Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 1 of 32

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

GARY WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff

v. Case No. _________________

BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

THOMAS PELLEGRINI, OSCAR
REQUER, RICHARD FAHLTEICH,
JOHN TEWEY, FRED CERUTI, JOHN
MACGILLIVARY, UNKNOWN
EMPLOYEES OF THE BALTIMORE
POLICE DEPARTMENT, AND MAYOR
AND THE CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE,

Defendants

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff GARY WASHINGTON, by his attorneys LOEVY & LOEVY, sues

Defendants BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT (hereinafter “BPD”), THOMAS

PELLEGRINI, OSCAR REQUER, RICHARD FAHLTEICH, JOHN TEWEY, FRED

CERUTI, JOHN MACGILLIVARY, UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES OF THE

BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT (collectively “Officer Defendants”), and the

MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE (hereinafter “The City”) and

states the following:

 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 2 of 32

INTRODUCTION

1. “Cooperate or you’ll never see your mother again.” With this and other

pointed and repeated threats, the Officer Defendants initiated an unjust and

underhanded process that led to Gary Washington being wrongfully convicted and

forced to spend 31 years in prison for crimes he did not commit.

2. Though completely innocent of the crimes charged, Plaintiff was

sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Faheem Rafig Ali (aka Beryl

Franklin), and 20 years for the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of

violence.

3. Plaintiff’s convictions were the direct result of the Officer Defendants’

manipulation of witnesses, fabrication of evidence, and withholding of evidence that

would have demonstrated Plaintiff’s absolute innocence. The Officer Defendants’

willful misconduct was taught and encouraged by BPD’s policies, customs, and

practices of condoning the Officer Defendants’ unconstitutional behavior.

4. From the very beginning, Plaintiff maintained his innocence. When he

lost at trial, Plaintiff filed multiple appeals and continued to fight to show he had

nothing to do with this crime. Ultimately, the child witness who originally testified

against Plaintiff came forward and told the truth about the coercion and fabrication

that led to his falsely accusing Plaintiff. After hearing from this witness, a criminal

court vacated Plaintiff’s convictions and ordered a new trial. Five months later, the

State dismissed the charges.

2
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 3 of 32

5. After spending more than 31 years locked in a cage for a crime he did

not commit, Plaintiff was finally cleared of the charges against him and released

from custody. This lawsuit seeks redress for his injuries.

JURISDICTION

6. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress the

deprivation under color of law of Plaintiff’s rights as secured by the United States

Constitution.

7. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1367.

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The events giving rise to this complaint

occurred in this judicial district.

THE PARTIES

8. Plaintiff is a 58-year-old resident of Baltimore, Maryland. He was born

and raised in Baltimore. During his wrongful incarceration, Plaintiff obtained his

GED and took college courses. Since being released from prison and exonerated,

Plaintiff has been employed at a construction company.

9. At all relevant times, Thomas Pellegrini, Oscar Requer, Richard

Fahlteich, John Tewey, Fred Ceruti, John McGillivary, and other unknown police

personnel were police employees of the Baltimore Police Department. Plaintiff sues

these defendants in their individual capacities, acting under color of law and within

the scope of their employment during the investigation of the death of Faheem Ali

and related events and circumstances.

3
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 4 of 32

10. Defendant Baltimore Police Department is or was the employer of each

of the Officer Defendants. The BPD is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.

11. Defendant Mayor Bernard Young and Defendant City Council of

Baltimore was and is a municipal corporation, organized and existing under the law

of the State of Maryland. In this respect, the City acted through its agents,

employees and servants, who held responsibility for the conduct of the police officers

employed by the BPD.

The Crime: The murder of Faheem Ali

12. On December 27, 1986, at or around 7:45pm, Faheem Ali walked down

the 2300 block of Barclay Street. While on the block Mr. Ali began to talk to two

men. The conversation quickly escalated into an argument – an argument that led

to one of the men pulling out a gun and shooting Mr. Ali in the chest. The two men

fled immediately after the gun went off, and Mr. Ali died shortly thereafter.

13. The Officer Defendants, including Officer Charles Ireland was the first

officer on the scene. When he arrived he observed that a large crowd had gathered

around Mr. Ali’s body. The Officer Defendants, including Officer Ireland, secured

the scene and waited for homicide to respond.

14. The Officer Defendants, including Defendants Detective Thomas

Pellegrini and Detective Oscar Requer, arrived within a few minutes of the murder

and began their investigation. The Officer Defendants, including Defendants

4
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 5 of 32

Pellegrini and Requer, canvassed the area and were unable to recover any items of

evidentiary value.

15. In the days that followed, the Officer Defendants, including Defendant

Detective John Tewey, Detective Richard Fahlteich, Detective Pellegrini, and

Detective Requer, interviewed a number of witnesses, none of whom could identify

the shooter or the man who accompanied the shooter.

