People v.

Ural, 56 SCRA 138 (1974)

- The CFI convicted Policeman Ural of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpertua as well as to
indemnify the heirs of Napola in the sum of 12,000
- Policeman Ural, beat up and burned a prisoner named Felix Napola
- This was witnessed by Brigido Alberto
- Dr. Luzonia Bakil, the municipal health officer treated the victim twice, it was mentioned that his
burns were severe and that they would have caused his death if he was not treated immediately
- Napola died on Aug 25, 1966, cause of death was stated as “burn”
- Ural on the other hand testified that he was on duty that night and heard Napola scream for
help, he saw the prisoner in flames and helped him take his shirt of. He mentioned that he was
assisted by Ernesto Ogoc and Anencio Siton
- Napola’s common law wife, Felicisima Escareal, testified that she heard Napola scream and saw
Ural and Siton help him remove his shirt to put out the fire
- The trial court held that Ural's denials cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Alberio. It
observed that Ural's alleged act of removing Napola's burning shirt was at most an indication
that he was "belatedly alarmed by the consequence of his evil act" but would not mean that he
was not the incendiary
- This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which provides that "criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended".
- The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire
- The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public position (Par. 1, Art.
14, Revised Penal Code). He could not have maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on
guard duty. Because of his position, he had access to the cell where Napola was confined
(Aggravating Circumstance)
- But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" (Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal Code). It
is manifest from the proven facts that appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola (Mitigating
Circumstance, praeter intentionem)
- Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating, circumstance of
abuse of his official position. The trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua
which is the medium period of the penalty for murder (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code)

People v. Leonor, 305 SCRA 285 (1999)

- Christopher Leonor was found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and was sentenced
to death and to pay the heirs of the victim, Dr Teresa Tarlengco
- During his arraignment Leonor pleaded not guilty
- Witnesses of the prosecution testified as follows:
o Tarlengco was at her clinic when a man entered and inquired about her professional fee
o The man was identified as Leonor
o After telling him of her fees, Leonor left and mentioned he would return
o When he came back, Tarlengco told Leonor to take a seat while she prepared her
instruments
o This was when Leonor demanded money from Dr Tarlengco
 o She told him that her money was on the table
o She was then stabbed by Leonor on the chest then he grabbed her wrist watch and ran
away
o Tarlengco managed to struggle out of the clinic and ask for help
o She was heard by the security guard who then chased Leonor, who was later joined by a
policeman who saw the commotion
o Upon apprehending Leonor, 900 pesos and a wrist watch were recovered from him
- Tarlengco underwent surgery
- Her father was later allowed to speak with her, there, she told him of the events that transpired
- She later died
- Leonor, on the other hand, admitted that he did stab Tarlengco but denied that he robbed her
- He stated that he wanted to get a tooth extraction and was told he’d have to pay 100 pesos per
tooth extracted, then during the procedure, Tarlengco mentioned that she would instead charge
the normal fee of 150/tooth
- He tried to leave but the Dr pushed and cursed at him, he then stabbed the dentist
- Leonor prayed to the SC that
o (1) convicting him of the crime of homicide, and not of robbery with homicide
o (2) appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed, sufficient provocation, passion and obfuscation,
voluntary surrender, and voluntary confession
- The prosecution proved in this case that there was violence and intimidation in the taking of Dr.
Tarlengcos property
- This was evidence by the dying declaration of Tarlengco
o To be admissible, a dying declaration must
 (1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarants death
 (2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death;
 (3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestion of improper
influence;
 (4) be offered in a criminal case in which the death of the declarant is the
subject of inquiry; and
 (5) the declarant must have been competent to testify as a witness had he been
called upon to testify
- The SC held that there were no mitigating circumstances in the case
- CHRISTOPHER claims that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as the act committed;
that there was sufficient provocation by the offended party immediately preceding the offense;
that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have produced in him passion and obfuscation;
that he voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority; and that he voluntarily confessed
having committed homicide
o Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong does not mitigate in homicide cases where
the accused used a deadly weapon in inflicting mortal wounds on vital organs of the
victim
o The provocation sufficient to mitigate an offense must be proportionate to the gravity of
the retaliatory act
  courts cannot appreciate passion and obfuscation unless there is a clear
showing that there were causes naturally tending to produce such powerful
excitement as to deprive the accused of reason and self-control
o CHRISTOPHER did not voluntarily surrender either to a person in authority or to any
other person. While he was being pursued by Security Guard Baquilod, he intentionally
went to where there were many people, presumably to confuse Baquilod
o Neither was there voluntary confession in the instant case. The mitigating circumstance
contemplated by law is a plea of guilty made spontaneously and unconditionally in open
court before the presentation of evidence for the prosecution
- There being no evidence of aggravating or mitigating circumstance against or in favor of
CHRISTOPHER, the lower of the two indivisible penalties shall be imposed
- CHRISTOPHER CAA LEONOR is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
robbery with homicide, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua

United States v. Ampar, 37 Phil. 201 (1917)

- Accused Clemente Ampar, 70 years old went to the kitchen during a fiesta and asked Modesto
Patobo for some roast pig
- Patobo answered “There is no more. Come here and I will make roast pig of you."
- Provoked by these words, Ampar hacked Patobo on the head with an ax which caused his death
- In ascertaining the penalty, the court, naturally, took into consideration the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia. The court, however, gave the accused the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance which on cursory examination would not appear to be justified. This mitigating
circumstance was that the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to
the one committing the felony
- The offense which the defendant was endeavoring to vindicate would to the average person be
considered as a mere trifle. But to this defendant, an old man, it evidently was a serious matter
to be made the butt of a joke in the presence of so many guests
- It is believed that the lower court very properly gave defendant the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance, and correctly sentenced him to the minimum degree of the penalty provided for
the crime of murder
- Judgment of the trial court sentencing the defendant and appellant to seventeen years four
months and one day of cadena temporal,

People v. Pajares, 210 SCRA 237 (1992)

- Leandro Pajares was charged with the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder
- Murder for killing Diosdado Viojan with a baseball bat (hit at the back of the head)
- Frustrated Murder for hitting Renato Perez with the same baseball bat
- Pajares pleaded not guilty
- Perez testified that he was walking with Viojan when Pajares suddenly struck Viojan with a
baseball bat behind the head
 - Pajares then hit Perez as well with the baseball bat, hitting him at the back below the left
shoulder. He then grappled with the appellant for the possession of the baseball bat but the
latter's companions mauled him until he lost consciousness
- Appellant Leandro Pajares y Florentino denied the allegations of the prosecution
- He testified that he was coerced to admit his participation in the crime
- He likewise denied any knowledge about any quarrel between his brother, Roberto Pajares and
the deceased Diosdado Viojan
- He was found guilty for both crimes
o GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized by
Art. 248, par, 1, Rev. Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstance to
consider, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA
o GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Slight Physical Injuries as defined in
par. 1, Art. 266 and penalized by Art. 27, both of the Rev. Penal Code, hereby sentencing
him to an imprisonment of ONE (1) MONTH; and to pay the cost of suit
- Appealed to the SC
- Pajares points out that hours before the clubbing incident, his younger brother, was mauled by
the group of Diosdado Viojan
- The mauling of his brother is a big insult and truly offending to him and his family. Hence, the
clubbing of Diosdado Viojan was a vindication of the grave offense committed against his family.
A mitigating circumstance under paragraph 5 of Article 13 of the RPC
- It must be emphasized that there is a lapse of about ten (10) hours between said incident and
the killing of Diosdado Viojan. Such interval of time was more than sufficient to enable appellant
to recover his serenity
- The mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be appreciated
in his favor
- the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED

United States v. Hicks, 14 Phil. 217 (1909)

