Electronically Filed by Superior Court of California, County of Orange, 12/23/2021 [Link] PM.

30-2019-01058029-CU-BC-CJC - ROA # 109 - DAVID H. YAMASAKI, Clerk of the Court By efilinguser, Deputy Clerk.

1 K&L LAW GROUP, P.C.

MARC Y. LAZO, SBN: 215998
2 WILLIAM WELDEN, SBN: 117056
2646 Dupont Drive, Suite 60340
3 Irvine, California 92612
Phone No.: (949) 216-4000
4 Fax No.: (800) 596-0370
5 Attorneys for Plaintiff Shuttlewood Investments Limited
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7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
8 COUNTY OF ORANGE, CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER
9
10 SHUTTLEWOOD INVESTMENTS ) Case No.: 30-2019-01058029-CU-BC-CJC
LIMITED., )
11 ) PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO
Plaintiff, ) DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
12 ) DEFAULT JUDGMENT
13 v. )
) [Request for Judicial Notice filed concurrently
14 ERIC PARKINSON, an individual, ) herewith]
)
15 Defendant. ) Date: January 7, 2021
____________________________________ ) Time: 1:30 p.m.
16
) Dept: C23
17 )
18
19 TO: DEFENDANTS ERIC PARKINSON, HANNOVER HOUSE, INC.,
20 BOOKWORKS, INC. AND FILMWORKS CREATIVE SERVICES LLC, AKA MEDALLION
21 RELEASING, INC.
22 PLAINTIFF SHUTTLEWOOD INVESTMENTS LIMITED by and through its attorneys of
23 record hereby oppose the Motion to Set Aside Default filed herein by DEFENDANTS ERIC
24 PARKINSON, HANNOVER HOUSE, INC., BOOKWORKS, INC. AND FILMWORKS CREATIVE
25 SERVICES LLC, AKA MEDALLION RELEASING (“Defendants”) on the grounds that Defendants
26 rely on “excusable neglect” as the basis for their Motion, yet fail to show such an excuse in their own
27 moving papers. Defendants actually show their neglect was not excusable by their own admissions; that
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OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

 1 Defendants’ Motion is extremely untimely having been filed more than two years after defaults were
2 entered; and that setting aside the judgment will severely prejudice Plaintiff’s case after so long a lapse.
3 I. INTRODUCTION
4 After sitting on their hands since July 8, 2019, when defaults were entered against them,
5 Defendants now seek an order vacating the default judgment entered against them more than two years
6 ago. See Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Exhibit 1 - July 8, 2019 defaults against Defendants
7 Parkinson and Hannover House - filed concurrently herewith. Defendants’ disgruntled protestations of
8 “excusable neglect” fail because the Motion on its face admits that no final settlement had been reached
9 because Plaintiff continued to demand updated financials that Parkinson knew had never been produced
10 despite being requested in 2019. These protestations are transparently designed to mask the one
11 indisputable fact that glaringly is not rectified in Defendants’ Motion: Defendants, from the outset,
12 knew about the lawsuit and opted to undertake zero action to defend themselves even in the face of a
13 default. Defendants ignored Plaintiff’s lawsuit but did so at Defendants’ own peril. Filing their Motion
14 to Set Aside years after the six month deadline under Code of Civil Procedure §473(b), Defendants
15 cannot merely rely on “excusable neglect.” The inherent discretionary power of the court is the only
16 basis for their Motion, and their options are therefore limited.
17 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
18 Defendant’s own Motion and supporting Declaration of Eric Parkinson make these rather
19 startling admissions:
20 • The Motion asserted that it was based on excusable neglect. Motion, 2:9-10.
21 • Defendants admit no settlement existed because financial issues remained
22 unresolved even as they used alleged settlement talks as “excusable neglect”. Motion, 10:6-14.
23 (Nowhere in the Motion do Defendants cite any follow up conversations after July 2019, they merely
24 assumed Fred Shelte was taking care of the matter.)
25 • Defendants claim they did not discover the default judgments against them until
26 Hannover’s President Fred Shefte filed for personal bankruptcy in the early part of 2021. Motion 10:16-
27 17.
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OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

