Saudi Arabian Airlines v.

CA - Case Digest

Facts:
Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA) hired Milagros Morada as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. While on a lay-over in Jakarta, Morada went to a disco with fellow crew
members Thamer & Allah, both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they returned to
their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. In which Allah left on some
pretext. Thamer attempted to rape Morada but she was rescued by hotel personnel when they heard her
cries for help. Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah, the latter as an accomplice.

Morada refused to cooperate when SAUDIA’s Legal Officer and its base manager tried to negotiate the
immediate release of the detained crew members with Jakarta police.
Through the intercession of Saudi Arabian government, Thamer and Allah were deported and,
eventually, again put in service by SAUDIA. But Morada was transferred to Manila.

One year and a half year later, Morada was again ordered to see SAUDIA’s Chief Legal Officer.
Instead, she was brought to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a blank document, which turned
out to be a notice to her to appear in court. Monada returned to Manila.

The next time she was escorted by SAUDIA’s legal officer to court, the judge rendered a decision
against her sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Apparently, she was tried by
the court which found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music
in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic
tradition.

After denial by SAUDIA, Morada sought help from Philippine Embassy during the appeal. Prince of
Makkah dismissed the case against her. SAUDIA fired her without notice.

Morada filed a complaint for damages against SAUDIA, with the RTC of QC. SAUDIA filed Omnibus
Motion to Dismiss which raised the ground that the court has no jurisdiction, among others which was
denied

ISSUE:

1. WON THERE IS A CONFLICT OF LAW IN THIS CASE

2. WON THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
3. WON PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD APPLY IN THIS CASE

HELD:

1. Yes.
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, we agree
with petitioner that the problem herein could present a "conflicts" case.

A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two
or more states is said to contain a "foreign element". The presence of a foreign element is inevitable
since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the
geographic limits of their birth or conception. 40

The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many.   The foreign element may
41

simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or
that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other
cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form.  42

In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada
is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also,
by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did
 transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila,
Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation to arise

2.

YES.

The court find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the suit.   Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic
48

Act No. 7691, to wit:

Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction:

(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of

whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and cots or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00)
or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the
above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
(Emphasis ours)

And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court — the venue, Quezon City, is
appropriate:

Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. — [Now Regional Trial Court]

(b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant
or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff
resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the
Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private
respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she
no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to
her.

Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have
been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent)
should be upheld.

Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein. By filing
her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has voluntary
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.

The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions   praying for the dismissal of
50

Morada's Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex Abundante Cautelam dated
February 20, 1995. What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for
other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial
court's jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than
lack of jurisdiction.

3. The Philippine law should govern.

As to the choice of applicable law, the court note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two
important questions:

(1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred
in two or more states; and

(2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation. 

Before a choice can be made, it is necessary to determine under what category a certain set of facts
or rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification". It is the
"process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule." 
The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum to select the proper law. 
 The starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or operative
fact.  An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point
of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right,
contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of
celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. 

These "test factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting factors" could be any of the following:

(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;

(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;

(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In
particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;

(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract
has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is
particularly important in contracts and torts;

(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of
contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;

(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement,
the lex loci intentionis;

(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex
fori — the law of the forum — is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier,
matters of "procedure" not going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by it;
and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law
is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of the
exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and

(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of
the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships
particularly contracts of affreightment.

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting factor" or
"point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred.

And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a
situs of the tort . This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private
respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that
petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give
her due and observe honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That
certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view
what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the
person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the
plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as
the situs of the alleged tort.

In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the "State
of the most significant relationship" rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the
factual context of this case.

In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following
contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to
the particular issue:

(a) the place where the injury occurred;

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;

(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and

(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.  62

There is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no
question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign
corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage.
Thus, the "relationship" between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit
is not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the most
significant contact with the matter in this dispute,  raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against
defendant in our view, has been properly established.

Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of and the place
"having the most interest in the problem". The court held by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on
tort liability should have paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising
out of this case. Further, the court held that the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could
properly apply Philippine law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 entitled
"Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines" is hereby REMANDED to Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City,
 DOWIS, ET AL V MUD SLINGERS
FACTS:

Johnny Edwin Dowis, a Tennessee resident, was hired by a Missouri corporation, Mud Slingers, Inc., to
hang large sheets of precast plaster molding at a national chain hotel in Roswell, Georgia.   Dowis was
injured at the Roswell project when he fell four stories from the basket of a telescopic boom forklift
operated by Graves.
Mud Slingers had workers' compensation insurance in Missouri, where Dowis filed his claim and
received benefits.   Dowis later filed this tort action in Georgia seeking damages against Mud Slingers and
Graves.   Dowis argued that, under Missouri's workers' compensation law, he could collect benefits and
bring a tort action against Mud Slingers and/or Graves. 
 Applying the exclusive remedy provision of the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act, and the lex loci
delicti rule regarding the applicable substantive law, the trial court granted summary judgment to the
defendants.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment, holding that lex loci delicti and
the consequent application of Georgia's exclusive remedy provision precluded Dowis from maintaining his
tort action in Georgia. In so doing, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that this Court has addressed the
issue of the viability of the rule of lex loci delicti and has continued to apply it.  

ISSUE:

WON GEORGIA SHOULD ABANDON ITS ADHERENCE TO LEX LOCI DELICTI

HELD:

NO, GEORGIA WILL NOT ABANDON ITS LEX LOCI DELICTI

There are several principle approaches to the resolution of conflict of laws issues in tort cases

1. The traditional approach, frequently referred to as the “vested rights” approach

-  Under this traditional rule, a tort action is governed by the substantive law of the state
where the tort was committed. 

a. The first such approach is based upon a concept of “governmental interest.”

- involves an analysis of the respective interests of the involved states to determine the law
that most appropriately applies to the issues in the case; controlling effect is given to the law
of the jurisdiction which has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the
litigation, unless a public policy exception dictates a contrary result. 

- Specifically, this theory mandates that a court first identify the specific law in each state
bearing upon the legal issue in dispute, then determine the precise policies which the
respective laws were designed to serve, and finally, that the court examine the relationship
of each jurisdiction with the litigation and determine whether the application of a particular
state's law would be consistent with the purposes identified as supportive of that law.

b.  Next is the choice-influencing considerations

- Under this theory, five factors are examined:  (1) predictability of result;  (2) maintenance of
the interstate and international order;  (3) simplification of the judicial task;  (4) advancement
of the forum's governmental interest;  and (5) application of the better rule of law.  

c. A third alternative to the traditional doctrine is lex fori,

- which provides that the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the law of the
forum.
The doctrine of lex loci delicti has served the resolution of conflict of laws issues in tort actions in this State for
nearly 100 years. It is desirable to have stability and certainty in the law;  therefore, stare decisis is a valid and
compelling argument for maintaining the doctrine. Moreover, as appellants acknowledge, lex loci delicti has the
virtues of consistency, predictability, and relative ease of application. 

But this ignores the reality that the place of an allegedly tortious act is not irrelevant to the conflict
issue, in that a state has an interest in wrongs committed within its boundaries. The crux of the matter
in regard to criticism of the traditional rule is the common underlying misconception that the resolution
of a conflict of laws in complex litigation requires an equally complicated mechanism to do so.

The approach taken by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) certainly fits a
description of complexity.   It is expansive;  it provides a multi-step procedure for making the
determination of which state's law should prevail.   Section 145 provides the general principle for
determining the relevant contacts:

(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local
law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in.

