14Defense

The Prosecutor

v. Major Lydia Rodarte-Quayle

October 2021
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. .................................................................................................. 5

STATEMENT OF FACTS. ..................................................................................................... 8

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS. .............................................................................................. 9

PRELIMINARY MATTERS................................................................................................ 10

I. STANDARD OF PROOF. ........................................................................................... 10

II. NATURE OF THE ARMED CONFLICT. ................................................................ 10

A. The events between Alpha and Bravo between July 13, 2026 and September 21, 2026

took place during an International Armed Conflict. .................................................... 10

B. The events between Alpha and Bravo after September 21, 2026 did not take place

during an IAC. ............................................................................................................. 11

COUNT 1 ................................................................................................................................ 12

I. RODARTE-QUAYLE IS NOT LIABLE FOR ORDERING CIVILIANS TO

ASSIST IN CONSTRUCTING DEFENSIVE EMPLACEMENTS. ....................... 12

A. An element under Article 8(2)(a)(v) is absent. ............................................................ 12

1. Rodarte-Quayle did not coerce the detained civilians to take part in military

operations. .............................................................................................................. 12

a. Civilians willingly agreed to assist in the building of defensive

arrangements.…. ............................................................................................... 12

B. Rodarte-Quayle is not liable for ordering under Article 25(3)(b). ............................... 13

1. Rodarte-Quayle did not issue an order to the civilians. ........................................ 13

2. Rodarte-Quayle was not aware that a crime would result from her conduct. ....... 13

3. Assuming that there was an order, the order was lawful. ...................................... 14

COUNT 2 ................................................................................................................................ 15

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 II. RODARTE-QUAYLE IS NOT LIABLE FOR COERCING MR. ROBOT TO

LAUNCH AN ATTACK ON THE ALPHAN NATIONAL WAR MEMORIAL. . 15

A. An element under Article 8(2)(a)(v) is absent. ............................................................ 15

1. Rodarte-Quayle did not coerce Mr. Robot to launch an attack against the Alphan

National War Memorial. ........................................................................................ 15

B. Rodarte-Quayle is not liable for directly perpetrating the crime under Article

25(3)(a).…. .................................................................................................................. 16

COUNT 3 ................................................................................................................................ 16

III. RODARTE-QUAYLE DID NOT COERCE THE ALPHAN MILITARY POLICE

REGIMENT TO SERVE AS PRISON CAMP GUARDS. ....................................... 16

A. The elements under Article 8(2)(a)(v) are absent. ....................................................... 16

1. There was no IAC when Rodarte-Quayle directed the Military Police on

September 29, 2026. .............................................................................................. 16

2. There was no nexus between the IAC and Rodarte-Quayle’s actions. .................. 17

3. Assuming arguendo there was an IAC, Rodarte-Quayle did not coerce the MPs. 17

B. Rodarte-Quayle is not liable for ordering under Article 25(3)(b). ............................... 18

1. Rodarte-Quayle did not issue an order to the MPs. ............................................... 18

2. Rodarte-Quayle was not aware that a crime would result from her conduct. ........ 18

COUNT 4 ................................................................................................................................ 19

IV. RODARTE-QUAYLE IS NOT LIABLE FOR ORDERING THE

DEPLOYMENT OF M1984 MINES. ......................................................................... 19

A. The elements under Article 8(2)(b)(xx) are absent. ..................................................... 19

1. M1984 mines are not inherently indiscriminate. ................................................... 19

2. M1984s are not subject of a comprehensive prohibition annexed to the Statute... 19

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 3. Assuming arguendo that M1984s are subject of the Ottawa Treaty, Rodarte-

Quayle cannot be held liable as Bravo is not a signatory. ..................................... 20

B. Rodarte-Quayle is not liable for ordering under Article 25(3)(b)............................... 20

1. Rodarte-Quayle did not issue an order to utilize tripwires. ................................... 20

2. Rodarte-Quayle was not aware that a crime would result from her conduct. ........ 20

COUNT 5 ................................................................................................................................ 21

V. RODARTE-QUAYLE IS NOT LIABLE FOR ATTACKING THE WAR

MEMORIAL. ................................................................................................................ 21

A. The elements under Article 8(2)(b)(ix) are absent. ..................................................... 21

1. Rodarte-Quayle directed the attack against a military objective. .......................... 21

2. Rodarte-Quayle intended the attack to be directed against a valid military

objective. ................................................................................................................ 22

