RULE 128
LEJANO VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 176389, DECEMBER 14, 2010
TOPIC: Relevance vs. Credibility; admissibility vs. Weight
FACTS:
Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer were
brutally slain at their home on June 30, 1991. The police arrested a group of
suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. The trial court however
smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged.
Four years later, the NBI announced that it had solved the crime by
presenting star-witness Jessica Alfaro who claimed to have witnessed the crime
and pointed herein accused Jeffrey Webb et. al. as culprits She also tagged
Gerardo Biong as an accessory after the fact.
In the trial court, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the
crime and claimed that they were elsewhere when the crime took place. Webb’s
alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the
ocean in the USA. He presented testimonies of witnesses as well as
documentary and object evidence to prove his alibi. In addition, the defense
presented witnesses to show Alfaro’s bad reputation for truth and the
incredible nature of her testimony. It was found out that there were significant
discrepancies between the affidavits executed by Alfaro on April 28 and May
22. Nevertheless, the trial court favored the testimony of Alfaro by considereing
Webb’s alibi as weak and thereby convicted the herein accused. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the trial court’s conviction but modified the penalities.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and
identifying herein accused, is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and
rebut Alfaro’s testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.
HELD:
1. NO. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping
into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job
of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the
accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the
accused’s claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as
positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can
also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking
an eye.
Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet
at least two criteria:
First, the positive identification of the offender must come
from a credible witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell
the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has,
to one who knows her, its weight in gold.
And second, the witness’ story of what she personally saw
must be believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies
about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes
bewildering claims.
In this case, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above
criteria. She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness
bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around that agency
for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals
and squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. She
was the prosecution’s worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her
superior testified that she volunteered to play the role of a witness in the
Vizconde killings when she could not produce a man she promised to the
NBI.
And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior
access to the details that the investigators knew of the case. She took
advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony
the clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door
glass frames even when they were trying to slip away quietly—just so she
can accommodate this crime scene feature. She also had Ventura
rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front door key that nobody
needed just to explain the physical evidence of that bag and its scattered
contents. And she had Ventura climbing the car’s hood, risking being
seen in such an awkward position, when they did not need to darken the
garage to force open the front door—just so to explain the darkened light
and foot prints on the car hood.
Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take
their turns raping Carmela is incongruent with their indifference,
exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a street light,
visible to neighbors and passersby, and showing no interest in the
developments inside the house, like if it was their turn to rape Carmela.
Alfaro’s story that she agreed to serve as Webb’s messenger to Carmela,
using up her gas, and staying with him till the bizarre end when they
were practically strangers, also taxes incredibility.
To provide basis for Webb’s outrage, Alfaro said that she followed
Carmela to the main road to watch her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue.
And, inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the role of messenger,
she claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gang-
rape Carmella, as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on
testifying on personal knowledge. Her swing from an emotion of fear
when a woman woke up to their presence in the house and of absolute
courage when she nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a
grim scene is also quite inexplicable.
Ultimately, Alfaro’s quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not
inherently unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive identification
that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an
alibi.
2. YES. The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked
cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well
as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from
airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to
secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9,
1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the
Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the
Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen
hours.
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it
might as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard
suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching
evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption
of truth of what they state, are immune to attack. They are not.
That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here, however, the
prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in
Webb’s passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S.’
immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back. The
prosecution’s rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted
in the lower court’s minds.
As a consequence, Alfaro’s stpry will not hold together. Webb’s
participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence
against the others must necessarily fall.
PEOPLE VS. MERCADO
G.R. NO. 218702, OCTOBER 17, 2018
TOPIC: MULTIPLE ADMISSIBILITY
FACTS:
Appellant was the nephew of Alicia who was enrolled at the nearby
college and used to live in the same house with the live-in partners Alicia and
Evelyn. Around 2:00 AM of October 15, 2007, the house of Evelyn and Alicia
was reported to be on fire. Through the help of neighbors, Evelyn and appellant
were brought out of the burning house. Witnesses declared that as soon as
Evelyn was carried out to safety, she promptly accused and pointed to
appellant as the person responsible for attacking her and Alicia as well as for
setting the house on fire. Specifically, Evelyn claimed that appellant hit her and
[Alicia] with a baseball [bat] then set them on fire. While on board the
ambulance on the way to the hospital, Evelyn repeated the name of appellant
as the culprit who caused their injuries and burned the house. Thus,she
uttered: "Te, si Patrick [Mercado] ang may gawa," "Si
Patrick [Mercado] sinunog kami," and "Si Patrick ang pumalo sa akin. Si
Patrick [Mercado] ang sumunog sa amin, pati sa bahay."