(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of to determine the law applicable to
an issue include:

(a) the place where the injury occurred,

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties,
and

(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue.

Section 6 sets forth the choice-of-law principles:

(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on
choice of law.

(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law
include

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,

(b) the relevant policies of the forum,

(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue,

(d) the protection of justified expectations,

(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,

(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and

(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

Finally, Section 146 specifically addresses personal injury actions:

In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the
rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a
more significant relationship under the principles stated into the occurrence and the parties, in which
event the local law of the other state will be applied.
This layered analysis has been described as “eclectic” because it represents a combination of several
choice-of-law methodologies. The approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws has
been described as working through three related functions, “in the reverse order of their best use.”

FUNCTION OF RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

Section 6(1) gives dispositive priority to the forum's statutory choice-of-law rules.   If none apply,
section 6(2) lists seven nonexclusive policies that may identify the state having the most significant
relationship to the dispute: ․

The second functional component is a set of three general principles for torts, contracts, and property.
  The general principles for torts and contracts list contacts “to be taken into account in applying the
principles” of The Second Restatement's. The third functional component is a number of sections
focused on specific claims and issues. For most choice-of-law questions, more than one section will
apply.

PROBLEMS WITH THE SECOND RESTATEMENT

- There are those who have criticized it as a tool for courts to simply engage in “contact counting” without
consideration of what is espoused in the Restatement (Second), that is, the interests and policies of the
states in question.

-  It has been said to have “indeterminate language and lack of concrete guidelines.”  

- Others find it: has the irony of dominating the field while bewildering its users. 

- The result is a set of choice-of-law decisions so lacking in uniformity that the Second Restatement's
balancing test has become chimeric, taking on vastly different forms in different courts.   Erratic
applications may be partly due to its code-like function, which can require the application of two or more
black letter sections, each with multiple analytical steps․Second Restatement adoptions necessarily
assume different forms in different states, even without aberrational applications.

- The adoption of the Restatement (Second) approach has not brought certainty or uniformity to the law. 

-  A review of cases shows that while the rule of lex loci delicti of the original Restatement is attacked
because of its seeming rigidity and its insistence on the application of a few specific rules, the approach
of the Restatement (Second) fails to provide enough guidance to the courts to produce even a
semblance of uniformity among the states following its method. 

- The methodology is not only complex, but it provides no underlying principle other than applying the law
of the state that has the “most significant relationship” to the issue․ As a result, it has become difficult to
predict what a court will do when faced with choice of law issues, and each case seems to demand an
ad hoc determination.  

- For attorneys, this lack of predictability may discourage settlement;  it certainly inhibits an accurate case
valuation.   For judges, choice of law issues take an inordinate amount of time and require a fairly
complex analysis.

The inescapable conclusion is that the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is not
superior to the traditional rule of lex loci delicti currently used in Georgia.   Nor have the other major
approaches mentioned earlier proven to be a panacea for the resolution of conflict of laws issues. In fact, the
array of “modern” conflict approaches and their seemingly unending variations have been described as
creating “a veritable playpen for judicial policymakers.
This Court will retain its long-held conflict of laws rule not out of blind adherence but rather, out of the
candid recognition that the subsequently-developed theories have significant problems.  
 The relative certainty, predictability, and ease of the application of lex loci delicti, even though sometimes
leading to results which may appear harsh, are preferable to the inconsistency and capriciousness that the
replacement choice-of-law approaches have wrought.  

MELTON VS STEPHENS

FACTS:

Melton, in a semi tractor-trailer, travelled west on U.S. 50, which has a posted speed limit of 50 mph,
at a speed of 58 mph. He was behind the 2006 Ford Fusion, driven by Stacy, when Stacy began to
slow the car several hundred feet from the intersection in anticipation of making her turn. She had
nearly completed her left turn onto County Road 900 East when Melton collided into her vehicle.
Melton contends that he was attempting to pass Stacy at the time of impact and claims that Stacy
failed to signal her turn as she approached the intersection. He was issued a citation for passing
within 100 feet of an intersection, which was adjudicated in the Lawrence Circuit Court, Lawrence
County, Illinois.

On June 9, 2011, the Stephens filed a Complaint against Melton and Perdue, alleging negligence by
Melton in the operation of the tractor-trailer.

On July 20, 2012, Appellants filed their motion to determine applicable law, requesting the trial court
to apply Indiana's substantive law to the instant cause,

On March 27, 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing on Appellants' motion to determine applicable
law. Thereafter, on June 4, 2013, the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions thereon,
holding that the substantive law of Illinois is applicable to the facts at hand.

ISSUE:

WON INDIANA LAW OR ILLINOIS LAW GOVERNED THE MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISSION HAPPENING IN ILLINOIS BETWEEN
TWO INDIANA RESIDENTS

HELD:

ILLINOIS LAW IS APPLICABLE

INDIANA’S LAW

The presumption is that the place of the tort will be significant and the place with the most contacts. In those
cases, the traditional rule serves well. However, this presumption is not conclusive. When the place of the tort
is an insignificant contact, then the trial court should be allowed to evaluate other factors. In these instances,
where the place of the tort bears little connection to the legal action, our supreme court allows the
consideration of factors that may be more relevant, such as: 1) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; 2) the residence or place of business of the parties; and 3) the place where the relationship is
centered.

Lex Loci Delicti

Under this presumption, the court applies the substantive laws of the state where the last event
necessary to make an actor liable for the alleged wrong takes place order vacated and trans denied
“[W]here the issue is the choice between the law of the place where an allegedly wrongful act or
omission took place and the law of the place where physical injury was inflicted, the general rule is
that the ‘place of the tort’ is the place where the injury or death was inflicted and not the place where
the allegedly wrongful act or omission took place.” 

SIGNIFICANCE OF ILLINOIS LAW

It is a “rare case” where the place of the tort is insignificant. In fact, Simon appears to suggest that most
cases involving an automobile accident will be governed by the laws of the state where the accident occurred.
(“[U]nlike in cases involving an automobile accident, the laws of the state where the crash occurred did not
govern the conduct of the parties at the time of the accident.”)
 To determine whether this is one of those “rare case[s],” this court should define “the gravamen” of the
Stephens' complaint. Focusing on the Stephens' Amended Complaints, we note that all the allegations stem
from Melton's perceived negligence in operating his vehicle, be it negligently ignoring the rules of the road or
negligently driving with knowledge of his severe sleep apnea. 
- the claims of negligent supervision and training lodged at Perdue and FPP Business do not find a
contact point in Illinois substantive law, we hasten to clarify that these allegations are also embedded in
Illinois' Rules of the Road. Specifically,certain parts of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, such
as the prohibition that a driver with a respiratory dysfunction is not medically certifiable to drive a CMV.

Because the drivers' conduct in operating their motor vehicles prior to the collision will be the focus of attention
to determine liability, and that conduct was governed by the rules of the road of the state in which the accident
occurred, we conclude that the presumption of the lex loci delicti remains significant and is not overcome. 
Moreover, recognizing that the issues presented by Stephens are substantial and not merely remedial or
procedural, the conduct must be necessarily governed by Illinois' Rules of the Road as “people do not take the
laws of their home state with them when they travel but are subject to the laws of the state in which they act.” 

Even if we deemed the State of Illinois, as place of the tort, to be an insignificant contact—which we
do not—an analysis of the additional Hubbard factors would yield a similar outcome.

