Aggravating Circumstances

attyrcd / January 28, 2010

The aggravating circumstances are based on the higher degree of perversity of the offender manifested at the time of
the commission of the felony; the place, the means, ways or methods employed; his relationship with the offended 
party; or other personal circumstance and others.

Kinds of aggravating circumstances:

1. Generic – that which generally applies to all crimes like recidivism.
2. Specific – that which applies to a particular felony like cruelty in crimes against persons.
3. Qualifying – that which changes the nature of the felony, as treachery in murder.
4. Inherent – that which is part of the felony committed, as unlawful entry in robbery with force upon things.
Distinction:
Generic Qualifying

1. Can be offset by an ordinary mitigating. 1. Cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating.

2. Cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the

2. Maybe proved even though not alleged. information.  However, it may be proved as a generic
aggravating circumstance.

3. Not offset have the effect of increasing the penalty to the 3. Changes not only the nature but also the name of the
maximum but not beyond that provided by law. offense.
The circumstances specifying an offense or aggravating the penalty thereof must be proved as conclusively as the
act itself, mere suppositions or presumptions being insufficient to establish their  presence according to law.  The
Supreme Court said that even if the generic aggravating circumstance is not  alleged in the information, the same
may be proved even over the  objection  of the adverse party. (Q10, 1991 Bar)

Specific circumstances:
1. Taking advantage of Official Position.
That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position. (Art. 14, Par. 1)

It  is  not only necessary that the person  committing the crime  be  a public officer; he must also use  the  influence,
prestige or ascendancy which such office gives him as a  means by which he realizes his purpose. (People v.
Yturriaga, 86 Phil. 534)

If the abuse of the office is an integral element of the felony as in falsification of public document by a public officer
who took advantage of his official position, bribery or malversation, the circumstances is not considered.  This
means that this aggravating circumstance is inherent in the crime, since, it cannot be committed except by public
officer. (People v. Teves, 44 Phil 275)

2. That the crime be committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities. (Art. 14, Par. 2)
Public authorities is a person in authority, not an agent of a person in authority, and that the person in authority
should be engaged in the exercise of his public functions, and  that he should not be the object of the crime.  It is
also essential that the offender knows of the identity of the public authority.
The Chief of Police is a person in authority for he is vested with authority to maintain peace and order and is duty
bound to prosecute and to apprehend violators of the laws. (People v. Rodil, 109 SCRA 308)  A Barangay Chairman
is a person in authority.  Teachers, professors, supervisors of public and duly recognized private schools, colleges
and universities, as well as lawyers are persons in authority only for the purposes of Direct Assault (Art. 148) and
Simple Resistance and Disobedience (Art. 151), but not for the purpose of the aggravating circumstance in this
paragraph. (People v. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601)

If the crime is committed against the public authority, the crime committed is direct assault and this aggravating
circumstance will be considered absorbed. (US v. Rodriguez, 29 Phil. 150)

3. Act be committed with insult to or in disregard   of the respect  due the offended party on account of  his  rank,
age, or sex, or that it be committed in the dwelling  of  the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation .
(Art. 14, Par. 3)
There are four aggravating circumstances in this paragraph, which, if present in the commission of the crime are
considered as one aggravating circumstance only.

There must, however, be proof showing that the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the age or sex of
the offended party. (People v. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548) So, these circumstances was not considered when the accused
was drunk at the time of the commission of the offense.

This aggravating circumstance is considered only in crimes against  persons, security or honor and not in crimes 
against  property such as robbery with homicide. (People v. Ang, 62833, Oct. 8, 1985) The mere fact that the victim
was a woman is not itself sufficient to support the contention that there was insult of disrespect to sex.  It is 
necessary to  prove the specific fact or circumstance, other  than that the victim is a woman, showing insult or
disregard of sex in order that it may be considered as an aggravating circumstance, such as compelling a woman to
go to the house of the accused against her will. (US v. Quevengco, 2 Phil. 412)

Disregard of respect due to sex and age may be included in treachery. (People v. Limaco, 99 Phil. 35)

