3.
4 How and why was the unification of Germany achieved by
1871?
Bismarck’s diplomacy towards France
It is not clear that Bismarck actively sought war with France as a long-term objective, but he was
prepared to accept it if necessary. He considered that it might even work in Prussia’s interests. A
conflict with an external foe, which could be depicted as threatening both southern Germany and the
North German Confederation, might act as a means of bringing about complete unification.
Relations between Prussia and France deteriorated after the Austro-Prussian War. Napoleon III was
under pressure from French public opinion to gain some compensation for enduring this powerful
neighbour on his eastern border. He was a weakened ruler by the late 1860s, exposed to domestic
criticism as he was cautiously liberalising the French political system. Bismarck turned down
Napoleon’s attempt to acquire part of the Rhineland, which belonged to Bavaria and Hesse. Instead, he
encouraged him to turn his attention to the Duchy of Luxembourg, an independent state whose ruler
was the king of the Netherlands. Some of the inhabitants were German-speaking, and a Prussian
garrison was stationed there. This meant that German nationalist feeling was aroused when it emerged
in March 1867 that the king was willing to transfer the territory to France, provided that he had
Prussian approval. Bismarck then deliberately whipped up German public opinion to prevent the deal
between France and the Netherlands from going through. Instead, a conference held in London in May
1867 resulted in Luxembourg being declared a neutral state. The Prussian garrison was withdrawn.
It is unlikely that Bismarck was trying to start a war with France at this stage, but he must have been
aware that he was provoking Napoleon into possible future aggression. The south German states – still
independent at the time – were horrified to discover that Napoleon wanted to take control of
Luxembourg, and turned against France. Events in another part of Europe now unexpectedly played
into Bismarck’s hands.
The Hohenzollern candidature and the outbreak of war
The Spanish succession crisis
In 1868, the Spanish queen, Isabella, was forced to abdicate by politicians who wanted an end to the
rule of the Bourbon royal family in their country. They selected Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-
Sigmaringen as their new monarch. Leopold was from a south German state and a Catholic, like the
Spanish, but he was also related to the Prussian royal family. Encouraged by Bismarck, Leopold
accepted the offer – a move that was certain to incite French anger as a further example of Prussian
expansionism. As king of Prussia, Wilhelm I was head of the Hohenzollern family. He was doubtful of the
wisdom of Bismarck’s policy.
A major international incident occurred in early July 1870, when a document announcing Leopold’s
acceptance arrived in Madrid at a time when the Spanish parliament was not in session. This was not
supposed to happen. Napoleon should not have heard the news until the Spanish had publicly chosen
Leopold. The French government concluded that there was a Prussian plot to encircle France and so
put Wilhelm under pressure to persuade Leopold to withdraw.
The king sent Bismarck a telegram describing a meeting about the matter he had just had with
Benedetti, the French ambassador, at the spa town of Ems. When he received the Ems Telegram (as it is
now known), Bismarck saw an opportunity to portray France as the unreasonable party in the
negotiations. He changed the original wording of the telegram to make it appear that the French were
demanding a humiliating pledge from Prussia never to support any future renewal of Leopold’s
candidature. He also gave the impression that Wilhelm had abruptly broken off the discussion with the
ambassador. Moltke, who was present when Bismarck edited the telegram, instantly grasped the
important difference between the two versions. ‘Now it has a different ring,’ he declared. ‘It sounded
before like a parley [a negotiation]; now it is like a flourish in answer to a challenge.’
The outbreak of war against France, July 1870
Bismarck then released the telegram in both Germany and France. The result was public outrage in
both Prussia and France. Resolving the situation became a matter of national honour. Urged on by
public opinion, Napoleon decided on war. It is not clear how far in advance Bismarck had been thinking
in terms of war with France, but this was the outcome of his manipulation of the Ems Telegram. War
would almost certainly unite the south German states with the North German Confederation against the
common enemy, Napoleon’s France. In the event, the French played into his hands by behaving so
aggressively.
ACTIVITY 3.15
Bismarck’s version of the Ems Telegram, 13 July 1870
After the news of the renunciation of the hereditary Prince von Hohenzollern had been officially
communicated to the Imperial Government of France by the Royal Government of Spain, the
French Ambassador further demanded of His Majesty the King, at Ems, that he would authorise
him to telegraph to Paris that His Majesty the King bound himself for all time never again to give
his consent, should the Hohenzollerns renew their candidature. His Majesty the King thereupon
decided not to receive the French Ambassador again, and sent the aide-de-camp [an officer who
acts as an assistant to a person of high rank] on duty to tell him that His Majesty had nothing
further to communicate to the ambassador.
Source: Kertesz, G.A. (ed.). (1970). Documents in the Political History of the European
Continent 1815–1939. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 200–201
Explain in your own words why the Ems Telegram would cause anger and alarm when published in
this form. Is the telegram proof that Bismarck intended to go to war with France, and had been
planning for this?
Reasons for the Prussian victory in the Franco-Prussian War, 1870–71
French isolation
France’s decision to initiate war in July 1870 was a risky decision. Despite attempts to establish
alliances, France was relatively isolated. It was seen as the aggressor while Prussia claimed only to be
defending itself. Britain refused to offer support, believing that France was not justified in going to war
over the Spanish throne. Italy also refused to come to France’s aid while French soldiers were still
present in its country, defending Rome on behalf of the Pope. Rome was the last area in the peninsula to
remain independent of the new Italian state, and its leaders wanted the French to withdraw so that they
could take it over.
The old conservative alliance of Russia and Austria, which had maintained the 1815 settlement for a
generation, was now dead, and Russia decided to remain neutral after Bismarck signalled a willingness
to help secure a revision of the treaty which had ended the Crimean War. Austria had been weakened by
its defeat in 1866 and was now focusing on its empire in south-eastern Europe. Holding that together
would require all of its depleted energies.
By contrast, the German national movement supported Prussia. The south German states committed
their troops to the war, viewing France as a threat to the whole of Germany, and they fought as well as
their Prussian allies. Prussia was able to move half a million troops to the French border while their
opponents had only 250 000 men concentrated in the Rhineland.
ACTIVITY 3.16
How useful is this drawing in explaining the Prussian victory over France in the war of 1870–71?
Figure 3.8: Siege of Paris (19.09.–28.01.1871): Emperor Wilhelm I on the rampart of a Prussian
artillery position the day after the surrender of the town. 29.01.1871 (Contemporary wood
engraving)
Prussian military superiority
Prussia’s rapid mobilisation and effective preparation for war strongly contrasted with the inefficiency
exhibited by France. As in 1866, the value of the Prussian general staff system was evident. By contrast,
the French leaders lacked effective means of command and control over their forces. Their army
reservists had to proceed to depots to collect equipment before moving to the points where they were
meant to assemble. They lacked maps of their own country, having only been issued with maps of
Germany, as they expected soon to be crossing the border to win a swift victory. Unlike Prussia, whose
military combined short-term, universal conscription with intensive training, France relied on long-
serving professionals, recruited by annual lottery. Its reserve force, the Garde Mobile, undertook only
14 days of training each year. One of the French generals claimed that their army was ‘ready to the last
gaiter button’, but this was an empty boast. They allowed the Prussians to take the initiative, so that
most of the war was fought on French territory.
France had some advantages in terms of weaponry. The recently issued Chassepot rifle was superior to
the Prussian needle gun, with an effective range of 1400 metres and a more rapid rate of fire. At the
Battle of Gravelotte, for example, in August 1870, the Prussians suffered 20 000 casualties, most of
them victims of the Chassepot, in return for fewer than 8000 French losses. The French also possessed
an early kind of machine gun, the Mitrailleuse, but their troops had not learned how to deploy it
effectively in support of infantry. Their battlefield tactics were faulty. They concentrated their troops in
prepared defensive positions and controlled their rate of fire as the enemy approached. This approach
played into the hands of the more mobile Prussians. They also fell victim to Prussia’s improved artillery.
Moltke had learned from his army’s experience at the hands of the Austrians, and had adopted rifled,
steel breech-loading field guns, which outclassed the French in terms of range, accuracy and rate of
fire.
ACTIVITY 3.17
This painting, produced in 1877, is not accurate in all details. Bismarck did not actually wear white,
for example, so why has the artist, Anton von Werner, depicted him like this? What can you learn
from the painting about the way in which Germans wanted to regard the achievement of
unification?
Figure 3.9: King Wilhelm I of Prussia being proclaimed German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors
in the Palace of Versailles. Bismarck is the central figure in white uniform and Moltke is to his
right, raising his hat.
Behind them are the leaders of the German states.
Reflection: Compare your approach to this question with that of another student. How did you decide on
your approach? Would you change your approach to similar questions following your discussion?
These improvements helped the Prussians and their allies to win the decisive battle of Sedan, near the
Belgian border, in September 1870. Here a French army of 100 000 men was encircled and shelled into
submission by the Prussian artillery. The French lost 17 000 troops while Prussian casualties were
closer to 8000. Napoleon III surrendered to Bismarck. The French emperor was in poor health, but felt
that he should be present at the battle, even though he had a poor grasp of military matters. He was
then forced to abdicate, after news of the defeat prompted a revolution in Paris and the establishment
of a republican government.
Meanwhile, France’s Marshal Bazaine allowed himself to be confined with 180 000 troops in the border
fortress of Metz, instead of proactively seeking to make use of his resources. In short, France’s leaders
could not make up their minds whether to fight an offensive or a defensive war. Their lack of a clear
strategy proved fatal to their prospects.
The war took a different turn with the decision of the new republican government in Paris to hold out
against the invaders in the capital city through the winter. In the countryside, the French used guerrilla
warfare to harass Prussian forces. The siege of Paris demonstrated the ruthlessness of the Prussians. A
combination of starvation, exhaustion and prolonged artillery bombardment finally led to surrender in
January 1871. The republic tried to recruit a new army but failed to find enough trained officers, and
the ill-disciplined force was soon defeated.
The defeat of France was a tribute to Bismarck’s skill as a diplomatic ‘chess player’. As in 1866, before
embarking on military action, he made sure that his opponent was isolated among the great powers. He
also showed skill in manipulating the growing sense of German nationality, using the French threat as a
way of binding the south German states to the war effort. He could not have achieved anything,
however, without the successes of the Prussian army, whose readiness to fight was a tribute to Moltke’s
effectiveness as a commander. The experienced chief of the general staff had further improved the army
after the clash with Austria four years earlier. Finally, Prussia was fortunate in the French army’s lack
of preparation, which cancelled out the advantages it possessed in terms of weaponry. The outcome of
the war was largely due to superior Prussian planning, combined with Bismarck’s willingness to take a
calculated risk in pursuit of his objectives.
Creation of the German Empire, 1871
The new Germany
As a result of the war with France, Germany was fully united. This was not, however, entirely a triumph
for German nationalism. Prussia remained the dominant state in the new Germany. It was a
kleindeutsch solution to the German problem, with Austria excluded from the new Reich.
Some southern states were still reluctant to be part of a ‘Greater Germany’ and thus come under
Prussian control. Bismarck had to make some concessions to persuade them to join the union. Bavaria,
the largest southern state, sought special powers to retain a degree of independence, including control
over its own armed forces. Bismarck also gave money to its king, Ludwig II, who was heavily in debt
and open to bribery. The funds for this came from the confiscated fortune of the king of Hanover, who
had been forced to abandon his throne and flee to Austria after unwisely backing the latter in the war of
1866.
It was not only the southern states that were concerned about the unification of their country. The
Junkers feared that Prussia would have less power and influence in a larger Germany. There was an
argument about the exact title that Wilhelm would take. He wanted to be known as ‘Emperor of
Germany’ but was eventually proclaimed ‘German Emperor’ or Kaiser in January 1871, at a ceremony
held in the Hall of Mirrors in the royal palace of Versailles. Bismarck preferred this title because it did
not sound as though Prussia was making an unreasonable claim to authority over the south German
states, whose cooperation he needed. The choice of venue was symbolic, since the palace had been
created by one of the greatest French monarchs, Louis XIV. This was a visible sign of France’s
humiliation.
The treatment of France
Bismarck took advantage of France’s weakness to impose harsh peace terms. The defeated country was
required to pay a sum of 5 billion francs as reparations, and a German army was posted in northern
France until this was paid. The border province of Alsace and the northern part of its neighbour,
Lorraine, were conceded to Germany, mainly to give the newly unified state security against the
possibility of a French war of revenge. Although the annexed areas were largely German-speaking, they
had belonged to France since the 18th century.
The harshness of the settlement contrasted starkly with Bismarck’s relatively generous handling of
Austria four years earlier. However, it was a way of binding the south German states to the new Reich.
The annexed territory was a buffer zone between France and the states of Bavaria, Württemberg and
Baden. Its acquisition was part of a strategy of labelling France as an aggressor, which must be seen to
be punished as part of the peace settlement. Bismarck had decided that, unlike Austria, France could
never develop into an ally in the future, and so the relationship must be based purely on superior
strength.
This created a lingering resentment on the part of the French. A statue in the centre of Paris,
representing the Alsatian city of Strasbourg, was permanently shrouded in black as a reminder to the
population of the loss they had suffered. The French desire to avenge the loss of the two provinces was
a long-term cause of the tensions which would lead to the First World War.
The constitution of the new Reich
The new Reich was very different from the national state for which German liberals had struggled in
the revolutionary years of 1848–49. This time, the imperial crown was being offered to a Prussian king
by his peer group, the princes, rather than by a popular assembly. Unity had been imposed by means of
force from above, not achieved from below by the people.
The constitution was modelled on that of the North German Confederation. Prussia had a deciding voice
in the Bundesrat since it was allocated 17 out of a total of 58 votes, and 14 votes were sufficient to
block any new proposals. It also had a majority of the seats in the Reichstag. The king of Prussia was
the Kaiser and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Bismarck was appointed as Imperial Chancellor
and remained the effective decision-maker in Germany until his downfall in 1890. The heads of the
government departments, such as the treasury, justice and the interior, were designated as state
secretaries who answered to the chancellor, rather than acting as a team of equal ministers. As
Prussian foreign minister, Bismarck was also in control of Germany’s external policy. On the other hand,
the individual states retained a number of powers, for example over direct taxation, education and
welfare policies, and their local parliaments had different relationships with the government in each of
the states. It was a Fürstenbund or confederation of sovereign principalities. The imperial government
was granted certain specific, but important powers: over foreign policy, peace and war, and control of
the customs system.
Most importantly, the Prussian army dwarfed the military establishments of the other German states.
The military exercised a special role in the new Reich. The army budget was not subject to
parliamentary control. Under the North German Confederation, it had been set in 1867 at a fixed level
for five years. During the Franco-Prussian War, this was extended until 1874 and, in practice, the
Reichstag never gained control of military spending. This meant that the power of the Reichstag to
evolve as a genuine parliamentary government, and to hold the Kaiser’s ministers effectively to
account, was always limited. The new Germany reflected the authoritarian, monarchical, military
culture of Prussia.
KEY CONCEPT
Significance: the role of the individual
Look back on the information in this chapter on the role of Bismarck. How significant do you think
his actions were in the move towards German unification? By contrast, how much did that process
owe to other factors, such as the economic strength of Prussia, its military strength, or the
mistakes and miscalculations of its opponents in the wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870–71? Overall, how
important do you consider this individual was relative to the other forces at work?
Exam-style questions
Source analysis questions
Read the four sources and then answer both parts of question 1.
SOURCE A
From a report by the British envoy to Bavaria, Sir Henry F. Howard, to the
British foreign secretary, Lord Stanley, 3 December 1866
It remains to be remarked that the feeling of uneasiness in Germany is augmented
[increased] by the impression that … when France shall have completed Her military
preparations, She will seek a war with Germany so as to obtain those compensations
for the aggrandisement [increased power] of Prussia, which She has sketched out, but
which She has already learnt will only be yielded to superior force. Whether the fears
thus entertained in regard to the eventual course of France and to the alliances to
which it may give rise will be realized or not, some seventeen or eighteen months
hence, their existence produces a feeling of uncertainty as to the future and furnishes
a motive for military preparation on the part of Germany.
Source: Report no. 140, December 3, 1866, in National Archives (formerly Public
Record Office, Kew), London, FO 9/177, reprinted at German History in Documents
and Images
SOURCE B
From a letter from Bismarck to Wilhelm I, 20 November 1869
In regard to the South German situation I think the line for Prussian policy is set by
two diverse aims … the one distant, the other immediate … The distant and by far the
greater aim is the national unification of Germany. We can wait for this in security
because the lapse of time and the natural development of the nation which makes
further progress every year will have their effect. We cannot accelerate it unless out
of the way [unexpected] events in Europe, such as some upheaval in France or a war
of other great powers among themselves offer us an unsought opportunity to do so …
Every recognisable effort of Prussia to determine the decision of the South German
Princes will endanger our immediate aim. I consider this to be … to keep Bavaria and
Württemberg in such political direction that neither will cooperate with Paris or
Vienna … nor find a pretext to break alliances which we have concluded [with them].
Source: Bohme, H. (1971). The Foundation of the German Empire. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. reprinted Shreeves, W.G. (1984). Nation Making in Nineteenth
Century Europe. Cheltenham: Nelson Thorne. p. 166
SOURCE C
From the speech of the king of Prussia at the opening of the North German
Reichstag, 19 July 1870
The [governments of the North German Confederation] have felt that they have done
all which honour and dignity permit to maintain for Europe the blessings of peace;
and the clearer it appears to all eyes that the sword has been forced into our hand,
with greater confidence we turn, supported by the unanimous will of the German
governments of the South, as well as of the North, to the love of the Fatherland and
willingness for sacrifice of the German people to the summons to protect her honour
and independence.
Source: Kertesz, G.A. (ed.). (1970). Documents in the Political History of the European
Continent 1815–1939. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 203
SOURCE D
From Bismarck’s memoirs, published in 1898, recalling the evening when he
edited the Ems Telegram, 13 July 1870
After I had read out the concentrated edition to my two guests, Moltke remarked:
“Now it has a different ring; it sounded before like a parley [a negotiation]; now it is
like a flourish in answer to a challenge.” I went on to explain: “If in execution of his
Majesty’s order I at once communicate this text, which contains no alteration in or
addition to the telegram, not only to the newspapers, but also by telegraph to all our
embassies, it will be known in Paris before midnight, and … will have the effect of a
red rag upon the Gallic [French] bull. Fight we must if we do not want to act the part
of the vanquished without a battle. Success, however, essentially depends upon the
impression which the origination of the war makes upon us and others; it is important
that we should be the party attacked …
Source: Hamerow, T. (ed.). (1973). The Age of Bismarck: Documents and
Interpretations. New York: Harper & Row, pp. 93–95 reprinted at German History in
Documents and Images
1 a Read Sources C and D. Compare and contrast Sources C and D as evidence of
Prussia’s responsibility for the outbreak of war with France in 1870.
b Read all of the sources. ‘Bismarck planned in advance to complete the process of
German unification by means of a war with France.’ How far do the sources
support this view?
Essay based questions
Answer both parts of the questions below.
2 a Explain why the rulers of the German states survived the revolutions of 1848–49.
b To what extent was Prussia’s military strength the most important reason for the
unification of Germany?
3 a Explain why revolutions occurred in several German states in 1848.
b ‘Prussia’s economic growth was the main reason for its dominant role in the
process of German unification.’ How far do you agree?
Sample answer
Read Sources C and D. Compare and contrast Sources C and D as evidence of Prussia’s
responsibility for the outbreak of war with France in 1870.
Source C is taken from an address by the Prussian king, Wilhelm I, to the North German
Reichstag, the parliament of the North German Confederation. This body had been
created as a result of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, in which Prussia defeated
Austria to become the dominant power in northern Germany. The king is speaking to the
Reichstag at the point when the war between France and Prussia broke out. Source D is
Bismarck’s own account of the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in his memoirs,
published at the end of his life in 1898.
Source C presents the war as defensive on the part of Prussia and the other German
states, stating that ‘the sword has been forced into our hand’ and claiming that they are
fighting to protect their ‘honour and independence’. Source D also centres on the idea
that the Germans fought a defensive war but it puts a quite different twist on this
theme. Bismarck admits that he had altered the text of the Ems Telegram, reporting a
meeting between the Prussian king and the French ambassador, to provoke a clash
between the two countries. He is much more honest than the author of Source C, in
stating that it was important for Prussia and the German states to appear as the victim
of French aggression.
This is a clear explanation of the content of the sources, focusing mainly on the
differences between them. The candidate has, quite correctly, used short quotations
rather than copying large sections of the text or relating the content at great
length. One important point in Source C, which the candidate has not highlighted,
is the reference to the South German states; a key feature of the war was the way
in which French aggression could be used to encourage southern German opinion
to support the North German Confederation − seen by many historians as a way of
completing the process of German unification.
The different dates of the two sources are important in explaining the differences
between them. Both are primary sources because they are written by participants in the
events of 1870, but Source C comes directly from the time whereas Source D is written
almost 30 years later. In July 1870 it was important for Prussia to persuade the other
German states to join the war, and this was Wilhelm’s main purpose. The other German
states would not have supported Prussia if they felt it had acted as the aggressor. We
cannot be sure, but it may be that the speech was written for him by Bismarck, as his
chief minister and the mastermind behind the conflict with France. By the 1890s,
however, the war was in the past and it would not affect the course of events for
Bismarck to be honest about how he had manipulated the situation. In fact it may be
that he wanted to show his cleverness. He quotes Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the
Prussian general staff at the time, as recognising the likely effect of his editing of the
telegram, which underlines his own brilliance to the reader.
This is an effective paragraph which begins to analyse why as well as how the two
sources differ. It makes good use of contextual knowledge and speculates
intelligently about the possible motivation behind the two extracts.
The intended audiences of the sources are also important in understanding why they
differ. The immediate audience for Source C would have been the leading politicians of
North Germany but it would also have been published abroad and can be interpreted as
justifying military action against France, so that other countries felt less inclined to take
the French side. Source D’s audience is the general public, particularly those interested
in recent political history. Politicians write memoirs when they retire partly to make
money but also to justify their earlier actions. Neither source will give a completely
reliable account of the events of 1870 because they are both written for particular
purposes, and will distort reality in order to make their point. However, Source D, as an
insider’s account written later, is probably more useful as evidence than a public
statement made at the time − although we need to make allowances for a retired
politician’s desire to exaggerate his own role.
This is an insightful paragraph which considers the issue of provenance and uses
outside knowledge to evaluate the sources for usefulness and reliability. The
candidate could, however, have commented further on the type of language used in
the sources. The way that Source C enlists the cause of German nationalism (‘love
of the Fatherland’ and the ‘sacrifice of the German people’) in support of Prussian
interests is worth noting. It is also relevant to highlight the dubious argument here,
that the North German Confederation has done its best to maintain ‘the blessings of
peace’. This claim could have been examined. In D, Bismarck is careful to state that
he was acting in obedience to the king whereas in fact he was exercising
considerable independence. His caricature of France as the ‘Gallic bull’ is a striking
use of language. In conclusion, this is a good response which explains and evaluates
the sources, and makes some effective use of contextual knowledge − but it could
have gone a little further in making greater use of the evidence presented in the
sources.
Sample answer
Explain why the rulers of the German states survived the revolutions of 1848–49.
The German princes were taken by surprise by the revolutions which swept across their
territories in 1848–49, but within a year they had recovered their power. This was partly
because of their own instinct for survival and the support they received from the two
most powerful states, Austria and Prussia. However, it was mainly because of the
internal weaknesses and divisions of the revolutionaries. In this essay I will explore
these different factors, in order to explain why the princes survived the revolutionary
upheavals of this period.
This introduces the key aspects of the explanation quite concisely, so that the
reader knows what to expect in the main body of the answer. It also shows
awareness of the need to assess the relative importance of different factors. But
does the final sentence really add anything? Remember that time is limited. It
would have been better to add a sentence to explain what is meant by an ‘instinct
for survival’.
The princes initially granted the revolutionaries some of their demands, setting up
constitutions which limited their own power. This showed their ability to react to
circumstances; they knew that they could be swept from power if they tried to use
military force at a time when support for the revolutions was strong, in the spring of
1848. But they were waiting for the right time, when the revolutions started to run out
of steam, to fight back. Most of the princes had made sure that they kept their armed
forces under their control. This meant that when the revolutionaries started to fall
victim to internal divisions, the princes were able to step in and recover control.
This is a valid explanation, and the last sentence links neatly to the next paragraph,
which deals with the weaknesses of the revolutionary movement. But it lacks
examples to support the points it makes. It could include, for example, the support
provided by Prussia to the rulers of Baden, Württemberg and elsewhere in
suppressing the uprisings in 1849. On a point of style, the phrase, ‘started to run
out of steam’ is not wrong, but a more formal expression, such as ‘began to lose
momentum’, might create a more ‘professional’ impression.
It is doubtful that the princes would have recovered their power so easily, if they had
been confronted by more united and better organised revolutionary forces. The
revolutions of 1848–49 in the German states were undermined by divisions between
liberal, middle-class groups and more radical, working-class elements. They were
struggling for different objectives and did not see eye to eye with each other. For
example, in the Rhineland, better-off middle-class revolutionaries abandoned the
revolution because they feared that armed working-class crowds were presenting a
threat to their property. This weakened the movement and helped the princes to regain
control.
This is a stronger paragraph because it uses a specific example, events in the
Rhineland, to illustrate the point it is making. But a sentence or two to explain the
different aims of the two types of revolutionaries would have helped to develop the
argument. What were the liberals and radicals seeking?
The weakness of the revolutionary movement was illustrated by the failure of the
Frankfurt Parliament, which the liberal nationalists hoped would create a new
constitution for Germany as a whole. It was too slow to agree on a form of government
and was also divided between those who wanted a smaller Germany, led by Prussia
(Kleindeutschland) and those who wanted a larger Grossdeutschland which would
include Austria. The Parliament did not have armed forces of its own and when a crisis
occurred in Schleswig-Holstein, which German nationalists wanted to see join the other
German-speaking provinces, they had to rely on Prussia for help. In August 1848 the
Prussians made their own peace with Denmark, whose king was the ruler of Schleswig-
Holstein, when it suited their interests.
This paragraph concisely highlights the key weaknesses of the Frankfurt
Parliament, whose failure was a key reason why the liberal revolutions of 1848
ended in disappointment. It uses appropriate terminology (Kleindeutsch
land/Grossdeutsch land). It would have been better with a concluding sentence
linking to the theme of the essay – the power of the princes. It could have ended,
for example: ‘This showed that the goals of liberal nationalism could not be realised
without the cooperation of the princes, who had shown that they still possessed the
vital resource of armed strength, which they would use to serve their own
interests.’
Finally, the recovery of the two largest states, Austria and Prussia, from the shocks of
March 1848 helped the princes to recover. Austria was soon in a position to use its
leadership of the German Confederation to its advantage, under a new prime minister,
Prince Schwarzenberg. In Prussia the key role was played by King Friedrich Wilhelm IV,
who had first seemed to show sympathy for the revolution but, when he felt strong
enough, crushed its hopes. This occurred when he turned down the offer of the German
imperial crown in April 1849. This showed that he refused to accept the authority of the
parliament and he would only receive such a crown if it was offered by his own peer
group, the German princes. The fact that the revolutionaries had such high hopes of the
king, rather than pushing for the more radical solution of a German republic, shows how
unlikely they were to succeed.
This is another strong paragraph. It would have benefited from more material on
the recovery of Austria, but the analysis of Friedrich Wilhelm IV’s role is
particularly good. The final sentence nicely links the part played by the king with
the weaknesses of the revolutionaries.
The princes recovered so rapidly from the upheavals of 1848–49, partly because they
were resourceful and they knew when to retaliate. They had never given up their most
important powers, even when they had been forced to grant their subjects more
freedoms and had introduced constitutions. But the main reason for their survival was
the weakness of liberal nationalism, which from the start was not well enough organised
or united to succeed.
This conclusion highlights the most important points of the argument, which have
been developed in the main body of the essay. But it does not fully show the
connections between the different causes. It demonstrates good knowledge of the
topic, although, as noted, more examples would have helped – few princes and their
states are actually mentioned and, perhaps understandably, the focus is mainly on
Prussia. It explains the main factors with relevant supporting information, and
there are no factual inaccuracies. It would benefit from a little more detail, and a
more fully supported conclusion.
Summary
After working through this chapter, make sure you understand the following
key points:
how the forces of conservatism held back the process of German unification
between 1815 and the 1860s
the roles that liberalism and nationalism played in the unification of Germany
why the revolutions of 1848–49 failed to produce a united Germany
the importance of Prussia’s growing economic and military strength in the
process of unification
the part played by Otto von Bismarck in making Prussia the dominant power in a
united Germany
the importance of a succession of wars fought by Prussia, against Denmark,
Austria and France, in bringing about German unification.
Further reading
Breuilly, J. (2011). Austria, Prussia and the Making of Germany, 1806–71.
(Chapters 3 to 7 give a chronological account of the process of unification; Chapter 8
compares Austria’s and Prussia’s strengths. Chapter 9 is a helpful conclusion.)
Clark, C. (2006). Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947.
London: Allen Lane/Penguin. (Chapters 12 to 15 provide more advanced material on
Prussia in the period 1815–71.)
Feuchtwanger, E. (2001). Imperial Germany 1850–1918. London: Routledge.
(Chapter 1 covers German nationalism from 1850–62. Chapter 2 deals with the three
wars of unification.)
Hawes, J. (2017). The Shortest History of Germany. London: Old Street
Publishing. (Looking at Germany from before it was Germany until the present day,
this is a helpful read to give context to the events in the chapter.)
Stiles, A. and Farmer. A. (2015). Access to History: The Unification of Germany
and the Challenge of Nationalism. 4th Edition. London: Hodder. (Chapters 1 to 4
discuss the process of German unification from 1789 to 1871.)
Williamson, D.G. (2010). Bismarck and Germany, 1862–1890. London:
Routledge. (Parts 1 to 3 describe unification, focusing on the role of Bismarck. Part 7
gives an overall assessment of his career and importance.)