Where the place of the tort bears little connection to the legal action, our supreme court allows the
consideration of other factors that may be more relevant, such as: 1) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred; 2) the residence or place of business of the parties; and 3) the place
where the relationship is centered. “These factors are not an exclusive list nor are they necessarily
relevant in every case.” All contacts “should be evaluated according to their relative importance to the
particular issues being litigated.”

Maintaining that the collision only took place in Illinois by accident, Appellants content that the real
connection lies in Indiana. They especially refer to the second contact point—domicile—to bolster
their claim: both Melton and Stacy are Indiana residents and were employed by Indiana-based
corporations at the time of the accident. Focusing on the negligent acts of supervision, Appellants
argue that “[a]lthough the effect of those allegedly negligent acts may have been felt in Illinois, the
conduct which is of the greatest significance to the Stephens' claims is rooted in Indiana. Thus,
Appellants assert that the Hubbard factors favor Indiana because “the relationship between the two
drivers and their employers, which took them on routes just over the Indiana border, are centered in
Indiana.”

Although we agree that the residence element of the Hubbard test favors Indiana, as both Melton and
Stacy are Indiana residents, working for Indiana-based companies, neither of the other two elements
support the application of Indiana substantive law to this cause. Despite Appellants' arguments to
center the relationship in Indiana, the ‘relationship’ between the two actors in the collision only came
into existence through the accident in Illinois. There is no evidence, and the parties cannot point us to
any, that their paths crossed anywhere else but in Illinois.

Furthermore, unlike Appellants, we deem the place of the conduct causing injury to be centered in
Illinois. We have defined the gravamen of the Stephens' Complaint to be Melton's negligent operation
of his vehicle. Therefore, this conduct is necessarily governed by the law of the state in which he
negligently acted, i.e., Illinois. Even though the Stephens asserted negligent training and supervision
against Perdue and FPP Business through the doctrine of respondeat superior, this negligence only
became actionable when the injury occurred at the time of the collision. As our supreme court noted
in Simon,

IF the state of conduct has a law regulating how the tortfeasor or victim is supposed to act in the
particular situation, courts will apply that standard rather than the law of the parties' residence. In fact,
this preference of the conduct-regulating law of the conduct state is virtually absolute, winning out
even over the law of other interested states. Courts as a practical matter recognize a conduct-
regulating exception to the normal interest-based choice-of-law methods․ This is also true in Indiana.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN FORT COLLINS VS. ROTEK

FACTS:

This case arises out of events surrounding a tragic airplane accident which took the lives of Carol
Hardin Rostek and her husband, John E. Rostek. The First National Bank in Fort Collins, plaintiff
below is the guardian of the natural children of Carol Hardin Rostek. The respondent is the
administratrix of the estate of John E. Rostek.

Petitioner filed a wrongful death action in Colorado district court alleging that negligent operation of
the aircraft on the part of John E. Rostek caused the accident and the ensuing death of his guest-
passenger, Carol Hardin Rostek.

The respondent filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the rights of the parties are governed
by the South Dakota Aircraft Guest Statute. This South Dakota statute requires proof by the guest-
passenger of willful or wanton misconduct on the part of an operator of an aircraft.

For purposes of the summary judgment motion the parties stipulated that at most the petitioner's
evidence would show simple negligence on the part of John Rostek. The parties also stipulated that
John and Carol Rostek were both citizens and residents of the state of Colorado, and that Carol
Rostek's natural children, who are her sole heirs at law, resided with her in Colorado. With respect to
the events in question, the stipulation stated:

The petitioner then petitioned this court, pursuant to C.A.R. 50, for a writ of certiorari to review the summary
judgment of the trial court. We granted certiorari for the sole purpose of determining if Colorado courts are
compelled to apply the doctrine of lex loci delicti (the law of the place of the wrong), under the facts and
circumstances of this case.

ISSUE:

WON SOUTH DAKOTA OR COLORADO LAW WILL APPLY TO THE CASE

HELD:

COLORADO SHALL GOVERN

HISTORY

- The rule of lex loci delicti was originally viewed as a practical formula by which individuals could govern
their actions in accordance with prevailing attitudes and customs, providing both uniformity of
application and predictability of results.

- with the industrial revolution and the passage of time, the interstate mobility of the citizenry increased in
speed and availability to such an extent that persons no longer regarded an interstate journey as a rare
occurrence entailing a significant change of surroundings. As these attitudes and conditions changed, it
became clear that the mechanical application of lex loci delicti to every multistate tort controversy often
yielded harsh, unjust results, unrelated to the contemporary interests of the states involved or the
realistic expectations of the parties.

- All of the generally accepted approaches, however, suffer from a similar defect; namely, they are all
"approaches," to be applied in a more or less ad hoc fashion, and containing indeterminate language
with no concrete guidelines. Thus, quite naturally, these approaches have exhibited a certain lack of
both predictability of result and uniformity of application. 

- To avoid the growing number of undesirable results which strict adherence to lex loci delicti produced,
courts devised various methods of characterizing the issues in the controversy to allow them to deviate
from the application of lex loci delicti without offending stare decisis. By labeling a matter as
"procedural" rather than "substantive," or "contractual" rather than "tortious," courts were able to apply
law other than the law of the place of the wrong. 
 We fully appreciate the arguments made by the defendant that lex loci delicti retains some predictability of
result and ease of application by courts. Yet, the facts in the case at bar classically demonstrate the injustice
and irrationality of the automatic application of the lex loci delicti rule. Both Carol and John Rostek were
citizens of Colorado. The airplane in question was registered in Colorado and was returning to Colorado when
the accident occurred. The lawsuit was brought in a Colorado forum with a Colorado resident as defendant. It
becomes evident, therefore, that South Dakota's only interest in this controversy is the fortuitous occurrence of
the accident within its borders. Thus the trial court's decision to apply South Dakota law to this case can be
affirmed only if we are to adhere to a mechanical and unfailing application of the place of wrong rule,
regardless of the interests of the states involved or the expectations of the parties. This we refuse to do.
Because of the lack of consistency and predictability exhibited by various proposed choice of law
"approaches," the principal question in choice of law today is whether or not to adopt rational choice of law
"rules," or to deal with each case as it comes to us on an ad hoc basis. Rules are employed in most areas of
the law because they provide the benefits of certainty and predictability. To some extent the existence of a rule
in any area of the law serves the ends of justice since it furnishes the juridical machinery by which like
situations are equally adjudged. 
Thus, in order to provide some predictability of result and uniformity of application, this court turns to
the adoption of some rules dealing with choice of law. In so doing, we begin with the particular issue presented
in this case, namely, the application of a guest statute to a host-guest controversy. We consider this issue a
narrow one, occurring with enough frequency and repetitiveness to enable us to extract specific guidelines that
will satisfactorily regulate this issue. 
Our search for a workable choice of law rule in the guest-host area leads to the majority opinion in
Neumeier v. Kuehner,

  In Neumeier the court was faced with a guest-host accident situation involving a citizen of Canada and
a resident of New York. Judge Fuld admitted that the recent choice of law "approach" in guest-host
controversies, initiated in Babcock v. Jackson, supra, had, until Neumeier, lacked consistency. The New York
court then proceeded to formulate a specific rule governing the application of guest statutes in multistate tort
controversies. This rule generally embodies the rational underpinnings of the newer approaches to choice of
law problems, emphasizing the expectations of the parties and the interests of the different jurisdictions
involved. We are persuaded that it is just and equitable and ought to be accepted in Colorado with respect to
the first two sections thereof and we now do so. As stated by the New York court, those sections provide:

