted to respondents Sps. Azares. From the evidence on record, the Court finds that respondents Sps. Azares have
not successfully hurdled this burden.

WHEREFORE, premised considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 30,2014 and
Resolution dated February 26, 2015 promulgated by the Court of Appeals - Cagayan de Oro City, Special Twenty-
First Division and Former Special Twenty-First Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 02878-MIN
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accordingly, the Decision dated February 27, 2012 promulgated by Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Davao del
Norte, Branch 30 in Civil Case No. 4026 is likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is DIRECTED to issue an Order under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court for the partition of the subject properties.
Doctrine: Co-ownership; Certificate of title merely serves as an evidence of ownership in the property. Therefore, the
issuance of a certificate of title does not preclude the possibility that persons not named in the certificate may be co-
owners of the real property, or that the registered owner is only holding the property in trust for another person.

Case Title: Rosario Victoria vs Normita Jacob Pidlaoan, GR. No. 196470 (J. Brion) (April 20, 2016)

Facts: The petitioners Rosario Victoria (Rosario) and Elma lived together since 1978 until Rosario left for Saudi
Arabia.

In 1984, Elma bought a parcel of land with an area of 201 square meters in Lucena City and was issued Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-50282. When Rosario came home, she caused the construction of a house on the lot
but she left again after the house was built.

Elma allegedly mortgaged the house and lot to a certain Thi Hong Villanueva in 1989. When the properties were
about to be foreclosed, Elma allegedly asked for help from her sister-in-law, Eufemia Pidlaoan (Eufemia), to redeem
the property. On her part, Eufemia called her daughter abroad, Normita, to lend money to Elma. Normita agreed to
provide the funds.

On March 21, 1993, Elma executed a deed of sale transferring the ownership of the lot to Normita. The last provision
in the deed of sale provides that Elma shall eject the person who erected the house and deliver the lot to Normita.
The document was signed by Elma, Normita, and two witnesses but it was not notarized.

When Elma and Normita were about to have the document notarized, the notary public advised them to donate the
lot instead to avoid capital gains tax. On the next day, Elma executed a deed of donation in Normita's favor and had it
notarized. Since then, Normita had been paying the real property taxes over the lot but Elma continued to occupy the
house.

Rosario found out about the donation when she returned to the country a year or two after the transaction.

In 1997, the petitioners filed a complaint for reformation of contract, cancellation of TCT No. T-70990, and damages
with prayer for preliminary injunction against Respondents. 

The petitioners argued that: first, they co-owned the lot because both of them contributed the money used to
purchase it; second, Elma and Normita entered into an equitable mortgage because they intended to constitute a
mortgage over the lot to secure Elma's loan but they executed a deed of sale instead; and third, the deed of donation
was simulated because Elma executed it upon the notary public's advice to avoid capital gains tax.

In their answer, the respondents admitted that the deed of donation was simulated and that the original transaction
was a sale.

The RTC ruled that Rosario and Elma co-owned the lot and the house. Thus, Elma could only donate her one-half
share in the lot. Hence, the respondents appealed to the CA.

The CA reversed the RTC's decision and dismissed the petitioners' complaint. The CA denied the petitioners' motion
for reconsideration; hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether Rosario is a co-owner. 

In the present case, the records of the case show that Elma alone purchased the lot in 1984 from its previous
owners. Accordingly, TCT No. T-50282 was issued solely in her name. Thus, Normita bought the lot relying on the
face of the TCT that Elma and no other person owned it.

We acknowledge that registration under the Torrens system does not create or vest title. A certificate of title merely
serves as an evidence of ownership in the property. Therefore, the issuance of a certificate of title does not preclude
the possibility that persons not named in the certificate may be co-owners of the real property, or that the registered
owner is only holding the property in trust for another person.

In the present case, however, the petitioners failed to present proof of Rosario's contributions in purchasing the lot
from its previous owners. The execution of the transfer documents solely in Elma's name alone militate against their
claim of co-ownership. Thus, we find no merit in the petitioners' claim of co-ownership over the lot.

At this point, we address the petitioners' claim that Rosario co-owned the lot with Elma because the value of the
house constructed by Rosario on it is higher than the lot's value. We find this argument to be erroneous.

