2

Market Globalism
Manfred B. Steger
All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

INTRODUCTION: THE IDEOLOGICAL Save for a few notable exceptions (Rupert,

DIMENSION OF GLOBALIZATION 2000; Sklair, 2002; Mittelman, 2004; Steger,
2008, 2009), globalization scholars have
From its beginnings in the early 1990s, the been surprisingly reluctant to enter the
fledgling field of global studies was domi- misty realm of ideology.
nated by accounts focusing primarily on the Bucking the trend, this chapter explores
economic and technological aspects of glo- the ideological dimension of globalization
balization. To be sure, a proper recognition with particular attention to its important
of the crucial role of integrating markets discursive features. After a general over-
and new information technologies should view of the role and function of political
be part of any comprehensive understand- ideologies within an overarching ‘global
ing of globalization, but it is equally impor- imaginary’, I suggest that the dominant ide-
tant to avoid the trap of technological and ology of our time – market globalism –
economic reductionism. As Malcolm Waters consists of a set of five core claims that play
(2001) observes, the increasingly symboli- crucial semantic and political roles. With
cally mediated and reflexive character of regard to semantics, I argue that these
today’s economic exchanges suggests that claims absorb and rearrange bits and pieces
both the cultural and political arenas are of several established ideologies and inte-
becoming more activated and energetic. grate them with new concepts into a new
Copyright 2014. SAGE Publications Ltd.

And yet, despite the burgeoning recent lit- global political belief system whose role
erature on crucial cultural and political consists chiefly of preserving and enhancing
aspects of globalization, researchers have asymmetrical power structures that benefit
paid insufficient attention to the global cir- particular social groups wedded to the ten-
culation of ideas and their impact on the ets of neo-liberalism (Steger, 2010). I end
rapid extension of social interactions and the chapter with a short discussion of
interdependencies across time and space. how, during the years of President George
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Account: [Link]

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 24 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION

W. Bush’s administration (2001–9) market systems of thought. In the Napoleonic era, how-
globalism was ‘toughened up’ into what I ever, ‘ideology’ acquired the pejorative meaning
call ‘imperial globalism’ only to return its of ‘falsehood’ or ‘deliberate distortion’ that it
original economistic articulation in the wake has retained in public discourse until our time
of the Global Financial Crisis (2008–9) and (Steger, 2008). French philosopher Paul Ricoeur
the ongoing European Debt Crisis. (1986) identified the historical elements and
functions of ideology. Drawing on the insights
of the Marxist tradition, he characterized the
POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES AND THE first functional level of ideology as distortion,
GLOBAL IMAGINARY that is, the production of contorted images of
social reality. Most importantly, the process of
Following Michael Freeden’s (1996, 2003) distortion hides the contrast between things as
and Lyman Tower Sargent’s (2009) suggestion they may be envisioned in theory and things as
that political belief systems serve as cognitive they play themselves out on the plane of mate-
maps that chart crucial dimensions of the rial reality. Indeed, all ideologies assemble a
political world, I define ‘ideology’ as a system picture of the world based on a peculiar mix-
of widely shared ideas, patterned beliefs, guid- ture that both represents and distorts social
ing norms and values, and ideals accepted as processes. Yet, Ricoeur disagreed with Karl
truth by some groups. Ideologies offer indi- Marx’s notion that distortion explains all there
viduals a more or less coherent picture of the is to ideology. For the French philosopher, dis-
world not only as it is, but also as it ought to tortion was merely one of the three main func-
be. In doing so, they help organize the tremen- tions of ideology, representing the surface level
dous complexity of human experience into of a phenomenon that contains two more func-
fairly simple, but frequently distorted, images tions at progressively deeper levels.
and slogans that serve as guide and compass Inspired by the writings Max Weber (Gerth
for social and political action. Each ideology is and Mills, 1946) and Karl Mannheim (1936),
structured around core claims which set it Ricoeur identified legitimation as the second
apart from other ideologies and endow it with functional level of ideology. Two main fac-
a specific conceptual form or ‘morphology’. tors were involved here: the claim to legiti-
As Freeden (1996: 77) puts it, ‘Central to macy made by the ruling authority, and the
any analysis of ideologies is the proposition belief in the authority’s legitimacy granted
that they are characterized by a morphology by its subjects. Accepting large parts of
that displays core, adjacent, and peripheral Weber’s explanation of social action, Ricoeur
concepts.’ What makes an ideology ‘political’ highlighted ideology’s function of mediating
is that its claims select, privilege, and con- the gap between belief and claim. For
strict social meanings related to the exercise Mannheim, it was the task of the intelligent-
of power in society. Ideologies speak to their sia capable of rising above their class and
audiences in stories and narratives whose historical context to provide objective expla-
claims persuade, praise, cajole, convince, nations of the discrepancy between the popu-
condemn, and distinguish ‘truths’ from ‘false- lar belief in the legitimacy of the ruling class
hoods’. Ideologies enable people to act, and the authority’s claim to the right to rule.
while at the same time constraining their Ricoeur’s analysis was completed in his
actions by binding them to a particular set of description of integration, the third functional
ideas, norms and values. level of ideology. Drawing on the writings of
The term ‘ideology’ was first coined by the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz
Antoine Destutt de Tracy in the late eighteenth (1973), who emphasized the symbolic struc-
century. The Enlightenment thinker sought to ture of social action, Ricoeur claimed that, on
establish a positivistic ‘science of ideas’ employ- the deepest level, ideology plays a mediating
ing the empirical tools of natural science to map or integrative role. It provides society with

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 MARKET GLOBALISM 25

stability as it creates, preserves, and protects modes of understanding that provide the most
the social identity of persons and groups. In general parameters within which people
its constructive function, ideology supplies imagine their communal existence. Drawing
the symbols, norms, and images that go into on Benedict Anderson’s account of the imag-
the process of assembling and holding ined community of the nation, Charles Taylor
together individual and collective identity. (2004, 23–6) has recently argued that social
Thus, ideology assumes a conservative func- imaginaries are neither theories nor ideolo-
tion in both senses of that word. It preserves gies, but implicit ‘background understand-
identity, but it also wants to conserve what ings’ that make possible communal practices
exists. Such rigid forms of resistance to and a widely shared sense of their legitimacy.
change contribute to turning beliefs and ideas The social imaginary offers explanations
into a dogmatic defense of dominant power of how ‘we’ – the members of a particular
structures. Suggesting that subordinate groups community – fit together, how things go on
often give their spontaneous consent to the between us, the expectations we have of each
social logic of domination that is embedded other, and the deeper normative notions and
in a ‘hegemonic’ ideology, the Italian Marxist images that underlie those expectations. This
philosopher Antonio Gramsci (1971), too, background understanding is both normative
emphasized the integrative role of ideology. and factual in the sense of providing us both
He noted that dominant groups frequently with the standards of what passes as common
succeeded in enticing the working class into sense. Much in the same vein, Pierre Bourdieu
embracing a collective identity that ran con- (1990, 54–5) notes that the social imaginary
trary to their interests, allowing power elites sets the pre-reflexive framework for our daily
to maintain a favorable social order without routines and social repertoires. Structured by
having to resort to open coercion. social dynamics that produce them while at the
In this chapter, I contend that ‘market glo- same time also structuring those forces, social
balism’ is a hegemonic system of ideas that imaginaries are products of history that ‘gener-
makes normative claims about a set of social ate individual and collective practices – more
processes called ‘globalization’. It seeks to history – in accordance with the schemes gen-
limit public discussion on the meaning and erated by history’.
character of globalization to an agenda of Human thought is mostly unconscious
‘things to discuss’ that supports particular and abstract concepts are largely metaphori-
political objectives. In other words, like all cal. Indeed, most of human reasoning is
social processes, globalization contains an based on mental images that are seldom
ideological dimension filled with a range of explicit; usually they are merely presup-
norms, claims, beliefs, and narratives about posed in everyday reasoning and debates.
the phenomena itself. After all, it is chiefly Thus, all social imaginaries consist of a
the normative question of whether globaliza- series of interrelated and mutually depend-
tion ought to be considered a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ ent narratives, visual prototypes, metaphors,
phenomenon that has spawned heated debates and conceptual framings. Despite their appar-
in classrooms, boardrooms, and on the streets. ent intangibility, however, social imaginaries
To understand the fundamental changes are quite ‘real’ in the sense of enabling com-
brought about by globalization and affecting mon practices and deep-seated communal
the ideological landscape of the twenty-first attachments. Though capable of facilitating
century, it is necessary to grasp the connection collective fantasies and speculative reflec-
between political ideologies and their over- tions, they should not be dismissed as
arching ‘social imaginary’. Constituting the phantasms or mental fabrications.
macro-mappings of social and political space In my previous work on the subject
through which we perceive, judge, and act in (Steger, 2008), I have suggested that ideol-
the world, social imaginaries are deep-seated ogies translate and articulate the largely

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 26 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION

pre-reflexive social imaginary in com- new buzzword ‘globalization’ as the central

pressed form as explicit political doctrine. metaphor for their political agenda – the
This means that the grand ideologies of creation of a single global free market and
modernity that were deeply colored by a the spread of consumerist values around the
national framework of community gave world. Most importantly, they translated the
explicit political expression to the implicit rising social imaginary into largely econo-
national imaginary. Indeed, we ought to mistic claims laced with references to glo-
treat the national not as a separate ideology bality: global trade and financial markets,
but as the background to our communal exist- worldwide flows of goods, services, and
ence that emerged in the northern hemisphere labor, transnational corporations, offshore
with the American and French Revolutions. financial centers, and so on.
The national gave the modern social imagi- But globalization was never merely a mat-
nary its distinct flavor in the form of various ter of increasing flows of capital and goods
factual and normative assumptions that polit- across national borders. Rather, it constitutes
ical communities, in order to count as ‘legiti- a multidimensional set of processes in which
mate’, had to be nation-states. images, sound bites, metaphors, myths, sym-
To be sure, each ideology deployed and bols, and spatial arrangements of globality
assembled its core concepts – liberty, pro- were just as important as economic and tech-
gress, race, class, rationality, tradition, com- nological dynamics. The objective accelera-
munity, welfare, security, and so on – in tion and multiplication of global material
specific and unique ways. But the elite codi- networks occurs hand in hand with the inten-
fiers of these ideational systems pursued sifying subjective recognition of a shrinking
their specific political goals under the com- world. Such heightened awareness of the
mon background umbrella of the national compression of time and space influences the
imaginary. Liberalism, conservatism, social- direction and material instantiations of global
ism, communism, and Nazism/fascism were flows. As Roland Robertson (1992) has
all ‘nationalist’ in the sense of performing emphasized time and again, the compression
the same fundamental task of translating the of the world into a single place increasingly
overarching national imaginary into con- makes ‘the global’ the frame of reference for
crete political doctrines, agendas, and spatial human thought and action. Thus, globaliza-
arrangements. tion involves both the macro-structures of
In the decades following World War II, community and the micro-structures of per-
however, new ideas, theories, and material sonhood. It extends deep into the core of the
practices produced in the public conscious- self and its dispositions, facilitating the crea-
ness a similar sense of rupture with the past tion of new identities nurtured by the intensi-
that had occurred at the time of the French fying relations between the individual and
Revolution. For example, novel technologies the globe (Elliot and Lemert, 2006).
facilitated the speed and intensity with which Like the conceptual earthquake that shook
these ideas and practices infiltrated the Europe and the Americas more than 200
national imaginary. Images, people, and years ago, today’s destabilization of the
materials circulated more freely across national imaginary affects the entire planet.
national boundaries. This new sense of ‘the The ideologies dominating the world today
global’ that erupted within and onto the are no longer exclusively articulations of the
national began to undermine the sense of nor- national imaginary but reconfigured idea-
malcy and self-contained coziness associated tional systems that constitute early-stage
with the modern nation-state. Identities based translations of the dawning global imaginary.
on national membership became destabilized. Hence, I suggest that there is, in fact, some-
By the mid-1990s, a growing chorus of thing new about today’s political belief sys-
global social elites was fastening onto the tems: a new global imaginary erupts with

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 MARKET GLOBALISM 27

increasing frequency within and onto the These power elites consisted chiefly of
familiar framework of the national, spewing corporate managers, executives of large
its fiery lava across flattening geographical transnational corporations, corporate lobby-
scales. Stoked, among other things, by tech- ists, high-level military officers, prominent
nological change and cultural innovations, journalists and public-relations specialists,
this global imaginary destabilizes the grand intellectuals writing to a large public audi-
political ideologies codified by social elites ence, state bureaucrats and influential politi-
during the last two centuries. Thus, our cians. By the mid-1990s, large segments of
changing ideational landscape is intimately the population in both the global north and
related to the forces of globalization, defined south had accepted globalism’s core claims,
here as the expansion and intensification of thus internalizing large parts of its overarch-
social relations and consciousness across ing neo-liberal framework that advocated the
world time and world space. deregulation of markets, the liberalization of
As the national and the global rub up trade, the privatization of state-owned enter-
against each other in myriad settings and on prises, and, after 9/11, the qualified support
multiple levels, they produce new tensions of the global ‘War on Terror’ under US lead-
and compromises. Putting the analytic spot- ership. Indeed, the comprehensive University
light on the changing ideational structures not of Maryland Poll (2004) conducted in 19
only yields a better understanding of current countries on four continents found that even
globalization dynamics, but it also helps us after five years of massive, worldwide dem-
make sense of the shifting conceptual and onstrations against neo-liberal globalization,
geographical boundaries that (re)shape indi- 55 per cent of the respondents believed that
vidual and collective identities. Although glo- globalization was positive for them and their
balization unfolds toward an uncertain future, families, while only 25 per cent said that it
the first attempts to translate the rising global was negative.
imaginary into concrete political agendas are Seeking to make a persuasive case for a
currently undertaken by new ‘globalisms’. new global order based on their beliefs and
values, these neo-liberal power elites con-
structed and disseminated narratives and
THE FIVE CORE CLAIMS OF images that associated the concept of glo-
MARKET GLOBALISM balization with inexorably expanding free
markets. Their efforts at de-contesting the
The term ‘globalization’ gained in currency master concept ‘globalization’ went hand in
in the late 1980s. In part, its conceptual hand with the rise of market globalism.
unwieldiness arose from the fact that global Ideological ‘de-contestation’ is a crucial pro-
flows occur in different physical and mental cess in the formation of thought systems
dimensions, usefully divided by Arjun because it fixes the meanings of the core
Appadurai (1996) into ‘ethnoscapes’, ‘tech- concepts by arranging them in a pattern or
noscapes’, ‘mediascapes’, ‘finanscapes’, and configuration that links them with other con-
‘ideoscapes’. The persistence of academic cepts in a meaningful way. As Michael
divisions on the subject notwithstanding, the Freeden (2003: 54–5) puts it:
term was associated with specific meanings
in public discourse during the 1990s. With An ideology attempts to end the inevitable con-
the collapse of Soviet-style communism in tention over concepts by decontesting them, by
Eastern Europe, loosely affiliated power removing their meanings from contest. ‘This is
what justice means,’ announces one ideology, and
elites concentrated in the global north stepped
‘that is what democracy entails.’ By trying to con-
up their ongoing efforts to sell their version vince us that they are right and that they speak
of ‘globalization’ to the public in the ideo- the truth, ideologies become devices for coping
logical form of ‘market globalism’. with the interdeterminacy of meaning … That is

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 28 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION

their semantic role. [But] [i]deologies also need to borrows heavily from both ideologies, it
decontest the concepts they use because they are would be a mistake to reduce it to either.
instruments for fashioning collective decisions.
Moreover, neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism
That is their political role.
should not be seen as ideological opposites,
for their similarities sometimes outweigh their
Effective ideological de-contestation
differences. In general, neo-conservatives agree
structures – I refer to them as ‘central
with neo-liberals on the importance of ‘free
ideological claims’ – can thus be pictured
markets’ and ‘free trade’, but they are much
as simple semantic chains whose concep-
more inclined than the latter to combine their
tual links convey authoritative meanings
hands-off attitude toward big business with
that facilitate collective decision making.
intrusive government action for the regulation
Their interconnected semantic and political
of the ordinary citizenry in the name of public
roles suggest that control over political lan-
security and traditional values. In foreign affairs,
guage translates directly into political
neo-conservatives advocate a more assertive
power, that is, the power of deciding ‘who
and expansive use of both economic and
gets what, when, and how’ (Laswell, 1958).
military power, although they often embrace the
Subjecting to critical discourse analysis
liberal ideal of promoting ‘freedom’ and
the utterances, speeches, and writings of
‘democracy’ around the world.
influential advocates of market globalism in
Embracing the classical liberal idea of the
the 1990s and 2000s, my previous work on
self-regulating market, Claim One seeks to
the subject suggests that ‘globalization’ and
establish beyond dispute ‘what globalization
‘market’ constitute two crucial core concepts
means’, that is, to offer an authoritative defi-
of this dominant ideology of our global age
nition of globalization designed for broad
(Steger, 2009).
public consumption. It does so by interlock-
ing its two core concepts and then linking
Claim One: Globalization is about them to the adjacent ideas of ‘liberty’ and
the Liberalization and Global ‘integration’. A passage in a BusinessWeek
editorial (13 December 1999) implicitly con-
Integration of Markets
veys this neo-liberal suspicion of political
This first claim of market globalism is power in defining globalization in market
anchored in the neo-liberal ideal of the terms: ‘Globalization is about the triumph of
self-regulating market as the normative basis markets over governments. Both proponents
for a future global order. According to this and opponents of globalization agree that the
perspective, the vital functions of the free driving force today is markets, which are
market – its rationality and efficiency, as well suborning the role of government. The truth
as its alleged ability to bring about greater is that the size of government has been
social integration and material progress – can shrinking relative to the economy almost
only be realized in a democratic society that everywhere.’ The same claim is made over
values and protects individual freedom. and over again by Thomas Friedman (1999)
‘Market’, of course, also plays an impor- whose seminal book on globalization pro-
tant role in two established ideologies: a lib- vided the dominant perspective on globaliza-
ertarian variant of liberalism (often referred tion in the United States. At one point in his
to as ‘neo-liberalism’) inspired by the ideas of narrative, the award-winning New York Times
Herbert Spencer, Friedrich Hayek, and Milton columnist insists that everybody ought to
Friedman, and the late-twentieth century accept the following ‘truth’ about globaliza-
brand of Anglo-American conservatism tion: ‘The driving idea behind globalization
(‘neo-conservatism’) associated with the is free-market capitalism – the more you let
views of Keith Joseph, Margaret Thatcher, market forces rule and the more you open
and Ronald Reagan. While market globalism your economy to free trade and competition,

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 MARKET GLOBALISM 29

the more efficient your economy will be. their neo-liberal account of globalization
Globalization means the spread of free- represents an objective or at least neutral
market capitalism to virtually every country diagnosis rather than a direct contribution to
in the world.’ the emergence of the very conditions it
By forging a close semantic link between purports to analyze.
‘globalization’ and ‘market’, globalists like To be sure, neo-liberals may indeed be
Friedman seek to create the impression that able to offer some ‘empirical evidence’ for
globalization represents primarily an eco- the ‘liberalization’ of markets. But does the
nomic phenomenon. Thus unburdened by the spread of market principles really happen
complexity of its additional non-economic because there exists an intrinsic, metaphysi-
dimensions, ‘globalization’ acquires the cal connection between globalization and the
necessary simplicity and focus to convey its expansion of markets? Or does it occur
central normative message contained in fur- because globalists have the political and dis-
ther semantic connections to the adjacent cursive power to shape the world largely
concepts ‘liberalization’ and ‘integration’: according to their ideological formulas?
the ‘liberation’ of markets from state control Their economistic-objectivist representation
is a good thing. Conversely, the notion of of globalization detracts from the multidi-
‘integrating markets’ is draped in the mantle mensional character of the phenomenon.
of all-embracing liberty, hence the frequent Ecological, cultural, and political dimensions
formulation of Claim One as a global impera- of globalization are discussed only as subor-
tive anchored in universal reason. Thus de- dinate processes dependent on the move-
contested as an economic project advancing ments of global markets.
human freedom in general, globalization
must be applied to all countries, regardless of Claim Two: Globalization is
the political and cultural preferences
Inevitable and Irreversible
expressed by local citizens. As President
George W. Bush notes in the National Security The second mode of de-contesting ‘globali-
Strategy of the United States of America zation’ turns on the adjacent concept of
(2002), ‘Policies that further strengthen mar- ‘inevitability’. At first glance, the belief in
ket incentives and market institutions are the historical inevitability of globalization
relevant for all economies – industrialized seems to be a poor fit for a globalist ideol-
countries, emerging markets, and the devel- ogy based on neo-liberal principles. After
oping world.’ all, throughout the twentieth century, liber-
In short, market globalist voices present als and conservatives have consistently criti-
globalization as a natural economic cized Marxism for its determinist claims that
phenomenon whose essential qualities are devalue human free agency and downplay
the liberalization and integration of global the ability of noneconomic factors to shape
markets and the reduction of governmental social reality. In particular, neo-liberals have
interference in the economy. Privatization, attacked the Marxist notion of history as a
free trade, and unfettered capital move- teleological process that unfolds according
ments are portrayed as the best and most to ‘inexorable laws’ that hasten the demise
natural way for realizing individual liberty of capitalism, ultimately leading to the emer-
and material progress in the world. The gence of a classless society on a global
ideological claim that globalization is about scale. By focusing on the ‘logic’ of technol-
the liberalization and global integration of ogy and markets, market globalists mini-
markets serves to solidify as ‘fact’ what is mize the role of human agency and individual
actually a contingent political initiative. choice – the centerpiece of liberal thought
Market globalists have been successful from John Locke and John Stuart Mill to
because they have persuaded the public that Milton Friedman.

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 30 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION

According to the market-globalist per- elites in the global south often faithfully
spective, globalization reflects the spread of echoed the determinist language of glo-
irreversible market forces driven by techno- balism. For example, Manuel Villar (1998),
logical innovations that make the global the Philippines Speaker of the House of
integration of national economies inevitable. Representatives, insisted that, ‘We cannot
In fact, market globalism is almost always simply wish away the process of globaliza-
intertwined with the deep belief in the ability tion. It is a reality of a modern world. The
of markets to use new technologies to solve process is irreversible.’
social problems far better than any alterna- The neo-liberal portrayal of globalization
tive course. When, in the early 1980s, British as some sort of natural force, like the weather
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously or gravity, makes it easier for market glo-
pronounced that ‘there is no alternative’, she balists to convince people that they must
meant that there no longer existed a theoreti- adapt to the discipline of the market if they
cal and practical alternative to the expansion- are to survive and prosper. Hence, the claim
ist logic of the market. In fact, she accused of inevitability serves a number of important
those nonconformists who still dared to pose political functions. For one, it neutralizes the
alternatives as foolishly relying on anachro- challenges of alterglobalist opponents by
nistic, socialist fantasies that betrayed their depoliticizing the public discourse about glo-
inability to cope with empirical reality. balization: neo-liberal policies are above pol-
Governments, political parties, and social itics, because they simply carry out what is
movements had no choice but to ‘adjust’ to ordained by nature. This view implies that,
the inevitability of globalization. Their sole instead of acting according to a set of choices,
remaining task was to facilitate the integra- people merely fulfill world market laws that
tion of national economies in the new global demand the elimination of government con-
market. States and interstate systems should, trols. There is nothing that can be done about
therefore, serve to ensure the smooth work- the natural movement of economic and tech-
ing of market logic. nological forces; political groups ought to
A close study of the utterances of influen- acquiesce and make the best of an unalterable
tial market globalists reveals their reliance on situation. Since the emergence of a world
such a monocausal, economistic narrative of based on the primacy of market values reflects
historical inevitability. While disagreeing the dictates of history, resistance would be
with Marxists on the final goal of historical unnatural, irrational, and dangerous.
development, they nonetheless share with
their ideological opponents a fondness for Claim Three: Nobody is in Charge
such terms as ‘irresistible’, ‘inevitable’, and
of Globalization
‘irreversible’ to describe the projected path
of globalization. For example, in a major The third mode of de-contesting globaliza-
speech on US foreign policy, President Bill tion hinges on the classical liberal concept of
Clinton (1999) told his audience: ‘Today we the ‘self-regulating market’. The semantic
must embrace the inexorable logic of globali- link between ‘globalization-market’ and the
zation … Globalization is irreversible. adjacent idea of ‘leaderlessness’ is simple: if
Protectionism will only make things worse.’ the undisturbed workings of the market
Frederick Smith (1999), chairman and CEO indeed preordain a certain course of history,
of FedEx Corporation, proclaimed that then globalization does not reflect the arbi-
‘Globalization is inevitable and inexorable trary agenda of a particular social class or
and it is accelerating … Globalization is hap- group. In other words, globalists are not ‘in
pening, it’s going to happen. It does not mat- charge’ in the sense of imposing their own
ter whether you like it or not, it’s happening, political agenda on people. Rather, they
it’s going to happen.’ Neo-liberal power merely carry out the unalterable imperatives

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 MARKET GLOBALISM 31

of a transcendental force much larger than ordinary people cease to believe in the pos-
narrow partisan interests. sibility of choosing alternative social
For example, Robert Hormats (1998), vice arrangements, market globalism gains
chairman of Goldman Sachs International, strength in its ability to construct passive
emphasized that, ‘The great beauty of glo- consumer identities. This tendency is fur-
balization is that no one is in control. The ther enhanced by assurances that globaliza-
great beauty of globalization is that it is not tion will bring prosperity to all parts of the
controlled by any individual, any govern- world.
ment, any institution.’ Likewise, Thomas
Friedman (1999: 112–3) alleged that ‘the Claim Four: Globalization Benefits
most basic truth about globalization is this:
Everyone ( … in the Long Run)
No one is in charge. … But the global mar-
ketplace today is an Electronic Herd of often This de-contestation chain lies at the heart of
anonymous stock, bond and currency traders market globalism because it provides an
and multinational investors, connected by affirmative answer to the crucial normative
screens and networks.’ Of course, Friedman question of whether globalization represents
is right in a formal sense. There is no con- a ‘good’ phenomenon. The adjacent idea of
scious conspiracy orchestrated by a single ‘benefits for everyone’ is usually unpacked
evil force to disempower Asian nations. But in material terms such as ‘economic growth’
does this mean that nobody is in charge of and ‘prosperity’. However, when linked to
globalization? Is it really true that the liber- globalism’s peripheral concept, ‘progress’,
alization and integration of global markets the idea of ‘benefits for everyone’ taps not
proceeds outside the realm of human choice? only into liberalism’s progressive worldview,
Does globalization, therefore, absolve busi- but also draws on the powerful socialist
nesses and corporations from social respon- vision of establishing an economic paradise
sibility? A critical discourse analysis of on earth – albeit in the capitalist form of a
Friedman’s statement reveals how he utilizes worldwide consumerist utopia. Thus, Claim
a realist narrative to sell to his audience a Four represents another bold example of
neo-liberal version of globalization. He combining elements from seemingly incom-
implies that anyone who thinks that globali- patible ideologies under the master concept
zation involves human choice is either hope- ‘globalization’.
lessly naïve or outright dangerous. At the 1996 G-7 Summit in Lyons, France,
The idea that nobody is in charge serves the heads of state and government of the
the neo-liberal political agenda of defending world’s seven most powerful industrialized
and expanding global capitalism. Like the nations issued a joint Economic Communiqué
market-globalist rhetoric of historical inevi- (1996) that exemplifies the principal mean-
tability, the portrayal of globalization as a ings of this claim:
leaderless process seeks to both depoliticize
the public debate on the subject and demobi- Economic growth and progress in today’s inter-
lize global justice movements. The deter- dependent world is bound up with the process
of globalization. Globalization provides great
ministic language of a technological progress
opportunities for the future, not only for our
driven by uncontrollable market laws turns countries, but for all others too. Its many positive
political issues into scientific problems of aspects include an unprecedented expansion of
administration. Once large segments of the investment and trade; the opening up to inter-
population have accepted the globalist national trade of the world’s most populous
regions and opportunities for more developing
image of a self-directed juggernaut that sim-
countries to improve their standards of living; the
ply runs its course, it becomes extremely increasingly rapid dissemination of information,
difficult to challenge what Antonio Gramsci technological innovation, and the proliferation of
calls the ‘power of the hegemonic bloc’. As skilled jobs.

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 32 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION

Even those market globalists who concede discrediting traditionalism and socialism.
the strong possibility of unequal global dis- After all, the contest with both precapitalist
tribution patterns nonetheless insist that the and anticapitalist forms of traditionalism,
market itself will eventually correct these such as feudalism, has been won rather easily
‘irregularities’. As John Meehan (1997), chair- because the political principles of popular
man of the US Public Securities Association, sovereignty and individual rights have been
puts it, ‘episodic dislocations’ such as mass enshrined as the crucial catalyst for the tech-
unemployment and reduced social services nological and scientific achievements of
might be ‘necessary in the short run’, but, ‘in modern market economies. The battle with
the long run’, they will give way to ‘quantum socialism turned out to be a much tougher
leaps in productivity’. Thus, market glo- case. As late as the 1970s, socialism provided
balists like Meehan justifiy the real human a powerful critique of the elitist, class-based
costs of globalization as the short-term price character of liberal democracy, which, in its
of economic liberalization. Such ideological view, revealed that a substantive form of
statements are disseminated to large audi- democracy had not been achieved in capital-
ences by what Benjamin Barber (1996) calls ist societies. Since the collapse of commu-
the profit-oriented ‘infotainment telesector’. nism in Eastern Europe, however, the
Television, radio, and the Internet frequently ideological edge has shifted decisively to the
place existing economic, political, and social defenders of a neo-liberal perspective who
realities within a neo-liberal framework, sus- emphasize the relationship between eco-
taining the claim that globalization benefits nomic liberalization and the emergence of
everyone through omnipresent affirmative democratic political regimes.
images, websites, banner advertisements, Francis Fukuyama (2000), for example,
and sound bites. asserted that there exists a ‘clear correlation’
between a country’s level of economic devel-
Claim Five: Globalization Furthers opment and successful democracy. While
the Spread of Democracy in the globalization and capital development do not
automatically produce democracies, ‘the
World
level of economic development resulting
The fifth de-contestation chain links from globalization is conducive to the crea-
‘globalization’ and ‘market’ to the adjacent tion of complex civil societies with a power-
concept of ‘democracy’, which also plays a ful middle class. It is this class and societal
significant role in liberalism, conservatism, structure that facilitates democracy’. Praising
and socialism. Globalists typically de-contest Eastern Europe’s economic transition
‘democracy’ through its proximity to ‘mar- towards capitalism, then First Lady Hillary
ket’ and the making of economic choices – a Rodham Clinton (1999) told her Polish audi-
theme developed through the 1980s in the ence that the emergence of new businesses
peculiar variant of conservatism Freeden and shopping centers in former communist
(1996: 392) calls ‘Thatcherism’. Indeed, a countries should be seen as the ‘backbone of
careful discourse analysis of relevant texts democracy’.
reveals that globalists tend to treat freedom, But Fukuyama’s argument hinges on a
free markets, free trade and democracy as limited definition of democracy that empha-
synonymous terms. Persistently affirmed as sizes formal procedures such as voting at the
common sense, the compatibility of these expense of the direct participation of broad
concepts often goes unchallenged in the pub- majorities in political and economic decision
lic discourse. making. This ‘thin’ definition of democracy
The most obvious strategy by which neo- is part of what William I. Robinson (1996:
liberals generate popular support for the 56–62) has identified as the Anglo-American
equation of democracy and the market is by neo-liberal project of ‘promoting polyarchy’

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 MARKET GLOBALISM 33

in the developing world. For the critical Bush administration drew on the existing
political economist, the concept of polyarchy climate of fear to promote their vision of a
differs from the concept of ‘popular democ- benign American Empire leading a coalition
racy’ in that the latter posits democracy as of ‘allies’ in the open-ended War on Terror.
both a process and a means to an end – a tool President George W. Bush abandoned the
for devolving political and economic power mildly isolationist position he espoused dur-
from the hands of elite minorities to the ing the 2000 election campaign and instead
masses. Polyarchy, on the other hand, repre- adopted the bellicose views of inveterate
sents an elitist and regimented model of ‘low hard-power advocates like Dick Cheney and
intensity’ or ‘formal’ market democracy. Donald Rumsfeld. As many market glo-
Polyarchies not only limit democratic par- balists struggled to maintain the viability of
ticipation to voting in elections, but also their ideological project focused on open
require that those elected be insulated from markets, the unilateralist Bush administra-
popular pressures, so that they may ‘effec- tion supported the compromise of toughen-
tively govern’. ing up the ideological claims of market
This focus on the act of voting – in which globalism to fit the neo-conservative vision
equality prevails only in the formal sense – of a benign US empire relying on over-
helps to obscure the conditions of inequality whelming military power.
reflected in existing asymmetrical power As a result, market globalism morphed
relations in society. Formal elections provide into ‘imperial globalism’. Claims One (glo-
the important function of legitimating the balization is about the liberalization and
rule of dominant elites, thus making it more global integration of markets) and Four (glo-
difficult for popular movements to challenge balization benefits everyone) – the backbone
the rule of elites. The claim that globaliza- of market globalism – remained largely
tion furthers the spread of democracy in the intact but the other claims had to undergo
world is largely based on a narrow, formal- hard-power facelifts. The determinist lan-
procedural understanding of ‘democracy’. guage of Claim Two, however, came under
Neo-liberal economic globalization and the sustained criticism by commentators who
strategic promotion of polyarchic regimes read the al-Qaeda attacks as exposing the
in the Third World are, therefore, two sides ‘dark side of globalization’. Some pro-
of the same ideological coin. They represent claimed the imminent ‘collapse of glo-
the systemic prerequisites for the legitima- balism’, worrying that the terrorist attacks
tion of a full-blown world market. The would usher in a new age of cultural particu-
promotion of polyarchy provides market larism and economic protectionism. For
globalists with the ideological opportunity to example, noted neo-liberal economists like
advance their neo-liberal projects of economic Robert J. Samuelson (2003) argued that pre-
restructuring in a language that ostensibly vious globalization processes had been
supports the ‘democratization’ of the world. stopped by similar cataclysmic events like
the assassination of the Austrian Archduke
Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914.
FROM MARKET GLOBALISM TO And yet, the unfolding War on Terror
IMPERIAL GLOBALISM … AND BACK allowed for the semantic intermingling of
military and economic inevitability – the
The five claims discussed in this chapter alleged ‘inevitability’ of America’s military
show that market globalism is sufficiently triumph over its terrorist nemesis. For exam-
systematic to add up to a comprehensive ple, Christopher Shays (2003), Republican
political ideology. In the harsh political cli- Congressman from Connecticut and at the
mate following the attacks of 11 September, time Chair of the House Subcommittee on
however, neo-conservative players in the National Security, argued that the ‘toxic zeal’

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 34 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION

of the terrorists would eventually be defeated security agenda. President Bush (2002) did
by the combination of military and market not mince his words in his New York Times
forces – ‘the relentless inevitability of free op-ed piece a year after the attacks: ‘As we
peoples pursuing their own enlightened self- preserve the peace, America also has an
interest in common cause’. Thus, market opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom
globalism’s ability to adapt to the new reali- and progress to nations that lack them. We
ties of the post-9/11 world gives ample proof seek a peace where repression, resentment
of its responsiveness to a broad range of and poverty are replaced with the hope of
political issues. democracy, development, free markets and
After 9/11, it also became increasingly free trade.’ A year later, the President (2003)
difficult for globalists to maintain Claim reaffirmed his government’s unwavering
Three (nobody is in charge of globalization). ‘commitment to the global expansion of
While a number of corporate leaders still democracy’ as the ‘Third Pillar’ of the United
reflexively referred to the ‘self-regulating States’ ‘peace and security vision for the
market’, it became obvious that the survival world’.
of globalization – conceived as the liberali- This idea of securing global economic inte-
zation and global integration of markets – gration through an American-led military
depended on the US government wielding drive for ‘democratization’ around the globe
its power. Having concealed their country’s became especially prominent in the corporate
imperial ambitions behind the soft language scramble for Iraq following the official ‘end
of market globalism during the 1990s, many of major combat operations’ on 1 May 2003.
American globalists took off their gloves Already during the first days of the Iraq war,
after 9/11, exposing the iron fists of an irate in late March 2003, globalists had suggested
giant. The attacks changed the terms of the that Iraq be subjected to a radical economic
dominant discourse in that it enabled certain treatment. For example, Robert McFarlane
groups within the globalist camp to put their (2003), former National Security Adviser to
geopolitical ambitions explicitly before a President Reagan and current chairman of the
public shocked by ‘terrorism’. Indeed, their Washington DC-based corporation Energy &
open advocacy of American global leader- Communication Solutions, LLC, together
ship spawned raging debates around the with Michael Bleyzer, CEO and president of
world over whether or not the United States SigmaBleyzer, an international equity fund
actually constituted an ‘empire’. management company, co-authored a promi-
The replacement of Claim Three with a nent piece in The Wall Street Journal bearing
more aggressive pronouncement of global the suggestive title, ‘Taking Iraq Private’.
Anglo-American leadership should not be Calling on ‘major U.S. corporations, jointly
read as a sign of globalism’s ideological with other multinationals’, to ‘lead the effort to
weakness. Rather, it reflected its ideational create capital-friendly environments in devel-
flexibility and growing ability to respond to oping countries’, the globalist duo praised the
a new set of political issues. Indeed, like all military operations in Iraq as an indispensible
full-fledged political belief systems, glo- tool in establishing the ‘political, economic
balism is broad enough to contain the more and social stability’ necessary for ‘building the
economistic variant of the 1990s as well as basic institutions that make democracy possi-
its more militaristic post-9/11. ble’. In their conclusion, the two men reminded
Claim Five (globalization furthers the their readers that ‘the U.S. must demonstrate
spread of democracy in the world) ascended that it is not only the most powerful military
to new heights with the hard-power mission power on the planet, but also the foremost
of ‘building democracy’ in Iraq and market economy in the world, capable of lead-
Afghanistan. Thus, this became firmly linked ing a greater number of developing nations to
to the Bush administration’s neo-conservative a more prosperous and stable future’.

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 MARKET GLOBALISM 35

In what amounted to another clear demon- more important over time. No wonder, then,
stration of their political resonance, these that commentators like Richard Falk (2003)
market globalist ideas translated almost who favor the second option have claimed to
immediately into collective decisions. For detect a dangerous turn of globalism toward
example, Ambassador Paul Bremer, the US fascism.
head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, To be sure, throughout the 1990s there had
pressured the Governing Council to let Order been sinister warnings on the part of promi-
39 take effect, permitting complete foreign nent cultural and social theorists that globaliza-
ownership of Iraqi companies and assets tion was actually ‘Americanization’ (Latouche,
(apart from natural resources) that had hith- 1996) or ‘McDonaldization’ (Ritzer, 1993) in
erto been publicly owned, total remittance of universalist disguise. But US unilaterism and
profits, and some of the lowest corporate tax belligerence in the wake of 9/11 appeared to be
rates in the world. Likewise, in his speeches a much more serious manifestation of the
at economic conferences on the Middle East same phenomenon. In fact, the problem of
attended by hundreds of American and Arab- market globalism’s shift toward imperial glo-
American business executives, Secretary of balism was as much conceptual as political.
State Colin Powell (Olivastra, 2002) After all, de-contesting globalization through
announced the development of a US–Middle its proximity to the idea of a necessary
East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) within a dec- ‘global War on Terror’ created obvious logi-
ade. Linked to the adminstration’s 2002 cal contradictions: the Anglo-American
‘US–Middle East Partnership Initiative’, the imperialistic undertones emanating from the
new project also included programs to send global War on Terror contradicted globaliza-
Arab college students to work as interns in tion’s alleged universalism.
American corporations. Instructive examples of the logical incon-
Finally, the neo-conservative commitment sistencies inherent in Claim Six abound.
to ‘American values’ of freedom, security, and Take, for instance, Thomas Barnett’s best-
free markets made it necessary to add a Claim selling book, The Pentagon’s New Map
Six: ‘Globalization requires a War on Terror’ (2004). The author, a professor of military
to market globalism’s discursive arsenal. As strategy at the US Naval War College, also
Robert Kaplan (2003) puts it: ‘You also have served as the assistant for strategic futures in
to have military and economic power behind the Pentagon’s Office of Force Transform­
it, or else your ideas cannot spread.’ Like the ations. In this capacity, Barnett gave his brief-
previous claims, this final de-contestation ings regularly to the US Secretary of Defense,
chain attests to globalism’s political respon- the intelligence community, and to high-
siveness and conceptual flexibility. It com- ranking officers from all branches of the US
bines the idea of economic globalization with armed forces.
openly militaristic and nationalistic ideas Barnett (2004) argues that the Iraq war
associated with the American-led global War marks the moment when Washington takes
on Terror. At the same time, however, Claim real ownership of strategic security in the age
Six possesses a somewhat paradoxical charac- of globalization. He breaks the globe down
ter. If global terror were no longer a major into three distinct regions. The first is charac-
issue, it would disappear without causing terized by ‘globalization thick with network
market globalism to collapse. In that case, it connectivity, financial transactions, liberal
seems that Claim Six is a contingent one and media flows, and collective security’, yielding
thus less important than the previous five. On nations featuring stable democratic govern-
the other hand, if the global War on Terror turns ments, transparency, rising standards of living,
out to be a lengthy and intense engagement – as and more deaths by suicide than by murder
suggested by the current American political (North America, most of Europe, Australia,
leadership – then it would become actually New Zealand, and a small part of Latin

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 36 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION

America). He calls these regions of the world unprecedented ‘stimulus packages’ designed
the ‘Functioning Core’ or ‘Core’. Conversely, to arrest the surging unemployment rate.
areas where ‘globalization is thinning or just Ironically, precisely at a time when the legiti-
plain absent’ constitute a region plagued by macy of market globalism was seriously shaken,
repressive political regimes, regulated mar- this new wave of ‘neo-Keynesian’ measures
kets, mass murder, and widespread poverty sweeping across the entire world did little to
and disease (the Caribbean Rim, virtually all displace the dominance of neo-liberalism. The
of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central popularity of stimulus spending bills in the
Asia, China, the Middle East, and much of global north proved to be short lived as neo-
Southeast Asia). The breeding ground of liberal imperatives made a swift comeback as
‘global terrorists’, Barnett refers to this region ‘budget cuts’, ‘austerity packages’, and the
as the ‘Non-Integrating Gap’, or ‘Gap’. ‘reduction of welfare benefits’. As Joseph
Between these two regions, one finds ‘seam Stiglitz (2010) shows convincingly, the Obama
states’ that ‘lie along the Gap’s bloody bound- administration’s interventionist policies
aries’ (Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, quickly gave way to the market globalist
Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, forces that had led the world to the brink of
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia). another Great Depression. In addition, the
For Barnett, the importance of 9/11 is that withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in 2011 and
the attacks forced the United States and its the impending troop reductions in Afghanistan
allies to make a long-term military commit- faciliated the transformation of imperialism
ment to ‘deal with the entire Gap as a strategic back into its original form – market globalism.
threat environment’. In other words, the desired To argue, however, that market globalism
spread of globalization requires a War on has shifted from a soft-power narrative to a
Terror. Its three main objectives are: ‘1) Increase hard-power discourse of empire and then back
the Core’s immune system capabilities for again does not mean that it enjoys undisputed
responding to September 11-like system pertur- ideological dominance. In fact, there exists a
bations; 2) Work on the seam states to firewall multiplicity of alternative stories about glo-
the Core from the Gap’s worst exports, such as balization that also aim to provide authorita-
terror, drugs, and pandemics; and, most impor- tive accounts of what the phenomenon is all
tant, 3) Shrink the Gap … The Middle East is about. As a result, market globalism’s ideo-
the perfect place to start.’ Barnett (2004) logical claims have been contested both by
emphasizes that ‘We ignore the Gap’s existence what I call ‘justice globalism’ on the political
at our own peril, because it will not go away Left (Steger, Goodman, and Wilson, 2013)
until we as a nation respond to the challenge of and ‘religious globalism’ on the political
making globalization truly global.’ Right (Steger, 2008). But it is the task of other
This celebration of globalization in chapters featured in this Handbook of
American imperialistic terminology invites the Globalization to examine the counterargu-
kind of conceptual contradiction that could ments advanced by the challengers of the
have been fatal to market globalism. By 2008, dominant ideology of our global age.
however, the global War on Terror had taken a
backseat to the unfolding Global Financial
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