2007 CarswellBC 2588

2007 SCC 48, J.E. 2007-2037, [2007] B.C.W.L.D. 6280, 51 C.R. (6th) 199, [2008] 1 W.W.R.
191, 225 C.C.C. (3d) 103, 73 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, 285 D.L.R. (4th) 583, 369 N.R. 1, [2007] 3
S.C.R. 405, 249 B.C.A.C. 1, 414 W.A.C. 1, 163 C.R.R. (2d) 280

R. v. Singh

Jagrup Singh (Appellant) v. Her Majesty The Queen (Respondent) and Attorney General of
Ontario, Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada, Criminal Lawyers' Association of Ontario
and Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (Interveners)

Supreme Court of Canada

McLachlin C.J.C., Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein JJ.

Heard: May 23, 2007

Judgment: November 1, 2007 [FN*]
Docket: 31558

© Thomson Reuters Canada Limited or its Licensors (excluding individual court documents).
All rights reserved.

Proceedings: affirming R. v. Singh (2006), 2006 CarswellBC 1410, 2006 BCCA 281, 38 C.R.
(6th) 217, 142 C.R.R. (2d) 68, 374 W.A.C. 241, 227 B.C.A.C. 241 (B.C. C.A.)Proceedings:
affirming R. v. Singh (2003), 2003 BCSC 2013, 2003 CarswellBC 3600 (B.C. S.C.)

Counsel: Gil D. McKinnon, Q.C. for Appellant

Wendy L. Rubin, Kate Ker for Respondent
Jamie C. Klukach for Intervener, Attorney General of Ontario
Ronald C. Reimer, Nicholas E. Devlin for Intervener, Director of Public Prosecution of Canada
Timothy E. Breen for Intervener, Criminal Lawyers' Association of Ontario
David Migicovsky, Margaret Truesdale for Intervener, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police

Subject: Criminal; Constitutional

Criminal law --- Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Life, liberty and security of person —
Pre-trial right to silence

Accused was arrested for second degree murder of innocent bystander killed by stray bullet
while standing inside doorway of pub — Accused was advised of his right to counsel and
privately consulted with counsel — During course of two subsequent police interviews,
accused stated on numerous occasions that he did not want to talk about incident —
Interviewing officer persisted in trying to get accused to make statement — Accused made
number of incriminating statements, which later became probative of issue of identification
at trial — On voir dire to determine admissibility of statements, trial judge was satisfied that
statements were voluntary and that breach of accused's right to silence had not been
proven — Trial judge found that probative value of statements outweighed any prejudicial
effect — Statements were admitted and accused was convicted by jury — Court of Appeal
upheld trial judge's ruling and affirmed conviction — Accused appealed — Appeal dismissed
— There was no error in law in approach adopted by lower courts — Law relating to pre-trial
Charter right to silence should not be changed — Use of legitimate means of persuasion is
permitted and is part of critical balance that must be maintained between individual and
state interests — Focus is on conduct of police and its effect on accused's ability to exercise
his or her free will — Test is objective, although individual characteristics of accused are
relevant — Police persistence in continuing interview, despite repeated assertions by
accused that he wished to remain silent, may well raise strong argument that subsequently
obtained statement was not product of free will — Trial judge was alive to this risk — Trial
judge's ultimate judgment call on issue was supported by record and was entitled to
deference — There was no reason to interfere with trial judge's ruling on admissibility.

Droit criminel --- Charte des droits et libertés — Vie, liberté et sécurité de la personne —
Droit au silence avant le procès

Accusé a été arrêté pour le meurtre au second degré d'un tiers innocent tué d'une balle
perdue alors qu'il se trouvait dans l'entrée d'un bar — Accusé a été informé de son droit à
l'avocat et s'est entretenu avec son avocat en privé — Par la suite, au cours de deux
interrogatoires menés par la police, l'accusé a déclaré à plusieurs reprises ne pas vouloir
discuter de l'incident — Policier interrogateur s'est acharné à obtenir une déclaration de la
part de l'accusé — Accusé a fait plusieurs déclarations incriminantes qui ont par la suite
acquis une valeur probante relativement à la question de l'identification au procès — Lors du
voir-dire visant à déterminer l'admissibilité des déclarations de l'accusé, le juge du procès a
conclu que ces déclarations avaient été faites librement et ne résultaient pas du fait que la
police avait compromis son droit de garder le silence — Juge du procès a considéré que la
valeur probante des déclarations l'emportait sur leur effet préjudiciable — Déclarations ont
été admises et l'accusé a été déclaré coupable par un jury — Cour d'appel a maintenu la
décision du juge du procès et confirmé la déclaration de culpabilité — Accusé a formé un
pourvoi — Pourvoi rejeté — Il n'y avait aucune erreur de droit dans l'approche adoptée par
les tribunaux d'instance inférieure — Règles applicables au droit de garder le silence avant
le procès garanti par la Charte devraient être maintenues — Recours à des moyens de
persuasion légitimes est permis et s'inscrit dans l'équilibre crucial qui doit être maintenu
entre les intérêts de l'individu et ceux de la société — Accent est mis sur le comportement
de la police et sur l'incidence qu'il a eu sur la capacité du suspect d'user de son libre arbitre
— Critère est de nature objective, bien que les caractéristiques individuelles de l'accusé
constituent des facteurs pertinents — Persistance des policiers à poursuivre l'interrogatoire,
malgré les affirmations répétées du détenu qu'il souhaitait garder le silence, permette de
faire valoir sérieusement que toute déclaration obtenue par la suite ne résultait pas d'une
libre volonté de parler aux autorités — Juge du procès était très conscient de ce risque —
Décision que le juge du procès a rendue sur ce point était étayée par le dossier et
commandait la déférence — Il n'y avait aucune raison de modifier sa décision sur la
question de l'admissibilité.

The accused was arrested for second degree murder of an innocent bystander killed by a
stray bullet while standing inside the doorway of a pub. The accused was advised of his right
to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and privately
consulted with counsel. During the course of two subsequent police interviews, the accused
stated on numerous occasions that he did not want to talk about the incident. The
interviewing officer persisted in trying to get the accused to make a statement. The accused
made a number of incriminating statements, which later became probative of the issue of
identification at trial.

On the voir dire to determine the admissibility of the statements, the trial judge was
satisfied that the statements were voluntary and that a breach of the accused's right to
silence under s. 7 of the Charter had not been proven. The trial judge found that the
probative value of the statements outweighed any prejudicial effect. The statements were
admitted and the accused was subsequently convicted by a jury. The Court of Appeal upheld
the trial judge's ruling and affirmed the conviction. The accused appealed.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.

Per Charron J. (McLachlin C.J.C., Bastarache, Deschamps, Rothstein JJ. concurring): There
was no error in law in the approach adopted by the lower courts. The law relating to an
accused's pre-trial Charter right to silence should not be changed. The use of legitimate
means of persuasion is permitted and is part of the critical balance that must be maintained
between individual and state interests. The suspect may be the best source of information
and it is in society's interest to tap into this source. The focus is on the conduct of the police
and its effect on an accused's ability to exercise his or her free will. The test is objective,
although the individual characteristics of an accused are relevant.

Police persistence in continuing an interview, despite repeated assertions by the accused

that he wished to remain silent, may well raise a strong argument that the subsequently
obtained statement was not the product of free will. The trial judge in this case was very
much alive to this risk. The trial judge's ultimate judgment call on this issue was supported
by the record and was entitled to deference. There was no reason to interfere with his ruling
on admissibility.

Per Fish J. (Binnie, LeBel, Abella JJ. concurring) (dissenting): The impugned statements
were obtained in violation of the accused's s. 7 Charter right to silence. The accused
asserted his right to silence unequivocally 18 times. The accused was imprisoned
throughout his interrogation and was under the total control of the police. The officer
understood very well that the accused had chosen not to speak with the police but
nonetheless disregarded the accused's repeated assertions of his right to silence. The
accused was thus deprived not only of his right to silence, but also, collaterally, of the
intended benefit of his right to counsel. At the very least, the officer's conduct unfairly
frustrated the accused's decision on whether to speak to the police. A choice that has been
disregarded and unfairly frustrated by relentless interrogation is neither free nor
meaningful. The admission of the impugned statements would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute and should have been excluded.

L'accusé a été arrêté pour le meurtre au second degré d'un tiers innocent tué d'une balle
perdue alors qu'il se trouvait dans l'entrée d'un bar. L'accusé a été informé de son droit à
l'avocat, tel que garanti par l'art. 10b) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, et
s'est entretenu avec son avocat en privé. Par la suite, au cours de deux interrogatoires
menés par la police, l'accusé a déclaré à plusieurs reprises ne pas vouloir discuter de
l'incident. Le policier interrogateur s'est acharné à obtenir une déclaration de la part de
l'accusé. L'accusé a fait plusieurs déclarations incriminantes qui ont par la suite acquis une
valeur probante relativement à la question de l'identification au procès.