We hold that mere construction of a house on another's land does not create a co-ownership. Article 484 of the Civil
Code provides that co-ownership exists when the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons. Verily, a house and a lot are separately identifiable properties and can pertain to different owners, as in this
case: the house belongs to Rosario and the lot to Elma.

WHEREFORE, we hereby PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The March 26, 2010 decision and March 15, 2011
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89235 are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
parties entered into a contract of sale, not a donation, and that petitioner Elma Pidlaoan sold the whole disputed
property to respondent Normita Jacob Pidlaoan. Costs against the petitioners.
Doctrine: Co-ownership; It has been settled that a co-heir or co-owner may bring suit without impleading all the other
co-owners if the suit is for the benefit of all. 

Case Title: Socorro T. Clemente vs. Republic, GR. No. 220008 (J. Carpio) (February 20, 2019)

Facts: Municipal Mayor Amado A. Clemente (Mayor Clemente), Dr. Vicente A. Clemente, Judge Ramon A.
Clemente, and Milagros A. Clemente (Clemente Siblings) were the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-50896. During their lifetime, they executed a Deed of Donation dated 16 March 1963
over a one-hectare portion of their property (Subject Property) in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

In the same Deed of Donation, District Engineer II Ciceron A. Guerrero of DPWH Region IV-A accepted said
donation. On 29 March 1963, TCT No. T-50896 was partially cancelled by TCT No. T-51745 covering the Subject
Property and issued in the name of the Province of Quezon.

In accordance with the Deed of Donation, the construction of a building for a hospital was started in the following
year. However, for reasons unknown, the construction was never completed and only its foundation remains today.

In 2004, almost forty-one (41) years after the Deed of Donation was executed, Socorro, as heir and successor-in-
interest of Mayor Clemente, filed a Complaint, and subsequently an Amended Complaint, for Revocation of Donation,
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession alleging that the Republic of the Philippines failed to comply with the
condition imposed on the Deed of Donation, which was to use the property "solely for hospital site only and for no
other else, where a [government [h]ospital shall be constructed."

RTC: The trial court dismissed the case on the ground of prematurity. The RTC held that the Republic agreed to
comply with the condition of constructing a government hospital, and it initially commenced its construction. The RTC
held that based on the records, it was only in the last semester of 2003 that Socorro demanded the construction of
the hospital. Despite such demand, no hospital was built on the donated property. 

CA: The CA denied the appeal, finding that while there may be basis for the recovery of the property, Socorro, as an
heir of a deceased co-donor, cannot assert the concept of heirship to participate in the revocation of the property
donated by her successor-in-interest.

Issue: Whether the settlement of an estate of the co-owners is a necessary requirement before the petitioner may file
an action for revocation of donation and recovery of possession of the property. 

Held: No, the settlement of an estate of the co-owners is not a necessary requirement before the petitioner may file
an action for revocation of donation and recovery of possession of the property. 

The nature of the donation made by the Clemente Siblings is a donation subject to a condition – the condition being
the construction of a government hospital and the use of the Subject Property solely for hospital purposes. Upon the
non-fulfillment of the condition, the donation may be revoked and all the rights already acquired by the donee shall be
deemed lost and extinguished. This is a resolutory condition because it is demandable at once by the done but the
non-fulfillment of the condition gives the donor the right to revoke the donation.

In this case, upon the execution of the Deed of Donation and the acceptance of such donation in the same
instrument, ownership was transferred to the Republic, as evidenced by the new certificate of title issued in the name
of the Province of Quezon. Because the condition in the Deed of Donation is a resolutory condition, until the donation
is revoked, it remains valid. However, for the donation to remain valid, the donee must comply with its obligation to
construct a government hospital and use the Subject Property as a hospital site.
Petitioner also argues that there is no need for a settlement of the estate before an action for revocation of donation,
reconveyance, and recovery of possession of property may be filed by an heir of a co-owner. We agree.

It has been settled that a co-heir or co-owner may bring suit without impleading all the other co-owners if the suit is
for the benefit of all. In Spouses Mendoza v. Coronel, we held:

[T]he law now allows a co-owner to bring an action for ejectment, which covers all kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, without the necessity of joining all the
other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.

In subsequent cases, this Court has consistently held that as long as the co-owner recognizes the co-ownership,
there is no need to implead all the co-owners in all kinds of action for recovery of possession.

