Criminal Trial Written Submissions: IPC 376
Criminal Trial Written Submissions: IPC 376
Submitted by
Sulagna Dutta 17010323124
Division B
Class 2017-2022
SYMBIOSIS LAW SCHOOL, HYDERABAD
In
May, 2021
I
INDEX
1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION………………………………………….01
4. ANNEXURES ……………………………………………………24-36
II
BRIEF INTRODUCTION
The instant document relates to the written submissions for the trial of a case under Section
376 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is a systematic and
exhaustive procedural law for holding a criminal trial in India, covering topics such as
evidence gathering, witness questioning, accused investigation, arrests, safeguards and
procedure to be followed by police and courts, bail, criminal trial process, form of conviction,
and the accused's rights to a fair trial. Except as otherwise mentioned, The Code of Criminal
Process, 1973 governs the procedure for a criminal trial in India (Cr.P.C.).
Except as issued by any other law in India, the Indian Penal Code, 1860, is the primary
penal law of India, and it applies to all offences. The IEA is a detailed treaty on the law of
"fact" that can be used in court, the way in which proof is produced in court, and the
evidentiary importance that can be assigned to such evidence. IEA also handles legal
presumptions, expert testimony, and scientific evidence. There are a few other statutes that
have been passed to deal with crime in unique situations. It's also worth noting that India
operates in an adversarial framework, in which the State (Prosecution) bears the burden of
evidence in proving the case against the accused, and the accused is considered innocent
unless and until the charge against him is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The republic of India is a diverse country in South East Asia, whose Constitution follows a
quasi- federal system with a strong Central Government. The instant case follows an
incident on the night of 26.01.2021. On 26.01.2021, there was an incident of violent sexual
attack on Ms. Riya by the Accused, who raped her, at Shamshabad. Ms. Riya is a young
woman, aged 24 years and is unlettered. The victim works for a call centre located at
Shadnagar, Hyderabad and is residing at Begumpet, Hyderabad, Telangana 500016. That
after the incident on the night of 26.01.2021, Ms. Riya telephoned her sister who resides with
her, in a distraught state and asked for her help to take her from the bus stand where she was
alone and feeling unsafe. The unfortunate incident was immediately reported to the nearest
police station situated at Begumpet Rd, Police Lines, Motilal Nehru Nagar, Begumpet,
Hyderabad, Telangana 500016. The police took cognizance of the matter and FIR was
registered. This trial is a subsequent development of the same plot.
1
WRITTEN
SUBMISSIONS ON
BEHALF OF THE
PROSECUTION
2
BEFORE THE METROPOLITAN SESSIONS JUDGE, SHAMSHABAD,
HYDERABAD.
THURSDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF APRIL, 2021
CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION No. 317 OF 2021
IN CRIME NO. 157 of 2021
AND
1. Mr. Rohan Shetty, S/o Mr. Shyam Shetty, aged 30 years, residing at Somajiguda,
Hyderabad, Telangana- 500082
2. Mr. Raju, aged 27 years, residing at Somajiguda, Hyderabad, Telengana-
500066…………………………………………………………....………Respondents
TO
THE HON’BLE METROPOLITAN SESSIONS JUDGE,
SHAMSHABAD
HYDERABAD,
TELENGANA
THE HUMBLE PETITION OF THE PETITIONER ABOVE NAMED.
1. That the Petitioner is preferring the instant petition under Section 228 of Cr.P.C read with
section 376 of IPC, 1860 pertaining to the offence of rape committed against Ms. Riya.
(hereinafter referred to as the victim).
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2. That the Petitioner is the Government of Telangana through the Public Prosecutor
(hereinafter referred to as Petitioner) having his registered office at High Court of
Telangana, High Court Rd, Near Government City College, High Court, Madina,
Telangana 500066.
3. That the Accused in the instant case is the first respondent (hereinafter referred to as the
Accused 1 or A1) against whom the charges under Section 376 of IPC have been brought.
4. That Accused-2 (A2) is a vendor, who runs a tea stall at Shamshabad, where the offence
was actualised.
5. That the instant petition is maintainable under Section 376 of IPC. In the case of Deepak
Vs. State of Haryana and others [CRM-M No. 31825 of 2017], the High Court of
Punjab & Haryana, although held that the offence under Section 376 IPC is a grievous
offence and also against the society at large, and that such matters should not be
compromised.
6. That the facts giving rise to filing of this criminal petition are as under: -
6.1. That on 26.01.2021, there was an incident of violent sexual attack on Ms. Riya by the
Accused, who raped her, at an isolated basement of an under-construction site at
Shamshabad. Ms. Riya is a young woman, aged 24 years and is unlettered. The victim
works for a call centre located at Shadnagar, Hyderabad and is residing at Vasavi's
Lifestyle Residency, Vasavi's, Vaman Naik Ln, Kundanbagh Colony, Begumpet,
Hyderabad, Telangana 500016.
6.2. That after the incident on the night of 26.01.2021, Ms. Riya telephoned her sister who
resides with her, in a distraught state and asked for her help to take her from the bus
stand where she was alone and feeling unsafe.
6.3. Thereafter she iterated the traumatic experience that she has gone through and it was
clear from her distress voice that she had been subjected to an immensely traumatic
experience.
6.4. The unfortunate incident was immediately reported to the nearest police station
situated at Begumpet Rd, Police Lines, Motilal Nehru Nagar, Begumpet, Hyderabad,
Telangana 500016. The police took cognizance of the matter and FIR was registered
as Begumpet Mahila PS Case No. 157/2021 [ANNEXURE-A]. The medical
examination of the victim was also conducted in the morning of 27.03.2021 followed
by a Rapid Antigen Covid test. Consequently, a charge sheet was drawn against the
Accused and a copy of the same has been attached as ANNEXURE-C.
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6.5. In the course of the next two days, that is, 27.01.2021 - 28.01.2021, the victim was
made to repeat her experience for multiple times, often only for voyeuristic purposes.
She was emotionally dependent and in a distraught state since the incident took place.
6.6. The Accused has been taken into police custody after the police acquired the CCTV
footage of the nearest signal win which the accused was spotted around the time of
the offense. The same was done within the time prescribed by the Amendment made
to the Cr.P.C. for speedy trial in Rape cases to which the Accused has raised
objection.
6.7. The police conducted a thorough investigation from the scene of crime and collected
evidence from witnesses at the crime scene. They informed the police that a man of
A1’s height and build had followed [Link] from the call centre and, upon this
statement the police arrested A1.
6.8. It was also found during the course of investigation that a tea stall vendor (A2) had
seen the Accused with the victim last before the incident took place. A2 has confessed
that he had helped the Accused find an isolated place where he could commit the
offence. He also tried helping the Accused flee the place of crime and left the victim
in an injured state.
6.9. The confession statements of certain persons [PW1, PW2, PW3 and PW4] were
recorded which have been laid down later in this petition.
6.10. On 29.01.2021, Ms X was summoned for the purposes of recording her statement u/s
164 CrPC. The Investigating Officer accompanied the victim to the District Court
building, and the victim was asked not to communicate with family until her
testimony had been registered. The victim was then led into the Magistrate's chambers
and was asked to make a statement.
6.11. Hence, the present Petition refers the matter to trial.
7. GROUNDS
That the prayers sought in the present petition are based on, inter alia, the following
grounds, which are taken without prejudice to one another:
7.1. That the present petition seeks to protect the Fundamental Rights of the Victim - to
dignity, liberty and access to justice, as guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution of India.
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7.2. That the Hon’Ble Guwahati High Court in the case of Nasiruddin Ali vs The State of
Assam and Anr. [In Case No. Crl.A. 227/2016], a recent and laudable decision by
the has stated unequivocally that rape is a violation of the victim's human right under
Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court stated as under:
“The chastity of a woman ruined as soon as such offence is committed, while in a
civilized society, respect or reputation is a basic right. No member of society can
afford to conceive the idea that he can create a hollow in the honour of a woman.
Such thinking is not only lamentable but also deplorable. Youthful excitement and
an attempt for momentary pleasure on the part of a person upon a woman, had a
devastating effect in the entire body and mind of the victim. It is to be kept in mind
that such offence lowers the dignity of a woman and mars her reputation. The
Courts are sensitized that rape is a violation of victim's fundamental right
under Article 21 of the Constitution and rape victim is placed on a higher pedestal
than an injured witness.”
Thus, it can be inferred from the above that the offence of rape does strip the victim
off fundamental rights enshrined under Article 14 and 21. The heinous offence that
the Accused has committed against Ms. Riya is a serious violation of the latter’s
rights under the mentioned Articles and the Accused should be punished for the same.
It is thus humbly submitted that the Hon’ble court should uphold the dignity and
liberty of the victim.
7.3. A man is guilty of rape if he commits sexual intercourse with a woman either against
her will or without her consent as enumerated under clauses firstly to seventhly of
Section 375 IPC. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chottey Lal, the Supreme Court
explained that the expression ‘against her will’would ordinarily mean that the
intercourse was done by a man with a woman despite her resistance and opposition.
7.4. The essence of rape is the absence of consent. According to Explanation 2, consent
means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the person by words, gestures or
any form of non-verbal communication, communicates a willingness to participate in
the specific sexual act. Thus, to absolve a person of criminal liability, consent must be
given freely and it must not be obtained by fraud or by mistake or under a
misconception of fact.
7.5. In the instant, the absence of consent cannot absolve the act of A1 from criminal
liability and the absence of consent and against the victim’s will shows that the
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ingredients under section 375 have been fulfilled and that A1 has committed the
offence of rape
7.6. That, the Amendment brought to the Code of Criminal Procedure of completing
the investigation within 2 months is valid under the Constitution. The same has been
brought in by the legislation to provide speedy trial and justice to the victims under
Article 14. In State of West Bengal v Anwar Ali Sarkar [AIR 1952 SC 75]., the
Court held that a legislation could be held to be constitutionally valid if the
classification had- i) intelligible differentia in making the classification between
different groups of persons and ii) if this differentia had a rational nexus to the object
of classification. This was reiterated in Sesachalam v Bar Council of Tamil Nadu
[AIR 2015 SC 816], which held that there must be a nexus between the basis of
classification and the object of the Act. As such, the rational nexus between the
differentia and object of classification has been held to be of utmost importance in
ascertaining violations to Article 14.
