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In Search of Phronesis: Leadership and the Art of Judgment

Article  in  Academy of Management Learning and Education, The · June 2014

DOI: 10.5465/amle.2013.0201

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In Search of Phronesis:
Leadership and the Art
of Judgment
JOHN SHOTTER
University of New Hampshire and London School of Economics

HARIDIMOS TSOUKAS
University of Cyprus and University of Warwick

We explore the process through which people in organizations, especially those in

leadership positions, in circumstances marked by ambiguity, surprise, and conflicting
values, come to, or arrive at, judgment. Briefly reviewing the (somewhat limited)
literature on judgment in management studies, we conclude that its mainly rationalist
orientation prevents us (scholars and practitioners alike) from properly grasping
important features of the hermeneutical– developmental process involved in coming to a
judgment. In particular, the role of emotions, moral agency, language use, and,
especially, the selective and integrative nature of perceptual processes, are far too easily
ignored. We make the case for a particular notion of judgment understood as Aristotelian
“phronesis” (practical wisdom). Phronetic leaders, we argue, are people who, in their
search for a way out of their difficulties, have developed a refined capacity to intuitively
grasp salient features of ambiguous situations and to constitute a “landscape” of possible
paths of response, while driven by the pursuit of the notion of the common good. We seek
to shed light on how this is accomplished, by drawing on neo-Aristotelian,
phenomenological, and Wittgensteinian philosophy.
........................................................................................................................................................................

Although not explored in great depth, the links who, soon upon taking office, must handle a com-
between organizational leadership and the exer- plaint of sexual harassment against a senior man-
cise of judgment have been noted by some organi- agement member who happened to have been her
zational and management scholars (March 2005: internal rival for the CEO job, we explore what is
116; Keohane, 2010: 87; Tichy & Bennis, 2007a: 5; involved in the process one (especially one in a
Weick, 2001: 363–364). However, the process of mak- position of leadership) engages in coming to judg-
ing (or coming to) judgment has either not received ment. We should clarify that we take a broad view
adequate attention or, to the extent it has, it is of leadership to include not just the usual high-
found wanting. We attempt here to address this profile organizational roles that capture the public
weakness. eye. but also, the more ordinary, everyday cases in
More specifically, drawing on Badaracco’s (2002) which people in organizations, at various levels of
account of Rebecca Olson, a newly appointed CEO responsibility, are facing dilemmas, ambiguity,
at St. Clement’s Hospital in Omaha, Nebraska, and surprise, and need to take action. Badaracco
(2002: 2) calls the handling of such cases “leading
quietly.” In “leading quietly,” the process of com-
We would like to thank Associate Editor Jean Bartunek for her ing to a judgment involves considering conflicting
patience, encouragement, and insightful comments and sug-
gestions on earlier drafts of this paper. We would also like to
values and priorities; is contextually bound; fol-
thank the anonymous reviewers for their generous and con- lows no pre-established templates; and appears to
structively challenging comments. require twists-and-turns in many new directions,
224
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2014 Shotter and Tsoukas 225

as each step in its developmental trajectory opens have been rising, staff turnover is high. Olson’s
up new realms of facts for consideration. So, how appointment—it is hoped—will address these
do “quiet leaders” do it? problems as well as energize the organization. As
Identifying weaknesses in currently dominant if these problems were not enough, soon after tak-
approaches to judgment, we make the case for a ing over, Olson is thrown into her first crisis: a
particular notion of judgment understood as Aris- serious allegation of sexual harassment made by a
totelian “phronesis” (prudence, practical wisdom). clerical employee, Melanie Wermert, against the
Phronetic leaders (i.e., leaders exercising practical vice president of operations, Richard Millar.
wisdom), we will argue, are people who have de- Millar came from a prominent local family, had
veloped a refined capacity to come to an intuitive held all the major nonmedical posts in the hospital
grasp of the most salient features of an ambiguous over a 25-year period, and had competed with Ol-
situation and, in their search for a way out of their son for the position of the CEO as the inside can-
difficulties, to craft a particular path of response in didate. The board had known this allegation for
moving through them, while driven by the pursuit several weeks but said nothing to Olson. The pre-
of the common good. We will seek to shed light on vious CEO had known about this too, but had de-
how this is accomplished by drawing on, mainly, cided not to get involved since he would be leav-
neo-Aristotelian, phenomenological, and Wittgen- ing. Now it was Olson’s problem. How should she
steinian philosophy. We also draw parallels with handle it?
current approaches in psychology and business In her preliminary explorations, Olson discov-
ethics that focus on moral intuition. ered that the hospital did have a process for inves-
The paper is structured as follows: First, we sum- tigating harassment charges, and she set it in mo-
marize the story of Rebecca Olson’s handling of the tion immediately. But as she began to interview
case of sexual harassment, as told in Badaracco members of staff further, it gradually emerged that
(2002). Second, we discuss how judgment has been although Millar had seemed confident and easy
predominantly conceptualized in management going on the surface, he had harassed other
studies. We review the main models and frame- women and bullied other members of staff he dis-
works suggested, assess their adequacy, and prob- liked into resigning, to such an extent that even
lematize what we take to be their mainly rational- Olson herself, a high-achiever and competitive
ist claims. Then we turn to neo-Aristotelian sports person when young, became somewhat
philosophy and approach judgment through the fearful of him. He seemed to act as if he was
perspectives of “praxis” and “phronesis.” We dis- bulletproof.
cuss some related concepts, especially perception, The lawyer’s report left Olson with little doubt
emotions, the moral quality of agents, and the that Millar deserved to be fired straightaway. How-
hermeneutics of making sense. Following this dis- ever, in the end, given all the local consequences
cussion, we focus particularly on “virtue,” as the of a public announcement of his many indiscre-
pivotal concept in the process of coming to a judg- tions over the years, and the deleterious effect of
ment, and argue that virtues are ontological skills, that on the hospital’s reputation, she judged that
drawing in particular on Wittgenstein’s (1953) phil- the best course of action was to push him to resign.
osophical methods. Last, in the discussion, we of- But how could this be contrived?
fer further reflections on judgment and “phronesis” For 2 months, Olson worked behind the scenes to
and their relevance for better making sense of prepare the occasion by imaginatively working
Rebecca Olson’s actions. through countermoves to all the moves that Millar
might make. She talked for hours with lawyers;
prepared a detailed report on the investigation;
JUDGMENT CALL:
labored over Millar’s severance package so that it
DEALING WITH RICHARD MILLAR
reflected the hospital’s obligations to a long-term
Consider the following case, drawn from Ba- employee; met privately with two other board
daracco (2002: 12–18): Rebecca Olson, a physician members who worked with her on ways to influ-
by training, ambitious and capable, with some ence the rest; and worked on a carefully staged
management experience but not at the top-level, is and scripted set of words to be used on the occa-
headhunted by a hospital to become its CEO. She sion when Millar was to be asked (told) to resign. In
accepts the position. The hospital is in trouble: It short, Olson did not respond to the situation facing
has been losing market share, patient complaints her by heroically doing “the right thing” immedi-
226 Academy of Management Learning & Education June

ately, or by blindly following her “gut reaction” is not a matter of “ethical decision making” alone
(Badaracco, 2002: 15); she spent time on exploring (Bazerman & Gino, 2012; Craft, 2013; Tenbrunsel &
the situation of concern in all its small and partic- Smith-Crowe, 2008; Trevino, den Nieuwenboer, &
ular details, and charting an intricate path which, Kish-Gephart, 2013). While the “moral context” (Ba-
she hoped, would be an appropriate response to zerman & Gino, 2012: 89) of the case is indisputable,
them all. or at least Olson appears to exhibit “moral aware-
ness” (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008: 555), inso-
far as moral considerations are clearly present in
In short, Olson did not respond to the her mind, her puzzlement as to what she needs to
situation facing her by heroically doing do is not a narrowly ethical one—legal and
business-related issues need to be considered too
“the right thing” immediately, or by
(Badaracco, 2002: 14).
blindly following her “gut reaction” Moreover, while in this case the organizational
(Badaracco, 2002: 15); she spent time on procedure is followed to the end and particular
exploring the situation of concern in all judgments are made with reference to it, in other
its small and particular details, and cases, different judgment calls may be made, as,
charting an intricate path which, she for example, when the leaders involved need to
judge whether they will stick to the organizational
hoped, would be an appropriate response
procedure or depart from it as they see fit. For
to them all. example, Admiral Allen, the national incident
commander of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and
a leading executive in the handling of Hurricane
Although incidents like this are not common (one Katrina disaster, describes the mental agility re-
hopes!), they are not unheard of either. Most large quired when confronting a complex, fast-moving
organizations have procedures in place for han- crisis: “There were times when we needed imme-
dling cases of harassment. Reading Badaracco’s diate action, and I went off book and gave some
account, one realizes that although the hospital direct orders, which is not normally done under the
had, indeed, a process for investigating harass- hurricane response model” (Allen, 2010: 77). Or con-
ment charges, and although Olson had handled sider the case of a junior hospital doctor who wit-
other harassment complaints in her professional nesses a senior doctor taking drugs while on duty
life before, how she would respond to this partic- (Shotter & Tsoukas, in press). There was no proce-
ular case was, at the start, unclear—it needed to be dure in the hospital to handle such incidents. How
worked out. Would she get personally involved or was the junior doctor supposed to act? To cut a
should she keep a low profile? (After all, her pre- long story short: when in existence, organizational
decessor had copped-out!) To what extent should procedures can be applied in several ways; there
she get members of the board involved? How are organizational rules and, also, exceptions to
would she politically handle those board and se- rules; and although sometimes there are no rules,
nior management members who were friendly action must be undertaken in the context of profes-
with Millar? Should she fire him, if proven guilty? sional norms and expectations. What all these
Should she ease him out of his job? Or should she more or less “scripted,” cases have in common is
seek a compromise? And so on. the exercise of judgment. In the next section, we
In other words, although an organizational pol- critically review the literature on judgment (with a
icy on harassment complaints was in place at the focus on management studies and policy making),
hospital, there was no detailed “script” for Olson to seeking to identify the main issues related to judg-
follow to address these questions. Some of them ment calls and the challenges they present.
are related to facts and evidence, others are re-
lated to values, and others to time-sensitive prior-
MAKING SENSE OF JUDGMENT IN
ities at the individual and organizational levels.
ORGANIZATIONS AND MANAGEMENT
How exactly Olson would handle the case de-
pended on how she would size up the entire situ- In this section we selectively and critically review
ation, seen in the broader context of her own role, the most influential approaches to the study of
values, and organizational background—it was a judgment in organizational and management re-
matter of judgment. Addressing these questions search. We note that most of the relevant studies
2014 Shotter and Tsoukas 227

fall into the rationalist school (see Sonenshein, needs to make a judgment” (Sternberg, 2000: 640)—
2007: 1022–1023). We also note the emergence of an where the “balancing” process is a matter of infor-
alternative approach, which seeks to move beyond mation processing aimed at producing a represen-
rationalism, toward embracing a more phenome- tational scheme oriented toward problem solving.
nologically informed mode of inquiry that privi- A similar rationalistic orientation is also evident
leges experience, process, and relationality. We in the work of Nonaka and Takeuchi (2011), and
situate ourselves in the latter school and seek to Tichy and Bennis (2007a, 2007b). Both pairs of au-
advance it further, in the rest of the paper, through thors tend to favor a primarily intellectual under-
drawing on neo-Aristotelian and Wittgensteinian standing of what coming to a judgment involves.
scholarship. Nonaka and Takeuchi write about the need for
“wise leaders” to grasp the essence of a situation
by practicing “mind-stretching routines,” such as
Rationalistic Approaches
“relentlessly asking what the basis of a problem or
The bulk of research in organization and manage- a situation is” and “constructing and testing hy-
ment studies is characterized by a rationalistic potheses” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 2011: 63– 64). Tichy
orientation to judgment (Bazerman & Moore, 2009; and Bennis explicitly model “judgment calls” on
cf. Kahneman, 2011: Chapter 8; Sonenshein, 2007: decision-making processes. As they note, a judg-
1022–1023). Judgment tends to be seen mainly as a, ment occurs not in a “single moment but grows out
reason-based matter: How an uncertain and equiv- of a process” (Tichy & Bennis, 2007b: 96). But what
ocal situation can be cognitively represented so as they mean by this is a 3-phase decision-making
to allow individuals to indulge in the rational ma- process that includes first, “preparation” (includ-
nipulation of symbols in the inner theater of the ing “sensing” and “framing” the issue at hand);
mind (see Baars, 1997). Even when the importance second, “the [judgment] call itself—the moment of
of “tacit knowledge” in shaping judgment is appre- decision”; and third, “execution—making it hap-
ciated, the emphasis is still on judgment as mainly pen while learning and adjusting along the way”
a mental process of problem solving (Nonaka & (Tichy & Bennis, 2007b: 96).
Takeuchi, 2011; Sternberg, 1998, 2000). And even Moral judgment has recently been an important
when the role of emotions is acknowledged, as is topic of research in ethical decision making (or
often the case in recent research, emotions are not behavioral ethics). Researchers have noted the im-
viewed as fundamentally constitutive of one’s cog- portance of the “decision frame” (Tenbrunsel &
nitive processing of a situation, but rather, as Smith-Crowe, 2008: 561–565) practitioners apply to
merely being contingently linked with cognition the decisions they make. Decision frames “repre-
(Sonenshein, 2007: 1033; Tenbrunsel & Smith- sent the dominant characteristics of the situational
Crowe, 2008: 576; Van de Bos, 2003). construal as perceived by the decision maker”
For example, Sternberg (2000: 640) argues that as a (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008: 564). An “ethical
manifestation of “practical intelligence,” wisdom, of- frame,” it is argued, prompts “moral awareness”
ten seen as synonymous with good judgment, is and, thus, “moral decision making” ensues. By con-
underlain by certain general “metacomponents” trast, when a “business” or a “legal frame” is ad-
that fit the information processing-cum-problem- opted, moral considerations are ignored or
solving model (see also Baltes & Staudinger, 2000). brushed aside, “decision makers are not morally
As he remarks: “[Wisdom] typically is acquired by aware,” and “amoral decision making” ensues
selectively encoding new information that is rele- (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008: 553).
vant for one’s purposes in learning about that con- However, when a situation is perceived by the
text, selectively comparing this information with individuals involved not as falling under a partic-
old information to see how the new fits with the ular frame, but as being at the intersection of mul-
old, and selectively combining pieces of informa- tiple frames (as is Olson’s case, insofar as she
tion to make them fit together into an orderly knows that she needs to simultaneously attend to
whole” (Sternberg, 2000: 640). Although these pro- ethical, legal, and organizational issues), behav-
cesses are used in all kinds of intelligence (ana- ioral ethics literature, for all its richness, is not
lytic, creative, and practical), what distinguishes particularly suggestive. While the distinctions
wisdom, according to Sternberg, is that the latter is made (e.g., “moral awareness” vs. “no moral
highly context-dependent, involving “balancing awareness,” “intended ethicality” vs. “unintended
off the various interests of parties about which one ethicality,” etc.—see Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe,
228 Academy of Management Learning & Education June

