Consciousness and introspection

Chapter in: Gawronski, B. & Payne, B. K. (Eds.), Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition: Measurement, Theory, and
Applications. New York: Guilford Press.

Consciousness, Introspection, and the Adaptive Unconscious

Wilhelm Hofmann Timothy D. Wilson
University of Würzburg University of Virginia

Consciousness is like the Trinity; if it is explained so that of how well we actually know ourselves (e.g., Wilson,
you understand it, it hasn’t been explained correctly. 2002).
(Joynt, 1981, p. 108) The present chapter is divided into two main parts. In
the first main part, we will begin with a selective review
In the history of psychology, the view that a great of the scope of unconscious processing. We will then ask
deal of mental operations is carried out in an unconscious what types of processes may be reserved for conscious
manner certainly has had its highs and lows. As early as processing and how consciousness may achieve these
the second half of the nineteenth century, British functions. This will lead us to introduce the global
physicians and philosophers such as William Carpenter workspace approach of consciousness (e.g., Baars, 1997;
(1874) argued for the existence of nonconscious Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). We believe that this
processes that carry out a large range of everyday mental approach, which has been emerging from the interplay of
operations from perception to behavior, a view also cognitive, neuroscientific, and philosophical
advocated by William James (1890). In contrast, investigations, may offer a useful conceptual framework
Sigmund Freud (1915) presented a more narrow for understanding the interplay between unconscious and
perspective on the unconscious, according to which conscious social cognition. In the second main part, we
irrational, unacceptable motives, drives, and feelings are will consider in detail whether and how introspective
repressed into the unconscious. The psychodynamic insight into the adaptive unconscious may be possible.
point of view dominated and perhaps hindered the To do so we will largely focus on the relationship
scientific exploration of unconscious processing during between implicit and explicit dispositions (i.e., attitudes,
the first half of the last century. When the behaviorist self-esteem, personality, self-concept). We will propose a
revolution overtook psychology and the interest in self-inference model that highlights the conditions under
mental processes plummeted altogether, the all-time low which more or less accurate explicit representations
of research on the unconscious was reached. about nonconscious dispositions may be formed and
Only with the advent of the cognitive revolution and organize the literature on implicit-explicit consistency
more sophisticated methods to study mental processes along this model. Our main conclusion will be that, even
has the tide turned again (e.g., Greenwald, 1992; Hassin, though self-insight into implicit dispositions is often
Uleman, & Bargh, 2005). Cognitive, personality, and poor, it is not impossible to obtain. Rather, self-insight
brain researchers alike share a renewed interest in the into implicit dispositions will increase to the degree that
exploration of mental processes outside of conscious valid mental or behavioral outcomes (such as gut feelings
awareness that nevertheless influence perception, or nonverbal behaviors) are detected and used as a basis
judgments, feelings, or behavior. Together, these for self-inference.
processes compose what we refer to as the adaptive Two conceptual issues need to be addressed at the
unconscious (Wilson, 2002)adaptive in the sense that outset. First, the distinction between unconscious vs.
these processes are vital to everyday functioning. The conscious which is in the focus of the present chapter is
adaptive unconscious is open to scientific investigations typically part of dual-system or dual-process theories of
using experimental methods such as priming the mind (Evans, 2008, for a review). In these models,
manipulations and indirect or implicit measures (see the unconscious vs. conscious distinction is generally
section II, this volume), behavioral observations, viewed as one of several features associated with the
neuropsychological data, and brain-imaging methods broader distinction between automatic and controlled
(see Ito, Chapter 5). processing, alongside with the features of unintentional
Just as the coastline of an island changes as the vs. intentional, effortless vs. effortful, and uncontrollable
surrounding water rises or falls, so do changing views vs. controllable (Bargh, 1994). Whereas these features
about the range of unconscious processing affect how may often coincide, an all-or-none view of perfectly
much mental landscape is considered to be exclusively correlated features is clearly an oversimplification (see
conscious territory. Faced with the progress in research Moors & De Houwer, 2006, for a detailed analysis).
on nonconscious social cognition in the past decades, one Second, it should be noted that the term unconscious can
must admit that the sea level is rising fast. This refer to different features involved in a psychological
development has sparked renewed interests in process (e.g., Bargh, 1994; Gawronski, Hofmann, &
fundamental issues such as the functions of Wilbur, 2006): (a) the conditions or stimuli that set a
consciousness and the interplay between unconscious process in motion, (b) the process itself (i.e., the
and conscious cognition. One particularly intriguing processing steps and algorithms involved), (c) the output
aspect of this interplay is whether, and to what extent, of the process, or (d) the consequences of the output. In
people may become consciously aware of the the present chapter, we take a conditional view of
unconscious underpinnings of their mental lives. On a automaticity by arguing that the output of an automatic
more general level, this relates to the perennial question process may, under certain circumstances, become
consciously available. If it becomes consciously

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 Consciousness and introspection