"1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same state, and the [vehicle] is
there registered, the law of that state should control and determine the standard of care which the host owes to
his guest. "2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that state does not cast him in
liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable by reason of the fact that liability would be imposed upon
him under the tort law of the state of the victim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest was injured in the state
of his own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver who has come into that state should noting the
absence of special circumstancesbe permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defense.
We must now apply the aforementioned choice of law rule to determine if the South Dakota guest
statute should be applied to the case at bar. Both the guest-passenger and the host-pilot were domiciled and
residing in Colorado, and the airplane was registered in Colorado. Thus, the facts in this case are governed by
the first statement of the rule. Under this statement, the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the
law of the place of domicile which in this case is Colorado. Accordingly, South Dakota law, including its
Airplane Guest Statute, is not the appropriate law to apply under this new rule.
Since the scope of our decision to reject the mechanical application of the rule of lex loci delicti extends
to all multistate tort controversies, we must now address ourselves to the question of what rules govern choice
of law in Colorado outside the rules laid down with respect to host-guest controversies which fit those rules.
We announce that Colorado will adopt the general rule of applying the law of the state with the most
"significant relationship" with the occurrence and the parties, as presented and defined in the Restatement,
(Second) Conflict of Laws
KAMELGARD v. MACURA

FACTS:

The plaintiff had testified against the defendant in a malpractice suit in New York, and the defendant
had retaliated-according to the plaintiff's complaint-by mailing a defamatory letter on or about March
1, 2006, to the American College of Surgeons, which is located in Chicago.   The defendant had on
that day mailed what the plaintiff believes to be an identical or nearly identical letter of complaint
about the plaintiff's testimony to the American Society of Bariatric Surgeons (now the American
Society for Metabolic and Bariatric Surgery), in Florida.   That letter is in the record, but the letter to
the American College of Surgeons (if there is such a letter) is not, and the plaintiff has seen neither
the original nor a copy.   On April 5, however, he received a letter from an official of the American
College of Surgeons, notifying him that the College had received a complaint about his testimony as
an expert witness in the New York malpractice suit against the defendant.   But the letter did not
identify the complainant.

The College's disciplinary committee assigned three bariatric surgeons to investigate the complaint.  
In October the College sent the plaintiff a letter charging him with unprofessional conduct.   But in
March of the following year, after he had informed the College that the defendant had been sued for
malpractice 30 times, the College wrote the plaintiff that its disciplinary committee had “voted to take
no further action with regard to this matter.”

The defendant argues that the applicable law in this case is not Illinois law, as he had thought initially, until the
district judge had questioned it (and as the plaintiff continues to argue), but New Jersey law.   If he is right, the
suit is time-barred because New Jersey, though like Illinois it has a one-year statute of limitations for
defamation suits.

ISSUE:
WHETHER NEW YORK LAW OR NEW JERSEY LAW APPLIES

HELD:
NEW JERSEY LAW APPLIES
It used to be a flat rule (called lex loci delicti-the law of the place of the wrong) that the law applicable in a tort
case is the law of the place where the tort occurred. 
Lex loci delicti, as explained in the Holmes and Cardozo opinions that we cited, is that the right to a tort remedy
vests upon injury;  the existence and scope of the right therefore depend on the law of the place of injury;  and
the vested right, viewed as a piece of property acquired in the place of injury, is carried by the plaintiff, like the
turtle's shell, to wherever he decides to sue.
The old rule came to seem too rigid, mainly because of such anomalies as suits between citizens of the same
state when it was not the state where the accident had occurred.   The rule has been reduced, in effect, to a
presumption, in Illinois as in other states. 
We say “in effect” because most states, including Illinois, nowadays apply the law of the state that has the
“most significant relationship” to the claim rather than the lex loci delicti.
But as we explained in the Spinozzi case, the state with the most significant relation to a claim is usually the
state in which the tort (and therefore the injury) occurred.   That state “has the greatest interest in striking a
reasonable balance among safety, cost, and other factors pertinent to the design and administration of a
system of tort law.   Most people affected whether as victims or as injurers by accidents and other injury-
causing events are residents of the jurisdiction in which the event takes place.
  So if law can be assumed to be generally responsive to the values and preferences of the people who live in
the community that formulated the law, the law of the place of the accident can be expected to reflect the
values and preferences of the people most likely to be involved in accidents-can be expected, in other words,
to be responsive and responsible law, law that internalizes the costs and benefits of the people affected by it.” 
Defamation, however, is a tort that the old rule, now a presumption, very often doesn't fit, because often
the defamatory statement is communicated in more than one state.   When the defamatory statement is
communicated in many different states, it makes sense to apply the law of the plaintiff's domicile, and that is
the usual result in Illinois. 
 That is where the principal injury from a defamation will occur because it is where the victim works and
lives and where (in the usual case) most of the people-family, friends, business associates, etc.-are found with
whom he has personal or commercial transactions, which might be impaired by defamation. 
The Restatement, while stating that in a defamation case “the state of most significant relationship will
usually be the state where the person was domiciled at the time,” “if the matter complained of was published in
that state.” In the law of defamation, the word “published” just means that the defamatory statement was made
to someone other than the plaintiff. 
 There is no actionable defamation if the recipient of a letter that libels him, no copy of which has been
sent to anyone else, tears it up without communicating its contents to. For then he cannot suffer an injury to his
reputation, or the repulsion that he feels because of the bad opinion of him that readers of the libel form.
No defamatory letter, so far as appears, was mailed to New Jersey;  there was no “publication” there.  
But absence of publication in the plaintiff's domicile should not be an absolute bar to the application of the law
of that domicile.   What is true, rather, is that the presumption of the applicability of that law may be rebutted
by showing that the plaintiff incurred no harm at all in his domicile state 
and if no one in that state had seen or learned of the defamatory statement, even second hand, this
would be a powerful rebuttal to the presumption that there was harm there.   But notice that Hand's analysis
would suggest that the state of the plaintiff's domicile would still be the primary site of the plaintiff's injury,
implying that its law would govern, even if the defamation had been communicated entirely to people in other
states and no one in the plaintiff's state-besides the plaintiff-was even aware of it.
The plaintiff is eager to abandon his Florida claim because it would make his suit one charging
multistate defamation, and would thus point-although, as we have just seen, not unwaveringly-to the
application of New Jersey law.   He prefers a claim limited to Illinois and governed by Illinois law (assuming his
Illinois claim survived his inability or unwillingness to make a serious effort to obtain the letter to the College of
Surgeons), with its discovery rule.
 But abandoning the Florida claim does not establish that Illinois law should trump New Jersey law.  
The American College of Surgeons is located in Illinois but is no longer accused of anything, and so Illinois has
no interest in the case.  
Only New Jersey, where the plaintiff has his practice and is therefore likely to suffer tangible harm from
defamation that impugns his professional integrity and competence, even if the defamation is not published
there, has a substantial interest in protecting him from defamation;  and it is therefore New Jersey law that
should apply.  
Lankenau v Patrick K. Boles, M & S Leasing Co., LLC

FACTS:

Plaintiff, a New York resident, commenced this negligence action in New York seeking damages for injuries
she sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Pennsylvania. At the time of the accident, plaintiff
was a backseat passenger in a vehicle operated by her mother, defendant Deena Lankenau, and owned by
her father, defendant Douglas Lankenau, both of whom are also domiciled in New York.
The accident occurred when the Lankenau vehicle collided with a tractor-trailer operated by defendant Patrick
K. Boles, an employee of defendant M & S Leasing Co., LLC. Both of those defendants are domiciled in New
Jersey. In their answers, defendants asserted as an affirmative defense that plaintiff failed to mitigate her
damages because she was not wearing an available seat belt. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the affirmative
defense, and we conclude that Supreme Court properly denied the motion.
Plaintiff contends that the court erred in denying her motion because New York's seat belt affirmative defense
regulates conduct, and thus does not apply in a tort dispute arising from an accident that occurred in
Pennsylvania.