2008: 554), and the concepts developed (e.g., ing priorities. But while the question of judgment
“bounded ethicality,” “moral identity”—see Bazer- involved in all kinds of organizational work, not
man & Gino, 2012; Tenbrunsel, Diekmann, Wade- just in high-profile leadership positions, has been
Benzoni, & Bazerman, 2010; Aquino & Reed, 2002; addressed in the literature, the fact that in all such
Weaver, 2006), along with the several research cases practitioners must appraise the particularity
propositions tested, are enlightening, behavioral of the situation facing them has not been seriously
ethics researchers do not fully engage with the addressed. To act in a prudent fashion, more is
complexity—the ambiguity, uncertainty, and con- needed than simply bringing general principles to
flict—involved in the exercise of practical reason bear on a case; practitioners must assess what the
in real-life contexts (Beiner, 1982; Berlin, 1996; Fer- circumstances demand, and do so by engaging
rara, 2008). The “framework of scientific rational- emotions and reason, intuition and intellect. As
ity” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011: 342) they adopt will be seen below, this is a point postrationalist
prevents them from grasping the still undifferenti- perspectives seek to address.
ated but meaningful relational totality in which
actors are immersed. Since actors are not viewed
Beyond the Rationalistic Perspective
as necessarily embedded in the world (Dreyfus,
1991; Sandberg & Pinnington, 2009; Yanow & Tsou- The complex nature of judgment has been noted by
kas, 2009), but as atomistic information processors reflective practitioners in management and policy
(Bazerman & Moore, 2009), how a situation appears making (Barnard, 1968; Follett, 1924; Keohane, 2010;
to actors who are already engaged in some way Vickers, 1983, 1984). Indeed, in some of their work
with the world at large is not explored (Sandberg & one finds the beginning of a postrationalist view that
Tsoukas, 2011: 341–346). sees judgment not as an information processing-
Thus, while it is certainly the case that some- cum-problem-solving exercise, but as an inherently
times practitioners show no signs of moral aware- open-ended, mental-cum-bodily activity, involving
ness when handling particular issues (or the re- the sizing up of a situation and the balancing of
verse: moral considerations may dominate other competing priorities. Sir Geoffrey Vickers’ work ex-
concerns), these are simple settings of decision emplifies such an approach, which we briefly dis-
making. A more complex setting is similar to that cuss below.
faced by Olson, namely when practitioners are Vickers, a distinguished UK senior civil servant
simultaneously pulled in different directions, several decades ago, sought to demonstrate the
knowing that they need to find a way of attending inevitability of discretion and, hence, judgment in
to several frames at once (e.g., moral, legal, and the management of human systems. Discussing
business frames; Badaracco, 2002, 2006; Tsoukas & in particular the case of a supplies manger in an
Hatch, 2001; Weick, 2001). If so, the question that industrial plant, Vickers distinguished between
needs to be addressed is how do practically think- two parts in any role practitioners (especially man-
ing agents, embedded in social practices, act in agers) carry out in organizations. First, there is the
complex circumstances, in which the alternatives specifiable part of the role, as is typically de-
available to them are at first not clear, or where the scribed in job descriptions. This part tends to be
situation is not a matter of neatly comparing a explicitly articulated, is measurable, and “is typi-
range of alternatives and making a best choice cal of automatic regulation of a very simple kind”
among them, but is a matter of coming to judgment (Vickers, 1983: 42). The second part of the role, how-
in a way that “does justice” to what the overall ever (the “unspecifiable content of his job,” Vick-
concrete circumstances seem both to “demand” ers, 1983: 43), is fuzzier, involving discretion and
and to “permit”? judgment to effectively carry it out.
Whether we are concerned with the work of a Thus, the supplies manager’s role, notes Vickers
nurse in a neonatal intensive care unit (Klein, (1983: 42), “is much more complex” than any me-
2003), of a firefighter (Klein, 1998), a waiter (Rose, chanical process, since it involves more than
2004), a finance manager (Bhide, 2010), or of a crisis merely balancing flows of materials. For, in order
manager (Allen, 2010), we are essentially con- to do this balancing effectively, the supplies
cerned with the choices practitioners (“quiet lead- manager:
ers”) come to make in circumstances that to a
lesser or greater degree involve ambiguity and the must get good value for his money, yet keep
need to consider alternatives and balance compet- good relations with his suppliers. He must be
2014 Shotter and Tsoukas 229

sensitive to changing nuances in the require- 1991: 26) involved in coming to judgment (Vickers,
ments of the users but only insofar as they 1984: 234 –235).
can be contained within a practicable buying Moreover, postrationalist approaches focus par-
policy. He must try out new supplies and new ticularly on the irreducibility of context and the
suppliers without unduly disturbing unifor- importance of values when practitioners exercise
mity of products and the goodwill of old es- judgment. This is especially clear in those studies
tablished contacts. In these and other ways addressing “wisdom” and “practical intelligence,”
he must reconcile the divergent requirements terms that have increasingly commanded atten-
of disparate, qualitative norms [. . .]. And he tion in management scholarship and have often
must do all this within the overall limitations been synonymously used with “judgment” (Chia &
of the funds available to him and of his own Holt, 2007; Clarke & Holt, 2010; Kessler & Bailey,
and his department’s energy, skill and time 2007; McKenna, Rooney, & Kenworthy, 2013;
(Vickers, 1983: 42). Nonaka & Toyama, 2007; Tenbrunsel & Smith-
Crowe, 2008; Weick, 2001: 365–366). All three con-
In other words, there is more in carrying out a cepts share a Wittgensteinian family resemblance
particular role than meets the eye. Discretion—the insofar as they refer to situations of varying de-
scope and initiative that are difficult to define, but grees of context-dependent equivocality, uncer-
which are, nonetheless, indispensable in any tainty, and moral conflict, causing puzzlement to
job—is ineliminable (Tsoukas, 2005: Chapters 3, those involved as to what would constitute an ef-
12). But what makes the “unspecifiable content” of fective course of action (McKenna, Rooney, & Boal,
a job different from the “specifiable” one? Vickers 2009; Sonenshein, 2007: 1024).
(1983: 43) suggests the following answer: The contextual character of judgment has been
widely acknowledged, even by researchers follow-
The qualitative norms cannot be prescribed, ing a rationalist approach. Thus, according to
as stock limits can be prescribed; nor can the Sternberg, whereas “analytic intelligence” is im-
degree of his success in meeting them be plicated in “relatively familiar decontextualized,
measured, as can the degree of his success in abstract, and often academic kinds of situations”
keeping his stocks within their prescribed (Sternberg, 2000: 641), “practical intelligence,” usu-
limits. [. . .] These norms and his performance ally associated with good judgment, “is called
against them can only be recognized by an upon for highly contextualized situations encoun-
act of judgment; and they are constantly so tered in the normal course of one’s daily life”
appraised by himself, his colleagues (espe- (Sternberg, 2000: 641). Vickers’ (1983, 1984) treatises
cially the users who depend on him for their on judgment, as well as Klein’s (1998) studies of
supplies) and by the manager to whom he is decision making, similarly stress the importance
responsible (Vickers, 1983: 43). of context, which practitioners involved have priv-
ileged access to, and the nuances and importance
And he concludes, by drawing on Jaques (1956): of which need to be properly appreciated. As Vick-
“[W]e are not paid . . . for doing what we are told to ers (1984: 241) remarks, a problem handler, more
do, but for doing rightly that part of our job which than anything else, “needs a ready sense for those
is left to our discretion; and we rate our own and aspects of the situation which are most relevant.”
our fellows’ jobs on our estimate of the weight of Those who have a highly developed ability to ap-
the discretionary element” (Vickers, 1984: 244). praise and handle situational complexity possess,
In other words, the “unspecifiable” part contains notes Vickers (1984: 241), a “heuristic gift” (see also
and sets the scene for what practitioners (and or- Kahneman & Klein, 2009).
ganizations at large) can specify. Judgment in- Moreover, it is commonly acknowledged that in
heres in first, the ineliminability of discretion, and exercising judgment practitioners necessarily
second, in the impossibility of precisely articulat- draw on values (Nonaka & Toyama, 2007). In ap-
ing the character of human activities. The “un- praising a particular situation in order to act, prac-
specifiable” part of a situation needs to be brought titioners inevitably ponder the “right” thing to do;
to specifiable clarity by those involved in it. Al- obtaining information about an issue of concern is
though Vickers does not further explore how this never enough to select a particular course of ac-
may be done, he does suggest the importance of tion. For example, Tichy and Bennis (2007b) discuss
“intramental” (i.e., internal) dialogue (Wertsch, the case of a triage nurse who needs to immedi-
230 Academy of Management Learning & Education June

