SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
1016
KA 20-01571
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, NEMOYER, CURRAN, AND BANNISTER, JJ.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
TERICK R. GOODWIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CAITLIN M. CONNELLY, BUFFALO, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
LEANNE K. MOSER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LOWVILLE, D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO,
PLLC, SYRACUSE (JOHN A. CIRANDO OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
Appeal from a judgment of the Lewis County Court (Daniel R. King,
J.), rendered July 19, 2019. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a
plea of guilty, of predatory sexual assault against a child (two
counts).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
unanimously reversed as a matter of discretion in the interest of
justice, the plea is vacated, and the matter is remitted to Lewis
County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following
memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon
his plea of guilty, of two counts of predatory sexual assault against
a child (Penal Law § 130.96). During a court appearance at which
County Court extended a plea offer that called for an aggregate
sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment, the court informed
defendant that “my policy is if a defendant gets convicted at trial,
that means that individual has not accepted responsibility for the
conduct that they’ve been convicted of, and . . . [i]n all likelihood
the sentence [after trial] would not even be close to the 20 years [to
life sought by the People], it would be much more – – many more years
and you are looking at a potential [of] 100 years to life.” The court
issued a virtually identical admonition at the next appearance, and
defendant subsequently accepted the court’s offer of 15 years to life
imprisonment.
Under the circumstances, we agree with defendant that the court’s
statements during plea negotiations did “not amount to a description
of the range of the potential sentences but, rather, they
constitute[d] impermissible coercion, ‘rendering the plea involuntary
and requiring its vacatur’ ” (People v Flinn, 60 AD3d 1304, 1305 [4th
Dept 2009]; see People v Rogers, 114 AD3d 707, 707 [2d Dept 2014], lv
denied 23 NY3d 1067 [2014]; People v Wilson, 245 AD2d 161, 163 [1st
Dept 1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 946 [1998]). The court’s coercive
statements were “all the more serious” in light of its misleading
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KA 20-01571
insinuation at the January 25, 2019 appearance that consecutive
sentencing would be mandatory after trial (People v Sung Min, 249 AD2d
130, 132 [1st Dept 1998]; see People v Christian [appeal No. 2], 139
AD2d 896, 897 [4th Dept 1988], lv denied 71 NY2d 1024 [1988]).
Contrary to the People’s contention, the constitutional bar on
coercing a guilty plea does not invariably turn on whether the court
“utilized language that deduced to an absolute guarantee” of a maximum
sentence after trial (see e.g. Rogers, 114 AD3d at 707; Flinn, 60 AD3d
at 1305; Wilson, 245 AD2d at 163).
Thus, although defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the
voluntariness of his plea, we exercise our power to review it as a
matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [3]
[c]), and we reverse the judgment, vacate the plea, and remit the
matter to County Court for further proceedings on the indictment. We
direct that all further proceedings in this case be conducted before a
different judge (see e.g. People v Zuniga, 42 AD3d 474, 475 [2d Dept
2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 966 [2007]).
Entered: December 23, 2021 Ann Dillon Flynn
Clerk of the Court