- Augustus Hicks, an Afro-American, and Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman, illicitly lived
together
- Agustina left Hicks for another black dude named Wallace Current, the current black dude
- Hicks together with another soldier named Lloyd Nickens went to the house where Agustina and
Wallace lived
- Hicks called out to Agustina and later called Wallace as well
- During their conversation, Hicks said "Did I not tell you to leave this woman alone?,"
- Current replied: "That is all right, she told me that she did not want to live with you any longer,
but if she wishes, she may quit me, and you can live with her."
- The accused then replied: "God damn, I have made up my mind;"
- He then drew his revolver. Wallace tried to stop him but Hicks managed to draw the gun anyway
- Hicks then shot Agustina, the bullet hitting her in the left side of the breast
- She fell to the ground, and died in a little more than an hour later
- Hicks gave himself up to the chief of police
- The provincial fiscal filed a complaint with the CFI charging Augustus Hicks with the crime of
murder
- He was later sentenced to death
 - Hicks stated that his revolver accidentally went off
- In addition to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as above referred to, the presence of
other aggravating circumstances, such as premeditation, and the fact that the crime was
committed in the dwelling of the deceased should be taken into consideration
o heard the accused repeatedly say, referring to the deceased, that her time had come,
adding that he would rather see her dead than in the arms of another man,
- no mitigating circumstances is present, not even that mentioned in paragraph 7 of article 9 of
the Penal Code, to wit loss of reason and self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by the
defense
- inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control
are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and
immoral passions
- From the foregoing considerations, and as the judgment appealed from is in accordance with
the law, it is our opinion that the same should be affirmed, as we do hereby affirm it with costs,
provided, however, that the death penalty shall be executed according to the law in force, and
that in the event of a pardon being granted, the culprit shall suffer the accessory penalties of
article 53 of the Penal Code unless the same be expressly remitted in the pardon

United States v. De la Cruz, 22 Phil. 429 (1912)

- The convict, in the heat of passion, killed the deceased, who had theretofore been his querida
(concubine or lover) upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual
acquaintance
- In the case of Hicks, the victim then refused to live in illicit relations with him
- His reason for killing her being merely that he had elected to leave him and with his full
knowledge to go and live with another man
- In the present case however, the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally
"produced passion and obfuscation" was not that the woman declined to have illicit relations
with him, but the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in
flagrante in the arms of another
- This was a "sufficient impulse" in the ordinary and natural course of things to produce the
passion and obfuscation which the law declares to be one of the extenuating circumstances to
be taken into consideration by the court
- Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was marked with the extenuating
circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9, and by the reduction of the penalty of fourteen
years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal to twelve years and one day of reclusion
temporal,(medium to minimum degree)

People v. Javier, 311 SCRA 576 (1999)

- Eduardo Javier was convicted by the RTC for the crime of parricide and sentenced him to death
- Based from testimonies of the prosecution
- Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier and the victim Florentina Laceste Javier were legally married
- They had a fight and Eduardo hacked Florentina to death and stabbed himself
- Eduardo Javier, in his testimony, admitted killing his wife in their bedroom with the use of a
sharp bolo
- He told the court that he killed his wife because he could not sleep for almost a month. He
claimed that when the killing took place, his mind went totally blank and he did not know what
he was doing.
- He claims that he was insane at the time of the incident
- The trial court rejected his defense of insanity and rendered its decision
- Appealed to the SC
- In his appeal, Eduardo alleged that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty,
considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances of illness of the offender and passion
and obfuscation (lack of sleep, wife had illicit relations with another man)
- He alleged that prior to the incident, he had been suffering from insomnia for around a month,
thus leading him to commit an act beyond his control, the killing of his wife, Florentina. The
defense went on to cite medical literature on the effects of total and partial sleep loss to
support his contentions
o For the mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender to be appreciated, the law
requires the presence of the following requisites:
 (1) illness must diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender; and
 (2) such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts
- In this case, however, aside from the testimony of the accused that his mind went blank when
he killed his wife due to loss of sleep, no medical finding was presented regarding his mental
condition at the time of killing
- No clear and convincing evidence was shown that accused-appellant was suffering an illness
which diminished his exercise of will-power at the time of the killing
- It is clear that accused-appellant was aware of the acts he committed
o he remembered killing his wife in their bedroom with the use of a bolo, where he
mangled her neck twice
o he remembered trying to commit suicide, by wounding himself with the same bolo he
used in killing his wife
o he remembered being brought to the hospital
- In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and to obfuscation, the
following elements should concur:
o (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of
mind; and
o (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission
of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his moral equanimity
- The crime of parricide, not being a capital crime per se as it is not punishable by mandatory
death penalty but by the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible
penalties, the application of the lesser or the greater penalty depends on the presence of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances
- AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Eduardo Javier y Basin should suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua
Canta v. People, 353 SCRA 250 (2001)

