Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 503-04 (2d Cir. 1996); Schieffelin & Co.

v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 232, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)). "An intent to parody is not an in-
tent to confuse the public." Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1486.
We agree with the district court. It is a matter of common sense that the strength of a famous
mark allows consumers immediately to perceive the target of the parody, while simultaneously al-
lowing them to recognize the changes to the mark that make the parody funny or biting. See Tommy
Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that
the strength of the "TOMMY HILFIGER" fashion mark [*262] did not favor the mark's owner in
an infringement case against "TIMMY HOLEDIGGER" novelty pet perfume). In this case, pre-
cisely because LOUIS VUITTON is so strong a mark and so well recognized as a luxury handbag
brand from LVM, consumers readily recognize that when they see a "Chewy Vuiton" pet toy, they
see a parody. Thus, the strength of LVM's marks in this case does not help LVM establish a likeli-
hood of confusion.
B
With respect to the second Pizzeria Uno factor, the similarities between the marks, the usage by
Haute Diggity Dog again converts what might be a problem for Haute Diggity Dog into a disfa-
vored conclusion for LVM.
Haute Diggity Dog concedes that its marks are and were designed to be somewhat similar to
LVM's marks. But that is the essence of a parody -- the invocation of a famous mark in the con-
sumer's mind, so long as the distinction between the marks is also readily recognized. While a trade-
mark parody necessarily copies enough of the original design to bring it to mind as a target, a suc-
cessful parody also distinguishes itself and, because of the implicit message communicated by the
parody, allows the consumer to appreciate it. See PETA, 263 F.3d at 366 (citing Jordache, 828 F.2d
at 1486); Anheuser-Busch, 962 F.2d at 321.
In concluding that Haute Diggity Dog has a successful parody, we have impliedly concluded
that Haute Diggity Dog appropriately mimicked a part of the LVM marks, but at the same time suf-
ficiently distinguished its own product to communicate the satire. The differences are sufficiently
obvious and the parody sufficiently blatant that a consumer encountering a "Chewy Vuiton" dog
toy would not mistake its source or sponsorship on the basis of mark similarity.
This conclusion is reinforced when we consider how the parties actually use their marks in the
marketplace. See CareFirst, 434 F.3d at 267 (citing What-A-Burger of Va., Inc. v. Whataburger,
Inc., 357 F.3d 441, 450 (4th Cir. 2004)); Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2005);
Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d at 503. The record amply supports Haute Diggity Dog's contention that its
"Chewy Vuiton" toys for dogs are generally sold alongside other pet products, as well as toys that
parody other luxury brands, whereas LVM markets its handbags as a top-end luxury item to be pur-
chased only in its own stores or in its own boutiques within department stores. These marketing
channels further emphasize that "Chewy Vuiton" dog toys are not, in fact, LOUIS VUITTON prod-
ucts.
C
Nor does LVM find support from the third Pizzeria Uno factor, the similarity of the products
themselves. It is obvious that a "Chewy Vuiton" plush imitation handbag, which does not open and
is manufactured as a dog toy, is not a LOUIS VUITTON handbag sold by LVM. Even LVM's most
proximate products -- dog collars, leashes, and pet carriers -- are fashion accessories, not dog toys.
As Haute Diggity Dog points out, LVM does not make pet chew toys and likely does not intend to
do so in the future. Even if LVM were to make dog toys in the future, the fact remains that the prod-
ucts at issue are not similar in any relevant respect, and this factor does not favor LVM.
D
The fourth and fifth Pizzeria Uno factors, relating to the similarity of facilities and advertising
channels, have already [*263] been mentioned. LVM products are sold exclusively through its
own stores or its own boutiques within department stores. It also sells its products on the Internet
through an LVM-authorized website. In contrast, "Chewy Vuiton" products are sold primarily
through traditional and Internet pet stores, although they might also be sold in some department
stores. The record demonstrates that both LVM handbags and "Chewy Vuiton" dog toys are sold at
a Macy's department store in New York. As a general matter, however, there is little overlap in the
individual retail stores selling the brands.
Likewise with respect to advertising, there is little or no overlap. LVM markets LOUIS
VUITTON handbags through high-end fashion magazines, while "Chewy Vuiton" products are ad-
vertised primarily through pet-supply channels.
The overlap in facilities and advertising demonstrated by the record is so minimal as to be prac-
tically nonexistent. "Chewy Vuiton" toys and LOUIS VUITTON products are neither sold nor ad-
vertised in the same way, and the de minimis overlap lends insignificant support to LVM on this
factor.
E
The sixth factor, relating to Haute Diggity Dog's intent, again is neutralized by the fact that