B. Rodarte-Quayle is not liable as a co-perpetrator under Article 25(3)(a). ................... 23

1. Rodarte-Quayle did not make an essential contribution. ....................................... 23

2. The subjective elements of the crime are not fulfilled. .......................................... 23

PRAYER FOR RELIEF ....................................................................................................... 24

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 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-

Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (1997)………………..…………………. 19, 20

ICC, Elements of Crimes (2011)…………………………………………..……………. 19, 21

Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War

(12 Aug 1949)………………………………………………………………………. 17, 18

Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War

(12 Aug 1949)…………………………………………………………………………... 12

Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims of

International Armed Conflicts (08 Jun 1977)…………………………………………… 14

Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and

other Devices as Amended (03 May 1996)……………………………………………... 21

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (01 Jul 2002)………………..……… 10, 16

JUDICIAL AND ARBITRAL DECISIONS

ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08, Trial Chamber (15 Jun 2009)………………. 18

ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Pre-Trial Chamber (30 Sep 2008)………… 16

ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber (29 Jan 2007)………… 23

ICC, Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10, Pre-Trial Chamber (16 Dec 2011).... 10

ICC, Prosecutor v. Mudacumura, ICC-01/04-01/12 Pre-Trial Chamber (13 Jul 2012)…….. 14

ICC, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Trial Chamber (09 Jun 2014)……………. 18

ICTR, Karemera v. Prosecutor, ICTR-98-44-A, Appeals Chamber (29 Sep 2014)………… 15

ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber (02 Sep 1998)………………. 15

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ICTR, Prosecutor v. Bikindi, ICTR-01-72-T, Trial Chamber (02 Dec 2008)………………. 15

ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber (29 Jul 2004)…………… 13, 22

ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalic, IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber (16 Nov 1998)………………….. 10

ICTY, Prosecutor v. Galic, IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber (05.12.2003)……………………… 13

ICTY, Prosecutor v. Karadzic, IT-95-5/18-T, Trial Chamber (24 Mar 2016)……………… 20

ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, IT-97-25-T, Trial Chamber (15 Mar 2002)………….... 13, 17

ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber (12.06.2002)…………..… 17

ICTY, Prosecutor v. Naletilic, IT-98-34-T, Trial Chamber (13 Mar 2003)…..………… 12, 17

ICTY, Prosecutor v. Prlic, IT-04-74-T, Trial Chamber (29.05.2013)………………………. 20

ICTY, Prosecutor v. Strugar, IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber (31 Jan 2005)………..……... 22, 23

ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber (02 Oct 1995)……..…….… 10, 11, 17

International Military Tribunal, Tanabe Koshiro Trial, Case 59, Macassar (05 Feb 1947)… 14

Nuremberg Trials, American Military Tribunal, The Hostages Trial (19 Feb 1948)………. 14

MANUALS, PUBLICATIONS, AND COMMENTARIES

Dahl, A., Center for International Law and Research, Lecture on Statute Art.8(2)(b)(v)

(31 May 2017)………………..…………………………………………………………. 14

GICHD, Guide to Mine Action (2010)……………………………………………………... 20

GICHD, Marking/Fencing in Mine Actions (2008)………………………………………… 19

Henckaerts, J.M., Customary IHL, Vol. I: Rules (2005)…………………………………… 21

Henckaerts, J.M., New Rules for the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict,

ICRC (30 Sep 1999)…………………………………………………………………….. 22

ICRC, Banning Anti-Personnel Mines: The Ottawa Treaty Explained (1998)……………... 20

ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols…………………………………………… 11

ICRC, Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention………………………………….….. 17

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ICRC, Commentary on Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I: Rules……….. 19

Klamberg, M., Commentary on the Law of the ICC (2017)………………………………... 22

Melzer, N., Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under

International Humanitarian Law, ICRC (02.2009)………..……………………………. 12

Schmitt, M., Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare

(2013)………………………………………………………………………………….... 22

UN Security Council, POWs in Iran and Iraq, (22 Feb 1985)……………………...………. 18

US Army Headquarters, Mine/Countermine Operations, FM20-32 (02 Feb 2004)………... 19

