G.R. No.
160869 May 11, 2007
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND
ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice,
Respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition to prevent Justice Secretary Datumanong from implementing R. A.
9225 entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes."
which was signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Petitioner argued that R.A.
9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 5, Article VI of the Constitution which states that “dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”
Petitioner contends that RA 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 thereof,
together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all
Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship
without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-
born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance
without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that
"Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath
taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The
fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an
unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.
Issues:
1. Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional
2. Whether the court jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance
Held:
1. No. It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the
provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos
who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship
to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3,
Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting
the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the
other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
2. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision.
The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the
framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a
mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this
is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to
dual allegiance.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we said that the courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts
and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in
determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with
judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. The doctrine of separation of powers demands no
less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the
Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for
study and legislation by Congress.