16. During the investigation, the Officer Defendants, including Defendants

Tewey, Fahlteich, Pellegrini, and Requer encountered two child witnesses who said

they had seen two men speaking with Mr. Ali just before he was shot, but they

unequivocally stated they did not know the identity of those two men. Nonetheless,

the Defendants zeroed in on these vulnerable children and decided that the children

would make their case.

Child Witness #1 – Otis Robinson

17. On the night of the shooting, Otis Robinson, a twelve-year-old seventh

grader, was being babysat by his mother’s boyfriend who lived a few houses away

from Otis’s home. Otis had lived in the neighborhood for about four years and had a

friendly relationship with Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s family.

18. At or around 7:30pm, Otis’s mother called and asked Otis to go to the

corner store to buy a few items. Otis left the house a few minutes after the call.

When Otis stepped out the front door, he casually noticed that there were unknown

men standing across the street talking. Finding nothing notable about the men,

Otis continued down the street towards the store. Soon thereafter, Otis heard a

5
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 6 of 32

gunshot. Upon hearing the shot, Otis ran to his own house. Finding the door locked,

Otis sprinted back to his mother’s boyfriend’s house and tumbled through the door.

19. When Otis’s mother came to pick him up, she found him shaken and

afraid. As a result, Otis’s mother took Otis to his grandparents’ house for the night.

While Otis was at his grandparents’ house, Officer Defendants, having heard that

Otis was outside during the shooting, went to Otis’s mother’s house and threatened

to take Otis away from her if she did not bring Otis to the police station within 24

hours.

The Officer Defendants coerce Otis into

fabricating evidence against Plaintiff
20. On the evening of December 29, 2019, two days after the shooting, Otis

and his mother were transported to the police station. There, the Officer Defendants

separated Otis from his mother, and brought the child witness, alone, into the

homicide room for questioning.

21. The Officer Defendants, including Defendants Pellegrini and

Fahlteich, questioned Otis about what he witnessed. Otis told the truth – he had

heard men talking and heard a gunshot but did not know who the men were or who

fired the shot. As Otis talked, the Officer Defendants wrote down that truthful

statement.

22. During the questioning, the Officer Defendants, including Defendant

Requer came in holding pictures, one of which was of Plaintiff. The Officer

Defendants asked if Otis recognized the people in the pictures. Otis affirmed that he

knew Plaintiff, but Otis never said Plaintiff was involved in the crime.

6
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 7 of 32

23. Throughout the questioning, Otis steadfastly maintained that he did

not see who shot the victim. Unsatisfied with that answer, the Officer Defendants

began threatening Otis. The Officer Defendants demanded that Otis cooperate and

identify the shooter or else they would take Otis away from his mother. The Officer

Defendants also threatened that Otis would be charged with homicide if he did not

bend to their wishes.

24. Afraid and removed from his mother, twelve-year-old Otis crumbled

under the pressure. The Officer Defendants wrote a new statement and fed Otis

details about the crime. Because of the Officer Defendants’ coercion, Otis agreed to

the Defendants’ lies, and when asked who the shooter was, Otis falsely identified

Plaintiff as the shooter, an identification the Officer Defendants knew to be false.

Only after he signed the fabricated statement was Otis allowed to see his mother.

25. Five days later, on January 2, 1986, the Officer Defendants, including

Defendants Requer and Fred Ceruti, had Otis come to the station to sign a typed

statement. Otis, still believing the Officer Defendants would make good on their

threats, signed a second fabricated statement falsely identifying Plaintiff as the

shooter.

26. The Officer Defendants knew that Otis’ statement was fabricated:

They had fed him the information about the shooting. And the Officer Defendants

likewise knew that Otis could not identify anyone as the shooter.

27. The Officer Defendants never disclosed any of the coercion that they

used to obtain Otis’s fabricated statement to the prosecutor or the defense. Further,

7
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 8 of 32

the Officer Defendants never disclosed Otis’s initial statement denying knowledge

of the shooter’s identity to the prosecutor or the defense.

Child Witness #2 – R.D.

28. On the night of the murder, thirteen-year-old R.D. was standing in the

crowd near the crime scene.

29. When the Officer Defendants arrived on the scene, they isolated R.D.

and began questioning her about what she witnessed. R.D. told the truth – she did

not know who shot Faheem Ali. She affirmed that she knew Plaintiff but never said

Plaintiff was involved in the crime.

The Officer Defendants coerce R.D. into

fabricating evidence against Plaintiff
30. On January 3, 1987, the Officer Defendants had R.D. come to the

station with her mother. Just as they had done for Otis, the Officer Defendants,

including Defendants Requer and Pellegrini, isolated R.D., demanded that she

“cooperate” with their investigation, and threatened to take her away from her

mother and even to arrest her mother.

