4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.

JOSE BELMAR
UMAPAS Y CRISOSTOMO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 215742, March 22,
2017]

FACTS:

In the evening of November 30, 1998, around 11 o'clock, appellant mauled his wife Gemma
Gulang Umapas and, with the use of alcohol intended for a coleman or lantern, doused her with
it and set her ablaze at their home located at Lower Kalakhan, Olongapo City. Gemma was
brought to James L. Gordon Memorial Hospital for treatment by a certain Rodrigo Dacanay who
informed the attending hospital personnel, which included Dr. Arnildo C. Tamayo (Dr. Tamayo),
that it was appellant who set her on fire. 

Gemma was found to have suffered the following injuries: contusions on the left cheek and on
the lower lip, lacerations on right parietal area and on the left temporal area, and thermal burns
over 57% of her body. Due to the severity of the injuries, the victim died on December 5, 1998
from multiple organ failure secondary to thermal burns.

The police authorities were unable to talk to Gemma immediately after the incident as they were
prevented from doing so by the attending physician at the hospital's emergency room. But the
following day, December 1, 1998, around 1:30 p.m., SPO1 Anthony Garcia (SPO1 Garcia) was
able to interview the victim at her hospital bed. Though she spoke slowly with eyes closed,
Gemma was said to be coherent and agreed to give a statement about the incident which included
her identifying her husband, Umapas, as her assailant. Gemma was asked if she felt that she was
dying, and she said "yes." SPO1 Garcia reduced her statement in writing and the same was
attested thru the victim's thumbmark. A nurse who was present when the statement of the victim
was taken signed as witness.

Appellant, for his part, narrated that on November 30, 1998, he was with a certain Rommel
fishing in Kalakhan. They left at 5 o'clock in the afternoon and returned at 2 o'clock in the
morning the following day to their residence at 195 Lower Kalakhan, Olongapo City.] When
appellant went home, there was a commotion, but he claimed not to know what the commotion
was all about. There were many people in the vicinity of their house.

He then learned from the neighbors who were outside their house that his wife was brought to
the hospital but was not told why. His four children were in their house and they told him that
their mother is in the hospital. When he learned about this, appellant allegedly dressed up to go
to the hospital, but he was not able to go because he was stopped by the people from the
barangay. He was instead brought to the police precinct and was detained.

ISSUES:

Whether the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant based on the alleged
dying statement of the victim Gemma Umapas, admitting the same as a dying declaration and
part of res gestae

whether the court a quo erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the prosecution's
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

Parricide is committed when a person is killed. The deceased is killed by the accused. The
deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.

In the instant case, the fact of Gemma's death is incontestable. The fact that Gemma died on
December 5, 1998 was established by witnesses from both the prosecution and defense. As
additional proof of Gemma's demise, the prosecution presented her Certificate of Death which
was admitted by the RTC. Also, the spousal relationship between Gemma and the appellant is
undisputed.

Appellant already admitted that Gemma was his legitimate wife in the course of the trial of the
case. In parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the relationship between the offender and
victim is their marriage certificate. However, oral evidence may also be considered in proving
the relationship between the two as long as such proof is not contested, as in this case. Thus,
having established the fact of death and the spousal relationship between Gemma and the
appellant, the remaining element to be proved is whether the deceased is killed by the accused.

Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible, thus:
1. The declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death. This refers not only to the facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both before and
after the assault having a direct causal connection with it. Statements involving the nature of the
declarant's injury or the cause of death; those imparting deliberation and willfulness in the attack,
indicating the reason or motive for the killing; justifying or accusing the accused; or indicating
the absence of cause for the act are admissible. 

2. At the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an
impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief
in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending
death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration
admissible. It is not necessary that the approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of
the deceased. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked
on death as certainly impending. 

3. The declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is that where the declarant would not have
been a competent witness had he survived, the proffered declarations will not be admissible.
Thus, in the absence of evidence showing that the declarant could not have been competent to be
a witness had he survived, the presumption must be sustained that he would have been
competent.
4. The declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which
the declarant is the victim.

In the present case, all the above mentioned requisites of a dying declaration were met. Gemma
communicated her ante-mortem statement to SPO1 Garcia, identifying Umapas as the person
who mauled her, poured gasoline on her, and set her ablaze. Gemma's statements constitute a
dying declaration, given that they pertained to the cause and circumstances of her death and
taking into consideration the severity of her wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that she
uttered the same under the belief that her own death was already imminent.

 There is ample authority for the view that the declarant's belief in the imminence of her death
can be shown by the declarant's own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the
nature of her wounds, statements made in her presence, or by the opinion of her physician.

Moreover, Gemma would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had
she survived. There is nothing in the records that show that Gemma rendered involuntary
declaration. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for parricide in
which Gemma was the victim. It has been held that conviction or guilt may be based mainly on
the ante-mortem statements of the deceased. In the face of the positive identification made by
deceased Gemma of appellant Umapas, it is clear that Umapas committed the crime.

Direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused when
circumstantial evidence can also sufficiently establish his guilt. The consistent rule has been that
circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have
been proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld
provided that the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person. All these requisites, not to mention the dying declaration of the deceased victim herself,
are present in the instant case.

Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency and
credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce. However,
while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person given for the
purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence,
it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact
that the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made.

Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such
statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a
matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of
such a fact. This is the doctrine of independently relevant statements. Thus, all these requisites to
support a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, not to mention the dying declaration of
the deceased victim herself, are existing in the instant case.