ately allocate scarce resources in an emergency mains unclear. Below, we briefly discuss why all of
room between two urgent cases: an old man suf- these features matter and need to be included in
fering from cardiac arrest and a pregnant teenage any adequate account of judgment.
girl wounded by a gunshot. The nurse’s choice
will not be a mere matter of information process-
Perception
ing, but also, of values. Who should she give pri-
ority to? What matters most, in conditions of scarce Perception is important insofar as it gives practi-
resources? Medical knowledge is not sufficient to tioners access to a relational and meaningful
make a judgment call, note the authors. An aware- whole, in which the meaning of each part depends
ness of values is also needed to help orient one’s on its relationships with all the other parts. The
judgment (see also Sternberg, 2000: 640; Vickers, very process of perceiving involves a developmen-
1984: 241). For Sternberg, a judgment becomes tal movement from an initial sense of a particular,
“wise” when it is driven by some conception of the undifferentiated whole to a more detailed, differ-
“common good” (see also Antonacopoulou, 2010; entiated situational whole. Perception is not pas-
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 2011: 61). sively receiving already well-articulated represen-
tations from the “outside” and then cognitively
processing (i.e., interpreting) them, but a matter of
DISCUSSION
being in a direct, back-and-forth, dialogical en-
A rationalistic perspective, while rightly acknowl- gagement with the world, depending on the kind of
edging the deliberative feature of judgment, either interest people take in it (Matthews, 2006: 35). Al-
misses out several other critical features of the though not conceptually developed, the beginning
process of coming to judgment (Tenbrunsel & of a nonrationalist approach to perception is al-
Smith-Crowe, 2008: 588) or, to the extent it acknowl- ready discernible in Vickers (1984: 235), when he
edges some of them (such as values and emotions), remarks: “The aspects of the situation which are
has yet to weave them into an integrated account appreciated (reality judgment) and evaluated
that overcomes unnecessary dualisms (e.g., reason (value judgment) are determined by the interest of
vs. emotion, deliberation vs. intuition, moral judg- the judging mind.” In other words, the expectations
ment vs. amoral judgment). To stay close to “the and motivations with which practitioners relate to
logic of practice” (Bourdieu, 1990; Sandberg & their surroundings, step-by-step, shape their per-
Tsoukas, 2011), such an account needs to coher- ceptions (Sonenshein, 2007: 1029).
ently interweave perception, emotions, the “moral
qualities” of the agent (see also Bartunek & Trul-
Emotions
len, 2007: 93; Vickers, 1984: 243), and the use of
language. Judgment is crucially shaped by emotions. Insofar
That all these features are important in coming as perception involves an actor to be in direct
to a judgment is clearly visible in Olson’s case. As contact with a relational, meaningful whole, the
Badaracco makes clear, what Olson thought was mode of engagement with the latter depends on
crucially shaped by what she felt and how she the “mood” of the situation (Dreyfus, 1991: 169 –175;
perceived the entire situation. The courage she Spinosa, Davis, & Glennon, 2014: 1–2) and draws
showed in pursuing the case to conclusion (Rear- out affective responses on the part of the actor. We
don, 2007; Scarre, 2010; Srivastva & Cooperrider, act to the extent we are moved to act (Yanow &
1998) was indicative of her moral qualities as an Tsoukas, 2009). To be practically involved with the
agent. Her handling of this particular case, with all world implies one has developed a certain sensi-
its situational uniqueness, was aided by her hav- bility, a particular orientation that indicates to him
ing handled similar cases in the past, as well as by what matters in his dealing with the world, and
her general understanding of what is fair and just therefore, a certain emotional attunement with it
in human affairs. (Dreyfus, 1991: 168 –175; Frankfurt, 1988). A rational-
However, in rationalistic approaches to judg- ist perspective approaches emotions as contingent
ment, how perception, emotions, and the moral experiences (van de Bos, 2003), downplaying the
qualities of agents, along with the hermeneutical role of emotions as constituting “modes of atten-
process in which agents are involved in making tion” (Sherman, 2000: 325)—namely that emotions
sense of a situation, work to shape the crafting of a are a fundamental part of every way humans are
particular process of coming to a judgment, re- engaged with the world. To the extent we are con-
2014 Shotter and Tsoukas 231

cernfully involved in a particular practice—to the ments matter deeply to the exercise of judgment
extent, that is, what happens in the world matters (Frank, 1988).
to us—we cannot be emotionally neutral. Dealing
with emotions, therefore, is not a contingent expe-
Hermeneutical Processes of Making Sense
rience (although what kind of emotions we have is
contingent on particular circumstances), but some- A special feature of coming to judgment is herme-
thing we are engaged in all the time (Greaves, neutical: the ability to spontaneously grasp the
2010: 64). “physiognomy” of a situation (Polanyi, 1967: 5, 11;
More recently, ethical intuitionism has gained Wittgenstein, 1953: no. 568), namely to effortlessly
currency. It suggests that affective-cum-intuitive relate several situational aspects into a unique
responses to situations precede moral judgment, holistic unity and see it as distinctive, in the same
while more deliberative reasoning is used to way we see each human face as distinct from all
merely rationalize intuitive reactions (Haidt, 2001; others. Indeed, as Nussbaum (1999: 156 –158) points
Sonenshein, 2007; Weaver, Reynolds, & Brown, out, as “concrete universals,” such unique holistic
2014). While such a perspective usefully acknowl- unities can function to help us be “responsive to
edges the constitutive role of emotions, it does so what is there” (158) in the situation of our concern.
at the expense of deliberate reasoning, thus repro- This is emphatically missed in rationalistic ap-
ducing the cognitive–affective split. However, de- proaches: In assuming that we can come to a de-
liberative reasoning need not be used exclusively terminate sense of the particular nature of an in-
to ex post facto justify and rationalize affective determinate circumstance, through an analysis of
responses but, also, to reflectively explore them. it into a unique set of generalized component
But for this to happen, the separation between cog- parts, the unique meaning of a particular circum-
nition and emotions must be challenged. As Dama- stance for us tends to be lost, since general formu-
sio (1994: xix) notes, “feelings are just as cognitive lations “do not contain the particularizing details
as other percepts” (see also Nussbaum, 2001; Solo- of the matter at hand, with which decision must
mon, 1988, 2001, 2003). grapple” (Nussbaum, 1999: 158).
Crucial in structuring this emerging sense is the
disclosive use of language (Spinosa, Flores, &
Dreyfus, 1997)—the possibility of becoming aware
Agents’ Moral Qualities
of the broader context within which our utterances
Vickers (1984: 243) has aptly remarked that the ex- are enunciated. Disclosing the broader context—
ercise of judgment requires certain “moral quali- what Wittgenstein (1981) calls “the whole hurly-
ties” on the part of the individual. As he notes, one burly of human actions, the background against
“could comprehend the situation, . . . could solve which we see an action” (no. 567)—is important,
the problem: but has he the guts to go on trying since it is this that provides the basic distinctions
until he succeeds? Will the mere stress of having to and the fundamental ways of thinking, talking,
try impair his capacity for success?” (Vickers, 1984: and feeling in terms of which experience is spon-
243) and further down, Vickers makes a similar taneously apprehended. Practical reasoners are
point: “no one can exercise good judgment unless tacitly aware of this “background”: Their aware-
he can support both the stress of the office in which ness is, at first, largely “inarticulate” (Taylor, 1991:
the judgment is to be exercised, and the stress of 308) and, when partially articulated, is always sus-
the judgment itself” (op. cit.). “Courage” and “en- ceptible to further development.
durance” are obvious moral qualities associated Thus, the distinction must be drawn between the
with good judgment, notes Vickers (see also Lilius, kind of thinking that we, as adult thinkers, delib-
Worline, Dutton, Kanov, & Maitlis, 2011; Quinn & erately do and the thinking that spontaneously
Worline, 2008; Srivastva & Cooperrider, 1998). But happens within us (without our being aware of it),
one may have them and, yet, be plagued with as a result of our having undergone a particular
important moral weaknesses: one may be con- language-based experience within a social prac-
ceited or prejudiced, for example. One needs to be tice (e.g., the thinking that happens within us as
“sufficiently selfless or sufficiently disciplined to we inwardly search for the “right” word to give
achieve that combination of detachment and com- voice to an experience; or hear a question and
mitment which good judgment demands” (see also begin to intuitively orient ourselves toward an-
Arendt, 1977: 241; Vickers, 1984: 244). Moral senti- swering it; Shotter, 2011). The language-mediated
232 Academy of Management Learning & Education June