US Army Headquarters, MP Internment/Resettlement Operations, FM3-19.40

(01 Aug 2001)…………………………………………………………………………... 14

Zhu, W., On Co-operation by States not Party to the ICC (2006)………………………….. 20

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 STATEMENT OF FACTS

In July 2026, Alpha invaded its neighboring country, Bravo. The latter mounted a
counter-attack and recaptured all lost territory. By August 2026, after Alpha refused
negotiations, Bravo invaded and gained control over large parts of Alphan territory.
On August 30, 2026, Major Lydia Rodarte-Quayle, realizing her position would be
overwhelmed by an Alphan counter-offensive, tasked willing civilian internees to assist in
defensive preparations. Further, in order to funnel the enemy advance, Rodarte-Quayle ordered
the deployment of M1984 mines with compulsory marking and warning requirements.
Subsequently, she contacted a hacker, Mr. Robot, to discuss executing a cyber-attack
on the Alphan National War Memorial to undermine Alphan military resistance. Mr. Robot
voluntarily cooperated with Rodarte-Quayle, initiating events which led to the surrender of the
Alphan military.
On September 29, 2026, with the massive influx of prisoners, Rodarte-Quayle directed
POWs under the 38th Alphan Military Police Regiment to help administer the camps until the
demobilization of all Alphan forces.

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 SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

First, Rodarte-Quayle is not liable for ordering civilians to assist with defensive
emplacements. She did not coerce the civilian internees as they volunteered to work in
exchange for extra rations and a favorable periodical review.
Second, Rodarte-Quayle is not liable for coercing Mr. Robot to launch an attack against
a protected object. She did not threaten Mr. Robot as he voluntarily launched the cyber-attack
on the National War Memorial.
Third, Rodarte-Quayle is not liable for ordering the Alphan Military Police Regiment
to serve as prison camp guards. She did not order the Military Police as they willingly served
as camp guards in exchange for incentives.
Fourth, Rodarte-Quayle is not liable for ordering the placement of mines in a manner
that would be person-activated and that will injure or kill one or more persons. She did not
order the setting up of tripwires nor the deployment of mines in a manner that would target
civilians.
Fifth, Rodarte-Quayle is not liable for directing an attack on the National War
Memorial. She did not direct an attack on a protected object as the National War Memorial was
a valid military objective at the time of the attack.

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 PRELIMINARY MATTERS

I. STANDARD OF PROOF.
The Prosecution must support each charge with sufficient evidence to establish
substantial grounds to believe that Major Lydia Rodarte-Quayle (Rodarte-Quayle) committed
the crimes charged.1
The Prosecution must demonstrate a clear line of reasoning underpinning specific
allegations,2 going beyond mere theory and suspicion. Any ambiguity shall be interpreted in
favor of the accused, and the definitions of crimes as charged shall be strictly construed.3
The Defense need only prove that at least one element of the crime is not sufficiently
established to dismiss the charges.4
II. NATURE OF THE ARMED CONFLICT.
A. The events between Alpha and Bravo between July 13, 2026 and September 21,
2026 took place during an International Armed Conflict (IAC).
The resort to a state’s armed forces in direct conflict against another state5 irrespective
of retaliation or intensity6 is definitive proof of the existence of an IAC. The simultaneous act
of Alphan forces crossing the frontier border and engaging in direct military action against
Bravo7 clearly triggered the IAC which began on July 13, 2026 and ended on September 21,
2026 after the mass surrender of Alphan armed forces.8

1
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (01.07.2002), [“Statute”] Art.61(5).
2
Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10, Confirmation (16.12.2011),
[“Mbarushimana”] ¶40.
3
Statute, Art.22(2).
4
Mbarushimana, ¶292.
5
Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-T, Appeal (02.10.1995), [“Tadic”] ¶70.
6
Prosecutor v. Delalic, IT-96-21-T, Trial (16.11.1998), ¶184.
7
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Asia-Pacific Moot, 2021 National Rounds
(Compromis), Statement of Agreed Facts [“Facts”], ¶7.
8
Facts, ¶24.

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B. The events between Alpha and Bravo after September 21, 2026 did not take place
during an IAC.
An IAC ends when there is a “general conclusion of peace,”9 which is defined as the
end of combat actions carried out by the armed forces.10 By September 21, 2026, all remaining
resistance by the Alphan military already collapsed and the entire Alphan military command
had completely surrendered to the Bravan forces,11 thus ending the IAC.

