CUSTOMER SERVICES DIRECTORATE

1 ROND POINT MAURICE BELLONTE

31707 BLAGNAC CEDEX FRANCE
TELEPHONE + 33 (0)5 61 93 33 33
SERVICE INFORMATION LETTER

SUBJECT: ELAC & SEC RELIABILITY

ATA CHAPTER: 27-90

AIRCRAFT TYPE: A318, A319, A320, A321

APPLICABILITY: All A318, A319, A320, A321 Aircraft

REFERENCES:

• TFU 27.34.51.014: ELEVATOR SERVOCONTROL SERVOVALVE FAILURES

• TFU 27.93.00.048: ELAC AIL ORDER DISAGREE, ALT LAW in PH05
• TFU 27.93.00.051: ELAC ACCELEROMETER FAULT MESSAGES
• TFU 27.94.00.022: SEC FAULT DUE TO PWS BOOST FUNCTION ISSUE
• TFU 27.94.00.024: SEC ARINC acquisition discrepancy leading to F/CTL SPLR FAULT on
ground
• SB 27-1173: FLIGHT CONTROLS - ELAC SYSTEM (ELEVATOR AILERON COMPUTER) -
INSTALL ELAC "B" SOFTWARE STD "L92".
• SB 27-1188: FLIGHT CONTROL -ELAC SYSTEM- INTRODUCE ELAC A L84 SOFTWARE
STANDARD - SB ONLY.
• SB 27-1209: MODIFY POSITION OF VENTILATION HOLES ON ELAC RACKS
• Thales VSB 394512B-27-21: FLIGHT CONTROLS – ELEVATOR AND AILERON COMPUTER
394512 ELAC INSPECTION AND POLLUTION CLEANING IN ORDER TO PREVENT
ACCELEROMETER OR HYDRAULIC FAULT MESSAGES
• Thales VSB 394512B-27-22: FLIGHT CONTROLS – ELEVATOR AND AILERON COMPUTER
394512 TO AVOID POLLUTION ON COMPUTER
• Thales VSB B372BAM-27-030: FLIGHT CONTROLS – SPOILER AND ELEVATOR
COMPUTER B372BAM IMPROVEMENT OF THE BOOST FUNCTION ON POWER SUPPLY
• Thales VSB B372BAM-27-028: FLIGHT CONTROLS – SPOILER AND ELEVATOR
COMPUTER B372BAM INSPECTION OF THE SAMSUNG SRAM MEMORY
• Thales VSB B372BBM-27-002: FLIGHT CONTROLS - SPOILER AND ELEVATOR COMPUTER
B372BBM INTRODUCTION OF THE STANDARD SEC STD B' 121
• Thales SIL THAV/SIL-1185: SEC- Preventive maintenance operations on SEC –Exchange of
relays
• Thales SIL THAV/SIL-1162: SEC- Preventive maintenance action
• Thales SIL THAV/SIL-1180: Complementary information for SEC Chronic Unit process
• Thales SIL SXT/A320-064: ELAC – Preventive maintenance action on relays of the Power MON
and COM boards
• Thales SIL THAV/SIL-1278: ELAC - Preventive maintenance action on Q04 (PNR A1238140) on
the Power MON and COM boards
© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

• Thales SIL THAV/SIL-1293: Chronic Unit process/reliability recommendations

• SIL 00-032: AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE AIDS (ASMA)
• FAIR ATA27 Working Group E-site:
https://w3.airbus.com/crs/A233_Resources/symposium/A320_fair_working_group/html/ATA
27-29_WG.html
Note: Airbus World login and password are necessary.

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0. REASON FOR REVISION

Analyses carried out during the FAIR (Forum with Airline for Interactive Resolution) ATA27
Working Group were partially based on data collected in 2009. A review was completed by mid
2011 and later by third quarter 2012 using more recent inputs in order to make sure WG
estimates (OI / MTBUR gains, etc...) are still valid. As it was not possible to re-do the WG
analyses in their entirety, only some key parameters have been investigated:
- ELAC and SEC component failure breakdown
- Contribution of known issues using bilateral survey
Results show no significant evolution compared to WG computations. So Summary Cards have
been mainly revised to reflect the availability of the solutions published since last issue.

Changes in subject SIL are highlighted by a vertical revision bar in the left-hand margin of the
respective page.

1. PURPOSE

The purpose of this SIL is to provide an overview of the work and analyses carried out during a
dedicated Working Group held in the course of 2010: so called FAIR ATA27 Working Group.
This work has been then continuously kept updated by Airbus.
This SIL contains a synthesis of the most valuable solutions identified by the Working Group
team to improve SEC and ELAC reliability.
Furthermore, it is recalled that maintenance practices play an essential role on the ELAC/SEC
system perceived reliability. Guidance permitting to improve this aspect has been also
developed and recorded in this document.