ISSUE:

WHETHER NEW YORK OR PENNSYLVANNIA LAW APPLIES.

HELD:

NEW YORK LAW APPLIES

 If conflicting conduct-regulating laws are at issue, the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will
generally apply because that jurisdiction has the greatest interest in regulating behavior within its borders'.
Conversely, where the conflicting laws serve only to allocate losses between the parties, such as vicarious
liability or comparative negligence rules, the jurisdiction where the tort occurred has only a minimal interest in
applying its own law.
Here, the conflicting laws relate to whether there is a valid affirmative defense of seat belt nonuse.
Pennsylvania law prohibits the presentation of evidence of seat belt nonuse.
 While New York law allows the trier of fact to consider a plaintiff's failure to wear an available seat belt only in
assessing damages and the plaintiff's mitigation thereof .
We therefore conclude that the court properly determined that the seat belt defense "allocate[s] losses after the
tort occurs.
We further conclude that Pennsylvania has at best a minimal interest in applying its own law in this case 
 The plaintiff and her defendant parents are residents of New York, where the seat belt defense is available.
The other defendants are domiciled in New Jersey, which also permits the seat belt defense
None of the parties is domiciled in Pennsylvania and, the situs of the tort notwithstanding, we perceive no basis
for applying Pennsylvania law to deny a potential affirmative defense.
WINTER v. NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS CORPORATION
FACTS:

Ruth Baldwin developed osteonecrosis of the jaw (ONJ) after two of her teeth were extracted. She
sued, alleging Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation negligently failed to provide adequate warnings for two
drugs she took, Aredia and Zometa. After a jury trial, Baldwin, by her executor, received $225,000 in
compensatory damages, plus certain costs. Novartis appeals, arguing the district court: (1) improperly found
that inadequate warnings proximately caused Baldwin's injuries; (2) erred in applying Missouri law to the
punitive damages claim; (3) abused its discretion in admitting hearsay evidence; and (4) abused its discretion
in awarding the costs for depositions conducted as part of multi-district litigation.

ISSUE:
WHETHER MISSOURI LAW APPLIES IN THIS CASE

HELD:
YES.
Under Missouri's choice-of-law rules, courts apply the substantive law of the state with the “most significant
relationship” to the occurrence and the parties.
Missouri, adopting the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, requires consideration of four factors in
determining the applicable law for tort actions: “the place where the injury occurred,” “the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred,” “the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties,” and “the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.”
 More importantly, for personal injury actions, Missouri applies the law of the place of injury, unless some other
state has a more significant relationship. Missouri's formulation “essentially establishes a presumption that the
state with the most significant relationship is the state where the injury occurred.”  
Novartis argues that New Jersey has the most significant relationship to the punitive damages claim because
that state is the site of any labeling and marketing misconduct. 
The district court correctly held that Missouri has the “most significant relationship” to the punitive damages
claim. Missouri is the place where the injury occurred, making it presumptively the state with the most
significant relationship.
Missouri is where Novartis's sales representatives failed to warn Baldwin's doctor, making it also, at
least in part, the state of the conduct causing the injury. New Jersey may have an interest in its corporations
being governed by its punitive damages provisions, but as the district court held, Missouri has a strong interest
in applying its punitive damages laws to deter conduct by corporations doing business in Missouri that harms
Missouri residents. New Jersey's interest, balanced against Missouri's, does not overcome Missouri's
presumption that the law of the place of injury should apply. 
FUTURESELECT PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, INC.; Futureselect Prime Advisor II LLC;
The Merriwell Fund, LP; and Telesis IIW, LLC, Respondents, v. TREMONT GROUP
HOLDINGS, INC.; Tremont Partners, Inc.; Oppenheimer Acquisition Corporation;
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.; and Ernst & Young LLP, Petitioners, Goldstein
Golub Kessler LLP and KPMG LLP, Defendants.
FACTS:

Between 1997 and 2008, FutureSelect, a Redmond based financial company, invested nearly
$200 million in Tremont's Rye Funds, which pooled and fed money into Bernie Madoff's fraudulent
securities investment scheme. These investments were lost when Madoff's fraud unraveled.
FutureSelect sued Tremont, Oppenheimer Acquisition Corp. and MassMutual (Tremont's parent
companies), and Ernst & Young and Tremont's other auditors for their failure to conduct due diligence
on Madoff's operations. FutureSelect alleged violations of the Washington state securities act
(WSSA), chapter 21 .20 RCW; negligence; and negligent misrepresentation.

The trial court dismissed on the pleadings, finding Washington's security law did not apply and
that Washington courts did not have jurisdiction over Oppenheimer. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Defendants seek to reinstate the trial court's findings. Oppenheimer argues that it lacks the requisite
minimum contacts with Washington for personal jurisdiction. The defendants collectively argue that
dismissing for failure to state a claim is appropriate because New York law—which does not provide
for a private cause of action under its state securities act, rather than Washington law, which does—
applies. Ernst and Young also contends that it is not a “seller” under the WSSA.

Defendants argue that New York law applies because New York has the more significant relationship to
the dispute and that dismissal on the pleadings was warranted because there is no private cause of action
under New York's state security law. 
ISSUE:
WHETHER NEW YROK OR WASHINGTON LAW APPLIES

HELD:
WASHINGTON LAW APPLIES
 To settle choice of law questions, Washington uses the most significant relationship test as articulated by
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws  But we have not shied from applying a different, more specific
section of the Restatement when warranted by a particular tort
Previously, we developed a two-step analysis for the significant relationship inquiry:
1. First, courts will continue to evaluate the contacts with each interested jurisdiction. Id. The “approach is
not merely to count contacts, but rather to consider which contacts are most significant and to
determine where these contacts are found.”

2. Second, courts will continue to evaluate the interests and public policies of potentially concerned
jurisdictions. “The extent of the interest of each potentially interested state should be determined on the
basis, among other things, of the purpose sought to be achieved by their relevant local law rules and
the particular issue involved.”