Dwelling includes dependencies, staircase, and enclosures under the house.  A place of “sanctuary worthy of
respect.” (People v. Parazo, May 14, 1997)  A combination house and store is not a dwelling. (People v. Magnaue,
3510, May 30, 1951)  For dwelling to be appreciated, it is not necessary that the victim is the owner of the dwelling. 
It is  enough  that she has the right to be in the dwelling and not only as an incidental circumstance. (People v. Sto.
Tomas, 138 SCRA 206)  It is aggravating where the place is, even for a brief moment, a home to the offended party
though he is not the owner thereof, provided that he did not provoke the commission of the crime and the dwelling is
not that of the offender also. (People v. Badilla, 185 SCRA 554)
Dwelling is an aggravating circumstance  even  if one does not enter the  house  of the victim.  Such as when the
assailant from the  outside  shoots the victim  inside  his  house. (People v. Bautista, 440, Nov. 29, 1947) This 
circumstance  is  not considered  where provocation was given by the offended  party or where both parties reside in
the same dwelling.  In case of a boarding  house,  each room of a boarder  is  considered  a separate dwelling.
(People v. Daniel, 75 OG 4834)

Dwelling is aggravating if adultery is committed in the conjugal dwelling because the respect due the conjugal house
is violated (US v. Ibanez, 33 Phil. 611) if the paramour is not residing in the conjugal dwelling.

4. Acts be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness. (Art. 14, Par. 4)
The requisites are:
a. The offended party had trusted the offender.
b. The offender abused such trust.
c. That such abuse of confidence facilitated the commission of the crime.
If the accused raped a girl who was entrusted to his care by the parents, there is betrayal of confidence reposed upon
him by the parents but not an abuse of the confidence of the offended party (People v. Crumb, 46 OG 6162) since
the confidence between the parties must be personal.  But if the offender was the servant of the family and
sometimes took care of the child, whom she later killed, there is present grave abuse of confidence. (People v.
Caliso, 58 Phil. 283)
5. Crime be committed in the (1) Palace of the Chief Executive, or (2) in his presence, or (3) where public
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in (4) a place dedicated to religious worship. (Art. 14, Par.
5)
In crime committed  in  the presence of the President, it is not necessary that the latter be exercising his functions. 
With respect to the first, third, and fourth, the crime must have been committed with full consciousness of the place;
in other words, the offender must have intended to commit  the crime at the place, knowing fully well that the place
deserves respect.

This circumstance is present when the accused stabbed the victim in the office of the Chief of Police who was
investigating a fist fight between them. (People v. De Ananias, 96 Phil. 979)

6. Nighttime, Uninhabited Place or Band.

That the crime be committed at night time, or in an uninhabited place, or by  a  band, whenever such circumstances
may facilitate the commission of the offense.  Whenever more than 3 armed malefactors shall have acted together in 
the commission  of  an offense, it shall be deemed  to have been committed by a band. (Art. 14, Par. 6)

Nocturnity comprises the period of the day between sunset and the  beginning  of  dawn.  But for nighttime to be
appreciated, it is not absolutely necessary that the  offender purposely sought nighttime to commit the crime; it is 
enough that it facilitated the commission of the crime or his escape or prevented identification. (People v. Cristobal,
91 SCRA 71) Where nocturnity is so interlocked with the circumstance of treachery as  to  become part of  the 
latter, nocturnity cannot  be taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance. (People v. Pardo, 79 Phil. 566) 
If the commission of the crime was commenced at day time and it was consummated at nighttime, such is not
aggravated. (US v. Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4)  Chance meeting between the accused and the victim negates nighttime as
an aggravating circumstances. (People v. Aquino, 124 SCRA 835) (Q9, 1994 Bar; Q3, 1997 Bar)
Uninhabited place (Despoblado) is determined not by the distance of the nearest  house to the scene of the crime,
but whether or not in the place where the crime was committed there was a reasonable possibility of the victim
receiving some help. (People v. Bangug, 52 Phil. 87)  Provided that solitude was purposely sought or taken
advantage of to facilitate the commission of the felony. (People v. Coderes, 104 SCRA 255)
Band consists of at least four armed malefactors organized with the intention of carrying out any unlawful design. 
They should have acted together in the commission of the crime.  If one has no direct participation in the
commission of the crime, like a principal by inducement there is no band. (Gamara v. Valero, 51 SCRA 322)  In a 
band, conspiracy is presumed, it need not be proved.
Band is inherent in brigandage but not in simple robbery committed by band.  It is not considered in the crime of
rape. (People v. Corpus, 43 OG 2249)  Band and abuse of superior strength have the same essence which is the
utilization of the combined strength of the assailants to overpower the victim and consummate the killing. (People v.
Medrano, 31871, December 14, 1981)