Haute Diggity Dog markets a parody of LVM products. As other courts have recognized, "An intent
to parody is not an intent to confuse the public." Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1486. Despite Haute Diggity
Dog's obvious intent to profit from its use of parodies, this action does not amount to a bad faith in-
tent to create consumer confusion. To the contrary, the intent is to do just the opposite -- to evoke a
humorous, satirical association that distinguishes the products. This factor does not favor LVM.
F
On the actual confusion factor, it is well established that no actual confusion is required to prove
a case of trademark infringement, although the presence of actual confusion can be persuasive evi-
dence relating to a likelihood of confusion. See CareFirst, 434 F.3d at 268.
While LVM conceded in the district court that there was no evidence of actual confusion, on ap-
peal it points to incidents where retailers misspelled "Chewy Vuiton" on invoices or order forms,
using two Ts instead of one. Many of these invoices also reflect simultaneous orders for multiple
types of Haute Diggity Dog parody products, which belies the notion that any actual confusion ex-
isted as to the source of "Chewy Vuiton" plush toys. The misspellings pointed out by LVM are far
more likely in this context to indicate confusion over how to spell the product name than any confu-
sion over the source or sponsorship of the "Chewy Vuiton" dog toys. We conclude that this factor
favors Haute Diggity Dog.
In sum, the likelihood-of-confusion factors substantially favor Haute Diggity Dog. But consider-
ation of these factors is only a proxy for the ultimate statutory test of whether Haute Diggity Dog's
marketing, sale, and distribution of "Chewy Vuiton" dog toys is likely to cause confusion. Recog-
nizing that "Chewy Vuiton" is an obvious parody and applying the Pizzeria Uno factors, we con-
clude that LVM has failed to demonstrate any likelihood of confusion. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Haute Diggity Dog on the issue of trademark
infringement.
III
LVM also contends that Haute Diggity Dog's advertising, sale, and distribution of [*264] the
"Chewy Vuiton" dog toys dilutes its LOUIS VUITTON, LV, and Monogram Canvas marks, which
are famous and distinctive, in violation of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 ("TDRA"),
15 U.S.C.A. ß 1125(c) (West Supp. 2007). It argues, "Before the district court's decision, Vuitton's
famous marks were unblurred by any third party trademark use." "Allowing defendants to become
the first to use similar marks will obviously blur and dilute the Vuitton Marks." It also contends that
"Chewy Vuiton" dog toys are likely to tarnish LVM's marks because they "pose a choking hazard
for some dogs."
Haute Diggity Dog urges that, in applying the TDRA to the circumstances before us, we reject
LVM's suggestion that a parody "automatically" gives rise to "actionable dilution." Haute Diggity
Dog contends that only marks that are "identical or substantially similar" can give rise to actionable
dilution, and its "Chewy Vuiton" marks are not identical or sufficiently similar to LVM's marks. It
also argues that "[its] spoof, like other obvious parodies," "'tends to increase public identification' of
[LVM's] mark with [LVM]," quoting Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1490, rather than impairing its distinc-
tiveness, as the TDRA requires. As for LVM's tarnishment claim, Haute Diggity Dog argues that
LVM's position is at best based on speculation and that LVM has made no showing of a likelihood
of dilution by tarnishment.
Claims for trademark dilution are authorized by the TDRA, a relatively recent enactment, 1
which provides in relevant part:

Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark . . . shall be entitled to
an injunction against another person who . . . commences use of a mark or trade name
in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of
the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of
competition, or of actual economic injury.

15 U.S.C.A. ß 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added). A mark is "famous" when it is "widely recognized by

the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or ser-
vices of the mark's owner." Id. ß 1125(c)(2)(A). Creating causes of action for only dilution by blur-
ring and dilution by tarnishment, the TDRA defines "dilution by blurring" as the "associati

1
The TDRA, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006), amended the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996), which added a "dilution" cause of action to ß
43 of the Lanham Act. When the Supreme Court held that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act re-
quired proof of actual dilution and actual economic harm, see Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,
537 U.S. 418, 432-33, 123 S. Ct. 1115, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2003); see also Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999), Con-
gress amended the Act principally to overrule Moseley and to require that only a likelihood of dilu-
tion need be proved. See 15 U.S.C.A. ß 1125(c)(1) (West Supp. 2007).