EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. L-31303-04. May 31, 1978.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO V. DE OCAMPO, and OSCAR ANGLO ,
respondents.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Assistant Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for
petitioner.
Eusebio V. Navarro, Eugenio G. Gemarino and Eusebio P. Navarro for respondent
Alfredo V. de Ocampo.
Vicente F. Delfin and V. del Rosario & Associates for respondent Oscar Anglo.

SYNOPSIS

In 1960, the Philippine Government (Republic, for short) opposed de Ocampo's

application for registration under the Torrens System of two parcels of prime sugar
land with an area of about 300 hectares, claiming that the property was already
registered in its name under Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 6014, having been
bequeathed to it by a certain Jalandoni, who in turn acquired the same by sale from the
original owner Meerkamp and Company whose title thereto was registered under the
system for as back as 1919. All these facts of registrations and transfers were
certi ed to by the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. De Ocampo, on the other
hand, alleged that the land subject of his application for registration was donated to
him by one Mosquera in 1911, and that it was different from that covered by the
mentioned certi cate of title of the Republic. However, the documents presented as
exhibits for de Ocampo were withdrawn from the les of the trial court and were
thereafter allegedly lost by re. As a result, the Republic's motion to have the same
produced for examination of their genuineness could not be made. The Land
Registration Court nonetheless ordered the registration of the land in de Ocampo's
name and the corresponding original certi cate of title was issued. Republic led a
Petition for Relief on the ground of actual fraud of de Ocampo in securing the lower
court's decision and the issuance of the decree of registration, by misrepresenting that
the two parcels of land he sought to be registered were different from the two parcels
belonging to the government, knowing it to be false. The Provincial Assessor of Negros
certi ed that the lots in question were declared in the name of the Republic but never in
the name of de Ocampo's alleged predecessors in interest. The trial court resolved the
Petition for Relief against the Republic, stating that the allegations therein did not
constitute actual and extrinsic fraud. Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals which,
however, dismissed the appeal for failure of the record on appeal to show on its face
that it was led within the reglementary period, it appearing that appellant's motion for
extension of twenty (20) days was never granted by the lower court, or even if said
motion was granted, the extension asked for would have expired on November 3, 1967,
and therefore, the record on appeal led on November 9, 1967 was led six (6) days
late. Hence, this appeal.
The Supreme Court held that it has repeatedly construed the rule onperfection of
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 appeals as jurisdictional and mandatory in nature,non-compliance with which justi es
the dismissal of the appeal; however, when the operation of the rules will lead to gross
injustice, the Supreme Court may resort to the extraordinary remedy of suspending the
rules and thus except the case from their operation, to prevent such injustice. A
consideration of the peculiar facts of the case and the procedural and substantive
implications of the dismissal of the appeal, as well as a due and proper regard to the
merits of the case at bar, rather than fascile reliance on procedural rules, compelled the
Court to reverse and set aside the dismissal.
Decision set aside and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for resolution
on the merits.

SYLLABUS

1. APPEAL; MATERIAL DATA RULE IS MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL,

EXCEPTION. — The rules on the ling of the record on appeal are mandatory and
jurisdictional in nature, non-compliance with which justi es the dismissal. However, an
appeal led out of time carries no persuasive force and may be completely disregarded
if the trial court acted without jurisdiction.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — When the operation of the Rules of will lead to
an injustice, the Supreme Court, in justi able instances and in the interest of just and
expeditious proceedings may resort to the extraordinary remedy of suspending the
rules or excepting the case from their operation. Thus the rule providing that appeals
shall be dismissed for failure to le record on appeal within the reglementary period
may be suspended where the appeal is premised on (1) lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court, and (2) fraudulent representations and machinations of the party in whose favor
the judgment was issued; and where the appeal if dismissed would result not only in
multiplicity of suits but will also entail the risk that the disputed property may be
disposed of to innocent purchasers for value so as to put them beyond recovery.
3. LAND REGISTRATION; LAND REGISTRATION COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO DECREE SECOND REGISTRATION OF LAND; SECOND DECREE NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO; GROUND FOR REVIEW. — A land registration court is without
jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already registered in an earlier
registration case, and the issuance of a second decree for the registration of the land is
null and void and is a ground for the review, provided no innocent purchaser for value
will be prejudiced.
4. JURISDICTION; NOT SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT OF PARTIES AND LACK OF
WHICH MAY BE RAISED ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. — Jurisdiction is
conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law,
and in the manner prescribed by law, and an objection on the lack of such jurisdiction
cannot be waived by the party and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The
in rmity cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent, or by
will of the parties.
5. LAND REGISTRATION; ACTUAL FRAUD; GROUND FOR REVIEW. — The
wilfull intent to deprive another of just rights constitutes the essential characteristics of
actual — as distinguished from legal — fraud and is a ground for review or to reopen a
decree of registration of land.
6. ID.; DOUBLE REGISTRATION; DUTY OF LAND REGISTRATION COURT TO
INVESTIGATE. — When the attention of the Court of Land Registration is called to the
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 fact that the same land has been registered in the name of two different persons, it is
the duty of said court to order an investigation of that fact and that should be done
without requiring the parties to show that fraud has been committed in securing the
double registration. When it is established that the same has been registered in the
name of two different persons, the title thereto should remain in the name of the person
securing the nal registration. The very purpose of the Torrens System would be
destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for
registration.
7. RULES OF PROCEDURE; PRIMARY OBJECTIVE; POWER OF THE COURT TO
SUSPEND; APPLICATION OF. — The Rules have been drafted with the primary objective
of enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. If their application and operation tend to
subvert and defeat instead of promote and enhance it, their suspension is justi ed. It is
always in the power of the Supreme Court to suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the ends of justice require it.
8. CIVIL LAW; HUMAN RELATIONS; MAXIM OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT. — No
person should enrich himself at the expense of or prejudice of others.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
1. APPEAL; MATERIAL DATA RULE; EXCEPTION. — An appeal, although led
6 days late beyond the requested extension period, may still be given due course, in the
interests of substantial justice, where special circumstances are present such as
respondent's failure to oppose the trial court's Order approving the petitioner's record
on appeal, and the petitioner's claims, erroneously rejected by the trial court, that the
evidence preponderantly shows that the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
land registration application of respondent, having been led belatedly with alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations, knowing the land to have been
registered 46 years ago in the name of the original owner, which claims raise a
jurisdictional issue that should properly be reviewed and determined by the appellate
court.
2. JUDGMENT; APPEAL THEREOF DISMISSAL OF APPEAL; PRINCIPLE OF
RES JUDICATA; SETS IN. — The dismissal of a party's appeal in a land registration case
would bar from seeking again to recover the lots in a different action after the appeal is
dismissed since he would be foreclosed by the principle of res judicata from ling still
another suit for the recovery of the lots in dispute.
3. APPEAL; REMAND TO COURT OF APPEALS AND NOT TO TRIAL COURT. —
Where an appeal from a trial court's judgment denying relief under Rule 38 is
peremptorily dismissed on technicality by the Court of Appeals, and such dismissal is
reversed by the Supreme Court, the record on appeal may properly be remanded to the
Court of Appeals (not to the lower court) for determination not only of the lower court's
denial of the petition for relief but also of its adverse judgment on the merits, without
need of amending the record on appeal, the appellant's notice of appeal (as well as its
pleadings and brief) duly appealed from the trial court's decision "on the ground that
said decision is not in accordance with law and evidence adduced in the case.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION; ATTENTION OF SOLICITOR GENERAL CALLED
TO ACTS OF CARELESSNESS ON PART OF STAFF OF STATE'S COUNCIL FOR PROPER
REMEDIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES. — The attention of the Solicitor General
should be called to the acts of carelessness and neglect on the part of his staff that
almost cost the State by default the forfeiture and loss of 289 hectares of prime sugar
land, were it not for the special circumstances and the interests of substantial justice
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 which have led the Court to set aside respondent court's summary dismissal of the
appeal.

DECISION

SANTOS , J : p

An appeal by certiorari led on December 5, 1969 by petitioner, Republic of the

Philippines (Republic. for short), from the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
August 21,1969 1 dismissing petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. Nos. 40683-84-R, as well as
from the resolution of the said Court dated November 14, 1969 2 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration thereof.
The relevant and essential factual and procedural antecedents follow. Both
Republic and respondents Alfredo V. de Ocampo and Oscar Anglo claim ownership
over the same lots, i.e., Nos. 817 and 2509 of the Sagay-Escalante Cadastre, Negros
Occidental, subject matter of this litigation. The basis of Republic's claim is that said
lots were bequeathed to the Bureau of Education (now Bureau of Public Schools) on
September 21, 1926 by the late Esteban Jalandoni through his will. 3 Republic further
alleged that the said parcels of land were already registered under the Torrens System
"before 1919 in a cadastral case in the name of Meerkamp and Company" in whose
favor Original Certi cate of Title (OCT, for short) No. 370 was issued; that said
company sold the lots to Esteban Jalandoni who was issued Transfer Certi cate of
Title (TCT, for short) No. 1251; that TCT No. 6014 was issued to the Bureau of
Education when the subject property was bequeathed to it; and that as a matter of fact,
a sugar quota (Plantation Audit No. 24-10) was issued for the lots under the name of
the Bureau of Education. 4 The lots have a total area of 289.47 hectares. 5
Respondent de Ocampo, upon the other hand, predicates his claim on an
application for registration of the same Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 in Land Registration
Case No. N-4, LRC Rec. No. N-19196, wherein a decree of registration No. 105538 was
issued over the lots, followed by the issuance in his name of OCT No. 576, on October
1, 1965. 6 He averred that the lots were unregistered lands belonging to and possessed
by him, by virtue of a donation dated November 10, 1911 from one Luis Mosquera. 7
Respondent Anglo intervened in the case on February 21, 1966, having allegedly
bought the same lots from respondent de Ocampo on January 6, 1966. TCT No. 42217
was issued to him (Anglo) on January 12, 1966. 8
Procedurally, the records show that the Bureau of Public Schools, then
represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Occidental initiated on December 24,
1958, a forcible entry and detainer case against de Ocampo over Lots Nos. 817 and
2509. On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the
complaint (Civil Case No. 5353). 9
Then on June 29, 1960, de Ocampo led an application for registration of the
same two parcels of land in Land Registration Case No. N-4 LRC Rec. No. N-19196,
entitled "Alfredo V. de Ocampo, Applicant, v. Republic of the Philippines, Oppositor."
Republic filed its opposition in due time. 1 0
On May 2, 1961, Republic, represented by the Solicitor General led a complaint
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 against de Ocampo with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (Branch VII)
for the recovery of possession of the subject lots, with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 264 (6154),
entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Alfredo v. de Ocampo, Defendant." 1 1 De Ocampo
averred in his answer that the properties alleged to have been donated by Esteban
Jalandoni to the then Bureau of Education were different from the properties involved in
this case, the former being titled lands (TCT No. 1251) containing two million nine
hundred and twelve thousand four hundred and seventy four square meters
(2,912,474), while Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 applied for by de Ocampo and which
Republic sought to recover were unregistered lands, and that granting, without
admitting, that they are the same lands, the court no longer had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action since the issue of possession over said lots was already
decided by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. 1 2
On May 26, 1961, a preliminary hearing was held before Branch IV of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, where the land registration case was pending, but
inasmuch as the issues involved in both Civil Case No. 264 (6154) for recovery of
possession and the land registration case were identical, the parties agreed to a joint
trial, this time before Branch VII, Judge Jose D. Divinagracia, presiding, where the civil
case was pending. 1 3
After a joint trial of the above-mentioned two (2) cases, the Court of First
Instance rendered judgment on August 3, 1965, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case
No. 264 (6154) and adjudging the registration of the subject two lots in the name of the
then applicant de Ocampo. On October 1, 1965, OCT No. 576 was issued in his name.
14

It is admitted by Republic that it received a copy of the decision on August 13,

1965 1 5 but no appeal was taken therefrom. However, Republic later led with the trial
court on December 28, 1965, a "Petition for Relief from Judgment with Preliminary
Injunction Pending Proceeding" 1 6 (petition, for short) praying, among other things, that
de Ocampo be restrained from enforcing the decision dated 3 August 1965, and that
after the hearing, an order be issued declaring the said decision to be not yet nal and
executory, and granting Republic the right to le a motion for reconsideration and/or
appeal within the period granted, to commence upon receipt of the order.
The petition alleged inter alia that the Republic's failure to appeal was due to
accident, mistake and/or excusable negligence, speci cally, stating that its docket
clerk, Cesar Salud, merely committed excusable negligence when he inadvertently
attached the copy of the decision to the le of another case; that it was only on
November 5, 1965, that Cesar Salud found the copy of the same, and that petitioner has
a substantial cause of action in Civil Case No. 264 (6154) and a good and substantial
defense in Land Registration Case No. N-4 Rec. No. N-19196. cdphil

An opposition to the petition was led by respondent de Ocampo on February 5,

1966 or the ground that the same was led beyond the reglementary period. The
17
petition was, however, given due course on January 11, 1966. 1 8 On February 21, 1966,
respondent Oscar Anglo led a motion for intervention alleging that he bought the
subject two (2) Lots Nos. 817 and 1509 from respondent de Ocampo on January 6,
1966 and that TCT No. 42217 of the Register of Deeds for Negros Occidental was
issued to him (Anglo) on January 12, 1966. 1 9 He also led an answer in opposition to
Republic's petition for relief from judgment 2 0 on the grounds, among others, that the
decree of registration and certi cate of title had already been issued and that a writ of
preliminary injunction will not lie to restrain enforcement of the decision of the trial
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 court.
On June 6, 1966, after respondents led their respective memoranda, the trial
court dismissed the Republic's petition for lack of competent proof, pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 38, of the Rules of Court which the court said required a hearing. 2 1
On July 25, 1966, petitioner Republic led a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order dismissing its petition; 2 2 and on August 4, 1966, it led a
manifestation averring additional grounds in support of the motion for reconsideration.
2 3 Respondent Anglo and de Ocampo opposed the same. 2 4

On September 28, 1966, Republic led an "Amended Petition for Relief from
Judgment and/or Review of Decree with Preliminary Injunction" 2 5 (Amended Petition,
for short). In speci c regard to the petition for review of the decree, Republic
contended, inter alia, that actual fraud had been perpetrated by respondent de Ocampo
in securing the lower court's decision ordering the registration of the lots in his name,
as well as the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certi cate
of title, on the grounds which, brie y restated, advert to respondent de Ocampo's
alleged misrepresentations that the two parcels of land applied for by him in the land
registration case were "different from the two parcels of land of the same lot numbers,
technical descriptions and areas belonging to the Government, knowing such
allegations to be false, the truth of the matter being that said parcels of land are the
same property owned by the Government"; 2 6 that there was previous registration of
the same parcels of land, Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, under the Torrens System in favor of
Meerkamp and Company which later sold the same to Jalandoni who, in turn, gave the
lots to the Bureau of Education as a legacy; and that the Court of First Instance no
longer had jurisdiction to decree again the registration of Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, in
favor of respondent de Ocampo, in view of the earlier registration of the same lands in
favor of Meerkamp and Company.
Additionally, Republic claimed that its counsel was not given notice of de
Ocampo's motion and the corresponding order dated September 16, 1965, for the
issuance of the decree of registration and the issuance of the decree itself by the Land
Registration Commission, "in violation of its constitutional rights to due process"; 2 7
that it has also been "in continuous peaceful, adverse, open and public owner and
possessor, in good faith and with just title" of the lots "deriving the fruits and products
of said properties and appropriating them to the purpose and purposes they were
intended for"; 2 8 that they were in fact declared for tax purposes; 2 9 that on April 11,
1927, the lands were leased for ten (10) years but the lease was amended several
times to extend the same 3 0 as that on September 17, 1964, Republic's counsel led a
"Petition for an Order to Produce the Original Documentary Exhibits and Submit Same
to the NBI for Examination," 3 1 which petition was communicated to de Ocampo's
lawyers, Atty. Gemarino and Garingalao, earlier on September 7, 1964; that they did not
object or state that the originals were burned or lost; that it was only on September 28,
1964 that de Ocampo's lawyers revealed for the rst time in their "Manifestation and
Reply" that the purported originals were burned in the house of Atty. Gemarino on May
16, 1963; 3 2 and that the "supposed originals were fake and their alleged burning was
false and these pretenses were intentionally resorted to only to evade the examination
of the spurious documents by the NBI and as camou age to hide their fraudulent
character." 3 3
On October 4, 1966, the trial court set aside its order of June 6, 1966, dismissing
the petition for relief, 3 4 having found Republic's motion for reconsideration well-
founded, and scheduled December 1 and 2, 1966, for Republic's witnesses to testify,
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 and likewise gave respondents, a chance to oppose the amended petition.
Respondents and Republic led their opposition 3 5 and reply; 3 6 respectively. Republic
alleged in the said reply that "(T)he lands in question and their incomes are used
exclusively for a public purpose: public education." 3 7
In a subsequent hearing on June 6, 1967, the trial court ordered Republic to
present its evidence in the absence of respondents, who objected thereto for lack of
jurisdiction, the parcels of land having been already registered in the name of
respondent de Ocampo and in fact transferred to an alleged buyer in good faith, the
other private respondent, Anglo.
On August 30, 1967, the trial court rendered its decision on the Amended Petition
3 8 against Republic, upon resolution of what it considered the "decisive" issue, i.e., that
the allegations in the said petition did not constitute actual and extrinsic fraud which is
the only ground available to review or reopen a decree in cadastral cases pursuant to
Section 38 of Act 496. 3 9
On the other issues, the trial court found that it was through mistake, accident
and excusable negligence that the decision of August 3, 1965 was not brought to the
attention of Solicitor Emerito Salva "as it was inadvertently clipped to the record of
another case". 4 0 However, while the petition for relief itself was led within the
reglementary period prescribed in Section 3, Rule 38, of the Rules of Court 4 1 the
remedy of relief from judgment was no longer available since the decree, and later the
title, were already issued in the name of respondent de Ocampo." 4 2 It also held that the
amended petition was still legally available as it was led within one (1) year after the
issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act No. 496, "in case of actual fraud"
and that it had jurisdiction to entertain the amended petition and to receive evidence in
support thereof, 4 3 but it had to deny the relief prayed for on grounds already adverted
to. In regard to respondent Anglo's claim that the petition for review was no longer
tenable as against him because he was a purchaser in good faith, the trial court ruled
that competent evidence to that effect should be submitted considering, among other
things, that the case was pending when he acquired his interest. 4 4 Finally, it held that
the fact that the Republic was not noti ed of the motion and the corresponding
issuance of the decree and title was immaterial since petitions for issuance of decrees
in cadastral cases are analogous to petitions for execution in ordinary cases and
parties are not entitled to notice thereof as a matter of right. 4 5 Thus —
"In the light of the decision of this Court dated August 3, 1965, Section 39
of Act No. 496 and the authorities cited . . . this court is persuaded to conclude as
it hereby holds, that the evidence adduced by the petitioner in this incident does
not establish actual and constructive fraud which is the only kind of fraud that is
considered a legal ground to review, reopen or set aside the decree which has
already been issued in the name of Alfredo V. de Ocampo.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition for Relief from Judgment and/or

Review of Decree is hereby dismissed without pronouncement as to costs." 4 6

From the said decision, Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed
therein as CA G.R. Nos. 4083-84-R. Private respondents de Ocampo and Anglo moved
to dismiss the appeal which was opposed by petitioner, Republic. 4 7 A supplemental
motion to the same effect was later led by respondent de Ocampo for failure of the
record on appeal to show on its face that it was filed on time, 4 8 followed by an ex parte
motion to consider the Solicitor General to have waived his right to oppose the said
supplemental motion to dismiss and that the case be submitted for resolution. 4 9 A
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 new party, Salvacion Maranon, sought to intervene in the case and also led a motion to
dismiss the appeal before respondent appellate court.
In its minute resolution of August 21, 1969, 5 0 the Court of Appeals resolved —
"(1) To DISMISS . . . the appeal . . . for failure of the record on appeal
to show on its face that the record on appeal was led within the period xed by
the Rules (Secs. 3 & 6, Rule 41, Sec 1[a] & [b], Rule 50, Rules of Court), it appearing
that appellant's motion for extension of 20 days from October 14, 1967 to le the
record on appeal was never granted by the lower court (there being no showing to
that effect in the record on appeal); and even if there was such an order granting
it, the extension asked for would have expired on November 3, 1967 and,
therefore, the record on appeal filed on November 9, 1967 was filed six days later .
. . ; and
(2) to DENY the motion to intervene of intervenor Salvacion Marañon
following the doctrine enunciated in Hant, et al. vs. O'Leary, et al. page 993. At any
rate, the purpose of intervening; which is to join the appellees in their motion to
dismiss the appeal of the appellant, has already been served by the dismissal of
the instant appeal."

On September 11, 1969, Republic led a motion for reconsideration 5 1 but on

November 14, 1969, the Court of Appeals —
"RESOLVED TO DENY the said motion for reconsideration. Rulings in the
pertinent cases are equally applicable to the Republic of the Philippines where the
Latter is the appellant that recourse to the original records is immaterial because
it is what appears in the record on appeal that is essential." 5 2

Hence, this appeal by certiorari on the following assignment of errors, i.e., that
the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that — (1) prescription, the statute of
limitations and laches do not be against the Republic, as a sovereign state, and that, it is
not bound or prejudiced by the faults or mistakes of its o cers and employees, (2) the
dismissal of Republic's appeal is not in accordance with the liberal construction of the
Rules of Court and the promotion of its object to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of actions and proceedings; (3) the trial court
has no jurisdiction to entertain the application for land registration of Alfredo V. de
Ocampo on the ground that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were already registered under the
Torrens System before 1919; (4) the dismissal of Republic's appeal placed technicality
over substance; and (5) the dismissal of Republic's appeal will abet and promote land
grabbing. 5 3
Private respondents in turn stress in their respective briefs, inter alia, (1) that
Republic shed its immunity and sovereignty and assumed the garb of an ordinary
private litigant when it initiated an action for forcible entry and detainer case over Lots
Nos. 817 and 2509 against respondent de Ocampo, led its opposition in the land
registration case, and instituted Civil Case No. 264 (6154); 5 4 (2) that Republic should
comply with the mandatory and jurisdictional requirements of the rules on perfection of
appeals, citing cases; 5 5 that there cannot be one set of Rules for ordinary private
litigants, and another set for the State otherwise the set-up will result in the denial of
due process and equal protection of law to private litigants as well as chaos in the
administration of justice; 5 6 and (4) that public policy and sound practice demand that,
at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become nal at some
definite date fixed by the law. 5 7
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 The threshold and, in the ultimate analysis, the decisive issue raised by this
petition is whether the dismissal by respondent Court of Appeals of Republic's appeal
from the decision of the trial court denying its Amended Petition, is not proper and
should be set aside as contended by Republic, or correct and should be maintained, as
argued by respondents. The issue — framed in the context of the suit's true signi cance
to the parties involved in this protracted proceeding and in the light of the value the
protagonists attach to the outcome of the litigation — may be stated thus — Should the
government, represented by petitioner Republic not be permitted by respondent Court
of Appeals to show that it stands to lose thru fraudulent machinations close to three
hundred (300) hectares of prime sugar land to the private respondents, who have
allegedly secured their titles to these holdings long after the same parcels of land were
already titled in the name of the original owner, Meerkamp and Company and, therefore,
the trial court's action in directing the issuance of the title in the name of respondent de
Ocampo is null and void ab initio and of no legal effect, simply because petitioner
Republic failed to show in its record on appeal that it was perfected on time and that it
actually filed its record on appeal six (6) days late?
Respondent Court of Appeals, in a very simplistic approach, which disregards the
substantive merits of the appeal dismissed, the same on the grounds that the record
on appeal did not show on its face that it was perfected on time, and, additionally, that
even if it were to be assumed that the motion for extension of 20 days to le the record
on appeal was indeed granted, the appeal was still not perfected on time because the
record on appeal was led November 9, six (6) days after November 3, 1967, when
petitioner's requested extension expired.
If respondents' line of reasoning were to be upheld, the dismissal of the appeal
may be sustained. For, as stated, in its notice of appeal led on October 12, 1967,
petitioner Republic received a copy of the decision of the trial court on September 14,
1967. 5 8 Therefore, it had until October 14, 1967 within which to le its record on
appeal. The record on appeal does not show that the extension prayed for was granted,
but the lower court in its order of December 4, 1967 approved the same, as there was
no opposition to its approval. There is also no mention in the order approving the
record on appeal as to whether or not it was led on time. The record on appeal is,
however, dated November 9, 1967. Assuming then that this was also the actual ling
date, and on the further assumption that the 20-day extension was impliedly granted
with its approval, it was still led six (6) days late, after the requested extension expired
on November 3, 1967. 5 9 And, as to the legal ground for the dismissal on the foregoing
bases, this Court has repeatedly construed Section 6, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court 6 0
as mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, non-compliance with which justi es the
dismissal of the appeal. 6 1
However, a consideration in depth of the unique and peculiar facts attendant to
this case and the procedural and substantive implications of the dismissal of the
appeal now sought to be reviewed and reconsidered; and a due and proper regard to
the merits of the case rather than a fascile reliance on procedural rules, compel this
Court to reverse and set aside the dismissal of Republic's appeal by respondent Court
of Appeals for the following reasons, viz: Should Republic prove that the subject Lots
Nos. 817 and 2509 were registered in favor of Meerkamp and Company before 1919,
the trial court's decision decreeing again the same lots in the name of respondent de
Ocampo in 1965 is null and void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction and a fatal in rmity
necessarily attaches to the said decision; (2) There are strong and substantial
allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations employed by
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 respondent de Ocampo in securing his title. Relevant to this is the express nding of
the trial court that the Petition for Relief was led within the reglementary period
prescribed in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and the Amended Petition was
led within one year from issuance of the decree. If the appeal is dismissed without
considering its merits, the above periods will resumed to run and will lapse, and the
reliefs sought herein will be forever foreclosed to Republic; (3) Assuming that
respondents can invoke the material data rule, and/or the fact that Republic's appeal
was led out of time because the record on appeal was submitted to the Court six (6)
days beyond the requested extension of 20 days, it always in the power of this Court to
suspend its rules or to except certain cases therefrom whenever countervailing
considerations so warrant; and (4) This Court is not powerless to prevent gross
miscarriage of justice, which would follow if Republic's appeal is dismissed — since it
stands to lose close to 300 hectares of prime sugar land already titled in its blame and
devoted to educational purposes — if it is true that the land registration court was
without jurisdiction to issue a second decree of registration in favor of respondent de
Ocampo and, if it is also true that fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations
attended respondent de Ocampo's application for registration and likewise prevented
Republic from exposing the fake exhibits, on the basis of which he secured his title. 6 2
1. Speci cally, both Republic and respondents claim ownership over the
same Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, hence, this controversy. If Republic's contentions are
true that the said lots had been registered twice, with OCT No. 370 issued in favor of
Meerkamp and Company before 1919 and another, OCT No. 576, issued in the name of
respondent de Ocampo in 1965 — or some forty-six (46) years later — then the decision
of the trial court, sitting as land registration court, is null and void ab initio and suffers
from a fatal in rmity, which is also a ground for the review of a decree of registration,
provided no innocent purchaser for value will be prejudiced. 6 3
It is very signi cant in this connection that respondent de Ocampo admitted the
donation of Jalandoni in favor of the Bureau of Education, but averred that the lots so
donated were titled (TCT No. 1251), 6 4 while Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 applied for by
him in the land registration case were "unregistered". 6 5 Yet, both parties claim to be the
owners of the same Lots Nos. 817 and 2509. Respondent de Ocampo also gave the
area of the lots covered by TCT No. 1251, in the name of Jalandoni, as two million nine
hundred and twelve thousand four hundred and seventy four (2,912,474) square
meters, or 291 hectares plus. 6 6 Coincidentally, Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 claimed by
Republic have a total area of 289.47 hectares, 6 7 or only about two (2) hectares less.
These factors, brought to light by respondent de Ocampo himself, cannot simply be
ignored in reaching the conclusion that the disputed resolutions of respondent Court of
Appeals be reversed.
It is also important to advert to the documentary exhibits adduced by Republic in
the hearing of the Amended Petition below, one of which was a certi cation dated
November 8, 1952 signed by the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, stating that
on May 13, 1919, there was registered a sale executed by Meerkamp and Company in
favor of Esteban Jalandoni and as a result OCT No. 370 in the name of the Company
was cancelled and TCT No. 1251 was issued to Jalandoni; that TCT No. 1251 was later
cancelled by virtue of the will of Jalandoni leaving the parcel of land to the then Bureau
of Education; that TCT No. 6014 was correspondingly issued to the Bureau of
Education; and that lease contracts were annotated in TCT No. 6014 in favor of
Francisco Copper, executed by the Division Superintendent of Schools. 6 8 However, the
above certi cation does not mention the lot numbers, and no certi cates of title were
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 exhibited in court, the incumbent Register of Deeds having declared that the titles could
not be found in his Office. 6 9
The trial court also made the express finding that the alleged deed of donation by
Luis Mosquera in favor of respondent de Ocampo, dated November 10, 1911,
acknowledged before one Notary Public John Boardman does not appear in his notarial
book which is on le in the Bureau of Record Management, Manila, from October 16,
1911 to May, 1913. 7 0
The Provincial Assessor of Negros Occidental likewise issued a certi cation,
dated November 29, 1966, stating that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were never declared in
the name of Mosquera. 7 1 His later certi cation states that the said lots were assessed
in the name of the Bureau of Education, and that the technical descriptions in the
Bureau of Lands records show that the same lots were in the name of Meerkamp and
Company. 7 2
Authorities are in agreement that a land registration court is without jurisdiction
to decree again the registration of land already registered in an earlier registration case,
and that the second decree entered for the same land is null and void. 7 3 If there is no
valid and nal judgment by the land registration court to speak of, then the ling of an
admittedly late appeal from the decision denying the Amended Petition would be
immaterial and of no moment, in so far as these proceedings are concerned in view of
the congenitally fatal in rmity that attaches to the main decision, decreeing for the
second time the registration of the same Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 in favor of
respondent de Ocampo, despite an earlier registration in the name of Meerkamp and
Company. Jurisprudence holds that the appellant's failure to perfect an appeal on time,
"although ordinarily decisive, carries no persuasive force" and may be completely
disregarded if the trial court acted without jurisdiction. 7 4 As held in United States v.
Jayme, 7 5 lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is fatal and may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organizes the court; it is given only by law, and in the manner prescribed by law and an
objection on the lack of such jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties. The in rmity
cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent, 7 6 or by will of
the parties. 7 7
In the interest of justice, which is the paramount consideration in all litigations,
and especially considering the cloud surrounding the decision of the land registration
court, as aforesaid, the more judicious course to follow is for respondent Court of
Appeals to entertain Republic's appeal, not to dismiss it, so that if it nds the same to
be meritorious, and the decision appealed from is reversed, the correct identity of the
lots that were donated to the then Bureau of Education (admitted by respondent de
Ocampo), as well as those parcels of land applied for by said respondent in the land
registration case, may already be ascertained once and for all, in the trial court below,
and in this same proceeding, without Republic having to resort to relitigation to prove
its claim. Further proceedings will not prejudice respondents. On the contrary, the cloud
over their titles, OCT No. 576 and TCT No. 42217, issued in favor of respondents de
Ocampo and Anglo, respectively, will be removed if Republic's claim is not true.
2. There is a serious charge, which is also crucial to the issue between the
parties, that respondent de Ocampo used fraudulent misrepresentations and
machinations in securing his title. Firstly, there was the averment in his Answer in Civil
Case No. 264 (6154) for recovery of possession of the subject lots by Republic, which
case was jointly tried with the land registration case, that the properties alleged to have
been donated by Jalandoni to the then Bureau of Education were "different" from Lots
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 Nos. 817 and 2509, applied for by him, the Jalandoni holdings being "titled" lands, while
Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were "unregistered" lands. The then applicant de Ocampo even
cited TCT No. 1251 of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental as the title covering
the lots in the name of Jalandoni, further stating that the lands donated by him to the
Bureau of Education had an area of 2,912,474 square meters, 7 8 or 291 hectares plus.
Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 have a total area of 289.47 hectares, 7 9 or a difference of only
2 hectares, more or less. The coincidence in area is highly signi cant since both claim
to be the owners of the same lots. Secondly, certain documents which were presented
as exhibits by respondent de Ocampo, on the basis of which he secured OCT 576 in his
name, were withdrawn from the les of the trial court, and, thereafter were allegedly
lost by re. As a result, Republic's pending motion to have the said exhibits produced
for examination of their genuineness by the NBI could not be made. Unless successfully
traversed, the inference is strong that respondents did not want a full disclosure of the
true nature of the same by the NBI and that the truth had been suppressed. The
inference is also buttressed by the Republic's claim that despite their counsel's
knowledge of Republic's intention to le the said motion which was orally
communicated to them earlier, the alleged loss was not revealed to Republic's counsel.
80

If the charge is true, there is the element of wilfull intent to deprive Republic of
just rights which constitutes the essential characteristics of actual — as distinguished
from legal — fraud. 8 1 As Justice Fernando stressed, "Nicolas v. Director of Lands 8 2
should erase any doubt as to the extreme judicial displeasure at this species of fraud of
an applicant seeking to include as a part of the property to which title is sought land
actually in possession of another." 8 3 This is very relevant in view of the denial of the
Amended Petition which was premised on the conclusion that allegations in the said
petition did not constitute actual and extrinsic fraud and which, according to the trial
court, is "the only ground" available to review or reopen the decree of related
signi cance is the express nding of the trial court that the original Petition for Relief
was led within the reglementary period pursuant to Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court, and the Amended Petition was led within one year from issuance of the decree.
For, if the appeal is dismissed — notwithstanding allegations of fraud which appear to
be supported by the evidence adduced during the hearing of the Amended Petition
below — the appealed decision will become nal and executory, and the aforesaid
periods will lapse, foreclosing forever to Republic the reliefs prayed for in the Amended
Petition. Although Republic may seek to recover the lots in a different action that may
still be legally available to it after the appeal is dismissed, that recourse will involve not
only a re-litigation and, therefore, multiplicity of suits, but will also entail the risk that
subject lots may be disposed of to innocent purchasers for value to put them beyond
recovery. As it is, the other respondent, Anglo, has already intervened, alleging that he
bought the same lots from respondent de Ocampo on January 6, 1966, and that TCT
No 42217 was in fact issued to him. 8 4 A new party, Salvacion Marañon, also sought to
intervene in the case and led in respondent Court of Appeals a motion to dismiss
Republic's appeal before the said Court. 8 5
Finally, We held in Reyes, et al. v. Borbon, et al. 8 6 "(W)hen the attention of the
Court of Land Registration is called to the fact that the same land has been registered
in the name of two different persons, it is the duty of said court to order an
investigation of that fact and that should be done without even without requiring the
parties to show that a fraud has been committed in securing the double registration.
When it is established that the same has been registered in the name of two different
persons, the title should remain in the name of the person securing the rst
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 registration." This Court further held that "(T)he very purpose of the Torrens System
would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second
action for registration." 8 7
3. The foregoing overriding considerations then — the alleged lack of
jurisdiction and the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations, which,
buttressed by strong evidence, can nullify the second registration and/or set aside OCT
576 issued to respondent de Ocampo — taken in relation with the procedural and
substantive implications which could and would arise if the appeal were dismissed,
namely, the risk that the holdings may be transacted to third parties and the fact that
Republic's action to recover the holdings would give rise to multiplicity of suits —
compel Us to conclude that the only recourse — in the interest of just and expeditious
proceedings, considering that these have been pending for close to twenty (20) years
now — is to suspend Our rules and/or except this case from their operation. For when
the operation of the Rules of will lead to an injustice We have, in justi able instances,
resorted to this extraordinary remedy to prevent it. 8 8 The Rules have been drafted with
the primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. 8 9 As a corollary, if
their application and operation tend to subvert and defeat instead of promote and
enhance it, their suspension is justi ed. In the words of Justice Antonio P. Barredo in
his concurring opinion in Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, "(T)his Court, through the revered and
eminent Mr. Justice Abad Santos, found occasion in the case of C. Viuda de Ordoveza v.
Raymundo, to lay down for recognition in this jurisdiction, the sound rule in the
administration of justice holding that 'it is always in the power of the court (Supreme
Court) to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation,
whenever the purposes of justice required it. . ." 9 0
Exceptions to the operation of the mandatory and jurisdictional character of the
rules on perfection of appeals are to be noted in Sarmiento v. Salud, et al., , 9 1 penned by
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, Dequito v. Lopez 9 2 and Carillo v. Allied Workers Association of the
Philippines 9 3 both written for the Court by Justice E. M. Fernando, decided years after
the Revised Rules of Court took effect in January, 1964. In the Sarmiento case, the late
appeal was allowed on the ground of laches on the part of the appellees, the ling of
the motion to dismiss having taken place six (6) years after the brief for appellees was
led, and after the case was submitted for decision. This, according to the Court,
"constitutes a unique instance of laches without comparable precedent in the records
of the Court." 9 4 The Dequito and Carillo cases, upon the other hand, took into account
the fact that labor cases were involved. Justice Fernando expressly noted in the
Dequito case that "in the light of the constitutional as well as codal and statutory
mandates, there being an explicit command of protection to labor as well as the
promotion of social justice," 9 5 the motion to dismiss the late appeal which was " led
much too late" hardly deserved sympathy or consideration. 9 6 In the Carillo case, no
question whatsoever as to the late appeal was raised, hence, "it would seem that
whatever right to contest the jurisdiction could have been availed of is by now no longer
in existence. 9 7 Continuing, Justice Fernando stated that "Social justice would be a
meaningless term if in a situation like the present, an element of rigidity would be
a xed to procedural precepts and made to recover the matter. Flexibility should not be
ruled out. Precisely, what is sought to be accomplished by such a fundamental principle
expressly so declared by the Constitution is the effectiveness of the community's effort
to assist the economically underprivileged." The responsibility to protect labor is
incumbent "not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary,
to translate this pledge into a living reality. " 9 8

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 While the above exceptions are predicated on different grounds, they
nevertheless support the view that the rigid adherence to the rules on perfection of
appeals may and should be relaxed where compelling reasons 80 warrant. The grounds
invoked in this case — not only lack of jurisdiction but gross injustice itself — more than
justify the exception — considering further that the delay in the perfection of the appeal
involved six (6) days only.
4. Finally, enshrined in our legal and judicial annuals is the maxim that no
person should enrich himself at the expense or prejudice of others. 9 9 Courts should
not be used as instruments to disregard this elemental and basic norm — which is the
essence of justice and fair play. The whole trust of our laws on civil relations enjoys all
those who come before the courts of justice to observe true faith and candor in their
dealings with one another — the government included. 1 0 0 The commendable and
determined efforts on the part of the citizenry to fashion a New Society rid of graft,
corruption and the persistent malaise of land grabbing, will be set back, if the subject
lots — consisting of close to 300 hectares which are devoted to educational purposes
— have indeed been wrongfully titled to respondent de Ocampo. Happily, We can at this
stage still prevent this, if true, by setting aside the dismissal of Republic's appeal and
according the parties the opportunity in this proceeding, and without further need to re-
litigate, to terminate this litigation, which has been pending for close to twenty (20)
long years — in fairness to both parties.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August
21, 1969, dismissing the appeal, as well as its resolution of November 14, 1969,
denying petitioner Republic's motion for reconsideration in CA G.R. Nos. 40683-84 are
hereby SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the said Court to give due course to and
consider on its merits Republic's appeal. No costs.
Castro, C J., Fernando, Muñoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero,
JJ., concur.
Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

This case illustrates graphically once more the correctness of the Court's turning
away from and setting aside of the rigid material data rule in the perfection of appeals
and its adoption, in the interest of substantial justice as against mere technicality, of
the liberal rule since the leading case of Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals 1 that "the
mere absence of a formal order granting the motion for extension of time to le the
record on appeal should not be fatal to the petitioner if the record on appeal led within
the requested extension period was approved by the court a quo."
Here, even conceding that the record on appeal was led six (6) days later
beyond the requested extension period, special considerations have been shown in the
case at bar for the application of the principle of substantial justice as set out in the
main opinion of Mr. Justice Santos. Among others, it should be stressed that the
State's record on appeal was approved as per the trial court's order of December 4,
1967 with the express statement that there was no opposition from respondents-
appellees to its approval; and that the State's claims, that its evidence preponderantly
shows that the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the land registration
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 application of respondent de Ocampo led belatedly after forty-six years and with
alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations since the lots in question
(some 289 hectares of prime sugar land) were long ago before 1919 already duly
registered in the name of the predecessor-vendor of Esteban Jalandoni who
subsequently bequeathed the same to the Bureau of Education exclusively for
educational purposes, which were rejected by the trial court on erroneous grounds,
raise a jurisdictional issue that should properly be reviewed and determined by the
appellate court. cdll

It should be further stressed that to uphold the appellate court's peremptory

dismissal of the State's appeal would bar the State "from seeking again to recover the
lots in a different action that may still be legally available to it after the appeal is
dismissed" notwithstanding the main opinion's declaration to this effect 2 since the
petitioner State would be foreclosed by the principle of res adjudicata from ling still
another suit for the recovery of the lots in question. And the State itself in its comment
of February 13, 1970 on respondents' motion to dismiss ( led through then Solicitor
General now a member of this Court, Associate Justice Felix Q. Antonio) expressly so
admitted "that if the petition is dismissed, thereby sustaining the resolution of the Court
of Appears dismissing the appeal by the Government, then the latter would have no
further remedy. Certainly, to lose a remedy resulting in unjust deprivation of one's
property cannot be categorized except as substantial" 3
The precedent of Paulino vs. Court of Appeals 4 where the Court ordered the
dying of due course to an appeal not withstanding that the same was admittedly led
two days beyond the reglementary period and had been therefore rejected by the
appellate court is fury applicable to the case at bar. We cited therein inter alia the
demands of substantial justice and the presence of special circumstances (as in this
case) for giving due course to the appeal and reiterated that "(T)he underlying principle
in the administration of justice and application of the rules is substantial justice and fair
play. As restated by the Court in Obut vs. Court of Appeals 5 , '(W)e cannot look with
favor on a course of action which would place the administration of justice in a straight
jacket for then the result would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at all.
Verily, judicial orders, such as the one subject of this petition, are issued to be obeyed,
nonetheless a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the circumstances attending the
case may warrant. What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant
is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense
rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities."
As in the case of Carco Motor Sales, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 6 wherein we also
set aside the appellate court's dismissal of an appeal for failure to le appellant's brief
due to the fault and negligence of counsel's o ce secretary, we are herein persuaded
that the higher interests of justice and fairness justify the setting aside of respondent
court's peremptory dismissal of petitioner's appeal and that the exercise of the Court's
"inherent right" to reinstate an appeal that was dismissed as the result of fraud, mistake
or unavoidable casualty is fully justified under the circumstances of the case at bar.
Referring brie y to the view expressed that the State's record on appeal be
remanded so that its appeal would cover not only the denial of its petition for relief but
the lower court's adverse judgment on the merits, 7 it should be noted that as stated
hereinafter the trial court in effect granted the petition for relief and reopened the case,
setting aside its rst adverse decision of August 3, 1965, (from which no appeal was
taken), although it again rendered an adverse judgment against the State as per its
decision of August 30, 1967, which is the subject of the State's appeal. The judgment of
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 the Court has therefore properly ordered the reinstatement of the State's appeal and
remanded the same to respondent Court of Appeals for determination on its merits
without need of amending the record on appeal, since the State's notice of appeal (as
well as its pleadings and briefs duly appealed from the trial court's decision of August
30, 1967 "on the ground that said decision is not in accordance with law and the
evidence adduced in these cases." 8
One nal word. The record shows a sorry lack of care and dedication to duty on
the part of the staff of the State's counsel that almost cost the State by default the
forfeiture and loss of the valuable lots involved, were it not for the special
circumstances and the interests of substantial justice which have led the Court to set
aside respondent court's summary dismissal of the appeal. The State's suit against
respondents for recovery of the land was rst dismissed by the trial court in its
judgment of August 3, 1965 and although the State was duly served with copy thereof
on August 13, 1965, it took no appeal therefrom since the docket clerk mis led the
same in another case and the period for appeal lapsed. 9 Fortunately, the State's
petition for relief from judgment was eventually granted by the trial court which
reopened the case and received additional evidence from the State, although ultimately
it rendered its questioned judgment of August 30, 1967 again dismissing the State's
suit. Here again, the appeal taken by the State appears to have been perfected late by
six (6) days, which normally would have meant forfeiture of the right of appeal. The
attention of the Solicitor General should be caused to these acts of carelessness and
neglect so that the proper remedial and administrative measures may be taken to avoid
the recurrence thereof.

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur in the well-written opinion of Justice Santos. I will even go farther. I vote
for the remand of the case to the trial court so that the State can amend its record on
appeal and appeal from the lower court's decision of August 3, 1965, dismissing its
complaint for recovery of the possession of the disputed land and ordering the
registration thereof in the name of Alfredo V. de Ocampo. The appeal from a judgment
denying relief Under Rule 38 includes the review of the judgment on the merits (Sec. 2,
Rule 41, Rules of Court).
The ultimate issue is whether the laud already registered as patrimonial property
of the State (for the use of the Bureau of Public Schools), as allegedly shown in TCT No.
6014, can still be registered in the name of another person. My answer is that it cannot
be done because section 46 of Act 496 provides that "no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession". The action to recover possession of registered land does not prescribe.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, p. 14.
2. Id., p. 15.
3. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 4 and 6.
4. Id., p. 6.
5. Id., p. 13.
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 6. Brief for Respondent de Ocampo, pp. 2-3.

7. See Answer, Brief for Petitioner, p. 45.

8. Record on Appeal, pp. 41-42.

9. Brief for respondent de Ocampo, p. 1.

10. Id., p. 2; See also, De Ocampo vs. Rep. of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-19633, Oct. 31,
1963; 118 Phil. 1276, 78, (1963).

11. Ibid.; Brief for respondent Anglo, p. 4.

12. See Answer, Brief for Petitioner, pp. 46-49.
13. Brief for respondent de Ocampo, pp. 2-3.

14. Id., p. 3.
15. Record on Appeal, pp. 5, 20 and 21.
16. Id., p. 2.
17. Id., p. 34.
18. Id., p. 29.
19. Id., pp. 41-42.
20. Id,. p. 43.
21. Id., p. 64.
22. Id., p. 71.
23. Id., p. 76.
24. Id., pp. 80 and 83.
25. Id., p. 88.
26. Id., p. 99.
27. Id., p. 98.
28. Id., p. 104.
29. Id., p. 101.
30. Id., pp. 102-104.
31. Id., pp. 105-106.
32. Id., pp. 106-107
33. Id., p. 107.
34. Id., p. 113.
35. Id., pp. 119 and 127.
36. Id., p. 131.

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 37. Id., p. 134.
38. Id., p. 169.
39. Id., pp. 186-189.
40. Id., pp. 181-182.
41. Id., pp. 182-183.
42. Id., pp. 183-184, citing Elviña v. Filamor, 56 Phil. 305.
43. Id., pp. 184-185.
44. Id., pp. 185-186.
45. Id., p. 184.
46. Id., pp. 191-192.
47. See note 1.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. See Rollo, p. 8.

52. See note 2.

53. Brief for petitioner, pp. 1-3.

54. Brief for respondent Anglo, p. 18; See 31150 Brief for respondent de Ocampo, pp. 47-48.

55. Brief for respondent Anglo, pp. 18-19.

56. Id., p. 25.
57. Id., p. 45.
58. Record on Appeal, p. 193.

59. Ibid.
60. Rule 41, Section 6 reads in part: "Section 6. Record on appeal; form and contents
thereof. The full names of all the parties to the proceedings shall be stated in the caption
of the record on appeal and it shall include the order or judgment from which the appeal
is taken, and, in chronological order, copies of only such pleadings, petitions, motions
and all interlocutory orders as are related to the appealed order or judgment and
necessary for the proper understanding of the issue involved, together with such data as
will show that the appeal was perfected on time . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
61. Berkenkotter v. Court of Appeals, No. L-36629, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 228;
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Santos, No. L-26227, Sept. 27, 1966, 18 SCRA
113; Arareta v. Madrigal & Co., Inc., Nos. L-26227-28, October 25, 1966, 18 SCRA 446;
Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corp. v. Progressive Labor Association, No. L-
27125, Sept. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 110; Ozaeta v. Court of Appeals, No. L-26938, Oct. 29,
1971, 42 SCRA 79; Reyes v. Carrascoso, No. L-28783, March 31, 1971, 38 SCRA 296;
Workmen's Ins. Co. v. Augusto, No. L-31060, July 29, 1971, 40 SCRA 123; Imperial Ins.
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 Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No. L-28722, Oct. 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 97.

62. See notes 31, 32 and 33.

63. Republic v. Kalintas, L-25141, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 716; See also Vda. de
Cuaycong vs. Vda. de Sengbenco, 110 Phil. 113 (1960).

64. See note 12.

65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. See note 5.

68. Record on Appeal, pp. 186-187.

69. Id., p. 187.

70. Ibid.
71. Id., pp. 187-188.
72. Id., p. 188.
73. Mabuhay Dev. Co. v. Ronquillo, Nos. L-24705-06, April 29, 1971, 38 SCRA 439;
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Zamora, 41 Phil. 905, (1920) and cases cited;
See also Reyes, et al. v. Borbon, et al 50 Phil. 791 (1927) citing Legarda and Prieto v.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915); Acantilado v. De Santos, 31 Phil. 350 (1915); Roman
Catholic Bishop of Cebu v. Phil. Railway Co. and Reynes, 49 Phil. 546 (1926); Singian v.
Mla. Railroad Co., 60 Phil. 192 (1934).

74. The Leyte-Samar Sales Co., et al. v. Cea, etc., et al., 93 Phil. 100 (1953), citing
authorities.
75. 24 Phil. 92 (1913).

76. Villa v. Ibañez, 88 Phil. 405 (1951).

77. Del Espiritu v. David, et al., 112 Phil. 292 (1961).

78. See note 12.

79. See note 5.

80. See notes 31, 32 and 33.

81. See Grey Alba v. Cruz, 17 Phil. 57-58 (1910); See also Minlay v. Sandoval, L-28901,
Sept. 4, 1973, 53 SCRA 8.
82. L-19147, December 28, 1963, 9 SCRA 934.

83. See Minlay v. Sandoval, supra, pp. 8-9.

84. See note 8.

85. See note 1.

86. 55 See note 13, at 769, citing cases; Emphasis supplied.

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 87. Id., p. 797.
88. Tiglao v. COMELEC, Nos. L-31566 and 31847, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 467, citing
Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275 (1936); Ocampo v. Sanchez, 97 Phil. 472, (1955);
Ronquillo v. Marasigan, L-11521, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 312-313; and Justice Barredo's
concurring opinion in Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, L-30570, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA, 933.
89. Shioji v. Harvey, 42 Phil. 341 (1922).

90. Cit. supra, at p. 933.

91. L-25221, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 365, (Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration).

92. L-27757, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1352.

93. L-23689, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 566.

94. Supra, p. 366.
95. Supra, p. 1355.
96. Ibid.
97. Supra, p. 572.
98. Id., p. 574.
99. See Civil Code, Art. 22.

100. Id., Art. 19.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

1. 53 SCRA 228 (1973), followed by Pimentel vs. Court of Appeals, 64 SCRA 476 (1975)
and a host of other cases.

2. At page 22. .
3. Rollo, at pages 78-79.

4. L-46723, Oct. 28, 1977, citing Bagalanon vs. Court of Appeals, 76 SCRA 233, 236-237
(March 31, 1977).
5. 70 SCRA 546-554 (April 30, 1976), per Muñoz Palma, J.

6. 78 SCRA 526, 530 (Aug. 31, 1977).pa.

7. See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino.

8. Record on appeal, pp. 192-193.

9. See main opinion at pp. 4-5.

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