 1 • Defendant Parkinson’s supporting declaration attempts to shift the blame for lack
2 of financial records onto Hannover’s President Fred Shefte, as if he were a third party rather than
3 Defendant Hannover’s leader. See, Declaration of Eric Parkinson (“Parkinson Decl.”), 4:7-24 filed in
4 support of the Motion.
5 • Parkinson admits that he was informed in June 2019 that Hannover was served.
6 Parkinson Decl., 5:16-25.
7 • Parkinson was still arguing his case to Plaintiff in July 2019 when he claims he
8 thought the case had been settled even though he knew Plaintiff wanted to see more financials. Parkinson
9 Decl. 6:1-24.
10 • Parkinson’s Declaration does not show he believed there was a settlement in July
11 2019. Parkinson Decl., 7:13-14. Instead, he admits he knew of the Default Judgment that Defendants
12 waited more than six months to move to set aside. Parkinson then seeks to blame Fred Shefte’s health
13 and financial problems for Defendants never following up with financials, as if Shefte were some
14 unrelated third party and intervening force majeure. Parkinson Decl., 6:16 to 7:13.
15 Requests for entry of default were filed herein on July 8, 2019, and entered that same date.. See,
16 RJN Exhibit 1. On July 2019 Parkinson states he sent the above-mentioned email to Steve Hails
17 advocating Hannover’s position. Parkinson Decl. 6:1-24. A judgment was entered against Defendants
18 on May 5, 2021. RJN, Exhibit 3. Yet this Motion to Set Aside was not filed until November 9, 2021-
19 more than two years after the defaults were entered and over six months from the entry of the judgment
20 date. RJN Exhibit 1. The defaults were entered on July 8, 2019, which is the operative date for
21 determining timeliness of this Motion, not the judgement date. Rutan v. Summit Sports, Inc. (1985) 173
22 [Link].3d 965, 970,
23 Defendants have a habit of sleeping on their rights for more than two years and then suddenly
24 discovering something that excuses their lack of a defense. RJN, Exhibit 2. Defendants’ Motion to
25 Amend Judgment seeking similar relief in U.S. District Court failed just as this instant Motion should
26 fail. See RJN, Exhibit 2 - Order Denying Motion to Amend Default Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
27 P. 60(d)(3) [56].
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OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

 1 III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR DENYING THE MOTION
2 “…[T]he application…shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months,
3 after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” CCP §473(b). (Emphasis added.)
4 “The general rule is that the six-month period within which to bring a motion to vacate under
5 section 473 runs from the date of the default and not from the judgment taken thereafter… The reason
6 for the rule is that vacation of the judgment alone ordinarily would constitute an idle act; if the
7 judgment were vacated the default would remain intact and permit immediate entry of another
8 judgment giving the plaintiff the relief to which his complaint entitles him…” Rutan v. Summit Sports,
9 Inc. (1985) 173 [Link].3d 965, 970 (emphasis added).
10 IV. ARGUMENT
11 A. Defendants’ Motion Is Untimely Because They Had Ample Notice and
12 Opportunity to Oppose but Chose not to Challenge the Default Judgement for
13 More than Two Years after Entry of Default.
14 This Motion should have been filed years ago. Defendants’ Motion was made more than six
15 months after the default judgment was entered and more than two years after a default was entered,
16 which means this Motion is outside the court's statutory power to grant relief for mistake or excusable
17 neglect under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. Phillips v. Trusheim, (1945) 25 Cal.2d 913, 917
18 [156 P.2d 25]; Thompson v. Vallembois, (1963) 216 Cal. App.2d 21, 24. This Motion is extra-statutory,
19 directed to the court's inherent equity power under which, apart from its statutory authority, the court
20 has the power to grant relief from a default judgment where there has been "extrinsic" fraud or mistake.
21 Hallett v. Slaughter, (1943), 22 Cal.2d 552, 557 [140 P.2d 3]; Weitz v. Yankosky, (1966) 63 Cal.2d 849,
22 854-855; Orange Empire Nat. Bank v. Kirk, (1968) 259 [Link].2d 347, 352.) But all Defendants
23 have shown is long-term, extensive neglect and no extrinsic fraud or mistake.
24 Defendants’ entire argument rests on the apparent reliance on Fred Shefte for requested financial
25 information, but this reliance is not grounds for the relief requested here. When a default is entered
26 because defendant has relied upon a co-defendant or other interested party to defend, the question is
27 whether the defendant was reasonably justified under the circumstances in his reliance or whether his
28 neglect to attend to the matter was inexcusable. Stout v. Bakker, (1963) 212 Cal. App.2d 78, 82-83;