31. The Officer Defendants fed R.D. lies that were consistent with the

Officer Defendants’ concocted theory of the case. R.D., alone and afraid, agreed to

sign the fabricated statement falsely identifying Plaintiff as the shooter. The Officer

Defendants presented R.D. with photographs and the Officer Defendants pressed

R.D. to sign her name next to Plaintiff’s picture. After R.D. complied with the

Officer Defendants’ wishes, she was permitted to see her mother.

8
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 9 of 32

32. The Officer Defendants knew R.D. had not seen the shooter, and knew

that R.D.’s statement identifying Plaintiff as the shooter was false.

33. The Officer Defendants never disclosed any of the coercion that they

used to obtain R.D.’s fabricated statement to the prosecutor or the defense. Further,

the Officer Defendants never disclosed R.D.’s initial statement denying knowledge

of the shooter’s identity to the prosecutor or the defense.

Plaintiff’s Wrongful Conviction

34. On January 5, 1987, under the supervision of Defendant John

MacGillivary, the Officer Defendants used the two fabricated witness statements to

obtain a warrant for Gary Washington’s arrest.

35. On January 6, 1987, Gary Washington was arrested and indicted for

first-degree murder and using a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence,

based on the two fabricated witness statements.

36. On June 4, 1987, Defendant Pellegrini testified at a motion to suppress

and committed perjury. Defendant Pellegrini knowingly misled the prosecutor,

judge, Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s counsel by testifying that Otis’s and R.D.’s witness

statements and identifications were obtained freely and voluntarily.

37. On June 5, 1987, Plaintiff went to trial. The only evidence that linked

Plaintiff to the crime came from Otis Robinson. Otis testified consistently with his

fabricated statement. The State presented no additional eyewitnesses and no

physical evidence connecting Plaintiff to Mr. Ali’s murder.

9
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 10 of 32

38. Plaintiff’s counsel was never given the original truthful statement Otis

provided the Officer Defendants. Plaintiff’s counsel was also never informed of the

coercive tactics the Officer Defendants employed to extract the fabricated

statements and untruthful identification. Consequently, Plaintiff’s counsel was

unable to present this information to the jury.

39. On June 16, 1987, Plaintiff was convicted of both counts. In convicting

Plaintiff, the jury relied exclusively on Otis’s false testimony.

40. Plaintiff was sentenced to life imprisonment followed by 20 years.

Plaintiff’s Exoneration

41. After Plaintiff was wrongfully convicted, he never gave up on his

innocence. Almost ten years after Plaintiff was convicted, Otis Robinson recanted

his testimony, explaining that the Officer Defendants coerced him into making false

statements against Plaintiff.

42. On August 20, 2018, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted

Plaintiff’s petition for a writ of actual innocence, finding that Otis’s recantation was

credible.

43. On January 15, 2019, the State dismissed the charges against

Plaintiff, and Plaintiff, for the first time in over 30 years, was able to walk free.

10
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 11 of 32

Baltimore Police Department’s

Policy and Practice of Conducting Flawed Investigations

44. The constitutional violations that caused Plaintiff’s wrongful

convictions were not isolated events. To the contrary, they were the result of the

BPD’s longstanding policies and practices of pursuing wrongful convictions through

reliance on profoundly flawed investigations.

45. By the time of Mr. Ali’s death and the investigation that led to

Plaintiff’s wrongful arrest and prosecution, those policies were firmly entrenched. In

a race to clear murder cases, the BPD cut corners and rushed to judgment.

Sometimes those constitutional errors were exposed prior to prosecution.

46. For example, in 1988, a year after Plaintiff’s convictions, nearly 10

percent of Baltimore’s 234 homicides were cleared by the BPD through arrest but

later dropped by the State’s Attorney’s Office prior to indictment.

47. Other times, however, the BPD’s unconstitutional conduct was not

exposed until long after a prosecution and a conviction had been obtained.

48. For example, in 1968, Walter Lomax was convicted of robbing a food

market and fatally shooting the market’s evening manager. It was later discovered

that several key pieces of evidence were not disclosed to Mr. Lomax’s trial attorney,

including a BPD report that showed that an eyewitness identified someone else as

the gunman. A separate police report contained notes from a witness interview in

which the witness’s description of the gunman did not match Mr. Lomax.

11
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 12 of 32

Mr. Lomax was granted a new trial in 2014 on the basis of these violations, and the

State dismissed the charges.

49. Similarly, Wendell Griffin was convicted of the 1981 murder of James

Wise. In 2011, Mr. Griffin discovered numerous documents in the BPD file that

were never turned over to him, including exculpatory reports that showed that the

two key witnesses in the case had failed early in the investigation to identify

Mr. Griffin as the perpetrator.

50. James Owens’s February 1988 convictions for burglary and felony

murder were overturned after Mr. Owens discovered that BPD detectives withheld

evidence of several inconsistent statements by their star witness. In 2018,

Mr. Owens settled a lawsuit against the BPD and three of its detectives for

$9 million.

51. Jerome Johnson was convicted of the 1988 murder of Aaron Taylor. In

2018, he was finally exonerated after it was learned that the key witness against

him had given a dramatically different account of events on the very day the crime

occurred, and a BPD officer had recorded that statement in an official report, but

that report had been buried.

52. In 1988, Anthony Coleman was tried and convicted of first-degree

murder and conspiracy to commit murder. In his post-conviction proceedings, Mr.

Coleman’s attorney was able to elicit testimony from a BPD Homicide detective on

how it was the department’s practice to decide which documents to share with State

prosecutors. It was found that the detectives involved in Anthony Coleman’s murder

12
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 13 of 32

case failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to Mr. Coleman’s trial counsel. The

Court of Special Appeals later remanded Mr. Coleman’s case after determining that

evidence had been wrongfully withheld from Mr. Coleman’s trial counsel.

53. Sabein Burgess was convicted of the 1994 murder of his girlfriend. But

the BPD had highly exculpatory evidence that was never turned over—in

particular, exculpatory information that the FBI had provided, and a statement

from the victim’s son who had seen the killers and told officers that Mr. Burgess

was not one of them. In 2014, Mr. Burgess’s conviction was overturned. In 2017, a

jury awarded him $15 million in his lawsuit against the BPD and one of its

detectives. During that civil suit, BPD detectives testified to the effect that the BPD

policies and practices did not require detectives to document investigative steps,

record all evidence in official reports, or turn over all documents to prosecutors.

54. Antoine Pettiford was convicted of murder in 1995. Mr. Pettiford’s

post-conviction counsel discovered that BPD officers failed to disclose eyewitness

statements and other exculpatory evidence. Mr. Pettiford’s conviction was

ultimately vacated and the charges against him were dismissed.

55. In 1998, Rodney Addison was wrongfully convicted of a 1996 murder.

In October 2005, after nine years in prison, Mr. Addison was released when it was

revealed that the State had withheld exculpatory witness statements, and its sole

witness recanted her testimony at a post-conviction proceeding.

56. In 1999, Malcolm Bryant was convicted of a 1998 murder and assault

that he did not commit. Mr. Bryant was exonerated in 2016. Mr. Bryant’s post-

13
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 14 of 32

conviction proceedings uncovered BPD officers’ failure to disclose several key pieces

of evidence exculpating Mr. Bryant and pointing to the true suspect, including

undisclosed witnesses and witness statements.

57. In 1999, Kenneth McPherson and Eric Simmons, two brothers, were

convicted of conspiracy to commit murder based on eyewitness testimony. During a

post-conviction investigation conducted by the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s

Conviction Integrity Unit, it was discovered that the police had failed to disclose

that one of the eyewitnesses, who was a police confidential informant, had lied

about witnessing the murder. It was also determined that the police had coerced a

child witness to make a recorded statement falsely accusing Mr. McPherson and

Mr. Simmons of participating in the murder.

58. In 1999, Tyrone Jones was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder in

the shooting death of a 15-year-old boy. At trial, the state presented evidence that a

witness identified Jones in a photo array and that Jones had a particle of gunshot

residue on his hand. During the post-conviction phase of Jones’s case, his counsel

discovered evidence in the BPD case file that the witness who identified Jones at

trial had told a BPD officer that he had not seen the shooting or the shooter; that

evidence was never disclosed to the prosecutor. Further, internal BPD documents

revealed that gunshot residue results were unreliable due to widespread

contamination of police department facilities. Despite requests by his counsel for

exculpatory material, the documents were disclosed only after a court ordered their

14
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 15 of 32

production. Ultimately, Jones’s conviction was vacated and the state nolle

prossequied the charges against him.

59. In 1999, Garreth Parks was convicted of the murder of Charles Hill.

Mr. Parks was later exonerated after it came to light that BPD officers had

suppressed a police report in which a man confessed to being the shooter.

60. In Plaintiff’s case, the unconstitutional fabrication of false inculpatory

evidence and/or withholding of exculpatory information and/or bad-faith destruction

of exculpatory or potentially exculpatory information was undertaken pursuant to,

and caused by a policy and practice on the part of the BPD.

61. The unlawful misconduct described in this Complaint occurred

systematically, pursuant to policies and practices, and accordingly occurred in other

cases as well.

62. Indeed, in 2000 BPD finally acknowledged that the Homicide Unit was

in a state of disarray. As such, in January 2000, then-Commissioner Daniel asked

BPD officer Stephen Tabeling to prepare a report on the state of the Unit (“Tabeling

Report”). In that report, Tabeling found that investigatory files were in a general

state of disarray; that there was no procedure for ensuring that all material about

an investigation had been recorded and filed appropriately; and that the Unit’s

practices with the assembly, storage, retrieval, confidentiality, and security of case

folders was highly deficient.

63. Consistent with the municipal policies and practices described in the

cases referenced in the preceding paragraphs as well as others, Officer Defendants

15
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 16 of 32

in this case fabricated eyewitness statements and concealed exculpatory and

impeachment evidence, including Otis’s and R.D.’s initial truthful statements, and

the coercive tactics that the Officer Defendants used on these witnesses to secure

their fabricated statements. None of this evidence was disclosed to the State or to

Plaintiff’s trial counsel.

64. Policymakers were deliberately indifferent to the violations of

constitutional rights described herein, and they condoned the practices described

above. By condoning these practices, policymakers caused Plaintiff’s injuries.

65. The BPD failed to act to remedy the abuses described in the preceding

paragraphs, despite actual knowledge of the pattern of misconduct. It thereby

perpetuated the unlawful practices and ensured that no action would be taken

(independent of the judicial process) to remedy Plaintiff’s ongoing injuries.

Failure to Train, Supervise, and Discipline

66. The constitutional violations described above were also caused by the

BPD’s failure to train, supervise, and discipline its police employees.

67. The BPD’s failure to train, supervise, and discipline its employees

effectively condoned, ratified, and sanctioned the kind of misconduct that the

Officer Defendants committed against Plaintiff in this case. Constitutional

violations such as those that occurred in this case were encouraged and facilitated

as a result of the BPD’s practices and de facto policies, as alleged above.

68. Indeed, the Tabeling Report found numerous deficiencies in training,

including in many basic legal and investigative concepts.

16
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 17 of 32

69. For example, there was a failure during the relevant time period to

train police employees on disclosing evidence and complying with their obligations

under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that case’s progeny and

extensions, notwithstanding the obvious necessity of such training.

70. Additionally, the BPD failed to properly supervise and discipline its

police employees. As a result, employees continued to violate citizens’ rights in the

manner described more fully above, with impunity.

71. The failure to train, supervise and discipline BPD employees was

consciously approved at the highest policy-making level by policymakers who were

deliberately indifferent to the violations of constitutional rights described herein,

and that failure was a cause of the injuries suffered here by Plaintiff.

72. The BPD failed to act to remedy the abuses described in the preceding

paragraphs, despite actual knowledge of the pattern of misconduct. It thereby

perpetuated the unlawful practices and ensured that no action would be taken

(independent of the judicial process) to remedy Plaintiff’s ongoing injuries.

The City’s Wrongful Conduct

73. The Baltimore Police Department policies and practices have long been

controlled by parties outside the BPD. In the 1850s, the ruling Know Nothing party

used the BPD to support gang activity in order to maintain political power, which

led to rampant violence throughout Baltimore City. As a direct consequence of the

Know Nothing party’s misuse of BPD, the Maryland General Assembly created the

17
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 18 of 32

Police Act of 1860, which transferred control of the BPD from the City to four Police

Commissioners appointed by the Maryland General Assembly.

74. Over time, however, the City has regained its power over the BPD. In

1976, the Maryland General Assembly gave Baltimore’s Mayor the power to appoint

and remove the BPD’s Commissioner, subject to confirmation by the City Council.

This shift in power from the Governor to the Mayor and City Council gave the City

the leverage it needed to direct BPD’s policies and practices.

75. At the time of Plaintiff’s arrest and conviction, the City was able to

exert control over the BPD’s Police Commissioner. For example, the Police

Commissioner engaged in direct communication with the Mayor about the way the

BPD was managing and investigating criminal cases. The Police Commissioner’s job

security, and by extension each homicide officer’s job security, was contingent on

the Police Commissioner’s ability to successfully prioritize and respond to the

mayor’s needs. Put more bluntly, as David Simon detailed in his year-long

ethnographic study of the practices of BPD’s Homicide Department in the late

1980s, this required the Police Commissioner to run the police department in a way

that served the Mayor “in whatever manner He [the mayor] [saw] fit”.

76. This relationship continued to persist into the 1990s. In 1999 Mayor-

elect Martin O’Malley commissioned consultants to study and report on BPD’s

policies and practices. The consultants were also hired to advise O’Malley on his

selection of the Police Commissioner. In response to the consultants’ scathing report

about the BPD’s policies and practices, O’Malley pledged that he would reform the

18
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 19 of 32

BPD and rid it of its corruption. The Mayor planned to do this through his selection

of, de jure, and de facto control over the Police Commissioner. By wielding this

power, the Mayor was able to make BPD not only submit to being studied by

consultants, with the intent of having BPD implement the consultants’

recommendations.

