SPE/IADC-194547-MS

MPD Deployment for Deepwater Drilling Operations – HSE & Risk

Considerations and Mitigation, Rig Configuration Challenges and MPD
Equipment Selection and Standardization

Sohail Mohammed and Ravi Vanjarapu, American Bureau of Shipping

Copyright 2019, IADC/SPE Managed Pressure Drilling and Underbalanced Operations Conference and Exhibition

This paper was prepared for presentation at the 2019 IADC/SPE Managed Pressure Drilling and Underbalanced Operations Conference and Exhibition held in
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 09 - 10 April 2019.

This paper was selected for presentation by an IADC/SPE program committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s).
Contents of the paper have not been reviewed by the International Association of Drilling Contractors or the Society of Petroleum Engineers and are subject to correction
by the author(s). The material does not necessarily reflect any position of the International Association of Drilling Contractors or the Society of Petroleum Engineers,
its officers, or members. Electronic reproduction, distribution, or storage of any part of this paper without the written consent of the International Association of Drilling
Contractors or the Society of Petroleum Engineers is prohibited. Permission to reproduce in print is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 words; illustrations
may not be copied. The abstract must contain conspicuous acknowledgment of IADC/SPE copyright.

Abstract
The objective of this paper is to discuss safety philosophy underlying MPD operations and address potential
risks involved and consequences for drilling assets during MPD deployment on a Deepwater Drilling
MODU. HSE and Risk Considerations for Deepwater MPD projects will be outlined. This paper will also
address rig configuration challenges and propose considerations for standardizing MPD Equipment for
Surface Back Pressure (SBP), Pressurized Mud Cap Drilling (PMCD) and Floating Mud Cap Drilling
(FMCD) Operations.

Introduction
With current market demand of drilling deeper wells at optimum cost, Managed Pressure Drilling (MPD)
techniques have gained wider acceptance for deepwater applications. MPD pressure control technologies
utilize a closed loop drilling system with adjustment of back pressure. While MPD methods have been
widely used for land operations and shallow-water wells, current demand for deepwater and previously un-
drillable wells has forced industry to deploy MPD techniques on deepwater MODUs. The success of MPD
installation on any deepwater MODUs depends upon its reliability and safety. This paper will summarize
various HSE and Risk considerations that are to be employed for installation of MPD equipment on a
deepwater MODU.
With increase in demand for MPD on deepwater projects, comes the need to generate standardized MPD
packages and equipment that can be utilized for any MPD project. Based on the ABS experience gained by
working on multiple projects, it has been noted that while the intent for installing MPD is alike for various
operators, however the MPD packages prepared and equipment utilized such as surface manifolds and their
control logic is unique to each drilling contractor, service provider and OEM. This paper will outline rig
configuration challenges for such installations and propose considerations for generating standardized MPD
packages and equipment that can be utilized for SBP, PMCD, and FMCD modes of MPD.
2 SPE/IADC-194547-MS

HSE & Risk Considerations

The philosophy underlying well design is based on API Recommended Practice (RP) 59 for well-control
operations where if a well is considered to have potential to flow, maintenance of a two barriers to flow
system should be considered i.e. functionally independent primary and secondary barriers are required.
Primary well control is defined as the maintenance of hydrostatic pressure in the wellbore, equal to or
greater than the formation pressure to prevent formation influx (i.e. Mud circulation). The MPD system
is considered as part of the primary barrier as it creates a closed well-circulation system that contributes
directly and actively to the prevention of an influx. This implies the equipment and components of secondary
well control system cannot be used for planned MPD operations.4
As MPD operations require additional equipment to be added to the rig, new operational procedures
unique to MPD are to be developed and changes to existing well control procedures are to be addressed.
These activities may introduce potential for new hazards or failure modes unique to MPD operations and
should be determined and measures needed for prevention, detection, and mitigation of such risks should
be developed and documented. As MPD operations are unique and different from conventional drilling
operations, the existing rig crew may not be familiar with MPD procedures and equipment, therefore
appropriate training material should be developed. Past experience has shown that, rig crew participation
in risk workshops is the ideal means for transfer of knowledge and bringing the whole team and all parties
involved in the project to have better understanding of the system.
For any MPD installation, the process begins with front-end engineering design, followed with a review
of the operational documentation to mitigate the hazards either by design or operationally. Various levels
of safety assessment are carried out during this process.
The process of integrating an MPD system onto a deepwater MODU must adhere to regulatory
requirements and assure that HSE safeguards have been assessed and, when required, implemented. To
this end, a comprehensive hazard analysis and risk assessment are undertaken and tested against accepted
concepts, such as "best available safest technology" and "as low as reasonably practicable." Typical process,
as shown in Figure 1, starts with HAZID followed by HAZOP and, FMECA at the equipment level
including electrical and control. Engineering, operations and field personnel typically participate in these
risk-assessment steps. A FMECA Validation Plan should be developed validating the safety critical barriers
identified during the FMECA workshop. A Risk Management plan should be maintained indicating action
taken to mitigate the risk.

