2. Panaguiton v DOJ, GR No.

167571, 25 November 2008

FACTS: Cawili borrowed various sums of money from the petitioner. Cawili and his business associate,
Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three checks which bear the signature of both in payment of
the said loans. Upon presentment for payment, the checks were dishonored. Petitioner, Panaguiton,
made demands but to no avail and so he filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.

During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.
Tongson alleged that he himself filed some complaints against Cawili and they are not associates.
Panaguiton showed documents proving the signatures of Tongson to strengthen his complaint against
Tongson. In a resolution, City Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the
charges against Tongson.

A case was filed against Cawili before the proper court but the petitioner filed a partial appeal
before the Department of Justice. The Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the
questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation.

Assistant City Prosecutor Sampaga dismissed the complaint against Tongson since the offense
had already prescribed. An appeal by Panaguiton to the Department of Justice thru Undersecretary
Manuel A.J. Teehankee was dismissed. But on motion for reconsideration, Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas
N. Gutierrez declared that the offense had not prescribed. On motion for reconsideration, this time by
Tongson, DOJ reversed and held that the offense had already prescribed.

Issue:

Whether or not the offense has prescribed as Act No. 3326 applies to violation of special acts and
that Act No. 3326 states that prescription shall be interrupted when judicial proceedings are instituted.

Held:

SC agreed that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22
merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a
fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the
commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof. Nevertheless, SC cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the
running of the prescriptive period.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed, preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, “institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment,” and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a
complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the
offense is halted.

The court ruled and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor signified the commencement of the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period
for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of
probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to
the filing of the information against petitioner.
 3. Zaldivia v. Reyes, GR No. 102342,03 July 1992

Words in a statute should be read in relation to and not in isolation from the rest of the measure, to
discover the true legislative intent.
Facts:
               Zaldivia was charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without Mayor’s permit in violation
of Ordinance No. 2 Series of 1988 of the Municipality of Rodriguez in the Province of Rizal. An information
was filed with the MTC of Rodriguez. Zaldivia moved to quash the information on the ground that the
crime had prescribed, invoking that under Act No. 3326, violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall
prescribe after two months from the commission of the offense governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure. The prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, saying that Rule 110, Section 1, last paragraph of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that “in all cases such institution interrupts the period of
the prescription of the offense charged,” applies to all cases including those falling under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
Issue:
               Whether the phrase, “in all cases such institution interrupts the period of the prescription of the
offense charged” applies to cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure
Ruling:
No
Rule 110, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure meaningfully begins with the phrase, “for
offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases,” which plainly signifies that the
section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase “in all cases”
appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those
offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are
violations of municipal or city ordinances, the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a
municipal ordinance, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110. If there is a conflict between
the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former
should prevail as special law. And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, is not allowed to “diminish, increase or modify substantive rights” under Article VIII, Section 5(5)
of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.

The prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the
penalty cannot exceed six months, and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. The
prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the Zaldivia commenced from its alleged commission on May
11, 1990, and ended two months after, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It
was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30,
1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period
was the filing of the information with the MTC of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990,
after the crime had already prescribed.
 4. Jadewell Parking v. Judge Lidua, GR No. 169588, 07 October 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to
operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also
authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its
wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.

Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru its General Manager Norma Tan and
Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on
May 17, 2003, the respondents Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and
carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624
owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and unattended at a Loading and
Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed with
a piece of metal is P26,250.00. The fines of P500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of P500.00
were also not paid by the respondents herein.

Jadewell filed two cases against respondents for Robbery it was filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003.
Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four
(4) of Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion.

On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
Baguio City dated July 25, 2003.

Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino
filed on January 20, 2004 a Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation[8] on February 2, 2004.

In an Order[10] dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and
dismissed the cases. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the
February 10, 2004 Order.

Respondents argued that in Zaldivia v. Reyes held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of
Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings. Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of
the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive
period commenced from the alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two
months after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October
2, 2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the cases.

The RTC of Baguio City, Branch 7 favored the respondents. In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the
RTC of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari.

Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.

ISSUE:

Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the
prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John
Does," and "Peter Does."

HELD:

The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules
governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as
amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and
municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not
provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.

In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, this Court defined the parameters of prescription: In resolving the issue of
prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for
the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive
period was interrupted.

With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense
charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.

The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the
same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.

As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was
correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes. In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal
ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the
offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the
Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.

Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly
in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree
that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he
wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not
the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date
before that.

Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then
files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period.

Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period
had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the
dismissal of the case against respondents. According to the Department of Justice National Prosecutors
Service Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as: SEC. 5. Information. -
An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor
signing the same.
 5. People v. Mateo Lee, GR No. 234618, 16 September 2019

ISSUE: whether the filing of the complaint against the respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman
for the purpose of preliminary investigation halted the running of the prescriptive period.

RULING:

In reversing the CA’s decision, We emphatically ruled that “(t)here is no more distinction
between cases under the RPC (Revised Penal Code) and those covered by special laws with respect to the
interruption of the period of prescription” and reiterated that the period of prescription is interrupted by
the filing of the complaint before the fiscal’s office for purposes of preliminary investigation against the
accused.

In the case at bar, it was clear that the filing of the complaint against the respondent with the
Office of the Ombudsman on April 1, 2014 effectively tolled the running of the period of prescription.
Thus, the filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan on March 21, 2017, for unlawful acts
allegedly committed on February 14, 2013 to March 20, 2014, is well within the three (3)-year prescriptive
period of R.A. No. 7877. The court a quo’s  reliance on the case of Jadewell v. Judge Nelson Lidua, Sr., [13] is
misplaced. Jadewell  presents a different factual milieu as the issue involved therein was the prescriptive
period for violation of a city ordinance, unlike here as well as in the Pangilinan and other above-
mentioned related cases, where the issue refers to prescription of actions pertaining to violation of a
special law. For sure, Jadewell did not abandon the doctrine in Pangilinan as the former even
acknowledged existing jurisprudence which holds that the filing of complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor tolls the running of the prescriptive period.

G.R. No. 234618, September 16, 2019 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MATEO A. LEE, JR., RESPONDENT.

As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.

There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the
Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to
run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the
judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.

According to the Department of Justice – National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors,

However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is
interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court.
 [Link] v People, GR no. 220054, 27 March 2014

FACTS:
 The city prosecutor filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43 four (4)
Informations for grave oral defamation against Deogracia M. Valderrama (Valderrama), pursuant to a
complaint filed by Josephine ABL Vigden (Vigden).
 During the trial on April 12, 2012, Vigden was present but the private prosecutor was absent despite
notice. On motion of the defense, the Metropolitan Trial Court considered the prosecution to have
waived its right to present further evidence and required a formal offer of its documentary evidence
within five (5) days. The prosecution failed to formally offer its evidence within five (5) days from the
hearing.
 Valderrama filed an opposition arguing that the public prosecutor did not give his conformity to
Vigden's Motion to Reconsider, in violation of Rule 110, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, and the
Motion to Reconsider's Notice of Hearing "was defective because it was not addressed to the parties,
and did not specify the date and time of the hearing."
 She further argued that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period allowed for motions for
reconsideration.
 She likewise pointed out that there was no medical certificate attached to the Motion to Reconsider
to prove the private prosecutor's sickness. Finally, she contended that the eight (8)-year delay in the
prosecution of the cases violated Valderrama's right to speedy trial.
 the Metropolitan Trial Court granted Vigden's Motion to Reconsider and set the continuation of the
prosecution's presentation of further evidence for the last time on November 22, 2012
 Valderrama moved to have the July 16,2012 Order reconsidered. The Metropolitan Trial Court
denied reconsideration
 Valderrama filed a petition for certiorari  but the Regional Trial Court found no grave abuse of
discretion by the lower court and dismissed the petition for certiorari
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court 
 Hence, Valderrama filed this Petition praying for the reversal of the ruling of the Court of Appeals
and the annulment of the Metropolitan Trial Court Orders dated July 16, 2012 and August 31, 2012.
 argues that the Metropolitan Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting
the patently defective Motion to Reconsider. She contends that the Motion to Reconsider
violated procedural rules and its grant was not a mere error of judgment
 Vigden filed a Comment to the Petition contending that there is no violation of law or procedural
rule or any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial courts as both the parties were granted
their day in court.
 The Office of the Solicitor General posits that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed that no grave
abuse of discretion was committed in allowing the prosecution to continue its presentation of
evidence. It claims that there was no showing that the relaxation of the procedural rules was
exercised arbitrarily, whimsically, or motivated by ill will.