Based on the dying declaration of Evelyn, accused-appellant Mercado
was charged for the killing of Alicia and Evelyn. The Trial Court and the CA
both convicted Mercado guilty of the crime of double murder. Mercado
questioned his conviction as the prosecution supposedly failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He averred that the prosecution's failure to
present the baseball bat he supposedly used, or prove the presence of gasoline
used to set the fire, amounted to reasonable doubt that necessitated his
acquittal.
ISSUE:
WON the prosecution proved Mercado's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
HELD:
YES. Time and again, this Court has ruled that denial is the weakest of
all defenses. It easily crumbles in the face of positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime. A denial, like other defenses,
remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence which is
independently assessed. When the evidence for the prosecution
convincingly connects the crime and the culprit, the probative value of
the denial is negligible.
xxxx
The failure of the prosecution to present the baseball bat allegedly used
and to prove the presence of the gasoline is of no moment. The evidence
presented and the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses were more
than sufficient to establish accused-appellant's guilt for the crime
charged. These testimonies specifically recounted the dying declarations/part
of the res gestae of Evelyn Santos which prove that accused-appellant hit the
victims with a baseball bat before placing them and the house on fire.
Furthermore, the failure to present the baseball bat actually did not, in any
way affect[,] the strength of the prosecution's evidence.
As an exception to the hearsay rule, a dying declaration is admissible as
evidence because it is "evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost
credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless
and false accusation."
The Court, in People v. Umapas, explained and expounded on how each
of the four requisites is to be understood. Thus:
Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be
admissible, thus: First, the declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death. This refers not only to the
facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both before and after the assault
having a direct causal connection with it. Statements involving the nature of
the declarant's injury or the cause of death; those imparting deliberation and
willfulness in the attack, indicating the reason or motive for the killing;
justifying or accusing the accused; or indicating the absence of cause for the
act are admissible. Second, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant
must be under the consciousness of an impending death. The rule is that, in
order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and
imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending
death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders the
dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the approaching death be
presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test is whether the
declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly
impending. Third, the declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is that
where the declarant would not have been a competent witness had he survived,
the proffered declarations will not be admissible. Thus, in the absence of
evidence showing that the declarant could not have been competent to be a
witness had he survived, the presumption must be sustained that he would
have been competent. Fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal
case for homicide; murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.
Accordingly, all the requisites abovementioned are present in the case at
bar.
In any event, even if the statements of Evelyn would not qualify as dying
declarations, they are nevertheless admissible in evidence because they are
part of the res gestae. A declaration made spontaneously after a startling
occurrence is deemed as part of the res gestae when (1) the principal act,
the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements
made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as
a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion
and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a
false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.
Applying the foregoing to the present case, the statements of Evelyn were
clearly part of the res gestae. The fire – which caused severe injuries on her
body, destroyed her house, and killed her live-in partner – was undeniably a
startling occurrence. Evelyn's statements were made immediately after she was
rescued, and when she was clearly suffering from the pain caused by her
injuries, thereby negating any possibility of her contriving or manufacturing a
lie. The statements were also undoubtedly about the startling occurrence as
Evelyn repeatedly claimed that Mercado was the one who attacked her and
Alicia, and thereafter set the house on fire. The statements were thus certainly
part of the res gestae.
PEOPLE VS. SALAFRANCA
GR No. 173476, February 22, 2012
TOPIC: MULTIPLE ADMISSIBILITY
FACTS:
Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the
fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon. RTC and CA found him guilty.
Bolanon was attacked from behind and stabbed passed midnight.
Bolanon was able to seek help and was rushed to the hospital by his uncle
Rodolfo Estano but eventually died despite receiving medical attention. On
their way to the hospital, the victim Bolanon was able to say that it was
Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him. Salafranca fled from his residence the
day after the incident and had stayed away in Bataan for 8 years until his
arrest.
The RTC convicted Salafranca. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision
of the trial court, citing the dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to
Salafranca as his assailant and Salafranca's positive identification as the
culprit by the prosecution's witness Agusto Mendoza. The alibi of Salafranca of
being in his home during the incident did not overcome the positive
identification, especially as his unexplained flight after the stabbing, leaving his
home and employment, constituted a circumstance highly indicative of his
guilt. Aggrieved, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State
did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an ante-mortem (dying declaration) declaration of
Bolanon is admissible.