Figure 1—Risk Assessment Process for an MPD Installation

SPE/IADC-194547-MS 3

HAZID study is undertaken to identify hazards and associated events that have the potential to result in
a significant consequence. A HazID study for MPD installation is focused on the operating phase of the
MPD system including tripping, stripping, drilling ahead, making and breaking connection, etc. Whereas,
HAZOP analysis is used to identify potential hazards or operability concerns relating to pieces of equipment
or systems. The primary objective of HAZOP is to assess whether sufficient measures are in place to safely
recover from each process deviation. HAZOP is not intended as a method for assessing fire protection,
escape routes etc. which are typically addressed during a HAZID. Safeguards are identified during such
studies, these safeguards can be a combination of hardware and procedural measures, for example, pressure
relief valves, and operator intervention triggered by alarms etc.
Managed pressure drilling takes place in one of several modes of operation such as: Constant Bottom
Hole Pressure, Early kick detection, RGH, PMCD, FMCD, etc. All such modes should be considered and
selected for the risk workshop. Typically all such modes are broken down into nodes/flow paths and worked
through.
FMEAs/FMECAs are typically performed to assess single failures and their effects (i.e., two
simultaneous independent failures are not considered). It is customary to also consider a single act of mal-
operation as a single failure. Assessments of this type are usually limited to errors that would result in
unwanted consequences. A "single act" is generally taken to mean the operation of a single button, switch,
lever, etc. There are two distinct instances when more than one failure should be considered in the FMEA:
i) When one of the failures can be latent, undetected or hidden ii) When two or more systems or components
can fail due to a single specific event or cause (common cause failures).
Standard Risk considerations and safety philosophy for MPD installations are summarized as follows:

• The MPD system is to be designed such that a single component failure in one of the MPD
subsystems will not lead to an unsafe situation.
• The pressure protection philosophy for the pressure relief devices and MPD Chokes – the control
logic and set points for MPD chokes and PRVs should be reviewed and documented.
• It is recommended to provide, redundant PRVs to protect the riser from over pressurization. It has
been observed that some operators prefer to flow through both the flow lines all the times, where
as some operators prefer to flow though one flow line to avoid the hassle of keeping both the hoses
filled with mud all the time. Consideration should be given to lining up surface valves so that
both PRVs are always active (even when a single flowline is being used). The pressure protection
philosophy for unplanned gas in the riser should also be considered.
• The Rig's Riser Gas Handling capability should be assessed. With RCD in place, the rig diverter
system is isolated and therefore Riser Gas Handling capability of the MPD system should be
determined.
• The rig crew should be provided with MPD specific training. From past experience it has been
found that close coordination is required between the driller and choke operator.
• The PLC logic should be reviewed against the failure modes identified during the risk workshops
to ensure it deals correctly with the upset conditions.
• Results from risk workshops should be incorporated into operating procedures and contingency
procedures
• If the installation includes a junk catcher, washout rates for the filters should be determined.

• The specification and pressure break of the MPD system should be clearly defined and shown on
the P&IDs. Since MPD manifolds are typically rated for a low pressure when compared to rig
choke or standpipe manifolds. Double isolation philosophy should be followed to protect the low
pressure system from high pressure system. Position verification of such valves should be checked
before starting operations.
4 SPE/IADC-194547-MS

• Pressure relief devices such as PRVs including discharge lines are to be designed as per API 520
and 521. Considerations should be given to the arrangement of PRV discharge lines to avoid use
of NRV or check valves since these devices are normally closed and the check valve can become
stuck in the closed position or fail in a manner causing an obstruction in the PRV path. The PRVs
should be sized with considerations for gas in mud.

Rig Configuration Challenges

Every rig offers a completely different set of parameters and conditions for design, installation, and operation
of the MPD system. Space limitations, weight restrictions, power requirements, and economic challenges
add up to the rig configuration challenges.3 Various aspects, as listed below are to be assessed and addressed
while integrating an MPD package on a MODU designed with a conventional drilling package.
With addition of the new MPD package, structural modifications are required to accommodate MPD on-
board. Additionally the deck load limitations are to be considered before installation of MPD equipment.
Some MPD installation may require a dedicated MGS, weight of MGS with content should be considered
while identifying deck load limitations.
Fire and Gas detection - Spaces having a fire risk, are to be provided with an automatic fire detection
and alarm system. Some installation involve addition on new modules to accommodate MPD equipment,
consideration should be given to the need for additional fire and gas detectors. Typically, a fixed automatic
hydrogen sulfide gas detection and alarm system are to be provided for the drill area and mud processing
area.2
MPD service providers may have a particular electrical power requirement for their MPD package.
Available power supply from the rig and the required power from the service provider should be assessed.
Additionally, electrical load analysis should be performed to verify the additional electrical loads added
because of MPD. Rig hazardous area zones rating may also become a limiting factor for installation of MPD
equipment on-board. The rig hazardous area plan should be updated to include MPD equipment.
For conventional drilling, emergency power supply for a period of 18 hours is required and mandated for
emergency lighting, navigation lights & signals, marking of offshore structures, internal communications,
fire & gas detection alarm systems, emergency signals BOP & well disconnection, fire pump and fire
extinguisher systems, diving equipment. Considerations are to be taken for emergency power supply
requirements for MPD control system, as upon loss of back pressure the well may go hydrostatically
underbalanced.2
Typically blowout preventer control systems and well control systems are considered primary essential
services while drilling conventionally; however while drilling under MPD mode, considerations shall be
given to MPD equipment which may be considered primary essential whose loss of failure would result in
an immediate danger to the unit. For all such sub-systems and equipment of MPD, reliability and built in
redundancy are to be considered. Essential services are typically required to be operable after emergency
shut down, considerations are to be taken to identify essential MPD equipment that are to be operable after
emergency shut down.2 As the MPD system is considered part of the primary barrier envelope, there may
be part of it which could be considered as ‘primary / essential’. Any loss of the primary barrier means that
the secondary barrier must be activated to re-instate the primary barrier – just like conventional drilling.
Incorrect mud density can result in a kick – is the drilling mud considered ‘essential’?
Considerations and update to the rig's emergency shut down philosophy due to MPD is to be addressed.
Typically, Rig's emergency arrangements are provided for disconnection or shutdown, either selectively or
simultaneously, of all electrical equipment and devices, except for essential services from the emergency
control station. Initiating the shut-downs may vary according to the nature of the emergency. Vessel specific
ESD philosophy should be developed incorporating MPD operations.
SPE/IADC-194547-MS 5

The rig's gas detection/ESD system cause and effect charts are to be updated to include MPD, where
the Cause and Effect Chart is to relate gas detection sensors to ESD shutdown groups of equipment and
areas on the unit.
Initial Riser recoil analysis considered conventional mode of operation, for each installation, a rig specific
recoil analysis including the effect of MPD should be performed.

MPD Equipment Selection and Standardization

Offshore projects involve multiple stakeholders that can influence the outcome of the project. If a project
is to be successful the needs of each individual stakeholder must be addressed at all stages throughout
project's lifecycle. With increase in use of MPD for deepwater MODUs, the MPD packages and equipment
are developed which are either drilling contractor or service provider or vendor specific. Standardization of
MPD packages and equipment can provide more options to the industry and reduce the risk. Additionally,
standardization can also reduce the overall cost of the project. Comprehensive standardization of various
MPD equipment is viewed as a visible solution in moderating project costs.
MPD equipment is to be selected considering fit for purpose, reliability, and safety. Based on our
experience gained from working on similar equipment supplied by different vendors, it is noticed that
the fault tolerances of similar equipment provided by different vendors is significantly different. Several
considerations can be incorporated to standardize the MPD equipment. FMEA or FMECA, can be used as
a tool to demonstrate reliability and fault tolerance of the equipment.
For the purpose of standardization and equipment selection, the following factors, at minimum should
be taken into consideration:

• MPD Equipment installed below the waterline is to be designed for subsea service, Cathodic
Protection is to be considered.
• The MPD riser equipment, is to be designed for combinations of pressure, tension, bending, and
other applicable loads per design conditions.1
• Sizing of the surface manifold, valves and piping to avoid erosion/washout due to high velocity,
solids-laden fluid flow.1
• Configuration of the buffer manifold to direct the well fluids to the rig's shakers, rig's choke
manifold, overboard lines, and to the MPD choke manifold.1
• Capability of the valves to allow full flow and hold the pressure from either direction.1

• Type of actuator required for valves and chokes, and their qualification.

• Provision for double isolation and live maintenance of chokes, meters and filters (if any).

• Capability of the surface manifolds to provide double isolation philosophy for overpressure
protection at the tie in point of MPD to rig choke or standpipe manifold.
• PRV and PRV discharge location to keep discharge lines free of any obstruction

Conclusions
In conclusion, the process of integrating an MPD system onto a deepwater MODU must adhere to regulatory
requirements and assure that HSE safeguards have been addressed/implemented. Though the hazards and
failure modes for each installation are unique however it has been noticed from past experience that majority
of the failure modes and hazards identified during each installation are similar, with few unique findings
depending upon the operator preference or system design. For specific operations, a rig specific riser recoil
analysis including the effect of MPD should be performed. Risk studies are also used as one of the means
to demonstrate reliability and safety to a regulatory body or a class society and are considered one of the
key documents in gaining approval from the regulator.
6 SPE/IADC-194547-MS

Several rig configuration challenges ranging from piping, structural, electrical to safety are identified in
this paper along with considerations and recommendations such as MGS capabilities, ESD philosophy, Fire
& gas detectors, electrical assessment etc.
This paper also summarizes, several recommendations for selection of MPD packages and equipment
standardization for the drilling contractor, service provider and vendor's consideration.

Acknowledgement
The authors wish to express their thanks to the management of ABS for allowing them to share these insights.
Appreciation is also extended to those who spent time reviewing and commenting constructively to improve
the information included here.

Nomenclature
ABS American Bureau of Shipping
API American Petroleum Institute
CBHP Constant Bottom Hole Pressure
ESD Emergency Shut Down
FMCD Floating Mud Cap Drilling
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
FMECA Failure Modes Effect and Criticality Analysis
HAZID Hazard Identification
HAZOP Hazards Operability
MGS Mud Gas Separator
MODU Mobile Offshore Drilling Units
MPD Managed Pressure Drilling
NRV Non-return Valve
P&ID Process & Instrumentation Diagram
PMCD Pressurized mud Cap Drilling
PRV Pressure Relief Valve
RGH Riser Gas Handling
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer

References
1. ABS. 2017, Guide for Classification and Certification of Managed Pressure Drilling Systems
(MPD Guide). American Bureau of Shipping. Spring, Texas.
2. ABS. 2019, Rules for Building and Classing Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU Rules).
American Bureau of Shipping. Spring, Texas.
3. Bruton, J., Patel, H.N., Mohammed, S., Lin, J., 2016 Lessons Learned during manufacture,
installation, deployment and operation of a Managed Pressure Drilling System on Classed
Drilling Units in Gulf of Mexico. Presented at the Offshore Technology Conference, Houston,
Texas, 2-5 May 2016. OTC-27265-MS. https://www.onepetro.org/conference-paper/OTC-27265-
MS
4. Dietrich, E. (Weatherford), Wright, R. P. (Berkley & Imperial LP), Patel, H. (ABS), and Bruton,
J. (ABS) 2017. Classification rules aim to advance deepwater MPD applications. World Oil
JANUARY 2017 issue, pg. 31–34. https://www.worldoil.com/magazine/2017/january-2017/
features/classification-rules-aim-to-advance-deepwater-mpd-applications