Under 148, to determine the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the dispute, we must consider
(1) the place where plaintiff acted in reliance on the representations; (2) the place where the plaintiff received
the representations; (3) the place where the defendant made the representations; (4) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; (5) the place where a tangible thing,
which is the subject of the transaction between the parties, was situated at the time; and (6) the place where
the plaintiff is to render performance under a contract that he has been induced to enter by the false
representations of the defendant
 Much like in Southwell, this case has “not presented this court with a record that is sufficiently
developed to enable us to undertake the factual analysis necessary for proper resolution of the conflicts issue
involved.” But for purposes of reviewing dismissal under a CR 12(b)(6) motion, we look to the complaint and
conclude that FutureSelect could show that (1) Washington was the place where FutureSelect acted in reliance
on the representations, (2) Washington was the place where FutureSelect received the representations, (3)
Washington and New York were the places where the defendants made the representations, (4) Washington
and New York were the primary places of business of the parties, and (5) it cannot be determined either way
where FutureSelect was to render performance under the contract that it had been induced to enter by the
false representations of the defendant.
To complete this analysis, we must “consider which contacts are most significant” in addition to finding
out where they are found.  In short, we find the contacts pleaded by FutureSelect to be sufficient to survive the
defendants' CR 12(b)(6) motions on the choice of law issue.
Babcock v. Jackson

FACTS:

On Friday, September 16, 1960, Miss Georgia Babcock and her friends, Mr. and Mrs. William
Jackson, all residents of Rochester, left that city in Mr. Jackson's automobile, Miss Babcock as
guest, for a week-end trip to Canada. Some hours later, as Mr. Jackson was driving in the Province
of Ontario, he apparently lost control of the car; it went off the highway into an adjacent stone wall,
and Miss Babcock was seriously injured. Upon her return to this State, she brought  the present
action against William Jackson, alleging negligence on his part in operating his automobile.

Jackson having died after the commencement of the suit, his executrix was substituted in his place as defendant.

At the time of the accident, there was in force in Ontario a statute providing that "the owner or
driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying passengers for
compensation, is not liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of
any person being carried in * * * the motor vehicle". Even though no such bar is recognized under
this State's substantive law of torts, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the law of the place where the accident occurred governs and that Ontario's guest statute bars
recovery. The court at Special Term, agreeing with the defendant, granted the motion and the
Appellate Division, over a strong dissent by Justice HALPERN, affirmed the judgment of dismissal
without opinion.

ISSUE:
WHETHER NEW YORK LAW OR CANADA LAW APPLIES IN THIS CASE

HELD:
NEW YORK LAW APPLIES

The traditional choice of law rule, embodied in the original Restatement of Conflict of Laws and
until recently unquestioningly followed in this court has been that the substantive rights and
liabilities arising out of a tortious occurrence are determinable by the law of the place of the tort.
It had its conceptual foundation in the vested rights doctrine, namely, that a right to recover for a
foreign tort owes its creation to the law of the  jurisdiction where the injury occurred and depends
for its existence and extent solely on such law.
the vested rights doctrine has long since been discredited because it fails to take account of
underlying policy considerations in evaluating the significance to be ascribed to the circumstance
that an act had a foreign situs in determining the rights and liabilities which arise out of that act.
"The vice of the vested rights theory", it has been aptly stated, "is that it affects to decide
concrete cases upon generalities which do not state the practical considerations involved". More
particularly, as applied to torts, the theory ignores the interest which jurisdictions other than that
where the tort occurred may have in the resolution of particular issues. It is for this very reason
that, despite the advantages of certainty, ease of application and predictability which it affords 
In Auten v. Auten, however, this court abandoned such rules and applied what has been termed
the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" theory of the conflict of laws. "Under this
theory," we declared in the Auten case, "the courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the parties'
intention or the place of making or performance, lay emphasis rather upon the law of the place
`which has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute'" 
 In the much discussed case of Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines ( 9 N.Y.2d 34), this court declined to
apply the law of the place of the tort as respects the issue of the quantum of the recovery in a
death action arising out of an airplane crash,  where the decedent had been a New York resident
and his relationship with the defendant airline had originated in this State. 
The emphasis in Kilberg was plainly that the merely fortuitous circumstance that the wrong and
injury occurred in Massachusetts did not give that State a controlling concern or interest in the
amount of the tort recovery as against the competing interest of New York in providing its
residents or users of transportation facilities there originating with full compensation for wrongful
death. Although the Kilberg case did not expressly adopt the "center of gravity" theory, its
weighing of the contacts or interests of the respective jurisdictions to determine their bearing on
the issue of the extent of the recovery is consistent with that approach.
The same judicial disposition is also reflected in a variety of other decisions, some of recent date,
others of earlier origin, relating to workmen's compensation, tortious occurrences arising  out of a
contract, issues affecting the survival of a tort right of action and intrafamilial immunity from
tort and situations involving a form of statutory liability. These numerous cases differ in many
ways but they are all similar in two important respects. First, by one rationale or another, they
rejected the inexorable application of the law of the place of the tort where that place has no
reasonable or relevant interest in the particular issue involved. And, second, in each of these
cases the courts, after examining the particular circumstances presented, applied the law of some
jurisdiction other than the place of the tort because it had a more compelling interest in the
application of its law to the legal issue involved.
The "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" doctrine adopted by this court in conflicts cases
involving contracts impresses us as likewise affording the appropriate approach for
accommodating the competing interests in tort cases with multi-State contacts. Justice, fairness
and "the best practical result"
may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of
its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the
specific issue raised in the litigation. The merit of such a rule is that "it gives to the place `having
the most interest in the problem' paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a
particular factual context" and thereby allows the forum to apply "the policy of the jurisdiction
`most  intimately concerned with the outcome of [the] particular litigation.'
Such, indeed, is the approach adopted in the most recent revision of the Conflict of Laws
Restatement in the field of torts. According to the principles there set out, "The local law of the
state which has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties
determines their rights and liabilities in tort" (Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, § 379[1];
also Introductory Note to Topic 1 of Chapter 9, p. 3 [Tentative Draft No. 8, 1963]), and the relative
importance of the relationships or contacts of the respective jurisdictions is to be evaluated in the
light of "the issues, the character of the tort and the relevant purposes of the tort rules involved" 
Comparison of the relative "contacts" and "interests" of New York and Ontario in this litigation,
vis-a-vis the issue here presented, makes it clear that the concern of New York is unquestionably
the greater and more direct and that the interest of Ontario is at best minimal. The present action
involves injuries sustained by a New York guest as the result of the negligence of a New York host
in the operation of an automobile, garaged, licensed and undoubtedly insured in New York, in the
course of a week-end journey which began and was to end there. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole
relationship with the occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that the accident occurred
there.
New York's policy of requiring a tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries caused by his
negligence cannot be doubted — as attested by the fact that the Legislature of this State has
repeatedly refused to enact a statute denying or limiting recovery in such cases (see, e.g., 1930 Sen.
Int. No. 339, Pr. No. 349; 1935 Sen. Int. No. 168, Pr. No. 170; 1960 Sen. Int. No. 3662, Pr. No.
3967) — and our courts have neither reason nor warrant for departing from that policy simply
because the accident, solely affecting New York residents and arising out of the operation of a New
York based automobile, happened beyond its borders. Per contra, Ontario has no conceivable
interest in denying a remedy to a New York guest against his New York host for injuries suffered in
Ontario by reason of conduct which was tortious under Ontario law. The object of Ontario's guest
statute, it has been said, is "to prevent the fraudulent assertion  of claims by passengers, in collusion
with the drivers, against insurance companies" (Survey of Canadian Legislation, 1 U. Toronto L.J.
358, 366) and, quite obviously, the fraudulent claims intended to be prevented by the statute are
those asserted against Ontario defendants and their insurance carriers, not New York defendants
and their insurance carriers. Whether New York defendants are imposed upon or their insurers
defrauded by a New York plaintiff is scarcely a valid legislative concern of Ontario simply because
the accident occurred there, any more so than if the accident had happened in some other
jurisdiction.

It is hardly necessary to say that Ontario's interest is quite different from what it would have been
had the issue related to the manner in which the defendant had been driving his car at the time of
the accident. Where the defendant's exercise of due care in the operation of his automobile is in
issue, the jurisdiction in which the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred will usually have a
predominant, if not exclusive, concern. In such a case, it is appropriate to look to the law of the
place of the tort so as to give effect to that jurisdiction's interest in regulating conduct within its
borders, and it would be almost unthinkable to seek the applicable rule in the law of some other
place.

The issue here, however, is not whether the defendant offended against a rule of the road prescribed
by Ontario for motorists generally or whether he violated some standard of conduct imposed by
that jurisdiction, but rather whether the plaintiff, because she was a guest in the defendant's
automobile, is barred from recovering damages for a wrong concededly committed. As to that
issue, it is New York, the place where the parties resided, where their guest-host relationship arose
and where the trip began and was to end, rather than Ontario, the place of the fortuitous occurrence
of the accident, which has the dominant contacts and the superior claim for application of its law.
Although the rightness or wrongness of defendant's conduct may depend upon the law of the
particular jurisdiction through which the automobile passes, the rights and liabilities of the parties
which stem from their guest-host relationship should remain constant and not vary and shift as the
automobile proceeds from place to place. Indeed, such a result, we note,  accords with "the interests
of the host in procuring liability insurance adequate under the applicable law, and the interests of
his insurer in reasonable calculability of the premium." 

In conclusion, then, there is no reason why all issues arising out of a tort claim must be resolved
by reference to the law of the same jurisdiction. Where the issue involves standards of conduct, it
is more than likely that it is the law of the place of the tort which will be controlling but the
disposition of other issues must turn, as does the issue of the standard of conduct itself, on the
law of the jurisdiction which has the strongest interest in the resolution of the particular issue
presented.
Casey v. Manson Constr. and Engineering Co.
Plaintiff and her husband, Donald J. Casey, are and were at all pertinent times residents and
inhabitants of Multnomah County, Oregon. The defendant Manson Construction and Engineering
Company is a Washington corporation which has a registered agent for service in the State of Oregon
and does business here and *276 the defendant Osberg Construction Company is a Washington
corporation licensed to do business within the State of Oregon. The defendants formed a joint
adventure under the name of Manson-Osberg Company to construct a dam and its appurtenances on
property owned by Washington Public Power Supply System adjacent to Packwood, Washington. In
connection with this work Manson-Osberg constructed an access road running to the damsite. On or
about September 9, 1963, Donald J. Casey was a business invitee upon this access road and was
driving a semi-auto car tractor loaded with pipe, when the road gave way beneath the vehicle,
causing it to tip over into a deep ravine. Plaintiff's husband sustained permanent injuries as a result.
The defendants were negligent in the construction of the road, in failing to maintain it in a safe driving
condition and to keep it in proper repair, and in failing to warn plaintiff's husband of its dangerous
condition. As a result of the defendants' negligence and the injuries to her husband the plaintiff has
lost the sexual consortium, companionship, comfort, and earning power of her husband, to the
plaintiff's damage in the sum of $95,000.00.

Washington adheres to the common law rule which denies to the wife a right of action for loss of
consortium resulting from a negligent injury to her husband: In Oregon that right is conferred by
statute: 

ISSUE:
is whether the law of Oregon or that of Washington governs this case.

HELD:
WASHINGTON LAW WILL APPLY
We conclude our review of the decisions with a reference to Watts v. Pioneer Corn Company, a death action
arising out of the collision of automobiles in Illinois in which a Federal Court in Indiana applied the law of that
state which did not authorize such an action unless the deceased left dependents. The deceased left no
dependents. Under Illinois law the action could have been maintained. All the parties were residents of Indiana.
The court reasoned that the Indiana requirement of dependents would be circumvented by the "fortuitous"
occurrence of the accident in Illinois and that Illinois "does not have a sufficiently substantial interest in the
recovery of damages by Indiana beneficiaries from Indiana defendants"

Careful consideration of these decisions, as well as of the extensive writings on the subject, persuade
us that we should adopt for tort actions the rule of "most significant relationship with the occurrence
and with the parties" as set forth in the Tentative Draft of the Restatement.

Application of that rule to the facts of this case is fraught with difficulty. The court in Clark v. Clark,
supra, observed that "[t]his case is a comparatively easy one". It was so indeed, for the only
connection of Vermont, the foreign state, with the issue was that the accident occurred there in the
course of a motor trip from one town in New Hampshire to another. It cannot be said, however, that
we are dealing here with an easy case.

It differs in important particulars from any of those which we have examined in which the courts have
refused to apply the law of the place of the wrong. There was nothing fortuitous here about the place
of the accident, it could not have happened anywhere except on the negligently constructed and
maintained road in the State of Washington. Again, this is not an action between residents of Oregon,
but is brought by an Oregon domiciliary against two Washington corporations. Both defendants, it is
true, are licensed to transact business in Oregon and one of them does so, though we are not
advised as to the extent of that business, but the only business of these defendants having any
connection with this case was the construction of a hydroelectric dam in Washington and, as incident
thereto, the building and maintenance of the access road where the accident occurred.

By contrast, in all the cases of injury by accident which have come to our attention and in which the
courts have disregarded the law of the place of the wrong, except the airplane cases, the parties were
residents of the state where the action was brought; while in each of the airplane cases which applied
the law of the forum rather than of the place of the wrong, the airline maintained an office in the state
of the forum, its planes landed and took off there and the ticket for the journey which ended in
disaster was purchased there.

In all these cases, moreover, there were potent reasons for finding that the foreign state had either "no
conceivable interest" or "relatively little interest"
As to the underlying policies involved and the interests of the respective states, it is to be presumed that the
Oregon Legislature deemed it desirable that an anachronistic common law rule, should be removed, and a wife
accorded the same right as a husband to recover for a similar injury, though not to the same extent, because,
with regard to the service element of consortium, in order to prevent a double recovery, the husband's recovery
would be taken into account in measuring the wife's damages
Since it must be presumed that if the wife is entitled to recover for loss of consortium the husband is also
entitled to recover for his personal injury, this state's chief concern is that a wife's loss of her husband's society
and affection should not go uncompensated.
Washington's policy is in one aspect rather negative than affirmative. Her highest court announced more than
13 years ago that no such action could be maintained unless the legislature provided for it and the legislature
has not done so. Washington, of course, has no concern with whether an Oregon wife recovers for loss of
consortium in an Oregon court, but Washington has a legitimate concern in whether she recovers against
Washington residents when the wrong giving rise to the action occurs in Washington in circumstances such as
those we deal with here. Washington has a legitimate concern with whether her residents engaged in a
construction job there in this case a job related to the public interest should be disappointed in their reasonable
expectation that the extent of their liability for negligent conduct in Washington be governed by the law of that
state, regardless of the domicile of an injured plaintiff. It bears repetition that this case is to be distinguished
from those in which the place of injury is a mere happenstance.

Section 379a of the Tentative Draft of the Restatement, April 24, 1964, reads:

"In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the
rights and liabilities of the parties, unless some other state has a more significant relationship with the
occurrence and the parties as to the particular issue involved, in which event the local law of the latter
state will govern."

Elaborating on this rule in Comment f under Section 379a it is said:

"The state where the conduct occurred is most likely to be the state of most significant relationship
when these two elements are combined, that is to say, when, in addition to the injured person's being
domiciled or residing or doing business in the state, the injury occurred in the course of an activity or
of a relationship which is centered there. *292 One example is where the injury occurred in the course
of an employment which is centered in the state where the conduct took place and where the injured
person is domiciled." (Italics added.)