9
Tadic, ¶70.
10
ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ¶67.
11
Facts, ¶24.

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 CHARGES

COUNT 1

I. RODARTE-QUAYLE IS NOT LIABLE FOR ORDERING CIVILIANS TO

ASSIST IN CONSTRUCTING DEFENSIVE EMPLACEMENTS.
A. An element under Article 8(2)(a)(v) is absent.
The crime of compelling service in hostile forces is committed when the perpetrator (i)
coerced (ii) one or more persons protected by the Geneva Conventions (GCs), (iii) despite
being aware of their protected status, (iv) in the context, (v) and with knowledge of an IAC.
1. Rodarte-Quayle did not coerce the detained civilians to take part in military
operations.
a. Civilians willingly agreed to assist in the building of defensive arrangements.
Civilians cannot be requisitioned for such work like the construction of fortifications
or those involving military operations.12 However, international law recognizes that civilians
may engage in work of military character by their own volition.13 Here, the civilians
volunteered to work in exchange for extra rations and a favorable periodical review.14
In determining whether protected persons actually consented to perform such work, the
fact that the work placed the prisoners in direct risk of their lives15 and that they were
substantially compensated16 are taken into consideration.
The civilians worked in an area away from the combat zone and were supplied with
military manuals to guide them.17 It can be reasonably inferred that the civilians had time to
study the manuals as they were able to deploy the mines without accidental casualties.18

12
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(12.08.1949), [“GC IV”] Art.51.
13
Melzer, Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under
International Humanitarian Law, (02.2009), p.70-71.
14
Facts, ¶17.
15
Prosecutor v. Naletilic, IT-98-34-T, Trial (13.03.2003) [“Naletilic”] ¶259.
16
Id.
17
Facts, ¶19.
18
Id.

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 In Krnojelac, the Chamber was satisfied that the extra meals which the working
detainees received in exchange for volunteering meant that their work was substantially
compensated.19 Here, the civilians willingly worked in exchange for extra rations and a
favorable periodical review.20 Thus, Rodarte-Quayle did not coerce the civilian internees as
they willingly assisted with defensive emplacements.
B. Rodarte-Quayle is not liable for ordering under Article 25(3)(b).
1. Rodarte-Quayle did not issue an order to the civilians.
To “order” means a person in a position of authority uses that authority to coerce
another to perform an act.21 Rodarte-Quayle could not have issued an order as there was no
indication that the work performed by the civilians was mandatory.22 The voluntary nature of
the work is evidenced by the fact that they were offered incentives for their participation.23 Had
her directive been in the nature of an order, there would have been no further need for Rodarte-
Quayle to offer them incentives.
2. Rodarte-Quayle was not aware that a crime would result from her conduct.
The perpetrator can only be held liable for issuing an order if she intended for the crime
to be committed or was aware that a crime would result from her conduct.24 Rodarte-Quayle
did not intend to commit a crime as her proposal was intended to secure volunteers 25 which is
evidenced by Rodarte-Quayle’s offer of extra rations and a favorable periodical review for their
participation.26

19
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, IT-97-25-T, Trial (15.03.2002), [“Krnojelac”] ¶374.
20
Facts, ¶17.
21
Prosecutor v. Galic, IT-98-29-T, Trial (05.12.2003), ¶168.
22
Facts, ¶17.
23
Id.
24
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14-A, [“Blaskic”], Appeals (29.07.2004), ¶42.
25
Facts, ¶17.
26
Id.

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 Rodarte-Quayle, considering her rank,27 knowledge regarding the civilians’ periodical
review,28 and efforts to ensure compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL),29 meant
she was aware if she was committing a crime. Therefore, Rodarte-Quayle is not liable for
ordering the detained civilians.
3. Assuming that there was an order, the order was lawful.
Forced labor does not always amount to unlawful labor.30 Compelling protected persons
to assist in defensive emplacements is not prohibited where it was ordered by superior authority
and is not performed in concurrently dangerous areas.31 Moreover, civilian internees can be
compelled and may volunteer to perform duties relative to protecting themselves against attack
or other war risks.32
As a commander, Rodarte-Quayle was in a position of authority33 as she was able to
issue orders to Bravan troops,34 strategize military operations,35 and was tasked with overseeing
Alphan prisoners of war (POWs) and civilian internees.36 Further, the work was not performed
in dangerous areas37 as the civilians worked outside of an active combat zone.38 Hence, the said
order was lawful.