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

 1 Montijo v. Robert Sherer & Co., (1907) 5 Cal. App. 736, 738-739. Here, Defendants claim to have
2 relied on Shefte for some financial records when Shefte was hospitalized at the time he was asked to
3 obtain financial records. Defendants assert no follow up occurred for over two years This is not
4 reasonable. Moreover, to the extent that the court's equity power to grant relief differs from its power
5 under section 473, the equity power must be considered narrower, not wider. Wattson v. Dillon, (1936)
6 6 Cal.2d 33, 42 [56 P.2d 220]. To hold otherwise would encourage litigants to wait until the six-month
7 period elapses before moving to set a default judgment aside.
8 B. Plaintiff’s Case Will be Seriously Prejudiced by This Delay since July 2019,
9 Resulting in Missing Witnesses, Evidence and Extra Costs.
10 Given that this Motion was made in November 2021 and the default was entered in July 2019,
11 laches would apply to this Motion made outside the limits of 473(b). See, Hallett v. Slaughter,
12 (1943), 22 Cal.2d 552, 557, 140 P.2d 3; Olivera v. Grace, (1941)19 Cal.2d 570, 574-575, 122 P.2d 564.
13 Moreover, the untimeliness of the Motion creates prejudice for Plaintiff. Even though the
14 Defendant had an obligation to show that the setting aside of the default will not result in prejudice to
15 the Plaintiff, he failed to do so. Plaintiff has already suffered harm as a result of Defendants’ tortious
16 conduct that gave rise to the subject lawsuit. Witnesses’ memories have had an extra two-plus years to
17 erode; Defendants’ documents have the potential to be lost or thrown out over the past two years;
18 witnesses have the time to move or even die. Plaintiff has not prepared for trial with a discovery plan
19 because this case was never at issue because no need existed to do discovery, hire experts, or interview
20 witnesses because all of the Defendants had defaulted. As such, Plaintiff will suffer severe prejudice by
21 this long-time delay.
22 C. Defendants’ Attempt to Amend a Default Judgement in U.S. District Court Is
23 Instructive Here
24 Defendants in Davis v Parkinson, 2:18-cv-02433-SVW-JPR attempted to amend away default
25 judgments entered against Hannover House and Eric Parkinson, but failed under the same set of
26 circumstances as exists here—more than two years of delay. Similarly, the Court should deny the instant
27 Motion for lack of diligence. In Davis, Defendants sat on their rights for two and a half years, then
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OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