HELD:
YES. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence
due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following
requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the time the
declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending
death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the
declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in
which the declarant is a victim. These requisites are present in the case at bar.
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-
mortem statement to Estaño, identifying Salafranca as the person who had
stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his
impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according
to Estaño, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon
succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission,
which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority
for the view that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death can be
shown by the declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence,
such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the
opinion of his physician. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the
subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was
offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the
victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and
thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time
to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.
BACERRA VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 204544, JULY 3, 2017
TOPIC: DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Bacerra was charged with simple arson. He was
convicted by the RTC based on circumstantial evidence adduced from the
collective testimonies of Alfredo Melegrito (Alfredo), Edgar Melegrito (Edgar),
Toni Rose dela Cruz, and P03 Marcos Bautista, Jr. whereby:
Alfredo and his family were sound asleep in their home on November 15,
2005. At about 1:00 a.m., he was roused from sleep by the sound of stones
hitting his house. Alfredo went to the living room and peered through the
jalousie window. The terrace light allowed him to recognize his neighbor and
co-worker. Bacerra. Bacerra threw stones at Alfredo's house while saying,
"Vulva of your mother." Just as he was about to leave, Bacerra exclaimed,
"[V]ulva of your mother, Old Fred, I'll bum you now." Bacerra then left.15
Alfredo's son, Edgar, also witnessed the incident through a window in his
room.
Troubled by Bacerra's threat, Alfredo waited for him to return. Alfredo sat down
beside the window. At around 4:00a.m., he heard dogs barking outside. Alfredo
looked out the window and saw Bacerra walking towards their nipa hut, which
was located around 10 meters from their house. Bacerra paced in front of the
nipa hut and shook it. Moments later, Alfredo saw the nipa hut burning.
Alfredo sought help from his neighbors to smother the fire. Edgar contacted the
authorities for assistance but it was too late. The nipa hut and its contents
were completely destroyed. The local authorities conducted an investigation on
the incident.
The CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Aggrieved, appellant argued that
his conviction is erroneous it being based on circumstantial evidence, which,
being merely based on conjecture, falls short of proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. No direct evidence was presented to prove that petitioner
actually set fire to private complainant's nipa hut. Moreover, there were two (2)
incidents that occurred, which should be taken and analyzed separately.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt based on
the circumstantial evidence adduced during trial
HELD:
YES. Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are classifications of
evidence with legal consequences. The difference between direct evidence and
circumstantial evidence involves the relationship of the fact inferred to the facts
that constitute the offense. Their difference does not relate to the probative
value of the evidence.
Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without drawing any
inference. Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, "indirectly proves a fact
in issue, such that the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from
circumstantial evidence."
The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than
nor superior to circumstantial evidence. The Rules of Court do not distinguish
between "direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from which the
existence of a fact may be inferred." The same quantum of evidence is still
required. Courts must be convinced that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a
fact from which it may be inferred, beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements
of a crime exist and that the accused is its perpetrator. There is no requirement
in our jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict. After all, evidence is
always a matter of reasonable inference from any fact that may be proven by
the prosecution provided the inference is logical and beyond reasonable doubt.
The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
support a finding of guilt is a qualitative test not a quantitative one. The proven
circumstances must be "consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with
the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt."
The crime of simple arson was proven solely through circumstantial
evidence in People v. Abayon. None of the prosecution's witnesses actually saw
the accused start the fire. Nevertheless, the circumstantial evidence adduced
by the prosecution, taken in its entirety, all pointed to the accused's guilt.
In People v. Acosta, there was also no direct evidence linking the accused to the
burning of the house. However, the circumstantial evidence was substantial
enough to convict the accused. The accused had motive and previously
attempted to set a portion of the victim's house on fire. Moreover, he was
present at the scene of the crime before and after the incident.
Similarly, in this case, no one saw petitioner actually set fire to the nipa
hut. Nevertheless, the prosecution has established multiple circumstances,
which, after being considered in their entirety, support the conclusion that
petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson.