27
Protocol Additional to Geneva Conventions Relating to Protection of Victims of IAC
(08.06.1977), Art.87(2).
28
Facts, ¶17.
29
Id., ¶19.
30
Dahl, Center for International Law and Research, Lecture on Statute Art.8(2)(b)(v)
(31.05.2017).
31
American Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Hostages Trial (19.02.1948).
32
US Army, MP Internment/Resettlement Operations FM3-19.40 (01.08.2001), ¶5-66.
33
Prosecutor v. Mudacumura, ICC-01/04-01/12 (13.07.2012).
34
Facts, ¶16.
35
Id..
36
Facts, ¶15.
37
Koshiro Trial, International Military Tribunal, Macassar (05.02.1947).
38
Facts, ¶17.

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 COUNT 2

II. RODARTE-QUAYLE IS NOT LIABLE FOR COERCING MR. ROBOT TO

LAUNCH AN ATTACK ON THE ALPHAN NATIONAL WAR MEMORIAL.
A. An element under Article 8(2)(a)(v) is absent.
1. Rodarte-Quayle did not coerce Mr. Robot (Robot) to launch an attack against the
Alphan National War Memorial (War Memorial).
Coercion may be evidenced by threats, intimidation, or other forms of duress preying
on fear or desperation.39 Whether a message constitutes as a threat requires evaluating40 how it
was understood by its recipient.41
Rodarte-Quayle messaged Robot of her plan to launch a cyber-attack on the War
Memorial to undermine the morale of the remaining Alphan forces. 42 Robot reasonably
interpreted her words “we have your family but we are taking good care of them,”43 as an
assurance that she meant no hostile intent. Further, he understood her words “we need you to
do this for us, and for Alpha,”44 as a request for his help and evinced her intent to prevent
further bloodshed between Alpha and Bravo.
Furthermore, Robot publicly opposed the militaristic policies of Alpha45 along with the
majority of war-weary Alphan civilians who actively protested against the Alphan
government.46 As the War Memorial was a central symbol of Alphan military power, 47 it can
be reasonably inferred that Robot voluntarily heeded the request of Rodarte-Quayle out of his

39
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial, (02.09.1998), ¶688.
40
Karemera v. Prosecutor, ICTR-98-44-A, Appeals (29.09.2014), ¶483.
41
Prosecutor v. Bikindi, ICTR-01-72-T, Trial (02.12.2008), ¶387-389.
42
Facts, ¶22.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id., ¶21.
46
Id., ¶11.
47
Id., ¶9.

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personal motivation to launch an attack against the War Memorial48 and bring an end to the
conflict. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to believe Rodarte-Quayle threatened or
intimidated Robot into launching the cyber-attack against the War Memorial.
B. Rodarte-Quayle is not liable for directly perpetrating the crime under Article
25(3)(a).
The criminal responsibility under Article 25(3)(a) for direct perpetration is established
when the perpetrator physically carries out the elements of the offense with intent.49 Intent is
proven if Rodarte-Quayle meant to coerce Robot or was aware that coercion would occur in
the ordinary course of events.50
As established, Rodarte-Quayle had no intent to coerce Robot as she merely tried to
secure his help.51 If Rodarte-Quayle intended to coerce Robot, she would not have reassured
him of his family’s safety, but instead would have employed stronger threats to make it clear
that he had no choice but to comply. In absence of any evidence that she coerced him into
complying, such criminal responsibility cannot be established.52

COUNT 3

III. RODARTE-QUAYLE DID NOT COERCE THE ALPHAN MILITARY POLICE

REGIMENT TO SERVE AS PRISON CAMP GUARDS.
A. The elements under Article 8(2)(a)(v) are absent.
1. There was no IAC when Rodarte-Quayle directed the Military Police (MPs) on
September 29, 2026.
The collapse and surrender of all Alphan military resistance to Bravan forces53 meant
Alpha lost its capability to engage in armed conflict against Bravo, which then led to a general

48
Facts, ¶23.
49
Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Confirmation (30.09.2008) ¶529.
50
Statute, Art.30(2)(b).
51
Facts, ¶18.
52
Statute, Art.66.
53
Facts, ¶24.