 1 accused Plaintiffs of fraud on the court for including a request for $800,000 in Davis’ Default
2 Application based on a bare assertion of business disparagement. See RJN, Exhibit 2.
3 The Davis v. Parkinson Order (RJN, Exhibit 2) emphasized the same pattern of dilatoriness
4 sought to be excused here by asserting no service and imaginary misconduct by another Plaintiff :
5 “Over two and a half years later, on September 23, 2021, Defendants filed this
6 motion to amend the default judgment pursuant to F. R. Civ. P.
7 60(b)…..Defendants argue that by "surreptitiously inserting a bare issue that
8 Defendants disparaged them resulting in a $800,000 loss in presumed damages,"
9 Plaintiffs have committed fraud on the court….Defendants have also claimed that
10 they never received the Application for Default Judgment because it was sent via
11 UPS to an office they had moved out of a month prior. [RJN Ex. 2, Order, Page
12 2]….Nor did Defendants show that Plaintiffs’ supposed fraud on the Court
13 “prevented the other party from "fully and fairly presenting his case or defense.
14 Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Barrett, 246 F.2d 846, 849 (9th Cir. 1957).
15 Defendants have offered little evidence to indicate that this is the case here, only
16 providing a conclusionary declaration from Defendant Parkinson stating that he
17 had not made any disparaging statements about Plaintiff Davis.” [RJN, Exhibit 2
18 - Order, Page 4.] (emphasis added.)
19 In Davis, Defendants, including Parkinson, claimed they never knew they had been defaulted
20 and then claimed to have been victims of sharp practice by Plaintiffs, a supposed Fraud on the
21 Court. Again here, in this matter, the Defendants failed to act for over two years under the guise
22 of ignorance about the defaults then attempted to assert an imaginary claim that Plaintiff lulled
23 Defendants with settlement. Defendants’ Motion must fail.
24 V. CONCLUSION
25 The Judgment entered by this Court was carefully decided. It reflected concern for a just
26 resolution based upon law and proper evidence. This Court expressly did not rubber stamp any request
27 //
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OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

 1 by the Plaintiff. The record is clear on this point. For all the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion
2 should be denied.
3
4 Dated: December 23, 2021 K&L LAW GROUP PC
5
6 By:_________________________________
MARC Y. LAZO
7
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

 1 PROOF OF SERVICE
(C.C.P. Section 1013a and Section 2015.5)
2
3 I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years
and not a party to the within action. My business address is 2646 Dupont Drive, Suite 60340, Irvine,
4 CA 92612.
5 On December 23, 2021, I served the within PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S
6 MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT on the interested parties in said action as
follows:
7
Daniel King – djyking@[Link]
8 LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL KING
3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1111
9
Los Angeles, CA 90010
10 (213) 388-3887

11 [ ] BY MAIL: I placed a true copy in a sealed envelope addressed as indicated above, on the
above mentioned date. I am familiar with the firm’s practice of collection and processing
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correspondence for mailing. It is deposited within the U.S. Postal Service on that same day in the
13 ordinary course of business. I am aware that on mention of party served, service is presumed invalid
if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit of mailing
14 in affidavit.
15
[ ] BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I placed a true copy in a sealed envelope addressed to each
16 person(s) named at the address(es) shown above and giving same to a messenger for personal
delivery before 5:00 p.m. on the above mentioned date.
17
18 [X ] BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE (C.C.P. § 1010.6 and pursuant to California Rules of Court,
Emergency Rule 12.): I caused such document to be served on this date by electronic transmission in
19 accordance with standard procedures and to the e-mail address listed on the attached service list.

20 [ ] BY FACSIMILE: From facsimile number __________, I caused each such document to be

transmitted by facsimile machine, to the parties and numbers indicated above, pursuant to Rule 2008.
21 The facsimile machine I used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the machine.
Pursuant to Rule 2008(e)(4), I caused the machine to print a transmission record of the transmission,
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a copy of which is attached hereto.
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[ ] BY FEDERAL EXPRESS: On the above mentioned date, I placed a true copy of the above
24 mentioned document(s) in a sealed envelope or package designated by Federal Express with delivery
25 fees paid or provided for, addressed to the person(s) as indicated above and deposited same in a box
or other facility regularly maintained by Federal Express to received documents.
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OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

 1 I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of California that the foregoing is true
and correct. Executed on December 23, 2021, at Irvine, California.
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OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT