Canadian Psychology / Psychologie canadienne © 2018 Canadian Psychological Association

2018, Vol. 59, No. 1, 1–14 0708-5591/18/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cap0000142

Emotion Regulation: Why Beliefs Matter

Brett Q. Ford James J. Gross

University of Toronto Stanford University

Emotion regulation research is flourishing. However, enthusiasm for this topic has outpaced conceptual
clarity, resulting in a maelstrom of disparate findings. In the present review, we bring together two
conceptual frameworks that we believe may be useful in organizing existing findings and suggesting
directions for future research. The first considers individuals’ fundamental beliefs about emotion and the
pervasive role they play in emotion regulation. The second identifies how emotion regulation unfolds
across time (Gross, 2015). We bring these two frameworks together to highlight how individuals’ beliefs
about emotion influence each step in the emotion regulation process: identifying a need to regulate,
selecting regulation strategies, implementing regulation, and monitoring one’s regulatory success. At
each stage, we consider both how individuals’ beliefs shape the emotion regulation they apply to
themselves (intrinsic emotion regulation), and also the emotion regulation they apply to others (extrinsic
emotion regulation). We conclude by highlighting several promising directions for future research.

Keywords: emotion, emotion beliefs, emotion regulation, extrinsic emotion regulation

Emotions are a crucial part of the human condition. Without them, education (Duckworth & Gross, 2014), business (Côté, 2005), eco-
we would not have the thrill of victory or the agony of defeat, the nomics (Heilman, Crisan, Houser, Miclea, & Miu, 2010), law
ecstasy of love, or the despair of loss. Emotions are not just orna- (Maroney, 2006), and political science (Halperin, 2014). This popu-
mental, either—they help us effectively respond to opportunities and larity, however, comes with challenges. Most centrally, an ever-
challenges we encounter (Lazarus, 1991). But emotions are not al- growing set of findings from a diverse set of perspectives has out-
ways helpful—they can also be destructive, especially when they are paced conceptual clarity. For this reason, it is important to develop
experienced to an inappropriate degree or in an inappropriate context conceptual frameworks that are relevant across perspectives and can
(Gross & Jazaieri, 2014). Thus, in spite of the pleasure, meaning, and provide clarity while also generating new testable ideas. In the present
utility that emotions can provide us, it is also crucial that we are able review, we focus on two frameworks that we believe may be helpful
to engage in emotion regulation, influencing which emotions we for the burgeoning field of emotion regulation.
have, when we have them, and how we experience and express them We first consider a thematically oriented framework, highlighting a
(Gross, 1998). theme that pervades the field of emotion regulation on a theoretical
Reflecting its long-standing importance, emotion regulation has level but has been relatively sparsely empirically examined: individ-
been explored for millennia, as philosophers (e.g., Socrates), historical uals’ fundamental beliefs about emotion. Individuals differ in how
movements (e.g., the Enlightenment), and more recently, psycholo- they think about emotions, and it is becoming increasingly clear that
gists (e.g., Freud) have weighed in on the interplay between emotion these varying beliefs are deeply consequential. Theorizing and initial
(e.g., passion) and its regulation (e.g., reason). Interestingly, in our evidence strongly suggests that emotion regulation may be a core
modern age, empirical interest in emotion regulation started slowly: conduit through which these beliefs influences our lives. Second, we
only a small number of papers on emotion regulation were published consider a process-oriented framework, highlighting a model that
each year through the mid1990s. Just two decades later, however, we clarifies the unfolding nature of emotion regulation across time: the
are in the enviable position of witnessing a flood of emotion regula- process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 2015).
tion research: in 2016 alone, Google Scholar indexed 20,000 or so After introducing each of these frameworks, we unite the frame-
new papers published on emotion regulation. works and illustrate the pervasive ways in which individuals’ beliefs
This accelerating trajectory brings many benefits, including new about emotion may influence emotion regulation at each stage of the
scientific findings regarding emotion regulation across various regulation process—identifying a need to regulate, selecting a regu-
domains including mental health (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & lation strategy, implementing the regulation, and monitoring one’s
Schweizer, 2010), medicine (DeSteno, Gross, & Kubzansky, 2013), regulatory success. This review highlights exciting new empirical
work as well as promising directions for future work.

Beliefs About Emotion

Brett Q. Ford, Department of Psychology, University of Toronto; James
J. Gross, Department of Psychology, Stanford University. Given that emotions are central to how we relate to our envi-
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Brett Q. ronment and to each other, it is natural that we spend time
Ford, Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, 1265 Military thinking, discussing, and developing beliefs about emotions. These
Trail SW427A, Toronto, Ontario M1C 1A4, Canada. E-mail: brett.ford@ beliefs, in turn, influence how we perceive and manage our own
utoronto.ca and others’ emotions.

1
2 FORD AND GROSS

To identify fundamental beliefs about emotion, it is useful to uals can also hold a variety of subordinate beliefs that consider: (a)
consider two age-old debates. One debate concerns our attitude beliefs about specific emotional states or affective states (e.g.,
toward emotions: to what extent are emotions good (e.g., de- anger, worry, happiness; negative or positive emotions); (b) beliefs
sirable and useful) versus bad (e.g., unwanted and harmful)? about specific emotion channels (e.g., the subjective feelings,
The second debate concerns the controllability of emotions: to expressive behaviours, or physiological concomitants of emo-
what extent are emotions uncontrollable (e.g., arriving unbid- tions); (c) beliefs about emotions within specific contexts, such as
den and departing of their own accord) versus controllable (e.g., particular settings (e.g., with friends and family vs. colleagues),
modulated according to our will)? These debates have endured when pursuing particular goals (e.g., when avoiding threats vs.
for thousands of years, likely because they evoke strong intu- pursuing rewards), or given certain self-regulatory resources (e.g.,
itions on either side. Indeed, each individual decides for her or when feeling fatigued vs. rested, or when using a particular self-
himself what the ‘right’ answer to these questions is and these
regulation tools); and (d) beliefs about the emotions of specific
decisions form the basis for each individual’s beliefs about
targets (e.g., a belief about the self, specific others, certain groups,
emotion. Although these are not the only beliefs individuals
or ‘people’ in general).
hold about emotions, the present review focuses on these beliefs
As illustrated in Figure 1, each of these subordinate beliefs can
because they are foundational, conceptually orthogonal, and
exist in a general form (e.g., Expressing emotions is bad), but also
have important consequences for whether and how individuals
engage in emotion regulation. in more specific forms in conjunction with other subordinate
Before considering each of these fundamental beliefs in more beliefs (e.g., Expressing embarrassment is good for making
detail, we first provide a map of the conceptual space these beliefs amends). As such, each individual is capable of holding a nuanced
cover (see Figure 1). Each of these superordinate beliefs – (1) and complex matrix of beliefs. Although many of these beliefs
beliefs about whether emotions are good versus bad and (2) beliefs have not yet been thoroughly empirically examined—and the
about whether emotions are controllable versus uncontrollable – conceptual map we provide here is doubtless incomplete—the
can be considered in their most general form as well as in more groundwork has begun to be laid for a clearer understanding of key
specific forms that vary across a number of subordinate categories. emotion-related beliefs. We next offer a brief introduction of the
For example, while an individual can hold a belief about emotion nascent research on each superordinate belief about emotion and
at its broadest level (e.g., Emotions are uncontrollable), individ- its embedded subordinate beliefs.

Figure 1. Conceptual mapping of superordinate beliefs about emotion regarding (1) whether emotions are good
versus bad and (2) whether emotions are controllable versus uncontrollable, and subordinate beliefs about
emotion regarding (a) specific emotions, (b) specific emotion channels, (c) specific contexts in which the
emotion occurs, and (d) specific targets of the belief. Although these beliefs can exist in a general form (see
“general” examples throughout), they can also overlap with each other (see “with overlap” examples through-
out), creating a complex matrix of possible beliefs about emotion.
 EMOTION REGULATION 3

Beliefs About Whether Emotions Are Good Stoics, for example, rejected the idea that emotions were outside of
Versus Bad our control (Epictetus, 1906). Others have taken an opposing view;
for example, David Hume suggested that emotions cannot be
A belief about whether emotions are ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ is controlled when he said that “reason is and ought only to be slave
one of the most basic beliefs about emotions. When this belief of the passions” (Hume, 1739). Despite long-standing interest in
is applied in a more contextualized manner, it can refer to emotion’s controllability, the empirical history of examining indi-
whether emotions are desirable (vs. undesirable), valued (vs. viduals’ beliefs about the controllability of emotion is short and
devalued), useful (vs. useless), helpful (vs. harmful), and so relatively sparse (Mikulincer & Ben-Artzi, 1995; Tamir, John,
forth. Philosophical judgments of emotion’s value (or lack Srivastava, & Gross, 2007).
thereof) can be traced through the centuries as various historical Much of the available literature on this topic has targeted
movements have expressed their opinions regarding emotion’s individual differences in general beliefs about the controllability of
promise (e.g., Sentimentalism) and its peril (e.g., Stoicism). emotion, assessed with items like “No matter how hard they try,
The empirical history of examining these beliefs, however, is people cannot really change the emotions that they have” (Tamir et
surprisingly short. al., 2007). Some scales focus on the controllability of negative
Recent research has begun to examine beliefs about whether emotion, whereas others refer primarily to ‘emotion’ (Veilleux,
emotions are good or bad by assessing individuals’ beliefs Salomaa, Shaver, Zielinski, & Pollert, 2015). Most scales also do
about whether emotion should be controlled (e.g., Mauss, not parse apart emotion channels (e.g., experience vs. expression),
Evers, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2006) or whether emotions are illog- although some scales combine items referring both to experience
ical or disruptive (e.g., Karnaze & Levine, 2017). Research has (e.g., control of ‘feelings’) and to expression (e.g., control of what
also targeted specific emotions, assessing beliefs about whether is ‘shown’; e.g., Halberstadt et al., 2013). Finally, several lines of
particular emotions are desirable (Ford & Mauss, 2014; research have considered different targets of these beliefs (e.g.,
Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Gable, 2011; Tsai, children; Halberstadt et al., 2013), including beliefs about the self
2007). Specifying further, recent research has assessed beliefs with items like ‘I have very little control over my emotions’
about whether particular emotions are desirable under certain (Catanzaro & Mearns, 1990; De Castella et al., 2013; Romero,
circumstances. Importantly, this contextualized work has also Master, Paunesku, Dweck, & Gross, 2014).
challenged the heuristic that unpleasant emotions are always When considering how beliefs about the controllability of emo-
believed to be ‘bad.’ Rather, people can believe that unpleasant tion may influence individuals’ lives, emotion regulation is a clear
emotions are desirable for a variety of reasons, including goal candidate: believing that emotions are relatively uncontrollable
attainment (e.g., feeling angry is useful when confronting ne- should pervasively impair the emotion regulation process (Knee-
gotiation partners; Tamir & Ford, 2012; Tamir et al., 2015), or land, Dovidio, Joormann, & Clark, 2016).
epistemic certainty (e.g., sadness feels comfortable and authen-
tic; Millgram, Joormann, Huppert, & Tamir, 2015; Wood,
Heimpel, Manwell, & Whittington, 2009). Although much of The Process Model of Emotion Regulation
the above research has examined individuals’ beliefs regarding The process model (Gross, 2015) holds that emotions funda-
people in general or themselves in particular, some research has mentally involve valuation—a determination of what is “good for
examined other targets. For example, the developmental liter- me” versus “bad for me.” This valuation process compares one’s
ature has long been interested in parents’ beliefs about chil- perception of the world (e.g., being late to an important interview)
dren’s emotions (Gottman, Katz, & Hooven, 1996; Halberstadt to one’s desired state of the world (e.g., wanting to perform well
et al., 2013). during the interview), resulting in an evaluative reaction (e.g.,
The superordinate belief about whether emotions are good ver- anxiety). As such, emotions represent the activity of a valuation
sus bad, as well as its constituent subordinate beliefs, all share the system.
quality of representing a fundamental evaluation of emotion. Eval- In general, a valuation system unfolds as follows: an individual
uations of emotion, in turn, carry strong implications for emotion is exposed to the world (W), which can be internal or external; they
regulation. Namely, believing an emotion is bad (or good) lays the perceive (P) the world; they evaluate (V) whether the perceived
groundwork for wanting to decrease (or respectively, to increase) world is good, bad, or irrelevant given their desired state of the
that emotion. Conversely, believing an emotion is essentially neu- world; and finally, they are motivated to engage in action (A)
tral—as in the case of emotional acceptance, when individuals aimed at addressing the gap between their perception of the world
believe that emotions are natural and simply come and go on their and their desired state of the world. In the context of an emotion,
own (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004)—lays the groundwork for not the world represents a potentially emotionally evocative situation
striving to change one’s emotion. As such, the process and out- (W), which individuals then perceive (P) and evaluate (V); based
come of emotion regulation depends upon beliefs about whether on that evaluation, an emotional response is generated (A).
emotions are good versus bad. There are many different valuation systems (Rangel, Camerer,
& Montague, 2008) and these systems can interact with each other
Beliefs About Whether Emotions Are Controllable in many different ways. This conceptualisation sets the stage for
emotion regulation: whereas an emotion represents a “first-order”
Versus Uncontrollable
valuation system that takes the world as its input, emotion regu-
Akin to beliefs about whether emotions are ‘good versus bad,’ lation represents a “second-order” valuation that takes another
much of the available discourse on beliefs about the controllability valuation system—an emotion—as its input. The input for the
of emotion has occurred in the writings of philosophers. The second-order system can be one’s own emotion (in the case of
4 FORD AND GROSS

intrinsic emotion regulation, when one attempts to regulate their identification stage is a valuation system itself, consisting of three
own emotion), or the input can be another person’s emotion (in the steps: the task of the perception step (P) is to detect the emotion.
case of extrinsic emotion regulation, when one attempts to regulate The task of the valuation step (V) is to determine whether the value
someone else’s emotion). of the emotion is sufficiently negative or positive to activate
Most simply, when an emotion (W) is perceived (P) and then regulation, given the current internal or external world context. If
evaluated as needing regulation (V), the resulting action impulse the value to regulate is strong enough, the action step (A) will
(A) is designed to help regulate that emotion. Emotion regulation, activate a goal to regulate the emotion. This goal represents a
however, is not a single monolithic construct. Rather, it is a change in the internal world (W), setting the next stage in motion.
multistep process that unfolds over time. Figure 2 portrays the The selection stage involves determining which strategy will be
interconnections between the original emotion (the first-order val-
used. The task of the perception step (P) is to represent different
uation system) and the multistep emotion regulation process (the
regulatory strategies (e.g., using cognitive change to reframe one’s
second-order valuation system), where each step in the process
perspective of the situation) as well as relevant features of the
triggers a subsequent step.
world that might influence the strategy (e.g., cognitive or physio-
logical resources; type or strength of the emotion). The task of the
Emotion Regulation Stages
valuation step (V) is to evaluate the costs and benefits of these
The identification stage involves deciding whether there is a strategies based on relevant features of the world. If a given
need to initiate emotion regulation. As depicted in Figure 2, the strategy is evaluated sufficiently positively, the action step (A) will

Figure 2. The process model of emotion regulation. Visual depiction of the interconnections between emotion
(a 1st order valuation system representing a response to the world) and emotion regulation (a 2nd order valuation
system representing a response to an emotion). Emotion regulation consists of linked systems that involve
identifying the need to regulate, selecting a regulation strategy, and implementing that strategy. Individuals also
monitor their progress throughout this process. Emotion beliefs are represented as surrounding the entire process,
given the pervasive influence that emotion beliefs likely have on both emotion and emotion regulation.
 EMOTION REGULATION 5

activate a goal to use that strategy. This goal represents a change Beliefs About Whether Emotions Are Good
in the internal world (W), and the implementation stage may then Versus Bad
be set in motion.
The implementation stage involves translating the selected strat- Intrinsic emotion regulation. Believing that an emotion is
egy (e.g., cognitive change) into situation-specific tactics (e.g., ‘good’ or ‘bad’ within a particular context may be a necessary
using positive reappraisal to reframe the meaning of a situation in precondition to identifying the need to regulate. At the perception
a more positive manner). The task of the perception step (P) is to step of the identification stage (see Figure 2), an individual’s
represent the various ways of implementing a particular strategy as beliefs about the value of particular emotions may alter her or his
well as relevant features of the world that might influence imple- experience of such emotions. For example, an individual who
mentation. The task of the valuation step (V) is to evaluate the strongly believes that anger is dangerous may be especially likely
costs and benefits of these tactics based on the relevant features of to notice the stirrings of anger or to perceive that anger as un-
the world. If a given tactic is evaluated sufficiently positively, the pleasant. At the valuation step of the identification stage, beliefs
action step (A) implements the tactic (e.g., using positive reap- should heavily influence the desired state against which the current
praisal to challenge the appraisal that generated the emotion in the state is compared: emotions that are believed to be desirable,
first place). Successful emotion regulation hinges upon this final useful, or otherwise ‘good’ will be positively valued (warranting
step of the process. maintenance or up-regulation), whereas emotions that are believed
Finally, individuals monitor their emotion regulation process. to be undesirable, harmful, or otherwise ‘bad’ will be negatively
Monitoring is perhaps most salient after the implementation stage, valued (warranting down-regulation). Sometimes this valuation
as individuals appraise the outcome of their regulation and decide process will be relatively straightforward, as when only one belief
whether to maintain, switch, or stop their regulatory efforts. Mon- is relevant (e.g., believing worry is undesirable should lead to
itoring also occurs throughout the entire emotion regulation pro- negative evaluations of one’s current worry), while other times this
cess as individuals track the progress of their regulatory efforts and valuation process will be more complex, as when multiple—and
decide whether to make course corrections. possibly conflicting— beliefs are relevant (e.g., believing happi-
ness is desirable and also believing worry can enhance perfor-
Linking Emotion Beliefs With Emotion Regulation mance on an upcoming exam requires weighing the value of both
beliefs before making a final valuation). If one’s current emotion
In the sections that follow, we integrate our conceptual mapping does not match one’s desired emotion, the action step initiates
of emotion-related beliefs with the process model of emotion emotion regulation.
regulation. At each stage, we consider not only how individuals’ Empirically, a growing body of evidence suggests that beliefs
beliefs may shape the regulation they apply to their own emotions about whether emotions are good versus bad influence whether
(intrinsic emotion regulation), but also the regulation they apply individuals identify the need to engage in emotion regulation. This
to others’ emotions (extrinsic emotion regulation). Although influence appears to begin at the very earliest perceptual step in the
extrinsic regulation is common (Dixon-Gordon, Bernecker, & identification stage. For example, individuals who believe that
Christensen, 2015; Niven, Totterdell, & Holman, 2009; Reeck, particular emotions are desirable also report experiencing those
Ames, & Ochsner, 2016; Zaki & Williams, 2013), the majority of emotions as relatively more pleasant, even if the emotion in
the emotion regulation literature has focused on intrinsic regula- question is typically considered ‘unpleasant,’ such as anger or fear
tion. And although extrinsic and intrinsic emotion regulation are (Ford & Tamir, 2014). More research has considered the links
undoubtedly linked (as when a parent regulates a child’s distress to
between beliefs about whether emotions are good or bad and the
maintain their own sanity), not all instances of extrinsic emotion
action output of the identification phase: the actual initiation of
regulation rely on an intrinsic emotion regulation motive. Extrinsic
emotion regulation. From this output, it is also possible to infer the
emotion regulation can occur for a diverse set of reasons and
content of the valuation step. For example, individuals who be-
through a variety of pathways that may overlap with— but should
lieved they deserved to feel sad were less likely to engage in
also be distinct from—intrinsic regulation. The process model is
regulatory attempts to improve their mood when feeling sad
useful here, providing a scaffold to explore how emotion beliefs
(Wood et al., 2009), perhaps because they actually positively
may uniquely impact each step of the intrinsic and extrinsic
evaluated their current experience of sadness as matching their
regulatory process.
desired state. As another example, those who believed anger was
useful in particular contexts (e.g., confrontational negotiations)
Identification Phase of Emotion Regulation
were more likely to engage in regulatory attempts to increase anger
As the first stage in the emotion regulation process, much hinges in those contexts (Tamir et al., 2015), presumably because they
upon the output of the identification stage. Given this, it is partic- negatively evaluated their current emotion as not matching their
ularly important to understand how beliefs about emotion may desired state of elevated anger. Overall, several lines of research
influence whether and how individuals identify the need to regu- indicate that identifying the need to regulate hinges upon the
late (either within the self or within another person). Not much emotions that individuals believe are relatively good versus bad.
empirical research has yet specifically examined the identification Extrinsic emotion regulation. The sequential steps of the
phase of emotion regulation, let alone which factors might influ- identification stage of regulation should proceed relatively simi-
ence this stage. Given this, we provide a theoretical account of larly whether considering one’s own emotion or another’s emo-
how beliefs might influence the perception, valuation, and action tion, but the mechanisms behind these steps may be different. For
steps of the identification stage, considering both intrinsic and example, the task of the perception step is to detect the emotion,
extrinsic regulation, then briefly summarise the relevant literature. which relies on insight and interoception in the context of one’s
6 FORD AND GROSS

own emotion but relies on social cognition in the context of pants who were induced to believe that well-being (an emotion-
another’s emotions. The process of ‘decoding’ another’s emotion related construct) is relatively uncontrollable (i.e., by reading a
can be influenced by a variety of factors (e.g., interpretive biases, passage describing well-being as based on a genetic set-point)
empathy deficits; Dixon-Gordon et al., 2015), including one’s were less motivated to increase their well-being, compared to
beliefs about emotions. For example, an individual who believes participants who were induced to believe well-being was more
that expressing emotions is unwise may be particularly sensitive to malleable. Although this study focused on beliefs about well-being
others’ expressions of emotions. The valuation step, in turn, should and not emotion per se, it provides initial experimental evidence
be strongly influenced by beliefs about emotion, given that the that believing emotion-related constructs are uncontrollable might
valuation hinges upon what one believes is desirable for other’s impair individuals’ ability to identify the need to regulate.
emotions. Because individuals’ desires for others’ emotions could Extrinsic emotion regulation. Believing that emotions are
– but need not – parallel their desires for their own emotions, relatively uncontrollable may have a similar influence on initiating
individuals may be more, less, or similarly likely to initiate emo- emotion regulation in others. More specifically, believing that
tion regulation in others, compared to themselves under the same emotions are uncontrollable may decrease the chance of evaluating
circumstances. another’s emotional state as being ‘in need’ of regulation. In
Empirically, several lines of work suggest that beliefs about addition to reducing the likelihood of initiating extrinsic regula-
whether emotions are good versus bad influence the initiation of tion, this belief may also foster more compassionate responses to
extrinsic emotion regulation. For example, developmental research others’ suffering—if emotions are uncontrollable, it is not some-
has found that parents’ beliefs about the value or danger of one’s ‘fault’ if they are suffering.
emotion predict how they talk to and teach their children about Empirically, initial evidence suggests that beliefs about the
emotions, a likely precursor to extrinsic regulation (Halberstadt, controllability of emotion influence the initiation of emotion reg-
Thompson, Parker, & Dunsmore, 2008). In addition, social psy- ulation. For example, when individuals reacted to a vignette de-
chological research suggests that people’s beliefs about emotion picting a depressed individual, those who believed that emotions
predict whether they initiate extrinsic emotion regulation with new were relatively uncontrollable were more empathetic toward that
social partners, sometimes in counterintuitive ways. Specifically, individual and less likely to blame him or her (Tullett & Plaks,
although it is common to want social partners to feel good and 2016). Although this study did not assess the initiation of emotion
social rivals to feel bad (Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008), regulation per se, it suggests that believing emotions are uncon-
individuals also aim to increase useful feelings in others, whether trollable may reduce the extrinsic emotion regulation an individual
those emotions are pleasant or unpleasant (López-Pérez, Howells, is likely to offer. Additional indirect evidence indicates that be-
& Gummerum, 2017; Netzer, Van Kleef, & Tamir, 2015). For lieving emotions are relatively uncontrollable may also hamper the
example, individuals who believed that anger would be useful to development of new friendships (Tamir et al., 2007), perhaps
feel during an upcoming task were more likely to try to increase suggesting that missing opportunities to help new friends to man-
anger in a partner who would be completing the task, but were also age their emotions might come at a longer-term cost.
more likely to try to decrease anger in a rival who would be
completing the task (Netzer, Van Kleef, et al., 2015). This research
Selection Phase of Emotion Regulation
suggests that people initiate extrinsic emotion regulation attempts
based upon an interplay between the nature of the interpersonal Much of the available literature on emotion regulation has
relationship and one’s beliefs about whether emotions are good examined specific strategies, largely building upon hypotheses
(e.g., useful) versus bad (e.g., harmful). generated from the process model’s early organisation of different
families of emotion regulation strategies (Gross, 1998). While this
research has often focused on how these strategies have different
Beliefs About Whether Emotions Are Uncontrollable
short and long-term effects (Aldao et al., 2010; Webb, Miles, &
Versus Controllable
Sheeran, 2012), it is also clear that these strategies have different
Intrinsic emotion regulation. Believing that emotions are antecedents (Gross & John, 2003). Beliefs about emotion likely
relatively uncontrollable versus controllable should impair the represent one of these core antecedents.
initiation of emotion regulation. This belief should have the stron-
gest influence on the valuation step: holding a belief that emotions Beliefs About Whether Emotions Are Good
are relatively uncontrollable should decrease the chance of evalu-
Versus Bad
ating one’s emotional state as being ‘in need’ of regulation. This
evaluation, in turn, should reduce the likelihood that the action step Intrinsic emotion regulation. Individuals’ beliefs about
will activate the goal to regulate. As such, beliefs about the which emotions are desirable, useful, or otherwise ‘good’ may
controllability of emotion may have the power to promote or influence their selection of emotion regulation strategies. Consid-
hinder the emotion regulation process from the outset. ering the perception step, an individual may represent a greater
Empirically, few studies have directly addressed whether beliefs number of strategies that are effective at attaining emotions be-
about controllability influence the identification phase of emotion lieved to be highly desirable (or that are effective at avoiding
regulation. Some research has begun to provide clues, however. emotions believed to be highly undesirable), compared with emo-
For example, a recent experiment suggests that beliefs about tions that are perceived relatively neutrally. Considering the val-
controllability are linked with the motivation to engage in emotion uation step, an individual should more positively evaluate strate-
regulation (Howell, Passmore, & Holder, 2016), the output of the gies they believe will help them attain desirable and avoid
identification phase of emotion regulation. Specifically, partici- undesirable emotions. Upon positively evaluating a given strategy,
 EMOTION REGULATION 7

the output of the action step would consist of activating a goal to such that their children tend to experience emotions that are in
use the strategy to attain (or avoid) that desired (or undesired) accordance with the parents’ beliefs.
emotion.
Empirically, little research has considered how beliefs about the Beliefs About Whether Emotions Are Uncontrollable
desirability of emotion might influence the selection of emotion
Versus Controllable
regulation strategies. The available evidence suggests that individ-
uals are more likely to positive evaluate and thus select strategies Intrinsic emotion regulation. Beliefs about the controllabil-
they believe will help them attain the emotions they believe are ity of emotion are likely to have a pervasive influence on the
‘good’ and avoid the emotions they believe are ‘bad.’ For example, selection stage of emotion regulation. Considering the perception
individuals who aimed to decrease their emotional responses were step, individuals who believe emotions are relatively uncontrolla-
more likely to select distraction (which involves shifting attention ble may perceive fewer strategies to choose from: if these indi-
away from a stimulus and tends to attenuate emotions), whereas viduals are less likely to initiate emotion regulation in the first
those who aimed to increase their emotional responses were more place, over time, they may lose opportunities to gain skill in
likely to select rumination (which involves repetitively thinking various strategies and would thus be less likely to consider such
about a stimulus and tends to heighten emotions; Tamir & strategies at the selection phase in the future. Considering the
Millgram, 2017). In other work, individuals who believed emo- valuation step, individuals who believe emotions are relatively
tions are bad or dangerous were more likely to use distraction uncontrollable should be less likely to positively evaluate the
when faced with negative stimuli (Dennis & Halberstadt, 2013). usefulness of various emotion regulation strategies. The nature of
Although these findings suggest that individuals can select effec- these evaluations may depend on the individuals’ subordinate
tive strategies to attain (or avoid) their desired (or undesired) beliefs about controllability. For example, believing that emotional
emotions, the selection process may not always proceed smoothly: experiences are relatively uncontrollable may more strongly influ-
individuals who hold relatively extreme beliefs about the value of ence the valuation of strategies that target emotional experiences
particular emotions (e.g., a belief that happiness must be experi- (e.g., reappraisal, which involves reframing the meaning of an
enced at all times) may be more likely to select strategies in a emotional event to change its emotional impact); conversely, be-
“scatter-shot” approach wherein they try a variety of strategies that lieving that emotional expressions are relatively uncontrollable
may even interfere with one another (Catalino, Algoe, & may more strongly influence the valuation of strategies that target
Fredrickson, 2014; Fergus & Bardeen, 2016). Overall, particular emotional expressions (e.g., expressive suppression, which in-
emotion beliefs that are intense, rigid, or otherwise dysfunctional volves masking one’s outward expressions). Being less likely to
may generate conflict or confusion at the selection phase of emo- value certain forms of emotion regulation, in turn, should affect the
tion regulation. action step by reducing the motivation to attempt implementing
Extrinsic emotion regulation. Beliefs about whether emo- such strategies.
tions are good versus bad should influence an individual’s selec- Empirically, much of the recent work examining beliefs about
tion of extrinsic emotion regulation strategies in a similar manner the controllability of emotion have examined how these beliefs are
as the selection of intrinsic emotion regulation strategies. Specif- linked with the use of particular emotion regulation strategies. This
ically, people should be more likely to select strategies that will work has demonstrated that individuals who believe in general that
help them enhance (or reduce) the emotions they believe are most emotions are relatively uncontrollable are less likely to select
desirable for their target to feel (or to avoid). An individual’s regulation strategies that involve changing emotional experiences
valuation of these strategies, however, may be complicated by (e.g., reappraisal) but are not more or less likely to select strate-
needing to consider both which strategies they can implement gies that involve changing emotional expressions (e.g., suppres-
successfully, and which strategies would be successfully received sion; e.g., De Castella et al., 2013, 2015; Ford, Lwi, Hankin,
by the person whose emotions are being regulated. Selecting an Gentzler, & Mauss, in press; Tamir et al., 2007). Experimental
optimal strategy would likely be facilitated by a greater knowledge studies have also provided evidence for the causal influence of
and familiarity with the person being regulated. these beliefs: adults who were induced to believe that emotions
Empirically, much of the existing literature examining how were relatively uncontrollable by reading a passage describing the
beliefs about emotion might influence the selection of extrinsic fixed (vs. malleable) nature of emotion were less likely to use
emotion regulation strategies has occurred within developmental reappraisal in a subsequent negative mood induction, but were not
contexts. This research suggests that parents’ beliefs influence the less (or more) likely to use suppression (Kneeland, Nolen-
regulation strategies they encourage in their children. For example, Hoeksema, Dovidio, & Gruber, 2016a, 2016b). This pattern may
when observing parents and children in the aftermath of a terrorist suggest that when individuals consider their beliefs about whether
attack, parents who generally believed that children’s emotions are ‘emotions’ are controllable in general, they are considering inter-
valuable were more likely to have children who engaged in nal emotional experiences more than external emotional expres-
problem-solving, emotion-oriented coping, and support-seeking in sions. Future research considering other strategies will help us
the wake of the attack; conversely, parents who generally believed understand how broadly or specifically beliefs about the control-
that children’s emotions are dangerous were more likely to have lability of emotion may shape the selection phase of emotion
children who engaged in avoidance and distraction in the wake of regulation.
the attack (Halberstadt et al., 2008). Avoidance and distraction— Extrinsic emotion regulation. If believing that emotions are
while less adaptive when used chronically—are highly useful at uncontrollable results in an impoverished repertoire of intrinsic
reducing negative emotion in the short run. As such, parents’ regulation strategies, it may also result in an impoverished reper-
beliefs appear to influence their use of extrinsic emotion regulation toire of extrinsic regulation strategies. It is important to consider,
8 FORD AND GROSS

however, that a vast repertoire may not be necessary for an select) the tactics they believe will help them attain the emotion
individual to select a useful emotion regulation strategy, either for they believe is desirable. The extent to which people successfully
intrinsic or extrinsic regulation. Indeed, having too many options attain desirable emotions (and avoid undesirable emotions) should
to choose from can be overwhelming and ultimately lead to worse depend largely on the effectiveness of the regulation tactics they
strategy selections (Bigman, Sheppes, & Tamir, in press). That employ.
being said, believing emotions cannot be controlled may still Empirically, several lines of research suggest that individuals
inhibit the use of particular strategies that are generally considered are more likely to select tactics they believe will help them attain
to be effective (e.g., reappraisal—although it remains to be con- the emotions they believe are desirable. This work has often
firmed whether extrinsic reappraisal is as beneficial as intrinsic examined the selection of tactics within the broader category of
reappraisal). situation selection, wherein individuals are able to select the emo-
Empirically, prior work has demonstrated that beliefs about tional stimuli to which they are exposed. Using such designs,
controllability are linked with social functioning more broadly, but individuals reveal their selected tactic via their selection of stimuli:
these findings do not yet speak to how beliefs may be linked with for example, people who believed that anger would be useful
the selection of extrinsic emotion regulation strategies in particu- during a confrontational negotiation were more likely to select
lar. For example, believing emotions are relatively uncontrollable anger-inducing music (vs. other types of music) while preparing
has been linked to receiving less social support over time (Tamir for the negotiation; in turn, individuals who engaged with the
et al., 2007), but it is unclear whether these beliefs may also lead stimuli they selected were more likely to experience the desired
to giving less social support. More generally, it is possible that emotion (Tamir & Ford, 2012). Although these findings suggest
research targeting the selection of extrinsic emotion regulation that individuals can select effective tactics to attain (or avoid) their
strategies is scarce because assessments of these strategies have desired (or undesired) emotions, the selection process may not
only recently been developed. Using such assessment tools, initial always proceed smoothly: holding extreme, rigid, or otherwise
research suggests that people, in general, report engaging in a maladaptive beliefs about emotions may promote a relatively
moderate amount of extrinsic emotion regulation using cognitive disordered selection of tactics. For example, after a positive event,
strategies (e.g., giving helpful advice to try to improve how the individuals who hold extreme beliefs about the value of happiness
target felt) as well as behavioural strategies (e.g., doing something (e.g., who strongly endorse items like: To have a meaningful life,
nice to try to make the target feel better; Niven et al., 2009). I need to feel happy most of the time) tend to use positive rumi-
However, individuals who reported using a greater diversity of nation tactics that enhance positive emotion, but also use negative
extrinsic strategies across their interpersonal relationships also rumination tactics that dampen positive emotion (Gentzler,
reported lower well-being, empathy, and relationship quality Palmer, & Ramsey, 2016). Although individuals’ beliefs about
(Niven, Macdonald, & Holman, 2012). Although preliminary, this emotion likely exert a pervasive influence on the tactics they
research is consistent with findings from intrinsic emotion regu- select, these tactics can conflict with one another or be otherwise
lation that employing ‘scatter-shot’ approach to extrinsic strategy ineffective and thus may not always lead to the desired emotion.
selection can work against successful regulation (e.g., Gruber, Extrinsic emotion regulation. The emotions that an individ-
Kogan, Mennin, & Murray, 2013). ual believes are good versus bad should guide the implementation
of their extrinsic regulation tactics in a manner similar to the
implementation of intrinsic tactics, with some additional complex-
Implementation Phase of Emotion Regulation
ity. The evaluation of these tactics should be complicated by the
The implementation phase of emotion regulation consists of fact that the regulator needs to identify and evaluate not only the
representing various regulation tactics that can be used to imple- relevant features of his or her own environment (to know which
ment the selected regulation strategy, evaluating those tactics, and tactic would be best to implement) but also the relevant features of
then employing a particular tactic. As such, this phase is ‘where environment of the target person being regulated (to know which
the rubber meets the road’—without this phase, a successful emo- tactic may be best received). When the tactic is implemented, the
tion regulation effort cannot be launched. action output is now an external process—something that must be
communicated in one way or another to the target. In turn, suc-
Beliefs About Whether Emotions Are Good cessful implementation will depend both on the effectiveness of
the regulator at using the tactic that has been selected and on the
Versus Bad
receptiveness of the target.
Intrinsic emotion regulation. The emotions that an individ- Empirically, researchers have begun to assess extrinsic emotion
ual believes are desirable, useful, or otherwise ‘good’ may influ- regulation tactics using similar methods to those used in assessing
ence the tactics that the individual employs, perhaps even more intrinsic emotion regulation tactics. Namely, by allowing people to
strongly than the regulation strategies they employ. Whereas strat- choose emotion-inducing activities for a partner (e.g., anger-
egies can be used to alter emotions in a variety of directions, inducing music vs. happiness-inducing music), a regulator can
specific tactics provide the necessary differentiation to tailor one’s employ specific tactics aimed at whichever emotions are believed
regulation attempt to the particular desired emotion, emotion chan- to be most desirable. In these studies, the more regulators believed
nel, or context (each of which may be the focus of particular it was useful for a target to feel anger, the more likely they were
emotion beliefs; see Figure 1). For example, someone can watch a to choose tactics that would enhance the target’s anger (López-
sad film or a happy film, as two different tactics that both are forms Pérez et al., 2017; Netzer, Van Kleef, et al., 2015). The extent to
of the broader emotion regulation category situation selection. which these tactics will successfully change a target’s emotions in
Overall, individuals should evaluate more positively (and then the desired direction, however, may also depend on the target’s
 EMOTION REGULATION 9

desires as well. For example, research suggests that targets are Empirically, we know relatively little about how beliefs about
more receptive to extrinsic emotion regulation tactics that will help the controllability of emotion might influence the implementation
them attain the emotions they believe are valuable (Marigold, of particular extrinsic emotion regulation tactics. Although believ-
Cavallo, Holmes, & Wood, 2014). Taken together, these findings ing that emotions are relatively uncontrollable has been linked to
suggest that the process of implementing an extrinsic emotion less successful intrinsic emotion regulation implementation, pre-
regulation strategy depends just as much on the individual doing liminary evidence suggests these beliefs may not carry the same
the regulation as the individual receiving the regulation—such downsides for extrinsic emotion regulation implementation. Spe-
dyadic links will be important to capture in greater detail in future cifically, individuals who believed that happiness cannot be con-
work. trolled responded with more empathy and less blame to an indi-
vidual who was struggling with intense negative emotions (Tullett
Beliefs About Whether Emotions Are Uncontrollable & Plaks, 2016). These findings provide indirect evidence that
believing emotions cannot be controlled—if it has not impaired the
Versus Controllable
initiation of extrinsic emotion regulation in the first place— could
Intrinsic emotion regulation. The influence of believing that enhance the likelihood of selecting regulation tactics that focus on
emotions are relatively uncontrollable should accumulate across emotional acceptance and empathy. Ironically, these tactics may
the stages of emotion regulation, culminating in less successful be highly effective, even if they are implemented by individuals
implementation. At the perception step, if an individual believes who do not necessarily believe that emotions are highly control-
that emotions are relatively uncontrollable, they may also have an lable.
impoverished repertoire of useful tactics to choose from. The
valuation step may also be impaired as the value of different tactics
Monitoring the Emotion Regulation Process
would be difficult for these individuals to calculate. Finally, the
action step—the actual implementation of the tactic—may be less As a second-order valuation system, the emotion regulation
successful because individuals who do not believe that emotions process aims to successfully alter a first-order valuation system:
are controllable should be less likely to select effective strategies the emotion. But how do individuals know if their emotion regu-
and tactics over time, and should thus be less practiced in the lation was successful? The final stage in the process model is the
successful use of those strategies and tactics. ongoing monitoring that helps individuals assess whether they
Empirically, several studies speak to the link between believing should stop, maintain, or alter their current regulatory efforts (see
emotions are relatively uncontrollable and unsuccessful emotion Figure 2). This monitoring often occurs after the implementation
regulation implementation. For example, those who believe emo- of a tactic, as the individual evaluates whether the change to the
tions are relatively uncontrollable in general reported lower con- first-order valuation system (i.e., the emotion) is satisfactory or if
fidence in their ability to regulate their emotions (De Castella et continued regulation is necessary. If the current emotion is satis-
al., 2013; Tamir et al., 2007) and experienced worse mood after an factory, the goal to continue regulating the emotion will not be
unpleasant mood induction (e.g., Kappes & Schikowski, 2013). reactivated and emotion regulation may be discontinued (emotion
When focusing on experimentally manipulated beliefs, however, regulation stopping). If the current emotion remains unsatisfac-
results have been mixed: on one hand, a manipulation that empha- tory, emotion regulation may continue either as-is (emotion regu-
sised the fixed nature of emotion in general did not result in lation maintenance) or a different strategy or tactic may be em-
different emotional responses to a stress induction, compared with ployed (emotion regulation switching). Monitoring also occurs
those in a control condition (Kneeland, Nolen-Hoeksema, et al., concurrently with the identification, selection, and implementation
2016b); on the other hand, individuals who were led to believe that phases, as the individual assesses whether changing circumstances
their own emotions were highly controllable— based on a manip- require updates to the ongoing emotion regulation process (e.g., a
ulation wherein they were convinced that greater emotion control noxious stimulus is removed on its own and regulation is no longer
was a side effect of a drug they were given—were more successful necessary).
at regulating their subsequent emotional responses, compared with
those in a control condition (Bigman, Mauss, Gross, & Tamir, Beliefs About Whether Emotions Are Good
2016).
Versus Bad
Extrinsic emotion regulation. Although believing that emo-
tions are relatively uncontrollable should hinder the implementa- Intrinsic emotion regulation. A significant portion of the
tion of extrinsic emotion regulation, believing that emotions are monitoring process consists of deciding whether the current emo-
relatively controllable does not guarantee success. When consid- tion regulation attempt was successful and if not, what to do about
ering extrinsic regulation, one should also take into account the it. Beliefs about whether emotions are good versus bad are likely
beliefs of the target: if a regulator believes that emotions are to influence this monitoring process because beliefs heavily shape
relatively controllable and selects a tactic they believe will be the standard of success that individuals set for themselves. Al-
useful for their given target, a target may not be receptive to though individuals may sometimes attain the standards they set,
the tactic if she or he does not believe that emotions are control- many times they do not. If people are unable to attain the
lable. However, a target does not necessarily need to be aware of emotions they believe are most valuable, they may experience
and receptive to an extrinsic emotion regulation attempt for it to metaemotion—an emotional reaction to one’s own emotions
still be successful—for example, providing relatively ‘invisible’ (Mitmansgruber, Beck, Höfer, & Schüßler, 2009). For example, an
indirect social support could be highly successful regardless of the individual may feel disappointed about his or her level of happi-
target’s beliefs (Bolger, Zuckerman, & Kessler, 2000). ness (Ford & Mauss, 2014), and this negative metaemotion may
10 FORD AND GROSS

not only directly interfere with the experience of happiness, but regulator may not have full access to information that could help
may also foster further rumination as the individual continues to them determine whether the regulation was successful. For exam-
negatively evaluate her or his own experience. This is one striking ple, the target may or may not may provide explicit feedback (e.g.,
way in which beliefs may influence the monitoring process: when ‘Thank you, I feel much better now!’ Or perhaps more likely,
an individual’s emotion beliefs reflect unreasonable and unattain- ‘You’re not helping!’). Additionally, if the regulation is not oc-
able emotion standards, the monitoring process may result in curring in-person, the individual may not have access to nonverbal
negative metaemotions, which can hinder the ongoing emotion emotion information from which to glean clues about how the
regulation effort. regulation attempt is faring (e.g., facial expressions, body lan-
Extrinsic emotion regulation. Beliefs about whether emo- guage). Given this, the process of monitoring may be particularly
tions are good versus bad likely influence extrinsic emotion reg- ambiguous during extrinsic emotion regulation. As such, beliefs
ulation monitoring in a similar way to how they influence intrinsic about emotion may play a particularly strong role as these beliefs
emotion regulation monitoring: beliefs about the desirability, help the regulator ‘fill in the blanks’ (Plaks, Levy, & Dweck,
value, and ‘goodness’ of emotion reflect the standard against 2009). For example, an individual who believes that emotions are
which an individual will judge extrinsic emotion regulation. In the relatively uncontrollable may be particularly likely to view much
case of monitoring the progress of extrinsic regulation, rather than of their own attempts at extrinsic emotion regulation to be unsuc-
having a metaemotional response to one’s own emotion, the reg- cessful. We might expect these individuals to stop their extrinsic
ulator may have a metaemotional response to (their perception of) emotion regulation efforts quite quickly—and perhaps premature-
the target’s emotion. This metaemotion can take many forms ly—whether the effort was successful or not.
depending on the regulator’s emotion beliefs and the outcome of
the regulation. For example, an individual who values excitement Directions for Future Research
and is throwing a party for a friend may feel disappointed if his
The field of emotion regulation is growing at an incredible pace.
friend does not show much excitement. Or, an individual who
This growth reflects a strong interest in emotion regulation across
believes that feeling worried would help her partner meet an
many areas of inquiry and has led to a great influx of new
important deadline may aim to increase her partner’s worry but
discoveries and ideas. The risk of this popularity, however, is that
also feel guilty when she successfully enhances her partner’s
we may lose track of a common thread. To maintain conceptual
distress. Depending on how these metaemotional reactions are
clarity and scaffold the growing field, common vantage points are
evaluated, these reactions to monitoring one’s extrinsic emotion
needed. The present review describes two frameworks that are
regulation attempts may have the result of either encouraging or
relevant across the domain of emotion regulation, and can be used
discouraging future extrinsic regulation attempts.
to organise existing findings and generate hypotheses to guide
future research. First, we considered a thematic framework that
Beliefs About Whether Emotions Are Uncontrollable considers individuals’ fundamental beliefs about emotion and their
Versus Controllable pervasive role in emotion regulation. Second, we considered an
organisational framework that identifies the stages of emotion
Intrinsic emotion regulation. As a result of the monitoring
regulation as they unfold across time in the process model of
process, individuals decide whether to maintain, switch, or stop
emotion regulation. By uniting these two frameworks, we gain a
ongoing emotion regulation efforts— essentially, whether to per-
greater understanding of who is likely to engage in emotion
severe or call it quits. Individuals who believe that emotions are
regulation, what that regulation will consist of, and whether it is
relatively uncontrollable should be less likely to persevere in
likely to be successful. Next, we turn to three directions for future
emotion regulation efforts (i.e., less maintenance, more stopping).
research that are guided by these frameworks.
This would be consistent with prior research examining beliefs
about controllability in other domains; for example, those who
Learning More About Emotion-Related Beliefs
believe that intelligence is uncontrollable are less likely to perse-
vere in academic pursuits (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, Increasing our knowledge about individuals’ emotion-related
2007). It is unclear whether believing emotions are relatively beliefs will be greatly served by improving our measurements
uncontrollable may also influence the likelihood of switching of beliefs and by examining the origins of those beliefs. Because
regulation strategies or tactics within a regulation episode, given beliefs about emotion are relatively abstract metatheories about
that switching can occur for multiple reasons. The switch may be how the world works, they should be primarily accessible via
strategic and flexible, based on an assessment of which approach self-report (vs. observable behaviours). Although there may not be
may work better in the future (which may be more common for clear behavioural criteria of beliefs, it is still possible to observe
individuals who believe that emotions are relatively controllable), the downstream consequences of those beliefs, ideally with assess-
but the switch may also be haphazard, based on a desperate attempt ments other than self-reported questionnaires (e.g., behaviours,
to exert any possible change (which may be more common for peer reports). For example, some beliefs can be assessed using
individuals who believe that emotions are relatively uncontrolla- implicit association tests, which rely on reaction times (Mauss et
ble). Examining the links between beliefs about controllability and al., 2006): one’s implicit association between an emotion concept
flexible emotion regulation switching is now feasible using rela- (e.g., “anger”) and the concept of “good” or “bad,” reveals one’s
tively recent metrics that tap the flexible deployment of strategies fundamental evaluation of that emotion (Netzer, Igra, Anan, &
and tactics (e.g., Kato, 2012). Tamir, 2015).
Extrinsic emotion regulation. Monitoring an ongoing extrin- This review’s primary focus was to examine the links between
sic emotion regulation attempt is complicated by the fact that the beliefs about emotion and emotion regulation, and did not address
 EMOTION REGULATION 11

where these beliefs may originate. At least two options are possi- high-intensity stressors because distraction can combat the initial
ble. First, beliefs may be generated from the ‘outside in,’ as intensity, but reappraisal is a more advantageous longer-term strat-
individuals learn which beliefs to hold from their social partners egy that allows individuals to learn and grow from the stressors;
(e.g., through explicit messages, observation, socialization, or cul- Sheppes & Gross, 2011). Blends of strategies are also important to
tural expectations). For example, a robust body of research sup- consider. Emotional acceptance, for example—wherein people
ports the crucial role of culture in shaping individuals’ beliefs accept rather than judge their emotions as ‘bad’ or unacceptable
about emotion (Tsai, 2007; Uchida & Kitayama, 2009). Second, (Baer et al., 2004)—represents a blended strategy that includes
beliefs may be generated from the ‘inside out,’ as individuals base attentional change (as individuals attend nonjudgmentally to their
their beliefs on personal experience (e.g., those who experience experiences), cognitive change (as they think about their emotions
intense and hard-to-manage emotions may conclude that emotions differently), and response modulation (as they are less likely to
are relatively uncontrollable). Although some research supports an suppress their emotions). Although acceptance appears not to
‘inside out’ approach (e.g., Schleider & Weisz, 2016), little re- involve an explicit goal to regulate one’s emotions, it nonetheless
search has actually tested this model of belief generation (cf. Ford, helps lower negative emotion in negative contexts (Ford, Lam,
Lwi, et al., in press). Examining the origins of emotion beliefs John, & Mauss, 2017) and enhance positive emotion in positive
remains a crucial area of future research given that these origins contexts (Dan-Glauser & Gross, 2015). Acceptance may thus
could lend key insights into effective ways to shape beliefs. Know- represent a particularly effective case of blended emotion regula-
ing how to cultivate relatively ‘adaptive’ beliefs about emotion tion that warrants future investigation. Interestingly, acceptance
should have implications for promoting successful emotion regu- also reflects a relatively neutral belief about emotions—that emo-
lation and enhancing longer-term outcomes such as greater psy- tions simply happen and are neither good nor bad. Research on
chological health and well-being. acceptance suggests that taking a nonevaluative stance toward
one’s emotions—perhaps particularly when considering negative
emotions—should promote less rumination and negative metae-
Learning More About Regulation Processes
motion and thus represents a relatively adaptive approach to re-
Our understanding of emotion regulation will be further served ducing one’s overall distress (e.g., Ford, Lam, et al., 2017). The-
by improving assessments of the full regulation process, within oretically, although evaluating emotion is often a core element in
both intrinsic and extrinsic contexts, and across various regulation the emotion regulation process, being able to minimising one’s
phases. Much of the available literature on emotion regulation has evaluations of emotion may represent a beneficial long-term ap-
examined specific intrinsic regulation strategies, focusing either on proach.
habitual strategy use (see Aldao et al., 2010 for meta-analysis) or
labouratory strategy use (see Webb et al., 2012 for meta-analysis). Learning More About How Beliefs Shape
This literature has led to a rich understanding of the correlates and
Core Outcomes
outcomes of specific regulation strategies, but it has rarely parsed
the different phases of regulation (identification, selection, imple- This review highlights the numerous ways in which our funda-
mentation, monitoring). Differentiating among these phases will mental beliefs about emotion are likely to shape emotion regula-
require novel approaches. As one example, recent research sug- tion. Emotion beliefs may thus represent a crucial lever on emotion
gests that daily diaries may be particularly useful for separately regulation processes which, in turn, are known to influence a
assessing when individuals have selected an emotion regulation variety of core outcomes. For example, recent longitudinal re-
strategy in daily life, from their success in implementing that search indicates that believing that emotions are uncontrollable
strategy (Ford, Karnilowicz, & Mauss, 2017; Goldin et al., 2014). predicts worse psychological health in the future via impaired
Studying the dynamic nature of extrinsic emotion regulation in emotion regulation processes (e.g., Ford, Lwi, et al., in press;
particular also requires clear operationalization, creative measure- Tamir et al., 2007). These beliefs also predict outcomes for psy-
ment, and sophisticated analysis (Dixon-Gordon et al., 2015). This chiatric samples and represent a mechanism of change within
creates challenges for examining extrinsic emotion regulation but psychological treatment (De Castella et al., 2015). Given the
the theoretical groundwork has begun (Dixon-Gordon et al., 2015; critical importance of emotion regulation for longer term health
Niven et al., 2009; Reeck et al., 2016; Zaki & Williams, 2013) and and well-being, future research will benefit greatly from experi-
the necessary measurement and analysis tools are being developed mental and longitudinal work directly examining how beliefs
(e.g., Butler, 2015). Because relatively little empirical research has about emotion influence psychological and even physical health.
examined extrinsic emotion regulation (although developmental Given that beliefs about emotion have the power to influence
researchers have considered parent-to-child regulation for many how individuals perceive and manage their daily lives, these be-
years; Thompson, 2011), future research will benefit from a sys- liefs may have a pervasive influence on numerous practical do-
tematic approach. To this end, the process model of emotion mains, including but not limited to: medicine, e.g., does sharing
regulation is a useful framework given that it already acknowl- the same emotion beliefs with one’s doctor improve one’s health
edges regulation as a dynamic and iterative process. outcomes? (Sims, Tsai, Koopmann-Holm, Thomas, & Goldstein,
Finally, it is important for future research to assess diverse 2014), education, e.g., do children’s beliefs about emotion influ-
emotion regulation configurations—such as the use of regulation ence their socioemotional function in the school environment?
sequences or blends— given that such diversity may be more the (Romero et al., 2014), business, e.g., does believing that emotions
norm than the exception (Gross, 2015). For example, specific are harmful influence how individuals make decisions? (Karnaze
sequences of strategies may be particularly effective (e.g., distrac- & Levine, 2017), law, e.g., does believing emotions are uncon-
tion followed by reappraisal may be a valuable sequence for trollable influence how we perceive culpability for ‘crimes of
12 FORD AND GROSS

passion’? (Plaks et al., 2009), and political science, e.g., what are Catalino, L. I., Algoe, S. B., & Fredrickson, B. L. (2014). Prioritizing
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tions. Journal of Personality Assessment, 54, 546 –563. http://dx.doi.org/
beliefs play in shaping emotion regulation and other core life
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Dan-Glauser, E. S., & Gross, J. J. (2015). The temporal dynamics of
La recherche sur la gestion des émotions est florissante. Or, emotional acceptance: Experience, expression, and physiology. Biolog-
l’enthousiasme que suscite cette question outrepasse la clarté con- ical Psychology, 108, 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2015
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présent examen, nous réunissons deux cadres conceptuels qui, De Castella, K., Goldin, P., Jazaieri, H., Heimberg, R. G., Dweck, C. S., &
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considère les croyances fondamentales de l’individu par rapport De Castella, K., Goldin, P., Jazaieri, H., Ziv, M., Dweck, C. S., & Gross,
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comment les croyances des individus concernant les émotions of emotion-related beliefs in selective attention to affective cues. Cog-
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.4.731 Received August 9, 2017
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