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conclusion of peace.54 Therefore, the IAC ended on September 21, 2026.55 Rodarte-Quayle
directed the MPs on September 29, 2026, eight days after the IAC ended.56
2. There was no nexus between the IAC and Rodarte-Quayle’s actions.
Assuming arguendo an IAC exists, it must be established that the perpetrator acted in
furtherance of or under the guise of an IAC.57 As established, Rodarte-Quayle directed the MPs
to guard the accused war criminals and perform disciplinary functions eight days after the end
of the IAC.58 Considering that the conflict had already ended, it did not serve as the pretext
behind her actions. Thus, the nexus requisite is not satisfied.
3. Assuming arguendo there was an IAC, Rodarte-Quayle did not coerce the MPs.
POWs may not be compelled to undertake any work unauthorized by the GCs,59 unless
they consent to it.60 In order to determine whether the POWs consented to perform such work,
the likelihood of volunteering to perform such work,61 and whether they were substantially
compensated62 are taken into consideration.
The MPs willingly cooperated with Rodarte-Quayle. As the commander tasked with
the administration of the POW camp,63 she had the duty to maintain POWs in a good state of
physical and mental health.64 Rodarte-Quayle complied with these conditions when she offered
the MPs incentives such as ration privileges and winter clothing for their participation.65

54
Tadic, ¶70.
55
Facts, ¶24.
56
Id.
57
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal (12.06.2002), ¶59.
58
Facts, ¶24.
59
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of POWs (12.08.1949) [“GC III”], Art.50.
60
ICRC, GC III Commentary, ¶2714.
61
Krnojelac, ¶411.
62
Naletilic, ¶259.
63
Facts, ¶24.
64
ICRC, GC III Commentary, ¶2656.
65
Facts, ¶24.

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 Rodarte-Quayle informed Major Ehrmantraut that it was in their best interest to
willingly assist her as she did not have the manpower to effectively administer the camps, 66
such as employing sanitary measures and maintaining healthy conditions for the POWs.67
Further, they were also substantially compensated for their labor in the form of extra
privileges.68
Taken together, it can be reasonably inferred that the MPs voluntarily complied to
conduct such work as it principally served to improve their welfare and they stood to benefit
the most.
B. Rodarte-Quayle is not liable for ordering under Article 25(3)(b).
1. Rodarte-Quayle did not issue an order to the MPs.
Rodarte-Quayle did not issue an order to the MPs as they were clearly given a choice
to comply with the work.69 Rodarte-Quayle’s acts of coursing her request for assistance through
the MP chain of command and explaining why it would be in their best interests to assist her70
further indicates that the nature of the work was voluntary.
2. Rodarte-Quayle was not aware that a crime would result from her conduct.
The mental element for ordering requires that the accused is at least aware that the crime
will be committed in the ordinary course of events as a consequence of the execution of the
order.71 Rodarte-Quayle must know and must be aware that the crime would be a consequence
of his or her order.72
Rodarte-Quayle was not aware she was committing a crime as she reasonably believed
they willingly complied with the order and undertook the work voluntarily in exchange for
incentives.73 Hence, Rodarte-Quayle cannot be held liable for ordering the POWs.

66
GC III, Art.29.
67
UN Security Council, Iran-Iraq POWs, (22.02.1985), ¶139.
68
Facts, ¶24.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision (09.06.2014), ¶145.
72
Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision (15.06.2009), ¶362.
73
Facts, ¶24.

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 COUNT 4

IV. RODARTE-QUAYLE IS NOT LIABLE FOR ORDERING THE

DEPLOYMENT OF M1984 MINES.
The crime of employing weapons to cause superfluous injury is committed when the
perpetrator (i) employed a weapon or method of warfare (ii) of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or was inherently indiscriminate, (iii) subject of a comprehensive prohibition annexed
to the Statute, (iv) in the context of, (v) and with knowledge of an IAC.74
A. The elements under Article 8(2)(b)(xx) are absent.
1. M1984 mines (M1984s) are not inherently indiscriminate.
Weapons capable of being directed at specific military objectives are not inherently
indiscriminate.75 M1984s are remote-controlled directional fragmentation mines76 which
means their detonation can be controlled and directed only against military targets.
Here, even if the mines were deployed as tripwire-activated,77 the same is not inherently
indiscriminate as Rodarte-Quayle ensured compliance with marking and warning
requirements78 to alert civilians of their placement.79 Therefore, M1984s are neither inherently
indiscriminate nor were they employed in a manner to cause indiscriminate effects.
2. M1984s are not subject of a comprehensive prohibition annexed to the Statute.
The Ottawa Treaty of 1997,80 which has been annexed to the Rome Statute in 2021,81
prohibits the use of anti-personnel mines or those designed to be exploded by the presence,
proximity or contact of a person.82 As established, M1984s are remote-controlled directional

