UNIVERSITY OF PERPETUAL HELP SYSTEM LAGUNA

COLLEGE OF LAW

CRIMINAL LAW 1
CASE DIGEST

Submitted by: John Kayle C. Borja

Submitted to: Fiscal Francis B. Reyes
 UNIVERSITY OF PERPETUAL HELP SYSTEM LAGUNA
COLLEGE OF LAW

Table of Contents

Case 1: The United States vs. Ah Chong

Case 2: People of the Philippines vs. Po3 Armando Dalag
Case 3: People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta
Case 4: People of the Philippine Island vs Juan Quianzon
Case 5: People of the Philippines vs. Jaime Tomotorgo
Case 6: United States vs Filomeno Marasigan
Case 7: People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Piamonte, et al,.
Case 8: Filomeno Urbana vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case 9: People of the Philippines vs. Andres Ancasan
Case 10: Sulpicio Intod vs. Court of Appeals
 UNIVERSITY OF PERPETUAL HELP SYSTEM LAGUNA
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THE UNITED STATES vs. AH CHONG

G.R. No. L-5272 | March 19, 1910
Carson, J.

Facts:
Ah Chong, the defendant, worked as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley,
Rizal Province, and Pascual Gualberto, the deceased, worked as a house boy or muchacho
therein. "Officers' quarters No. 27" is a detached home located about 40 meters from the next
structure and was used only as an officers' mess or club in August of 1908. Only the two servants
slept in the house, who shared a small room toward the back of the structure, the door to which
opened into a narrow porch running along the side of the building, via which connection with the
rest of the house was possible.
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of
the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of
security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of
reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the
night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in
bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at
the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room.
The room was very dark because of the heavy growth of vines at the front of the porch, and the
defendant, fearful that the visitor was a robber or thief, leapt to his feet and shouted out. "I will
kill you if you enter the room." He was struck slightly above the knee by the edge of the chair
that had been propped against the door at that precise moment. The defendant believed the blow
was delivered by the person who had forced the door open, whom he mistook for a burglar,
albeit, in light of subsequent events, it is more likely that the chair was simply propelled back
into the room by the quick opening of the door against which it lay.
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly
at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon
the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the
defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded,
he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to
secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
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There had been multiple robberies in Fort McKinley not

long before the date of the occurrence just recounted, one of which occurred in a house where the
defendant worked as a cook, and the defendant claims he kept a knife under his pillow for
personal safety because of these recurrent robberies.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial
court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted
that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful
right of self-defense.

Issue/s:
1. Whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of
homicide and assassination as defined and penalize in the Penal Code.

2. Whether or not the defendant must be acquitted due to mistake of fact.

Held:
1st Issue:
It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and
offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the
crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor
may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions
subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from
liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of
exemption.
But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the United States,
the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions
expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime,
nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or
criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in
the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability
resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily
committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he
intended to commit.
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2nd Issue:
The Supreme Court Convinced was convinced that defendant Ah Chong struct the fatal blow
alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his
sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in the imminent peril, both of his life and
of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that, in view of all the
circumstances, he acted in good faith, without malice or criminal intent, in the belief that he was
doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he
believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his
act; and that he cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend
himself from the imminent danger which he believes threatened his person and his property and
the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and
the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with
the costs of both instance de oficio.
Source: G.R. No. L-5272 (lawphil.net)
 UNIVERSITY OF PERPETUAL HELP SYSTEM LAGUNA
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO3 ARMANDO

DALAG
G.R. No. 129895 | April 30, 2003
CALLEJO, SR., J

Facts:
Armando Dalag, a member of the Philippine National Police stationed in Bacolod City, was
married to Leah Nolido Dalag legally. Francis, Princess Joy, and Ezra John were their three
children. The family lived in Bacolod City's Barangay Handumanan. Armando and Leah's
marriage was far from perfect. Violent quarrels disrupted their coverture, with Leah always on
the losing end. She had contusions, bruises, and bumps on various regions of her body every
time the pair fought.
Francis, then eleven years old, and his sister Princess Joy, then nine years old, were watching
television in their home on August 15, 1996, at 8:00 p.m. Armando and Leah were in the yard,
sitting beneath the datiles tree, sipping hard liquor. The children heard their parents arguing for a
brief moment. Armando was being warned by Leah not to drink alcoholic beverages.
Some object was being slammed against the wall, which the kids picked up on. Following that,
they heard their mother sob. Outside the house, Francis and Princess Joy rushed to see what was
going on. They were shocked to see Armando shoving and kicking Leah on the left side of her
body from a distance of three meters. She was thrown to the ground.
Even though Leah was already on the ground, Armando continued to thrash her, punching her in
various places of the body. Princess Joy and Francis pleaded with their father to stop abusing
their mother. Armando yelled aggressively at them, threatening to beat them up as well if they
interfered. He snatched Leah's hair and slammed it against the wall. Leah's brow collided with
the wall. Armando stepped on a nail in the process.
"Toy, Toy," she said as she was being assaulted by her husband, "I will locate some medicine for
your wound." Leah then ran to their next-door neighbor, Felisa Horilla, also known as "Tia Feli."
Armando chased Leah down and shoved her into Felisa's house. Francis returned to his home.
Princess Joy searched for her parents but was unable to locate them.
Meanwhile, Armando was herding Leah back to the home. When Princess Joy heard her mother
screaming, she was startled awake. Princess Joy noticed her mother being pushed by her father
when she went outside the house. Leah collapsed to the ground and passed out. Leah was
brought to the house by Armando and Francis. There were lumps on his mother's face, as well as
bruises on both arms, between her breasts, and on her thighs, according to Francis.
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Leah's right ear was also covered in blood. Armando urged

Francis to grab some hot water after she sat down on the bed. Armando then used lukewarm water
to wash his wife's face. Francis' mother was still awake when he eventually fell asleep. Francis and
Princess Joy saw their mother was still unconscious when they awoke the next day, on August 16,
1996. Despite their mother's illness, they chose to attend school. Francis went home for lunch and
discovered that Leah's condition had not improved.
When the kids returned home from school in the afternoon, Armando informed them that their
mother had been taken to the hospital. Armando told Francis to notify his coworkers at the police
station that he would be unable to report to work because his wife had slipped and needed to be
sent to the hospital.
When Francis went to see his mother in the hospital, he noticed that she was laying on the bed
with a bloated face. He noticed bumps and bruises on her body in various places. Leah was never
able to regain consciousness. On August 22, 1996, she passed away.
When the station commander, SPO3 Herman S. Garcia, learned of Leah's death, he told Armando
not to leave the police station. Armando, on the other hand, left the police station without Garcia's
knowledge or permission on August 23, 1996, and was never found. Armando, on the other hand,
surrendered to SPO3 Garcia and PO3s Joel Stephen B. Casador and Filemon Roderos on August
28, 1996.
In his defends, Armando vigorously denied killing his wife. The accused contest that what
happened to Leah was purely an accident.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment finding Armando guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of parricide for killing his wife and sentenced him to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The trial court appreciated the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and "one
analogous to passion and obfuscation" in favor of Armando.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the trial court correctly convicted the accused of parricide.
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Held:
Yes, the trial court correctly determined that Leah's injuries, which resulted in her death, were
caused by the appellant's deliberate and intentional actions.
The crime of parricide is defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code thus: Any person
who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: (1) a person is killed; (2)
the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused. The prescribed penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death. The
key element in parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and
the deceased would be the marriage certificate.
Decision, dated January 10, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 42, in
Criminal Case No. 17838 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of parricide defined in and penalized by Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code. He is sentenced to reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, there being a mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance in the
commission of the crime. The appellant is ordered to pay to the children of the victim Leah
Nolido the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and the amount of P50,000 as moral damages.

Source: G.R. No. 129895 (lawphil.net)

 UNIVERSITY OF PERPETUAL HELP SYSTEM LAGUNA
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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs. ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA
G.R. No. L-47722 | July 27, 1943
MORAN, J.

Facts:
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial
Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following
tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in
Cabanatuan get him dead or alive."
Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.
Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D.
Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where
they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a
picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the
instruction contained in the telegram.
The Chief of Police Oanis, who was also summoned by the Provincial Inspector, received the
same directive. When asked if he knew a bailarina named Irene, the head of police said that he
knew a loose moral with the same name. The Chief of Police attempted to locate some of his
men to assist the constabulary soldiers in locating Balagtas at the request of the Provincial
Inspector, but after failing to locate any of them, he volunteered to accompany the party.
When Oanis arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached Brigida Mallare, and inquired about Irene's
room. Brigida pointed to the location and, upon further questioning, revealed that Irene was
sleeping with her paramour.
Brigida, terrified, retreated to her own room, which was next to the one occupied by Irene and her
lover. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then walked to Irene's room and, noticing a guy sleeping with
his back to the door where they were, fired their .32 and.45 caliber revolvers at him simultaneously
or sequentially.
Irene was awoken by gunfire and saw that her lover was already injured, and when she looked at
the door where the rounds came from, she saw that the defendants were still firing at him. The
entire scene astounded me. Irene passed unconscious; it was later discovered that the person shot
and died was Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour, rather than the known criminal Anselmo Balagtas.
 UNIVERSITY OF PERPETUAL HELP SYSTEM LAGUNA
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When the Provincial Inspector was told of the murder, he

went to the spot and questioned who killed the victim. "We two, sir," Galanta replied, referring to
himself and Oanis. Multiple bullet wounds sustained by a.32 and a.45 caliber revolvers were
discovered on Tecson's body during an autopsy performed by Dr. Ricardo de Castro.
After due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were
sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two
months of prison correctional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P1,000.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the defendant could be acquitted by invoking mistake of fact.

2. Whether or not justifying circumstances must be accorded to the defendant.

Held:
No, mistake of fact can be only applied when mistake is committed without fault or carelessness.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the
case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat.
In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or
carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and
being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as
they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing.
In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances
whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then
asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been
made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only
legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they
were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if
resistance or aggression is offered by him.
In the second issue, the Supreme Court states that, justifying circumstance defined in article 11,
No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal
liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that
the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that
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the injury or offense committed be the necessary

consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
In the instance case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have acted in the
performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not
the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas
or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through
impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the
fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any
resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of
murder with the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of
reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio
Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.

Source: G.R. No. L-47722 (lawphil.net)

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

vs. JUAN QUIANZON
G.R. No. 42607 | September 28, 1935
Recto, J

Facts:
A novena for the suffrage of the deceased person's soul was performed in the house of Victoria
Cacpal in a barrio near the poblacion of the municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, on February 1,
1934, with the typical attendance of relatives and friends. The incident that led to the filling of
these charges took place between 3 to 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Andres Aribuabo, one of the
persons present, went to ask for food of Juan Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who, to all
appearances, had the victuals in his care.
It was the second or third time that Aribuabo approached Quianzon with the same purpose
whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took hold of a firebrand and applied ran to the place where
the people were gathered exclaiming that he is wounded and was dying. Raising his shirt, he
showed to those present a wound in his abdomen below the navel. Aribuabo died as a result of
this wound on the tenth day after the incident.
One of the witnesses at the event, Roman Bagabay, stated that he witnessed Juan Quianzon place
a firebrand around the neck of Andres Aribuabo, who then proceeded toward the witness and the
other guests, telling them he was wounded and about to die, and named Juan Quianzon as the
person who hurt him.
He also stated that when Juan Quianzon was confronted about the event right afterwards, he
admitted to attacking Aribuabo with a bamboo spit. Gregorio Dumalao, a barrio lieutenant who
immediately launched an investigation after being informed of the event, questioned Aribuabo,
who told him that it was the accused who had wounded him.
He also questioned the accused, who admitted to wounding the corpse with a bamboo spit.
Quianzon confessed to applying a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and wounding him with a bamboo
spit after being brought before Juan Llaguno, Paoay's chief of police, for questioning.
Quianzon retracted his confession before the head of police could put it in writing, denying that he
had hurt Aribuabo; as a result, in the affidavit Exhibit B, Quianzon admits to having applied a
firebrand to Aribuabo's neck but not to having wounded the deceased with a bamboo spit.
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Issue/s:
Whether or not the accused must be convicted of a crime of homicide.

Held:
The supreme court state that, one who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be
guilty of homicide if the injury contributes mediately or immediately to the death of such other.
The fact that the other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility.
The question herein raised by the appellant has already been finally settled by jurisprudence. The
Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision of April 3, 1879, said in the case similar to the present, the
following: "Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his act — and in this case
the physical condition and temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil, the
seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the means employed, but by the result
actually produced; and as the wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause
which determined his death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that the
act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc."
The principle on which this rule is founded is one of universal application, and lies at the
foundation of the criminal jurisprudence. It is, that every person is to be held to contemplate and
to be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a
deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of
this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that
other causes co-operated in producing the fatal result.
Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction and of intention to commit so grave
a wrong as the committed should be taken into consideration in favor of the appellant, without any
aggravating circumstances adverse to him, we modify the appealed judgment by sentencing him
to an indeterminate penalty with a minimum of four years of prison correctional and a maximum
of an eight years of prision mayor, affirming it in all other respect, with cost to said appellant.

Source: G.R. No. 42607 (lawphil.net)

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME

TOMOTORGO
G.R. No. L-47941 | April 30, 1985
ALAMPAY, J.

Facts:
Magdalena de los Santos was the aforementioned accused's wife. Magdalena de los Santos had
been pleading with her husband to sell the conjugal home, which was then located in Sitio
Dinalungan, Barangay Cabugao, Municipality of Siruma, Camarines Sur, for several months
before to the deadly incident on June 23, 1977.
She wanted their family to transfer to the house of her husband's in-laws which is in the town of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Accused Tomotorgo refused to comply with his wife's request. He
didn't want to leave the house where he and his wife were residing at the time. He also had no
desire to go because he had numerous plants and improvements on the field, he was farming in the
municipality of Siruma, Camarines Sur, a town far from his in-laws' home where his wife intended
their family to translocate.
On the morning of June 23, 1977, about 7:00 a.m., the accused left his home to work on his farm.
That following morning, around 9:00 a.m., he returned. His wife and three-month-old baby were
already gone when he arrived. He was on the lookout for both of them, and eventually saw his
wife carrying his infant boy and bringing him home on a trail approximately 200 meters from their
house.
He begged and pleaded with his wife to return home with their child, but she was fiercely opposed.
When appellant attempted to take the child from his wife, she flung the child on the grassy section
of the trail, causing her to cry. The herein accused was incensed by his wife's behavior. Angry and
out of control, appellant grabbed a nearby piece of wood and began striking his wife with it,
causing her to fall to the ground and complain of terrible chest problems.
When the accused realized what he had done, he took his wife in his arms and brought her to their
home. He then returned to the location where the child had been tossed and took the youngster
home with him. Magdalena de los Santos died soon after, despite her husband's best efforts to
relieve her suffering.
After the accused changed the dress of his wife, he reported the tragic incident to the Barangay
Captain of their place who brought him to Policeman Arellosa to whom the accused surrendered.
He also brought with him the piece of wood he used in beating his wife.
The accused, who was charged with parricide, pleaded not guilty to the charge at his arraignment
on November 24, 1977, with the help of his de-oficio attorney.
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When his case came up for trial on December 13, 1977, his
attorney informed the court that after meeting with the accused, the latter expressed a desire to
modify his previous plea of not guilty to guilty. He confirmed the manifestations made by his
counsel to the court regarding his desire to change his initial plea. He expressed his realization of
the gravity of the offense charged against him and the consequences of his plea. His counsel was
then permitted by the court to establish the mitigating circumstances which were then invoked in
favor of the accused.
After the accused had testified and upon his plea given in open court, the court below found him
guilty of the crime of parricide, but with three mitigating circumstances in his favor, namely:
voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, and that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to
have produced passion and obfuscation.
With the imposition by the court below of the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the herein accused
and the subsequent denial of his motion for reconsideration of the judgment rendered against him,
the accused through his counsel filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the appellant must be convicted of a crime of parricide.