2. BACKGROUND

During Paris 2009 A320 Family symposium, operators ranked ATA27 & 29 as top concerns and
requested the launch of a working group (WG) exercise to cover these two ATA chapters.
Activity was started by October 2009 and run all along 2010.
Many operators were involved (more than 25) guaranteeing operators concerns were
adequately addressed and permitting to collect worldwide experience and inputs.
For ATA27, Airframe vibration and ELAC / SEC system performance were more specifically
addressed.
THALES as the ELAC & SEC OEM was deeply involved in the exercise, which was conducted
as a tri-party activity (Airbus/Suppliers/Operators).

3. DESCRIPTION / ACTION TAKEN

© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

a. Reliability solutions

i. ELAC and SEC categories

During the ATA27 WG activity, ELAC and SEC categories were built in order to clarify what
changes (hardware, software) really influence the reliability of these computers. In particular,

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opportunity was taken to highlight that most of the ELAC and SEC Part Numbers introduced
during the last years were not incorporating reliability improvements, but additional operational
features.

Configuration matrices are supplied in appendix of this SIL.

ii. Summary Cards

For each category, the most valuable solutions permitting to improve the ELAC and SEC
reliability were identified. The potential benefits (MTBUR, Operational Interruption, etc...) that
can be expected by the application of these solutions have been also evaluated and recorded in
dedicated Summary Cards. These documents also provide more details on the issues
(background, technical explanations and technical documentation references).

Besides, some Summary Cards have been created despite the unavailability of final solution.
They enable to better figure out the contribution of these issues and might explain reliability
degradation observed by some operators. When applicable, cards include instruction to mitigate
the issue.

Corresponding Summary Cards are annexed to this SIL. These cards will be regularly updated.
Latest version will be downloadable via the FAIR ATA27 Working Group e-site:
https://w3.airbus.com/crs/A233_Resources/symposium/A320_fair_working_group/html/ATA
27-29_WG.html
Note: Airbus World login and password are necessary.

iii. Reporting and continuous follow-up

A reporting sheet enabling operators to report application of these solutions and to provide
comments on their effectiveness is also enclosed in the SIL appendix. Operators accepting to
share their experience with the WG team shall return these forms to Airbus.

b. Alternative solutions: Maintenance best practices

The opportunity of the WG was taken to closely work with two large operators in order to deeply
analyse their ELAC removals and the Operational Interruption (OI) linked to ELAC/SEC
systems.
The aim was to define the weight of some known contributors:
• Chronic Units
• Repeater aircraft
• Unjustified removal
© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Investigations have been conducted during several months involving a fleet of more than 300
aircraft.

i. Initial assessment

As an initial assessment (3 first months), all ELAC removals recorded were reviewed and put in
3 different categories. Results are presented in Figure 1.

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In the meantime, Operational Interruptions (ELAC – SEC system related) have been screened
and assessed similarly. Outcomes can be found in Figure 2.

Figure 1 - ELAC Removal analysis for 2 operators (WG team members)

Figure 2 – Operational Interruption analysis for 2 operators (WG team members)

Legend of figure 1 & 2:

• Unnecessary removal: Removal caused by inadequate troubleshooting (e.g. not
requested by TSM)
• Chronic Units: definition given in paragraph 3.b.ii.
• Repeater:
© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

o ELAC removals classified as “Repeater” when repeated fault on same aircraft

have led to multiple computer replacements
o OI retained as “Repeater” (avoidable) when issue might have been addressed at
the opportunity of at least 2 night stops having preceded the Operation
Interruption occurrence.
• SERVO VLV: Issue described in TFU 27.34.51.014 and in ELAC Summary Card #5

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Analyses have shown that Chronic Units, Repeater aircraft and Unjustified removals
significantly influence the ELAC MTBUR (Fig 1) and ATA27 Operation Interruption rate (Fig. 2).

Promoting and implementing best maintenance practices is thus susceptible to improve cost-
efficiently the actual situation. Recommendations and methods are provided in the following
paragraphs.
Investigations have also permitted to confirm the contribution of known failure modes (already
covered by ELAC Summary Cards N°5 and N°6).

ii. Chronic Units treatment

Since 2004, Thales has implemented a Chronic Unit process as it was identified that some units
necessitate extensive testing and investigation to properly determine the faulty component.
These boxes cause repeated removals affecting the aircraft dispatch reliability and reducing the
ELAC or SEC MTBUR.

Definition, according to Thales Chronic Unit Policy

• Chronic Unit: Any unit with three (unscheduled) removals for a failure within the
previous 18 month period regardless of removal reason and/or previous corrective
actions.
• Applicable to LRUs :
o Detected by Thales repair shops
o For which an alert has been set up by Thales customer support representatives
o For which a direct request has been received from the customer
• Customer request shall be supported by complementary failure data: PFR, A/C
Troubleshooting Data, History of previous customer repairs (if applicable), and any
additional information which can help investigation.
• If classification of the unit as a Chronic is accepted by Thales, customer agreement
is requested to start the process

The Chronic Unit policy applies to both ELAC and SEC. Principle is depicted in the following
SILs:
• SEC: THAV/SIL-1180
• ELAC: THAV/SIL-1293

These SILs also provide a compilation of VSBs, VSILs, and best practices. If applied as a
precautionary measure function of the removal reason, these recommendations might also
reduce the number of units entering the Chronic Unit process.
© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

It is recommended that operators monitor their ELAC and SEC removals and liaise with Thales
if Chronic Unit candidates are identified.

iii. Repeater aircraft

Intermittent faults, resettable by the flight crew or the maintenance team, might lead to repeated
occurrences as not addressed by a positive maintenance action. These faults might not induce

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systematic and/or immediate operational interruption. However, repeated events increase the
risk of operational consequences as fault might become hard or necessitates a return to gate for
trouble-shooting.
Additionally, repeated/recurring faults are rendering trouble-shooting follow-up more difficult and
might lead maintenance crews to apply same step of the TSM several times (for instance
computer replacement). This contributes to feed ELAC / SEC removals and NFF rate.

Several strategies and methods have been elaborated and deployed with operators involved in
the Working Group activity. They consist in identifying the repeater aircraft for accomplishment
of a corrective action during night stop in accordance with TSM instruction.

1. Proactive trouble-shooting for dedicated ECAM Warning

It was noticed that some faults (ECAM Warnings) are more susceptible to appear intermittently
and not systematically at each flight. Experience has shown that events of this type having
occurred 2 or 3 times and successfully reset will re-occur. A typical example is shown in figure
3.

Figure 3. Airman extract

We have determined that it is advisable to perform pro-active maintenance action during night
stop whenever the following E/Ws are experienced more than 3 times:
- F/CTL ELAC x FAULT
- F/CTL ELAC PITCH x FAULT
- F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT

Note: If failure symptoms relate to ELAC Summary Cards N°5, it is recommended to adhere to
the mitigation block.
© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

2. Fault monitoring

Operators can investigate events logged within their fleet in order to identify aircraft affected by
recurring faults. Different analysis method can be utilized: AIRMAN, Logbook screening...
Note: a built-in Tracking Function is implemented in AIRMAN to monitor repeater fault.

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The following parameters were retained during our analysis:

- AIRMAN analysis was performed on Monthly or Bi-monthly basis
- Failures with more than 5 occurrences associated with a cockpit effect were tagged:
“to be trouble-shot”
Frequency and criterion used to monitor the fleet might be adapted to operator situation,
resources and need.

iv. Unjustified removals

Close cooperation activities achieved in the working group framework have enabled to define
typical situations where ELAC and SEC are inadequately replaced. This has led Airbus to
develop a dedicated booklet permitting maintenance staff to better understand Electrical Flight
Control System architecture and the reason why ELAC / SEC replacement is not necessary.
This booklet was elaborated and validated with the cooperation of the Working Group team.

Flight Control Trouble-shooting Tips Booklet was published by first half 2011. This document
has been cross-referenced in the SIL 00-032 that provides procurement details to obtain hard
copies. Booklet electronic version can also be downloaded via the WG e-site.
A revision of this booklet containing additional practical cases was released by second half
2012.

v. Final results

Effectiveness of the best practices reflected here-above has been evaluated with the cooperation
of these 2 operators.
Results have been evaluated by monitoring the ELAC removals and the ATA27 OI (EFCS
related). Significant improvements have been obtained on both aspects (reduction by 50%).
© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

4. MODIFICATION INFORMATION

Not Applicable.

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5. MATERIAL

Not Applicable.

6. PROCUREMENT

Not Applicable.
© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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Appendix 1:

ELAC Configuration Matrix & Summary

Cards

• ELAC configurations
• ELAC Card #1: Scheduled / preventive replacement of
electromechanical relays
• ELAC Card #2: Precautionary replacement of relays when
ELAC is NFF in shop
• ELAC Card #3: Scheduled / preventive replacement of
transistor Q04 of supply boards
• ELAC Card #4: Aileron order disagree
• ELAC Card #5: Blue elevator servovalve fault
• ELAC Card #6: ACCLRM fault
• Reporting sheet
© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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Appendix 2:

SEC Configuration Matrix & Summary

Cards

• SEC configurations
• SEC Card #1: Scheduled / preventive replacement of
electromechanical relays
• SEC Card #2: Precautionary replacement of relays when
SEC is NFF in shop
• SEC Card #3: Power supply power boost function issue
• SEC Card #4: Defective S-RAM
• SEC Card #5: SEC Std 120 deviation
• Reporting sheet
© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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OI rate and MTBUR improvement slightly

© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

changed. Impact of the issue has slightly

reduced since first study.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. This document
and all information contained herein is the sole property of AIRBUS S.A.S. No intellectual property
rights are granted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure of its content. This document
shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the express written consent of AIRBUS
S.A.S. This document and its content shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which it is
supplied.
© AIRBUS S.A.S 2013. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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