7. Crime committed on the Occasion of Calamity.

That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck,  earthquake, epidemic,  or other
calamity or misfortune. (Art. 14, Par. 7)

This is aggravating because the offender “who in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted,
adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil them.” (US v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150)

The development of engine trouble at sea is a misfortune but it does not come within the meaning of “other calamity
or misfortune.” (People v. Arpa, 27 SCRA 1037)

8. Aid of Armed Men who insure or afford impunity.

That the crime  be committed with the aid of  armed  men or persons who insure or afford impunity. (Art. 14, Par. 8)
It  should be borne in mind, that the armed men should not participate  in the execution of the felony.  Otherwise, 
they become co-principals.  Casual presence is not aggravating if the offender did not avail himself of any of their
aid nor did he knowingly count upon their assistance in the commission of the crime. (US v. Abaigar, 2 Phil. 417)  If
used as a means to insure its execution in the killing of a person, such is absorbed in treachery.

9. Recidivism (Art. 14, Par. 9)

Recidivist is one  who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final  judgment
of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code.  Recidivism involves at least two conviction, and hence, it
is a form of plurality of crimes like reiteration, habitual delinquency and quasi-recidivism.  The first conviction must
be by final judgment and must take place prior to the second conviction. (People v. Baldera, 86 Phil. 189)  The
number of years intervening between the convictions is immaterial.  Recidivism is likewise considered even if the
offender has been given absolute pardon for the first conviction, since pardon merely extinguishes the penalty (US v.
Sotelo, 28 Phil. 147) but not in the case of amnesty as such extinguishes all the effects in law of the crime
committed. (US v. Francisco, 10 Phil. 185)
Habitual delinquent is a person who within a period of ten (10) years from the date of his release or last conviction
of the crime of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa, or falsification, has been found guilty
of any said crimes a third time or oftener. (Art. 62, Par. 5)
Distinction:
Recidivism Habitual Delinquency

1. Applies to all offenses embraced in the same title of the 1. Applicable only to robbery, theft, estafa, falsification,
Code. serious and less serious injuries.

2. Need not be alleged in the complaint or information. 2. Must be alleged or charged.

3. If not offset, merely raises the imposition of the prescribed

3. Carries with it an additional penalty.
penalty to its maximum period.

4. Between each conviction there should not be a lapse of

4. Intervening period between convictions  is immaterial.
time of more than 10 years.
May the offender be a recidivist and a habitual delinquent at the same time? Yes, if the offender was convicted for
the third time of theft within the conditions prescribed by law, the first and second convictions referring to robbery
and estafa, recidivism will be aggravating in the imposition of the principal penalty for the crime of theft.  At the
same time, by reason of such recidivism, he is also a habitual delinquent, and is sentenced to the additional penalty
provided by law, although in the imposition of the said additional penalty, recidivism is no longer considered as an
aggravating circumstance as it is inherent in this form of habitual delinquency. (People v. Manalo, 8586, May 25,
1956)  May the offender be a habitual delinquent without being a recidivist?  Yes, if the three convictions refer to
the specific felonies not embraced in the same title of the Code like robbery, falsification and serious physical
injuries.

Quasi-recidivism arises when the offender shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment,
before beginning to serve the sentence, or while serving the same, he shall be punished by the maximum period of
the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony, besides being penalized as a habitual delinquent, if applicable.
(Art. 160)  This is not a separate crime by itself.
It is necessary to allege recidivism in the information and to attach thereto certified copies of the previous sentence
rendered against the accused to be presented during the trial. (People v. Martinada, 194 SCRA 36) (Q18, 1993 Bar)

10. Reiteracion or Habituality.
That the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty
or for 2 or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. (Art. 14, Par. 10)
In reiteracion (habituality), it is essential that the offender must have been previously punished, i.e., he must have
served, partially or totally, the penalty imposed upon him; that  the penalty  for the crime for which he was 
previously  punished, must  be equal or greater than the penalty for the crime for which he is on trial, or that he had
previously been  punished for 2 or more offenses the penalty for which is lighter  than the  penalty  prescribed for
the offenses for which he  is  on trial.  Reiteracion is discretionary on the court.  In reiteracion, the offenses are not
embraced in the same title of the Code.
To be appreciated, it is necessary to present as evidence certified copies of the sentence rendered against the
accused, except when the accused pleads guilty to an information alleging reiteracion. (People v. Monterey, Sept. 3,
1996)

