Art. 261 . Challenging to a duel.

— The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period 23 shall be imposed

upon any person who shall challenge another, or incite another to give or accept a challenge to a duel, or shall
scoff at or decry another publicly for having refused to accept a challenge to fight a duel.

Acts punished under Art. 261:

1. By challenging another to a duel.

2. By inciting another to give or accept a challenge to a duel.

3. By scoffing at or decrying another publicly for having refused to accept a challenge to fight a duel.

"Shall challenge another x x x to a duel."

A challenge to fight, without contemplating a duel, is not challenging to a duel. The person making the
challenge must have in mind a formal combat to be concerted between him and the one challenged in the
presence of two or more seconds.

Not challenging to a duel.

Nursing ill-feelings and moved by hatred, the accused challenged the offended party to a duel, inciting
the latter to accept said challenge by uttering: "Come down, let us measure your prowess, we shall see whose
intestine will come out. You are a coward if you do not come down." The offended party refused to come down
and accept the challenge. Later, when the accused saw the offended party running toward a nearby house, the
former ran after the latter, but desisted upon seeing that the offended party had a companion.

Held: This is not challenging to a duel, but only light threats underArt. 285, par. 2. (People vs. Tacomoy, G.R. No.
L-4798, July 16, 1951)

Persons responsible under Art. 261 are:

(1) challenger, and

(2) instigators.

Art. 262. Mutilation. — The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of some essential
organ for reproduction.

Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods.

Mutilation, defined.

The term "mutilation" means the lopping or the clipping off of some part of the body.

The putting out of an eye does not fall under this definition. Thus, when a robber stabbed a woman in
one eye, and as a result of the wound thus inflicted, she lost the use of the eye, there is no mutilation. (U.S. vs.
Bogel, 7 Phil. 285)

Two kinds of mutilation:

1. By intentionally mutilating another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for
reproduction.

2. By intentionally making other mutilation, that is, by lopping or clipping off any part of the body of the
offended party, other than the essential organ for reproduction, to deprive him of that part of his body.
Elements of mutilation of the first kind:

1. That there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation, such as the penis or
ovarium.
 2. That the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of
some essential organ for reproduction. (Guevara)

Mutilation of the first kind is castration which must be made purposely.

Clearly it is the intention of the law to punish any person who shall intentionally deprive another of any
organ necessary for reproduction. An applicable construction, is that of Viada in the following language: "At the
head of these crimes, according to their order of gravity, is the mutilation known by the name of 'castration'
which consists of the amputation of whatever organ is necessary for generation. The law could not fail to punish
with the utmost severity such a crime, which, although not destroying life, deprives a person of the means to
transmit it. But bear in mind that according to this article in order for 'castration' to exist, it is indispensable that
the 'castration' be made purposely. The law does not look only to the result but also to the intention of the act.
Consequently, if by reason of an injury or attack, a person is deprived of the organs of generation, the act,
although voluntary, not being intentional to that end, it would not come under the provisions of this article, but
under No. 2 of Article 431." (Art. 263; Viada, Codigo Penal, Vol. 3, p. 70. See to same effect, 4 Groizard, Codigo
Penal, p. 525, cited in U.S. vs. Esparcia, 36 Phil. 840) "Any other intentional mutilation." If the mutilation involves
a part of the body, other than an organ for reproduction, such as the cutting of the outer ear or arm of the
offended party, with a deliberate purpose of depriving him of that part of his body, it is other intentional
mutilation, under the second paragraph of Art. 262.

"Mayhem" is other intentional mutilation.

Penalty when the victim of other intentional mutilation is under 12 years of age.

The penalty for Article 262, paragraph 2 (other intentional mutilation) shall be reclusion perpetua when
the victim is under 12 years of age (Sec 10, R.A. No. 7610)

The offender must have the intention to deprive the offended party of a part of his body.

If a mutilation is not caused purposely and deliberately so as to deprive the offended party of a
particular part of his body, the case will be considered as physical injuries falling under Art. 263, paragraph 1
(offended party becoming impotent) or paragraph 2 (loss of hand, foot, arm, or leg), as the case may be.

Art. 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault another, shall be guilty of the
crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the injured person shall
become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if in consequence of the physical
injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall
have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg, or shall have lost the use of any such member, or shall have
become incapacitated for the work in which he was theretofore habitually engaged;

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in consequence of the physical
injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body,
or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in
which he was habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days;

4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the
physica injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than
thirty days.

If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in Article 246, or with
attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the case covered by subdivision number 1 of
this article shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, the case covered by
subdivision number 2 by prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period the
case covered by subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and the case
covered by subdivision number 4 by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to a parent who shall inflict physical
injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement.

How is the crime of serious physical injuries committed?

It is committed —

(1) by wounding;

(2) by beating; or

(3) by assaulting (Art. 263); or

(4) by administering injurious substance. (Art. 264)

The accused, while conversing with the offended party, drew the latter's bolo from its scabbard. The offended
party caught hold of the edge of the blade of his bolo and wounded himself.

Held: Since the accused did not wound, beat or assault the offended party, he cannot be guilty of serious
physical injuries. (U.S. vs. Villanueva 31 Phil. 412)

May be committed by reckless imprudence, or by simple imprudence or negligence.

A person may be guilty of lesiones by reckless imprudence, or by simple imprudence or negligence under Art.
365 in relation to Art. 263, when due to lack of precaution he wounded another.

What are serious physical injuries?

They are:

1. When the injured person becomes insane, imbecile, impotent or blind in consequence of the physical injuries
inflicted.

2. When the injured person (a) loses the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or loses an eye, a hand,
a foot, an arm, or a leg, or (b) loses the use of any such member, or (c) becomes incapacitated for the work in
which he was theretofore habitually engaged, in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted.

3. When the person injured (a) becomes deformed, or (b) loses any other member of his body, or (c) loses the
use thereof, or (d) becomes ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he was habitually
engaged for more than 90 days, in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted.

4. When the injured person becomes ill or incapacitated for labor for more than 30 days (but must not be more
than 90 days), as a result of the physical injuries inflicted.

Classes of serious physical injuries.

Art. 263 is divided into several paragraphs, with specifications, in each case, of (1) the consequences of the
injuries inflicted, (2) the nature and character of the wound inflicted, and (3) the proper penalty. (U.S. vs. Santos,
17 Phil. 87)

There must not be intent to kill.

If there was intent to kill when the offender inflicted any of the serious physical injuries described in this article,
the crime would be frustrated or attempted murder, parricide or homicide, as the case may be.

Physical injuries, distinguished from attempted or frustrated homicide.

1. In both crimes, the offender inflicts physical injuries. Attempted homicide may be committed, even if no
physical injuries are inflicted.
2. While in the crime of physical injuries, the offender has no intent to kill the offended party, in attempted or
frustrated homicide, the offender has an intent to kill the offended party.

PARAGRAPH 1: INJURED PERSON BECOMES INSANE, IMBECILE, IMPOTENT OR BLIND

Meaning of the term "impotent".

In medical jurisprudence, impotence means inability to copulate. Properly used of the male; but it also has been
used synonymously with "sterility". (Smith vs. Smith, 206 Mo. App. 646, 229, S.W. 398; Heinemann vs.
Heinemann, 118 Or. 178, 245, p. 1082, 1083, cited in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 889)

Since the effect is the same: loss of power to procreate, the term impotent should include inability to copulate
and sterility.

Penalty when the victim of serious physical injuries under paragraph 1 is under 12 years of age.

The penalty for Article 262, paragraph 1 shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under 12 years of age.
(Sec. 10, R.A. No. 7610)

Blindness and loss of an eye.

Under paragraph 1, the blindness must be of two eyes.

Under paragraph 2, note the loss of an eye only.