Section 380a of the Tentative Draft of the Restatement reads:

"The law selected by application of the rule of 379 determines whether the interest affected is entitled
to legal protection."

Although, for the purpose of determining a question of estoppel by judgment the right of action for
loss of consortium is not considered derivative, but, independent, yet it cannot be disputed that it is in
fact derivative, for it arises only as the result of injury to the other spouse; and so it is held that in such
actions the place of the conduct, not of the marital domicile, is the place of the injury

Accordingly, in Comment a under Section 380a, the authors of the Restatement say: "Likewise, when
a spouse suffers personal injury the law selected by application of the rule of Section 379 [the "most
significant relationship" rule] should determine whether the other spouse may recover for loss of
consortium, namely for the loss of the injured spouse's companionship, services and conjugal
affection."
While consideration should be given, we assume, to the interest of Oregon arising from the fact that
the effects of the injury are experienced by the plaintiff in this state, we, nevertheless, have a case in
which both conduct and injury occurred in Washington when the plaintiff's husband was a business
invitee of the defendants on land in their possession and control.

We conclude that Washington has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the
parties and that Washington's law should govern the issue presented by the demurrer to the
complaint. We think that none of the recent decisions refusing to apply the law of the state of the
injury to the particular circumstances of those cases can be cited as authority for a different result.

Ramos v. Louisiana
In 2015, petitioner Evangelisto Ramos was indicted in Louisiana state court for second-degree
murder. Ramos maintained his innocence and demanded a jury trial. After deliberating, ten of
the twelve jurors found him guilty, and under a provision of Louisiana’s constitution allowing for
non-unanimous jury verdicts, that was enough to convict Ramos. He was sentenced to life in
prison without parole. Ramos appealed his conviction, arguing that the U.S. Constitution requires
jury unanimity to convict. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, relying on a 1972 Supreme Court
decision called Apodaca v. Oregon, rejected Ramos’s claim that Louisiana’s non-unanimity rule is
unconstitutional, and when Ramos appealed that decision to the Louisiana Supreme Court, it
denied review. Ramos then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court,
which granted review in March 2019.

ISSUE:

HELD:

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
“ impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.[5] ”
The legal doctrine of stare decisis derives from the Latin maxim “stare decisis et non quieta movere,” which means to
stand by the thing decided and not disturb the calm. The doctrine reflects respect for the accumulated wisdom of judges
who have previously tried to solve the same problem.

“it is an established rule to abide by former precedents,” to “keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to
waver with every new judge’s opinion.”

To “avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable” that federal judges “should be bound down by strict
rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.”

The doctrine of stare decisis does not mean, of course, that the Court should never overrule erroneous precedents. All
Justices now on this Court agree that it is sometimes appropriate for the Court to overrule erroneous decisions.

As those many examples demonstrate, the doctrine of stare decisis does not dictate, and no one seriously maintains,
that the Court should never overrule erroneous precedent. As the Court has often stated and repeats today, stare decisis
is not an “inexorable command.”

To begin with, the Court’s precedents on precedent distinguish statutory cases from constitutional cases. In statutory
cases, stare decisis is comparatively strict, as history shows and the Court has often stated. That is because Congress and
the President can alter a statutory precedent by enacting new legislation. To be sure, enacting new legislation requires
finding room in a crowded legislative docket and securing the agreement of the House, the Senate (in effect, 60
Senators), and the President. Both by design and as a matter of fact, enacting new legislation is difficult—and far more
difficult than the Court’s cases sometimes seem to assume

In constitutional cases, by contrast, the Court has repeatedly said—and says again today—that the doctrine of stare
decisis is not as “inflexible.”

That said, in constitutional as in statutory cases, to “overrule an important precedent is serious business.” Jackson, 30 A.
B. A. J., at 334. In constitutional as in statutory cases, adherence to precedent is the norm. To overrule a constitutional
decision, the Court’s precedents on precedent still require a “special justification,” or otherwise stated, “strong
grounds,”

In particular, to overrule a constitutional precedent, the Court requires something “over and above the belief that the
precedent was wrongly decided.” Allen, 589 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9) (internal quotation marks omitted). As Justice
Scalia put it, the doctrine of stare decisis always requires “reasons that go beyond mere demonstration that the
overruled opinion was wrong,” for “otherwise the doctrine would be no doctrine at all.” Hubbard v. United States, 514
U. S. 695, 716 (1995) (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). To overrule, the Court demands a special
justification or strong grounds.

The stare decisis factors identified by the Court in its past cases include:  the quality of the precedent’s reasoning;  the
precedent’s consistency and coherence with previous or subsequent decisions;  changed law since the prior decision; 
changed facts since the prior decision;  the workability of the precedent;  the reliance interests of those who have
relied on the precedent; and  the age of the precedent.

sistent manner. As I read the Court’s cases on precedent, those varied and somewhat elastic stare decisis factors fold
into three broad considerations that, in my view, can help guide the inquiry and help determine what constitutes a
“special justification” or “strong grounds” to overrule a prior constitutional decision. First, is the prior decision not just
wrong, but grievously or egregiously wrong? A garden-variety error or disagreement does not suffice to overrule. In the
view of the Court

that is considering whether to overrule, the precedent must be egregiously wrong as a matter of law in order for the
Court to overrule it. In conducting that inquiry, the Court may examine the quality of the precedent’s reasoning,
consistency and coherence with other decisions, changed law, changed facts, and workability, among other factors. A
case may be egregiously wrong when decided, see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), or may be unmasked as egregiously wrong based on later legal or factual understandings
or developments, see, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410 (1979), or both, ibid. Second, has the prior decision caused
significant negative jurisprudential or real-world consequences? In conducting that inquiry, the Court may consider
jurisprudential consequences (some of which are also relevant to the first inquiry), such as workability, as well as
consistency and coherence with other decisions, among other factors. Importantly, the Court may also scrutinize the
precedent’s real-world effects on the citizenry, not just its effects on the law and the legal system. See, e.g., Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U. S., at 494–495; Barnette, 319 U. S., at 630– 642; see also Payne, 501 U. S., at 825–827. Third,
would overruling the prior decision unduly upset reliance interests? This consideration focuses on the legitimate
expectations of those who have reasonably relied on the precedent. In conducting that inquiry, the Court may examine a
variety of reliance interests and the age of the precedent, among other factors. In short, the first consideration requires
inquiry into how wrong the precedent is as a matter of law. The second and third considerations together demand, in
Justice Jackson’s words, a “sober appraisal of the disadvantages of the innovation as well as those of the questioned
case, a weighing of practical effects of one against the other.”

Those three considerations together provide a structured methodology and roadmap for determining whether to
overrule an erroneous constitutional precedent. The three considerations correspond to the Court’s historical practice
and encompass the various individual factors that the Court has applied over the years as part of the stare decisis
calculus.

Taken together, those three considerations set a high (but not insurmountable) bar for overruling a precedent, and they
therefore limit the number of overrulings and maintain stability in the law.4 Those three considerations also constrain
judicial discretion in deciding when to overrule an erroneous precedent. To be sure, applying those considerations is not
a purely mechanical exercise, and I do not claim otherwise. I suggest only that those three considerations may better
structure how to consider the many traditional stare decisis factors.