11. Crime be committed in consideration  of a price, reward, or promise. (Art. 14, Par. 11)
It is not enough that the one committed the crime received a gift or a reward; it is essential that such price or  reward
or  promise  must  have been the prime  consideration  in  the commission of the crime.  Thus, if the money was
given, without any previous promise, after the commission of the crime as an expression of sympathy, this
circumstance cannot be present. (US v. Flores, 28 Phil. 29)  The offender who induced others to commit the crime
for a price, promise or reward is a principal by inducement. (People v. Otero, 51 Phil. 201)

12. Crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a vessel or intentional damage
thereto, derailment  of a locomotive, or by the  use  of  any other artifice involving great waste and ruin . (Art. 14,
Par. 12)
It  is essential that any of the means mentioned must  have been  used  by such offender in the commission of  the
crime. Thus, if the building is burned as a means to kill the occupant, the crime will be murder, not murder with
arson. (People v. Villarega, 54 OG 3482) This is the only aggravating circumstance that could be  a crime in itself. 
Such that if a hand grenade was thrown into a house and as a result of the explosion, the house was damaged but no
one was injured, the crime committed is the crime involving destruction. (People v. Comporedondo, 47 OG 779)

13. That the act be committed with evident premeditation. (Art. 14, Par. 13)
The 3 requisites of evident premeditation are:
a. The time when the accused determined to commit the crime.

b. An act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination.

c. A sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the 
consequences of his acts. (Q3, 1997 Bar)

In order that premeditation may be considered either as an aggravating  circumstance or as a qualifying

circumstance,  it must  be evident, that is, the intention to kill must  be manifest  and  it must have been planned in
the  mind  of  the offender and carefully meditated.  Conspiracy does not necessarily imply  evident  premeditation
although premeditation can co-exist with price or reward. (US v. Nabor, 7 Phil. 267)  This circumstance is inherent
in the crime of robbery, especially committed by several persons, since there must be an agreement and the persons
have to meditate and reflect on the manner of carrying out the crime and they have to act immediately in order to
succeed. (People Carillo, supra) But it may be considered in robbery with homicide (People v. Valeriano, 1259,
Sept. 19, 1955), if there is evident premeditation to kill besides stealing.

Mere threats to kill without evidence of sufficient time for meditation and reflection do not constitute evident
premeditation. (People v. Apao Moro, 6771,May 18, 1957)  An attack made in the heat of anger negates evident
premeditation. (People v. Amin, 39046, June 30, 1975)

14. Craft, fraud, or disguise is employed. (Art. 14, Par. 14)

These are intellectual means in the commission of a crime and are separate aggravating circumstances.
By the employment of craft and fraud, the offender  resorts more to intellectual rather than material means in order
to attain his objective.  Craft is cunning or intellectual trickery or chicanery resorted to by the accused to carry out
his evil design. (People v. Zea, 130 SCRA 77)  There is craft when the accused assumed a position of authority to
gain entrance in a house to enable him to be alone with the offended party to commit acts of lasciviousness upon
her. (People v. Timbol, 47 OG 1859) Also, this circumstance is aggravating where the offenders pretended to be
bona fide passengers of a jeepney in order not to arouse suspicion, but once inside the jeepney, they robbed the
passengers and the driver. (People v. Lee, 66848, Dec. 20, 1991)  If the craft is used to insure the commission of the
crime without risk to the accused, it is absorbed by treachery. (People v. Malig, 46 OG Sup. 11, 255)
Fraud which constitutes deceit and manifested by insidious words or machination is illustrated in the case of the
step-father of the offended party, who taking advantage of the absence of the her mother, took the young girl away
and told her she was to be taken to the house of her godmother but instead she was taken to another house where she
was raped. (People v. De Leon, 50 Phil. 539)
The term disguise refers to  anything that the offender may use to prevent recognition.  If in spite of the disguise, the
offender was recognized, such cannot be aggravating. (People v. Sonsona, 8966, May 25, 1955)
15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense. (Art. 14, Par. 15)
There must be a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, and to appreciate it, it is
necessary to evaluate the physical conditions of the protagonists and the arms employed by each side. (People v.
Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285)  There must be deliberate intent to take advantage of the same. (People v. Bello, 10 SCRA
298)  Mere numerical superiority does not  necessarily involve superiority in strength.  It is necessary to prove,
besides, that attackers “cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from superiority in strength. (People v.
Elizaga, 47 OG 38)

Abuse of superior strength is inherent in parricide when the husband killed his wife, as generally the husband is
physically stronger than the wife. (People v. Galapia, supra)  Also, it is inherent in rape or is absorbed in the element
of force. (People v. Saylan, 130 SCRA 159)

Intoxication a victim with intention to kill him is characterized by means employed to weaken the defense. (People
v. Ducusin, 53 Phil. 280)

16. Treachery
That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).  There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes  against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the  execution thereof  which  tend  directly
and  specially  to  insure  its execution,  without risk to himself arising from  the  defense which the offended party
might make. (Art. 14, Par. 16)
In parricide, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance as well as in homicide, if it is not alleged in the
information.

Even a frontal attack may be considered as such if it was sudden and unexpected so that the  victim  had  no chance 
to  defend  himself  or  evade  the  blow.  However, suddenness  of the attack itself does not indicate  treachery.  It 
must be sought as a means to insure the execution  of  the crime and to insure the attacker from the defense
forthcoming from the offended  party. (People v. Bongo, 26909, Feb. 22, 1974)  Treachery  must  exist  at   the
commencement of the execution of the felony. (US v. Balagtas, 19 Phil. 164)  Thus, if the attack begun without
treachery but the same continued, and consummated with treachery, it will not be considered. (Q6, 1995 Bar; Q6,
1993 Bar)

Treachery  absorbs nighttime, abuse of  superior  strength, uninhabited place, by band, aid of armed men, as well as
means to  weaken the defense.  When treachery rests upon a separate fact, nighttime is not absorbed by treachery. 
Treachery may co-exist with evident premeditation, as when the accused quarreled with the deceased, threatened to
kill him and on the following day did so, when he surreptitiously entered the house of the deceased and without
warning, fired at the deceased who was shot unaware. (People v. Mutya, 11255, Sept. 30, 1959)  Treachery is
inherent in murder by poisoning. (People v. Caliso, 58 Phil. 283) (Q10, 1991 Bar)
Any  sudden  and unexpected attack from behind is clearly treacherous.  However, an attack from behind or
shooting at a fleeing victim is not necessarily treacherous unless it appears that the method of attack was adopted by
the accused deliberately with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without any risk  to the assailant from
any defense that the party assaulted may make. (People v. Canete, 44 Phil. 478)  A shot in the back of the victim’s
head is not conclusive proof of treachery; the manner of aggression or how the act which resulted in the death of the
victim had began and developed, must be proved. (People v. Ablao, 183 SCRA 658)

But where the persons killed are children of tender years, being 1 year old, 6 years old and 12 years old, the killing
is murder even if the manner of the attack was not shown. (People v. Ganohon, 74670, April 30, 1991)

In sum, the following requisites must concur for treachery to be present:

a. The culprit employed means, methods or forms of execution which directly and specially tend to insure the
offender’s safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party.

b. That such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously shown. (People v. Clemente, 21
SCRA 261) (Q3, 1997 Bar)

17. That  the  means be employed or  circumstances  brought  about which add ignominy (shame or disgrace) to the
natural effects of the act.(Art. 14, Par. 17)
It is, as the saying goes, adding insult to injury;  for instance,  raping  a  married woman in  the  presence  of  her
husband  who was helpless to render any assistance, much  less to  defend  her as he was bound.  Ignominy to  be 
appreciated must be inflicted on the victim while he is still alive.  Thus, there is no ignominy when the accused
sliced and took the flesh from the thighs, legs and shoulder of the victim after killing her with a knife. (People v.
Balondo, 27401, Oct. 31, 1969)  There is ignominy where the accused in committing the rape used not only the
missionary position, but also, the dog position as dogs do, i.e., entry from behind.

Ignominy produces moral suffering, while cruelty produces physical suffering.