PEOPLE VS. CANLAS
G.R. NO. 141633, DECEMBER 14, 2001
TOPIC: DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Rex Canlas, among other six unidentified men, was
found guilty of robbery with homicide for the death of Jing Flores. There is no
direct evidence in this case that could link appellant to the commission of the
crime. As stated by the trial court, (N)obody actually saw how the victim was
killed and how the robbery was committed. The trial court was thus compelled
to rely solely on circumstantial evidence. The trial court enumerated the pieces
of circumstantial evidence that justified its finding of guilt:
1. Jing Garcia Flores was last seen alive at around 2 oclock in the afternoon of
June 14, 1998 entering a small alley leading to the house of Jose Tamayo.
2. The victim was wearing a blue Bench cap and a pair of blue Beach Walk
sandals, with a red towel and carrying assorted merchandise when last seen
entering a small alley.
3. While conducting the search for Jing Garcia Flores in the afternoon of June
14, 1998, prosecution witness Ismael Victoria saw accused Rex Canlas
standing under a tree across the house of Jose Tamayo contrary to the accused
(sic) allegation that he was already in Metro Manila at that time.
4. In the early morning of June 15, 1998, the lifeless body of Jing Garcia Flores
was found in a creek bearing contusions and incised wounds.
5. The creek is only around three hundred meters away from the house of Jose
Tamayo.
6. Drips of blood and blood stains (sic) were found at the creek were the body of
the victim was recovered.
7. The drips of blood and blood stains (sic) were also found on the leaves of
different plants that lead to the backyard of Jose Tamayo.
8. Blood stains (sic) were also found leading to the kitchen of Jose Tamayos
house.
9. At the kitchen floor, drips of blood were found which were covered with
sand. Blood stains (sic) were also found on the wall and on the small table of
the kitchen.
10. When the police and the searching party entered the house of Jose
Tamayo, they saw the grandmother of the accused washing a white Hanes shirt
stained with blood in a basin. The grandmother said that the clothing belonged
to the victim and at the same time requesting that she be not involve (sic) in
the case as she is already old.
11. Underneath a bamboo bed inside one of the rooms of the house of Jose
Tamayo was found a bag containing assorted clothings (103 pieces of short
pants and 34 pieces of sandos) with some soaked in blood and were identified
to belong to the victim.
12. The blue cap with Bench marking, the blue sandals, and a red towel
stained with blood all belonging to the victim were also found inside the said
room. At the corner of the bamboo bed was a lead pipe with blood stains (sic).
13. A bedsheet (sic) with blood stains (sic) was also found inside the room.
14. Dr. Olga Bausa, a forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp
Crame, testified that these items with blood stains (sic) when subjected for
examination gave positive results for the presence of human blood.
15. Jose Tamayo testified that after the accused (sic) mother died, said accused
lived with them and they were the ones who send (sic) Rex to school.
16. Jose Tamayo also admitted that the accused used to stay and sleep at the
room where the items belonging to the deceased were recovered.
17. Accused admitted that in the morning of June 14, 1998, he was at his
cousin Dexter Canlas house and attended the birthday of the latter. Dexter
Canlas house is very near the house of Jose Tamayo.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred in convicting Canlas based on
circumstantial evidence.
HELD:
YES. True, conviction is not always based on direct evidence for it may
also rest purely on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is that
evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue
may be established by inference. It is founded on experience, observed facts
and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven
facts and the facts sought to be proved. Conviction may be warranted on the
basis of circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to the third requisite, it is
essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an
unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.
Based on these requisites, the circumstantial evidence invoked by the
trial court raises doubt rather than moral certainty as to the guilt of appellant.
The circumstantial evidence of the prosecution fails to muster the quantum of
proof required in criminal cases guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the
circumstances enumerated by the trial court do not completely discount the
possibility that other than appellant, there could be another person or persons
who could have perpetrated the crime.
PEOPLE VS. OCHATE
G.R. NO. 127154, JULY 30, 2002
TOPIC: DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Ochate was charged with rape with homicide for the
death of Rowena Albiso who was then 8 years old. The trial court found him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the said crime based on the following
circumstantial evidence: (1) in the afternoon of September 26, 1994, when the
victim was last seen alive by her brother Roseller, appellant was seen near his
house located along the road where the victim and Roseller pass on their way
home; (2) the road passing through accused-appellant’s house is the only path
coming from the school going to the house of the victim’s family; (3) appellant
was the only person seen by Roseller on his way home; (4) appellant, who was
alone at that time, appeared to Roseller as if he was waiting for somebody; (5)
upon waking up in the morning of September 27, 1994 and noticing that
people in their barangay were gathering and looking for somebody, appellant
did not bother to inquire about the reason for such activity; (6) he did not
participate in the search for the missing girl; (7) the victim’s cadaver was found
about 50 meters from appellant’s hut; (8) when he was informed by his wife
that the victim’s cadaver was found near their house, he showed no surprise
and he did nothing; (9) on two occasions, when he was informed by the police
that someone was killed in their barangay and that he is a suspect in the
killing, he did not bother to ask who the victim was. The CA affirmed the
decision of the lower court. Aggrieved, Ochate went to the Supreme and argued
that the circumstantial evidence against him are not sufficient to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
WON THE CONVICTION THE ACCUSED ON ALLEGED
INCRIMINATORY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS PROPER.