Lors du voir-dire visant à déterminer l'admissibilité des déclarations de l'accusé, le juge du

procès a conclu que ces déclarations avaient été faites librement et ne résultaient pas du
fait que la police avait compromis son droit de garder le silence garanti par l'art. 7 de la
Charte. Le juge du procès a considéré que la valeur probante des déclarations l'emportait
sur leur effet préjudiciable. Les déclarations ont été admises et l'accusé a été déclaré
coupable par un jury. La Cour d'appel a maintenu la décision du juge du procès et a
confirmé la déclaration de culpabilité. L'accusé a formé un pourvoi.

Arrêt: Le pourvoi a été rejeté.

Charron, J. (McLachlin, J.C.C., Bastarache, Deschamps, Rothstein, JJ., souscrivant à son

opinion): Il n'y avait aucune erreur de droit dans l'approche adoptée par les tribunaux
d'instance inférieure. Les règles applicables au droit de garder le silence avant le procès
garanti par la Charte devraient être maintenues. Le recours à des moyens de persuasion
légitimes est permis et s'inscrit dans l'équilibre crucial qui doit être maintenu entre les
intérêts de l'individu et ceux de la société. Le suspect peut être la source de renseignements
la plus riche et la société a intérêt à ce que la police essaie de mettre à profit cette source
précieuse. L'accent est mis sur le comportement de la police et sur l'incidence qu'il a eu sur
la capacité du suspect d'user de son libre arbitre. Le critère est de nature objective, bien
que les caractéristiques individuelles de l'accusé constituent des facteurs pertinents.

La persistance des policiers à poursuivre l'interrogatoire, malgré les affirmations répétées

du détenu qu'il souhaitait garder le silence, permette de faire valoir sérieusement que toute
déclaration obtenue par la suite ne résultait pas d'une libre volonté de parler aux autorités.
Le juge du procès était très conscient de ce risque. La décision que le juge du procès a
rendue sur ce point était étayée par le dossier et commandait la déférence. Il n'y avait
aucune raison de modifier sa décision sur la question de l'admissibilité.

Fish, J. (Binnie, LeBel, Abella, JJ., souscrivant à son opinion) (dissident): Les déclarations
contestées ont été obtenues dans des conditions qui portent atteinte au droit de l'accusé de
garder le silence, tel que garanti par l'art. 7 de la Charte. L'accusé a clairement invoqué son
droit de garder le silence 18 fois. Pendant toute la durée de son interrogatoire, l'accusé était
incarcéré et se trouvait entièrement sous le contrôle des autorités policières. Le policier qui
a interrogé l'accusé comprenait parfaitement que ce dernier avait choisi de ne pas parler à
la police et n'a pourtant pas tenu compte des revendications répétées de l'accusé de son
droit de garder le silence. L'accusé a ainsi non seulement été privé de son droit de garder le
silence, mais aussi, parallèlement, de l'avantage censé découler de son droit à l'assistance
d'un avocat. Le comportement de l'interrogateur a tout au moins empêché de façon
inéquitable l'accusé de décider de faire ou non une déclaration aux autorités. Un choix
auquel on a passé outre et qu'on a empêché de façon inéquitable de faire en poursuivant
sans relâche l'interrogatoire d'un détenu n'est ni libre ni utile. Autoriser l'utilisation des
déclarations contestées est susceptible de déconsidérer l'administration de la justice et
auraient dû être écartées.

Annotation

Singh is the latest in a line of cases in which the Supreme Court has safeguarded law
enforcement interests by limiting the protections afforded to interrogated suspects. In the
leading confessions case of R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, and the recent case of R. v.
Spencer (2007), 44 C.R. (6th) 199 (S.C.C.) the Court framed the voluntary confessions rule
in such a way as to permit interrogators to use a wide range of pressure tactics in their
efforts to obtain confessions. In Singh, the Supreme Court holds that the pre-trial right to
silence offers no protection to detainees interrogated by obvious persons in authority
beyond the protection offered by the voluntariness rule. According to the majority of the
Court, recognizing an independent role for the pre-trial right to silence in this context would
unduly interfere with the investigation of crime, which depends on the ability of police to
question and try to obtain information from suspects. The majority's claim that effective law
enforcement depends on the authorities' ability to interrogate even those detainees who
have asserted their right to silence rings hollow, as the dissenters point out, in light of the
decades-long US experience with the Miranda rules, which require police to stop questioning
suspects who have asserted a choice not to speak. Nevertheless, a majority of the court
accepts this law enforcement argument and refuses to extend the pre-trial right to silence in
this context.

Arguably, Singh provides insufficient protection for the right to silence. As long as the
Charter protects the pre-trial right to silence, there is something unseemly about the
Supreme Court jealously guarding the power of police interrogators to undermine a
suspect's choice to remain silent. At the same time, the majority in Singh recognizes that
persistent questioning of suspects who repeatedly assert their right to silence can result in
the exclusion of the resulting statements under the voluntariness rule. Such a statement will
be involuntary, and exclusion automatic, where it was not the product of the suspect's free
will to speak to the authorities.

Ultimately, then, there may be less separating the majority and the minority in Singh than
one might initially suppose. Certainly the majority rejects the dissenters' suggestion that
the police are obliged to stop questioning a detainee who clearly asserts the right to silence.
However, the full court agrees that persistent questioning in the face of repeated assertions
of the right to silence can render a statement inadmissible. The question whether the
exclusionary remedy arises from the confessions rule or the s. 7 pre-trial right to silence is
less important than the availability of the remedy itself.

Lisa Dufraimont[FN*]

The decision that the section 7 right to silence is subsumed under the voluntary confession
rule as set out in Oickle will certainly make voir dires on the admissibility of confessions
easier for trial judges. Just apply the four-factor approach in Oickle and don't worry about
the Charter.

The disturbing reality is that our Supreme Court has now clearly given the police huge
leeway to use tricks and inducements in interrogation. Oickle and the majority's later ruling
in R. v. Spencer (2007), 44 C.R. (6th) 199 (S.C.C.) will encourage police questioning to
exploit emotions about possible prosecution against partners. Oickle says police may use
polygraphs and lie about their accuracy. The Ontario Court of Appeal in R.v. Osmar (2007),
44 C.R. (6th) 276 (Ont. C.A.) found nothing in the Charter or Oickle to prevent police from
pretending to be members of organised crime (the Mr. Big strategy) in their undercover
investigations to obtain confessions. Now we have Singh saying that a confession can be
admitted if it is voluntary even if the interrogation goes on for hours over the accused's
protests that he or she does not wish to talk.

The problem is that even Oickle is not just about voluntariness. Under Oickle there is a
freestanding discretion to exclude confessions obtained by tricks that shock the community.
Why wasn't such an sustained effort by the police to override an assertion of the right to
silence shocking? The Supreme Court has held that adverse inferences should not be drawn
against someone who is silent at the pre-trial stage as it would be a "snare and delusion" to
advise about the right to silence and then to turn around and use silence as a sign of guilt
(R. v. Turcotte (2006), 31 C.R. (6th) 197 (S.C.C.)). Why isn't it a snare and delusion to say
a suspect has the right to si1ence but allow police to ignore its exercise? The section 7 pre-
trial right to silence was recognised with very strong language in R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2
S.C.R. 151 about the need to move beyond the old common law's focus on reliability to
allow judicial control of police interrogation abuses and forced incrimination. Singh has
suddenly reduced this to the very little right that an undercover agent cannot elicit
statements by the functional equivalent of an interrogation. Certainly in Singh there is no
mention of any section 7 right to be advised of the right to silence where police are not
undercover. Whether the accused receive advice from the police or a lawyer (if there was
one) is just a factor to be considered on the voluntariness inquiry.

The community shock test is a very high hurdle for accused and does not apply to the s.
24(2) remedy of exclusion for Charter breaches. In the United Kingdom judges under s.
76(2) of the Evidence Act of 1984 have a discretion to exclude a confession where police
interrogation methods are considered oppressive and not just where they shock the
community. Under s.76(5) oppression "includes torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or
the use or threatened use of violence (whether or not amounting to torture)".

Trial judges in Canada who have relied on Oickle to exclude confessions on the basis that
oppression has resulted in involuntariness have often felt it necessary to buttress their
rulings by also finding a section 7 breach. See, for example, R. v. Hammerstrom (2006), 43
C.R. (6th) 346 (B.C. S.C.) (police tricking the accused by claiming they had the crime
videotaped on a store surveillance tape), and R. v. N. (2005), 28 C.R. 6th) 149 (Ont. S.C.)
(five-hour polygraph, hostile interrogation and shocking number of tricks). Prior to Oickle,
Fradsham J. in R. v. S. (M.J.) (2000), 32 C.R. (5th) 378 (Alta. Prov. Ct.) excluded a
confession in part because the videotape revealed Calgary police were using the oppressive
atmosphere and psychological brainwashing Reid method pioneered in the United States,
which should not be accepted in Canada. The resort to section 7 analysis is clearly no longer
available given Singh.

Regulation of police interrogation is one area where Parliament may have achieved a better
balance than the courts. Under section 269.1 of the Criminal Code torture is an indictable
offence punishable to a maximum of 14 years. Torture is widely defined in s. 269.1(2) as
any act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person.

Further, under subsection 4, a statement obtained by torture is inadmissible in any

proceedings over which Parliament has jurisdiction. This may be a vehicle for further judicial
checks on police interrogation.

Don Stuart[FN*]