In this case, although petitioner alone filed the complaint for unlawful detainer, he stated in the complaint that he
is one of the heirs of the late Lilia Castigador, his mother, who inherited the subject lot, from her
parents. Petitioner did not claim exclusive ownership of the subject lot, but he filed the complaint for the purpose
of recovering its possession which would redound to the benefit of the co-owners. Since petitioner recognized
the existence of a co-ownership, he, as a co-owner, can bring the action without the necessity of joining all the
other co-owners as co-plaintiffs.

In this case, it is not disputed that Socorro is an heir of one of the donors. Moreover, her prayer in her action was to
revoke the Deed of Donation and to cancel the TCT issued in the name of the Province of Quezon, and to issue a
new certificate in the names of the heirs of the Clemente Siblings, pro-indiviso, and to direct the Republic to
surrender or reconvey possession over the property to the heirs of the Clemente Siblings. It is clear, therefore, that
Socorro acknowledges and continues to recognize her co-heirs as co-owners of the Subject Property. Further, based
on the Complaint and Amended Complaint of Socorro, it is clear that the suit was intended for the benefit of all the
co-heirs of the Clemente Siblings. Thus, there is no need to implead the other co-heirs for the action to proceed as it
is for the benefit of the co-ownership.

Moreover, there is no need for the settlement of the estate before one of the heirs can institute an action on behalf of
the other co-heirs. Although an heir's right in the estate of the decedent which has not been fully settled and
partitioned is merely inchoate, Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the heir the right to exercise acts of
ownership. Thus, even before the settlement of the estate, an heir may file an action for reconveyance of possession
as a co-owner thereof, provided that such heir recognizes and acknowledges the other co-heirs as co-owners of the
property as it will be assumed that the heir is acting on behalf of all the co-heirs for the benefit of the co-ownership.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 17 October 2014 Decision and the 14 August 2015 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91522 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64, is ORDERED to cause the cancellation by the Register of Deeds of Quezon of TCT
No. T-51745 and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of the corresponding certificate of title in the name of the heirs of
Amado A. Clemente, Dr. Vicente A. Clemente, Judge Ramon A. Clemente, and Milagros A. Clemente.
Doctrine: Co-ownership; Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for
ejectment. The article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a
reivindicatory action. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will
benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded
co-owners.

Case Title: Nieves Plasabas vs. CA, GR. No. 166519 (J. Nachura) (March 31, 2009)

Facts: In 1974, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of title to a parcel of coconut land in Canturing, Maasin,
Southern Leyte (property) with damages before the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Southern Leyte against
respondents. In their complaint, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered confirming their rights and legal title to
the subject property and ordering the defendants to vacate the occupied portion and to pay damages.

Respondents, for their part, denied petitioners’ allegation of ownership and possession of the premises, and
interposed, as their main defense, that the subject land was inherited by all the parties from their common ancestor,
Francisco Plasabas.

It was revealed during the trial that petitioner Nieves was not the sole and absolute owner of the land. Based on the
testimonies of petitioners’ witnesses, the property passed on from Francisco to his son, Leoncio; then to Jovita
Talam, petitioner Nieves’ grandmother; then to Antonina Talam, her mother; and then to her and her siblings—Jose,
Victor and Victoria.

After resting their case, respondents raised in their memorandum the argument that the case should have been
terminated at inception for petitioners’ failure to implead indispensable parties, the other co-owners – Jose, Victor
and Victoria.

RTC: The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of cause of action as the plaintiffs spouses Marcos
Malazarte and Nieves Plasabas Malazarte have no complete legal personality to sue by themselves alone without
joining the brothers and sisters of Nieves who are as indispensable as the latter in the final determination of the case.
Not impleading them, any judgment would have no effectiveness.

CA: The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The Court of Appeals, further, declared that the non-
joinder of the indispensable parties would violate the principle of due process, and that Article 487 of the Civil Code
could not be applied considering that the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery of title or a reivindicatory
action.

With their motion for reconsideration denied in the further assailed December 1, 2004 Resolution, petitioners filed the
instant petition.

Issue: Whether spouses Marcos Malazarte and Nieves Plasabas Malazarte have legal personality to sue by
themselves alone without joining the brothers and sisters of Nieves.

Held: Yes, spouses Marcos Malazarte and Nieves Plasabas Malazarte have legal personality to sue by themselves
alone without joining the brothers and sisters of Nieves.

Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment. The article
covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory action.
A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-
owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners.

With this disquisition, there is no need to determine whether petitioners’ complaint is one for ejectment or for recovery
of title. To repeat, Article 487 of the Civil Code applies to both actions.

Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners as parties. The only exception to this rule
is when the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled to the
possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleads the other co-owners who
are indispensable parties.

Here, the allegation of petitioners in their complaint that they are the sole owners of the property in litigation is
immaterial, considering that they acknowledged during the trial that the property is co-owned by Nieves and her
siblings, and that petitioners have been authorized by the co-owners to pursue the case on the latter’s behalf.
Impleading the other co-owners is, therefore, not mandatory, because, as mentioned earlier, the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court
for appropriate proceedings. The trial court is further DIRECTED to decide on the merits of the civil case WITH
DISPATCH.
Doctrine: Co-ownership; A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-
owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit
of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not
prosper.

Case Title: Rey Castigador Catedrilla vs. Mario and Margie Lauron, GR. No. 179011 (J. Peralta) (April 15, 2013)

Facts: On February 12, 2003, petitioner Rey Castigador Catedrilla filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Lambunao, Iloilo a Complaint for ejectment against the spouses Mario and Margie Lauron.

In their Answer, respondents claimed that petitioner had no cause of action against them, since they are not the
owners of the residential building standing on petitioner's lot, but Mildred Kascher (Mildred), sister of respondent
Margie, as shown by the tax declaration in Mildred's name; that in 1992, Mildred had already paid ₱10,000.00 as
downpayment for the subject lot to Teresito Castigador; that there were several instances that the heirs of Lilia
offered the subject Lot 183 for sale to respondents and Mildred and demanded payment, however, the latter was only
interested in asking money without any intention of delivering or registering the subject lot; that in 1998, Maximo,
petitioner's father, and respondent Margie entered into an amicable settlement before the Barangay Lupon of
Poblacion Ilawod, Lambunao, Iloilo wherein Maximo offered the subject lot to the spouses Alfons and Mildred
Kascher in the amount of ₱90,000.00 with the agreement that all documents related to the transfer of the subject lot
to Maximo and his children be prepared by Maximo, but the latter failed to comply; and that the amicable settlement
should have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, hence, the instant suit is barred by prior judgment.

MTC: The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. The MTC found that from the allegations and evidence presented, it
appeared that petitioner is one of the heirs of Lilia Castigador Catedrilla, the owner of the subject lot and that
respondents are occupying the subject lot; that petitioner is a party who may bring the suit in accordance with Article
487 of the Civil Code; and as a co-owner, petitioner is allowed to bring this action for ejectment under Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court; that respondents are also the proper party to be sued as they are the occupants of the
subject lot which they do not own; and that the MTC assumed that the house standing on the subject lot has been
standing thereon even before 1992 and only upon the acquiescence of the petitioner and his predecessor-in-interest.

The MTC found that respondents would like to focus their defense on the ground that Mildred is an indispensable
party, because she is the owner of the residential building on the subject lot and that there was already a perfected
contract to sell between Mildred and Maximo because of an amicable settlement executed before the Office of the
Punong Barangay. However, the MTC, without dealing on the validity of the document and its interpretation, ruled
that it was clear that respondent Margie was representing her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Bienvenido Loraña, in the
dispute presented with the Punong Barangay.
RTC: The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC except for the payment of ₱20,000.00 as attorney's fees. The RTC
found that petitioner, being one of the co-owners of the subject lot, is the proper party in interest to prosecute against
any intruder thereon. It found that the amicable settlement signed and executed by the representatives of the
registered owner of the premises before the Lupon is not binding and unenforceable between the parties. It further
ruled that even if Mildred has her name in the tax declaration signifying that she is the owner of the house
constructed on the subject lot, tax declarations are not evidence of ownership but merely issued to the declarant for
purposes of payment of taxes; that she cannot be considered as an indispensable party in a suit for recovery of
possession against respondents; that Mildred should have intervened and proved that she is an indispensable party
because the records showed that she was not in actual possession of the subject lot. The RTC deleted the attorney's
fees, since the MTC decision merely ordered the payment of attorney's fees without any basis.