77. In addition, the City determines the BPD’s budget and authorizes the

number of the BPD’s members. Through the purse strings, the Mayor is also able to

control how the BPD spends its money, manages its hiring practices and complies

with the Mayor’s directions. For example, in 1993, then-Mayor Kurt Schmoke sent

BPD a directive, instructing the BPD to cut the Academy’s training program and

hire 330 new officers. This directive was adopted even though many in the law

enforcement community predicted that the trickle-down effect of the Mayor’s

directive would negatively impact the BPD’s officers’ ability to properly train and

supervise officers.

78. This City’s power over BPD continues in a similar manner today.

Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake is credited for soliciting the United States

Department of Justice to launch a pattern-or-practice investigation into the BPD

and initiating a body-camera pilot program for officers. While working hand-in-

hand with her appointed Police Commissioner, Mayor Rawlings-Blake also

developed a strategic plan for the BPD and shut down a police unit that was the

subject of multiple citizen complaints of harassment and use of force.

19
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 20 of 32

79. In addition to being able to direct BPD’s policies and practices, at the

time of Plaintiff’s arrest and conviction, the City was also apprised of the

misconduct that took place within BPD. The City was informed of BPD officer

misconduct through the City’s Complaint Evaluation Board (“CEB”). The CEB was

established in 1977 to review and evaluate citizen complaints regarding police

actions. The CEB was comprised of representatives from seven agencies, one of

which was the City Solicitor for Baltimore City. The City Solicitor was and

continues to be a mayoral appointee and the head of the City’s Department of Law.

The Solicitor served and continues to serve as the City’s legal advisor, agent, and

representative.

80. Moreover, near the time of Plaintiff’s arrest and conviction, the City

had access to other agencies that monitored citizen experiences with BPD officers.

One such agency was the Baltimore City Community Relations Committee (“CRC”).

In 1979, the CRC reported to the Mayor that it found Baltimore residents,

particularly poor and Black residents, felt that BPD officers mistreated them and

used excessive force against them.

81. The City continues to be informed about police activity. By law, the

Police Commissioner is required to annually apprise the City of BPD’s operations

and work so that the City can maintain a continuing familiarity with the programs

and operations of the BPD.

20
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 21 of 32

82. Finally, the City’s obligation to indemnify the BPD’s employees under

the Local Government Torts Claim Act underscores the City’s connection to the

BPD. Per the statute, the local government is given notice of any potential claims

and then required to provide legal defense for employees in any action resulting

from tortious conduct or omissions committed within the scope of employment. The

City also approves and pays for settlements and verdicts against the BPD.

83. Nonetheless, despite being able to impact and reform the BPD’s

policies and practice, as well as being informed of BPD officers’ misconduct, the City

did not undertake any action to correct the misconduct that took place at the time of

Plaintiff’s arrest and conviction. To the contrary, the City condoned, ratified, and/or

turned a blind eye to the problems described above, and therefore was deliberately

indifferent to the violation of constitutional rights described herein.

84. The City’s failure to act in the face of repeated constitutional

violations, and unconstitutional policies and practices, was the proximate cause of

Plaintiff’s injuries.

Plaintiff’s Damages

85. For more than a quarter of a century, Plaintiff was forced to live in a

cage and serve a punishment for crimes he did not commit.

86. Plaintiff was required to live in conditions that would traumatize and

break down the bravest of men. The Baltimore Sun reported that one of the

facilities in which Plaintiff was held was marked by killings of inmates by other

21
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 22 of 32

inmates. A constant atmosphere of fear, distrust, and threats of violence from

inmates permeated the prison environments.

87. During periods of Plaintiff’s wrongful incarceration, Plaintiff was

forced to share a cell that was little bigger than the average parking space. For

more than 31 years, Plaintiff’s life was marked by a steady stream of human rights

abuses.

88. While wrongfully incarcerated, Plaintiff was stripped of the various

pleasures of basic human experience, from the simplest to the most important,

which all free people enjoy as a matter of right. He missed out on the ability to

share holidays, births, funerals, and other life events with loved ones, and he was

denied the fundamental freedom to live his life as an autonomous human being.

89. Plaintiff’s 31 years of wrongful incarceration forced him into a world of

isolation in which he lost contact with many of his friends and family in the outside

world.

90. Plaintiff must now attempt to make a life for himself outside of prison

without the benefit of more than three decades of life experiences, which normally

equip adults for the task.

91. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff has suffered tremendous damage,

including psychological and emotional distress, all caused by the Defendants’

misconduct.

22
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 23 of 32

Count I – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Due Process (Against Officer Defendants)

92. Each paragraph of this Complaint is incorporated as if restated fully

herein.

93. As described more fully above, the Officer Defendants, while acting

individually, jointly, and/or in conspiracy, as well as under color of law and within

the scope of their employment, deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional right to due

process.