18. Crime be committed after an unlawful entry. (Art. 14, Par. 18)

There is unlawful entry when an entrance is effected by a way not intended for the purpose. Entering through the
window is unlawful entry. The unlawful entrance must be made for the purpose of committing a crime like rape or
murder.  But it is inherent in the crime of trespass to dwelling (US v. Barberan, 17 Phil. 509) and in robbery with
force upon things although it may be considered in robbery with violence or intimidation against persons. (Q3, 1997
Bar)

Unlawful entry to be aggravating must be for the purpose of entrance and not for the purpose of escape.  It must be
alleged in the information to qualify the crime to robbery; otherwise, the crime will be theft. (People v. Sunga, 43
Phil. 205)

19. As a means to the commission of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be broken.(Art. 14, Par. 19)
This means is for the purpose of committing a crime. It is inherent in robbery with force upon things.

20. That  the crime be committed with the aid of persons under 15 years of age or by means of motor vehicles,
motorized watercraft, airships, or other similar means. (Art. 14, Par. 20, as amended by RA 5438)
There are two distinct  aggravating circumstances.  The first shows the greater perversity of the offender in taking
advantage of the youthfulness of those persons for criminal purposes.  The second is intended to meet the problem
created by modern criminal in resorting to faster means of conveyance to commit the crime.  The use of motor
vehicles facilitates the commission of the crime.  If the vehicle is used to facilitate only the  escape of the offender it
is not aggravating.  A scooter and a motorcycle are included under “similar means.”
21. That the  wrong  done  in the  commission  of  the  crime  be deliberately  augmented by causing other wrong 
not  necessary for its commission. (Art. 14, Par. 21)
It is essential that the offender inflicted the wounds not necessary for the crime but for the purpose of making the 
victim suffer  more.  For cruelty to exist, there must be proof  that the  acts were perpetrated while the victim was 
still  alive.  This circumstance is distinguished from that of  ignominy  in that  cruelty refers to physical suffering,
whereas,  ignominy is circumscribed to moral suffering. Gagging of the mouth of a 3-year old child with stockings,
dumping him with head downward into a box, and covering the box with sacks and other boxes, causing slow
suffocation, and as a result the child died, constitutes cruelty. (People v. Lara, 113 SCRA 316)  Also, in the crime of
rape, where the offender tied the victim to a bed and burnt her face with a lighted cigarette while raping her. (People
v. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316) (Q8, 1994 Bar)
The fact that 13 stabs wounds were inflicted upon the victim does not constitute cruelty, absent proof that such
wounds were inflicted sadistically in a way that made the victim agonize before the fatal blow which snuffed out his
life was delivered. (People v. Ferrer, 255 SCRA 19)

22. Under influence of dangerous drugs. (RA 6425, as amended)

When a crime is committed by an offender who is under the influence of dangerous drugs, such state shall be
considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the definition of a crime and the application of the penalty
provided in the Revised Penal Code. (People v. Belgar, 92155, March 11, 1991)

23. Syndicate or Organized Crime Group.

This is a special aggravating circumstance, contemplates of a group purposely formed or organized to engage in
criminal activities for gain, not merely the commission of a particular crime by two or more persons who
confederated and mutually helped one another in its commission.  The existence of a conspiracy does not necessarily
imply or carry with it this aggravating circumstance. (People v. Alberca, June 26, 1996)

Alternative Circumstances
Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration  as  aggravating  or mitigating 
according  to  the nature  and effects of the crime and other  conditions  attending its commission.
Specific circumstances:
1. Relationship
It shall be taken into consideration when the offended party is  the  spouse,   ascendant,   descendant, legitimate,
natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by  affinity  in  the  same degree of  the  offender. (Art. 15)

Relationship of stepfather or stepmother and stepson or stepdaughter is included by analogy as similar to ascendant
or descendant. (People v. Bersabal, 48 Phil. 439)  But relationship between uncle and niece is not included. (US v.
Incierto, 15 Phil. 358)

Relationship is mitigating in crimes against property.  But in theft, estafa and malicious mischief, relationship is
exempting.

It  is considered  as an aggravating circumstance in crimes against persons if the offended party is of a higher level
than the offender, or when the offender and the offended party are relatives of the same level. (People v. Mercado,
51 Phil. 99) As a rule, relationship is mitigating if the offended party is of a lower level than that of the offender or
even exempting if committed by a parent in excessive chastisement.