CA: The appellate court granted the petition for review. The CA found that only petitioner filed the case for ejectment
against respondents and ruled that the other heirs should have been impleaded as plaintiffs citing Section 1, Rule 7
and Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court; that the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non
for the exercise of judicial power; that when an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be
dismissed as without the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render judgment
and grant relief in favor of the respondents.

The CA also ruled that while petitioner asserted that the proper parties to be sued are the respondents as they are
the actual possessors of the subject lot and not Mildred, petitioner still cannot disclaim knowledge that it was to
Mildred to whom his co-owners offered the property for sale, thus, he knew all along that the real owner of the house
on the subject lot is Mildred and not respondents; that Mildred even paid ₱10,000.00 out of the total consideration for
the subject lot and required respondents' relatives to secure the documents that proved their ownership over the
subject lot; that Maximo and Mildred had previously settled the matter regarding the sale of the subject lot before the
Barangay as contained in an amicable settlement signed by Maximo and respondent Margie. Thus, the question in
this case extends to mere possessory rights and non-inclusion of indispensable parties made the complaint fatally
defective. From the facts obtaining in this case, ejectment being a summary remedy is not the appropriate action to
file against the alleged deforciant of the property.

Issue: Whether petitioner can file the action for ejectment without impleading his co-owners.

Held: Yes, petitioner can file the action for ejectment without impleading his co-owners.

Article 487 of the New Civil Code is explicit on this point:

ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession, i.e., forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion
interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). As
explained by the renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino:

A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not
prosper.
In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, this Court declared that a co-owner is not even a
necessary party to an action for ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded even in his absence, thus:

In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article
487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of
action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner
who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-
owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be
afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the
benefit of all co-owners.

In this case, although petitioner alone filed the complaint for unlawful detainer, he stated in the complaint that he is
one of the heirs of the late Lilia Castigador, his mother, who inherited the subject lot, from her parents. Petitioner did
not claim exclusive ownership of the subject lot, but he filed the complaint for the purpose of recovering its
possession which would redound to the benefit of the co-owners. Since petitioner recognized the existence of a co-
ownership, he, as a co-owner, can bring the action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs.

Petitioner contends that the CA committed a reversible error in finding that Mildred Kascher is an indispensable party
and that her non-inclusion as a party defendant in the ejectment case made the complaint fatally defective, thus,
must be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated February 28, 2007 and
the Resolution dated July 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order
dated March 22, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Iloilo City, in Civil Case No. 04-27978, is hereby
REINSTATED.
Doctrine: Co-ownership; Even just one of the co-owners, by himself alone, can bring an action for the recovery of the
coowned property, even through an action for revival of judgment, because the enforcement of the judgment would
result in such recovery of property.

Case Title: Petronio Clidoro vs. Augusto Jalmanzar, GR. No. 176598 (J. Peralta) (July 9, 2014)

Facts: The instant appeal stemmed from a complaint for revival of judgment filed by Rizalina Clidoro, et al. against
Onofre Clidoro, et al., praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed with modification the
RTC Decision for partition, be revived and that the corresponding writ of execution be issued.

The assailed CA Decision ordered the partition of the estate of the late Mateo Clidoro in the following manner:

1. One-fifth portion to the Plaintiffs-Appellees, by right of representation to the hereditary share of Gregorio
Clidoro, Sr.;

2. One-fifth portion to Defendant-Appellant Antonio Clidoro or his legal heirs;

3. One-fifth portion to Appellant Josaphat Clidoro;

4. One-fifth portion to Appellant Aida Clidoro; 5. One-tenth portion to Gregoria Clidoro, as her legitime in the
hereditary share of Onofre Clidoro; and
 6. One-tenth portion to Catalino Morate, as successor-ininterest to the legitime of Consorcia Clidoro.

RTC: The RTC issued the assailed Order dated December 8, 2003 dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of
action. The trial court argued that the complaint shows that most of the parties-plaintiffs, parties-defendants and
interested parties are already deceased and have no more natural or material existence. Thus, they could no longer
be considered as the real parties-in-interest. Besides, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 3 (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure),
where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case.

CA: The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Orders of the RTC, and remanded the case to the RTC for
furaher proceedings.

Issue: Whether respondents are real parties-in-interest.

Held: Yes, respondents are real parties-in-interest.

