Citizenship

NATURAL BORN CITIZENSHIP

FACTS:

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27,
1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he
lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country."

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act
No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11,
1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then
running for reelection.1âwphi1.nêt

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. 4

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision 5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the
duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD:

YES.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority, and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the
Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, 21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 22 and (5) political
economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where
the person concerned resides or last resided.

In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to
reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to
do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil
registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 26 This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the
United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place
where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation
of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father.27 It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO 

FACTS:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish
Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. 

When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and
Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition 

On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the
Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City.   Desirous of being with her husband
10

who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29
July 1991. 1

On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. On 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed
back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition.   Her father slipped into a coma
17

and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral
arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate.

The petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines.

On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. BI acted favorably on petitioner's
petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are
considered as citizens of the Philippines.

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections.   In her COC, the
56

petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9
May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.  The petitioner attached to
57

her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public
in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 

A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course
or cancel said COC. Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of
the fact that she was a foundling.  Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-born status and
62

Filipino citizenship on foundlings which was granted by the COMELEC.

After then Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) file against
petitioner before the COMELEC

Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage,
particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative
of natural-born status.  Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not included is excluded. He
73

averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 193 5
Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them.

ISSUE:

WON A FOUNDING CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A FILIPINO CITIZEN?

HELD:

YES.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)  that from 1965 to 1975,
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the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the
country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-
born Filipino was 99.83%

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an
infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.  She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge,
1âwphi1

straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.

All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in
a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more
than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability
if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is
based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings
either.
 Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law
can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation.  On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
124

clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.  Article 15 thereof states:
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1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC
imposes the following obligations on our country:

Article 7

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to
acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their
obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24
thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"

Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social
origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the
part of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth
and ensure that no child is stateless.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of
international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict
of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit:

Article 14

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's parentage is
established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was
found. (Underlining supplied)

The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained
in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:

Article 2

A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered
to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.

Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness
is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of
natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines.
As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
DJUMANTAN vs. HON. ANDREA D.
DOMINGO,
Facts

Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract [Link] then embraced and
was converted to Islam.

He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then returned to the Philippines.
Petitioner and her two children with Banez arrived in Manila as the “guests” of Banez. The latter made it appear that
he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his
stay in Indonesia. Banez executed an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support,” for his “guests.” As “guests,” petitioner
and her two children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as
temporary visitors. Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a
complaint for “concubinage”, however, subsequently dismissed for lack of merit. Immigration status of petitioner was
changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of
registration. Banez’ eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint subsequently referred to CID. Petitioner was
detained at the CID detention cell. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she
was validly married to a Filipino citizen. CID disposed that the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent
Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. They revoked the visa previously
granted to her.

Issue

Whether or not the Djumantan’s admission and change of immigration status from temporary to permanent
resident legal.

Ruling

There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry into the country and the
change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained
through [Link] was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in
her applications for temporary visitor’s visa and for permanent residency.
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the
public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country. This
right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a matter
of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to
stay.

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be
given permanent residency, in the [Link] fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her
from the operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien
woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her
failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien. It is not mandatory for
the CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitor’s visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to
an indefinite stay. an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and “may be admitted” as a
permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a
Philippine citizen. The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right,
even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FACTS:

 Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of
the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother
were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an
American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his
Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the
United States.

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the
City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were
as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894

Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a
certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,  the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and
2

ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen
and, under §40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective position.

On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.  Petitioner's motion was opposed by
4

private respondent.

The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4
to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and
declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

HELD:

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with
dual citizenship."

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national
by the said states.  For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state
9

which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of
the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father's'
country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive
act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's
volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual
citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. 

Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as
referring to "dual allegiance."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of
which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view
of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. 
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONER VS GO LLANO

FACTS:

Herein respondents were the illegitimate children of Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese citizen, and Emilia Callano, a Filipino
citizen, who started living maritally in Malitbog, Leyte,

 In 1946, Go Chiao Lin, Emilia and their four sons went to Amoy, China, on vacation, but Go died there the same
year. In 1948, Emilia had to return to the Philippines as the maid of Consul Eutiquio Sta. Romana because she was
penniless, leaving her children behind. Subsequently the latter were able to go to Hongkong, where they sought and
obtained employment. In 1961, they applied with the Philippine Consul General in Hongkong for entry into the
Philippines as Filipino citizens.

On December 12 of that year, the Consulate received a cablegram from the Department of Foreign Affairs
authorizing it to investigate whether the petitioners for entry were the illegitimate children of Emilia Callano a Filipino
citizen, and, if satisfied, after a thorough screening, to issue the corresponding document certifying that they were
Filipino citizens.

The Consulate made thereafter the appropriate investigation, and on the basis of evidence presented consisting of
the sworn statements of the applicants, their birth certificates and blood test reports, said office issued late that
month a certificate of registration and identity to the effect that the applicant had submitted sufficient evidence of
their citizenship and identity and had been allowed to register in the Consulate as Filipino citizens and to travel
directly to the Philippines.

On December 26 of the same year 1961, they arrived in Manila by plane from Hongkong. As the Immigration
Inspector at the airport was of the opinion that their travel documents did not constitute conclusive proof of
citizenship.

Thereupon, the Department declared several documents among them the cable authorization just mentioned to be
null, void and of no effect, and the documentation made by the Philippine Consulate General at Hongkong pursuant
to said cable authorization consisting of the certificates of registration and identity issued to Beato Go Callano and
his brothers Manuel, Gonzalo and Julio for travel to the Philippines were cancelled.
ISSUE:

Whether petitioners who are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth subsequently acquired Chinese citizenship under the
Chinese Law of Nationality by reason of recognition or a prolonged stay in China.
HELD:

NO.

Did the petitioners lose their Philippine citizenship upon the performance of certain acts or the happening of certain
events in China? In deciding this question no foreign law can be applied. The petitioners are admittedly Filipino
citizens at birth, and their status must be governed by Philippine law wherever they may be, in conformity with
Article 15 (formerly Article 9) of the Civil Code which provides as follows: "Laws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, conditions and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad."

Under Article IV, Section 2, of the Philippine Constitution, "Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
manner provided by law," which implies that the question of whether a Filipino has lost his Philippine citizenship
shall be determined by no other than the Philippine law.

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by Republic Act No. 106, provides that a Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; subscribing to an oath
of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country; rendering service to, or accepting a commission
in, the armed forces of a foreign country; cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; declaration by competent
authority that he is a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war; in the case of a woman by marriage to a
foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her husband's country, she acquires his nationality. 

Recognition of the petitioners by their alien father is not among the ground for losing Philippine citizenship under
Philippine law, and it cannot be said that the petitioners lost their former status by reason of such recognition. About
the only mode of losing Philippine citizenship which closely bears on the petitioners is renunciation.

But even renunciation cannot be cited in support of the conclusion that petition lost their Philippine citizenship
because the law requires an express renunciation which means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication; a renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language, as
distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct.
NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner,
vs.
ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December
1989. 3

Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California.

The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval 4 of petitioner’s request, and on the same day,
petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. 5 On 27
September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a
citizen of the Philippines.

Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. 7

On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC Provincial Office in
Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of
Republic Act No. 9225, 

On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution disqualifying the petitioner from running for
the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship. The
COMELEC Second Division explained that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 does
not automatically bestow upon any person the privilege to run for any elective public office. It additionally ruled that the
filing of a Certificate of Candidacy cannot be considered as a renunciation of foreign citizenship. 

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate for his failure to make personal and sworn renunciation
of his U.S. citizen.

Held:

Yes. He is disqualified

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized
citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or
retain their Philippine citizenship

By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing
therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein
said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship.

The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate of Candidacy which
must be executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine elections.

Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a
foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to
additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public
officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.

Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to
accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof
(oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines).

There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining
their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the
Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely,
Philippine citizenship.

By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially
similar to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn
renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of
allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the
renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their
special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P.
PAGADUAN, Respondents.

The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On
December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas
Condon.

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in
Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003."

On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before
the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated
September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. 6

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She
again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained
the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13,
2010.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and Luis M. Bautista, (private
7  8 

respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the
petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her
elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed
by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an
Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in
Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear
abandonment of her Australian citizenship.

In its consolidated Decision dated October 22, 2010, the trial court held that the petitioner’s failure to comply with
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the petitioner
herself during trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath. The law clearly
mandates that the document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before any public
officer authorized to administer oath.

The COMELEC en banc concurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC; it also granted the Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal filed by the private respondents.

ISSUE:

whether the "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma
requirement.

HELD:

NO.

R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic.
18 

Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when
she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual
citizenship,

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of
Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the
exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized
to administer oath.

In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen
21 

cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of
all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the
renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an
officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is
renouncing all foreign citizenship.

We find no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by the above rulings to the phrase "sworn
renunciation". The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and sensible
meaning and must thus be read literally. The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly
25 

sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.

The "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" must be deemed a formal requirement only with respect to the re-
acquisition of one’s status as a natural-born Filipino so as to override the effect of the principle that natural-born
citizens need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship. Never was it mentioned or even alluded to that, as the
petitioner wants this Court to believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and thereafter run for public
office has the option of executing an unsworn affidavit of renunciation.

An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a revered person or thing, that one’s
statement is true or that one will be bound to a promise. The person making the oath implicitly invites punishment if
the statement is untrue or the promise is broken. The legal effect of an oath is to subject the person to penalties for
perjury if the testimony is false.
28

Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath ensures truthfulness to the prospective
public officer’s abandonment of his adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines.

To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it would also
accommodate a mere qualified or temporary allegiance from government officers when the Constitution and the
legislature clearly demand otherwise.

Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is already deemed to have lost her
citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. 

Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. To prove a
29 

foreign law, 

The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the existence of a foreign law may also
be established through: (1) a testimony under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in the country
where the foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section of the law and states that the same was in
force at the time material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by the
Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although
not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of
all the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered."

he petitioner failed to show proof of the existence of the law during trial. Also, the letter issued by the Australian
government showing that petitioner already renounced her Australian citizenship was unauthenticated hence, the
courts a quo acted judiciously in disregarding the same.

The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her Australian
citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of
candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded
33 

by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. 34

The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the most number of
votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.

In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and seek
elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized
public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in
Philippine elections. The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner,
36 

without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the
right to run for public office.
G.R. No. 195649               April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

FACTS:

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. 3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization
as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. 4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
of his foreign citizenship

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which
contains, among others,

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a
foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented
in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been
using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado
left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back
in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that
Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence
to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-
year residency requirement under the Local Government Code.

n the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino
citizen.18

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225,
Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively
negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification,
and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law, 24 having been filed on 28 April 2010,
which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s
Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship
as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent
became a pure Philippine Citizen again.

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office
despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010
mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

ISSUE:

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing a renunciation earlier made.
HELD:

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run
for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. 32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the
foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship. 33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he
continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.

By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect
declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and
privileges granted by the United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be
violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American
citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation 36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance
and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and
political rights and privileges of the United States of America."

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office,
as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights
and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification
under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, 40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009
until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US
passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation." 42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the
twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.

It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him from
running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office
would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who
subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.

Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he renounced his
foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the
use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport
does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag
and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek
election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the
public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted
the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.