74
Elements, Art.8(2)(b)(xx).
75
ICRC, Customary IHL, Vol. I: Rule 71.
76
Facts, ¶19.
77
US Army, Mine/Countermine Operations, FM20-32 (02.02.2004), p.1-6.
78
Facts, ¶19.
79
GICHD, Marking/Fencing in Mine Actions (2008), p.4.
80
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and their Destruction (1997) [“Ottawa Treaty”].
81
Facts, ¶1.
82
Ottawa Treaty, Art.2.

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fragmentation mines83 which means that they are neither victim-activated nor indiscriminate in
their effects.84 Therefore, M1984s are not prohibited under the Ottawa Treaty.
3. Assuming arguendo that M1984s are subject of the Ottawa Treaty, Rodarte-Quayle
cannot be held liable as Bravo is not a signatory.
Bravo is not a signatory to the Ottawa Treaty85 and therefore not bound by its
provisions. Since the Ottawa is an international legal agreement,86 it is binding only on state
parties and does not create obligations for a non-party state or its citizens.87
B. Rodarte-Quayle is not liable for ordering under Article 25(3)(b).
1. Rodarte-Quayle did not issue an order to utilize tripwires.
Giving an order requires a positive act and thus may not be committed by implicit
omission.88 Rodarte-Quayle merely directed the deployment of M1984s to funnel the enemy
advance,89 however she did not explicitly order them to deploy the mines in such a way that
they would be tripwire-activated.90 This is evidenced by the fact that she simply instructed her
troops to distribute the military manual to the civilians.91
2. Rodarte-Quayle was not aware that a crime would result from her conduct.
Rodarte-Quayle can only be held liable for ordering if she was aware of the substantial
likelihood that a crime would be committed in the execution of the act ordered.92 Being a field-
grade military officer of a state signatory to the Amended Protocol II to the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons,93 Rodarte-Quayle was aware that the use of mines are

83
Facts, ¶19.
84
GICHD, Guide to Mine Action (2010), p.75.
85
Compromis, Annex I [“Annex I”].
86
ICRC, Banning APMs: The Ottawa Treaty Explained (1998), p.1.
87
Zhu, Co-operation by States not Party to the ICC (2006), p.108.
88
Prosecutor v. Prlic, IT-04-74-T, Trial (29.05.2013), ¶231.
89
Facts, ¶18.
90
Id., ¶18-19.
91
Id., ¶19.
92
Prosecutor v. Karadzic, IT-95-5/18-T, Trial (24.03.2016), ¶573.
93
Annex I.

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permitted as long as all feasible precautions are taken to protect civilians from the effects of
such weapons.94 Here, Rodarte-Quayle ensured compliance with the marking and warning
requirements under the GCs.95 Hence, Rodarte-Quayle was not aware that there was a
possibility that the crime of employing indiscriminate weapons could reasonably occur.
Assuming arguendo that M1984s have anti-personnel functions and are prohibited
under Ottawa Treaty, Rodarte-Quayle could not have been aware of their prohibition as Bravo
is not a signatory to such treaty.96 Therefore, Rodarte-Quayle is not liable for ordering the
deployment of M1984s.

COUNT 5

V. RODARTE-QUAYLE IS NOT LIABLE FOR ATTACKING THE WAR

MEMORIAL.
The crime of attacking protected objects is committed when the perpetrator (i) directed
an attack (ii) on a historic monument which was not a military objective (iii) intentionally, (iv)
in the context of, and (v) with knowledge of an IAC.97
A. The elements under Article 8(2)(b)(ix) are absent.
1. Rodarte-Quayle directed the attack against a military objective.
Attacks on protected objects are prohibited unless and for such time, they become
military objectives.98 To assess whether an object is a military objective, two criteria must be
fulfilled.99 First, the object’s use makes a contribution to military action,100 and the attack on

94
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Mines, Booby-Traps, and Other Devices
(1996), Art.3(10).
95
Facts, ¶19.
96
Annex I.
97
Elements, Art.8(2)(b)(ix).
98
Henckaerts, Customary IHL, Vol. I (2005), Rule 10.
99
Henckaerts, New Rules for Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, (30.09.1999),
¶835.
100
Klamberg, Commentary on the Law of ICC (2017).