thinking that spontaneously occurs within us, as “thrown” (Dreyfus, 1991: 173–174), is, for Aristotle,
we size up the situation confronting us, “sets the the mark of “phronesis” (prudence, practical wis-
scene” for the kind of deliberate thinking that we dom). The exercise of phronesis is no mere intel-
as individuals can then go on to do in that situa- lectual effort but, more crucially, an aspect of
tion. We apprehend the situation not as it alleg- “who” one would like to be (Hartman, 2013; Hurst-
edly is, but as it shows up to us in our particular house, 1999; Sherman, 1989). Through undertaking
mode of engagement with it (Dreyfus, 1991). Each action, a human agent does not merely contribute
new question we can think of asking, or each new to producing something (some “thing”), but also to
move we can contemplate of undertaking, adds acting well—acting in a way that contributes to the
further illumination to what the situation is or can fulfillment of a good life (“eudaimonia”; Beadle &
be for us (Weick, 1995). Moore, 2006; Nussbaum, 2001).
Thus, through deliberate thinking we can be- A good life is a fulfilled life: the life that fulfills
come aware of (a) the broader context within which human needs and goals, namely that enhances
deliberate thinking occurs, and (b) the particularity typically human strengths and addresses charac-
of the situation facing us, through “wandering teristically human weaknesses (Nussbaum, 2001;
around” within the situation, testing possible ways Solomon, 2003). For Aristotle, a good life is a life
in which to describe it in words, while sensing how lived in virtue, since “humans do not get on very
it “talks back” to us (Shotter, 1978). Notice that this well without them [virtues]. Nobody can get on well
is as much a bodily as a mental process—it is a if he lacks courage, and does not have some mea-
hermeneutical process, in which the sense of, or sure of temperance and wisdom . . .” (see also
feeling for, the physiognomy of a particular situa- Bartunek & Trullen, 2007: 92–93; Foot, 1977: 2–3). But
tion gradually emerges, prior to our being able to unlike intellectual virtues (which we can acquire
use language in that situation in a “fitting” repre- by being taught them in classrooms), moral virtues
sentational fashion (Gendlin, 1997). are not acquired by gaining knowledge of gener-
To sum up, it is broadly accepted in manage- alities (though laws, rules, or recipes), for they are
ment studies that judgment is contextual, driven to do with how we relate ourselves to the particular
by appraisal of a situation, and based on values. circumstances we face each time. As Aristotle
At the same time, however, with a few exceptions, (1955: 91–92 or 1103a14-b1⫺1103b125) points out,
judgment tends to be seen mainly in rationalistic anything we have to learn to do in such circum-
terms, so much so that even when its perceptual, stances, we learn “by the actual doing of it: people
affective, value, and interpretive aspects are ac- become builders by building and instrumentalists
knowledged, they are fitted into a contingency by playing instruments. Similarly we become just
framework that underestimates actors’ entwine- by performing just acts, temperate by performing
ment in a meaningful, relational whole, their emo- temperate ones, brave performing brave ones.”
tional attunement, and the hermeneutical engage- Moral virtues are learned in practice.
ment with it, as well as actors’ moral qualities that
are necessarily implicated in its exercise. In the
Poiesis und Praxis: The Technical and the Moral
next section we seek to overcome these weak-
nesses by developing an integrated hermeneutical As Aristotle (1955: 1106b36-1107a2) notes, moral vir-
framework for understanding what is involved in tues, such as courage, temperance, generosity,
coming to a judgment that draws mainly on neo- charity, and so on, are habitual dispositions,
Aristotelian philosophy. namely enduring character traits that enable their
possessor to lead a good life (Bartunek & Trullen,
2007: 93; Crossan, Mazutis, Seijts, & Gandz, 2013:
JUDGMENT AS PHRONESIS
288; Hartman, 2006, 2013; Park & Peterson, 2003;
Although in our everyday lives, we usually come Sherman, 1989). As dispositions, virtues are habits
across situations similar to ones we have encoun- learned in the contexts of social practices (Mac-
tered in the past, any time we are called to act in a Intyre, 1981), and they help mediate between the
particular situation we must do so while appreci- good life at large and the particular choices indi-
ating its uniqueness and, thus, act “for ‘another viduals make (Schwartz & Sharpe, 2006). Being ha-
first time’” (Garfinkel, 1967: 9). The ability to think bitually formed tendencies to adopt one or another
well about what one should try to do in the partic- orientation in relation to a particular circum-
ular circumstances into which one has been stance, virtues are different from crafts (or skills),
2014 Shotter and Tsoukas 233

which are to do with the making of things. For (1955: 66 or 1095a712-29), that the end we aim at in
example, a sculptor, a potter, an architect, or a our actions “is happiness . . . and [we all] identify
pianist is seen as acting more or less skillfully, happiness with living well or doing well. But when
depending on the quality of the products they pro- it comes to saying in what happiness consists,
duce. “The excellence of the product is sufficient opinions differ, and the account given by the gen-
for us to say that the agent acted skilfully,” notes erality of mankind is not at all like that of the
Hughes (2001: 55). wise.”
Virtues, however, are different insofar as it is not Moral virtues, then, are character traits that dis-
so much the quality of the products they lead to pose agents to act habitually in particular ways
that matters, (i.e., whether the craftsperson is truly (Chappel, 2009: 104; Hughes, 2001: 54 –57; Norman,
skillful or not), but whether the actions involved in 1998), not in ways they consciously choose, but in
production are good actions, or not. The moral ways that they can only make themselves aware
worth of a person’s actions is not to be judged in of, indirectly, by imaginatively comparing what
terms of what can be found “within” the actions they are actually doing with their “vision” of who
themselves, but is a matter of the larger scheme of they wish to be. Qua dispositions, moral virtues
things that the actor thinks of his actions as being orient people toward spontaneously emotionally
“contained” within, and as contributing toward. responding to situational events in characteristic
Thus, a person’s action is partly defined in terms of ways that express who they are. Rushing to a hos-
the person’s self-understanding of what she does, pital to visit a good friend who is ill or being
or is trying to do: “[I]f we are to conclude that honest in one’s dealings with a business partner
someone acted virtuously, we need to see not only are examples of virtuous action. In such cases peo-
what she did or said; we need to know how she saw ple do not have to reason their way to action;
what she was doing or saying” (Hughes, 2001: 55; rather, they spontaneously respond to the situation
emphasis added). For example, saying kind words at hand. The virtues “program” them for good ac-
to someone may not necessarily indicate kindness tion. The choices a virtuous agent makes are from
as a desire to manipulate. While production aims among those that his good disposition makes sa-
at creating a product without deliberating about lient to him (Chappel, 2009: 106 –107).
the final end of the process (i.e., without caring
about its overall effect within the rest of the world
Emotions As Evaluative Judgments
at large), actions aim at doing the right thing—
acting in ways that contribute to living a good life Insofar as virtues orient people to what matters in
overall (Reeve, 1995). life, people will approach practical matters affec-
Thus, the point of our practical actions is to be tively (Dreyfus, 1991; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005; Nuss-
found not so much in the immediate consequences baum, 2001; Solomon, 2001, 2003). Emotions blend
to which they lead, as to “whether or not the agent judgments and feelings, and that is why Aristotle
can see what he is doing as making sense from the describes the choices people make as lying on the
point of view of a fulfilled life” (Hughes, 2001: 90). borderline between the intellectual and the “pas-
Indeed, having the power to produce something sional” (Nussbaum, 1999: 170), for our passions re-
does not justify doing so. What is distinctive of veal to us what we care about (Frankfurt, 1998). Our
performing an action (“praxis”) is that one not only emotions reveal judgments concerning what mat-
knows what one is trying to do (one’s end), but also, ters in a situation and how it ought to be re-
one anticipates that one will, at least partly, come sponded to (Nussbaum, 2001; Solomon, 2001). It is
to know what one is doing more clearly in the because a virtuous agent is able to spontaneously
doing of it. Praxis is self-transformative in a deep feel a surge of compassion that she will rush to
sense (Nielsen, 1990, 1993). hospital to see her friend. Or it is because of the
While poiesis (production) aims at going through feelings of guilt he will experience that a business-
various steps to make something, praxis (practical man will refrain from cheating on his business
action) must aim at achieving eudaimonia (well- partner. In game-theoretical language, experi-
being, a fulfilled life). It should be noted that Aris- enced emotions, acquired as habits through being
totle does not tell us that we ought to seek a ful- socialized in a social practice, “alter the payoffs”
filled life (since, for him, our yearning for it seems for those involved (Frank, 1988: 53).
to be a fact of nature), nor does he specify the Emotions are manifested through culturally ap-
content of well-being. All agree, says Aristotle propriate symbolic expressions that display the
234 Academy of Management Learning & Education June

judgments they incorporate (Harre & Gillett, 1994: rational decision. I do not first ask myself what my
146; Stearns, 1995: 37). For example, to feel and response should be, reflect on and assess the sit-
display “contempt” toward top management (Huy, uation, and then decide to become angry. My anger
2011), expresses a judgment of the moral quality of may be entirely immediate and automatic. Never-
the people toward whom the emotion is felt and, theless, my feelings may be rational in the sense
at the same time, displays an act of protest toward that they are sensitive to the real nature of the
the same people. To put it differently, emotions situation” (for a similar, yet of different origins,
are not just general feelings of diffuse arousal but argument from psychology see Haidt, 2001, 2012).
can work to disclose to people what matters to But how might I come to know what the nature of
them in a situation (Nussbaum, 2001; Solomon, an initially bewildering situation actually is, so
2001). As Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008: 575), that I act within it appropriately? Aristotle does not
drawing on Damasio (1994), remark, “Without emo- have any particular advice here other than to point
tions like empathy or shame to draw our attention out that we should have feelings of anger, fear,
to moral issues and highlight the moral imperative generosity, and so on “at the right time on the right
in situations . . . we would not be able to distin- grounds towards the right people for the right mo-
guish the abhorrent from the mundane.” In other tive and in the right way . . .” (Aristotle, 1955: 101 or
words, emotions “are forms of evaluative judg- 1106b 18 –23). He gives us, however, a clue: We
ment” (Nussbaum, 2001: 22). should have these feelings as and when a prudent
While there is an irreducible personal aspect to person (“phronimos”) would have them.
emotions, they are, at the same time, socially It is interesting that Aristotle does not offer a
learned responses since one needs to be trained in general rule as to how to act appropriately but
the context of a social practice (Sandberg & Tsou-
points to exemplary behavior. Since human affairs
kas, 2011; Tsoukas, 2010), in order to pick up the
are so variable, he notes, practical knowledge is
evaluative judgments involved in emotions and to
concerned with particulars— knowing what to do
manifest them in culturally appropriate displays.
in a particular situation—not theoretical univer-
To feel a situation as being of a certain kind (e.g.,
sals. It therefore cannot be acquired by appealing
stressful or dangerous) leads one to apply a certain
to general rules but built up through training in the
linguistic description to it, along with the expecta-
context of social practices, in which practitioners
tion that the situation ought to be responded to in
inductively learn, through particular cases and ex-
a particular manner. The language one applies to
amples, what to feel and how to respond. Through
a situation, the emotions experienced, and the re-
sponses adopted form a hermeneutical loop (Tay- such training by more experienced others, who
lor, 1985a: 71, 1985b: 23), in that the words used have achieved some measure of practical wisdom,
work not only to articulate a circumstance, but to practitioners build up an intuitive sense of when,
express it in the sense that both listeners and and in what form, they should experience certain
speakers are “moved” in the same way— both feelings and how to handle particular situations
come to anticipate each other’s next step (Shotter, (Norman, 1998: 38 –39).
2010, 2011). As concrete universals, moral emotions are vari-
It should be further noted that, for Aristotle, it is able and inexact, escape precise definition and
not only that the cognitive and the affective are codification, and are often only known to us in
inextricably linked, but that emotions can be more terms of vivid exemplars, functioning as “land-
or less rational, in that they can be more or less marks” within the inner landscape of our own lived
appropriate to the situation at hand (Chappel, experiences. It is impossible, for example, to pro-
2009: 104 –111; Hughes, 2001; Norman, 1998: 38; Nuss- vide rules for kindness or courage that apply to all
baum, 1999, 2001). I am irrationally angry if I ex- situations. The choices people make are always
plode because someone accidentally stepped on particular, dealing with the unique features of ev-
my toe in the metro; whereas I am rationally angry ery practical situation they handle. Although peo-
if I become furious when I see a group of adults ple inevitably bring their universal understanding
beating up a child on the street. My feelings of in reading particular situations, by so doing, they
anger are not the result of a calculation but a further refine their understanding of the universal
spontaneous, intuitive reaction to what the situa- itself. Thus, any time we act kindly, courageously,
tion demands. As Norman (1998: 38) remarks, “It is or generously, we refine our understanding of
not that my anger is the product of an independent what “kindness,” “courage” or “generosity” is. In
2014 Shotter and Tsoukas 235

deliberating about the means, we clarify our respond to the catastrophe with the appropriate
values. sympathy. In telling a TV crew “I’d like my life
Practical wisdom crucially involves discerning back” and in appearing on his yacht near the Isle
perception, namely the ability to recognize the sa- of Wight at the height of the crisis (see New York
lient features of a situation (Bartunek & Trullen, Times, 1/9/2012), he fell short of discerning the sa-
2007: 96). Such ability is noninferential and nonde- lient features of the situation at hand—and conse-
ductive, arising from intuitive insight, in people quently, for a while at least, became a deeply
who are directly engaged with the world (Haidt, unpopular figure. His failing to feel and display
2001; Matthews, 2006; Nussbaum, 1999). Such a form the appropriate emotions conveyed a particular
of perception develops through a long process of evaluative judgment of the situation. To put it dif-
experience that develops agents’ resourcefulness ferently, by failing to experience the appropriate
and responsiveness to the particularities of the emotion of sympathy with those who suffered dev-
situations they face (Kahneman & Klein, 2009; astating consequences in the oil spill, Hayward
Klein, 1998, 2003). Perception is discerning when displayed a lack of judgment concerning the sever-
the agent brings herself fully to the situation to feel ity of the situation— he failed to fully grasp what
its contours and its landscape of possibilities. This was at stake. More generally, a perceiver’s claim to
is not a mere intellectual matter. The perceiver is knowledge seems to depend on the extent to which
fully in the world, body and mind, acting on the his entire personality is immersed in the situation
world as well as being acted on by it (Matthews, and the extent to which he is appropriately respon-
2006: 37). sive to it. Lack of emotional engagement reveals
Moreover, concerning exemplary behavior, it is important aspects of one’s character.
not sufficient for an agent to merely imitate the
content of a virtuous person’s action, but to do so
ON LEARNING TO BE A BETTER PRACTICAL
while having the appropriate emotions the situa-
REASONER: PERCEPTION, VIRTUES, AND
tion calls for. “Without feeling, a part of correct
ONTOLOGICAL SKILLS
perception is missing” (Nussbaum, 1999: 170). Ex-
cessive reliance on one’s intellect may impede per- Every particular situation calling for judgment has
ception. As Nussbaum (1999: 173) remarks about some repeatable as well as unique features. Prac-
Creon, the ruler of Thebes in Sophocles’ Antigone, titioners can be guided by past experience but they
it is Creon’s fascination with his role as the new need also to be perceptually alert to contextual
king and his theoretical effort to reduce all human uniqueness. Olson, for example, had handled ha-
concerns to civic well-being that disables him from rassment cases before. She could, therefore, notice
acknowledging even his emotional ties to his son similarities with previous cases and use her expe-
Haemon and, thus, responding more resourcefully rience as a guide. But this case had a unique
to the situation confronting him (i.e., how to recon- configuration too. Millar was the internal rival for
cile the rule of law with the unwritten rules of the her job and had an elevated status both within the
Gods concerning the burial of the dead, in a city hospital and in the community. She had been new
stricken by civil war; Badaracco, 2006: Chapter 8). to her role as a CEO when she turned her attention
Resourceful responsiveness is brought about by an to the case, and her handling of it would “color her
agent’s ability to be moved emotionally by the initial relationship with the hospital staff, its
situation at hand. From an Aristotelian point of board, and, if the matter became public, the local
view, it is not simply that the theoretical attitude community” (Badaracco, 2002: 14). The hospital was
(and the attendant rationalist style of thinking) in financial difficulties. The politics surrounding
needs to be supplemented by the inclusion of emo- the case were complex. And so on. Be that as it
tions, as suggested by most business ethics re- may, the question is how should the uniqueness of
search, but that the intellect can impede discern- the case be grasped by Olson? Or, to put it more
ing perception (Nussbaum, 1999: 173). generally, how may the salient features of a trou-
For example, a leader, such as BP’s CEO at the bling situation be discerned?
time, Tony Hayward, who may have intellectually To address this question, we must continually
known that the oil spill in 2010, the worst oil spill in remind ourselves of what we already know of the
US history that started with an explosion in an oil working of the social world around us from our
rig, killing 11 people, was damaging to many peo- involvements within it and seek to determine how
ple’s lives in the Mexican Gulf, clearly failed to what we already know is distinctively manifested
236 Academy of Management Learning & Education June

in the particular case at hand. What we already interminably) to question each other as to how,
know is partly manifested in our use of language. exactly, we are using our words.
Our ways of using concepts, acquired in the con- But if the situation in question has its own
text of the social practices we have taken part of, unique features, which need to be distinguished
provide us with a capacity for “perceptual cou- and responded to uniquely, then we cannot find
pling” with the world in an open-ended way (Lunt- them out through a language that merely repre-
ley, 2003: 86). We spot similarities and saliencies in sents things already well known to us. We need
the world around us, and are enabled to creatively first to be “introduced” to the situation, so to speak,
adjust to it. This is a skill we pick up very early in to become acquainted with it, to discover “its” role
learning our first language. within the larger field of our activities, to acquire
However, although it is impossible to lift our- some expectations as to how “it” will respond to a
selves out of our immersion into earlier experi- whole range of our actions. In other words, in com-
ences, we can still come to know the character of a ing to know how to bring words to a new situation
particular situation relationally. How? By compar- in a way in which we can be sure that the others
ing and contrasting what-it-feels-like-here with around us will judge as meaning what we intend
what-it-feels-like-there (Weick, 2007: 16 –17), we them to mean, we must hermeneutically “place”
imaginatively move around within the situation at the situation within a whole web of relationships
hand (as Olson did in her explorations in the among the rest of what is known to us. We seem
course of her 2 months of preparations by thinking able to do this by first “entering into” and imagi-
about the present case and relating it to her pre- natively moving around within the situation of our
vious experiences, personal and organizational) concern, and gradually, as we explore it in its
unique details, coming to sense within it both sim-
and express these similarities and differences her-
ilarities to and differences from circumstances ex-
meneutically, both to ourselves and to others.
perienced before—a process which Nussbaum
Notice that in learning our first language, we are
(1999: 169) calls “deliberative imagination.” In such
not just learning a code, a way of putting our
a process, “instead of ascending from particular to
thoughts into words, assuming that our words
general, deliberative imagination links particulars
stand for things (Genova, 1995; Shotter, 2011). A
without dispensing with their particularity” (Nuss-
much more basic process is involved, to do with
baum, 1999: 169).
what Shotter (1984) calls “ontological skills,”
To get back to Olson’s predicament, the process
namely skills at being this or that kind of person
of deliberative imagination was visible in Rebecca
(see also Spinosa et al., 1997). In learning the skill Olson’s handling of the Millar case. As Badaracco
of being an effective language user, we are learn- (2002: 14) makes clear, she “had handled other ha-
ing how to use our utterances in ways in which we rassment complaints at past jobs.” But this case,
can expect others to judge them as meaning what like each other similar case before it, had its own
we intend them to mean. This is crucial. For exam- uniqueness, which she needed to explore. Such an
ple: “How do I know that someone is in doubt?” exploration was no merely intellectual matter. Un-
asks Wittgenstein (1969: §127, §128). “How do I know like her predecessor, Olson was literally moved to
that he uses the words ‘I doubt it’ as I do? From a action partly as a result of empathizing with the
child up I learnt to judge like this. This is judging.” alleged victim. As Badaracco (2002: 14) remarks:
“Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledg- “She also realized that she identified very strongly
ment” (§378). That is, our use of the word “doubt” is with Wermert, even though they had never met.
based on a capacity we have learned to relate Like Wermert, Olson was physically disabled. She
ourselves to a “something” in our surroundings walked with a pronounced limp, the result of a
linguistically, in a certain manner, to distinguish it freak sledding accident when she was a teenager.”
and to describe it as being of an X-type rather than Olson’s process of coming to a judgment as to
as of a Y-type. No wonder that Wittgenstein (1953: how to act was filled with emotions. Millar’s “tran-
§242) remarks: “If language is to be a means of quility” during the investigation “alarmed” her
communication there must be agreement not only (Badaracco, 2002: 15) and made her pursue the mat-
in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in ter with more determination and diligence. One
judgments”—for without such an agreement in afternoon, watching him trying to make small talk
judgments (as to whether an event was, or was not, with one of his alleged victims “gave Olson the
of an X-type), we would be having continually (and creeps” (Badaracco, 2002: 15). “Millar didn’t seem to
2014 Shotter and Tsoukas 237

care what he had done or whether he was being an acutely discriminative sense of the particular
investigated. He seemed to think he was bullet- circumstances in which one must act. What Olson
proof” (Badaracco, 2002: 15). Notice how his per- needed to aim at, then, in her imaginative work
ceived indifference was not merely an observa- prior to the resignation meeting, was not only to
tional datum for Olson, but it was revealing to her, gradually differentiate an overall vague concern
suggesting that he probably did not care about the into an interrelated set of subsidiary concerns—
investigation (possibly because he thought that his with each small part properly related to the larger
elevated status in the company and locally had whole— but to do so in such a way that it all “felt
made him untouchable). That made Olson even right,” that she was not left with any uncomfort-
more determined. able feelings of not having done justice to each
Through handling this particular case, Olson re- small component issue.
alized that she experienced certain feelings for the
first time, and such a realization had an impact on
DISCUSSION: PHRONESIS IN PRACTICE
her— her actions (her praxis) changed her. Al-
though both in college and at work she had been a
competitive person who was viewed by others “as “The virtues are concerned with what we find
direct, forceful, and sometimes harsh,” (Badaracco, difficult.”
2002: 15), in handling this particular case she found
—Thomas Aquinas
herself “growing wary of him [Millar]” (Badaracco,
(cited in Chappel, 2009: 100).
2002: 14), a rather uncharacteristic feeling for her.
Her emotions were complex (Nussbaum, 2001): em- We have argued here that making phronetic
pathy with the alleged victim; a strong desire to do judgments requires deliberative imagination:
the right thing both for Wermert and for the hospi- emotionally responsive attunement to the situation
tal; anger at the board that they chose to keep this at hand; focusing on concrete particulars in such a
allegation from her until she had taken office; and way as to see each one of them as a “something”
wrath at what Millar had done (“he should not just within a larger whole; bringing forth past experi-
be fired, but dragged out of his office and thrown ence to the present context. We can now shed more
into the street,” Badaracco, 2002: 15), coupled with a light on deliberative imagination by approaching
slight fearfulness in his presence. One of the it through Arendt’s (1977: 241) notion of “represen-
things she needed to work on later, when she tative thinking.” According to Arendt, imagination
would tell Millar he had to resign, was on her (Aristotle’s phantasia), is the faculty of represent-
tone of voice. To be effective, her tone needed to be ing in our mind what has appeared in our senses
determined, free of “quavering” (Badaracco, 2002: (Arendt, 1982; see also Nussbaum, 1999: 168). When I
17)—and it was. Awareness of her complex emo- look at a specific slum dwelling, notes Arendt (cited
tions enabled her to work on herself—to develop in Beiner, 1982: 108), “I perceive [in it] the general
further her determination. The latter was reflected notion, which it does not exhibit directly, the notion
in how she announced her decision to Millar. Un- of poverty and misery. I arrive at this notion by rep-
like Hayward, Olson acted the way she did be- resenting to myself how I would feel if I had to live
cause she was able to develop (and work on) ap- there . . . .” Representative thinking, thus, involves
propriate feelings towards the situation. Her style enlarging one’s perspective to take into account the
of communication, its relational tone, was an inte- viewpoints of others (Keohane, 2010: 89).
gral part of what she was trying to do. In other words, we try to imagine what it would
In short, Olson’s moral qualities and her sensi- be to feel like in someone else’s place and experi-
tivity to her own unfolding emotional experiences ence a particular situation (“I can imagine how I
enabled her to engage in “perceptual coupling” would feel and think if I were in their place,” Ar-
(Luntley, 2003: 86) with the environment around her, endt, 1977: 241). By doing so, we enlarge our men-
thus making it possible for her to single out with tality but, at the same time, as Arendt (1977: 242)
clarity the salient features of the situation. Olson’s notes, an important “condition for this exertion of
handling of the case reminds us that past experi- the imagination is disinterestedness, the libera-
ences are recalled and compared (related) with tion from one’s own private interests.” Business
present concerns, since the task involves fashion- ethics researchers have usefully pointed out the
ing not simply a logical schema within which to likely cognitive biases, emotional traps, situa-
calculate a possible line of action, but to arrive at tional conditions, and social forces that tend to
238 Academy of Management Learning & Education June

undermine such “disinterestedness” (Bazerman & (rationalizing) role compared to intuition, but as
Gino, 2012; Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). substantially shaping the particular action ad-
Keohane (2010: 88) remarks that phronetic judg- opted. An Aristotelian perspective makes it possi-
ment has “an inner core,” which “has more to do ble to see both intuition and deliberation as con-
with a person’s innate reactions than with intellec- tributing to moral judgment, each in its own way.
tual dexterity.” An Aristotelian account of judg- In so far as virtues (as habitual dispositions) orient
ment as practical wisdom helps us shed light on actors to do what is required to achieve eudaimo-
these “innate reactions,” by stressing the sponta- nia, actors are presented with a limited set of op-
neous action that virtuous agents undertake in tions for action. Those options are intuitively
each case they face. Spontaneous action involves (spontaneously) generated by what the virtues dis-
emotional attunement with the particular case in a close to the actors involved. However, which option
way that makes discerning perception possible. an actor will choose depends on his or her delib-
Deliberation, then, builds on what emotional re- erative imagination. In short, the virtues disclose
sponsiveness has disclosed as being important. what is intuitively available, while deliberation
An agent’s virtues, developed as dispositions to do works on it.
what is required to live well (i.e., live a fulfilled The simultaneous presence of intuition and de-
life), “program” agents for good action as the situ- liberation is clearly visible in the case of Rebecca
ation demands (Chappel, 2009: 105). As Chappel Olson. Not for one moment did she contemplate not
(2009: 102) remarks, dispositions such as courage, dealing with the harassment case personally. She
generosity, fairness, and so on, are to living well thought of her predecessor’s refusal to get in-
as dispositions, such as strength, speed, and so on, volved, since he allegedly wouldn’t be able to see
are to playing tennis well. You need the former the issue through to the end, as “simply a cop-out”
dispositions to live a good life, as you need the (Badaracco, 2002: 14). She intuitively identified
latter to excel as a tennis player. with the alleged victim, and she spontaneously
Thus, the scope of a virtuous agent’s delibera- saw the allegation as the likely abuse of a power-
tion is narrower than what the ethical rationalist less female employee by a powerful male man-
envisages. The virtuous agent does not reason her ager. She saw her role as that of the guardian of
way to action, by way of searching for and com- organizational justice, but she needed to deliber-
paring all possible alternatives until she finds the ate between a small range of alternatives to deter-
best. Rather, she deliberates between a narrow mine what to do, and how to do it, should Millar be
range of alternatives that her disposition has proven guilty.
made available to her. As Chappel (2009: 107) Olson kept an open mind— hermeneutical inqui-
notes, “a person who has a virtue will make his ries are always open to further development. Thus,
choices between the options that the virtue makes she asked the hospital’s lawyer for an independent
salient to him.” The moral sentiments included in collection and assessment of evidence. She ac-
the virtues act as a “mental module” by preselect- knowledged Millar’s “many years of service to the
ing which possibilities will be made available for hospital” (Badaracco, 2002: 16), but she was also
deliberation (Chappel, 2009: 108; Frank, 1988). In determined to deliver justice. She did not allow her
other words, virtues as ontological skills orient slight intimidation by Millar to dominate her feel-
agents to the world— disclose to them “where” ings, showing courage throughout. Her virtues—
they are and what matters to them “there,” thus her dispositions to do the right thing— oriented her
compelling agents to act from within a range of in a particular way to pay attention to the salient
actually available possibilities. features of the case, unlike with had happened
Even as the scope of a virtuous agent’s deliber- with BP’s Tony Hayward. Olson’s attention to the
ation is narrower than what the ethical rationalist many relevant details was not a mere intellectual
envisages, it is also broader than what the ethical matter, but an emotional attunement with the
intuitionist imagines. Intuitionist models suggest situation that disclosed to her what mattered
that moral judgment is noninferential, noncon- within it.
scious and automatic, and that deliberation is post In the deliberative imaginative work Rebecca
hoc, used to merely rationalize or justify moral Olson did during her 2 months of preparations, she
intuition (Haidt, 2001, 2012; Sonenshein, 2007; would have been, we suggest, carrying out three
Weaver, Reynolds, & Brown, 2014). However, delib- major perceptual processes: first, she would have
eration need not be seen as having a marginal been hermeneutically linking particular with par-
2014 Shotter and Tsoukas 239

ticular to come to an overall sense of the circum- baum, 1999: 152). For each “trajectory” leads us—
stances she now faced. Second, in the course of depending on how we articulate it in words fitting
this, she would have been measuring the features to its contours—to “look out” toward our surround-
of this present circumstance up against her past ings with the particular expectations of perceiving,
experiences of similar such difficulties, comparing not only certain features, but also their expected
and contrasting them to arrive at a more differen- development; and it is only when our expectations
tiated sense of the Millar case in terms of similar- are satisfied to a sufficient degree of felt confi-
ities familiar to her and, crucially, departures from dence that we can feel able to justify ourselves in
them. And third, while in the course of all this, as taking a next step.
an effective language user, she would have con- Finally, it should be noted that although, by our
tinually been trying to fit words to the shape of her account, Olson acted prudently in this case, the
experiences, and to their future implications— long-term outcome was not necessarily what she
words that she judges others will judge as mean- had envisaged. Millar was pushed to resign and
ing what she intends them to mean. everyone was happy for a short while, but the
In doing this, more than bringing an articulate crisis was not over. About a month after Millar had
understanding to the at-first-unspecified aspects gone, a local newspaper published an article
of the Millar case, Olson will have aimed at con- about “his unfair treatment by St. Clement’s Hos-
structing an overall context within which to get a pital” (Badaracco, 2002: 18), followed by several
felt sense (not simply to think) of a possible ethi- letters written from Millar’s allies criticizing Olson
cally and politically good trajectory through the and the hospital board. As if this was not enough,
landscape of the circumstances facing her—a felt Olson was harassed (through receiving threaten-
sense in which she had some confidence in expect- ing phone calls at home late at night and having a
ing many of the concerned others to share. In that rock thrown through a window of her home), while
landscape there was a place for the overall con- a few board members, “continued to speak approv-
cerns of the hospital, the other “players” in the ingly of Millar and several of them remained dis-
issue, Olson’s concern for her career and future tant and unfriendly to Olson” (Badaracco, 2002: 18).
reputation, and so on—all the small nuances that As Olson’s continuing trouble shows, phronetic
“do justice” to the detailed perception she brings to judgment that leads to moral action is not neces-
the situation. In doing this, Olson drew together sarily a simple and lineal process; it is not an
her knowledge of people in general— of what mat- independent variable that impacts on a dependent
ters to them and how they respond to events—as variable, nor the “solution” to a riddle. As argued
well as her knowledge of those in this particular earlier, the exercise of phronesis is an aspect of
situation. Along with her knowledge of what is who one wants to be. Moreover, the exercise of
judged in general as right and fair in such situa- judgment is a dynamic process—problems do not
tions, she needed to figure out what people’s judg- necessarily go away when addressed but may re-
ments were likely to be in this situation. cur in a different shape, and one needs to be alert
Although the process of coming to a judgment as well as determined to handle the entire unfold-
may seem to involve a process like calculation and ing process. Although Olson perhaps should have
“decision making” (in which options are compared anticipated some problems of that kind (revenge,
and the best chosen), if we are correct in our sug- after all, is a powerful human motive), her partic-
gestions above, this is not the case (see Weick, ular judgment in showing Millar the door was no
1995: 15, 1996). The “inner scales of measurement” less prudent because of the trouble she subse-
we imaginatively construct for ourselves—in quently experienced. Her judgment was rooted in
which we compare and contrast what is already common sense (i.e., in the intersubjective world
known to us from our past experiences with what agents share) and was, therefore, intelligible to
we seem now in particular to be facing—are not others in the same situation as her, seeking to
measurable in quantitative terms (Nussbaum, satisfy “an imagined community of potential col-
1999: 149 –154). Although seemingly more vague if locutors that a particular has been adequately ap-
seen in qualitative terms, each “inner scale” we praised” (Beiner, 1982: 120). Acting virtuously was
construct, each possible “trajectory,” is in fact (in important and “sufficient” in itself.
relation to the political and ethical issues in- As discussed earlier, unlike production, action
volved), more distinct and precise than any scale aims at doing the right thing—acting in a way that
formulated in general, numerical terms (Nuss- makes sense from the perspective of a fulfilled life.
240 Academy of Management Learning & Education June

Being alert to the unintended effects of one’s ac- guided, moment-by-moment, by contingent sens-
tions does not alter the character of moral action ings as each new step brings us into new circum-
but, on the contrary, should make one more deter- stances, where pre-established rules or recipes
mined, perceptive, and agile in facing the compli- cannot, in principle, apply. Phronesis is knowing
cations one is presented with along the way. Phr- how to arrive at a judgment, not in relation to
onetic judgment does not necessarily “solve” general circumstances, but in relation to particu-
problems, once and for all, so much as orienting lars, “because it is concerned with conduct, and
one to how problems might “best” be handled on conduct has its sphere in particular circum-
an ongoing basis—for often, as several interna- stances” (Aristotle, 1955: 213).
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John Shotter is Emeritus Professor of Communication in the Department of Communication,

University of New Hampshire, and a Research Associate, Centre for Philosophy of Natural and
Social Science (CPNSS), London School of Economics, London. He is the author of Social
Accountability and Selfhood (Blackwell, 1984); Cultural Politics of Everyday Life: Social Con-
structionism, Rhetoric, and Knowing of the Third Kind (Open University, 1993); Conversational
Realities: The Construction of Life through Language (Sage, 1993); Conversational Realities
Revisisted: Life, Language, Body, and World (Taos Publications, 2009); and Getting It:
‘Withness’-Thinking and the Dialogical . . . in Practice (Hampton Press, 2011).

Haridimos Tsoukas (www.htsoukas.com) holds the Columbia Ship Management Chair in

strategic management at the Department of Business and Public Administration, University of
Cyprus, and is a Distinguished Research Environment Professor of Organization Studies at
Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, UK. Tsoukas was the editor-in-chief of
Organization Studies (2003–2008) and is the cofounder and co-organizer of the International
Symposium on Process Organization Studies, and coeditor of the series Perspectives on
Process Organization Studies, Oxford University Press (both with Ann Langley). He is the
author of Complex Knowledge: Studies in Organizational Epistemology (Oxford University
Press, 2005). His research interests include knowledge-based perspectives on organizations
and management; organizational becoming; practical reason in management and policy
studies; and metatheoretical issues in organizational and management research.

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