94. In the manner described more fully above, the Officer Defendants,

individually, and/or jointly, fabricated false evidence, deliberately withheld

exculpatory evidence, and destroyed exculpatory or potentially exculpatory evidence

in bad faith. In doing so, the Officer Defendants violated Plaintiff’s clearly

established constitutional right to due process.

95. Absent Defendants’ misconduct, the prosecution of Plaintiff could not

and would not have been pursued, Plaintiff would not have been convicted, and

Plaintiff would have been exonerated and released sooner than he was.

96. The Officer Defendants’ misconduct directly and proximately resulted

in Plaintiff’s unjust and wrongful criminal conviction and lengthy wrongful

imprisonment; denied him his constitutional right to a fair trial; and offended

recognized fundamental principles of justice and fairness, in violation of the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

23
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 24 of 32

97. As a direct and proximate result of this violation of his constitutional

right to a fair trial, Plaintiff suffered injuries, including but not limited to the loss of

liberty and psychological and emotional distress.

98. The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable

and was undertaken intentionally, in bad faith, and with willful indifference to

Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.

99. The misconduct described in this Count by the Officer Defendants was

undertaken pursuant to the policy and practice of the BPD, in the manner more

fully described above and in Count VI below.

Count II – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Federal Malicious Prosecution (Against Officer Defendants)

100. Each paragraph of this Complaint is incorporated as if restated fully

herein.

101. As described more fully above, the Officer Defendants, while acting

individually, jointly, and/or in conspiracy, as well as under color of law and within

the scope of their employment, caused the seizure of Plaintiff by legal process.

102. In particular, the Officer Defendants caused a criminal proceeding to

be commenced and/or continued against Plaintiff that resulted in Plaintiff being

deprived of his liberty, despite there being no probable cause for commencing and/or

continuing that criminal proceeding, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the

United States Constitution.

24
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 25 of 32

103. The proceedings against Plaintiff terminated in his favor.

104. As a direct and proximate result of the Officer Defendants’ misconduct

described in this Count, Plaintiff suffered injuries, including but not limited to loss

of liberty and psychological and emotional distress.

105. The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable

and was undertaken intentionally, with malice and willful indifference to Plaintiff’s

clearly established constitutional rights.

106. The misconduct of the Officer Defendants described in this Count was

undertaken pursuant to the policy and practice of the BPD, in the manner more

fully described above and in Count VI below.

Count III – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Detention without Probable Cause (Against Officer Defendants)

107. Each paragraph of this Complaint is incorporated as if restated fully

herein.

108. In the manner described above, the Officer Defendants, while acting

individually, jointly, and/or in conspiracy, as well as under color of law and within

the scope of their employment, detained Plaintiff.

109. There was no probable cause for Plaintiff’s detention.

110. As a result of the Defendants’ action, Plaintiff’s rights were violated,

and he suffered injuries, including but not limited to loss of liberty and

psychological and emotional distress.

25
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 26 of 32

111. The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable

and was undertaken intentionally, in bad faith, and with willful indifference to

Plaintiff’s rights.

112. The misconduct of the Officer Defendants described in this Count was

undertaken pursuant to the policy and practice of the BPD, in the manner more

fully described above and in Count VI below.

Count IV – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Failure to Intervene (Against Officer Defendants)

113. Each paragraph of this Complaint is incorporated as if restated fully

herein.

114. In the manner described above, by their conduct and under color of

law, during the constitutional violations described herein, the Officer Defendants

stood by without intervening to prevent the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights, even though they had the opportunity to do so.

115. As a direct and proximate result of the Officer Defendants’ failure to

intervene to prevent the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Plaintiff

suffered injuries, including but not limited to loss of liberty and psychological and

emotional distress. The Officer Defendants had a reasonable opportunity to prevent

this harm but failed to do so.

116. The misconduct described in the Count was objectively unreasonable

and was undertaken intentionally, in bad faith, and with willful indifference to

Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.

26
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 27 of 32

117. The misconduct described in this Count by the Officer Defendants was

undertaken pursuant to the policy and practice of the BPD, in the manner more

fully described above and in Count VI below.

Count V – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Monell Policy Claims (Against BPD and the City)

118. Each paragraph of this Complaint is incorporated as if restated fully

herein.

119. The actions of all the Officer Defendants and other known and

unknown co-conspirators were undertaken pursuant to policies and practices of the

BPD, described above, which were ratified by policymakers with final policymaking

authority. These policies and practices included the failure to adequately train,

supervise, and discipline officers who engaged in the alleged constitutional

violations, as set forth in greater detail above. The policies and practices also

included the failure to turn over exculpatory evidence (both before and after a

criminal trial) and reliance on fabricated evidence, including fabricated witness

statements, identifications, and police reports.

120. The policies and practices described in this Count were maintained

and implemented by the BPD and the City with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights.