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the military objective offers a definite military advantage.101 In circumstances where a civilian
object is used for military ends,102 it becomes a military objective under the “use” criterion.103
The War Memorial was a military objective as it was used as a propaganda center by
the Fring regime104 and symbol of the Alphan military power.105 Further, it was evidently used
as a stronghold by Fring and his aides during the time of the attack. 106 The attack offered a
definite military advantage as it resulted in the surrender of the Alphan military and the collapse
of the Alphan military command.107 Thus, the War Memorial was a valid military objective at
the time of the attack.
2. Rodarte-Quayle intended the attack to be directed against a valid military objective.
Intent is proven if the perpetrator had the intention to attack the protected object with
the knowledge of the building not being a military objective.108 Rodarte-Quayle was aware that
the War Memorial was being used to make an effective contribution to Alphan military
operations by its use as a propaganda center by the Fring regime109 and as a stronghold by Fring
and his aides.110
Rodarte-Quayle directed the attack as she reasonably expected that an attack on the War
Memorial would demoralize the remaining resistance of the Alphan forces and force them to
surrender,111 which occurred.112 Hence, Rodarte-Quayle intended such attack to be against a
military objective.

101
Henckaerts, supra note 98.
102
Prosecutor v. Strugar, IT-01-42-T, Trial (31.01.2005), [“Strugar”] ¶310.
103
Schmitt, Tallinn Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (2013), Rule
38, ¶8.
104
Facts, ¶8.
105
Id., ¶9.
106
Id., ¶23.
107
Id., ¶24.
108
Blaskic, IT-95-14-T, Trial (03.03.2000), ¶185.
109
Facts, ¶8.
110
Id., ¶23.
111
Facts, ¶22.
112
Id., ¶24.

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B. Rodarte-Quayle is not liable as a co-perpetrator under Article 25(3)(a).
1. Rodarte-Quayle did not make an essential contribution.
Only those who make an essential contribution and have the power to frustrate the
commission of the crime by not performing their tasks have joint control over the crime.113
Rodarte-Quayle did not make an essential contribution to the attack on the War Memorial as
she merely proposed an idea to Robot.114 This idea could have come from anyone and would
have still resulted in Robot launching the attack on the War Memorial. This is further evidenced
by the fact that she did not give specific instructions on how to launch the attack.115 Finally, as
Robot was a famously capable hacker, the cyber-attack would still have been able to proceed
notwithstanding any contribution or encouragement from Rodarte-Quayle.116
2. The subjective elements of the crime are not fulfilled.
The subjective elements require that the accused was aware that the plan would result
in realization of the objective elements of the crime.117 However, where the state of mind of
the person falls short of accepting that the objective elements of the crime may result from her
actions, such cannot qualify as truly intentional realization of the objective element and would
not meet the “intent and knowledge” requirement.118
As established, Rodarte-Quayle intended to attack the War Memorial which was a valid
military objective at the time of the attack.119 Rodarte-Quayle reasonably believed that the War
Memorial was not a protected object but a military objective considering its use as a
propaganda center120 and as a stronghold by Fring and his aides.121 Hence, Rodarte-Quayle
cannot be held liable for directing an attack on the War Memorial.

113
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, [“Lubanga”] Confirmation (29.01.2007), ¶925.
114
Facts, ¶22.
115
Id.
116
Id., ¶21.
117
Lubanga, ¶361-5.
118
Id., ¶355.
119
Strugar, ¶278.
120
Facts, ¶8.
121
Id., ¶23.

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 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

The Defense respectfully requests this Honorable Court to adjudge and declare that
there are no substantial grounds for Major Lydia Rodarte-Quayle to be found criminally
responsible for the war crimes under Articles 8(2)(a)(v), 8(2)(b)(xx), and 8(2)(b)(ix) of the
Rome Statute, and deny these charges against her.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE

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