ROSA YAP PARAS vs. JUSTO J.

PARAS

G.R. No. 147824 ; August 2, 2007

DOCTRINE:

Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and assume the basic
marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.

Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment, and the like.

FACTS:

1. Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4)
children, namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.
2. Twenty-nine years thereafter, Rosa filed with the RTC a complaint for annulment of her
marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code. She alleged that Justo is
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the
following circumstances:

(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction;

(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;

(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and

(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.

To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and testimonial evidence.

3. Rosa met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. He courted her, frequently spending time at her
"Botica." Eventually she was convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him.
4. They resided at her parents’ house for three (3) years until they were able to build a house of
their own. For the first five (5) years of their marriage, Justo did not support her and their
children because he shouldered his sister’s schooling. Consequently, she was the one who spent
for all their family needs, using the income from her "Botica" and store.
5. Justo lived the life of a bachelor. His usual routine was to spend time with his "barkadas". He
also failed to provide for their children’s well-being.
6. To cope with the death of their two children because of leukemia and electrocution, the entire
family went to the United States. After three months, Justo abandoned them and left for the
Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other
businesses heavy in debt. She then realized Justo was a profligate. At one time, he disposed
without her consent a conjugal piece of land.
 7. She endured all of Justo’s shortcomings, but his act of maintaining a mistress and siring an
illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file the present case.
8. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their
cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa)
and Justo‘s deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.
9. As expected, Justo has a different version of the story.
10. He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the bar examinations in Manila. In 1963,
they decided to get married.
11. He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets from the slump of the price of sugar and
not to his alleged profligacy. Due to his business ventures, he and Rosa were able to acquire a
10-room family house, expand their store, establish their gasoline station, and purchase several
properties. He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained
that he did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the
renewal of a sugar crop loan before the bank’s authorized employee.
12. As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in Rosa’s attitude after her return from
the United States. She became detached, cold, uncaring, and overly focused on the family’s
businesses. He tried to reach her but Rosa was steadfast in her "new attitudinal outlook." Before
other people, he merely pretended that their relationship was blissful.
13. He did not abandon his family in the United States. It happened that they only had tourist visas.
He was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately
returned to the Philippines.
14. He spent for his children’s education. At first, he resented supporting them because he was just
starting his law practice and besides, their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide
for their needs.
15. What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosa’s act of embarrassing him during his
birthday celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests.
16. As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her
secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness.
Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
17. RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the marriage. The RTC observed that the
relationship between the parties started well, negating the existence of psychological incapacity
on either party at the time of the celebration of their marriage. And lastly, it ruled that there
appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought the declaration of nullity of their
marriage.
18. Rosa filed with this Court a petition for disbarment against Justo and he was found guilty
of falsifying Rosa’s signature in bank documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family.
He was suspended from the practice of law.
19. Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosa’s
inability to offer the testimony of a psychologist is fatal to her case, being in violation of the
tenets laid down by this Court in Molina. Thus, she failed to substantiate her allegation that
Justo is psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

ISSUES:

1. whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case;
 2. whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root cause of
Justo’s alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and
3. whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.

RULING:

1. whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case;

A reading of the Court of Appeals’ Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the
appellate court even assumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to
declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Justo's alleged infidelity, failure to
support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are true, such traits are at best
indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these
grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These
grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly in cognitive of the basic marital
covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person. While they may manifest the
"gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show “incurability”, such that
while his acts violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an
irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic
obligations of marriage in the future.

2. whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root cause of
Justo’s alleged psychological incapacity is necessary.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court categorically explained that under the New Rules, a petition
for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code need not allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity or on its root cause. What must be alleged are the physical manifestations
indicative of said incapacity.

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.

The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that the wife failed, both in her allegations in
the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of her
husband. The Court then concluded that "emotional immaturity and irresponsibility" cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity.

In the instant case, there is no reason to remand it to the trial court. The records clearly show that there
is sufficient evidence to establish the psychological condition of Justo.

3. whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.

A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and documentary evidence, shows that Rosa’s main
grounds in seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo are his infidelity, profligacy
which includes the falsification of her signature in one of the loan documents, failure to support the
children, and abandonment of the family. Both the courts below found the charges unsubstantiated
and untrue. However, this Court, in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment, found the evidence sufficient to
support Rosa’s charges of sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, and abandonment of family,

ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT’S SIGNATURE

The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the signatures of complainant.
However, an analysis of the above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the questioned or
falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored by respondent as said falsified
signatures were the same as the sample signatures of respondent.

ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE

The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-statements of his children and three
other persons who used to work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his infidelity more
than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of
Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent was named as the father of the child; his naming the child after
his deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in
their house in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with
Ms. Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child.

While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity,
falsification of her signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children, are true, nonetheless,
there is nothing in the records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In
other words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

There is no evidence that Justo’s "defects" were present at the inception of the marriage. His "defects"
surfaced only in the latter years when these events took place; their two children died; he lost in the
election; he failed in his business ventures and law practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her
family. Surely, these circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only after almost 30 years of
their marriage.

Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justo’s "defects" are incurable or grave.

Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute

psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or
sexual promiscuity.

What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from the path of marriage because of a
conflicting relationship with his wife and her family and repeated life’s setbacks. While these do not
justify his sins, they are not sufficient to establish that he is psychologically incapacitated.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take

cognizance of and assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. As this Court repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family
Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment, and the like. At best the evidence presented by
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.