available, a large range of follow-up processes are nonconsciously to influence later behavior (Zemack-
possible (e.g., transformations, corrections, self- Rugar, Bettman, & Fitzsimons, 2007).
inferences) that unconscious information cannot be Evidence for unconscious processing has also been
subjected to. In other words, we view conscious obtained in the domains of perceptual processing (e.g.,
availability as a highly consequential change of studies on blindsight; Weisskrantz, 1997), semantic
representational status that can (but often does not) processing (Devine, 1989; Marcel, 1983; Merikle,
happen with regard to the output of automatic processing Joordens, & Stolz, 1995), implicit memory (e.g.,
which would otherwise remain unconscious. Schacter, 1987) and with regard to the execution of overt
behavior (e.g., the perception-behavior link; Bargh,
Evidence for Unconscious Processing Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).
Evidence for unconscious processing has Finally, even self-regulatory processes, which have
accumulated in the domains of perceptual, affective, typically been attributed to be under the sole domain of
semantic, motor, and self-regulatory processes. A variety conscious operations, may be carried out nonconsciously.
of methods have been used, including subliminal Specifically, Bargh and colleagues (Bargh, Gollwitzer,
priming, in which normal participants are presented with Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Troetschel, 2001) argued that
stimulus material for such short durations that it cannot goals can be primed by external triggers and then guide
be consciously perceived, and supraliminal self-regulatory behavior without the individual
manipulations, in which participants are aware of the consciously intending to do so (see Ferguson, Chapter
stimulus material (e.g., scrambled sentences; hidden 17).
rules) but unaware of how it effects them. Evidence for Taken together, an entire array of perceptual,
unconscious processing is obtained if such manipulations affective, semantic, motor, and self-regulatory processes
reliably affect perception, feelings, judgments, or has been shown to occur outside of conscious awareness.
behavior in spite of participants’ reported unawareness. These findings make a strong case for views stressing the
Further evidence for unconscious processing comes from modularity of mind (e.g., Fodor, 1983), where the human
studies on brain lesion patients (Dietrich, 2007; brain is seen as a massive parallel processing system in
Weisskrantz, 1997). Some of these lesions appear to which special subsystems or ‘modules’ are dedicated to
wipe out aspects of conscious processing while leaving specific computational purposes. Due to the modular
intact lower-order unconscious processes which patients architecture of the mind, many mental operations and
are completely unaware. even sequences of interconnected operations (such as the
First and most importantly for the present purpose, perception-behavior or the perception-affect link) can
unconscious processes have also been identified in proceed unconsciously. Clearly, the efficiency gained by
affective processing (e.g., Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). This delegating a great deal of “brainwork” to specialized
point has been made most prominently by the pioneering mental compartments or subsystems that need no
work of LeDoux (1996) on the brain’s fear circuit. conscious awareness cannot be overestimated (Bargh,
LeDoux argued that the limbic system, and in particular 2005; James, 1890). However, given that such a
the amygdala, is part of an automatic danger-detection considerable amount of mental processing appears to
system. It has privileged access to incoming sensory occur nonconsciously, one is led to wonder what
information at a relatively crude level of perceptual consciousness, the “cream on the cake of mentality”
analysisbefore the results of more accurate but also (Armstrong, 1980), is good for after all? Framed
more time-consuming high-level perceptual analyses can differently, what are the computational and evolutionary
enter conscious awareness. The amygdala quickly scans advantages enabled by conscious processing?
early perceptual processing outputs for signs of danger
and can automatically trigger a fear response if it detects The Case for Conscious Processing
such signs. Because the analysis is fast and crude, The question about the functional utility of
however, errors can happen (such as when mistaking a consciousness has been raised by neuroscientists,
tree trunk for a crocodile). Amygdala activation has been philosophers, and cognitive psychologists alike. Not
demonstrated in response to subliminally presented surprisingly, quite divergent answers have been
emotional stimuli, indicating that these affective proposed. Still, asking the functional question is probably
responses do not require conscious awareness, among the most fruitful ways to approach the thorny
identification, or additional cognitive processing issue of consciousness (Dennett, 2001). From our reading
(Whalen et al., 1998). In the domain of prejudice, Phelps of the literature, there seems to be some convergence in
et al. (2000) found that amygdala activation in response at least four classes of interrelated functions requiring
to out-group members correlated with implicit attitude consciousness (e.g., Baars, 1997; Dietrich, 2007; for an
scores on the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, excellent overview, see Dehaene & Naccache, 2000):
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Broadly, it has been argued active information maintenance, flexible combination of
that all kinds of simple affective processes involve a information (including rule-based reasoning), the
potentially unconscious contribution from subcortical generation of intentional behavior, and the creation of a
processes (Berridge, 2003). This core affect (Russell, sense of “self”. These functions appear to build on each
2003), or more colloquially, ‘gut’ feeling may not other in order to enable mental achievements of
become fully conscious (in the sense of access increasing complexity.
consciousness defined later) but may nevertheless
influence behavior and decision making in ways that Active Information Maintenance
people do not consciously recognize (Bechara, Damasio, First, many automatic processing modules appear to
Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Winkielman, Berridge, & have their own domain-specific memory buffer (e.g.,
Wilbarger, 2005). Recently, researchers argued that even iconic memory in the visual system). However,
specific emotions such as guilt can be primed information in these buffers decays very quickly
(Sperling, 1960). One primary purpose of consciousness,

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 Consciousness and introspection

therefore, may be its capacity to maintain (selected) when people plan, initiate, and correct goal-directed
information in an active state so that it can be used for behavior, particularly those that involve long-term
mental manipulations of all kinds (Dehaene & Naccache, planning (e.g., Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Wilson, 2002).
2001). The ability to bridge temporal gaps by These processes involve (a) conscious deliberation about
maintaining active internal representations of objects, and simulation of the costs and benefits of future action,
persons, etc. has been linked to working memory, (b) the commitment to a particular action, (c) the ability
especially to the episodic buffer as a common storage to assemble action plans by combining sub-goals into a
system (Baddeley, 2007). One important implication of a goal hierarchy or sequence, ranging from concrete to
common temporary store is that information may be abstract, and (d) the ability to adapt to discrepancies
represented in a shared representational format that is between actual and ideal states by inhibiting or
closely linked to thought and language (Dehaene & overriding interfering behaviors during goal pursuit.
Naccache, 2001). Note that active information Note that the research on nonconscious goal pursuit
maintenance is distinct from long-term memory. The cited above (Bargh et al., 2001) seems to call into
latter is probably best viewed as a modular sub-system question whether consciousness is necessary for
contributing information to consciousness (Dehaene & intentional behavior to occur and there is more and more
Naccache, 2001). For instance, when being asked “What evidence that each of these stages can also be carried out
is ‘Tiger’ Wood’s actual first name?” you have to hold nonconsciously (Hassin, Aarts, Eitam, Custers, &
the question temporarily in mind (active information Kleiman, 2008). We think that the essential difference
maintenance) and then search your long-term memory in between conscious and nonconscious goal pursuit lies in
the hope for an answer. the flexibility enabled by conscious processing.
Consciousness may not be needed foror may even
Flexible Combination of Information hamperthe initiation and performance of context-
A second type of conscious mental activity is the appropriate action plans that, due to their frequent
ability to combine information in a highly flexible way. occurrence, have become consolidated into automatized
This ability forms the basis of deliberate, rule-based routines (Baumeister, 1984; Cleeremans & Jiménez,
reasoning which requires the flexible selection, 2002). However, consciousness may be needed to
manipulation and combination (e.g., weighting) of provide the “workplace” where action plans can be
information. This idea lies at the heart of influential generated anew or significantly modified and corrected
conceptualizations of working memory as involving not in response to an ever changing environment (Bargh,
only an episodic buffer used for active information 2005; Bongers, Dijksterhuis, & Spears, 2008; Dehaene &
maintenance (see above) but also the ability to perform a Naccache, 2001; Tononi & Edelman, 1998). Somewhat
large range of mental operations ‘on top of’ the ironically then, “one of the primary objectives of
represented information (Baddeley, 2007; Kane, conscious processing may be to eliminate the need for
Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001). Furthermore, the itself in the future by making learned skills as automatic
flexible manipulation of information is associated with a as possible” (Bargh, 2005; p. 53)but to be back on the
subjective feeling of mental effort. Take, for example, alert in case things go wrong. For an illustrative field
mental arithmetic (e.g., solve 24  13) or anagrams (e.g., experiment, simply exchange the coffee machine in your
find an anagram for “scones cousins”).1 In fact, abundant department by a completely different type and observe
research attests to the limited capacity and resource- how people have to suppress their (now inappropriate)
dependence of executive operations such as switching routine actions, use all their conscious attention to figure
between tasks, mental transformations, negations, or out the new operating rules, and, after only a few days
response inhibition (Deutsch, Gawronski, & Strack, fetch their coffees whistling as absentmindedly as usual.
2006; Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003). This Typically, our intentional behaviors are accompanied
limited capacity and resource dependence sets by a subjective feeling of conscious will or a sense of
considerable constraints on the scope and influence of ‘agency’. Yet, there are quite diverging views about
conscious operations. whether this co-occurrence should be interpreted in
We do not mean to suggest that consciousness is causal terms (i.e., conscious operations actually causing
“smart” and unconscious processing is “dumb.” Recent intentional behavior) or rather as a spurious correlation
research suggest that distracting people from consciously (i.e., conscious will and intentional behavior both caused
thinking about the information before letting them by unconscious mechanisms, reducing conscious will to
choose leads to higher quality decisions (Dijksterhuis, an epiphenomenon; Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Perl,
Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006; but see Acker, 1983; Wegner, 2002). Some authors (e.g., Libet, 1999 in
2008)at least for complex choice tasks involving large his 1999 article; Wilson, 2002) have adopted something
amounts of information (J. W. Payne, Samper, Bettman, like a middle position, assigning consciousness neither
& Luce, 2008). This may be the case because distraction the role of an all-controlling agent nor of a totally passive
may prevent people from consciously weighing the and utterly inconsequential recipient of fait accompli. A
presented information in an overly selective manner. metaphor to describe this midline position is that of a
Most researchers agree, however, that conscious thought chief executive residing over a number of independent
is required to follow set rules where information has to departments in a well-functioning company. The
be combined in a precise and selective manner department officers set their own agendas, and do not
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). typically inform the executive about their every move.
However, the executive still has a certain picture about
Generation of Intentional Behavior what is and should be going on in the company. During
Third, consciousness seems to be strongly associated times of crisis, he can use his or her power to ‘veto’
with the generation of willful, intentional behavior (Libet, 1999) or modify important decisions under way if
(Baars, 1997; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). What we they do not conform to his vision of the company’s
refer to here is the set of complex processes involved future.