It is the humble submission before this Hon’ble Court that in the instant case, the
Amendment brough to force which aims at completing investigation of rape cases
within a prescribed time period rests on a rational nexus for securing the object of
delivering faster delivery to the victim. Moreover, the Accused has been spotted and
identified from the CCTV footage acquired from the place of commission of the
crime.
7.7. The second requirement which, if not met, violates Article 14 is the test of
arbitrariness. In the case of E P Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu [AIR 1974 SC 555],
it was held that no action by the State could be arbitrary and as such, such
arbitrariness would be antithetical to Article 14. Furthermore, equality as a concept
was held to be dynamic and not confined. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI [1978 SCR (2) 621] has laid down that A statute that is not
"right, just, and equal" is arbitrary, according to this ruling.
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brooding omnipresence, and the process contemplated by Article 21 shall pass the
reasonableness test only if it is in conformity with Article 14.”
Thus, it is the humble request of the counsel for the Petitioner that the instant case fulfils the
second requirement too. The concept of reasonableness has been tested true by the reason that
victims of heinous offenses like those under Section 376 of IPC require speedy trial and
justice as the victim is under immense trauma and long drawn trials and repetitive narration
of the incident can be difficult and sometimes adverse to the physical and mental condition of
the victim. In the case of State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, the Supreme Court held that
Court is under an obligation to see that prosecutrix is not unnecessarily harassed and
humiliated in cross-examination in case of rape trial.
7.8. Further, the right to a speedy trial has been held to be a part of fair trial under
Article 21. In Hussainara Khatoon v State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 98.], the right to
access justice in a speedy, expeditious manner was held to be a fundamental right.
Further, in the case of Ranjan Dwivedi v CBI [(2012) 8 SCC 495], it was held that a
speedy trial was to ensure that the accused does not undergo unduly oppression and
targeting.
7.9. In Kartar Singh v State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569], it was held that the right
to a speedy trial forms part of article 21 and speedy trials can ensure a reasonable and
just procedure and completion. As such, this right is also held to be an important
safeguard for the accused and the victim. Furthermore, in Rattiram v State of
Madhya Pradesh [(2012) 4 SCC 516], it was held that a speedy trial was not just a
right but also a collective requirement of society as a whole.
In the present case, the amendment is hence one that is not to the detriment of the accused
or to their rights in any manner whatsoever- as such, the purpose and the provisions the
Act is to observe the fundamental rights and collective interests of society as a whole. By
making the procedure speedy in a mandatory manner, a fair trial and speedy justice is
ensured at all costs.
7.10. In Bishwanath Bhattacharya v UOI [AIR 2014 SC 1003], the Court observed that it
was a well settled principle that legislature can make retrospective laws except in
criminal law, and such a bar operated due to the effect of Article 20(1) . In Jawala
Ram v State of Pepsu [AIR 1962 SC 1246] it was held that the scope of Art. 20(1)
was confined to punishments alone.
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7.11. Article 20(1) is hence limited in application only to- i) substantive criminal provisions
and ii) convictions and penalties. In State of W.B v S K Ghosh [AIR 1963 SC 255],
the Court identified the following features as part of Art. 20(1)'s scope- i) the State
cannot punish for act that was not an offence at time of commission and ii) it cannot
enhance penalty retrospectively.
7.12. This scope of Art. 20(1) means that the provision does not cover procedural changes.
Thus, in the case of Sajjan Singh v State of Punjab [AIR 1964 SC 464], it was thus
held that retroactivity was impermissible but for substantive penal provisions only.
The same has also bee reiterated in later and more recent judgements such as that of
Varinder Singh v State of Punjab.[ (2014) 3 SCC 151]Further, in UOI v Sukumar
Pyne,[ AIR 1966 SC 1206.] it was expressly held that Article 20 covers no vested
right to any specific procedure whatsoever.
7.13. Thus, in Mahipal Singh v CBI [(2014) 11 SCC 282.] it was held that there would be
no impediment in complying with the procedural requirement later on if the
ingredients of offence as it was on the date of commission was satisfied.
Furthermore, in a case where the amendment had the effect of changing the forum of
trial from Judicial Magistrate, First Class to the Court of Sessions, a retrospective
application of the same could not be held to be ultra vires Art. 20(1).
7.14. The right to fair trial can be found u/A 21 after the expanded scope given to it by the
judgement of Maneka Gandhi v UOI [AIR 1978 SC 597.]. As such, the cornerstone
of the right to a fair trial includes the principles of natural justice, which are the rights
to be heard and the right to approach an unbiased forum of adjudication.
7.15. Any law or action that deprives an individual of his liberty must thus be in
consonance with fair trial principles and the guarantee of the same includes the
following, as has been held the Supreme Court. In J Jayalalitha v State of Karnataka
[(2017) 6 SCC 263], it was held that the State had to justify any and every deprivation
of liberty before an impartial tribunal.
In the present case, the changes brought about by the Amendment Act are purely
procedural in nature. Furthermore, these procedures are not arbitrary but follow well settled
safeguards for the accused and hence, the impugned Act must be upheld.
7.16. It is most humbly submitted that the Accused and PW-1 are guilty for committing the
crime of criminal conspiracy with a common intention to commit the offence of
9
rape against the victim. It is pertinent to note that the punishment for committing
criminal conspiracy is mentioned in Section120 B, Indian Penal Code (herein after
referred to as “IPC”) whereas in order to show conviction under this charge, it is
important to refer to the ingredients of Sec.120A, IPC. Thus, this will be shown by
looking at the actus reus and common intention to conspire by the respondents.