- Exuperancio Canta was found guilty by the trial court for violation of PD No 533 or Anti-Cattle
Rustling law of 1974
- Narciso Gabriel is the owner of the cow in question
- He gave the care of the cow to Gardenio Agpay
- Agpay took the cow to graze in the mountains
- However, when he came back for it, the cow was gone
- He later found out that Canta took the cow
- Canta explained that the cow belonged to him and that it was lost some time ago
- He later presented a certificate of ownership, which was denied by the municipal treasurer
- On January 24, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of the offense
charged
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration
- Petitioner claims good faith and honest belief in taking the cow. He cites the following
circumstances to prove his claim:
o 1. He brought the mother cow to Pilipogan to see if the cow in question would suckle to
the mother cow, thus proving his ownership of it;
o 2. He compared the cowlicks of the subject cow to that indicated in the Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle issued on February 27, 1985 in his name, and found that they
tally;
o 3. He immediately turned over the cow to the barangay captain, after taking it, and
later to the police authorities, after a dispute arose as to its ownership; and
o 4. He filed a criminal complaint against Narciso Gabriel for violation of P. D. No. 533.
- P.D. No. 533, 2(c) defines cattle-rustling as
o the taking away by any means, methods or scheme, without the consent of the
owner/raiser, of any of the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or gain,
or whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any person or
force upon things
- The crime is committed if the following elements concur:
o (1) a large cattle is taken;
o (2) it belongs to another;
o (3) the taking is done without the consent of the owner;
o (4) the taking is done by any means, methods or scheme;
o (5) the taking is with or without intent to gain; and
o (6) the taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against person or
force upon things
- These requisites are present in this case
- The fact that petitioner took the cow to the barangay captain and later to the police authorities
does not prove his good faith. He had already committed the crime, and the barangay captain to
whom he delivered the cow after taking it from its owner is his own father
- Accused-appellant should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance analogous to
voluntary surrender
 - The circumstance of voluntary surrender has the following elements:
o (1) the offender has not actually been arrested;
o (2) the offender surrenders to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and
o (3) the surrender is voluntary
- In the present case, petitioner Exuperancio Canta had not actually been arrested. In fact, no
complaint had yet been filed against him when he surrendered the cow to the authorities
- There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance in the commission of
the crime, the penalty to be imposed in this case should be fixed in its minimum period
- The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the modification

Baxinela v. People, G.R. No. 149652, 24 March 2006

- Eduardo Baxinela a police officer was convicted by the trial court of homicide for the shooting
and death of Ruperto Lajo
- Baxinela during trial, claimed self defense
- However, based from witnesses presented by the prosecution, this was proved otherwise
- Baxinela grabbed Lajo’s arm from behind, and as Lajo was turning to look who apprehended
him, Baxinela shot him
- Lajo introduced himself, saying he was also part of the military
- Baxinela got his wallet and ID then left the scene with his companion
- He was convicted by the trial court
- The CA affirmed his conviction with modification, disallowing the mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation
- Petitioned to the SC
- The requisites for self-defense are:
o 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
o 2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and
o 3) employment of reasonable means to prevent and repel and aggression
- The first requisite is an indispensable requirement of self-defense
- There was no unlawful aggression on the part of Lajo
- alternative defense of fulfillment of a duty
o 1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office; and
o 2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office
- While the first condition is present, the second is clearly lacking
- Baxinela’s duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked behind his waist in a
public place
- But perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the desire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his
duty by firing upon Lajo who was not at all resisting
- The shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed
no serious threat or harm to Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub
- The Court will, however, attribute to Baxinela the incomplete defense of fulfillment of a duty as
a privileged mitigating circumstance
- it was held that if the first condition is fulfilled but the second is wanting, Article 69 of the
Revised Penal Code is applicable so that the penalty lower than one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed
- The Court grants in favor of Baxinela a privileged mitigating circumstance and lower his penalty
by one degree. His entitlement to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is
also recognized, thereby further reducing his penalty to its minimum
- the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED