DOCTRINES:

a. (Contempt) Department officials' act of installing farmer-beneficiaries in landholding did not constitute
an open defiance and disobedience to Court's order.
b. A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title. The title becomes incontrovertible after
expiration of the one (1)-year period from the issuance of the registration decree, upon which it was
based.
c. The court's contempt power should be exercised with restraint and for a preservative, and not
vindictive, purpose. "Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be
exercised."

G.R. No. 189162, January 30, 2019

LEONEN, J.:

NATURE OF THE CASE

For this Court's resolution is a Petition for Contempt filed by POPARMUCO, a duly organized and registered
cooperative of agrarian reform beneficiaries, against Regional Director Inson of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, Region VII, Cebu City.

FACTS

The landholding owned by Polo Coconut Plantation, Inc. was placed under the coverage of CARP. A Notice of
Coverage was sent on May 23, 2003 to Polo Coconut President Rene Espina (Espina). LBP valued the property of
the amount of P85,491,784.60 as just compensation for 393.1327 hectares of Polo Coconut property. The
RARAD of Cebu City affirmed the valuation offered by Land Bank of the Philippines.

Meanwhile, Polo Coconut's title was canceled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. On January 27, 2004, a
collective Certificate of Land Ownership Award, with CLOA No. 00114438, was issued. It was registered on
January 30, 2004, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-802,10 in favor of POPARMUCO members whom
the Department of Agrarian Reform identified as agrarian reform beneficiaries.

Polo Coconut filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari questioning the propriety of subjecting its
property to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. It contended that the City of Tanjay had already
reclassified the area into a mixed residential, commercial, and industrial land. It also assailed the eligibility of the
identified agrarian reform beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Polo Coconut.

In its September 3, 2008 Decision, this Court in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Polo Coconut Plantation
Company, Inc. reversed the Court of Appeals Decision. It confirmed the acts of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, through the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, and declared the issuance of TCT No. T-802 and CLOA
No. 00114438 as valid. This Court also ruled that Polo Coconut did not exhaust its administrative remedies when
it directly filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals instead of first filing a protest or opposition
before the Department Secretary. Furthermore, it held that the property was never placed beyond the scope of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, as the Department Secretary never approved the land's
conversion.
The September 3, 2008 Decision became final and executory on November 26, 2008.2

On June 30, 2009, 164 alleged regular farmworkers of Polo Coconut (Alcantara, et al.) filed a Petition for
Inclusion as qualified beneficiaries in TCT No. T-802/CLOA No. 00114438 and Exclusion of those named as
beneficiaries therein (Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion). They were allegedly not informed when the Department
of Agrarian Reform conducted the identification and screening process for potential beneficiaries. They contend
that the Certificate of Land Ownership Award holders were not qualified beneficiaries under Section 22 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

On July 1, 2009, Alcantara, et al. also filed a Petition for Immediate Issuance of a Cease and Desist Order and/or
Injunction. They averred that the Certificate of Land Ownership Award holders had attempted to occupy the
property even without authority from the Department of Agrarian Reform. Moreover, the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer of Tanjay had allegedly scheduled the relocation and subdivision of the property for the final
installation of the qualified beneficiaries. Thus, they sought a Cease and Desist Order to preserve their legal
rights while the administrative proceedings for the inclusion/exclusion of farmer beneficiaries were pending
resolution.28

Acting on the Petition, Regional Director Inson issued a Cease and Desist Order. On July 20, 2009, Regional
Director Inson also issued Special Order No. 070, series of 2009,31 creating an independent body to conduct a
revalidation of farmers-beneficiaries in the property.

On July 23, 2009, POPARMUCO members, who are Certificate of Land Ownership Award holders, filed a Motion
to Quash the Cease and Desist Order with Motion for Reconsideration.

On July 30, 2009,40 POPARMUCO members filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional
Adjudication Board a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution seeking to enforce the September 3, 2008
Decision.

POPARMUCO filed before this Court a Petition for Contempt against respondent Inson, raising the following
grounds:

a. Respondent issued a Cease and Desist Order without any notice in violation of petitioner's members'
constitutional right to due Process.43
b. Respondent defied this Court's September 3, 2008 Decision, which ruled with finality on the qualification of
petitioner's members as beneficiaries in Polo Coconut's landholding covered under TCT No. T-802/CLOA No.
00114438.44

ISSUE

WHETHER RESPONDENT REGIONAL DIRECTOR RODOLFO T. INSON'S COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION FOR
INCLUSION/EXCLUSION OF FARMER BENEFICIARIES, AND HIS SUBSEQUENT ISSUANCE OF THE JULY 7, 2009
CEASE AND DESIST ORDER AND THE MARCH 12, 2010 ORDER DISQUALIFYING SOME OF PETITIONER'S
MEMBERS, CONSTITUTE DEFIANCE OF THIS COURT'S SEPTEMBER 3, 2008 DECISION IN G.R. NOS. 168787 AND
169271.

RULING
NO. Respondent Rodolfo T. Inson (Regional Director Inson)'s cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion of
farmer beneficiaries, and his subsequent issuance of the March 12, 2010 Order disqualifying some members of
petitioner Polo Plantation Agrarian Reform Multipurpose Cooperative (POPARMUCO), were improper.
Nonetheless, these acts do not constitute an indirect contempt of court.

In Concha v. Rubio,109 this Court, citing Lercana v. Jalandoni110 and Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation
v. Amante,111 held that the identification and selection of agrarian reform beneficiaries involve the
administrative implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, which is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Hence, when seeking to contest the selection of
beneficiaries, a party should avail of the administrative remedies under the Department of Agrarian Reform, not
under the Adjudication Board. In Concha:

In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports, this Court held that the
administrative prerogative of DAR to identify and select agrarian reform beneficiaries holds sway upon the
courts.

Seven (7) months later, on June 30, 2009 after the September 3, 2008 Decision of this Court becomes final and
executory, Alcantara, et al. filed the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion. They questioned the inclusion of
petitioner's members as beneficiaries and recipients of Certificates of Land Ownership Award. They contended
that the existing certificate holders were "outsiders" and have no connection with the Polo Coconut
property.130 Respondent took cognizance of the Petition and granted the Cease and Desist Order.

By that time, however, the September 3, 2008 Decision had already become final and executory. Consequently,
this Court affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reform's previous identification and designation of qualified
agrarian reform beneficiaries, who were named in CLOA No. 00114438. The finality of this Decision meant that:

[T]he decrees thereof could no longer be altered, modified, or reversed even by the Court en banc. Nothing is
more settled in law than that a judgment, once it attains finality, becomes immutable and unalterable, and can
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the
court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. This rule rests on the principle that all litigation must come
to an end, however unjust the result of error may appear; otherwise, litigation will become even more intolerable
than the wrong or injustice it is designed to correct.132 (Citations omitted)

A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title. The title becomes incontrovertible after
expiration of the one (1)-year period from the issuance of the registration decree, upon which it was based.

Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, provides that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings
are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings:
....

The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired lands to the landless
would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest, just because his certificate
of title was issued in an administrative proceeding.

Petitioner's assertion that respondent's cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion constituted
defiance of the September 3, 2008 Decision does not lie.
In Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Paruñgao,138 this Court explained the concept of contempt of court:

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and
dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the court's order, hut such conduct which tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due
administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by
the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the
Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can
be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.139 (Emphasis
supplied)

The court's contempt power should be exercised with restraint and for a preservative, and not vindictive,
purpose. "Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised."

In Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation, the Department officials' act of installing farmer-beneficiaries in Rivulet
Agro-Industrial Corporation's landholding did not constitute an open defiance and disobedience of this Court's
December 15, 2010 temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 193585.

Still, respondent's erroneous cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion can only be deemed as grave
abuse of discretion, which is more properly the subject of a petition for certiorari, not a petition for contempt.
"No one who is called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment."

At any rate, whether respondent's actions were improper is not an issue here. What is crucial in contempt
proceedings is the intent of the alleged contemnor to disobey or defy the court as held in St. Louis University,
Inc. v. Olairez:

In contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith or lack of it, of the alleged
contemnor is considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it
is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of
a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be determinative of its character. . . . To constitute
contempt, the act must be done wil[l]fully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.146 (Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted)

All told, this Court finds no clear and contumacious conduct on the part of respondent. His acts do not qualify as
a willful disobedience to this Court nor a willful disregard of its authority.

FALLO

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Contempt is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.