An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous
judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed upon motion of the
prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor's case nor the
propriety or correctness of the first judgment. An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action,
different and distinct from either the recovery of property case or the reconstitution case [in this case, the original
action for partition], wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the
judgment sought to be enforced is rendered.

With the foregoing in mind, it is understandable that there would be instances where the parties in the original case
and in the subsequent action for revival of judgment would not be exactly the same. The mere fact that the names
appearing as parties in the complaint for revival of judgment are different from the names of the parties in the original
case would not necessarily mean that they are not the real parties-in-interest. What is important is that, as provided
in Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they are "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." As the prevailing parties in the previous case for partition, the
plaintiffs in the case for revival of judgment would be benefited by the enforcement of the decision in the partition
case.

In Basbas v. Sayson, the Court pointed out that even just one of the co-owners, by himself alone, can bring an action
for the recovery of the coowned property, even through an action for revival of judgment, because the enforcement of
the judgment would result in such recovery of property. Thus, as in Basbas, it is not necessary in this case that all of
the parties, in whose favor the case for partition was adjudged, be made plaintiffs to the action for revival of
judgment. Any which one of said prevailing parties, who had an interest in the enforcement of the decision, may file
the complaint for revival of judgment, even just by himself.

Verily, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for revival of judgment on the ground of lack of, or failure to
state a cause of action. The allegations in the complaint, regarding the parties' interest in having the decision in the
partition case executed or implemented, sufficiently state a cause of action. The question of whether respondents
were the real partiesin-interest who had the right to seek execution of the final and executory judgment in the partition
case should have been threshed out in a full-blown trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 17, 2006, and its
Resolution dated February 6, 2007 in CA-G.R. No. 82209, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Doctrine: Co-ownership; While a co-owner has the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest,
nevertheless, as a co-owner he cannot alienate the shares of his other co-owners – nemo dat qui non habet.

Case Title: Wilfredo and Swarnie Aromin vs. Paulo Floresca, GR. No. 160994 (J. Callejo, Sr.) (July 27, 2006)
Facts: The present case arose from three civil cases pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La
Union, Branch 67 involving the same property and parties, namely: the spouses Wilfredo and Swarnie Aromin, Paulo
Floresca and his brother's children, Lilia (now surnamed Roxas), Victor and Juanito Floresca.

The first case was an action for specific performance filed by the spouses Aromin against Paulo. In their complaint,
the spouses Aromin alleged that Paulo was the owner of the following properties:

a) A parcel of unirrigated riceland situated at Taberna, Bauang, La Union under Cad. Lot No. 4894-pt, with a
total area of 68,658 square meters, more or less. x x x Covered by Tax Declaration No. 26377;

b) A parcel of unirrigated riceland situated at Taberna, Bauang, La Union under Cad. Lot No. 4894, with a
total area of 34,456 square meters, more or less. x x x Covered by Tax Declaration No. 25257.

On different dates from 1990 up to 1992, Paulo sold to the spouses Aromin several portions of the above-mentioned
properties. All the deeds of sale were not registered with the Register of Deeds. On September 29, 1992, Paulo
executed a receipt acknowledging that he received from the spouses Aromin a total amount of P1,462,000.00 in
consideration for the sale of a total of 98,257 square meters of Cad. Lot No. 4894. In their complaint, the spouses
Aromin sought to compel Paulo to formally execute the corresponding deed of sale covering the entire property.

The second case was an action for quieting of title filed by the spouses Aromin against Victor, Juanito, Lilia, and
Paulo. In their complaint, the spouses Aromin alleged that they are the owners and in actual physical possession of
the subject property which they purchased from Paulo. Further, they just discovered that a judgment based on
compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 832-BG had been rendered and that the said case involved the same
property as that in Civil Cases Nos. 921-BG and 938-BG. They alleged that the said judgment based on compromise
agreement is not binding on them as they were not parties to Civil Case No. 832-BG. They prayed for an injunction to
restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution in the said case and instead to declare them as the lawful owners of
the subject property.