ISSUE: whether the Metropolitan Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
the Motion to Reconsider to allow the prosecution to continue its presentation of evidence.

RULING:
We grant the Petition. The respondent's Motion to Reconsider was fatally defective and
should have been denied by the Metropolitan Trial Court.

In this case, there is no conformity from the public prosecutor. This circumstance was not
denied by the private respondent. Private respondent merely claimed that the the Office of the City
Prosecutor did not object to the filing of the Motion to Reconsider. The Office of the City Prosecutor
was only furnished with a copy of the Motion to Reconsider and it opens with the phrase "[p]rivate
complaining witness, through counsel and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, and to this
Honorable Court respectfully states . . ." This is not sufficient. Since the Motion to Reconsider pertains
to the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, it involves the criminal aspect of the case and,
thus, cannot be considered without the public prosecutor's conforme.

Since Vigden’s MR was laden with procedural defects, the MTC acted with grave abused of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, its orders should be declared void.
 [Link] v. Ayco, AM No. RTJ-05-1944, 13 December 2005

SUMMARY
Judge Roberto L. Ayco of the RTC of South Cotabato allowed the defense in a criminal
case to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of
State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case. State Prosecutor Pinote was at
that time undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City. On the
subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case, Pinote refused to cross-examine the two
defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, maintaining that prior proceedings
conducted in his absence were void. Judge Ayco considered the prosecution to have waived its
right to cross-examine the two defense witnesses. Hence, arose the present administrative
complaint lodged by Pinote against Judge Ayco for “Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of
Authority and Serious Misconduct.”

DOCTRINE GENERAL RULE:

All criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the public
prosecutor. o If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there
are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the
Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the
approval of the court. o Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute
the case until the termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the
authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.

RELEVANT PROVISION(S) 
Sec. 5., Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure. Who must prosecute criminal action. – All
criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of a public prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public
prosecutor or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be
authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to
prosecute the case subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the
criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to end of the trial
even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise
withdrawn.

FACTS 
 Judge Ayco allowed the defense in People v. Vice Mayor Salvador to present evidence consisting of
the testimony of two witnesses even in the absence of State Prosecutor Pinote who was prosecuting
the case.
 Pinote was undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center, hence his absence.  On
the subsequent hearings, he refused to cross-examine the two defense witnesses despite being
ordered by the judge, he maintaining that the proceedings conducted in his absence were void.
 Judge considered the prosecution to have waived it right to cross examine. (,MANIFESTATION)
 Hence, an administrative complaint was lodged by Pinote against Ayco. 
 RESPONDENT JUDGE: Considering the prosecution to have waived presenting evidence, respondent
justifies the same on complainant’s failure to formally offer the evidence for the prosecution despite
several extensions of time granted for the purpose. o No substantial prejudice was suffered by the
prosecution for complainant was permitted to cross examine the two defense witnesses but he
refused to do so. 
 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR: Finds respondent to have breached Sec. 5, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure and accordingly recommends that he be reprimanded therefor,
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE(S)/HELD WON: Judge Ayco violated the Rules on Criminal Procedure for allowing the
defense to present evidence in the absence of a prosecutor – YES. 

As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction
of the public prosecutor. If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in
case there are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the
Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case,
subject to the approval of the court. o Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue
to prosecute the case until the termination of the trial even in the absence of a public
prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn. 
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and
not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on
 this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to
protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the
bedrock of peace of the people.