HELD:
NO. The requisites to sustain a conviction of an accused based on
circumstantial evidence are: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2)
the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of
the accused. And in the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, there are four
basic guidelines: (1) it should be acted upon with caution; (2) all the essential
facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (3) the facts must exclude
every other theory but that of guilt; and (4) the facts must establish such a
certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the judgment beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the offense.
After a careful review of the entire evidence presented, we find that a
combination of the foregoing circumstances is insufficient to convict appellant
of rape with homicide. Said circumstances do not lead to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, is the person
guilty of the offense charged. Appellant’s indifference to the events that
happened in their barangay beginning September 26, 1994 up to the time
of his arrest on September 29, 1994 may lend support to the suspicion of
the barangay and police authorities that he is the author of the crime.
But then, mere suspicion, no matter how strong it may be, is not
sufficient to sustain conviction. Law and jurisprudence demand proof
beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived of his life, liberty,
or even property. Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the
presumption nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established
by the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of innocence requires
courts to take "a more than casual consideration" of every circumstances or
doubt proving the innocence of the accused.
Jurisprudence instructs that where the circumstances obtaining in a
case are capable of two inferences, one of which is consistent with the
presumption of innocence while the other may be compatible with the finding
of guilt, the court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty and, therefore, is insufficient to support a judgment
of conviction.
Doubtless, accused-appellant’s defenses of alibi and denial are
weak. Nevertheless, it is a settled principle in criminal law that a finding of
guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s own evidence and not on
the weakness or absence of evidence for the defense. In the present case, the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
AMARELA VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NOS. 225642-43, JANUARY 17, 2018
TOPIC: POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION; WOMEN’S HONOR DOCTRINE
FACTS:
Based on the lone testimony of AAA, the RTC found Juvy D.
Amarela (Amarela) and Junard G. Racho (Racho) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) different charges of rape. It is to be noted that in this case, the
version in AAA's affidavit-complaint is remotely different from her court
testimony. At the first instance, AAA claims that she was pulled away from the
vicinity of the stage; later, in court, she says that she was on her way to the
rest room when she was grabbed. Nevertheless, the CA affirmed the lower
court’s decision based on the well-entrenched rule that in matters of credibility
of witnesses, the assessment made by the trial court should be respected and
given preponderant weight. [AAA's] ordeal is so traumatic that she would rather
forget the whole incident. But once a rape victim has decided to seek justice,
that means she is willing to recall the dastardly detail of the animalistic act
committed on her person. This is otherwise known as the women’s honor
doctrine.
ISSUE:
WON the conviction of Amerala and Racho based on the lone
testimony of AAA is proper.
HELD:
NO. The "women's honor" doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence
sometime in 1960. In the case of People v. Tana, the Court affirmed the
conviction of three (3) armed robbers who took turns raping a person named
Herminigilda Domingo. The Court, speaking through Justice Alejo Labrador,
said:
It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit
that they have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened. This is
due to their natural instinct to protect their honor. We cannot believe that the
offended party would have positively stated that intercourse took place unless
it did actually take place.
This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor. And while the factual
setting back then would have been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman
to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault; today, the Court simply cannot
be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino
woman. The Court, should stay away from such mindset and accept the
realities of a woman's dynamic role in society today; she who has over the
years transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful
person, willing to fight for her rights.
In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of
rape without gender bias or cultural misconception. It is important to weed out
these unnecessary notions because an accused may be convicted solely on the
testimony of the victim, provided of course, that the testimony is credible,
natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things. Thus, in order for the Court to affirm a conviction for rape, we must
believe beyond reasonable doubt the version of events narrated by the victim.
In this case, the prosecution miserably failed to present a clear story of what
transpired.