According to Cuello Calon (II Codigo Penal, 10 th Ed., pp. 515-516), the blindness must be complete. Mere
weakness of vision is not contemplated.

PARAGRAPH 2: INJURED PERSON LOSES USE OF SPEECH OR POWER TO HEAR OR SMELL OR LOSES AN EYE,
HAND, FOOT, ARM, OR LEG, OR LOSES USE OF ANY SUCH MEMBER OR BECOMES INCAPACITATED FOR WORK IN
WHICH HE WAS HABITUALLY ENGAGED.

Loss of power to hear.

It must be loss of power to hear of both ears. If there is loss of power to hear of one ear only, it is serious
physical injuries under paragraph 3 of Art.263. (People vs. Hernandez, 94 Phil. 49)

Loss of use of hand or incapacity for usual work must be permanent.

During the trial, offended party Eleuterio Macayan tried to prove that as a result of the injury on his left
wrist, he permanently lost the use of it "because the fingers are paralyzed, the fingers lose their flexibility." Art.
263, paragraph 2, presupposes that the loss of the use of the hand or the incapacity for usual work is
permanent. Offended party's uncorroborated testimony does not sufficiently establish that the loss of the use of
his left hand is lasting and permanent. Even if he could not use his left hand during the trial, it does not
necessary follow that he has forever lost the use thereof. It is possible that he might later on regain its use. No
expert testimony was presented to show that the nature of Eleuterio Macayan's injury was such that he has
permanently lost the use of his left hand by reason thereof. In order to sustain a conviction under the
aforementioned provision of law, the prosecution must prove by clear and conclusive evidence that the
offended party actually cannot make use of his hand and that such impairment is permanent. The act committed
by the defendant constitutes the crime of serious physical injuries defined and penalized under paragraph 3,
Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Reli, C.A., 53 O.G. 5695)

All those mentioned in paragraph 2 are principal members of the body.

All those mentioned in paragraph 2 of this article are principal members. Thus, the eye, the hand, etc.,
are principal members.

The arm is a principal member within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this article. (U.S. vs. Camacho, 8
Phil. 142) Where victim's left arm becomes permanently maimed, the crime is serious physical injuries. (People
vs. Sto. Tomas, 138 SCRA 206)
PARAGRAPH 3: INJURED PERSON BECOMES DEFORMED, OR LOSES ANY OTHER MEMBER OF THE BODY, OR THE
USE THEREFOR, OR BECOMES ILL OR INCAPACITATED FOR THE PERFORMACE OF THE WORK IN WHICH HE WAS
HABITUALLY ENGAGED FOR MORE THAN 90 DAYS

Paragraph 3 covers any member which is not principal member of the body.

The phrase "any other part of his body" in paragraph 3 of this article should be "any other member",
meaning any member other than an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg, which are mentioned in paragraph 2.
(People vs. Balubar, 60 Phil. 699)

The fingers of the hand are not principal members. The loss of the use of three fingers of a left hand is
serious physical injuries under paragraph 3 of Art. 263. But if it is alleged in the information and proved that the
loss of the use of the three fingers also resulted in the loss of the use of the hand itself, it is serious physical
injuries under paragraph 2 of said article. (U.S. vs. Punsalan, 23 Phil. 375)

It is a serious physical injury when the offended party becomes deformed.

Deformity, defined.

By deformity it is meant physical ugliness, permanent and definite abnormality. It must be conspicuous and
visible.

Deformity requires that it be —

(a) physical ugliness,

(b) permanent and definite abnormality, and

(c) conspicuous and visible.

Note: If the scar is usually covered by the dress or clothes, it would not be conspicuous and visible.

A scar produced by an injury on the upper part of the neck, near the jaw, constitutes deformity within the
meaning of paragraph 3 of this article.

Loss of teeth as deformity.

The loss of three incisors is a visible deformity, while the loss of one incisor does not constitute deformity
according to the Supreme Court of Spain. (Guevara)

Deformity by loss of teeth refers to injury which cannot be repaired by the action of nature.