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 Consciousness and introspection

Sense of Self theater stage (Baars, 1997), or, to use our preferred
Consciousness surely contributes to a sense of self. metaphor, an internal news program.3 In other words, the
Each conscious state is typically experienced as a unity global workspace provides a common communication
(Tononi & Edelman, 1998). The integrated, unitary platform onto which important ‘headlines’ from a
nature of consciousness may provide the experiential potentially great range of processing modules are
basis for a feeling of selfhood. On a larger time scale, broadcast. This global workspace seems to be highly
conscious experiences are condensed into an interconnected with thought and language. Mental
autobiographical self through the temporal integration of contents that enter the global workspace can be readily
events into a coherent, personal narrative (Dietrich, 2007; represented in the currency of ‘thought’ (e.g., “The
Wilson, 2002). Thus, as a fourth function, consciousness answer is »Eldrick«!”), or, to use a term applied by
may allow for the development of relatively stable Strack and Deutsch (2004; Chapter 4), in a propositional
explicit self-views, self-concepts, beliefs, and attitudes. format. These propositional representations can then be
These explicit representations involving the self “bind” communicated via language by drawing on serial speech
together what would otherwise be relatively meaningless production centers (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). Of
reactions on the spur of the moment. Clearly, having a course, people may sometimes lack the precise words for
sense of self or “self model” (Vogeley, Kurthen, Falkai, describing their internal states or be unwilling to report
& Maier, 1999) is a great organizing principle. It endows these states explicitly. Nevertheless, the connection
humans with the capacity to coordinate their activities between consciousness and language seems to be so
across long time-spans (e.g., pursuing a university close that many authors have made the verbal
degree) and in accordance with basic orientations that reportability a central defining feature of consciousness
have proven functional in the past. (e.g., Weisskrantz, 1997).

Contemporary Approaches to the Nature of Access to the Global Workspace

Consciousness: Consciousness as Global Workspace The next question, of course, is which particular sub-
Having sketched a shortlist of functions that may be systems share a subscription to the common news
associated with consciousness, the next question to ask is channel and which do not? The assumption here is that
obviously how these functions are achieved. That’s the brain modules not interconnected to the global
Million Dollar question in consciousness research. It workspace are permanently cut off from the global
would be either naïve or arrogant to claim that workspace and can therefore never participate in the
psychology has even come close to solving this riddle. internal broadcasting of conscious content (for instance,
However, the last decade or so has seen great progress in brainstem systems for controlling body functions).
conceptualizing possible underlying mechanisms. This Dehaene and Naccache (2001) suggest that several
progress has been facilitated by the tools of cognitive classes of neural subsystems appear to participate in the
neuroscience, which have made it possible to explore the workspace. These include (a) a working memory system
neural architecture that supports consciousness. An used for active representation and manipulation of
extensive review of different approaches to the nature of information, (b) perceptual systems that provide sensual
consciousness is beyond the scope of this chapter (for a information about the present state of the environment
review, see Atkinson, Thomas, & Cleeremans, 2000). To and the body, (c) long-term memory networks that
sacrifice breadth for detail, we will only discuss one retrieve condensed past workspace outputs (e.g.,
basic idea towards which a number of scholars have been knowledge laid down in semantic memory) or reinstate
converging from quite different fields (Dennett, 2001): past workspace states (e.g., episodic memory of past
the idea of consciousness as a global workspace (Baars, experiences), (d) evaluation circuits that provide valence
1997; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). We will then use the in relation to previous experience, (e) motor circuits that
global workspace model as a background and elaborate a are concerned with the preparation and execution of
more specific model about the relation between implicit actions, and (f) special processing units dedicated to
and explicit cognition and about possible ways by which extract and interpret information about the self (see also
accurate self-inferences about the adaptive unconscious Damasio, 1999), allowing for the long-term temporal
may be possible. integration of conscious experiences into a personal
narrative or autobiographical self. These systems can all
The Global Workspace as a Communication Platform contribute and exchange a wide range of potential
Many cognitive theories share the assumption that contents within the global workspace through their
conscious processing goes beyond the modularity of mutual interconnections. This may account for the
dedicated subsystems that operate in parallel along amazingly rich and differentiated spectrum of conscious
established neural pathways. Instead, it is supposed to be states (Tononi & Edelman, 1998).
supported by a functional architecture that allows for a However, only a tiny fraction of the information from
highly flexible exchange of information across subsystems that are potentially interconnected to the
participating processing units (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; global workspace does gain access at a given point in
Posner, 1994; Shallice, 1988). One idea that has received time (to determine each global workspace state).
a great deal of attention in consciousness research (e.g., Whether the output of a given process is actually
Baars, 1997) is that of a global workspace “with long- recruited into consciousness may depend on at least two
distance connectivity that can potentially interconnect dynamical parameters. First, the information stemming
multiple specialized brain areas in a coordinated though from nonconscious processing has to have a minimal
variable manner” (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001, p. 13). amount of (bottom-up) activation that exceeds a certain
The computational benefit enabled by such a global threshold. Some processes may simply be too weak to
workspace is that modular systems that are not directly yield sufficient degrees of ongoing activation in order for
interconnected to each other nevertheless receive access the represented information to be recruited into the
to each other’s contentmuch like through a shared global workspace (see Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002, for

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 Consciousness and introspection

a more differentiated view). Yet, the same processes may top-down attentional amplification. This zone refers to
still be strong enough to trigger further nonconscious what has under different names and emphases been
processing and may eventually even produce significant called fringe consciousness (James, 1890), preconscious
behavioral output. This is presumably the case in the (Freud, 1924/1968), experiential awareness (Strack &
subliminal priming studies reviewed above, where the Deutsch, 2004), primary experience (Farthing, 1992),
neural activation triggered by the subliminal stimulus is first-order experience (Lambie & Marcel, 2002), or, the
assumed to fall in between a ‘minimal threshold' of term adopted here, phenomenal consciousness (Block,
information processing and a ‘consciousness threshold’ 1995). Phenomenal consciousness may encompass a vast
above which information can be recruited into the global range of sensations and experiences, including
workspace. perceptions, feelings, and other bodily sensations such as
Second, whether information becomes part of the pain, people are having without being aware (in the sense
current workspace is assumed to depend on a mechanism of knowing) that they are having them (Frijda, 2005;
of ‘top-down’ attentional amplification (Dehaene & Lambie & Marcel, 2002). Importantly, information
Naccache, 2001; Lamme, 2003; Posner, 1994). Most represented in this way may, under certain conditions
theorists share the postulate that a selective attention (i.e., attentional amplification), become fully consciously
system is responsible for gating access to and residence accessible and gain the status of the third zone (Dehaene
time in consciousness. Specifically, the orientation of & Naccache, 2001; Lamme, 2003).
attention, similar to a spotlight, is the “mechanism, by The third zone is reserved for the elite information
which modular processes can be temporarily mobilized that has passed the gates of selective attention and
and made available to the global workspace, and therefore become recruited into the global workspace. As
therefore to consciousness” (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001, part of the global workspace, it becomes accessible to a
p. 14). In other words, on-going activity is not sufficient large range of different processing modules including
for information to enter consciousness. It also has to be long-term memory, self-processing units, and speech
amplified and maintained over a sufficient amount of production centers that translate the information into a
time in order to become available for other processes propositional format (see above). This zone represents
participating in the workspace.4 what has been termed noetic awareness (Strack &
The capacity for what is represented in consciousness Deutsch, 2004), reflective experience (Farthing, 1992),
at a given point in time is severely limited. Therefore, at second order experience (Lambie & Marcel, 2002), or
any given time, multiple modular processing outputs access consciousness (Block, 1995). This transition to
compete for access to the global workspace, or ‘fame in access-consciousness is where an informational
the brain’ as Dennett (2001) has put it. Because access is ‘quantum leap’ takes place: Suddenly, experience is no
limited and competitive, the contours of the global more ‘just’ experience. It has been tagged as such and
workspace are not constant (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; become the object of higher-order thoughts directed at it
Tononi & Edelman, 1998). Rather, global workspace (Rosenthal, 1993; Schooler, 2002), such as when you
states change dynamically as, depending on the context, eventually realize during an interesting sofa conversation
different information gains temporary access and fades that your foot has gone asleep. Access-consciousness
out againgiving rise to what James (1890) has called therefore refers to informational contents that people are
the ‘stream of consciousness’. aware of in the sense of knowing. These contents can be
communicated, at least approximately, in the form of
Three ‘Zones’ of Consciousness propositional statements about oneself and the world.
In sum, the adopted framework of a global
workspace leads to three different ‘zones’ of Getting to Know the Adaptive Unconscious
consciousness as illustrated in Figure 1: First, The discovery that many processes take place outside
information that is forever impervious to consciousness of conscious awareness has raised the question about
because it is part of lower-order subroutines that cannot what people can actually know about their mental life
per se share their contents in the common (Wilson, 2002). In other words, to what degree can we
communication protocol due to a lack of neural gain conscious self-insight into our adaptive
connectivity with the workspace (Dehaene & Naccache, unconscious? In the following, we will consider two
2001). Take, for instance, the ‘low-level’ computations approaches to this question. A first line of research has
performed by separate dedicated sub-systems in your demonstrated the limited nature of people’s introspective
visual cortex. No matter how hard you try (without using ability. Because this research has been summarized in
a scalpel), you will never be able to perceive separately great detail elsewhere (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), we will
the intermediate results from the dorsal stream (the only provide a short overview of the major conclusions
“where” pathway) and the ventral stream (the “what” from this work. The second line of research, which we
pathway) before they are actually integrated on a higher- will focus on in the present chapter, deals with implicit-
order level of processing. The first zone may be referred explicit consistency, that is, the match or mismatch
to as the realm of unconscious processing in the strict between people’s explicit self-reports about their
sense. Even though impervious to consciousness, attitudes, self-esteem, self-concept, or motives on the one
unconscious modular processing can be the source both hand and their scores in thematically corresponding
of processing outputs from the following zone implicit measures on the other.
(phenomenal consciousness) and of behavioral output Filling out a questionnaire about oneself (e.g., “Do I
(e.g., Bargh et al., 1996). like green eggs and ham?”) presupposes some kind of
The second zone is given by the subclass of higher- introspective activity. Introspection is a very broad term
order processing outputs from modular sub-systems that and can involve quite different activities ranging from
has the potential to be recruited into the workspace but meditation to psychoanalytic therapy (Wilson, 2002). For
does not (currently) gain access to it, either because it is the following analysis, we would like to narrow the term
too weakly represented or because it does not receive down to those cases in which people reflect about their

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 Consciousness and introspection

own dispositions or behaviors and define it as a The Implicit-Explicit Relationship: A Self-Inference

conscious mental activity by which attention is directed Model
towards one’s own phenomenal sensations and The research program just described has provided
experiences in an attempt to form a self-referential evidence for limited introspective access into the
proposition about these experiences with the use of nonconscious underpinnings of mental life by
inferential rules. Introspection thus defined is a complex demonstrating discrepancies between people’s
inference process by which mental experiences may introspective reports and influential aspects in their
become access-conscious and become integrated into a stimulus environment that have been varied
coherent propositional judgment involving the self (e.g., experimentally. However, the advances in the assessment
“I do not like green eggs and ham, the mere sight of them of implicit representations such as implicit attitudes, self-
makes me sick”). esteem, and personality self-concepts without which
this handbook would not have been writtenhave
Introspective Limits into the Causes of Behavior opened up a new way of studying the issue of
A first wave of interest into people’s introspective introspective access to the adaptive unconscious.
abilities has been sparked by the general finding that Specifically, by investigating the degree of
people are often unaware of the effects of a given correspondence (or consistency) between explicit and
stimulus on their own behavior (for a review, see Nisbett implicit measures of the same construct new insights
& Wilson, 1977). In a series of experiments, Nisbett and about the relationship between implicit and explicit
Wilson showed that participants’ verbal reports about the cognition and the factors that moderate it may be gained.
causes of their behavior often stand in stark contrast to Much of the early debate around implicit social
the true state of affairs. For instance, in one study Nisbett cognition was sparked from empirical findings showing a
and Wilson (1977) manipulated the warmth or coldness dissociation between implicit and explicit measures of
of a foreign college teacher presented in a video attitudes, self-esteem, motives, and personality
interview. One group watched the lecturer answer a (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; for a review, see Wilson,
series of questions in an extremely warm and friendly Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). This lack of correspondence
manner. The second group saw exactly the same person between implicit and explicit measures was often taken
answer exactly the questions in a cold and distant as evidence for the existence of implicit representations
manner. They then rated the teacher on three attributes (with regard to objects, people, and the self) that were
that were kept constant across conditions: physical “introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately) identified”
attractiveness, mannerisms, and accent. Consistent with (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, p. 5). However, the
the so-called halo effect, students who saw the warm claim of complete independence may be too strong. That
version of the teacher rated his physically attractiveness, is, the relationship between implicit representations and
mannerisms, and accent as more appealing than did explicit representations may be conditional rather than
students who saw the cold version. However, when asked fixed. Such a view is theoretically consistent with the
whether their liking for the teacher had influenced their above idea that access to consciousness is the result of a
ratings of the three attributes, participants in both groups competition among many modular processes depending
denied any effect this might have had. Even more on features of the processes themselves (strength of
striking, those in the cold condition claimed that their activation) but also on the surrounding context
impressions of the three attributes had influenced their (attentional amplification). Hence, the result of
overall liking for him. In other words, they had inverted unconscious processing may, at different times, become
the true causal relationship between the variables in this access-conscious or not. Oftentimes, dissociations
study. between implicit and explicit representations may
These and similar results across a wide range of emerge if implicit processing outputs are too weak, not
domains (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; see Eastwick & attended to, misinterpreted, or suppressed for
Finkel, 2008, for a recent extension to romantic partner motivational reasons and these dissociations may have
preferences) support the idea that introspecting about the important consequences for further information
reasons for their behavior is a constructive process in processing and well-being (Wilson & Dunn, 2004;
which people have only limited conscious access to the Wilson et al., 2000). Given the right conditions, however,
true underlying processes. The true underlying processes, implicit processing outputs may enter access
however, may often be produced by the adaptive consciousness and factor into people’s explicit
unconscious (such as, for instance, the halo effect). When representations about themselves and the world. In these
asked to provide causal explanations for their behavior, cases, at least gradual self-insight into workings of the
people may retrieve lay theories about themselves (i.e., adaptive unconscious should be possible.
chronic self-views or personal narratives) or about how The conditional view to implicit-explicit consistency
certain events are caused and generate explanations that suggests a moderator approach by which changes in the
are consistent with these lay theories. However, people correlation between implicit and explicit measures are
may often fail to recognize that the explanations thus investigated as a function of cognitive or motivational
generated are incomplete and inaccurate. As Nisbett and factors. In order to organize the empirical research that
Wilson (1977) implied, introspective reports should has adopted such an approach, we suggest a self-
become more accurate to the extent that influential inference model for implicit-explicit consistency (Figure
stimuli aspects are salient and plausible causes of 2) that allows putting the observed correlation between
behavior so that they are attended to and used as a basis explicit self-reports and implicit measures (arrow i), into
for causal inference. a broader theoretical perspective (see also Hofmann,
Gschwendner, Nosek, & Schmitt, 2005).5
As a starting point, we will adopt a dual
representation view according to which implicit and
explicit dispositions have distinct mental representations

6
 Consciousness and introspection

(e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wilson et al., 2000). More Route 1: Introspective Access to MentalExperiences
specifically, most models of implicit cognition propose According to the model, translation can only work if
that implicit dispositions are represented in an associative there are valid internal cues that are associated with
format (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & implicit representations in the first place (path a). In
Deutsch, 2004). For instance, a negative implicit attitude principle, many different kinds of phenomenal
towards obese people is understood as an associative link experiences may be triggered by implicit representations
between the concept of ‘obese’ and a negative evaluative and serve as valid cues, among them gut feelings or core
node. Conscious, explicit dispositions are represented in affect (Russell, 2003), as well as experiences of fluency,
a propositional format, that is, through a statement about familiarity, or confidence (e.g., Petty, Brinol, & Tormala,
concepts and their interrelations (e.g., “I do not like 2002; Reber & Schwarz, 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 1996;
obese people”). In contrast to associative links, Topolinski & Strack, 2009). To illustrate our point, we
propositional statements carry a truth value and can will focus on gut feelings here as particularly relevant
therefore be accepted as true or rejected as false (e.g., and likely cues for such self-inferences, especially in the
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, domains of attitudes and self-esteem (Fazio,
2004). Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Gawronski &
Viewed this way, the issue of introspective access Bodenhausen, 2006; Phelps et al., 2000). For other
becomes the question of how information that is domains involving semantic processing such as implicit
represented in an associative format can be ‘translated’ stereotyping or the implicit self-concept, knowledge-
into a propositional format. Clearly, distinct formats (i.e., related mental cues such as fluency, familiarity, or
associative vs. propositional) preclude direct confidence may prove to be more relevant.
introspective access in the sense of a direct explicit In accordance with the above approach to
oversight of implicit representational structures (e.g., consciousness, such mental cues do not necessarily enjoy
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). We cannot spot our a conscious status. They reflect, in essence, an
associations directly. Any approach concerned with the experiential, preconscious, or phenomenal state of
transition from implicit to explicit representations must awareness (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). These signals can
therefore specify how such a translation process may be be weak, ambiguous, or simply unattended to because
brought about. We believe that much conceptual clarity attention is directed elsewhere. Often, therefore, these
can be gained by viewing this translation as a self- cues may fade into oblivion before ever becoming fully
inference process and by drawing on the logic of consciously available for self-inferencest the same
prominent models of social inference (e.g., Brunswik, time they may still be strong enough to bias judgments
1956; Funder, 1999). That is, even though people cannot and behavior in an unconscious manner (e.g.,
directly ‘take a look’ at their implicit associations they Winkielman et al., 2005). Following the global
may be able to infer valid self-insights about these workspace approach, whether valid cues are
properties by registering the perceivable processing introspectively accessible (path b) may hinge on at least
outputs that these associations produce.6 Specifically, the two parameters: their strength of activation and whether
activation of implicit representations may generate (a) they receive attentional top-down amplification (Dehaene
inner phenomenal experiences or (b) behavioral cues & Naccache, 2001).
which may assist in drawing inferences about the nature
of the underlying implicit representation. The accuracy Activation Strength
of the self-inference process will depend on the quality of Given that access to consciousness is the result of a
three consecutive steps: First, implicit representations dynamic competition among processing outputs for
have to be reliably associated with phenomenal or ‘fame in the brain’, strong representations may yield
behavioral cues in the first place (cue validity). Second, outputs that have a higher potential for becoming
these valid cues have to be noticed (cue detection). And available to access-consciousness than weak
third, the information contained in these cues has to be representations. As a consequence, implicit and explicit
integrated into the explicit self-inference (cue representations may correspond more closely for strong
utilization). As we will see, obstacles to accurate self- representations. Nosek (2005) tested this hypothesis by
insights about implicit representations may lurk at each using a combined strength factor of attitude importance,
stage of this process. thought frequency, and familiarity as a moderator of
In the following, we will first consider cue validity implicit-explicit consistency. Across 57 attitude domains,
and cue detection for the two plausible routes to self- a multilevel analysis revealed that stronger
knowledge about implicit representations, that is, via representations were associated with greater consistency
phenomenal cues (path a  path b in Figure 2) or via the between implicit and self-reported evaluations as
self-observation of behavioral cues (path c  path e). If compared to weaker attitudes. Comparable effects have
successfully taken, information contained in valid cues been observed for attitude importance as a proxy for
will become consciously available for self-inference. We representational strength (Hofmann, Gschwendner, &
will then discuss factors such as additional information Schmitt, 2005; Karpinski, Steinman, & Hilton, 2005).
retrieval and invalidation processes that may prevent Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact mechanism
consciously accessible information from having a responsible for these findings, these data generally
traceable impact on the final explicit representation. support the idea that strong implicit representations yield
These factors are represented by a feedback loop (arrow mental experiences that are more easily detectable than
f) to indicate that conscious content is iteratively those stemming from weak representations.
transformed through the additional processes involved. Is activation strength linearly related to better access
Finally, we will highlight some issues of measurement into consciousness? Some authors have argued, that
(involving paths g and h) one should be aware of when strength (in terms of frequency of operation) may rather
drawing conclusions about self-insight based on the have an inverse U-shaped relationship with availability to
correlation between implicit and explicit measures. access-consciousness (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002).

7
 Consciousness and introspection

Novel representations may yet be too weak to become that implicit dispositions related to social interactions,
noticeable whereas highly overlearned representations no such as implicit prejudice, implicit anxiety, or implicit
longer attract attention (even though their representations shyness, are particularly strongly reflected in nonverbal,
may be very strong). This is clearly an area for future relatively uncontrolled modes of behavior (e.g.,
research and points to the interplay between Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Dovidio, Kawakami,
representational properties and the modulating role of & Gaertner, 2002; Egloff & Schmukle, 2002). In
attention that will be considered next. contrast, explicit dispositions have been shown to
primarily predict controlled behaviors (e.g., Asendorpf et
Focus of Attention al., 2002; Dovidio et al., 2002; indicated by path d in the
Whether attention is focused on valid diagnostic cues model). During social interaction, people typically pay
or directed somewhere else should have a decisive relatively little attention to the uncontrolled (e.g.,
influence on the detection of these cues. For instance, nonverbal) aspects of their behavior, quite in contrast to
Hofmann and colleagues reasoned that, all else being what they say or what they intentionally do. Hence,
equal, people high in private self-consciousness asking individuals to adopt the visual perspective of an
(Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) should direct their observer and to focus on these normally unattended
attention inwards more often than people low in private behavioral cues may increase self-perceivers’ accuracy
self-consciousness and become more sensitive with about their underlying implicit dispositions.
regard to inner mental experiences (especially affective Plausible as the self-perception route seems to be, the
and visceral signals). However, in an initial set of available evidence suggests that it is more like a bumpy
studies, private self-consciousness did not by itself yield road than a highway to the adaptive unconscious.
increased implicit-explicit correspondence (Hofmann, Hofmann, Gschwendner, and Schmitt (in press)
Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; investigated whether self-perceivers can detect their own
Hofmann, Gschwendner, & Schmitt, 2005). implicit dispositions such as implicit extraversion or
These first findings are consistent with the idea that implicit anxiety from nonverbal behavioral cues
introspection does not necessarily lead to greater contained in video feedback. Across three studies, near
accuracy. Rather, the focus at which attention is directed zero-correlations between participants’ implicit
seems to be crucial. Often, introspection may involve an dispositions and their behavioral self-assessment on the
extensive information search about why one holds a respective nonverbal dimensions were consistently
particular attitude or trait (Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lisle, obtained. One may object that, perhaps, the behaviors
1989). This may direct the spotlight of attention away under investigation were not diagnostic of implicit
from relevant phenomenal cues such as immediately dispositions. This alternative interpretation can be ruled
experienced feelings (Gawronski & LeBel, 2008; Hixon out by the fact that neutral observers reliably detected
& Swann, 1993; Storbeck & Clore, 2008). In a stringent participants’ implicit dispositions from the videotapes
test of this assumption, Gawronski and LeBel (2008) (Hofmann et al., in press). This suggests that the videos
manipulated the focus of attention during introspection actually did contain valid information about implicit
about their attitudes. Consistent with the assumed role of dispositions which, however, remained undetected by
attentional focus, implicit-explicit correspondence was self-perceivers (see also Dovidio et al., 2002).
close to zero when participants were instructed to focus The observed discrepancy between self- and other-
on the reasons for their preferences; however, substantial perception suggests that people have a ‘blind’ spot when
implicit-explicit correspondence emerged when it comes to the detection of their own implicit
participants were instructed to focus on their affective dispositions from behavioral information. Somewhat
reactions instead. Similarly, Smith and Nosek (2007) paradoxically then, observers making accurate inferences
showed that implicit and explicit attitudes formed a from behavioral cues may sometimes know a target
single factor when participants completed both measures person’s implicit dispositions better than the target
under an affective focus manipulation. In contrast, herselfat least when she has no privileged introspective
implicit and explicit attitudes diverged when a cognitive access via Route 1. There are a number of cognitive and
focus was induced. These results are consistent with a motivational factors that may account for such a blind
meta-analysis across many content domains in which spot (for a more detailed discussion, see Hofmann et al.,
IAT measures correlated more highly with self-reports in press). For instance, individuals may harbor chronic
that implied an affective as compared to a cognitive self-schemas (Markus, 1977) which may bias the
focus (Hofmann, Gawronski et al., 2005). perception and categorization of one’s own behavior,
leading to less accurate self-observations than
Route 2: Self-observation of Diagnostic Behavior observations made by unbiased observers. Such
Rather than ‘looking inward’, a person may take a perceptual barriers may be overcome if accuracy takes
‘look outward’ approach in order to infer something precedence over consistency motivation, for instance
valid about her adaptive unconscious. In accordance with when high incentives are provided or when people learn
self-perception theory (Bem, 1972), it has been suggested to view themselves through the eyes of others (Wilson,
that individuals may gain conscious insights about 2002; Wilson & Dunn, 2004).
implicit dispositions by self-observing diagnostic
behaviors (path e) that are caused by implicit dispositions Limits to Cue Utilization: Information Retrieval and
(path c) (e.g., Gawronski et al., 2006; Nosek, 2005; Invalidation Processes
Wilson, 2002). Via this behavioral detour, individuals So far we have argued that, at least under certain
may generate accurate self-inferences about their implicit conditions, potentially diagnostic information about
representations. underlying implicit dispositions may become consciously
What kinds of behavioral cues are potentially available in a propositional format. But this is only half
diagnostic with regard to underlying implicit dispositions the story. For the self-inference process to be completed,
(path c)? There is now accumulating research showing the potentially diagnostic information has to be

8
 Consciousness and introspection

integrated into the explicit representation (cue How are such invalidation processes brought about?
utilization). Consistent with the global workspace Consistent with theories of cognitive consistency (e.g.,
approach, conscious information may become subject to Festinger, 1957), invalidation may result if the
additional processing (arrow f) that leads to a flexible propositional implication of an implicit representation
manipulation of the contents of consciousness in relation (e.g., “I do not like obese people”) is logically
to other propositionally available information. Due to the inconsistent with other currently represented
large amount of possible operations, these additional propositions. Of particular interest in this regard are
transformations of conscious content can take many chronically available self-views (e.g., Gawronski &
forms. Here, we will pinpoint two broad classes of Bodenhausen, 2006; Gawronski, Peters, Brochu, &
operations that we think are key when people form an Strack, 2008). For instance, it has often been reported
explicit representation about their attitudes, self-esteem, that people high in motivation to control prejudiced
or self-concept: further information retrieval and reactions (MCPR) show decreased implicit-explicit
invalidation processes. correspondence as compared with people low in MCPR
(e.g., Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995;
Further Information Retrieval and Integration Hofmann, Gschwendner, & Schmitt, 2005; B. K. Payne,
When forming an explicit representation of their Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). Assuming that both
dispositions, people are likely to retrieve information groups do not differ on their level of implicit prejudice
from long-term memory. Such information may include (Devine, 1989), this pattern of findings can be interpreted
past behaviors, knowledge about the world, and as the result of an invalidation process in individuals who
knowledge about the self. Consistent with the basic view themselves as unprejudiced (e.g., “I am an
tenets of information integration theory (Anderson, egalitarian person”). Specifically, chronic self-views may
1981), such additional information will ‘dilute’ the lead people to invalidate diagnostic mental experiences
residual weight or impact of the diagnostic cue for the (e.g., becoming aware of negative gut feelings towards
resulting explicit representation. For instance, when the prejudiced group) or behavioral self-observations
introspecting about whether to buy a given car, a (e.g., becoming aware of the fact that one physically
person’s explicit representation may be based on more avoids members of the prejudiced group) that are
than just the propositional translation of her gut feelings inconsistent with these self-views.
about the car, incorporating also judgments derived from A second source of inconsistency may be given by
information about price, fuel consumption, and lay theories about the diagnostic value of certain mental
maintenance expenses. Hence, the more an explicit or behavioral events (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). There are
representation includes additional propositions that are a number of largely untested research hypotheses that
different from those implied by implicit representation, can be derived from this idea. Regarding mental
the more implicit and explicit representations will experiences, for instance, people may question whether
diverge. Consistent with the information integration intuitions and gut reactions can be trusted (Epstein,
hypothesis, implicit-explicit consistency has been found Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). All else being equal,
to be lower for those individuals that are high in need for low trust in intuition should therefore lead to a rejection
cognition (Florack, Scarabis, & Bless, 2001) or high in of mental experiences stemming from implicit
working memory capacity (Hofmann, Gschwendner, dispositions. Accordingly, higher correspondence
Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008, Study 2). Conversely, it between implicit and explicit self-esteem has been
has been found that the correspondence between explicit obtained among people with high faith in their intuition
and implicit dispositions increases when explicit self- (Jordan, Whitfield, & Zeigler-Hill, 2007). In the case of
reports are made spontaneously or under time pressure behavioral cues, people may need to be convinced that
(Hofmann, Gawronski et al., 2005; Koole, Dijksterhuis, their nonverbal behavior may tell them something central
& van Knippenberg, 2001; Ranganath, Smith, & Nosek, about themselves and that the situation in which it is
2007). Taken together, factors that prevent additional observed is valid enough to warrant a dispositional self-
information retrieval and integration may lead to self- attribution (Hofmann et al., in press).7 Finally, some
inferences that are more in line with implicit people may be more tolerable than others of
representations. inconsistencies between new potentially diagnostic
information and existing top-down views about
Invalidation Processes themselves (e.g., Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995;
The process of information retrieval just described Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).
should yield gradual changes in implicit-explicit It is possible that validation processes that involve
consistency as more and more information is integrated. the same constellations over and over again may
In contrast to the above dilution-effect, certain factors themselves become so highly automatized that
may lead to a complete invalidation of potentially invalidation occurs outside of conscious awareness, i.e.,
diagnostic cues. As a result of invalidation, the before people become consciously aware of discordant
information contained in these cues is not utilized for implicit processing outputs (e.g., Moskowitz, Gollwitzer,
self-inference at all. Specifically, information that would Wasel, & Schaal, 1999). This suggests the fascinating
be potentially diagnostic of implicit representations may possibility of unconscious motivational barriers to
become tagged as false, inappropriate, or nondiagnostic introspection (Wilson & Dunn, 2004), similar to the
and thus become rejected as a basis for an explicit Freudian idea of repression (Erdelyi, 1993). To our
judgment (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack knowledge, these ideas are still scientifically largely
& Deutsch, 2004). If an invalidation process is directed unchartered territory (see Northoff, Bermpohl,
at mental or behavioral cues stemming from implicit Schoeneich, & Boeker, 2007, for a recently proposed
representations, explicit and implicit representations are neuroscientific approach).
likely to diverge.

9
 Consciousness and introspection

A Final Note on Measurement inflexible) automatic processing, resulting in smooth,

When making inferences about the interplay of efficient, but potentially biased behavior.
implicit and explicit representations it is important to We have also argued that, without consciousness,
keep in mind that the measures used will only be there would be no sense of self, at least in the human
proxiesnever pure reflectionsof the hypothetical sense with which we are all familiar. Only conscious
constructs they are supposed to assess. Rather, both processing appears to enable the long-term temporal
implicit and explicit measures inevitably suffer from integration of conscious experiences into a coherent
method-specific variance and reliability constraints that narrative about oneself. Because this constructive process
impinge on the quality of measurement (paths g and h in of self-inference draws on a limited informational basis,
the model). Explicit self-report measures are known to be explicit self-views may often be dissociated from the
sensitive to the way questions are posed (Schwarz, contents of the adaptive unconscious, rendering people
1999). Also, self-reports are generally more susceptible strangers to themselves (Wilson, 2002). These
to faking than implicit measures (e.g., Asendorpf et al., dissociations become particularly striking when people
2002). Implicit measures, likewise suffer from method- are explicitly instructed to provide explanations for their
specific sources of contamination (e.g., Mierke & Klauer, often unconsciously driven feelings, judgments, and
2003). In addition, some implicit measures such as behaviors.
affective or sequential priming exhibit unsatisfactory Are people always ignorant about their adaptive
reliabilities (Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; unconscious? We think that self-insight into implicit
Olson & Fazio, 2003). Furthermore, implicit-explicit dispositions may be best viewed as a gradual thing.
correlations may be attenuated by a lack of structural or Using the relationship between implicit and explicit
conceptual correspondence between measures measures as a criterion, we proposed a model according
(Gschwendner, Hofmann, & Schmitt, 2008; Hofmann, to which self-insight into implicit dispositions may be the
Gschwendner, Nosek et al., 2005; B. K. Payne, Burkley, result of a self-inference process. The accuracy of this
& Stokes, 2008) such as when using black and white process will be highest if valid cues for implicit
faces in an Implicit Association Test and questions dispositions exist (cue validity), are detected (cue
addressing perceived discrimination in the Modern detection), and are used (cue utilization) as a basis for an
Racism Scale (Brigham, 1993). As a consequence, explicit inference about one’s attitude or self. While there
implicit-explicit correlations can be attenuated due to is evidence that valid cues do exist in the form of internal
method-specific variance, measurement error, or lack of phenomenal experiences such as gut feelings or self-
correspondence. Interpreting the size of implicit-explicit observed nonverbal behaviors, cue detection and cue
correlations in an absolute manner may therefore lead to utilization may be hampered by a host of variables
false conclusions about the “true” relationship at the related to attentional focus, information integration and
level of representations. For this reason, approaches invalidation processes. Perhaps most centrally, chronic
contrasting implicit-explicit consistency as a function of self-views and false lay theories may reduce the accuracy
specific experimental manipulations or personality of self-inferences.
dispositions in a relative manner are to be preferred. Because introspection can go awry so easily, limited,
Nevertheless, researchers should use corresponding but at the same time variable self-insight into the
measures and make sure that the situational or adaptive unconscious can be expected. As the interplay
dispositional moderators of interest are not confounded between implicit and explicit cognition becomes
with sources of method-specific variance, changes in the increasingly well understood, so will be the conditions
reliability of measurement, or both. under which people can increase their self-knowledge
about the inner workings of their minds. Whether such
Summary and Conclusions self-insight is always beneficial to the individual is a
In summary, recent social cognition research has different story about which it may be worthwhile to
provided extensive support for a fundamental insight of introspect a little more.
early pioneers of psychology: that a vast amount of
everyday human information processing occurs Authors’ Note
unconsciously. The amount of evidence attesting to the We thank Axel Cleeremans, Malte Friese, Nico
workings of the adaptive unconscious is so massive that Frijda, Regina Krieglmeyer, Robert Kordts, Katie
it has become a challenging task to take up the cudgels Lancaster, Justin Storbeck, Sascha Topolinski, and
for consciousness as a mental faculty that complements Reinout Wiers for valuable comments.
nonconscious processing in important ways. Drawing on
global workspace theory (e.g., Baars, 1997; Dehaene & Footnotes
1
Naccache, 2001), we have argued that consciousness The correct answer to the anagram can be found in
implies the global availability of information to a large the title of this chapter.
2
range of participating modular systems that otherwise For a more fine-grained list see, for instance, Jack
would not gain access to each other’s content. & Shallice (2001). Also, for reasons of space we will not
Information that has entered the global workspace enjoys delve into the complex relationship between
the advantage of being actively represented for a longer consciousness and learning (e.g., Cleeremans & Jiménez,
duration so that it can be subject to all kinds of 2002).
3
transformations and serve as the basis for the generation As a reviewer pointed out, the theater metaphor
and execution of new, flexibly adjusted action plans. seems more open to Dennett’s (1991) criticism of the
From this perspective, consciousness appears to be most “Cartesian theater” in which he asks “but who is the
needed when the organism encounters novel situations or audience?” The newscast metaphor seems somewhat less
problems that demand a careful analysis. Oftentimes, open to this kind of criticism because it suggests some
however, conscious processing may be superfluous and modules broadcasting information that other modules
be effectively “bypassed” by powerful (but relatively might access, so there is no homuncular audience, but

10
 Consciousness and introspection

only modules as both generators and consumers of Asendorpf, J. B., Banse, R., & Mücke, D. (2002). Double
information. dissociation between implicit and explicit personality
4
Whether a given process receives ‘top-down’ self-concept: The case of shy behavior. Journal of
amplification may depend on a complex interplay of the Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 380-393.
current state of affairs. Rather than invoking some kind Atkinson, A., Thomas, M., & Cleeremans, A. (2000).
of homunculus or Cartesian master who ‘decides’ what is Consciousness: Mapping the theoretical landscape.
and what is not attended to at will, Dennett (2001) and Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 372-382.
others warn against taking the term ‘top-down’ too Baars, B. J. (1997). In the theater of consciousness: The
literally. Instead, attentional amplification should be seen workspace of the mind. New York: Oxford
as a competitive process that is heavily constrained by University Press.
the activation of currently active processors representing Baddeley, A. D. (1986). Working memory. Oxford:
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5
The present framework shares many commonalities (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (Vol. 2, pp. 1-
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The assumption here is that implicit associations Baumeister, R. F. (1984). Choking under pressure: Self-
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Figures
Figure 1. Three ‘zones’ of consciousness. At the bottom of the information processing pyramid is the realm of unconscious
processing delegated to modular subsystems. A portion of processing outputs from these modular subsystems may gain the
status of phenomenal consciousness. Only a small subset of the rich spectrum of phenomenological experience enters the
global workspace through mechanisms of selective attention, thereby gaining the status of access consciousness. Access-
conscious information is assumed to be represented in a propositional format and is therefore (in principle) verbally
reportable. Behavior can be generated both via unconscious processing and through consciously formed action plans.

ACCESS CONSCIOUSNESS
Verbal
Propositionally Represented
Reportability
Information in Global Workspace
Selective Attention

PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Internal Processing Outputs Behavior

UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSING

Modular Subsystems

Input

15
 Consciousness and introspection

Figure 2. A self-inference model for implicit-explicit consistency. According to the model, accurate explicit representations
of implicit representations depend on whether valid phenomenal or behavioral cues are available (paths a or c, respectively)
and whether these cues are detected (paths b and e, respectively). Further, accuracy as assessed by implicit-explicit
consistency (i) can be impaired by additional information integration or invalidation processes (arrow f) and by poor
measurement (paths g and h).

ACCESS-CONSCIOUSNESS
f

Explicit (Propositional) h
Self-report
Representation
e

Introspective d
b Self-
Access Controlled Behavior perception Implicit-Explicit
Phenomenal cues Uncontrolled Behavior Consistency

a c (Accuracy)
i
Implicit (Associative)
Indirect Measure
Representation g

ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS

16