7.17. Under Sec.120A, IPC, Criminal conspiracy is defined as when two or more persons
agree to do or cause to do;
a) There must be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to conspire;
and b) That agreement should be for doing; an illegal act, or an act which is not
illegal by illegal means, then such an agreement is designated to be criminal
conspiracy.
The accused dealing with the criminal conspiracy, show that there were transactions which
infer the conduct of respondents for the same. In the instant case, A-2 was fully aware of the
act that the Accused was about to commit and still helped him in proceeding with the same.
He also helped him flee the place of commission of the crime in order to escape police action,
7.18. An act is said to be illegal which amounts to an offence, prohibited by law according
to Section 43 of IPC. The mere agreement by two or more persons to do or causing
any illegal act to be done constitutes an overt act (actus reus). Actus Reus in a
conspiracy is the agreement to execute the illegal conduct, not the execution of it. It is
not however necessary that each conspirator should have been in communication with
every other.
There lies no spec of doubt arising out of the fact that A2 did knew about the plot of the
crime and still purported to help A1. In the case of Queen Emperess v. Hos Nak, [1941
ALJR 416]. Circumstantial evidence can be instrumental to convict an accused if it shows
that a chain of evidence has been so completed that it does not leave room for any reasonable
doubt for a conclusion to prove him guilty.
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7.20. That in the case of Rishideo Pande v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [AIR 1955 SC 331], it
was held that Common intention as per Sec.34, IPC presupposes that there must be a
prior concert, a prearranged plan, that is, a prior meeting of minds, does not mean that
there must be a long interval of time between the formation of common intention and
doing the act. Further, in the case of Nazir v. Emperor, [AIR 1948 All 229]. Such
common intention may take place at the time of commission of criminal act and it
does not mean that the accused. need to have knowledge about the consequences but
should know the act to be punishable under IPC.
7.21. It is further submitted that in the case of Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, [AIR
1952 SC 54], it was held that corroboration is not required to be done by way of direct
evidence only but even mere circumstantial evidence can be need to show the same.
The following statements by witnesses who were accomplice are to be held as
circumstantial evidence.
PW1 Statement (The victim’s co-worker): Ms. Riya (the victim) was seen near gate of the
office, wearing a white kurta and who waved her back before leaving on foot to the nearest
store which was the pick-up point for her auto.
PW2 Statement (The Receptionist at Office): Ms. Riya left for home after entering in the
register at the usual time. She was always a reserved person at temperament and she shared a
cordial relationship with everyone at work.
PW3 Statement (the reserved Auto-rickshaw driver who took the victim home every
day) Due to traffic congestion at the signal, I arrived about 15 minutes later than usual on the
day the unfortunate event took place. When I reached there, I expected Ms. Riya to be
waiting but she was not there. I waited for 45 minutes but she did not come. I called her more
than twice but in vain. I left thereafter.
PW4 Statement (nearby store vendor)- A man of A1’s height and build had followed
[Link] from the call centre.
That in the case of Krishna Pillai v. State of Kerala, [AIR 1981 SC 1237], it was observed
that Evidence adduced by way of statements by (in the instant case by PW1, PW2 and PW3)
cannot be disregarded in toto, even though they being interested witness.
7.22. The minor discrepancies in the evidence cannot be used to totally discredit the
evidence deposed by witnesses against the accused. Such discrepancies in evidence
11
are likely to happen due to normal errors of observations, normal errors of memory
due to lapse of time and due to mental dispositions. This was observed in the case of
Rizan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2003) 2 SCC 661. Further, in Anand Mohan v.
State of Bihar, (2012) 7 SCC 225, it was held that due care and caution must be taken
while looking at the admission of such statements. Secondly, as contended by the
respondents, in State of Orissa v. Sibcharan Singh, AIR 1962 Ori. 157, it was held
that it is not necessary to have examination of investigating order and it is neither fatal
nor prejudicial to respondents in the present case.
In the instant case, the statements of the Prosecution witnesses throw light on ascertaining
that the Accused 1 and 2 had the common intention to strip the victim of her dignity and the
investigation has been done in the right course.
7.23. Therefore, in the above circumstances, it is prayed that the Hon’ble Court may be
pleased to uphold the rights of the victim and thus deliver justice by convicting the
Accused under Section 376 of IPC, 1860 or conditions as this Hon’ble Court deems
fit and in the interest of justice.
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PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, may
this Hon’ble Court be pleased to:
a) Hold that the Amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure is not detrimental to the
interests of the Accused and is formulated with the purpose of delivering speedy trial and
justice.
b) Convict the Accused for offence of criminal conspiracy coupled with common intention
and vis-à-vis Sections 120B and 34 of IPC respectively.
c) Convict A1 for offence of rape under Section 376 of IPC,1860 and grant imprisonment for
life.
AND/OR
Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
Sd/-
Public Prosecutor
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WRITTEN
SUBMISSIONS ON
BEHALF OF THE
DEFENSE
14
BEFORE THE METROPOLITAN SESSIONS JUDGE, HYDERABAD
THURSDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF APRIL, 2021
CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION No. 317 OF 2021
IN CRIME NO. 157 of 2021
AND
1. Mr. Rohan Shetty, S/o Mr. Shyam Shetty, aged 30 years, residing at Somajiguda,
Hyderabad, Telangana- 500082
2. Mr. Raju, aged 27 years, residing at Somajiguda, Hyderabad, Telengana-
500066……………………....……………………………………………Respondents
1. That the instant submissions relate to the deny the allegations and charges that have been
put forth in the petition filed by the Petitioner under Section 228 of Cr.P.C read with
section 376 of IPC, 1860 pertaining to the alleged offence of rape committed against Ms.
Riya. (hereinafter referred to as the victim).
2. That the Petitioner is the Government of Telangana through the Public Prosecutor
(hereinafter referred to as Petitioner) having his registered office at High Court of
Telangana, High Court Rd, Near Government City College, High Court, Madina,
Telangana 500066.
3. That the Accused in the instant case is the first respondent (hereinafter referred to as the
Accused 1 or A1) against whom the charges under Section 376 of IPC have been brought.
4. That Accused-2 (A2) is a vendor, who runs a tea stall at Shamshabad, where the offence
was actualised.
5. That the facts leading to the instant petition are as follows:
5.1. That on the night of 26.01.2021, the victim was allegedly attacked sexually at an
isolated area near her workplace at Shamshabad.
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5.2. That the victim had narrated the incident to her sister over phone at a time when she
was under immense traumatic pressure and an unstable mental balance.
5.3. That the same was reported to the Police at Begumpet police station and the police
acquired the CCTV footage about a week later, during the course of investigation.
5.4. That a man of the same build was seen accompanying the victim to the alleged area
but the same cannot be ascertained to be the Accused 1 as the face is not clearly visible
from the footage.
5.5. Based on the footage and in the absence of any substantial evidence, the Accused 1
and 2 were arrested and have been brought to trial before the Hon’ble Court under
charges of Rape u/s 376 of IPC, 1860.
6. REPLY TO GROUNDS
6.1. The instant case, the Accused cannot be said to have committed the offence of rape
under 376 of IPC. The same has been deduced after an investigation whereby the CCTV
footage showed a person of the same build as A1 but that cannot be treated as conclusive
proof of the same. The presumption of innocence is the principle which asserts that an
individual is always considered “innocent until proven guilty”. In the case of Noor Aga
Khan vs. state of Punjab it was held by the apex court that, though not explicitly
mentioned in the constitution, presumption of innocence is nevertheless a potent
background to the conception of justice, in preserving confidence in enduring integrity
and security of a legal system.
6.2. Presumption of innocence is a human right and cannot be thrown away in any
case. Article 6 (Right to recognition before law), Article 7 (Equality before law), Article
10 (Right to a fair trial), Article 11(2) (Right to presumption of innocence) under the
universal declaration of human rights, create even more grave concerns for the accused in
the present case.
6.3. The guilt should be proved beyond any reasonable doubt that a reasonable man with
ordinary prudence can have. There should be no doubt whether the accused is guilty or
not. If there is slightest doubt, no matter how small it is, the benefit will go the accused.
In Indian legal system the provision regarding Burden of Proof and how it is to
discharged are grandeur laid down in Chapter VII of the Evidence Act, 1872. The rule is
that whoever alleges a fact must prove it. In a criminal trial it is the prosecution who
alleges that the accused has committed the offence with requisite mens-rea and so the
burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the same.
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6.4. Apex court in Abdulla Mohammed v. State explained the difference between Burden
and onus it was held that Burden of proof lies upon the person who has to prove a fact
and it never shifts, but the Onus of proof shifts.
6.5. The impugned Amendment Act makes changes to the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
with respect to the procedure for offences under sections 326A, 354F, 354G, 376, 376A,
376AB, 376D, 376DA, 376DB and 376E of the Hakuna Penal Code.(footnote annexure
of fact sheet). The amendment makes the following mandatory requirements- i)the
investigation must be completed within seven days of receiving information; ii)the trial
must be completed within twenty days from date of filing chargesheet and iii)appeals
must be disposed within a period of six months.
6.6. Article 14 guarantees the right to equality to all persons. In Shayara Bano v UOI, the
Court held that equality u/A. 14 entailed two concepts- i) equality before the law and ii)
equal protection of laws (if the law is arbitrary, it goes against equal protection of laws
and postulates positive equality).
6.7. The language of Article 14 is couched in negative terms and is hence, an "admonition
addressed to the State". Furthermore, the tests developed to ascertain whether article 14
has been violated include- i) the reasonable classification test and later on, with emphasis
being placed upon ii)the arbitrariness test. In the instant case, the impugned Act is
manifestly arbitrary and thus, violates Article 14. In the instant case, the investigation was
completed as per the amended Code and as a result of the same, the Accused has been
arrested. Arrest on the basis of a CCTV footage has been affected to put a serious
accusation as rape against the Accused which is violation of the rights of the latter.
6.8. The Court first expanded the scope of Article 14 to include arbitrariness on the part of
the State in E. P Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu [AIR 1975 SC 2299]. It was held that
the concept of equality was dynamic and multi-dimensional and could not be confined to
narrow tests- upon this, the court held that arbitrariness could be reviewed u/A. 14 as
equality was antithetic to arbitrariness. This was further held and reiterated in the case of
Ajay Hasia v Khalid Mujib Sehravardi [(1981) 1 SCC 722].
6.9. Furthermore, in Shayara Bano [(2017) 9 SCC 1], the notion of equal protection of
laws was held to entail that the law or State action could not be arbitrary. Legislation that
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imposes arbitrary requirements can be held to be violative of Article 14. In Indira
Gandhi v Raj Narain [AIR 1975 SC 2299], it was held that the rule of law required that
exercise of powers be subject to the doctrine of equality. Thus, it was held that manifest
arbitrariness was a ground that could be used to strike a law down. This was further
reiterated in the case of K S Puttaswamy v UOI [(2019) 1 SCC 1], which held that a
legislation, if it was manifestly arbitrary, could be struck down.
6.10. Such an instance was seen in the case of Navtej Johar v UOI [(2019) 1 SCC(LS)
443.], wherein a provision was struck down, amongst other reasons, for its arbitrariness as
against sexual orientations. In Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Union of India
[Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1074 of. 2019] a provision was struck down to be manifestly
arbitrary since, asides other grounds, the legislature revived an automatic stay in some
cases retrospectively.
6.11. It is further submitted that a well settled principle that the Courts will not interfere in
policy making and matters unless the same has manifest arbitrariness involved. The same
was observed in the case of V Sivamurthy v State of A.P., [2008 13 SCC 730]. As such,
further the Court in the case of Bombay Dyeing & Mfg Ltd v Bombay Environmental
Action Group, [2006 3 SCC 434]. Held that manifest arbitrariness in a legislation must
be reviewed on the basis of the objects and provisions of statute thereof. Such
arbitrariness is evident when the legislature has done something without adequate
determining principle.
6.12. The most pertinent case with respect to the instant issue is that of Committee of
Creditors v Satish Kumar Gupta [(2019) 2 SCC 1], wherein the legislative provision for
the time period to complete the corporate insolvency process was held to be manifestly
arbitrary. Significantly, the provision used the word "shall" and thus made it mandatory to
complete the process within a specified time period, which was thus struck down on the
basis of this concept.
In the present case, the impugned Act is violative of Article 14 as it is manifestly arbitrary in
its requirements of specified time periods, which have been made mandatory. As such,
similar provisions and the use of the word “shall” in this context has been used to strike down
18
a provision as manifestly arbitrary. No basis as to why only specific provisions given
different time and why specific offences made cognizable and non bailable.
6.13. It is humbly submitted that, whilst the right to a speedy and fair trial can be seen as
effect of Article 21, the lack of the same can be held violative of Article 21 only when
such delay in trial has resulted in the oppression of the accused- this was as held to be in
the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay v R S Nayak [1992 1 SCC 225]. Further, in the case
of Mohd Hussain v State [2012 9 SCC 408], it was held that delay in itself was not a
violation of Article 21. As such, delay would amount to a violation only if it was to the
prejudice of the accused, as was held in Dharmendra Kirthal v State of Uttar Pradesh
[(2013) 8 SCC 368.]
6.14. As such, the primary purpose of a fair trial is to enable the accurate determinations of
factual guilt or innocence, as was held in Hardeep Singh v State of Punjab [(2014) 3
SCC 92] Hence, stemming from this purpose, a fair trial was held to be in the case of J
Jayalalithaa v State of Karnataka [(2017) 6 SCC 263] to be one that helps arrive at the
truth, rather than confine itself to mere technicalities at the cost of the truth.
It can thus be derived that the purpose of making trials speedy is to ensure that the accused
and the victims do not have to undergo oppression and undue prejudice, whilst the broader
purpose of a fair trial is the truth. By making certain time periods mandatory, the impugned
Act gives further importance to technicalities of time as compared to ensuring that fair trials
are conducted and the truth is arrived at.
6.15. Furthermore, the impugned Amendment, whilst providing for fast tracking of
specified offences, does not create any new Courts or additional infrastructure to manage
the same- in Bhim Singh v UOI [(2015) 13 SCC 603], the Court dealt with a similar
situation wherein it held that by fast tracking with additional courts, more burden and
delay was being imposed upon other classes of cases not fast tracked and hence, violated
Article 21. Similarly, the instant case and the Amendment, by making the same error, too
is violative of Article 21 rather than being conducive to the same.
The right to a fair trial has been held to be an intrinsic part of Article 21. In Zahira
Habibulla v State of Gujarat [(2004) 4 SCC 158], it was held that the concept of fair trial
19
could not be given an exhaustive meaning or exhaustive list of principles- it had to be
determined on a fact- to-fact basis and had to be substantial. As such, the procedure for trials
must be fair and reasonable and not to the prejudice of the accused that causes unnecessary
oppression to him
6.16. It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble court that neither of the two accused are
guilty under section 120B of the IPC, 1860 as there is no substantial proof to prove the
same.
Section 120A of the Indian penal Code states that
“[120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy—When two or more persons agree to do,
or cause to be done
(1) an illegal act, or
(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a
criminal conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an
offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the
agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.
Explanation—It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such
agreement or is merely incidental to that object.]”
In the case of Kalakoti Somireddi and Ors. V. state of Andhra Pradesh, [1958 SCC OnLine
AP 170], the Court held that:
Since neither of the two accused agreed to do or cause an illegal act, the two cannot be
charged under the said section.
6.17. That in the case of Rangaswami v. State of Tamil Nadu, [(1989) Cr LJ 875: AIR
1989 SC 1137], it was observed that mere surrender by appellant alongwith accused
before police does not show meeting of minds as to bring the case within ambit of section
34. Further, the Court in Santosh Desai v. State of Goa, [(1997) 2 Crimes 666 (Bom)]
20
held that when an offence is sought to be proved only on circumstantial evidence, the
allegations of common intention under section 34 normally cannot be established in
absence of meeting of mind, the overt act of the accused, by their conduct, by using the
weapons by their utterance of words.
6.18. That it is further submitted that in the case of Sachin Jana & Another vs State of
West Bengal, [2008 (2) scale 2 SC)], the Hon’ble Court has held the following:
"Section 34 has been enacted on principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal
act, the section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence.
The distinctive feature of the section is the element of participation in action. The
liability of one person for an offence committed by another in the course of criminal
act perpetrated by several person arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is
done in furtherance of a common intention of the person who join in committing the
crime. Direct proof of common intension is seldom available and, therefore, such
intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved
facts of the case and the proved circumstances.”
In the instant case also, no common intention can be established under Section 34 of IPC
since there is no meeting of minds between the Accused.
6.19. That The burden lies on prosecution to prove that actual participation of more than
one person for commission of criminal act was done in furtherance of common intention
at a prior concert as was held in the case of State of Orissa v. Arjun Das, [AIR 1999 SC
3229]. In the instant case, the same could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the
Prosecution and hence Section 34 cannot be attracted.
6.20. The Counsel for the Defence submits that a statement made under section 164 of the
code is admissible in evidence and may be used to corroborate or contradict a statement
made in the Court in the manner provided under section 157 and 145 of the Indian
Evidence Act. However, the statement made under this section cannot be used as a
substantive piece of evidence. In the case of Bisipati Padhan v/s. State [A.I.R. 1969
Orissa 289], it was held that A statement of a witness u/s 164 of the Code is not
substantive evidence, but it is a former statement made before an authority legally
competent to investigate the fact. Such a statement can be used either for corroboration of
21
the testimony of a witness u/s 157 of the Act or for contradiction thereof u/s 145 of the
Act.
6.21. That further in the case of State v. Kartar [A.I.R. 1970 SC 1305 :1970 Cr.L.J. 1144],
it was held that Statements under Section 164 of the Code are not substantive evidence.
But it can be used to corroborate or contradict the maker under section 145 and 157 of the
Act. Hence, in the instant case, the statements of PW1, PW2, PW3 and PW4 cannot be
treated as substantive evidence and the charge upon the Accused cannot be tested upon
those.
6.22. That statements of PW1, PW2, PW3 and PW4 produced by the Prosecution cannot be
relied upon as substantive evidence for the purpose of the instant trial since the same lack
corroboration. It is further submitted that for the ends of justice, the Hon’ble Court may
be pleased to consider the aforementioned submissions before delivering the verdict.
22
PRAYER
a) Hold that the Amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure is detrimental to the interests
of the Accused and is formulated with the purpose of delivering speedy trial and justice.
b) Acquit the Accused for offence of criminal conspiracy coupled with common intention
and vis-à-vis Sections 120B and 34 of IPC respectively.
AND/OR
Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
Sd/-
Defence Counsel.
23
ANNEXURES
24
ANNEXURE-A
1. District Ranga Reddy P.S.- Begumpet Year 2021 FIR No. 157/2021 Date..26.01.2021....
(c) General Diary Reference: Entry No. .......157....... Time ........21 Hours.....
6. Place of Occurrence: (a) Direction and distance from P.S. .....6KM……Beat No. …………
NA……….
(e) Passport No. ...1472006. Date of Issue ...2006. Place of Issue- Hyderabad
(f) Occupation.........Service...............
(g) Address ...... Vasavi's Lifestyle Residency, Vasavi's, Vaman Naik Ln,
Kundanbagh Colony, Begumpet, Hyderabad, Telangana 500016
25
8. Details of known/suspected/unknown accused with full particulars: (Attach separate
sheet, if necessary)
(1) Mr. Rohan Shetty, S/o Mr. Shyam Shetty, aged 30 years, residing at Somajiguda,
Hyderabad, Telangana- 500082
(2) Mr. Raju, aged 27 years, residing at Somajiguda, Hyderabad, Telengana- 500066
On the night of 26.01.2021, Ms Riya was walking towards the pick-up point of her reserved
auto rickshaw at around 18:30 hours, when she noticed the Accused 1 following her. She
has to pass an isolated stretch to get to the pick-up point and it was at this time, that A1
with the help of A2 grasped Ms. Riya by her wrist and dragged her to an isolated basement
of an under-construction property. Despite her efforts, Ms, Riya could not stop A1 from
forcing himself on her. A1 tied her mouth with her dupatta and allegedly committed rape on
Ms. Riya. Thereafter, he left her to at an injured state there. The incident took place at
around 19:00 Hours. After a while, at around 20:00 hrs when Ms. Riya regained her senses,
she helped herself to make a phone call to her sister who resides at her place. Her sister,
Ms. Shruti then travelled to the spot and thereafter reported the same to the police at 21:00
hrs, the general diary reference being 157/2021.
13. Action taken: Since the above information reveals commission of offence(s) u/s as
mentioned at Item No. 2. :
(1) Registered the case and took up the investigation or
26
(4) Transferred to P.S. .........Shamshabad…… District ......Ranga Reddy … on point of
jurisdiction.
Sd/-
R.O.A.C.
Signature of Officer in charge, Police Station
Physical features, deformities and other details of the suspect/accused : ( If known / seen
)
ANNEXURE-B
27
CRIME DETAILS FORM
1) ..................................NA...............................
28
ANNEXURE-C
CHARGE SHEET
(Under Section 173 Cr.P.C.)
5. Type of Final Form/Report: Charge Sheet / Not charge sheeted for want of
evidence / FR True, Undetected / FR True, Untraced / FR True, offence abated / FR
Unoccurred . (tick ' 3 ' applicable portion).
29
1 2 3 4 5 6
11. Particulars of accused persons charge-sheeted: (Use separate sheet for each
accused)
Sl. No. …….
(i) Name Mr. Rohan Shetty Whether verified .............yes...........................…
(ii) Father's/Husband's name .....Shyam Shetty………. (iii) Date/ Year of birth ...05-
05-1990 …
(iv) Sex ......Male….. (v) Nationality ....Indian... (vi) Passport No. ................NIL......
……………..
(x) Address
Somajiguda, Hyderabad, Telangana- 500082
Whether verified .......................yes.................….
(xi) Provisional criminal No. .....................................
……………………………………………………..
(xii) Regular criminal No. (if known) ...........................….. (xiii) Date of arrest
30
Name …………………………….. Father’s/Husband’s name ………………………………………….
Occupation ....................................
Address .................................................................................……
Identification …………………………………………………………………………………………..
12. Particulars of accused persons - not charge sheeted (suspect) : (Use separate sheet for
each suspect)
Sl. No. ……
(i) Name ............Mr. Raju..............................................………… Whether
verified.............................…yes………
31
(x) Provisional criminal No. .......................……………..
............................................................................................................................
..................................
32
ANNEXURE-D
ARREST FORM
(FOR ACCUSED 1)
5. Arrested and forwarded/ Arrested and released on bail or PR bond/ Arrested but
released on anticipatory bail/ Arrested and remanded to police custody/
Surrendered in court and bailed out/ Surrendered in court and sent to judicial
custody/ Surrendered in court and remanded to police custody.
(tick ' 3 ' applicable portion).
(v) Nationality ..............Indian........ (vi) (a) Voter Id. card No. NIL
(b) Passport No. ........NIL……... (c) Date of issue ........ (d) Place of issue................
33
(ix) SC/ST/OBC.............................................. (x) Occupation....Contractual
Service........……..
7. Injuries, cause of injuries and physical condition of the arrested person (Indicate if
medically examined) :
8. The arrested person, after being informed of the grounds of arrest and his legal
rights, was duly taken into custody on…29.01.2021...(date) at …13:00 HRS….........
(hours) at …Somajiguda.. (place). The following article(s) was/were found on physical
search, conducted on the person of the arrested person and was/were taken into
possession, for which a receipt was given to the arrested person. If no article found,
`NIL’ may be indicated.
(1) ...................................nil…
(Attached separate sheet, if required).
Necessary wearing apparels were left on the arrested person for the sake of human
dignity and body protection.
The arrested person was cautioned to keep himself/ herself covered for purpose of
identification.
34
9. District…..Ranga Reddy. P.S. Shamshabad Year 2021 FIR/Proceeding /G.D.
No. ..157…….. Date...30.01.2021
11. Name of the court (if surrendered): .... Metropolitan Judge First Class at
Shamshabad, Hyderabad
13. Arrested and forwarded/ Arrested and released on bail or PR bond/ Arrested but
released on anticipatory bail/ Arrested and remanded to police custody/
Surrendered in court and bailed out/ Surrendered in court and sent to judicial
custody/ Surrendered in court and remanded to police custody.
(tick ' 3 ' applicable portion).
(v) Nationality .......Indian.............. (vi) (a) Voter Id. card No. ........NIL……...
(b) Passport No. ........NIL ………... (c) Date of issue ........ (d) Place of issue................
35
(xiii) Present Address Somajiguda, Hyderabad, Telangana- 500082.....…
Distt........ ....Ranga Reddy, P.S Somajiguda
(xiv) .Injuries, cause of injuries and physical condition of the arrested person
(Indicate if medically examined) :
.....................................................NIL.............................................................................
................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
..........................................
15. The arrested person, after being informed of the grounds of arrest and his legal
rights, was duly taken into custody on…30.01.2021…............(date) at 15:00 hrs
…….........(hours) at …...Somajiguda......... (place). The following article(s) was/were
found on physical search, conducted on the person of the arrested person and
was/were taken into possession, for which a receipt was given to the arrested
person. If no article found, `NIL’ may be indicated.
Necessary wearing apparels were left on the arrested person for the sake of human
dignity and body protection.
The arrested person was cautioned to keep himself/ herself covered for purpose of
identification.
36