The third case was an action for the annulment of sale filed by Victor, Juanito, and Lilia against their uncle Paulo and
the spouses Aromin. The siblings alleged that their father Alberto, his sister Josefa, and his brother Paulo were the
co-owners of the subject property as they acquired the same upon the death of their parents Juan and Cornelia
Floresca. In 1966, the said co-owners caused the preparation of the survey thereof and, subsequently, the subject
property was designated as Cad. Lot No. 4894 with an area of 105,991 square meters. In July 1973, Alberto died
leaving his share in the co-ownership to his children Victor, Juanito, and Lilia. On the other hand, Josefa became ill
and left the administration of the subject property to Paulo. She died on June 18, 1988, unmarried, and without any
child.

Victor, Juanito, and Lilia alleged that Paulo was able to fraudulently secure Tax Declaration No. 25246 in his name as
purported owner of the north portion of the subject property to the exclusion of Victor, Juanito, and Lilia. Using
another fraudulent means, Paulo was likewise allegedly able to secure Tax Declaration No. 25244 in his name as
purported owner of the south portion of the subject property. Thereafter, with Tax Declarations Nos. 25246 and
25244 in his name, Paulo allegedly obtained Tax Declaration Nos. 25257 and 26377 covering the entire Cad. Lot No.
4894 purportedly as the sole owner thereof.

Victor, Juanito, and Lilia alleged that they filed the complaint for partition in Civil Case No. 832-BG and, during the
proceedings therein, they and Paulo entered into a compromise agreement which they submitted to the trial court. On
February 10, 1993, acting thereon, the said court rendered the judgment based on compromise agreement and
partitioned Cad. Lot No. 4894, thus: "one-half of the area of the riceland, one-half of the area of the sandy land, and
one-half of the area of the swampland" belonged to Victor, Juanito, and Lilia while the other half of the said areas
belonged to Paulo. The said judgment became final and executory and its execution was pending resolution by the
trial court. The spouses Aromin allegedly knew of this fact.

Nonetheless, on February 10, 1994, Paulo and the spouses Aromin allegedly executed a Deed of Sale where the
former, purportedly as the true and absolute owner of the subject property, conveyed to the latter the ownership of
the same. The said deed was allegedly part of the compromise agreement entered into between Paulo and the
spouses Aromin in Civil Case No. 921-BG and which they submitted for the trial court's approval.

Victor, Juanito, and Lilia opposed the approval of the said compromise agreement. They likewise prayed for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale dated February 10, 1994, executed by Paulo in favor of the spouses Aromin covering
the entire subject property.

In their joint answer, Paulo and the spouses Aromin alleged that the subject property was sold under the deed of sale
executed between them on February 10, 1994. The spouses Aromin raised the defense that they were buyers in
good faith as they believed that Paulo was the sole owner of the subject property. The spouses Aromin further
alleged that they have been in actual and physical possession thereof, and have been actually appropriating for
themselves the fruits thereof for the past years. They have also allegedly introduced improvements thereon.

These three civil cases were jointly tried before the court a quo. Incidentally, while the case was pending resolution,
Paulo died and was accordingly substituted by his heirs, namely, Jose Floresca, Angelina Floresca-Dumpit, Eliseo
Floresca, Consolacion Floresca, and Cecilio Floresca.

RTC: The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Aromin. The court a quo disbelieved the claim of Victor, Juanito,
and Lilia that they were co-owners of the subject property. Instead, it gave credence to Paulo's testimony that when
he signed the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 832-BG, which was made the basis of the judgment thereof,
he was of the belief that the said agreement did not include those properties that he had already disposed of. The
court a quo likewise noted that Paulo was not assisted by counsel when he entered into the said agreement. It
opined that Victor, Juanito, and Lilia surreptitiously prepared the compromise agreement and that they took
advantage of Paulo's advanced age and weak mental faculties during the execution thereof.

The court a quo found that the subject property was Paulo's share in the estate of their parents and, thus, was
exclusively owned by him. Alberto, Paulo's brother, and the father of Victor, Juanito, and Lilia, no longer had a share
therein because his own share consisted in the properties situated in San Agustin, Bauang, La Union. Relying on the
testimonies of tenants who stated that they delivered the produce of the subject property to Paulo and not to the
siblings Victor, Juanito, and Lilia, the court a quo concluded that this proved that Paulo was the sole owner thereof.