2. Whether or not the appellant must be accorded with executive clemency due to mitigating
circumstances.

Held:
Ye, the appellant must be convicted of a crime of parricide. The Supreme Court states that, Article
4 of the Revised Penal Code expressly states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended
and that the accused is liable for all the consequences of his felonious acts.
The reference made by the accused to Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code which prescribes
graduated penalties for the corresponding physical injuries committed is entirely misplaced and
irrelevant considering that in this case the victim died very soon after she was assaulted. It will be,
therefore, illogical to consider appellant's acts as falling within the scope of Article 263 of the
Revised Penal Code. The crime committed is parricide no less.
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We hold that the fact that the appellant intended to maltreat

the victim only or inflict physical imjuries does not exempt him from liability for the resulting and
more serious crime committed. In the case of People vs. Climaco Demiar, 108 Phil. 651, where
the accused therein had choked his mother in a fit of anger because the latter did not prepare any
food for him, it was ruled that hte crime committed by Demiar is parricide (Article 246, Revised
Penal Code), the deceased victim of his criminal act being his legitimate mother. Said crime was
declared as punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. As the mitigating circumstance of alck of
intent to commit so grave a wrong. (Article 13 (3 Id.) The penalty imposed on the herein accused
is therefore correct in the light of the relevant provisions of law and jurisprudence.
Considering the circumstances which attended the commission of the offense, the manifest
repentant attitude of the accused and his remorse for his act which even the trial court made
particular mention of in its decision and the recommendation made by the Office of the Solicitor
General as well as number of years that the accused-appellant had been imprisoned, this Court can
do no less than recommend that executive clemency be extended to the accused-appellant, Jaime
Tomotorgo y Alarcon, or that his sentence be commuted so that he can now qualify and be
considered eligible for parole. This recommendation of the Court should be promptly brought to
the attention of the President of the Republic of the Philippines by the proper authorities in whose
custody the herein accused has been placed.
The trial court in its consideration of this case had added a recommendation that "executive
clemency be extended to the accused-appellant after his service of the minimum of the medium
penalty of prison mayor." The Solicitor General likewise concludes and prays in the People's Brief
that in view of the circumstances which attended the commission of the offense, a recommendation
for the commutation of the penalty would be appropriate. (Appellee's Brief, pg. 7). This Court is
constrained to take note that the accused-appellant is said to have been in detention since June 23,
1977 or for more than seven years already. This Court can do no less than express its hope that the
accused-appellant can be now extended an absolute or conditional pardon by the President of the
Republic of the Philippines or that there be a commutation of his sentence so that he may qualify
and be eligible for parole.
Considering the circumstances which attended the commission of the offense, the manifest
repentant attitude of the accused and his remorse for his act which even the trial court made
particular mention of in its decision and the recommendation made by the Office of the Solicitor
General as well as number of years that the accused-appellant had been imprisoned, this Court can
do no less than recommend that executive clemency be extended to the accused-appellant, Jaime
Tomotorgo, or that his sentence be commuted so that he can now qualify and be considered eligible
for parole.

Source: G.R. No. L-47941 (lawphil.net)

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THE UNITED STATES vs. FILOMENO MARASIGAN

G.R. No. L-9426 | August 15, 1914
MORELAND, J.

Facts:
In this case, it appears that Francisco Mendoza was ordered to approach the accused and his wife
around 4 p.m. on January 23, 1913, while inspecting his sugar crop growing on his property in the
barrio of Irucan, now called Calayan, in the municipality of Taal, Batangas Province.
On arriving near them the accused said to Mendoza: "Why is this line curved?" [indicating the
division line between the lands of the two.] "Let us make it straight."
Francisco replied saying: "Why do you want to make the line straight? If you make the line straight,
it will put certain logs and trees on your land.?"
To this the accused replied: "This is false." Saying this he drew his knife and struck at Mendoza.
Mendoza was injured in the left hand while attempting to deflect the strike. Mendoza grabbed the
accused by the neck and body and threw him down as the accused continued to strike. Even though
they were both on the ground, the accused attempted to attack Mendoza with his blade.
The latter grabbed the dagger-wielding hand and tried to untangle himself from it. While they were
squabbling over the knife, the accused's wife stepped up and snatched the dagger from her
husband's grip, tossing it to the side. She then took Mendoza and, after a series of movements,
struck him with a strike that knocked him out.
As a result of the fight Mendoza received three wounds, two in the chest and one in the left hand,
the latter being the most serious, the extensor tendor in one of the seven days at a cost of about
P45, but the middle finger of the left hand was rendered useless.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not a new trial should be warranted.

2. Whether or not a surgical operation in favor of the victim might exonerate the appellant
from the crime he committed.
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Held:
The Supreme Court held that, we do not regard the case made as sufficient to warrant a new trial.
It is immaterial for the purposes of this case whether the finger, the usefullness of which was
destroyed, was the middle finger or the third finger. All agree that one of the fingers of the left
hand was rendered useless by the act of the accused. It does not matter which finger it was.
Nor do we attach any importance to the contention that the original condition of the finger could
be restored by a surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results of
his crime. It was his voluntary act which disabled Mendoza and he must abide by the
consequences resulting therefrom without aid from Mendoza.

Source: G.R. No. L-9426 (lawphil.net)

 UNIVERSITY OF PERPETUAL HELP SYSTEM LAGUNA
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FILOMENO URBANO vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 72964 | January 7, 1988
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

Facts:
Petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his rice field in Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan,
at about 8:00 a.m. on October 23, 1980, roughly 100 meters from Marcelo Javier's tobacco
seedbed. He discovered the area where he kept his palay swamped with water from a nearby
irrigation canal that had spilled.
To find out what had happened, Urbano walked to the raised portion of the canal, where he
spotted Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He inquired as to who was responsible for
the irrigation canal's opening, and Javier revealed that he was the one. After that, Urbano became
enraged and demanded that Javier compensate him for his soaking palay. They got into an
argument. Urbano took his bolo out of its sheath (it was about 2 feet long, including the handle,
and 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier in the right palm of his hand, which had been used to parry
the bolo hack.
Javier, who was unarmed at the time, attempted to flee but was pursued by Urbano, who chopped
him again, this time hitting him in the left thigh with the back portion of the bolo, causing
swelling. When Urbano attempted to hack and injure Javier further, his daughter embraced him
and stopped him. Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe immediately drove Javier to his
residence, which was about 50 meters away from where the incident occurred. Emilio then went
to Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven's residence, but when he couldn't find him, he looked for
barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead.
Following Solis' instruction, the Erfes and Javier headed to the San Fabian police station to
report the incident. Javier was taken to a doctor, as suggested by Corporal Torio. The group
proceeded to San Fabian's rural health physician, Dr. Guillermo Padilla, who did not treat Javier
and instead suggested they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla was out of medicine.
Urbano and Javier agreed to reconcile their disputes after Councilman Solis intervened. Urbano
offered to pay P700.00 for Javier's hospital bills. As a result, on October 27, 1980, the two
appeared before the San Fabian Police Department, escorted by Solis, to formalize their amicable
settlement. The incident was documented on the police blotter by Patrolman Torio.
At the police station, Urbano gave Javier P400.00. The additional P300.00 was paid to Javier at
Urbano's house on November 3, 1980, in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.
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Around 1:30 a.m. Javier was transported to the Nazareth

General Hospital in a critical condition on November 14, 1980. Javier had lockjaw and was
suffering convulsions when he was admitted to the hospital. Javier's terrible condition was
caused by tetanus toxin, according to Dr. Edmundo Exconde, who personally attended to him.
He discovered a healed wound in Javier's palm, which he suspected was infected with tetanus.
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of
homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District. RTC
and CA found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
Petitioner raised the case to the SC arguing that the cause of the death of Javier was due to his
own negligence.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the action of Urbano was the proximate cause of death of Javier.

Held:
No, Pursuant to this provision “an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in
violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. The rule is
that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused.
The petitioner reiterates his position that Marcelo Javier died as a result of his own negligence,
that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier contracted tetanus when he
returned to his farm two weeks later and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands, exposing
the wound to harmful elements such as tetanus germs.
As a result of the hacking incident, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus. Given
the circumstances of Javier's death, his wound could have been infected with tetanus type 2 or 3
or a few, but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which
result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause.
The CA's judgment was OVERTURNED, and Petioner was found NOT GUILTY of homicide.
Source: G.R. No. 72964 (lawphil.net)
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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs. AGUSTIN PIAMONTE, ET AL
G.R. No. L-5775 | January 28, 1954
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.

Facts:
A robbery was committed in the residence of Magno Israel in barrio Gabas, municipality of
Baybay, Leyte, early on October 28, 1951. Israel was critically injured during the heist and was
taken to the Western Leyte Hospital in Baybay for treatment. When Baybay's Chief of Police
was told of the occurrence, he dispatched a police officer to the hospital to investigate.
Officer Macario Dawal discovered the wounded, who was suffering from the horrific wounds he
had suffered. Nonetheless, the policeman was able to obtain statements from him on the robbery,
which he typed on a keyboard when he returned to work. The Chief of Police and the Justice of
Peace went to the hospital the next morning to verify the accuracy of the victim's statements, and
when they arrived, they found him restless, his face pale, he was breathing heavily, and his entire
body was bandaged. His hands and legs were tethered to the bed.
The attending nurse assured the two officials that the medication given to the patient was just
meant to help him live longer. The written statements were read to the patient by the Justice of
the Peace, and after ensuring that he understood them, he was requested to ratify them. The
patient did so under oath. In his affidavit, the patient, among other things, stated that of the
person who went to his house in the morning in question he was only able to identify Guillermo
Mascariñas who was long known to him. The robbers took away his cash amounting P320. He
was not able to identify those who actually wounded him.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the action of the accused was the proximate caused of the death of Israel.
Held:
Yes, while it is true, he did not die immediately after the wounds were inflicted, and he was able
to survive for a while thanks to the operation he underwent and the medical treatment he
received at the Western Leyte Hospital. However, the fact remains that he did as a result of the
mucuous colitis he contracted because of his weak condition resulting from the wounds he had
received. The doctors who treated him concurred that his weakened state, which had disrupted
his intestines' functioning, made it possible for him to get mucuous colitis, demonstrating that,
while the wounds were not the immediate cause of death, they were the proximate cause. This is
sufficient to hold the accused accountable for the alleged crime.
Source: G.R. No. L-5775 (lawphil.net)
 UNIVERSITY OF PERPETUAL HELP SYSTEM LAGUNA
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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

vs. ANDRES ANCASAN
G.R. No. L-28620 | February 24, 1928
OSTRAND, J

Facts:
On May 3rd, 1927, In the municipality of Banganga, Province of Davao, a celebration of the last
day of novenario took place in the home of one Faustino Lancian. A number of persons were
present, among them Andres (Mandaya), Venancio Lamncian, Domingo Bancailan, the accused
Andres Ancasan, and now deceased Eugeniano Felizardo.
Domingo Bancailan and Eugeniano Felizardo agreed to sing a duet after dinner, but when
Felizardo sang at a higher tone than Bancailan, the latter became enraged and attempted to hurl
Felizardo to the floor. His efforts were in vain, and he collapsed to the ground, Felizardo on top
of him. While the two men were in this position, the accused, a friend of Bancailan, struck
Felizardo in the back of the head with a heavy cudgel, inflicting a wound that grew infected with
tetanus and resulted to Felizardo's death a few days later.
The trial court found the defendant Ancasan guilty of the charges in the complaint and sentenced
him to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, plus any further penalties imposed by
law, as well as to indemnify the deceased's heirs in the amount of P500 and pay one-half of the
costs.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the statement of the deceased can be consider as dying declaration.

2. Whether or not the appellant was entitled to lower degree of sentenced.

Held:
Yes, because the Supreme Court states that, it is not necessary for the validity or admissibility of
a dying declaration that the declarant expressly state that he has lost all hope of recovery; rather,
the circumstances must inevitably lead to the conclusion that the declarant did not expect to
survive the injury from which he died at the time the declaration was made.
The defendant struck the deceased from behind, creating an aggravating factor of treachery, but
it is also clear from the record that the defendant was inebriated and did not mean to kill the
deceased. These two alleviating reasons more than offset the aggravating event and reduce the
penalty to the bare minimum of temporal confinement.
Source: G.R. No. L-28620 (lawphil.net)
 UNIVERSITY OF PERPETUAL HELP SYSTEM LAGUNA
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SULPICIO INTOD vs. HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 103119 | October 21, 1992
CAMPOS, JR., J

Facts:
Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio, and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador
Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental on February 4, 1979, and
asked him to accompany them to Bernardina Palangpangan's residence. Mandaya and Intod,
Pangasian, Tubio, and Daligdig met with Aniceto Dumalagan after that. He told Mandaya that he
wanted Palangpangan killed because they had a land issue, and that unless Mandaya
accompanied the four (4) men, he would be killed as well.
Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio, and Daligdig, all armed with rifles, arrived at
Palangpangan's residence in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental, at 10:00 p.m. on the
same day. Mandaya indicated the location of Palangpangan's bedroom at the request of his
buddies. Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio, and Daligdig then opened fire on the room. Palangpangan,
on the other hand, was found to be in another city, and her residence was taken over by her son-
in-law and his family. When the accused fired the bullets, no one was in the room. The gunfire
did not hit anyone.
Witnesses positively identified the petitioner and his associates. "We will kill you (the witness),
especially Bernardina Palangpangan, and we will come back if (sic) you were not hurt," the five
guys said before leaving the premises, according to one witness.
The Regional Trial Court found Intod guilty of attempted murder after a trial. The court (RTC)
found Petitioner guilty of attempted murder, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner requests that the verdict be modified so that he is only accountable for an impossible
offense, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the respondent court correctly convicted the accused of a crime of attempted
murder.

Held:
The Supreme Court states that, the Positivist School influenced the Revised Penal Code, which
respects the offender's fortitude and now penalizes an act that would be a criminal against person
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or property if it wasn't aimed at something completely

unachievable or carried out with insufficient resources. The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish
such criminal tendencies.
The conduct committed by the offender cannot result in an offense against a person or property
under this article because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible to
accomplish; or (2) the means employed are either (a) insufficient or (b) ineffective.
To qualify an act as an impossible crime, it must either be impossible to carry out the intended
deed.
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and
expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical
act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from
the intended act does not amount to a crime.
Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondent Court of Appeals' decision convicting
Petitioner of Attempted Murder is MODIFIED. We find Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime
as defined and punished in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code.

Source: G.R. No. (lawphil.net)