The accused struck the injured party in the mouth with the iron instrument used for turning the engine of a
motor truck, causing the loss of four front teeth.

The injury contemplated by the Code is an injury that cannot be repaired by the action of nature. The fact that
the offended party may have artificial teeth, if he has the necessary means and so desires, does not repair the
injury, although it may lessen the disfigurement. The case of a child or an old man is an exception to the rule.
(People vs. Balubar, 60 Phil. 699)

Loss of one tooth which impaired appearance is deformity.

The crime committed falls under subdivision 3 of Article 263 in view of the uncontroverted loss of Duremdes' left
upper central incisor which loss was visible and impaired his appearance, and which disfigurement could not be
removed by the action of nature. (People vs. Lagrosas, C.A., 61 O.G. 6519, citing the case of People vs. Balubar,
60 Phil. 698)

In an earlier case, it was held that the breakage of an incisor does not constitute deformity. (People vs. Cambel,
CA-G.R. No. 6054, Nov. 28, 1940)

A front tooth is a member of the body.

A front tooth is a member of the body, other than a principal member, within the meaning of the words, "or
shall have lost any other member," as used in Subsection 3 of Art. 263 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs.
Balubar, 60 Phil. 707)

Hence, the loss of a front tooth due to a fist blow is serious physical injury under paragraph 3 of Art. 263.

Loss of both outer ears constitutes deformity and also loss of the power to hear.

Since the loss of two ears caused the deafness of the injured party, the defendants who cut off both ears of the
offended party are guilty of serious physical injuries. (U.S. vs. Manaul, et al., 4 Phil. 342)

Note: The loss of the outer ears will necessarily cause deformity. If there is loss of power to hear of both ears as
a result of the loss of both outer ears, the crime should be punished under par. 2 of Art. 263.

Loss of the lobule of the ear is deformity.

The accused held the offended party by the hair, dragged her along the ground, and then bit her left ear.

Held: The offended party was permanently disfigured because of the loss of the lobule of the left ear. (U.S. vs.
Solis, et al, 4 Phil. 178)

Loss of index and middle fingers is either deformity or loss of a member, not principal one, of his body or use of
same.

The accused struck with his bolo the offended party, severing the index and middle fingers of his right hand. The
offended party was not rendered incapable of working in the fields, his occupation, with the loss of his said
fingers.

Held: The offended party lost a member, not principal one, of his body or the use of the same and was also
deformed. (U.S. vs. Bugarin, 15 Phil. 189)

Loss of power to hear of right ear only is loss of use of other part of body.

Loss "of the power to hear" is surely a serious physical injury. But is the loss "of the power to hear of his
right ear" a loss of the power to hear? As the offended party may still hear thru his left ear, it would seem he has
not lost the power to hear. However, Article 263, paragraph 3, prescribes prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods if the person injured shall have lost "the use of any other part of his body." The offended
party was deprived of the use of his right ear, a part of his body. (People vs. Hernandez, 94 Phil. 49)

Illness as a consequence of physical injuries inflicted.

The words "ill" and "illness" are used in paragraphs Nos. 3 and 4, respectively, of Art. 263. There is illness
for a certain period of time, when the wound inflicted did not heal within that period. (People vs. Penesa, 81
Phil. 403)

In a case, months after the offense occurred, the injury to the offended party's left eye has not been
entirely cured. This is illness for more than 30 days and the case falls under paragraph 4 of Art. 263. (People vs.
De Castro, G.R. No. 41606, April 29, 1935)

Note: It would seem that if the injury would require medical attendance for more than 30 days, the illness of the
offended party may be considered as lasting for more than 30 days. The fact that there was medical attendance
for that period of time shows that the injuries were not cured for that length of time.

Medical attendance is not important in serious physical injuries.

It is to be noted that par. 4, Art. 263, requires illness or incapacity for labor, not medical attendance.
(People vs. Obia, C.A., 45 O.G. 2568) In other paragraphs of Art. 263, medical attendance is not also mentioned.

