PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. HENRY T.

GO, respondent

G.R. No. 168539; March 25, 2014

Ponente: Peralta, J.
Principles/Doctrines:
Nature of the Case: PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI

FACTS:

The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in Agan,
Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts
awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and
maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA IPT III).

Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019.
Among those charged was herein respondent, Henry T. Go, who was then the Chairman and
President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile in
entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable
cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer
indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.

Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the
Sandiganbayan. On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why
this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged
co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case.

The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the Sandiganbayan has
already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary
appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The
prosecution also argued that the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's
case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a public
officer.

On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him
on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the Sandiganbayan, also
contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom
he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated
by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019.

Sandiganbayan Resolution: Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated
April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private
person and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case
was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the
Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and
dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in
violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to
have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.

HELD:

YES. The settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers,
may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of
R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of
public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may
lead thereto.

It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer
with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however,
that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is
his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the
charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent.
Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public
officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of
Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in
conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in
all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the
public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer
has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
 Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for
conspiracy. If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them
pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are
jointly responsible therefor. This means that everything said, written or done by any of the
conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said,
done, or written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or
dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. The death of one of two or more conspirators does
not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.
So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge
for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.

On Jurisdiction over his person:

Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not
confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters
which called for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now
to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him.

In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his
Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the
case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.

As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a
contract entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the
Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D.
1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers.

Conclusion:
In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and
Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan.
However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for
reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the Sandiganbayan is already divested of its
jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise
would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law
defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.