It is the view of the court a quo that the spouses Aromin rightfully relied on Paulo's assurance that he was the sole
owner of the subject property on the basis of the tax declarations in his name. The first sale was made between
Paulo and the spouses Aromin on November 12, 1990 covering an area of 12,314 square meters of the subject
property and forthwith the latter built their house thereon. The failure of the Floresca siblings to take any action
against this act of adverse possession was interpreted by the court a quo as indicative of their recognition of Paulo's
right to dispose his own property.

CA: The Court of Appeals ruled that it was erroneous for the court a quo to impugn the judgment based on
compromise agreement rendered by the RTC (Branch 33) in Civil Case No. 832-BG. Under the terms thereof, the
subject property had been partitioned such that one-half of the rice land, sandy land, and swampland belonged to
Paulo while the other half of the said areas belonged to the siblings Victor, Juanito, and Lilia.

Following these precepts, the appellate court stated that it was not within the ambit of the court a quo's judicial power
to disturb, much more to nullify, absent any appeal or motion to set aside the judgment, the co-ownership of the
subject property between Paulo and the siblings which was the subject of the judgment based on compromise
agreement rendered by the RTC (Branch 33) in Civil Case No. 832-BG. It was also noted that Paulo himself
recognized the existence of the said co-ownership because in his answer with compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case
No. 921-BG, he admitted the sale of the subject property to the spouses Aromin "only to the extent of his share in the
parcels described therein, considering that the said parcels are not owned exclusively by defendant (referring to
Paulo) but co-owned with his deceased brother and sister Alberto Floresca and Josefa Floresca, respectively.

The claim of the spouses Aromin that they were buyers in good faith was not given credence by the appellate court. It
found that when portions of the subject property were being offered for sale, the spouses Aromin merely relied on the
representations made by Paulo that he was the sole owner thereof. The appellate court faulted them for not making
any inquiries with the Register of Deeds or the Assessor's Office in their province about the ownership of the subject
property.

According to the appellate court, when the three deeds of sale pertaining to some portions of the subject property
were executed in November 1990 and June 1991, the spouses Aromin already knew of the existence of the co-
ownership over the subject property. This knowledge should have impelled them to verify the extent of Paulo's
ownership rights. Their failure to do so, the appellate court held, indicated negligence on their part and such
negligence precluded them from claiming that they were buyers in good faith.

With respect to the other four deeds of sale that were executed in February 1992,11 the appellate court observed
that Civil Case No. 832-BG had already been filed at the time and, in connection therewith, a notice of lis pendens
had also been filed with the register of deeds. These facts should have put the spouses Aromin on notice that the lots
they were buying were not solely owned by Paulo.

Despite the absence of good faith, the sale made by Paulo in favor of the spouses Aromin was declared valid but
only to the extent of his one-half share of the subject property. The appellate court cited the settled rule that even if a
co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners
who did not consent to the sale.

Issue: Whether petitioners own the entire subject property pursuant to the Deed of Sale executed by Paulo.

Held: No, petitioners do not own the entire subject property.

Having established that the subject property was owned in common by Paulo and the siblings, it necessarily follows
that Paulo could only dispose to the petitioners his share in the subject property. Article 493 of the Civil Code
provides that "[e]ach co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership."
Under the said provision, while a co-owner has the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest,
nevertheless, as a co-owner he cannot alienate the shares of his other co-owners – nemo dat qui non habet. Paulo,
however, sold the entire subject property to the petitioners without the consent of the co-owners. Following the well-
established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so –
quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest - the disposition affects only Paulo's share pro indiviso,
and the transferee, in this case the petitioners, gets only what corresponds to Paulo's share in the partition of the
subject property, i.e., one-half of the areas described as riceland, sandy land and swampland which constitute the
subject property.

Finally, the Court cannot accede to the petitioners' plea that, in the interest of equity and justice, the heirs of Paulo
should be directed to reimburse to them the amount equivalent to one-half of the total purchase price of the subject
property. Under the circumstances, the petitioners have no one else to blame for the consequences of their
imprudent purchase of the subject property. They did so at their peril and the consequences would have to be borne
by them alone because, unfortunately for them, Paulo had already passed away. It would be unfair to Paulo's heirs if
they themselves would be required to reimburse the petitioners the amount equivalent to one-half of the purchase
price that Paulo received for the subject property absent any showing that they had received any amount for the
transactions between the petitioners and Paulo.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated June 6, 2003 and Resolution dated
October 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69651 are AFFIRMED in toto.