In determining incapacity, must the injured party have an avocation at the time of the injury?
 In paragraph 2 of this article, note that the incapacity of the offended party refers to the work "in which
he was theretofore habitually engaged."

So also in paragraph 3, which speaks of "incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he was
habitually engaged."

In these two paragraphs, at least, the offended party must have an avocation or work at the time of the
injury.

The term "work" includes studies or preparation for a profession.

Incapacity for a certain kind of work only, but not for all, is a serious physical injury under par. 2 or par. 3
of this article.

In the case of U.S. vs. Bugarin, 16 Phil. 189, it is said that the incapacity must show that the physical
injury has rendered the offended party incapable of working in the fields which was the occupation in which at
the time he had been habitually engaged.

When the injured man did not recover so as to be able to attend to his ordinary avocation for a period of
a little more than 30 days, the case falls under Art. 263, par. 4. (U.S. vs. Sy Vinco, 5 Phil. 47)

PARAGRAPH 4: INJURED PERSON BECOMES DLL OR INCAPACITATED FOR LABOR FOR MORE THAN 30 DAYS

Paragraph 4 speaks of incapacity for any kind of labor.

The fourth paragraph of this article does not refer to labor in which the offended party is engaged at the
time the serious physical injuries are inflicted. Hence, the incapacity is for any kind of labor.

Injury requiring hospitalization for more than thirty days is serious physical injuries.

The leg injury inflicted on the victim required hospitalization for more than 30 days. Said physical injury
is covered by par. 4 of Art. 263 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Moro Ali, et al., G.R. No. L-7431, May 30,

1958, 103 Phil. 1166)

Note: Hospitalization for more than thirty days may mean either illness or incapacity for labor for more than
thirty days.

When the category of the offense of serious physical injuries depends on the period of illness or incapacity for
labor, there must be evidence of the length of that period; otherwise, the offense is only slight physical injuries.

We cannot share the view of the trial court that despite the absence of evidence the appellant should be
found guilty of serious physical injuries. In a prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense and the
severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor, the length of this period must
likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same manner as the main act charged. (People vs.
Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950) And when, as in the case at bar, proof of the said period is absent,
the crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries. (People vs. De los Santos, C.A., 59 O.G.
4393, citing People vs. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398; People vs. Sarmiento, et al., CA-G.R. No. 3784-R, July 28, 1950)

Lessening of efficiency due to injury is not incapacity.

There is no incapacity if the injured party could still engage in his work although less effectively than
before. (U.S. vs. Bugarin, supra)

Ordinary physical injuries, distinguished from mutilation.

The mutilation must have been caused purposely and deliberately to lop or clip off some part of the
body so as to derive the offended party of such part of the body; this special intention is not present in the other
kinds of physical injuries.

Qualified serious physical injuries.

 If the offense is committed against any of the persons enumerated in the article denning the crime of
parricide (Art. 246) or with the attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in the article denning the
crime of murder (Art. 248), the law provides higher penalties. (Art. 263, paragraph next to the last)

Serious physical injuries by excessive chastisement by parents are not qualified.

The penalties referred to in the paragraph next to the last of Art. 263 are not to be imposed on a parent
who inflicted physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement. (Art. 263, last paragraph)

Art. 264. Administering injurious substances or beverages. — The penalties established by the next preceding
article shall be applicable in the respective case to any person who, without intent to kill, shall inflict upon
another any serious physical injury, by knowingly administering to him any injurious substances or beverages or
by taking advantage of his weakness of mind or credulity.

Elements:

1. That the offender inflicted upon another any serious physical injury.

2. That it was done by knowingly administering to him any injurious substances or beverages or by taking
advantage of his weakness of mind or credulity.

3. That he had no intent to kill.

It is frustrated murder when there is intent to kill.

If the offender had any intention to kill, the crime would be frustrated murder, the injurious substance
to be considered as poison.

"By knowingly administering to him any injurious substances."

If the accused did not know of the injurious nature of the substances he administered, he is not liable
under this article.

Administering injurious substance means introducing into the body the substance.

The infliction of injuries by throwing mordant chemicals or poisons on the face or upon the body is not
contemplated in this article, because that is not "administering" injurious substance or beverage. (U.S. vs. Chiong
Songco, 18 Phil. 459)

Art. 264 does not apply when the physical injuries that result are less serious or slight.

If as a result of administering injurious substance, only less serious or slight physical injuries are inflicted,
they will be treated under Art. 265 or Art. 266, as the case may be.

Art. 264 specifically mentions "any serious physical injury."

"Weakness of mind or credulity,"

"By taking advantage of his weakness of mind or credulity" may take place in the case of witchcraft,
philters, magnetism, etc. (Albert)

Art. 265. Less serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall inflict upon another physical injuries not
described in the preceding articles, but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or
more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor

Whenever less serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted with the manifest intent to insult or
offend the injured person, or under circumstances adding ignominy to the offense, in addition to the penalty of
arresto mayor a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.
 Any less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the offender's parents, ascendants, guardians, curators,
teachers, or persons of rank, or persons in authority, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods, provided that, in the case of persons in authority, the deed does not constitute the crime
of assault upon such persons.

Matters to be noted in the crime of less serious physical injuries.

1. That the offended party is incapacitated for labor for ten days or more (but not more than 30 days), or needs
medical attendance for the same period of time.

2. That the physical injuries must not be those described in the preceding articles.

Thus, if the incapacity is more than 30 days or the illness lasts for more than 30 days, it is a serious physical
injury under paragraph 4 of Art.

Qualified less serious physical injuries.

(1) A fine not exceeding P500, in addition to arresto mayor, shall be imposed for less serious physical injuries
when —

(a) there is a manifest intent to insult or offend the injured person, or

(b) there are circumstances adding ignominy to the offense.

(2) A higher penalty is imposed when the victim is either —

(a) The offender's parents, ascendants, guardians, curators or teachers; or

(b) Persons of rank or persons in authority, provided the crime is not direct assault.

Medical attendance or incapacity is required in less serious physical injuries.

The law includes two subdivisions, dealing with (1) the inability for work, and (2) the necessity for
medical attendance. So that although the wound required medical attendance for only two days; yet if the
injured party was prevented from attending to his ordinary labor for a period of twenty-nine days, the physical
injuries are denominated less serious. (U.S. vs. Trinidad, 4 Phil. 152; People vs. Olavides, C.A., 40 O.G., Supp. 4, 8)

The crime is less serious physical injuries even if there was no incapacity, but the medical treatment was for 13
days.

Her injury comes under the provisions of Art. 265, inasmuch as she was treated for only 13 days, and there is no
evidence that she was given further medical attendance, granting that it took more than 13 days for the fracture
to heal. She was not incapacitated for the performance of the work in which she was habitually engaged.
(People vs. Anastacio, C.A., 55 O.G. 5047)

It is only slight physical injury when there is no medical attendance or incapacity for labor.

Physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual work or require
medical attendance are classified as slight. (Art. 266, par. 2) This is true even if the injuries were cured, but
without medical attendance, say in twenty days.

But suppose the injuries, without medical attendance, were healed after two months? In this case, it
may be considered illness for more than 30 days and, hence, the crime is serious physical injuries under par. 4,
Art. 263. (See People vs. De Castro, supra)

"Or shall require medical attendance for the same period."

Does the phrase "shall require" refer to the nature of the wound or injury inflicted or to the actual
medical attendance?
 Suppose, A inflicted on B physical injuries which did not incapacitate the latter for labor. B did not apply
any medicine to his wounds, but they were healed in 14 days. Is A liable for less serious physical injuries? It will
be noted that no medical attendance was given to B, although the nature of the wounds required it. It is
believed that the phrase "shall require" refers to the actual medical attendance. There must be proof as to the
period of the required medical attendance. (People vs. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398)