In crimes against chastity, relationship is aggravating whether the offender is of a higher or lower degree than that of
the offended party.  It is due to the nature of the crime. (People v. Porras, 58 Phil. 578)

2. Intoxication
As a general rule, intoxication is a mitigating circumstance. It must be shown that at the time of the commission of
the criminal act, the accused has taken such quantity of alcoholic drinks to blur his reason and deprive him of certain
degree of control. (People v. Boduso, 450, Sept. 30, 1974) Intoxication to be mitigating must be proved to the
satisfaction of the Court. (People v, Noble, 77 Phil. 93)  It is aggravating only in two cases:

a.  Where intoxication is habitual.

b.  When it is intentional, that is, it is subsequent to the plan of the commission of a felony.

For intoxication to be habitual, it is not necessary that  the offender should be drunk 7 days a week.  It is enough that
the offender has acquired the habit of getting drunk, or  drinking to excess.  If one who had plotted to kill the victim,
had drunk wine in order to embolden him in carrying out with his evil plan, drunkenness is not mitigating. (People v.
Hernandez, 3391, May 23, 1952)

3. Degree of instruction or education of offender.

As  a  rule, lack of instruction or a low degree of intelligence is considered as a mitigating circumstance in all
crimes  except in offenses against chastity and property.  And also, in the crime of murder, for a man as a rational
being, has always been forbidden to kill. (People v. Tabian, 126 SCRA 571)  It should  be  borne  in  mind  that  this 
circumstance  is  not dependent  on the matter of schooling; it depends more on  the alertness  of the mind, the
ability to observe and  grasp  the significance of happenings around him.  If one is unable to write but is highly and
exceptionally intelligent or mentally alert that he easily realizes the significance of his act, there is no mitigating
circumstance. (People v. Gorospe, 105 Phil. 184)

High degree of instruction is aggravating if the offender availed himself or took advantage of it in committing a
crime as in the case of a lawyer who commits falsification or a doctor who kills his victim by means of poison.

PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE

The following are criminally liable for grave  and  less  grave felonies:
1. Principals
The following are considered principals:

a. Those who take direct part in the execution of the act.

They  are those who, participating in the criminal  design, personally  take part in the execution of the felony  by 
acts tending to the same end.  As a general rule, all those who participated in a felony are liable as principal when a
conspiracy between or among them is established. (People v. Nierra, 96 SCRA 335)

b. Those  who directly force or induce others to  commit  the offense.

Generally,  the induction is done by means of promises or reward or price, sometimes, by the utterance of words.  It 
is necessary that the person uttering the encouraging words  must have  such a moral influence over the person
induced that  the words of the other would practically amount to a command;  and the  words uttered must have been
the moving factor that  made the actor commit the offense, and that the words uttered  were used to procure the
commission of the offense.
There is a principal by induction or by inducement only if it is shown that the crime was actually committed by
another who was induced. (People v. Ong Chiat Lay, 60 Phil. 788)

Regarding the induction, it is essential that (1) it be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of
the crime, and (2) that such inducement be the determining cause of the said commission by the one induced.
(People v. De la Cruz, 97 SCRA 385)

c. Those  who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished. (Art. 17)
These are persons who, without personally participating  in the  execution of the felony, nevertheless cooperate with 
the principals by direct participation by performing another  act.  The  act  performed  by him must be absolutely 
essential  or indispensable to the extent that without the act performed  by him, the crime could not have been
committed.  It is only when the  evidence fails to show the existence of conspiracy when the act  of the alleged 
principals by  cooperation  must  be indispensable.  An example of which is the act of lending  the boat for the
purpose of robbing a person who lived in an islet separated  from  the  mainland by a wide and  deep  river  and
accessible  only  by a water craft. The lender  becomes principal by indispensable cooperation.  Also, the act of
initialing the check is indispensable to the act of defraudation of the depositor as without it the check would not be
cashed. (US v. Lim Buanco, 14 Phil. 484)
But any cooperation, even done with knowledge of the criminal intent of the accused, if not indispensable to the
commission of the crime, will make one liable as an accomplice.  So, if the accused knowingly aided the killers by
casting stones at the victim (People v. Tatlonghari, 27 SCRA 726) or the act of giving the victim a fist blow after he
was stabbed by the other accused (People v. Vistido, 79 SCRA 719) the liability will be that of an accomplice.

2.  Accomplices
Those  persons, who, not being  principals, cooperate in the execution of the offense  by  previous  or simultaneous
acts. (Art. 18)
The acts performed while material must not be indispensable.  Thus,  where  the accused is proven to have merely 
assisted in guarding the detained persons  to  prevent their escape, the accused should be held as an accomplice  only
since  the  act  performed  by  him  was  not   indispensable.  However,  if the person takes part in the conspiracy, 
he  can never be an accomplice.

An accomplice has knowledge of the criminal design of the principal and all that he does is to concur with the latter
in his purpose, by cooperating in the execution of the crime by previous or simultaneous acts, for the purpose of
supplying material or moral aid to the principal in an efficacious way. (People v. Tanzo, 44 Phil. 18)

It is also necessary that any wound inflicted by the accomplice must not be the cause of death; if the wound is
mortal, the offender would be a principal by direct participation. (People v. Aplegido, 76 Phil. 571)

Accomplices are also known as accessories before the fact.  Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in the
commission of the crime, is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility. (People v. Abiog, 15310, Oct. 31,
1961)
Supposing, while A is choking B, C suddenly appears and stabs B mortally.  If A continues choking B after the
mortal wound is inflicted, A will be an accomplice.  His act is a concurrence in the criminal design of C to kill B.
(People v. Tamayo, supra)  If, however, he does not do any act after B is stabbed, A has no liability in the killing of
B by C.  The liability of A and C will then be individual.  If there is conspiracy between A and C to kill B, both will
be collectively liable as principals for the death of B.

A person who assaults a victim already fatally wounded by another is only regarded as an accomplice, unless there
was anterior conspiracy. (People v. Cagalingan, 188 SCRA 313)

3.  Accessories
Those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either  as
principals  or  accomplices,  take  part  subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
a. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.
Buying  a  gold  watch from another, knowing  that  it  was stolen  property, the accessory assists the thief to profit 
by the effects of the crime.  The accessory should materially benefit from the act.  Riding in a stolen vehicle is “not
profiting” since it does not improve his economic position.  Profiting is not synonymous to intent to gain as an
element of theft. (People v. Morales, 71 OG 529)

b. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or  instruments  thereof, in  order  to  prevent  its
discovery.
In  the  crime of homicide, the body of the  crime  or  the corpus delicti is the fact of the killing, that is, a specific
offense in fact committed by someone. (People v. Marquez, 43 OG No. 5)  A person who place in one of the hands
of the deceased after he was killed to show that he was armed and it was necessary to kill him for having offered
resistance to the authorities, is an accessory. (People v. Saladino, 3634, May 30, 1961)  This is similar to concealing
the body of the crime to prevent its discovery.
c. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with
abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt at  the life of the Chief Executive, or is known  to  be  habitually guilty of some other crime. (Art. 19)
If the one assisted is the accomplice, there is no accessory.  The public officer is an accessory irrespective of the
crime committed by the principal provided it is not a light felony.  On the other hand, in case of private person, the
author of the crime must be guilty of treason, parricide, murder or attempt against the life of the President or is
known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.  Thus, if a private person assists another who has been guilty of
robbery, he cannot be an accessory.

An accessory does not participate in the criminal design nor cooperate in the commission of the crime. (People v.
Verzola, 80 SCRA 600)  If the principal is acquitted because the facts alleged to have been committed are not
proved or do not constitute a crime, the accessory is not liable. (US v. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194)  But if the principal is
acquitted because of an exempting circumstance, the accessory may be held liable as the crime has been committed. 
As long as the crime has been committed, even if the principal has not been arrested and convicted, the accessory
may be held liable. (People v. Billon, 48 OG 1391)

The following are criminally liable for light felonies:

1. Principals
2. Accomplices
The  penalties  prescribed  for  accessories  shall  not  be imposed  upon those who are such with respect to  their
spouses, ascendants, descendants,  legitimate,  natural,   and   adopted brothers  and sisters, or relatives by affinity
within  the  same degrees,  with  the  exception where  the  accessory  profits  or assists in the principal to profit
from the effects of the crime. (Art. 20)

The reason therefor is that if the accessory himself profited or assisted to profit from the effects of the crime the
motivating power  was not his relationship with the principal but  his  love for  money.