121. As a direct and proximate result of the BPD’s and the City’s actions,

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated and he suffered injuries, including but

not limited to loss of liberty and psychological and emotional distress.

27
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 28 of 32

122. The BPD and the City are therefore liable for the misconduct

committed by the Officer Defendants.

Count VI – State Law Claim 1

Malicious Prosecution (Against Officer Defendants)

123. Each paragraph of this Complaint is incorporated as if restated fully

herein.

124. The Officer Defendants accused Plaintiff of criminal activity knowing

those accusations to be without genuine probable cause, and they made statements

to prosecutors and other officials with the intent of exerting influence and

instituting and continuing the judicial proceedings.

125. The Officer Defendants caused Plaintiff to be improperly subjected to

judicial proceedings for which there was no probable cause, resulting in injury.

126. The Officer Defendants’ statements regarding Plaintiff’s alleged

culpability were made with knowledge that the statements were false and perjured.

The Officer Defendants fabricated evidence and/or withheld exculpatory evidence

and/or destroyed exculpatory or potentially exculpatory evidence in bad faith. The

Officer Defendants were aware that, as described more fully above, no true or

reliable evidence implicated Plaintiff in the murder of Faheem Ali.

127. The Officer Defendants intentionally withheld from and

misrepresented to prosecutors facts that further vitiated probable cause against

1Plaintiff presented his state-law claims included in this Complaint to Defendants,

as required by Maryland law, on May 8, 2019. The notice was served on the City
Solicitor, Andre Davis and Daniel Beck, Chief of the Office of Legal Affairs for the
Baltimore Police Department.
28
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 29 of 32

Plaintiff, as set forth above, and failed to investigate evidence that would have

implicated the actual perpetrator.

128. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken intentionally,

with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of others.

129. The prosecution was eventually terminated in Plaintiff’s favor.

130. As a direct and proximate result of this misconduct, Plaintiff

sustained, and continues to sustain, injuries as set forth above, including

psychological and emotional distress.

Count VII – State Law Claim

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(Against Officer Defendants)

131. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated as if restated fully

herein.

132. The acts and conduct of the Officer Defendants as set forth above

were extreme and outrageous. The Officer Defendants’ actions were rooted in an

abuse of power or authority, and they were undertaken with intent to cause, or

were in reckless disregard of, the probability that their conduct would cause severe

emotional distress to Plaintiff, as is more fully alleged above.

133. As a direct and proximate result of the Officer Defendants’ actions,

Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer physical injury and severe emotional

distress.

29
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 30 of 32

Count VIII – State Law Claim

Directly Under the Maryland Constitution
(Against Officer Defendants)

134. Each paragraph of this Complaint is incorporated as if restated fully

herein.

135. As described more fully in the preceding paragraphs, the Officer

Defendants violated Plaintiff’s due process rights, in violation of the Maryland

Declaration of Rights, including but not limited to Articles 19, 24, and 26.

136. As a direct and proximate result of the Officer Defendants’ actions,

Plaintiff was wrongfully imprisoned for more than 31 years for a crime that he did

not commit.

137. As a direct and proximate result of the Officer Defendants’ actions,

Plaintiff suffered damages, including physical sickness and injury, and severe

emotional distress, as is more fully alleged above.

Count IX – State Law Claim

Indemnification (Against BPD and the City)

138. Each paragraph of this Complaint is incorporated as if restated fully

herein.

139. Maryland law provides that public entities are directed to pay any tort

judgment for compensatory damages for which employees are liable within the

scope of their employment activities.

30
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 31 of 32

140. The Officer Defendants are or were employees of the Baltimore Police

Department, who acted within the scope of their employment in committing the

misconduct described herein.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, GARY WASHINGTON, respectfully requests that

this Court enter judgment in his favor and against Defendants BALTIMORE

POLICE DEPARTMENT, THOMAS PELLEGRINI, OSCAR REQUER, RICHARD

FAHLTEICH, JOHN TEWEY, JOHN MACGILLIVARY, UNKNOWN

EMPLOYEES OF THE BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT, and the MAYOR

AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE, awarding compensatory damages,

attorneys’ fees, and costs against each Defendant, and punitive damages against

each Defendant, as well as any other relief this Court deems appropriate.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff, GARY WASHINGTON, hereby demands a trial by jury pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b) on all issues so triable.

Respectfully submitted,

GARY WASHINGTON

By: /s/ Gayle Horn

One of Plaintiff’s Attorneys

31
 Case 1:19-cv-02473-SAG Document 1 Filed 08/27/19 Page 32 of 32

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Jon Loevy*
Gayle Horn
Roshna Bala Keen*
Renee Spence*
LOEVY & LOEVY
311 N. Aberdeen St.
Third Floor
Chicago, IL 60607
(312) 243-5900
(312) 243-5902 (fax)
gayle@[Link]
*Pro hac vice applications forthcoming

32