Respondent’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of
complainant public prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is thus a clear
transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to
cross-examine the witnesses.

Respondent’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no
matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process,
so is the State.

Respondent’s lament about complainant’s failure to inform the court of his inability to attend the
August 13 and 20, 2004 hearings or to file a motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently file a
motion for reconsideration of his Orders allowing the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates
may be mitigating. It does not absolve respondent of his utter disregard of the Rules.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Roberto L. Ayco is hereby ordered to pay a fine FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (₱5,000.00) with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
 9. Jona Bumatay v Lolita Bumatay, GR No. 191320, 25 April 2017

 
Rules of Court: Rule110 Section 5
Section 5.
 Who must prosecute criminal actions.
—
 All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when
the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended party, any peac eofficer, or
public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority
cease upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court.
(This Section was repealed by A.M. No. 02-2-07-SCe effective May 1, 2002)
 The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including the guilty parties, if both alive, nor, in any case, if the offended party has consented to the
offense or pardoned the [Link] offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall
not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents or
guardian, nor,in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by any of them. If the offended
party dies or becomes incapacitated before she can file the complaint, and she has no known parents,
grandparents or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her [Link] offended party,
even if a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution of the offenses of seduction, abduction and acts
of lasciviousness independently of her parents,grandparents, or guardian, unless she is incompetent or
incapable of doing so. Where the offended party, who is a minor, fails to file the complaint, her parents,
grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The right to file the action granted to parents, grandparents
or guardian shall be exclusive of all other persons and shall be exercised successively in the  order herein
provided, except as stated in the preceding [Link] criminal action for defamation which consists in
the imputation of the offenses mentioned above shall be brought except at the instance of and upon
complaint filed by the offended party. The prosecution for violation of special laws shall be governed by
the provisions thereof.

FACTS
 Lolita allegedly married a certain Amado Rosete (Amado) on January 30,1968, when she was 16
years old.
 Prior to the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Amado onSeptember 20, 2005,  Lolita married
Jona's foster father, Jose Bumatay(Jose), on November 6, 2003.
 Jona filed a Complaint-affidavit for Bigamy against Lolita, stating that on November 6, 2003, while
Lolita’s husband Amado Rosete was still alive and her marriage with him was valid and subsisting,
Lolita contracted another marriage with Jose M. Bumatay.
 When Lolita contracted her second marriage with Jose Bumatay, she knows fully well that her first
marriage with her first husband Mr. Amado Rosete, who is still living up to today, has not been
legally dissolved but existing. 
 In her Counter-Affidavit, Lolita claims that she learned from her children (with Amado) that Amado
had filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage. Sometime in 1990, she was informed
by her children that Amado had died in Nueva Vizcaya.
 Subsequently, an Information for Bigamy was filed by Prosecutor Valdez of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan. The Proceedings before the RTC- Dagupan City on Lolita's
Petition for Declaration of Nullity.
 After the Information for Bigamy against Lolita was filed in the RTC-San Carlos but before her
arraignment, Lolita filed with the RTC of Dagupan City apetition for the declaration of nullity of  her
marriage to Amado.
 September 20, 2005, the RTC-Dagupan City issued a Decision declaring as null and void the marriage
between Lolita and Amado.
 the RTC-Dagupan City found that no marriage ceremony took place between Lolita and Amado as it
was Lolita's sister who had married Amado and that, in fact, the signature appearing on the marriage
certificate was not Lolita's signature but tha tof her sister's.
 Their marriage was void from the very [Link] Bigamy Proceedings before the RTC-San Carlos.
 November 2, 2005, she filed a Motion to Quash the Information. Her motion was hinged on the
argument that the first element of the crime of bigamy - that is, that the offender has been
previously legally married- is not present.
 Lolita attached a copy of the RTC-Dagupan City Decision declaring the marriage between her and
Amado void ab initio.
 RTC-San Carlos granted Lolita’s Motion to Quash and dismissed the complaint for bigamy.
 CA affirmed the RTC-San Carlos' Order granting the Motion to Quash and dismissed Jona's appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Jona Bumatay has the legal capacity to sue Lolita in a Criminal Case of Bigamy? - NO

HELD/RATIO
It appears undisputed that Jona has no legal personality to assail the dismissal ofthe criminal
case.
 
Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, dictates that all criminal actions
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a
public prosecutor. In appeals of criminal casesbefore the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the
State is vested solely inthe Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
 
In criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest and only the OSG can represent the
People in criminal proceedings before this Court. Inasmuch as the private offended party is but a witness
in the prosecution of offenses, the interest of the private offended party is limited only to the aspect of
civil liability. It follows therefore that in criminal cases, the dismissal of the case against an accused can
only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.

Jona's personality to even institute the bigamy case and thereafter to appeal the RTC-San
Carlos' Order dismissing the same is nebulous, at best. Settled is the rule that "every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest[,]" who, in turn, is one "who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the
suit."[56] Within this context, "interest" means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. [57] To be
clear, real interest refers to a present substantial interest, and not a mere expectancy, or a future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.

Here, the record is replete with indications that Jona's natural parents are unknown and she was
merely raised as the "foster daughter" of Jose Bumatay, without having undergone the process of legal
adoption. It likewise does not escape the Court's attention that in the Petition for the Issuance of Letters
of Administration filed by Rodelio Bumatay (Jose Bumatay's nephew), Jona was described as "claiming to
be the adopted [child] of [Jose] but cannot present legal proof to this effect". Finally, even in her
own Reply (to the comment to the petition for review), Jona merely denotes herself as "the only child of
the late Jose Bumatay,"[63] without, however, presenting or even indicating any document or proof to
support her claim of personality or legal standing.
 10. Lee Pue Liong v. Chua Pue Chin Lee, GR No. 181658, 07 August 2013

Facts:
 Petitioner executed a duly notarized affidavit of loss of certificate of title;
 The Respondent accused the Petitioner for the crime of perjury for executing the said affidavit of loss
because the said title was in his possession, for her capacity as corporate secretary and custodian of
documents; City prosecutor filed information before the MeTC for the case of perjury based on the
Complaint of Respondent;
 Atty. Augusto M. Macam appeared as counsel for respondent and as private prosecutor with the
consent and under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor;
 Petitioner’s counsel moved in open court that respondent and her lawyer in this case should be
excluded from participating in the case since perjury is a public offense; Further, the offense of
perjury is a crime against public interest where the offended party is the State alone;
 Said motion was denied by the MeTC; Likewise, the MR was denied;
 Petitioner sought relief from the CA via a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order; The CA declared that respondent’s
property rights and interests as the treasurer and a stockholder of CHI were disturbed and/or
threatened by the alleged acts of petitioner; Petitioner filed MR but denied by the CA; and,
 Hence, this Petition.

Issue/s: Whether the private respondent may intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case

Ruling:

The petition has no merit.

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law
that “[e]very person criminally liable x x x is also civilly liable.”42 Underlying this legal principle is the
traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in
which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual
member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission. 43cralaw virtualaw library

Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—(a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private prosecutor is allowed
under Section 16 of Rule 110:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.—Where the civil action
for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines an offended party
as “the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed.” In Garcia v. Court of
Appeals,44 this Court rejected petitioner’s theory that it is only the State which is the offended party in
public offenses like bigamy. We explained that from the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is
the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender
is civilly liable is the offended party.

In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,45 we also held that

Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended
party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property
 was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused,
or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained
of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject
matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to
recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the
accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not
be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be
personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some
third and unrelated party.46 (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering CHI’s
property and its loss through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to
respondent’s personal credibility and reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the duties and
responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the corporation itself is
likewise undeniable as the court-ordered issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was only
averted by respondent’s timely discovery of the case filed by petitioner in the RTC.

Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the
MeTC, this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco,47 cited by both MeTC and CA, that
whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the
intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private
prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right
reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the
civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention,
moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor. 48cralaw virtualaw library