Republic of the Philippines the rebellious MNLF and MILF was cultivated.

8 Thus, the Autonomous Region of

SUPREME COURT Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created through Republic Act No. 6734. The law
Manila took effect on August 1, 1989.
EN BANC Then came the presidency of President Fidel V. Ramos. He issued on
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183572, 183893 and 183951 - THE PROVINCE OF NORTH September 15, 1993, Executive Order No., 125 (E.O. 125) which provided for a
COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or comprehensive, integrated and holistic peace process with the Muslim rebels.
VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PINOL, for and in his own behalf vs. THE E.O. 125 created the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL give momentum to the peace talks with the MNLF.
ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, In 1996, as the GRP-MNLF peace negotiations were successfully winding down,
ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN, and/or GEN. the government prepared to deal with the MILF problem. Formal peace talks
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and started on January of 1997, towards the end of the Ramos administration. The
duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the Buldon Ceasefire Agreement was signed in July 1997 9 but time ran out for the
so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process negotiations to be completed.
Promulgated: President Joseph Estrada continued the peace talks with the MILF. The talks,
October 14, 2008 however, were limited to cessation of hostilities and did not gain any headway.
x--------------------------------------------x President Estrada gave both sides until December 1999 to finish the peace
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION process.10 They did not meet the deadline. The year 2000 saw the escalation of
PUNO, C.J.: acts of violence and the threats to the lives and security of civilians in Southern
It is the duty of the government to seek a just, comprehensive and enduring Mindanao. President Estrada then declared an "all-out war" against the MILF. 11
peace with any rebel group but the search for peace must always be in accord He bowed out of office with the "war" unfinished.
with the Constitution. Any search for peace that undercuts the Constitution must Thereafter, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assumed office. Peace
be struck down. Peace in breach of the Constitution is worse than worthless. negotiations with the MILF were immediately set for resumption. Executive
I. Historical Roots Order No. 3, was issued "Defining Policy and Administrative Structure: For
A historical perspective of our Muslim problem is helpful. Government's Comprehensive Peace Efforts." On March 24, 2001, a General
From time immemorial, an enduring peace with our Muslim brothers and sisters Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks between the GRP and the MILF
in Mindanao has eluded our grasp. Our Muslim problem exploded in March of was signed. Republic Act No. 9054 12 was also enacted on March 31, 2001 and
1968 when Muslim trainees were massacred by army officers at Corregidor. took effect on August 14, 2001 to strengthen and expand the Autonomous
About 180 Muslim trainees had been recruited in the previous year as a part of a Region of Muslim Mindanao. Through the Organic Act of 2001, six municipalities
covert force named Jabidah,1 allegedly formed to wrest away Sabah from in Lanao del Norte voted for inclusion in the ARMM.
Malaysia. The trainees were massacred when they reportedly protested their On June 22, 2001, the ancestral domain aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
unbearable training and demanded the return to their home. 2 The Jabidah Agreement was signed in Libya. Several rounds of exploratory talks with the
Massacre fomented the formation of Muslim groups clamoring for a separate MILF followed. Unfortunately, on April 2, 2003, Davao was twice bombed. Again,
Islamic state. One of these groups was the Muslim Independence Movement the peace talks were cancelled and fighting with the MILF resumed. On July 19,
(MIM), founded by the then Governor of Cotabato, Datu Udtog Matalam. 3 2003 the GRP and the MILF agreed on "mutual cessation of hostilities" and the
Another was the Nurul Islam, led by Hashim Salamat. parties returned to the bargaining table. The parties discussed the problem of
On September 21, 1972 Martial Law was declared by President Ferdinand E. ancestral domain, divided into four strands: concept, territory, resources, and
Marcos. Among the reasons cited to justify martial law were the armed conflict governance.
between Muslims and Christians and the Muslim secessionist movement in the On February 7, 2006, the 10th round of Exploratory Talks between the GRP and
Southern Philippines.4 The imposition of martial law drove some of the Muslim the MILF ended. The parties issued a joint statement of the consensus points of
secessionist movements to the underground. One of them was the Moro the Ancestral Domain aspect of GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of June
National Liberation Front (MNLF) headed by Nur Misuari. In 1974, the MNLF 22, 2001. The Joint Statement provides that:
shot to prominence, when the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) officially "Among the consensus points reached were:
gave it recognition. During the 5 th ICFM, they strongly urged "the Philippines · Joint determination of the scope of the Bangsamoro
Government to find a political and peaceful solution through negotiation with homeland based on the technical maps and data submitted
Muslim leaders, particularly with representatives of the MNLF in order to arrive by both sides;
at a just solution to the plight of the Filipino Muslims within the framework of · Measures to address the legitimate grievances of the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines"; and recognized Bangsamoro people arising from the unjust dispossession
"the problem as an internal problem with the Philippine Government to ensure and/or marginalization;
the safety of the Filipino Muslims and the preservation of their liberties in · Bangsamoro people's right to utilize and develop their
accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."5 ancestral domain and ancestral lands;
In December 1976, the Philippine government and the MNLF under the · Economic cooperation arrangements for the benefit of the
auspices of the OIC started their peace negotiation in Tripoli, Libya. It bore its entire Bangsamoro people."
first fruit when on January 20, 1977, the parties signed the Tripoli Agreement in On July 27, 2008, a Joint Statement on the Memorandum of Agreement on
Zamboanga City in the presence of the OIC Representative. Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was signed by Chairperson Rodolfo C. Garcia on
President Marcos immediately implemented the Tripoli Agreement. He issued behalf of the GRP Peace Panel, and Mohagher Iqbal on behalf of the MILF
Presidential Proclamation No. 1628, "Declaring Autonomy in Southern Panel. In the Joint Statement, it was declared that the final draft of the MOA-AD
Philippines." A plebiscite was conducted in the provinces covered under the has already been initialed. It was announced that "both sides reached a
Tripoli Agreement to determine the will of the people thereat. Further, the consensus to initial the final draft pending its official signing by the Chairmen of
legislature enacted Batasang Pambansa Blg. 20, "Providing for the Organization the two peace panels in early August 2008, in Putrajaya, Malaysia."13
of Sangguniang Pampook (Regional Legislative Assembly) in Each of Regions The Joint Statement triggered the filing of the petitions at bar. These Petitions,
IX and XII." President Marcos then ordered the creation of Autonomous Region sought among others, to restrain the signing of the MOA-AD. On August 4,
IX and XII. 2008, a day before the intended signing of the initialed MOA-AD, this Court
In the meanwhile, the MNLF continued enhancing its international status. It was issued a Temporary Restraining Order stopping the signing of the MOA-AD.
accorded the status of an observer in Tripoli, Libya during the 8 th ICFM. In the Several petitions-in-intervention were also filed praying for the same relief. On
15th ICFM at Sana'a, Yemen, in 1984, the MNLF's status was further elevated August 8, 2008 and September 1, 2008, the respondents through the Solicitor
from a mere 'legitimate representative' to 'sole legitimate representative' of the General, submitted official copies of the initialed MOA-AD to the Court and
Bangsamoro people.6 furnished the petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention with copies of the same.
In April 1977, the peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the All the petitions were heard by the Court in three separate days of oral
Philippines (GRP) and MNLF Talks collapsed. Schism split the MNLF arguments. In the course of the arguments, the Solicitor General informed the
leadership. The irreconcilable differences between Nur Misuari and Hashim Court that the MOA-AD will not be signed "in its present form or any other
Salamat led to the formation of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), form."14 Thereafter, the government Peace Panel was dismantled by the
headed by Hashim Salamat. Thus, the Maguindanao-led MILF, parted ways President.
with the Tausug-led MNLF. II. Petitions should be Decided on the Merits
In 1986, the People Power Revolution catapulted Corazon C. Aquino to the The first threshold issue is whether this Court should exercise its power of
Presidency. Forthwith, she ordered the peace talks with the MNLF to resume. judicial review and decide the petitions at bar on the merits.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people. It provided for the creation of I respectfully submit that the Court should not avoid its constitutional duty to
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao through an act of Congress. But decide the petitions at bar on their merit in view of their transcendental
again the talks with the MNLF floundered in May 1987. 7 Be that as it may, it was importance. The subject of review in the petitions at bar is the conduct of the
during President Aquino's governance that a culture of peace negotiations with peace process with the MILF which culminated in the MOA-AD. The
constitutionality of the conduct of the entire peace process and not just the unconstitutional act. Schwartz cites one vital consideration in determining
MOA-AD should go under the scalpel of judicial scrutiny. The review should not ripeness, viz:
be limited to the initialed MOA-AD for it is merely the product of a constitutionally In dealing with ripeness, one must distinguish between statutes and
flawed process of negotiations with the MILF. other acts that are self-executing and those that are not. If a
Let us revisit the steps that led to the contested and controversial MOA-AD. statute is self executing, it is ripe for challenge as soon as it is
Peace negotiations with the MILF commenced with the execution of ceasefire enacted. For such a statute to be subject to judicial review, it is not
agreements. The watershed event, however, occurred in 2001, with the necessary that it be applied by an administrator, a prosecutor, or
issuance of Executive Order No. 315 entitled "Defining Policy and Administrative some other enforcement officer in a concrete case.22
Structure for Government's Comprehensive Peace Efforts." Government Peace Although Schwartz employs the term "statute," he qualifies that the principle
Negotiating Panels were immediately constituted to negotiate peace with rebel enunciated applies to other governmental acts as well.23
groups, which included the MILF. Significantly, Executive Order No. 3 Prescinding from these parameters, it is evident that the Court is confronted
provides that in the pursuit of social, economic and political reforms, with a MOA-AD that is heavily laden with self-executing components. Far
administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional amendments from the representation of the Solicitor General, the MOA-AD is not a mere
may be required.16 Section 4 of Executive Order No. 3 states, viz: collection of consensus points,24 still bereft of any legal consequence. The
SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the commitments made by the government panel under the MOA-AD can be divided
comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as the into (1) those which are self-executory or are immediately effective by the
"Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated and terms of the MOA-AD alone, (2) those with a period or which are to be effective
not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously within a stipulated time, and (3) those that are conditional or whose effectivity
in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may depends on the outcome of a plebiscite.
not be limited to, the following: Let us cast an eye on the self executory provisions of the MOA-AD which will
a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL demolish the argument of the respondents that the issues in the petitions at bar
REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous are not ripe for adjudication.
implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and The MOA-AD provides that "the Parties affirm that the core of the BJE shall
projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal constitute the present geographic area of the ARMM, including the municipalities
armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require of Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal in the province of
administrative action, new legislation or even Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001
constitutional amendments. plebiscite."
xxxx The MOA-AD then proceeds to enumerate the powers that the BJE possesses
c. PEACEFUL, NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH THE within its area. The BJE is granted powers of governance which it can exercise
DIFFERENT REBEL GROUPS. This component involves without need of amendments to be made to the Constitution or existing law or
the conduct of face-to-face negotiations to reach peaceful without imposing any condition whatsoever.
settlement with the different rebel groups. It also involves The MOA-AD also gives the BJE the unconditional right to participate in
the effective implementation of peace agreements. international meetings and events, e.g., ASEAN meetings and other specialized
(Emphasis supplied) agencies of the United Nations.25 It grants BJE the right to participate in
Executive Order No. 3, was later amended by E.O. No. 555, 17 and was followed Philippine official missions and delegations that are engaged in the negotiation
by the Tripoli Peace Agreement of 2001. The Tripoli Peace Agreement of 2001 of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection, equitable
became the basis for several rounds of exploratory talks between the GRP sharing of incomes and revenues, in addition to those of fishing rights. 26 Again,
Peace Panel and the MILF. These exploratory talks resulted in the signing of the these rights are given to the BJE without imposing prior conditions such as
Joint Statements of the GRP and MILF peace panels to affirm commitments that amendments to the Constitution, existing law or the enactment of new
implement the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, including the ancestral domain aspect. legislation.
The issuance of the Joint Statements culminated in the initialing of the Next, let us go to provisions of the MOA-AD with a period which will further
MOA-AD.18 demonstrate the lack of merit of respondents' posture that the petitions at bar
It is crystal clear that the initialing of the MOA-AD is but the evidence of the are not ripe for adjudication. The MOA-AD provides that "without derogating
government peace negotiating panel's assent to the terms contained therein. If from the requirements of prior agreements 27, the Government stipulates to
the MOA-AD is constitutionally infirm, it is because the conduct of the conduct and deliver, within twelve (12) months following the signing of the
peace process itself is flawed. It is the constitutional duty of the Court is to Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain, a plebiscite covering the
determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack areas as enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A x x x the
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the government peace negotiating panel Parties shall endeavor to complete negotiations and resolve all outstanding
in the conduct of the peace negotiations with the MILF. The Court should issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from signing
not restrict its review on the validity of the MOA-AD which is but the end of the MOA-AD."28 Once more, it is evident that no conditions were imposed with
product of the flawed conduct of the peace negotiation with the MILF. respect to the conduct of a plebiscite within twelve months following the signing
Requirements of Ripeness and of the MOA-AD. The provision starkly states that within twelve months, the
Mootness are not bars to review government will conduct and deliver a plebiscite covering areas under Category
In contending that this Court should refrain from resolving the merits of the A of the MOA-AD.
petitions at bar, two principal defenses were deployed by the Solicitor General: We now come to respondents' argument on mootness. In determining whether
the issues raised for resolution are not ripe for adjudication and regardless of a case has been rendered moot, courts look at the development of events to
their ripeness, are moot. ascertain whether the petitioner making the constitutional challenge is
With due respect, the defenses cannot be sustained. To contend that an issue is confronted with a continuing harm or a substantial potential of harm.
not ripe for adjudication is to invoke prematurity; 19 that the issue has not reached Mootness is sometimes viewed as "the doctrine of standing set in a time frame:
a state where judicial intervention is necessary, hence, there is in reality no The requisite personal interest must exist at the commencement of the litigation
actual controversy. On the other hand, to urge that an issue has become moot and must continue throughout its existence." 29 Stated otherwise, an actual
concedes that judicial intervention was once proper but subsequent controversy must be extant at all stages of judicial review, not merely at the time
developments make further judicial action unnecessary. Together, mootness the complaint is filed.30
and ripeness act as a two-pronged pincer, squeezing the resolution of Respondents insist that the petitions at bar are moot for three reasons: (1) the
controversies within a narrow timeframe. 20 petitioners North Cotabato and Zamboanga have already been furnished copies
First, the issues at bar are ripe for resolution. In Ohio Forestry Ass'n Inc. v. of the MOA-AD; (2) the Executive Secretary has issued a Memorandum that the
Sierra Club,21 the following factors were identified as indicative of the ripeness government will not sign the MOA-AD and, (3) the GRP Peace Panel has been
of a controversy: dissolved by the President.
1. Whether delayed review would cause hardship to the plaintiffs; These grounds are barren grounds. For one, the press statements of the
2. Whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., are
further administrative action; clear that the MOA-AD will still be used as a major reference in future
3. Whether the Court would benefit from further factual development negotiations.31 For another, the MILF considers the MOA-AD a "done deal," 32
of the issues presented; hence, ready for implementation. On the other hand, the peace panel may have
Underlying the use of the foregoing factors is first, the setting of a threshold for been temporarily dismantled but the structures set up by the Executive and their
review and second, judicial application of the threshold to the facts extant in a guidelines which gave rise to the present controversy remain intact. With all
controversy. I respectfully submit that where a controversy concerns these realities, the petitions at bar fall within that exceptional class of
fundamental constitutional questions, the threshold must be adjusted to cases which ought to be decided despite their mootness because the
allow judicial scrutiny, in order that the issues may be resolved at the complained unconstitutional acts are "capable of repetition yet evading
earliest stage before anything irreversible is undertaken under cover of an review."33
This well-accepted exception to the non-reviewability of moot cases was THE PRESIDENT: So, what is before the body is the proposed
first enunciated in the case of Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC.34 The amendment on Line 11 of Section 1.
United States Supreme Court held that a case is not moot where interests of a Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
public character are asserted under conditions that may be immediately MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President, if there is now an autonomous
repeated, merely because the particular order involved has expired. region in Mindanao and if, according to the Honorable Ople, this has
In the petitions at bar, one need not butt heads with the Solicitor General to the recognition of the central government, what then is the use of
demonstrate the numerous constitutional infirmities of the MOA-AD. There is no creating autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and going through
need to iterate and reiterate them. Suffice to stress that it is because of these the process of a plebiscite and enacting an organic act?
evident breaches, that the MOA-AD requires the present Constitution to undergo My amendment is simply to clarify the term "Muslim Mindanao." I
radical revisions. Yet, the unblushing threat is made that the MOA-AD which really did not expect that this will go this far --- that it is being placed in
shattered to smithereens all respect to the Constitution will continue to be a the Constitution, that it is a fait accompli and that all we have to do
reference point in future peace negotiations with the MILF. In fine, the MOA-AD here is say "amen" to the whole thing and it we do not say "amen,"
is a constitutional nightmare that will come and torment us again in the near they will still continue to be autonomous regions. I insist on my
future. It must be slain now. It is not moot. amendment, Madam President.
Let us adhere to the orthodox thought that once a controversy as to the MR. OPLE: May I provide more information to Commissioner de
application of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a Castro on this matter.
legal issue which the Court is hide-bound to decide. 35 Supervening events, First of all, we have to correct the misimpression that the autonomous
whether contrived or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a regions, such as they now exist in Mindanao, do not enjoy the
decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution has already been recognition of the central government. Secondly, may I point out that
committed or the threat of being committed again is not a hypothetical fear. 36 It is the autonomy existing now in Regions IX and XII is a very imperfect
the function of judicial review to uphold the Constitution at all cost or we forfeit kind of autonomy. We are not satisfied with the legal sufficiency of
the faith of the people. these regions as autonomous regions and that is the reason the
III. The Deviation from the MNLF initiative has been taken in order to guarantee by the Constitution the
Model of Pursuing Peace with right to autonomy of the people embraced in these regions and not
Rebels is Inexplicable merely on the sufferance of any existing or future administration. It is a
The MNLF model in dealing with rebels which culminated in the Peace right, moreover, for which they have waged heroic struggles, not only
Agreement of 1996, was free from any infirmity because it respected the metes in this generation but in previous eras and, therefore, what we seek is
and bounds of the Constitution. While the MNLF model is ostensibly based on constitutional permanence for this right.
the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, its implementation was in perfect accord with May I also point out, Madam President, that the Tripoli Agreement
Philippine laws. The implementation of the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 came in was negotiated under the aegis of foreign powers. No matter how
two phases: the first, under the legislative power of then President Marcos and friendly and sympathetic they are to our country, this is under the
the second, under the provisions of Article X of the 1987 Constitution and its aegis of the 42-nation Islamic Conference. Should our brothers look
implementing legislation, Republic Act No. 6734. 37 across the seas to a conclave of foreign governments so that their
Under President Marcos, autonomy in the affected provinces was recognized rights may be recognized in the Constitution? Do they have to depend
through Presidential Proclamation No.1628. It declared autonomy in 13 upon foreign sympathy so that their right can be recognized in final,
provinces and constituted a provisional government for the affected areas. The constitutional and durable form.
proclamation was followed by a plebiscite and the final framework for the THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Ople, the consensus here is to
autonomous region was embodied in Presidential Decree No.1618. grant autonomy to the Muslim areas of Mindanao?
The establishment of the autonomous region under P.D. 1628 was MR. OPLE: Yes.(Emphasis supplied)38
constitutionalized by the commissioners in the 1987 Constitution as shown Clearly, the mandate for the creation of the ARMM is derived principally
by the following exchange of views: from the 1987 Constitution. Thereafter, ARRM was given life by Republic Act
MR. ALONTO: Madam President, I have stated from the start of our No. 6734,39 the Organic Act of the ARMM. Our executive officials were guided by
consideration of this Article on Local Governments that the and did not stray away from these legal mandates at the negotiation and
autonomous region exists now in this country. There is a de facto execution of the Peace Agreement with the MNLF in 1996. Without ifs and buts,
existence of an autonomous government in what we call now Regions its Whereas Clauses affirmed our sovereignty and territorial integrity and
IX and XII. Region IX is composed of the provinces of Tawi-Tawi, completely respected our Constitution.40
Sulu, Basilan, Zamboanga City, Zamboanga del Sur and Zamboanga In stark contrast, the peace process with the MILF draws its mandate
del Norte, including all the component cities in the provinces. Region principally from Executive Order No. 3. This executive order provided the
XII is composed of the Provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, basis for the execution of the Tripoli Agreement of 2001 and thereafter, the
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and North Cotabato. This autonomous MOA-AD. During the whole process, the government peace negotiators
region has its central governmental headquarters in Zamboanga City conducted themselves free from the strictures of the Constitution. They
for Region IX and in Cotabato City for Region XII. In fact, it is stated played fast and loose with the do's and dont's of the Constitution. They acted as
by Commissioner Ople that it has an executive commission and a if the grant of executive power to the President allows them as agents to make
legislative assembly. agreements with the MILF in violation of the Constitution. They acted as if these
MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President. violations can anyway be cured by committing that the sovereign people will
MR. ALONTO: These two regions have been organized by virtue of change the Constitution to conform with the MOA-AD. They forgot that the
P.D. No. 1618 of President Marcos, as amended by P.D. No. 1843. Constitution grants power but also sets some impotence on power.
MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President. IV. The Exercise of Executive Power is
MR. ALONTO: If the Gentleman will bear with me, I will explain to him. Subject to the Constitution
That is why there is a de facto autonomous government existing in Clearly, the respondents grossly misunderstood and patently misapplied the
Mindanao executive powers of the President.
MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President. The MILF problem is a problem of rebellion penalized under the Revised Penal
THE PRESIDENT: May we please allow Commissioner Alonto to Code.41 The MILF is but a rebel group. It has not acquired any belligerency
finish his remarks before any interruption? status. The rebellion of the MILF is recognized expressly by E.O. No. 3 42 as well
MR. DE CASTRO: Yes Madam President. as by E.O. No. 555.43 The President's powers in dealing with rebellion are
MR. ALONTO: Madam President, this autonomous region is spelled out in Article VII, section 18 of the Constitution, viz:
recognized by the present regime for the very reason that the present The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
regime is now in the process of a negotiation with the Moro National the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
Liberation Front. In a way, what we are doing is to give constitutional such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
basis for the President of this country today to proceed with the or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
negotiation with the Moro National Liberation Front. requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Uka is recognized. privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
MR. UKA: Madam President, not only that. President Corazon C. part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
Aquino has appointed Mr. Albert Tugum as the Chairman of Region IX proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
and Mr. Datu Zakaria Candau as chairman of Region XII. They are writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or
doing their work well right now. So there are two recognized in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
autonomous regions. They have also a complete regional assembly least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
as the legislative body. So, it is only a matter of putting this in the revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not
Constitution. be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
 Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or Needless to stress, the power of the President to negotiate peace with the MILF
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the is not plenary. While a considerable degree of flexibility and breadth is accorded
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. to the peace negotiating panel, the latitude has its limits - the Constitution. The
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours Constitution was ordained by the sovereign people and its postulates may not
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance be employed as bargaining chips without their prior consent.
with its rules without need of a call. V. The Constitution as Compact of the People
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by The question may be asked: In the process of negotiating peace with the MILF,
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of why cannot the Executive commit to do acts which are prohibited by the
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas Constitution and seek their ratification later by its amendment or revision?
corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision Many philosophical perspectives have been advanced in reply to this question.
thereon within thirty days from its filing. Yet, no theory has been as influential, nor has been as authoritative, as the
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the social contract theory,46 articulated by John Locke, viz:
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual,
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on made a community, they have thereby made that community one
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and
to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of determination of the majority: for that which acts any community,
habeas corpus. being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body
apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the
inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion. consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, continue one body, one community, which the consent of every
any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is
three days, otherwise he shall be released. bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore
These are the well crafted commander-in-chief powers of the President. They we see, that in assemblies, empowered to act by positive laws, where
enumerate with exactitude the powers which the President should use in dealing no number is set by that positive law which empowers them, the act of
with rebellion. They are graduated in degrees. The strongest of these powers is the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines,
the power to declare martial law and worthy to note, its exercise is subject to as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole.47
restraints. But more important, all these commander-in-chief powers can only be The French philosopher, Jean Jacques Rosseau stressed the non-derogability
used to quell the rebellion. They cannot be utilized to dismember the State or to of this social contract, viz:
create a state within our State and hand it over to the MILF rebels. But the body politic or sovereign, deriving its existence only from the
In dealing with the MILF rebellion, the President may, however, opt not to sanctity of the contract, can never bind itself, even to others, in
use force but negotiate peace with the MILF. Undoubtedly, the President as anything that derogates from the original act, such as alienation of
Chief Executive can negotiate peace with rebels, like the MILF. Article VII, some portion of itself, or submission to another sovereign. To violate
section 1 of the Constitution vests in the President the entire panoply of the act by which it exists would be to annihilate itself; and what is
executive power, to reach peace with rebels. But undoubtedly too, the nothing produces nothing.48
exercise of executive power to secure peace with rebels is limited by the Dean Vicente Sinco of the U.P. College of Law articulated these precepts in his
Constitution. seminal work, Philippine Political Law, viz:
All these are due to the preeminent principle that our government is As adopted in our system of jurisprudence a constitution is a written
fundamentally one of limited and enumerated powers. As well stated in Angara instrument which serves as the fundamental law of the state. In
v. Electoral Commission,44 viz: theory, it is the creation of the will of the people, who are deemed the
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and source of all political powers. It provides for the organization of the
in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and essential departments of government, determines and limits their
the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and powers, and prescribes guarantees to the basic rights of the
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, individual.49
however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves xxxx
off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political Some authorities have also considered the constitution as a compact,
excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be an "agreement of the people, in their individual capacities, reduced to
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the writing, establishing and fixing certain principles for the government of
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called themselves." This notion expresses the old theory of the social
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the contract obligatory on all parties and revocable by no one individual
several departments and among the integral or constituent units or group less than the majority of the people; otherwise it will not
thereof. have the attribute of law.50 (Emphasis supplied)
In fine, there is no power in the Constitution that can run riot. There is no power In sum, there is no power nor is there any right to violate the Constitution
in the Constitution that is unbounded. There is no power in the Constitution that on the part of any official of government. No one can claim he has a blank
can be exercised if it will destroy the Constitution. For all powers in the check to violate the Constitution in advance and the privilege to cure the
Constitution are designed to preserve the Constitution. violation later through amendment of its provisions. Respondents' thesis
In other words, the President as Chief Executive can negotiate peace with the of violate now, validate later makes a burlesque of the Constitution.
MILF but it is peace that will insure that our laws are faithfully executed. The I vote to grant the petitions.
President can seek peace with the MILF but without crossing the parameters of REYNATO S. PUNO
powers marked in the Constitution to separate the other branches of Chief Justice
government to preserve our democracy. For even in times of war, our system of
checks and balances cannot be infringed. 45 More so in times where the only
danger that faces the State is the lesser danger of rebellion.
G.R. No. 160261             November 10, 2003 x---------------------------------------------------------x
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C.
petitioner-in-intervention, LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner-in-intervention, petitioner-in-intervention,
vs. vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO,
G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents. respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003 G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES,
RAZON-ABAD, petitioners, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioners-in-intervention, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner-in-intervention, vs.
vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. x---------------------------------------------------------x
x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003 LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners, MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
petitioners-in-intervention, GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,
vs. GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR.,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY
x---------------------------------------------------------x SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003 QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO
petitioner-in-intervention, GALLOR, petitioners,
vs. WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF petitioner-in-intervention,
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS vs.
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER
GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON.
LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET
LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN AL., respondents.
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO x---------------------------------------------------------x
NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS vs.
LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, x---------------------------------------------------------x
ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE
PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO
BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE
TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS vs.
ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83
DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE
DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, x---------------------------------------------------------x
CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, vs.
JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents, ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents. vs.
x---------------------------------------------------------x THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G.
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003 DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
vs. CARPIO MORALES, J.:
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the
respondents. determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope
x---------------------------------------------------------x and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003 provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at
PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches.
CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the
NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a
CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present
OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second
vs. impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has
DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was
GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to
SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court
COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents. unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-
x---------------------------------------------------------x constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003 permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
vs. In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents. powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by
x---------------------------------------------------------x no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003 of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner, At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
vs. carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF co-equality.
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government,
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination
respondents. among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and
x---------------------------------------------------------x enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003 what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners, est suprema lex.
vs. Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE ARTICLE XI
VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE Accountability of Public Officers
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents. SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
x---------------------------------------------------------x employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003 with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
petitioner. Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
x---------------------------------------------------------x the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003 and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
vs. trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member
PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents. of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
x---------------------------------------------------------x endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003 Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE from receipt thereof.
PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, (3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
[FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed
CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, forthwith proceed.
 (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same Secretary General of the House 12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
official more than once within a period of one year. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results
of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This
on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two- Members of the House of Representatives.13
thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al.,
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according the same official more than once within a period of one year."
to law. In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the
underscoring supplied) issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious
Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on introduced by the 12th Congress," 14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment
November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules 1 complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to
approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted
Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation: and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES
prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9
thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus
RULE II RULE V
directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX,
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment
Section 2. Mode of Initiating PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to
Impeachment. – Impeachment Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed
shall be initiated only by a verified Initiated. – In cases where a Member of the House files a
promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court
complaint for impeachment filed verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with
by any Member of the House of complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House the second impeachment complaint.
Representatives or by any citizen through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable
upon a resolution of endorsement officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and
by any Member thereof or by a deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance,
verified complaint or resolution of that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
impeachment filed by at least one- official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on
third (1/3) of all the Members of the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of
the House. the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of
resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance. a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President
In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at
Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House, Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the with the impeachment trial.
time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution
of impeachment with the Secretary General.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang,
  as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it
RULE V Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT Proceedings. – Within a period of one (1) year from the date the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided
impeachment proceedings shall be in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second
initiated against the same official can be initiated against the same official. (Italics in the impeachment complaint.
more than once within the period original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has
of one (1) year.
recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, 2 of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the complaint be declared unconstitutional.
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and
Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3 members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting,
complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint,
Jr. and seven Associate Justices 5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." 6 The complaint Impeachment to the Senate.
was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and
Didagen Piang Dilangalen, 7 and was referred to the House Committee on Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of
Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional
Constitution which reads: impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers'
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House
days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all
The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court
within ten session days from receipt thereof. enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing,
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from
on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. 10 To date, the conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint 11 was filed with the involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the
House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295,
Impeachment be declared null and void. which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260
member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the
Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a
their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of
second impeachment complaint. Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House
mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum, 19 and as reflected above, to
prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or
declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003,
enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint. Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to
for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared participate.
unconstitutional. Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require
in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor
in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3,
succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00
respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition,
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo,
as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from
respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the committing acts that would render the petitions moot.
Judiciary. Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special
alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no
transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives,
Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to
with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and
and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
due course. jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one
they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant
power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22
Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved
the (JDF)." to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003;
Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President
constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned,
students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding
and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented
impeachment complaint be declared null and void. before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it
locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to
the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to
exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295,
"To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003
Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void. on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the
issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino
(1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to
declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261.
conducting any proceedings thereon. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos.
taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were
void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be admitted.
prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the
or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal,
proceeding with the impeachment trial. and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court, 18 prayed for the Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and
prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the a) locus standi of petitioners;
declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
void for being unconstitutional. c) political question/justiciability;
 d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
impeachment; parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
impeachment; dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis- unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original) expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from expressed through their representatives in the executive and
impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the legislative departments of the government. 24 (Italics in the original;
exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the emphasis and underscoring supplied)
substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the
seriatim. proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to
Judicial Review direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the
judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint. power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the demandable and enforceable."26
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution: Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a wit:
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first
government. (Emphasis supplied) mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that
Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral rank.
Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
discoursed: constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great departments, are bound by that instrument. 28 (Italics in the original;
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not emphasis supplied)
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, 30 the
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom
limited, has established a republican government intended to operate or practice to the contrary.
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which,
government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock
of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are
of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the system of government. It obtains not through express provision but
United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
article VIII of our Constitution. elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is in the workings of the various departments of the government. x
to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano,
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine "x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth boundaries of authority and control between them." 33 To him, "[j]udicial review is
all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. – of the judiciary in that balancing operation." 34
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore- underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held
quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion: circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object
xxx is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says: Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
lower courts as may be established by law. whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
I suppose nobody can question it. calculated to effect that purpose. 39 (Emphasis and underscoring
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first supplied)
and explain. As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue 40 where, speaking
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
part or instrumentality of the government. adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
that in a number of cases against the government, which then offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a
defense of political questions and got away with it. As a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of Manuel Moran declared:
habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not
political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its
the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction
questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment with all other provisions of that great document. 43 (Emphasis and
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further underscoring supplied)
violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed
xxx that:
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
judgment on matters of this nature. another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that to stand together.
the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and
this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
supplied) nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to
must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
principles of constitutional construction. Secretary, this Court expounded:
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared: be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to
attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass
where technical terms are employed in which case the of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood
its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents
and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel
the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the
underscoring supplied) coverage of judicial review.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character.
And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment
Secretary38 in this wise: proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc
to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of
review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49 congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the
are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on
al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties
principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial
contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives
inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to
fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the
checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does
the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts
relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, 66 it ruled that confirmation by
show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment. the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge
American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of
demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and
to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral
and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that
reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by
the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to the Constitution.
impeachment proceedings. Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial
Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
"[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs." 53 Indeed, although (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father case.
Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord." x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
instrumentality. presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without expressed through their representatives in the executive and
limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, 55 provides for several limitations Standing
to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial
Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
official. question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 69
on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that
of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and
willfulness and pride."56 will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above- Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing
not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters,
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest 70 and
of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the
of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond have not abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul
the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing
petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non- transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when
ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review. the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot
judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners
this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to standing.
inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure 73 while the latter
prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine has constitutional underpinnings. 74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding
Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not party-in-interest.
 The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and
has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of
is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397,
is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three is mum on his standing.
requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following
can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets
to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a
injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. 90 Applying
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are
interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have indeed of transcendental importance.
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
difficult constitutional questions." paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean
xxx that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such
he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner
the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'" 76 (Citations omitted) Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged standing.
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of
before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives. not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention. 92
when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case,
Court. they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed,
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of and Petition-in-Intervention.
its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.,
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court
complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
interest. 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of
improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to
of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a intervene were hereby granted.
general interest common to all members of the public.80 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate
suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the
petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which
the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds. transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of
action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. 82 Indeed, a Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 83 Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
While an association has legal personality to represent its members, 84 especially Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied
when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing
vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to
any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and wit:
nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. 86 It, therefore, behooves this legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it. respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent
persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the
class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public
whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest
interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after
a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without
had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the
may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
proceeding. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the lower courts as may be established by law.
second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the I suppose nobody can question it.
House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the and explain.
second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
complied with. part or instrumentality of the government.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be that in a number of cases against the government, which then
exhausted. had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ
encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an release of political detainees, and other matters related to the
opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government
Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court
the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it."
transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper
constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss. solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law
Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who
since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the
of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of
injuries. Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21.
Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the
previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on
clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, September 21. So that when martial law was announced on
whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact,
exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the media could not publish any story not only because our main
the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who
to grant it. succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the
Justiciability object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not
defined the term "political question," viz: finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague,
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full was taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. 99 Constitution was presented to the President around December 1,
(Italics in the original) 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law
rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of decree which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of
cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to
the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a
judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a
of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and
bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary 102 criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the danger of
which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of
force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a
thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the
being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity. questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision
refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated
motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into
Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application existence. The questions to be propounded were released with
on issues involving political questions, viz: proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was
usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the
branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard before
the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a
 proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems
already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But
in the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the there is a difference.
departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to
parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the
Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force. government had authority or had abused its authority to the
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not
proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
government was that the issue was a political question and that the xxx
court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided
xxx by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with
January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note the political question doctrine?
that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but MR. CONCEPCION. No.
none of them had been notified of any referendum in their respective FR. BERNAS. It is not.
places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of
referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding. discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not
majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
referendum. MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define
big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says,
another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition
political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is that we might make may not cover all possible areas.
not the only major case in which the plea of "political question" FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems
was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past. arising from the political question doctrine.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that
the issue was clearly justiciable. truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power. 104
xxx (Emphasis supplied)
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power? Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a
What is a political question? duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify,
settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which
a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her "are not truly political questions."
duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect
duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by
cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so which are not truly political in nature.
personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College
derogatory to human dignity." of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that: questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual Constitution.
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or In Marcos v. Manglapus, 105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene
enforceable . . . Cortes, held:
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine
hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government, the and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,
Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
of government are generally considered divided into three departments to decide.106 x x x
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 107 through Justice Teodoro
one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the Padilla, this Court declared:
others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court
given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice. must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court
judgment on matters of this nature. ruled:
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
question. would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied) Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these
Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus: two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
also in other lower courts as may be created by law. question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes. of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example? discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
 impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining
for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law
various departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied) broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly
department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which
resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of
not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a
presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present. violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of (d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary.121
judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the
Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said
determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue. Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non- the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of
justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional
are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these
the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said
This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy. petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not
These petitions raise five substantial issues: be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative
constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution. inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in Blue Ribbon Commttee, 122 viz:
accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution. The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21,
into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement Article VI thereof provides:
of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution. appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus,
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill
left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113 the right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra,
impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the
trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and
1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article
than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving XI of the Constitution which reads:
at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor. 114 Clearly, the issue calls Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII. House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
Lis Mota trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives
constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the
Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held: requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the
is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the
which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for "We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of
consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro
question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124
supplied] Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically
where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin
being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit: "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having
a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee
satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied] included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
 Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution
days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in
The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's
within ten session days from receipt thereof. competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully
more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of Senators.
impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power
House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest
contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the
necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified fundamental law.
impeachment complaint. It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the
does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—
impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon.
the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992
only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the
raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or
complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of
instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be
original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and
petitioners as well. hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and
determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said collectively.
intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the
al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting
are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision. in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in
they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of
Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
Constitution. amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members
Judicial Restraint alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a
decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself
judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.
impeachment proceedings. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the
a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court,
impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment." 125 the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the
But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very
compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if
House of Representatives are subject to them. sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally participation of its entire membership of Justices. 133 (Italics in the
disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to original)
which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it
shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More exercises its power of judicial review.
than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the
cognizance of the instant petitions. 127 In the august words of amicus curiae "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US
Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of 1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
duty." friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between
other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a
been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry
matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
as always, with detachment and fairness." 129 After all, "by [his] appointment to 2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in
the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the
[he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to necessary to a decision of the case.'
render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to 3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
[his] office."130 4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other
been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found
the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide
interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its
the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently
disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent
held: state ground.
 5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within
of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office,
many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men
the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting
Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by
performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or
v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even
citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the for Impeachment Proceedings
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens. adopted by the 12th Congress
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues
instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits. that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file"
(citations omitted). because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment
v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a
encapsulated into the following categories: resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against
by the facts of the case the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet
operation of the statute to act on it.
5. that the parties are not in estoppel The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate."
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality. Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,
exercise of judicial review: Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5,
enforcement 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it
possible opportunity twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136 complaint and take initial action on it.
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial "Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to
restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International
embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or
the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of
hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions
serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official. 137 Intervenor Soriano Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a
echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The
Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate.
authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the
the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee
not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all on Justice.
impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by
because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis. Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act. is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the
act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The
only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal
consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation.
petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into
constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987
quasi-validation, follows." 138 Constitution can be pried from its records:
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary 139 where this Court was split and "in MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the
the end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I
respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would
paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime. need some time for Committee action.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee
coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been
not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my
the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights
government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment
violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the
of the land. information of the Committee, the resolution covers several
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation,
doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141 action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report,
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and
justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political judgment by the Senate.
 xxx refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of
we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term
floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by
actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment.
the body. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word
we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It
impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint
resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen
the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the
initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject
that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or
these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further
been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House
the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee
on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at
proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
want to indicate this on record. Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that
xxx the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is
the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as
the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of impeachment court.
the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated
regarding impeachment. when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the
this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House
delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
"resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather,
letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and
the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which
Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution triggers the series of steps that follow.
WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at
recorded." least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
the House of Representatives of the United States is concerned, ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but
really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every rather the filing of a complaint does. 146 Thus the line was deleted and is not
resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of found in the present Constitution.
Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted
will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this
vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to
procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the
Congress. Thank you, Madam President. 143 (Italics in the original; people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary
emphasis and udnerscoring supplied) people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning,
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse
accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144 it.
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of
"the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the "impeachment proceeding."
vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs
the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term
verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with
Constitution."145 Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice
that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
complaint moving. Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz: same official within a one year period.
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,
power to initiate all cases of impeachment. impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
xxx House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the
official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution
supplied) is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize
rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction
"initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral. over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against
use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of
Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal procedure by legislators.
opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as
Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our a window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the
deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the
of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are "x x x
so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more "The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may
about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of
disinterestedness.148 this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. its rules:
There are at present only two members of this Court who participated in the Rule XV
1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf 3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the
Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the
obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and
opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of
examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof. the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb.
Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make 14, 1890)
and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what
assumption, however, is misplaced. methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may
on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages
power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only
contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to
to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz: constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there
Section 3. (1) x x x should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member proceedings established by the rule and the result which is
of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better,
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond
from receipt thereof. the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon
be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found
The vote of each Member shall be recorded. to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint;
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a
by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be
forthwith proceed. defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same powers.154
official more than once within a period of one year. xxx
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it courts to categorically reject the political question defense when
would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1,
the Constitution without need of referendum. Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has
House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in
Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the
United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM
rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state
Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the
that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice
proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the Legislative departments of government.155
result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all xxx
matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this
case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise.
Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it
Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
of the Rules of Congress, viz: instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
 jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
checking powers of this Court against the other branches of against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
government despite their more democratic character, the President prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
and the legislators being elected by the people. 156 impeachable officer within a one-year period.
xxx Conclusion
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a
courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government' or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven
Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both
branches of government. This provision was dictated by our sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they
experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved.
more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the
xxx impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar
xxx slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society -
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith –
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of
Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not upon areas of national life.
merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued
initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the
there is a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to approach House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak
but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made
not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present. through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability,"
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may
to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the
rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against
bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already
new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for
exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of
the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation
should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of
history should provide us the light and not the experience of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the
supplied) process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. patently without basis in fact and in law.
Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on
are involved. the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year
basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had
Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political
U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the
clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive
whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of
impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this
Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members'
how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised. interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long
there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights
and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions
House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an
"initiate" a meaning different from "filing." incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution?
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year sequitur.
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality
other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and Georgilu Yumul-Hermida, Pwersa ng Masa, 4th District, Quezon 21.
ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high- Jose Carlos Lacson, Lakas, 3rd District, Negros Occidental 22.
profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law Manuel C. Ortega, NPC, 1st District, La Union 23. Uliran Joaquin,
and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief NPC, 1st District, Laguna 24. Soraya C. Jaafar, Lakas, Lone District of
Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The Tawi-Tawi 25. Wilhelmino Sy-Alvarado, Lakas, 1st District, Bulacan
law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life. 26. Claude P. Bautista, NPC, 2nd District, Davao Del Sur 27. Del De
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test Guzman, Lakas, Lone District of Marikina City 28. Zeneida Cruz-
once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Ducut, NPC, 2nd District, Pampanga 29. Augusto Baculio,
Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search Independent-LDP, 2nd District, Misamis Oriental 30. Faustino Dy III,
for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But NPC-Lakas, 3rd District, Isabela 31. Agusto Boboy Syjuco, Lakas, 2nd
though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in District, Iloilo 32. Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon, LDP, Lone District of
our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this Muntinlupa City 33. Leovigildo B. Banaag, NPC-Lakas, 1st District,
crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve Agusan del Norte 34. Eric Singson, LP, 2nd District, Ilocos Sur 35.
differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other. Jacinto Paras, Lakas, 1st District, Negros Oriental 36. Jose Solis,
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Independent, 2nd District, Sorsogon 37. Renato B. Magtubo, Party
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of List-Partido ng Manggagawa 38. Herminio G. Teves, Lakas, 3rd
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the District, Negros Oriental 39. Amado T. Espino, Jr., Lakas, 2nd District,
second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. Pangasinan 40. Emilio Macias, NPC, 2nd District, Negros Oriental 41.
which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Arthur Y. Pingoy, Jr., NPC, 2nd District, South Cotobato 42. Francis
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Nepomuceno, NPC, 1st District, Pampanga 43. Conrado M. Estrella
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of III, NPC, 6th District, Pangasinan 44. Elias Bulut, Jr., NPC, Lone
Article XI of the Constitution. District of Apayao 45. Jurdin Jesus M. Romualdo, NPC, Lone District
SO ORDERED. of Camiguin 46. Juan Pablo Bondoc, NPC, 4th District, Pampanga 47.
Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion. Generoso DC. Tulagan, NPC, 3rd District, Pangasinan 48. Perpetuo
Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion. Ylagan, Lakas, Lone District of Romblon 49. Michael Duavit, NPC, 1st
Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate District, Rizal 50. Joseph Ace H. Durano, NPC, 5th District, Cebu 51.
concurring opinion. Jesli Lapus, NPC, 3rd District, Tarlac 52. Carlos Q. Cojuangco, NPC,
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received. 4th District, Negros Occidental 53. Georgidi B. Aggabao, NPC, 4th
Carpio, J., concur. District, Santiago, Isabela 54. Francis Escudero, NPC, 1st District,
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of Sorsogon 55. Rene M. Velarde, Party List-Buhay 56. Celso L.
J. Vitug. Lobregat, LDP, Lone District of Zamboanga City 57. Alipio Cirilo V.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion. Badelles, NPC, 1st District, Lanao del Norte 58. Didagen P.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion. Dilangalen, Pwersa ng Masa, Lone District of Maguindanao 59.
Footnotes Abraham B. Mitra, LDP, 2nd District, Palawan 60. Joseph Santiago,
1
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 180-182; Annex "H." NPC, Lone District of Catanduanes 61. Darlene Antonino-Custodio,
2
Per Special Appearance with Manifestation of House Speaker Jose NPC, 1st District of South Cotobato & General Santos City 62. Aleta
C. De Venecia, Jr. (Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 325-363) the pertinent C. Suarez, LP, 3rd District, Quezon 63. Rodolfo G. Plaza, NPC, Lone
House Resolution is HR No. 260, but no copy of the same was District of Agusan del Sur 64. JV Bautista, Party List-Sanlakas 65.
submitted before this Court. Gregorio Ipong, NPC, 2nd District, North Cotabato 66. Gilbert C.
3
Id. at 329. Created through PD No. 1949 (July 18, 1984), the JDF Remulla, LDP, 2nd District, Cavite 67. Rolex T. Suplico, LDP, 5th
was established "to help ensure and guarantee the independence of District, Iloilo 68. Celia Layus, NPC, Cagayan 69. Juan Miguel Zubiri,
the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy and Lakas, 3rd District, Bukidnon 70. Benasing Macarambon Jr,. NPC,
required by the impartial administration of justice" by creating a 2nd District, Lanao del Sur 71. Josefina Joson, NPC, Lone District of
special fund to augment the allowances of the members and Nueva Ecija 72. Mark Cojuangco, NPC, 5th District, Pangasinan 73.
personnel of the Judiciary and to finance the acquisition, maintenance Mauricio Domogan, Lakas, Lone District of Baguio City 74. Ronaldo B.
and repair of office equipment and facilities." Zamora, Pwersa ng Masa, Lone District of San Juan 75. Angelo O.
4
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 120-139; Annex "E." Montilla, NPC, Lone District of Sultan Kudarat 76. Roseller L.
5
The initial complaint impleaded only Justices Artemio V. Panganiban, Barinaga, NPC, 2nd District, Zamboanga del Norte 77. Jesnar R.
Josue N. Bellosillo, Reynato S. Puno, Antonio T. Carpio and Renato Falcon, NPC, 2nd District, Surigao del Sur 78. Ruy Elias Lopez, NPC,
C. Corona, and was later amended to include Justices Jose C. Vitug, 3rd District, Davao City.
14
and Leonardo A. Quisumbing. Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 5. Petitioner had previously filed two
6
Supra note 4 at 123-124. separate impeachment complaints before the House of
7
Rollo, G.R. No. 160403 at 48-53; Annex "A." Representatives against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto.
8 15
http://www.congress.gov.ph/search/bills/hist_show.php? 299 SCRA 744 (1998). In Chavez v. PCGG, petitioner Chavez
bill_no=RPT9999 argued that as a taxpayer and a citizen, he had the legal personality to
9
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 8. file a petition demanding that the PCGG make public any and all
10
Rollo, G.R. No. 160295 at 11. negotiations and agreements pertaining to the PCGG's task of
11
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 43-84; Annex "B." recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. Petitioner Chavez further
12
Supra note 2. argued that the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the
13
A perusal of the attachments submitted by the various petitioners Marcoses is an issue of transcendental importance to the public. The
reveals the following signatories to the second impeachment Supreme Court, citing Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985),
complaint and the accompanying Resolution/Endorsement. 1. Gilbert Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987) and
Teodoro, Jr., NPC, Tarlac (principal complainant) 2. Felix Fuentebella, Albano v. Reyes, 175 SCRA 264 (1989) ruled that petitioner had
NPC, Camarines Sur (second principal complainant) 3. Julio standing. The Court, however, went on to elaborate that in any event,
Ledesma, IV, NPC, Negros Occidental 4. Henry Lanot, NPC, Lone the question on the standing of petitioner Chavez was rendered moot
District of Pasig City 5. Kim Bernardo-Lokin, Party List-CIBAC 6. by the intervention of the Jopsons who are among the legitimate
Marcelino Libanan, NPC, Lone District of Eastern Samar, (Chairman, claimants to the Marcos wealth.
16
House Committee on Justice) 7. Emmylou Talino-Santos, 384 SCRA 152 (2002). In Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
Independent, 1st District, North Cotobato 8. Douglas RA. Cagas, Development Corporation, wherein the petition sought to compel the
NPC, 1st District, Davao del Sur 9. Sherwin Gatchalian, NPC, 1st Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on its then on-
District, Valenzuela City 10. Luis Bersamin, Jr., PDSP-PPC, Lone going negotiations with Amari Coastal Development Corporation to
District of Abra 11. Nerissa Soon-Ruiz Alayon, 6th District, Cebu 12. reclaim portions of Manila Bay, the Supreme Court said that petitioner
Ernesto Nieva, Lakas, 1st District, Manila 13. Edgar R. Erice, Lakas, Chavez had the standing to bring a taxpayer's suit because the
2nd District, Kalookan City 14. Ismael Mathay III, Independent, 2nd petition sought to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.
17
District, Quezon City 15. Samuel Dangwa, Reporma, Lone District of 224 SCRA 792 (1993).
18
Benguet 16. Alfredo Marañon, Jr., NPC, 2nd District, Negros Subsequent petitions were filed before this Court seeking similar
Occidental 17. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Reporma, 1st District, relief. Other than the petitions, this Court also received Motions for
Zamboanga del Norte 18. Agapito A. Aquino, LDP, 2nd District, Intervention from among others, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and
Makati City 19. Fausto L. Seachon, Jr., NPC, 3rd District, Masbate 20.
 51
Special Appearances by House Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr., and Supra note 2 at 349-350 citing Gerhardt, Michael J. The Federal
Senate President Franklin Drilon. Impeachment Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis, 1996,
19
Supra note 2 at 10. p. 119.
20 52
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Former Constitutional Commissioners 227 SCRA 100 (1993).
53
Justice Regalado E. Maambong and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, Id. at 112.
54
Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Former Minister of Justice and Solicitor US Constititon. Section 2. x x x The House of Representatives shall
General Estelito P. Mendoza, Deans Pacifico Agabin and Raul C. have the sole Power of Impeachment.
55
Pangalangan, and Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga,. 1987 Constitution, Article XI, Section 3 (1). The House of
21
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 275-292. Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
22
Id. at 292. impeachment.
23 56
63 Phil 139 (1936). Supra note 2 at 355 citing Agresto, The Supreme Court and
24
Id. at 157-159. Constitutional Democracy, 1984, pp. 112-113.
25 57
Vide Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924); Tañada v. Cuenco, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
58
103 Phil 1051 (1957); Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 141 SCRA 263 (1986).
59
SCRA 659, 665 (1987). Supra note 25.
26 60
Const., art. VIII, sec. 1. 298 SCRA 756 (1998).
27 61
5 US 137 (1803). 272 SCRA 18 (1997).
28 62
Id. at 180. 201 SCRA 792 (1991).
29 63
In In re Prautch, 1 Phil 132 (1902), this Court held that a statute 187 SCRA 377 (1990).
64
allowing for imprisonment for non-payment of a debt was invalid. In 180 SCRA 496 (1989).
65
Casanovas v. Hord, 8 Phil 125 (1907), this Court invalidated a statute Supra note 25.
66
imposing a tax on mining claims on the ground that a government Supra note 23.
67
grant stipulating that the payment of certain taxes by the grantee Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 38 at 330-
would be in lieu of other taxes was a contractual obligation which 331.
68
could not be impaired by subsequent legislation. In Concepcion v. Id. at 158-159.
69
Paredes, 42 Phil 599 (1921), Section 148 (2) of the Administrative IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000) citing Joya v. PCGG, 225
Code, as amended, which provided that judges of the first instance SCRA 568 (1993); House International Building Tenants Association,
with the same salaries would, by lot, exchange judicial districts every Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 703 (1987); Baker v.
five years, was declared invalid for being a usurpation of the power of Carr, supra note 57.
70
appointment vested in the Governor General. In McDaniel v. Apacible, Citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 250 SCRA 130 (1995).
71
42 Phil 749 (1922), Act No. 2932, in so far as it declares open to lease Citing Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA
lands containing petroleum which have been validly located and held, 330 (1997).
72
was declared invalid for being a depravation of property without due Citing Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas,
process of law. In U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 (1922), Act No. 163 SCRA 371, 378 (1988).
73
2868, in so far as it authorized the Governor-General to fix the price of Rule 3, Section 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the
rice by proclamation and to make the sale of rice in violation of such a party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
proclamation a crime, was declared an invalid delegation of legislative or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
power. authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
30
Vicente V. Mendoza, Sharing The Passion and Action of our Time defended in the name of the real party in interest.
74
62-53 (2003). JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 143, 152
31
Supra note 23. (2000).
32 75
Id. at 156-157. 246 SCRA 540 (1995).
33 76
Florentino P. Feliciano, The Application of Law: Some Recurring Id. at 562-564.
77
Aspects Of The Process Of Judicial Review And Decision Making, 37 Agan v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003 citing BAYAN v.
AMJJUR 17, 24 (1992). Zamora, 342 SCRA 449, 562-563 (2000) and Baker v. Carr, supra
34
Ibid. note 57; Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733 (2000); TELEBAP
35
I Record of the Constitutional Commission 434-436 (1986). v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998).
36 78
31 SCRA 413 (1970) Chavez v. PCGG, supra note 15.
37 79
Id. at 422-423; Vide Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770 (1988); Del Mar v. PAGCOR 346 SCRA 485, 501 (2000) citing Kilosbayan,
Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 Inc., et.al. v. Morato, supra note 70; Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA
SCRA 51 (1990); Ordillo v. Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 392 (1980); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976); Philconsa v.
(1990). Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966); Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,
38
194 SCRA 317 (1991). 110 Phil 331 (1960); Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77;
39
Id. at 325 citing Maxwell v. Dow, 176 US 581. Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965); Philconsa v.
40
152 SCRA 284 (1987). Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965); Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters
41
Id. at 291 citing Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259 (1938), Association v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).
80
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc v. Land Tenure Administration, supra note 36, BAYAN v. Zamora, supra note 77 citing Bugnay v. Laron, 176
and I Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines 21 SCRA 240, 251-252 (1989); Vide Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79;
( Fourth Ed. ). Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77; TELEBAP v. COMELEC, supra
42
82 Phil 771 (1949). note 77; Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70; Joya v. PCGG,
43
Id. at 775. supra note 69; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Sanidad v.
44
Supra note 38. COMELEC, supra note 79; Philconsa v. Mathay, supra note 79;
45
Id. at 330-331. Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra note 79; Philconsa v. Gimenez,
46
Id. at 337-338 citing 16 CJS 2.31; Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. supra note 79; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano,
365, 3 Atl. 220 and Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 203, supra note 79; Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works, supra note 79.
81
SW 2d, 734, 356 Mo. 808. Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77 citing Dumlao v. COMELEC,
47
Supra note 2. supra note 79; Sanidad v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Tan v.
48
Citing Section 3 (6), Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 (1972).
82
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide Tatad v. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 436 (1995); Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Morato, supra note 70 at 140-141 citing Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the SCRA 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659 (1992);
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v.
the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 (1971).
83
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two- Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79 at 502-503 citing Philconsa v.
thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Mathay, supra note 79.
49 84
Supra note 21. Chinese Flour Importers Association v. Price Stabilization Board, 89
50
506 U.S. 224 (1993). Phil 439, 461 (1951) citing Gallego et al. vs. Kapisanan Timbulan ng
mga Manggagawa, 46 Off. Gaz, 4245.
85 112
Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez, supra note 79 citing Id. at 217.
113
Gonzales v. Hechanova, 118 Phil. 1065 (1963); Pascual v. Secretary, 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission at 286.
114
supra note 79. Id. at 278, 316, 272, 283-284, 286.
86 115
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000). 76 Phil 516 (1946).
87 116
MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Id. at 522.
117
Philippines, G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003, citing Industrial Supra note 37.
118
Generating Co. v. Jenkins 410 SW 2d 658; Los Angeles County Id. at 58 citing Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Winans, 109 P 640; Weberpals v. Jenny, 133 NE 62. Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989).
88 119
Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559, Vide concurring opinion of Justice Vicente Mendoza in Estrada
570-571 (1974), citing Moore's Federal Practice 2d ed., Vol. III, pages v.Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 550 (2001); Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA
3423-3424; 4 Federal Rules Service, pages 454-455; Johnson, et al., 208, 210-211 (1987) citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
120
vs. Riverland Levee Dist., et al., 117 2d 711, 715; Borlasa v. Polistico, As adverted to earlier, neither a copy the Resolution nor a record of
47 Phil. 345, 348 (1925). the hearings conducted by the House Committee on Justice pursuant
89
MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the to said Resolution was submitted to the Court by any of the parties.
121
Philippines, supra note 87, dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio; Bulig- Rollo, G.R. No. 160310 at 38.
122
bulig Kita Kamag-Anak Assoc. v. Sulpicio Lines, 173 SCRA 514, 514- Supra note 107.
123
515 (1989); Re: Request of the Heirs of the Passengers of Doña Paz, Id. at 777 (citations omitted).
124
159 SCRA 623, 627 (1988) citing Moore, Federal Practice, 2d ed., Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 73.
125
Vol. 3B, 23-257, 23-258; Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88 Supra note 2 at 342.
126
(1996), citing Section 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court; Mathay v. Perfecto v. Meer, 85 Phil 552, 553 (1950).
127
Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., supra note 88; Oposa v. Factoran, Estrada v. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108, 155-156 (2001); Vide Abbas
supra note 17. v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651 (1988); Vargas v.
90
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994). Rilloraza, et al., 80 Phil. 297, 315-316 (1948); Planas v. COMELEC,
91
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70 citing Civil Liberties Union 49 SCRA 105 (1973), concurring opinion of J. Concepcion.
128
v. Executive Secretary, supra note 38; Philconsa v. Giménez, supra Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 705
note 79; Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano, supra (1993).
129
note 79; Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949); vide Tatad v. Ibid.
130
Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997); Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462, 477 (1986).
131
Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997); KMU v. Garcia, Jr., Supra note 127.
132
239 SCRA 386 (1994); Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 368 (1993); Carpio Estrada v. Desierto, supra note 127.
133
v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992); Osmeña v. Id. at 155-156 citing Abbas, et al. v. Senate Electoral Tribunal,
COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 supra note 127; Vargas v. Rilloraza, et al., supra note 127.
134
(1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991); Daza v. Supra note 119 at 210-211.
135
Singson, supra note 64; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79. Supra note 119.
92 136
Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 522, 531 Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 103 (1996); Joya v.
(1999) citing Gibson vs. Revilla, 92 SCRA 219; Magsaysay-Labrador PCGG, supra note 69 at 575; Macasiano v. National Housing
v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 266, 271 (1989). Authority, 224 SCRA 236, 242 (1993); Santos III v. Northwestern
93
Supra note 79. Airlines, 210 SCRA 256, 261-262 (1992), National Economic
94
Id. at 403. Protectionism Association v. Ongpin, 171 SCRA 657, 665 (1989).
95 137
Supra note 81. Supra note 2 at 353.
96 138
Id. at 681. Supra note 33 at 32.
97 139
SECTION 3. x x x Supra note 102.
140
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by Supra note 33.
141
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any 249 SCRA 244, 251 (1995).
142
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member Id. at 251.
143
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business 2 Records of the Constitutional Commission at 342-416.
144
within ten session days, and referred to the proper Id. at 416.
145
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Commissioner Maambong's Amicus Curiae Brief at 15.
146
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission at 375-376, 416
147
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
148
session days from such referral, together with the Justice Hugo Guiterrez's Amicus Curiae Brief at 7.
149
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be 109 Phil. 863 (1960).
150
calendared for consideration by the House within ten 40 SCRA 58, 68 (1971).
151
session days from receipt thereof. 286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932).
152
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the 277 SCRA 268, 286 (1997).
153
House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable 144 U.S. 1 (1862).
154
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Supra note 152 at 304-306.
155
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of Id. at 311.
156
each Member shall be recorded. Id. at 313.
98 157
Supra note 25. Supra note 152 at 314-315.
99 158
Id. at 1067. Supra note 50.
100
Vide Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905); Montenegro v.
Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952); De la Llana v. COMELEC, 80 SCRA
525 (1977).
101
Vide Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949); Macias v. COMELEC, 3
SCRA 1 (1961); Cunanan v. Tan, Jr., 5 SCRA 1 (1962); Gonzales v.
COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448
(1971); Tolentino v. COMELEC, supra note 82.
102
50 SCRA 30 (1973).
103
Record of the Constitution Commission, Vol. 1, July 10, 1986 at
434-436.
104
Id. at 439-443.
105
177 SCRA 668 (1989).
106
Id. at 695.
107
203 SCRA 767 (1991).
108
Id. at 776 citing Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452, 463 (1990).
109
Supra note 64.
110
Id. at 501.
111
Supra note 57.
EN BANC DECISION
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016 LEONEN, J.:
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, Petitioner, v. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND
MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Respondents.
The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as to callously degree.22 In 1991, she earned a bachelor's degree in Political Science from
exclude all foundlings from public service. Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts.23chanrobleslaw

When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares,
diligent search, but sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable both an American and Filipino national since birth.24 The marriage took place in
inference that satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at least Sanctuario de San Jose Parish, San Juan, Manila.25cralawred On July 29, 1991,
one or both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be sufficient to Senator Poe returned to the United States with her husband.26 For some time,
establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen. When these inferences are she lived with her husband and children in the United States. 27chanrobleslaw
made by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of its sole and exclusive
prerogative to decide the qualifications of the members of the Senate, then there Senator Poe and her husband had three (3) children: Brian Daniel (Brian),
is no grave abuse of discretion remediable by either Rule 65 of the Rules of Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna), and Jesusa Anika (Anika).28 Brian was born in the
Court or Article VIII, Section I of the Constitution. United States on April 16, 1992. Hanna was born on July 10, 1998, and Anika
on June 5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika were born in the
This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship of every single Philippines.29chanrobleslaw
foundling as natural-born. The circumstances of each case are unique, and
substantial proof may exist to show that a foundling is not natural-born. The Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18,
nature of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and its place in the scheme of political 2001.30 She was subsequently given a United States passport. 31chanrobleslaw
powers, as devised by the Constitution, are likewise different from the other
ways to raise questions of citizenship. Senator Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the 2004 National Elections. 32 To support her
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Rizalito Y. David father's candidacy, Senator Poe and her daughter Hanna returned to the
(David). He prays for the nullification of the assailed November 17, 2015 Philippines on April 8, 2004.33 After the Elections, she returned to the United
Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution of public respondent Senate States on July 8, 2004.34 It was during her stay in the Philippines that she gave
Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-15.2 The assailed November 17, 2015 birth to her youngest daughter, Anika.35chanrobleslaw
Decision3 dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by David, which sought
to unseat private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004 and eventually
allegedly not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not "slipped into a coma."36 Senator Poe returned to the Philippines on December
being qualified to hold such office under Article VI, Section 34 of the 1987 13, 2004.37 On December 14, 2004, her father died.38 She stayed in the country
Constitution. The assailed December 3, 2015 Resolution 5 denied David's Motion until February 3, 2005 to attend her father's funeral and to attend to the settling
for Reconsideration. of his estate.39chanrobleslaw

Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States. She never looked
biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish for work again in the United States. 40chanrobleslaw
Church of Jaro, Iloilo.6 Edgardo Militar found her outside the church on
September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m.7 He later turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005.41 After consulting her children,
Emiliano Militar.8 Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil they all agreed to return to the Philippines to support the grieving Susan
Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968. 9 She was given the Roces.42 In early 2005, they notified Brian and Hanna's schools Virginia, United
name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.10 Local Civil Registrar issued a States that they would be transferring to the Philippines the following semester. 43
Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling Certificate stating:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary She came back on May 24, 2005.44 Her children also arrived in the first half of
Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH 2005.45 However, her husband stayed in the United States to "finish pending
CHURCHD [sic] OF JARO, ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30 A.M. BY projects, and to arrange for the sale of the family home there."46chanrobleslaw
EDGARDO MILITAR AND THE SAID CHILD IS PRESENTLY IN THE
CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL STREET, Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of Internal
JARO . . .11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Revenue a Tax Identification Number (TIN) on July 22, 2005.47chanrobleslaw
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the
Decision granting the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the
Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe Philippines:48
(more popularly known as Susan Roces).12 The Decision also ordered the I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will support and defend
change in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar to the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.13 October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
Eleanor A. Sorio certified that the Decision had become final in a Certificate of hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Finality.14chanrobleslaw Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received the Decision of the evasion.49chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
San Juan Court Municipal Court and noted on Senator Poe's foundling On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and or Re-
certificate that she was adopted by Spouses Ronald Allan and Jesusa Poe.15 acquisition of Philippine Citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225. 50 She also
This hand-written notation appears on Senator Poe's foundling certificate: "filed applications for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children who
NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that time." 51chanrobleslaw
as per Court Order, Mun. Court, San Juan, Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo M.
Gorgonio dated May 13, 1974, under Sp. Proc. No. The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on July
138.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 18, 2006 through an Order signed by Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro
Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila for Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr:52
when she turned 18 years old.17 The Commission on Elections issued her a A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the instant petition
Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro indicate that David was a former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being
Manila on December 13, 1986.18chanrobleslaw born to Filipino parents and is presumed to be a natural born Philippine citizen;
thereafter, became an American citizen and is now a holder of an American
On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a Philippine passport; was issued an ACT and ICR and has taken her oath of allegiance to
passport.19 Her passport was renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, October the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed to
13, 2009, December 19, 2013, and March 18, 2014. 20 Having become Senator, have re-acquired her Philippine Citizenship.53 (Emphasis in the original)
she was also issued a Philippine diplomatic passport on December 19, In the same Order, Senator Poe's children were "deemed Citizens of the
2013.21chanrobleslaw Philippines in accordance with Section 4 of R[epublic] A[ct] No. 9225." 54 Until
now, the Order "has not been set aside by the Department of Justice or any
Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the Philippines, other agency of Government."55chanrobleslaw
Manila, but eventually went to the United States in 1988 to obtain her college
On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificates in P R
the name of Senator Poe and her children.56 It stated that Senator Poe is a O c t o b e r
3 5  
"citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and Re- 5 , 2 0 0 8
9
acquisition Act of 2003 . . . in relation to Administrative Order No. 91, Series of
2004 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005 per Office Order No. AFF-06- M a y P R
9133 signed Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated July 18, 2 1 , 1 0  
2006."57chanrobleslaw 2 0 0 9 5

Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City P R
A u g u s t
on August 31, 2006.58chanrobleslaw 7 3  
3 , 2 0 0 9
3
Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America between 2006
and 2009 using her United States Passport No. 170377935. 59 She used her P R 1
N o v e m b e r 6
passport "after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic on 07 July 0 3  
1 5 , 2 0 0 9 1
2006, but not after she has formally renounced her American citizenship on 20
October 2010."60 The following are the flight records given by the Bureau of On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed Senator
Immigration:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification
F l i g Board (MTRCB).62 On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of
D e p a r Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of
h t  
t u r e s American Citizenship, 63 stating:
N o .

N o v e m b e S Q I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and presently

r 1 , 0 7   residing at No. 107 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon City, Philippines, after
2 0 0 6 1 having been duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby depose and
state that with this affidavit, I hereby expressly and voluntarily renounce my
J u l y P R United States nationality/American citizenship, together with all rights and
2 0 , 7 3   privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity thereunto pertaining. I make
2 0 0 7 0 this renunciation intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own free will, free of any
duress or undue influence.64 (Emphasis in the original)
P R The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on October 21, 2010. 65
O c t o b e r
3 0   On October 21, 2010, she took her Oath of Office as MTRCB Chairperson and
3 1 , 2 0 0 7
0 assumed office on October 26, 2010.66 Her oath of office
P R stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
O c t o b e r PANUNUMPA SA KATUNGKULAN
3 5  
2 , 2 0 0 8
8
Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa katungkulan bilang
A p r i l P R Chairperson, Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, ay taimtim
2 0 , 1 0   na nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang buong husay at katapatan, sa abot ng
2 0 0 9 4 aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng
mga iba pang pagkaraan nito'y gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng
J u l y P R Pilipinas; na aking itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligan Batas ng Pilipinas;
3 1 , 7 3   na tunay na mananalig at tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga batas, mga
2 0 0 9 0 kautusang lega, at mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga sadyang itinakdang may
kapangyarihan ng Republika ng Pilipinas; at kusa kong babalikatin ang
O c t o b e r P R pananagutang ito, nang walang ano mang pasubali o hangaring umiwas.
1 9 , 1 0  
2 0 0 9 2 Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.
P R NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa harap ko ngayong ika-21 ng Oktubre 2010,
N o v e m b e r
1 0   Lungsod ng Maynila, Pilipinas.67 (Emphasis in the original)
1 5 , 2 0 0 9
3 Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States68 in the presence of Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July
P R
D e c e m b e r 12, 2011.69 On this occasion, she also filled out the Questionnaire Information for
1 1  
2 7 , 2 0 0 9 Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship.70 On December 9, 2011, Vice
2
Consul Jason Galian executed a Certificate of Loss of Nationality for Senator
M a r c h P R Poe.71 The certificate was approved by the Overseas Citizen Service,
2 7 , 1 0   Department of State, on February 3, 2012. 72chanrobleslaw
2 0 1 0 2
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections.73 On September
F l i g 27, 2012, she executed a Certificate of Candidacy, which was submitted to the
A r r i Commission on Elections on October 2, 2012.74 She won and was declared as
h t  
v a l s Senator-elect on May 16, 2013.75chanrobleslaw
N o .

N o v e m b e S Q David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the
r 4 , 0 7   Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015.76 He
2 0 0 6 6 contested the election of Senator Poe for failing to "comply with the citizenship
and residency requirements mandated by the 1987
J u l y P R Constitution."77chanrobleslaw
2 3 , 7 3  
2 0 0 7 1 Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-01 requiring
David "to correct the formal defects of his petition." 78 David filed his amended
N o v e m b e P R Petition on August 17, 2015. 79chanrobleslaw
r 5 , 3 3  
2 0 0 7 7 On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was issued by the Senate Electoral
M a y P R Tribunal, through its Executive Committee, ordering the Secretary of the Senate
8 , 1 0   Electoral Tribunal to summon Senator Poe to file an answer to the amended
2 0 0 8 3 Petition.80chanrobleslaw

Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David filed a Motion Subpoena the
Record of Application of Citizenship Re-acquisition and related documents from WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified Motion for
the Bureau of Immigration on August 25, 2015. 81 The documents requested Reconsideration (of the Decision promulgated on 17 November 2015) of David
included Senator Poe's record of travels and NSO kept Birth Certificate. 82 On Rizalito Y. David dated 23 November 2015.
August 26, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-04
granting the Motion.83 The same Resolution directed the Secretary of the The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No. 15-11 dated 24
Tribunal to issue a subpoena to the concerned officials of the Bureau of November 2015 issued by the Executive Committee of the Tribunal; to NOTE
Immigration and the National Statistics Office.84 The subpoenas ordered the the Comment/Opposition filed by counsel for Respondent on 01 December
officials to appear on September 1, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. before the Office of the 2015; to GRANT the motion for leave to appear and submit memorandum as
Secretary of the Senate bearing three (3) sets of the requested documents. 85 amici curiae filed by Dean Arturo de Castro [and to] NOTE the Memorandum (for
The subpoenas were complied with by both the Bureau of Immigration and the Volunteer Amicus Curiae) earlier submitted by Dean de Castro before the
National Statistics Office on September 1, 2015. 86chanrobleslaw Commission on Elections in SPA No. 15-139 (DC), entitled "Amado D. Valdez,
Petitoner, versus Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llaman[z]ares,
On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified Answer with (1) Respondent."
Prayer for Summary Dismissal; (2) Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Grounds
for Immediate Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3) Motion to Cite David for Direct SO ORDERED.105 (Emphasis in the original)
Contempt of Court; and (4) Counterclaim for Indirect Contempt of On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal's Resolution was received
Court.87chanrobleslaw by David.106 On December 9, 2015, David filed the pre Petition for Certiorari
before this Court.107chanrobleslaw
On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-
05 requiring the parties to file a preliminary conference brief on or before On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate Electoral Tribunal and
September 9, 2015.88 The Resolution also set the Preliminary Conference on Senator Poe to comment on the Petition "within a non-extendible period of
89
September 11, 2015. During the Preliminary Conference, the parties "agreed fifteen (15) days from notice."108 The Resolution also set oral arguments on
to drop the issue of residency on the ground of prescription."90chanrobleslaw January 19, 2016.109 The Senate Electoral Tribunal, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, submitted its Comment on December 30, 2015.110 Senator
Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on September 21, Poe submitted her Comment on January 4, 2016.111chanrobleslaw
2015.91 The parties were then "required to submit their respective [memoranda],
without prejudice to the submission of DNA evidence by [Senator Poe] within This case was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the Commission on
thirty (30) days from the said date."92chanrobleslaw Elections case on the issue of private respondent's citizenship.

On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15 days the submission For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Senate Electoral Tribunal
of DNA test results.93 The Senate Electoral Tribunal granted the Motion on committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
October 27, 2015 through Resolution No. 15-08. 94 On November 5, 2015, in dismissing petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto based on its finding that
Senator Poe filed a Manifestation regarding the results of DNA Testing, 95 which private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen, qualified to hold a seat as
stated that "none of the tests that [Senator Poe] took provided results that would Senator under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
shed light to the real identity of her biological parents."96 The Manifestation also I
stated that Senator Poe was to continue to find closure regarding the issue and Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial review through a
submit any development to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator Poe petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He
submitted "the issue of her natural-born Filipino citizenship as a foundling for seeks to annul the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Senate Electoral
resolution upon the legal arguments set forth in her submissions to the Tribunal, which state its findings and conclusions on private respondent's
Tribunal."97 On November 6, 2015, through Resolution No. 15-10, the Senate citizenship.
Electoral Tribunal "noted the [M]anifestation and considered the case submitted
for resolution."98chanrobleslaw Ruling on petitioner's plea for post-judgment relief calls for a consideration of
two (2) factors: first, the breadth of this Court's competence relative to that of the
On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed Senate Electoral Tribunal; and second, the nature of the remedial vehicle—a
Decision finding Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and, therefore, petition for certiorari—through which one who is aggrieved by a judgment of the
qualified to hold office as Senator. 99 The Decision Senate Electoral Tribunal may seek relief from this Court.
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary I. A
We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of Representatives
and continue to be a natural-born citizen as defined under the 1987 Constitution, Electoral Tribunal, is a creation of Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987
as she is a citizen of the Philippines from birth, without having to perform any act Constitution:112
to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine citizenship. ARTICLE VI
.... The Legislative Department
In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a natural-born Filipino ....
citizen, Respondent validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
taking her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, as required Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF 05-002 (the Revised the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
Rules Implementing R.A. No. 9225), the foregoing Oath of Allegiance is the shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
"final act" to reacquire natural-born Philippine citizenship. may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
.... the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-
To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the moment she list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
renounced her American citizenship on 20 October 2010. She remained solely a be its Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
natural-born Filipino citizen from that time on until today. Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates from all other judicial
and quasi-judicial bodies (particularly, courts and the Commission on
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo warranto is Elections113) the power to rule on contests114 relating to the election, returns, and
DISMISSED. qualifications of members of the Senate (as well as of the House of
Representatives). These powers are granted to a separate and distinct
No pronouncement as to costs. constitutional organ. There are two (2) aspects to the exclusivity of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal's power. The power to resolve such contests is exclusive to
SO ORDERED.100 (Citations omitted) any other body. The resolution of such contests is its only task; it performs no
101
On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration. The Senate other function.
Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-11 on November 24, 2015, giving
Senator Poe five (5) days to comment on the Motion for The 1987 Constitution is not the first fundamental law to introduce into our legal
Reconsideration.102chanrobleslaw system an "independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the
legislature and specially created for that singular purpose." 115 The 1935
Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration on Constitution similarly created an Electoral Commission, independent from the
December 1, 2015.103 David's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the National Assembly, to be the sole judge of all contests relating to members of
Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 3, 2015: 104 the National Assembly.116 This was a departure from the system introduced by
prior organic acts enforced under American colonial rule—namely: the Philippine the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent civil action. 122 The viability
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916—which vested the power to resolve of such a petition is premised on an allegation of "grave abuse of
such contests in the legislature itself. When the 1935 Constitution was amended discretion."123chanrobleslaw
to make room for a bicameral legislature, a corresponding amendment was
made for there to be separate electoral tribunals for each chamber of The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been generally held to refer to such
Congress.117 The 1973 Constitution did away with these electoral tribunals, but arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack
they have since been restored by the 1987 Constitution. of jurisdiction:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions—which of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
provide for the creation of electoral tribunals (or their predecessor, the Electoral at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
Commission), have been unequivocal in their language. The electoral tribunal and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of
shall be the "sole" judge. discretion is not enough: it must be grave. 124chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal:118 Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which
conferred. . . . The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or which
1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for.125chanrobleslaw
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature[.]" Earlier, this grant
of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcohn as "full, clear A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as
and complete." . . . Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was well as a misreading or misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is
unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal . . . and it remained as full, also considered grave abuse of discretion.126 The arbitrariness consists in the
clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral disregard of the current state of our law.
Commission. . . . The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.119chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or frivolously departs
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and from settled principles engenders a strong suspicion of partiality. This can be a
qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope of their powers is, badge of hostile intent against a party.
thus, vested in these electoral tribunals. It is only before them that post-election
challenges against the election, returns, and qualifications of Senators and Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a) where the tribunal's approach
Representatives (as well as of the President and the Vice-President, in the case to an issue is premised on wrong considerations and its conclusions founded on
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated. a gross misreading, if not misrepresentation, of the evidence;127 (b) where a
tribunal's assessment of a case is "far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review. Article very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with
VI, Section 17's stipulation of electoral tribunals' being the "sole" judge must be standards that can be used";128 "(c) where the tribunal's action on the
read in harmony with Article VIII, Section 1's express statement that "[j]udicial appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to
power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not the point of being grossly unreasonable"; 129 and (d) where the tribunal invokes
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of erroneous or irrelevant considerations in resolving an issue.130chanrobleslaw
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." I. C
Judicial review is, therefore, still possible. In Libanan v. House of We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without
Representatives Electoral Tribunal:120 or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the [House or excess of jurisdiction.
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] the power to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and
House of Representatives, any final action taken by the [House of exhaustive reading of the Constitution, one that proceeds from an intent to give
Representatives Electoral Tribunal] on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a life to all the aspirations of all its provisions.
rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral
Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate
would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." Electoral Tribunal was confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship
status of children whose biological parents are unknown, considering that the
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes reference to one's father
cases. In Robles vs. [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], the Court or mother. It was compelled to exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of a
has explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was without judicial precedent.
interference, the Court may do so, however, but only "in the exercise of this
Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a
Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its reasonable interpretation of the law while needfully considering the established
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a personal circumstances of private respondent. It could not have asked the
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power impossible of private respondent, sending her on a proverbial fool's errand to
as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very establish her parentage, when the controversy before it arose because private
clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion respondent's parentage was unknown and has remained so throughout her life.
that there has to be a remedy for such abuse."
The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human capacity. It did not insist
In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the Court has ruled that on burdening private respondent with conclusively proving, within the course of
the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in the few short months, the one thing that she has never been in a position to
any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it conscientiously appreciated the
as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not, to paraphrase it implications of all other facts known about her finding. Therefore, it arrived at
in Co vs. [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], venture into the perilous conclusions in a manner in keeping with the degree of proof required in
area of correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the Government; proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not proof
it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence, but "substantial
abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
calls for remedial action.121 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."131chanrobleslaw
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals not
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all children with the
determination of whether there has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error in misfortune of having been abandoned by their biological parents. Far from
judgment. reducing them to inferior, second-class citizens, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
I. B did justice to the Constitution's aims of promoting and defending the well-being
A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral Tribunal of children, advancing human rights, and guaranteeing equal protection of the
invokes the jurisdiction of this Court through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari laws and equal access to opportunities for public service.
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. An appeal is a continuation II
of the proceedings in the tribunal from which the appeal is taken. A petition for Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that "[n]o
certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines." It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of
the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone,
Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen and, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into
therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly on two (2) view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
grounds. First, he argues that as a foundling whose parents are unknown, instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
private respondent fails to satisfy the jus sanguinis principle: that is, that she interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and
failed to establish her Filipino "blood line," which is supposedly the essence of one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
the Constitution's determination of who are natural-born citizens of the construction, the two can be made to stand together.
Philippines. Proceeding from this first assertion, petitioner insists that as private
respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she could never leave reverted to In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
natural-born status despite the performance of acts that ostensibly comply with favor of construction which will render every word operative, rather than one
Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re- which may make the words idle and nugatory. 139 (Citations omitted)
acquisition Act of 2003. Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that has
previously considered that exact same text, if any. Our legal system is founded
Petitioner's case hinges on the primacy he places over Article IV, Section 1 of on the basic principle that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the 1987 Constitution and its enumeration of who are Filipino citizens, more the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal system." 140 Jurisprudence is not an
specifically on Section 1(2), which identifies as citizens "[t]hose whose fathers or independent source of law. Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part
mothers are citizens of the Philippines." Petitioner similarly claims that, as of or written into the text itself as of the date that it was originally passed. This is
private respondent's foundling status is settled, the burden to prove Filipino because judicial construction articulates the contemporaneous intent that the
parentage was upon her. With private respondent having supposedly failed to text brings to effect.141 Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation of
discharge this burden, the supposed inevitable conclusion is that she is not a considering prior interpretation as immutable.
natural-born Filipino.
III Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks into how the text has
At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely, evolved. Unless completely novel, legal provisions are the result of the re-
foundlings have biological parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, adoption—often with accompanying re-calibration—of previously existing rules.
by the nature of their being foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their Even when seemingly novel, provisions are often introduced as a means of
parents. Thus, this controversy must consider possibilities where parentage may addressing the inadequacies and excesses of previously existing rules.
be Filipino but, due to no fault of the foundling, remains unknown.132 Resolving
this controversy hinges on constitutional interpretation. One may trace the historical development of text by comparing its current
iteration with prior counterpart provisions, keenly taking note of changes in
Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the sovereign's syntax, along with accounting for more conspicuous substantive changes such
purpose so as to identify which among competing interpretations of the same as the addition and deletion of provisos or items in enumerations, shifting
text is the more contemporarily viable construction. Primarily, the actual words— terminologies, the use of more emphatic or more moderate qualifiers, and the
text—and how they are situated within the whole document—context—govern. imposition of heavier penalties. The tension between consistency and change
Secondarily, when discerning meaning from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails, galvanizes meaning.
contemporaneous construction may settle what is more viable. Nevertheless,
even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient, contemporaneous Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which enumerates who are
construction may still be resorted to as a means for verifying or validating the citizens of the Philippines, may be compared with counterpart provisions, not
clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution. only in earlier Constitutions but even in organic laws142 and in similar
III. A mechanisms143 introduced by colonial rulers whose precepts nevertheless still
The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision must necessarily resonate today.
begin with the text itself. The language of the provision being interpreted is the
principal source from which this Court determines constitutional Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic appreciation of legal
intent.133chanrobleslaw interpretation must grapple with the truth that meaning is not always singular
and uniform. In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,144 this
To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is Court explained the place of a holistic approach in legal
consistent with the basic precept of verba legis.134 The Constitution is truly a interpretation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
public document in that it was ratified and approved by a direct act of the People Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what they (respectively)
exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it through a plebiscite. The construe to be plainly evident from Section 5.2(a)'s text on the part of
preeminent consideration in reading the Constitution, therefore, is the People's COMELEC, that the use of the words "paid for" evinces no distinction between
consciousness: that is, popular, rather than technical-legal, understanding. direct purchasers and those who purchase via subscription schemes; and, on
Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary the part of petitioners, that Section 5.2(a)'s desistance from actually using the
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We word "subscriber" means that subscribers are beyond its contemplation. The
do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that variance in the parties' positions, considering that they are both banking on what
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective they claim to be the Fair Election Act's plain meaning, is the best evidence of an
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where extant ambiguity.
technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that foments
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the absurdity. The dangers of inordinate insistence on literal interpretation are
people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be commonsensical and need not be belabored. These dangers are by no means
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to endemic to legal interpretation. Even in everyday conversations, misplaced
the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the literal interpretations are fodder for humor. A fixation on technical rules of
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the grammar is no less innocuous. A pompously doctrinaire approach to text can
people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for stifle, rather than facilitate, the legislative wisdom that unbridled textualism
construction is reduced to a minimum.135 (Emphasis supplied) purports to bolster.
Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the
whole of the Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a constituent of a Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is
greater whole. It is the framework of the Constitution that animates each of its erroneous. In reality, universality and uniformity in meaning is a rarity. A contrary
components through the dynamism of these components' interrelations. What is belief wrongly assumes that language is static.
called into operation is the entire document, not simply a peripheral item. The
Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather
—ut magis valeat quam pereat.136 Each provision must be understood and than parochial: to consider context and the interplay of the historical, the
effected in a way that gives life to all that the Constitution contains, from its contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the
foundational principles to its finest fixings.137chanrobleslaw convergence of social realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to be
effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock of the prevailing
The words and phrases that establish its framework and its values color each legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that describes
provision at the heart of a controversy in an actual case. In Civil Liberties Union the Constitution — saligan — demonstrates this imperative of constitutional
v. Executive Secretary:138 primacy.
Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation. Here, Section 1's enumeration, which includes a reference to parentage. These
we consider not an abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part of the whole, provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the factual milieu of this case.
i.e., the statute of which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing the ideal of fair The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and
elections. We consider not a cloistered provision but a norm that should have a uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of private
present authoritative effect to achieve the ideals of those who currently read, respondent's Filipino parentage.
depend on, and demand fealty from the Constitution.145 (Emphasis supplied)
III. B On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born
Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may be unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily
resorted to when the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings.146 It is only engendered by a complete consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its
then that one can go beyond the strict boundaries of the document. provisions on citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending the well-being
Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been ascertained from a reading of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal access to
of the plain text, contemporaneous construction may serve to verify or validate opportunities for public service, and respecting human rights, as well as its
the meaning yielded by such reading. reasons for requiring natural-born status for select public offices. Moreover, this
is a reading validated by contemporaneous construction that considers related
Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by the realization that legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international
the business of understanding the Constitution is not exclusive to this Court. The instruments.
basic democratic foundation of our constitutional order necessarily means that V
all organs of government, and even the People, read the fundamental law and Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status' commencement
are guided by it. When competing viable interpretations arise, a justiciable from birth means that private respondent never had to do anything to
controversy may ensue requiring judicial intervention in order to arrive with consummate this status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently
finality at which interpretation shall be sustained. To remain true to its naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status upon satisfying the
democratic moorings, however, judicial involvement must remain guided by a requirement of Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office
framework or deference and constitutional avoidance. This same principle as Senator of the Republic.
underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to refrain from issuing advisory V. A
opinions. Specifically as regards this Court, only constitutional issues that are Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are citizens of the
narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be Philippines:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
entertained.147chanrobleslaw Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
When permissible then, one may consider analogous jurisprudence (that is, Constitution;
judicial decisions on similar, but not the very same, matters or concerns), 148 as (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
well as thematically similar statutes and international norms that form part of our (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
legal system. This includes discerning the purpose and aims of the text in light of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
the specific facts under consideration. It is also only at this juncture—when (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.150
external aids may be consulted—that the supposedly underlying notions of the Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born
framers, as articulated through records of deliberations and other similar citizens:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
accounts, can be illuminating. Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
III. C from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation, inferring meaning Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
from the supposed intent of the framers or fathoming the original understanding with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
of the individuals who adopted the basic document is the weakest approach. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2's significance is self-evident. It provides a definition of the term
These methods leave the greatest room for subjective interpretation. Moreover, "natural-born citizens." This is distinct from Section 1's enumeration of who are
they allow for the greatest errors. The alleged intent of the framers is not citizens. As against Section 1's generic listing, Section 2 specifically articulates
necessarily encompassed or exhaustively articulated in the records of those who may count themselves as natural-born.
deliberations. Those that have been otherwise silent and have not actively
engaged in interpellation and debate may have voted for or against a proposition The weight and implications of this categorical definition are better appreciated
for reasons entirely their own and not necessarily in complete agreement with when supplemented with an understanding of how our concepts of citizenship
those articulated by the more vocal. It is even possible that the beliefs that and natural-born citizenship have evolved. As will be seen, the term "natural-
motivated them were based on entirely erroneous premises. Fathoming original born citizen" was a transplanted, but tardily defined, foreign concept.
understanding can also misrepresent history as it compels a comprehension of V. B
actions made within specific historical episodes through detached, and not Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the "right to have
necessarily better-guided, modern lenses. rights."151 It is one's personal and . . . permanent membership in a political
community. . . The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that
Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution is not always is, the right to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the
uniform with the original understanding of the People who ratified it. In Civil right to hold public office[,] and the right to petition the government for redress of
Liberties Union:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary grievance.152chanrobleslaw
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings
of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community of which one is
the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail part.153 Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is
as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when owed to the state, considering the benefits and protection provided by it. This is
the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as particularly so if these benefits and protection have been enjoyed from the
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for moment of the citizen's birth.
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did
not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls Tecson v. Commission on Elections 154 reckoned with the historical development
gave the instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe of our concept of citizenship, beginning under Spanish colonial rule.155 Under the
the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation Spanish, the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands were identified not as
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it citizens but as "Spanish subjects."156 Church records show that native
than in the framer's understanding thereof. 149 (Emphasis supplied) inhabitants were referred to as "indios." The alternative identification of native
IV inhabitants as subjects or as indios demonstrated the colonial master's regard
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen for native inhabitants as inferior.157 Natives were, thus, reduced to subservience
without the need for an express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her in their own land.
status as such is but the logical consequence of a reasonable reading of the
Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides its own cues; there is Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within Spanish territory,
not even a need to delve into the deliberations of its framers and the implications not just peninsular Spain, were considered Spaniards, classification, however,
of international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from several levels. did not extend to the Philippine Islands, as Article 89 expressly mandated that
the archipelago was to be governed by special laws.158 It was only on December
On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that
which principally governs: the Constitution's actual definition, in Article IV, there existed a categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens, 159
Section 2, of "natural-born citizens." This definition must be harmonized with thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 (a) Persons born in Spanish territory, citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing
therein.
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant of the Philippine
of Spain, Islands was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if he
or she was "(1) a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers, Philippines on said date, and (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other
country."168chanrobleslaw
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy. 160 There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a mode of acquiring
1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine Islands were citizenship. It was the 1935 Constitution that made sole reference to parentage
ceded by Spain to the United States of America under the Treaty of Paris, which vis-a-vis the determination of citizenship.169 Article III, Section 1 of the 1935
was entered into on December 10, 1898. The Treaty of Paris did not Constitution provided:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
automatically convert the native inhabitants to American citizens.161 Instead, it SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
left the determination of the native inhabitants' status to the Congress of the
United States:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in adoption of this Constitution.
such territory or may remove therefrom. . . . In case they remain in the territory (2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making . . . a adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which Philippine Islands.
declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
nationality of the territory in which they may reside. (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching
Thus - the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this jurisdiction in the 1935
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by Constitution's provision stipulating the qualifications for President and Vice-
Congress.162chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary President of the Philippines. Article VII, Section 3
Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native inhabitants who read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
had ceased to be Spanish subjects were "issued passports describing them to SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the office of President or Vice-
be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United President, unless he be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified
States."163chanrobleslaw voter, forty years of age or over, and has been a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten years immediately preceding the election.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared in legislation in the While it used the term "natural-born citizen," the 1935 Constitution did not define
Philippine Organic Act, otherwise known as the Philippine Bill of 1902: 164 the term.
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein, who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution—read with the then civil law
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children provisions that stipulated the automatic loss of Filipino citizens lip by women
born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the who marry alien husbands—was discriminatory towards women.170 The 1973
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, Constitution rectified this problematic situation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and this Constitution.
ninety-eight. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of children born in the (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
Philippine Islands to its inhabitants who were Spanish subjects as of April 11,
1899. However, it did not account for the status of children born in the Islands to (3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
parents who were not Spanish subjects. A view was expressed that the common Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
law concept of jus soli (or citizenship by place of birth), which was operative in
the United States, applied to the Philippine Islands.165chanrobleslaw (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain
On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended Section 4 of the her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under
Philippine Bill of 1902. It was made to include a proviso for the enactment by the the law, to have renounced her citizenship.171chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
legislature of a law on acquiring citizenship. This proviso The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually define the term
read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary "natural-born citizen." Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby provided:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such citizenship.172chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United The present Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution
States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the on citizenship, "except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the
United States if residing therein.166chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law of Constitution."173chanrobleslaw
1916, replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902. It restated the citizenship provision of
the Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended: 167 Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now reads: Section 1. The following
Section 2.—Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the this Constitution;
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.174
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution's previous definition of
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such natural-born citizens, as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the (Emphasis supplied)
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
Ironically, the concept of "natural-born" citizenship is a "foreign" concept that actual naturalization process. There is no more straightforward and more
was transplanted into this jurisdiction as part of the 1935 Constitution's eligibility effective way to terminate this inquiry than this realization of total and utter lack
requirements for President and Vice-President of the Philippines. of proof.

In the United States Constitution, from which this concept originated, the term At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential approach to
"natural-born citizen" appears in only a single instance: as an eligibility foundlings, as well as compliance with Republic Act No. 9225, with
requirement for the presidency.175 It is not defined in that Constitution or in naturalization. These attempts at analogies are misplaced. The statutory
American laws. Its origins and rationale for inclusion as a requirement for the mechanisms for naturalization are clear, specific, and narrowly devised. The
presidency are not even found in the records of constitutional deliberations.176 investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefits children, individuals whose
However, it has been suggested that, as the United States was under British capacity to act is restricted.184 It is a glaring mistake to liken them to an adult
colonial rule before its independence, the requirement of being natural-born was filing before the relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to become a
introduced as a safeguard against foreign infiltration in the administration of Filipino, the grant of which is contingent on evidence that he or she must himself
national government:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary or herself adduce. As shall later be discussed, Republic Act No. 9225 is
It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was inserted in premised on the immutability of natural-born status. It privileges natural-born
response to a letter sent by John Jay to George Washington, and probably to citizens and proceeds from an entirely different premise from the restrictive
other delegates, on July 25, 1787, which stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary process of naturalization.
Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a strong
check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national So too, the jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-a-vis natural-born
Government; and to declare expressly that the Command in Chief of the status is clear. It should be with the actual process of naturalization that natural-
American army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but a natural born born status is to be contrasted, not against other procedures relating to
Citizen. citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be thrown open for the unbridled diminution
Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von Steuben, who had of the status of citizens.
served valiantly in the Revolutionary forces, but whose subsequent loyalty was V. E
suspected by Jay. Another theory is that the Jay letter, and the resulting Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human thoroughbred.
constitutional provision, responded to rumors that the Convention was
concocting a monarchy to be ruled by a foreign Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section 1(2) stipulates that to be a
monarch.177chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary citizen, either one's father or one's mother must be a Filipino citizen.
In the United States, however, citizenship is based on jus soli, not jus sanguinis.
V. C That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features, genetics, pedigree, and
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-born and ethnicity are not determinative of citizenship.
naturalized.
Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino citizens. It
A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of does not even require them to conform to traditional conceptions of what is
the Philippines "from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect indigenously or ethnically Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be
Philippine citizenship." By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is one who ethnically foreign.
is not natural-born. Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal178
articulates this definition by dichotomy:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree: parentage. The
[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is citizenship of everyone else in one's ancestry is irrelevant. There is no need, as
apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino bloodline.
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of Filipino citizenship
obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born may be sustained by evidence adduced in a proper proceeding, which
Filipino.179chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary substantially proves that either or both of one's parents is a Filipino citizen.
Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on the concept V. F
of naturalized citizens in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson: naturalized
citizens, he stated, are "former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced in these
procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they proceedings attests to how at least one—if not both—of her biological parents
possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law were Filipino citizens.
in order to become Filipino citizens." 180chanrobleslaw
Proving private respondent's biological parentage is now practically impossible.
One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization is generally To begin with, she was abandoned as a newborn infant. She was abandoned
required to file a verified petition. 181 He or she must establish. among others, that almost half a century ago. By now, there are only a handful of those who, in
he or she is of legal age, is of good moral character, and has the capacity to 1968, were able-minded adults who can still lucidly render testimonies on the
adapt to Filipino culture, tradition, and principles, or otherwise has resided in the circumstances of her birth and finding. Even the identification of individuals
Philippines for a significant period of time.182 Further, the applicant must show against whom DNA evidence may be tested is improbable, and by sheer
that he or she will not be a threat to the state, to the public, and to the Filipinos' economic cost, prohibitive.
core beliefs.183chanrobleslaw
V. D However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for private respondent
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an enumeration. to establish her parentage.
Section 2 categorically defines "natural-born citizens." This constitutional
definition is further clarified in jurisprudence, which delineates natural-born In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial evidence.
citizenship from naturalized citizenship. Consistent with Article 8 of the Civil In Suerte-Felipe v. People:185
Code, this jurisprudential clarification is deemed written into the interpreted text,
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any
thus establishing its contemporaneous intent. inference or presumption; while circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact or
facts from which, taken either singly or collectively, the existence of a particular
Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to establish fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable
bloodline is misplaced. It is inordinately selective and myopic. It divines Section consequence.186chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1's mere enumeration but blatantly turns a blind eye to the succeeding Section's People v. Raganas187 further defines circumstantial
unequivocal definition. evidence:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than the
Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on, and Section 2, it is fact in issue, which by experience have been found so associated with such fact
Section 2 that is on point. To determine whether private respondent is a natural- that in a relation of cause and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory conclusion.188
born citizen, we must look into whether she had to do anything to perfect her (Citation omitted)
citizenship. In view of Bengson, this calls for an inquiry into whether she Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for instance, stipulates
underwent the naturalization process to become a Filipino. when circumstantial evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction in criminal
proceedings:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
She did not. Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if:
At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent went through the
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) There is more than one circumstances;
Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private respondent upon
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and a mere showing that she is a foundling is a serious error.
cralawlawlibrary
Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential presumption that all
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction newborns who have been abandoned in rural areas in the Philippines are not
beyond reasonable doubt. Filipinos. His emphasis on private respondent's supposed burden to prove the
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of circumstantial circumstances of her birth places upon her an impossible condition. To require
evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless proof from private respondent borders on the absurd when there is no dispute
sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings. 189 There is no that the crux of the controversy—the identity of her biological parents—is simply
rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal not known.
proceedings and for not considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof "Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
in civil and/or administrative proceedings. necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required
by law." Burden of proof lies on the party making the allegations;198 that is, the
In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction party who "alleges the affirmative of the issue"199 Burden of proof never shifts
(which may result in deprivation of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the from one party to another. What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift
highest standard or proof that our legal system would require, i.e., proof beyond happens when a party makes a prima facie case in his or her favor.200 The other
reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high standard, party then bears the "burden of going forward"201 with the evidence considering
so too may it suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in that which has ostensibly been established against him or her.
administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such as those before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence. 190chanrobleslaw In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the party
who brings the action and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the
Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish Church of office involved in the controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies
Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968.191 In 1968, Iloilo, as did most—if not all— such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite quantum of proof is
Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino population. 192 Private substantial evidence.202 This burden was petitioner's to discharge. Once the
respondent is described as having "brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal petitioner makes a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the
bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face." 193 She stands at 5 feet and respondent.
2 inches tall.194 Further, in 1968, there was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo.
Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not establish a prima
These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference that her facie case in favor of petitioner. While it does establish that the identities of
biological parents were Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is more private respondent's biological parents are not known, it does not automatically
or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a predominantly mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino.
religious and Catholic environment, would have behaved. The absence of an
international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the possibility of a foreigner mother, The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is
along with a foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and out of by no means substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case and shifting
Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave her offspring there. Though proof of the burden of evidence to private respondent.
ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless attest to it.
Isolating the fact of private respondent's being a foundling, petitioner trivializes
In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections,195 the other uncontroverted circumstances that we have previously established as
Solicitor General underscored how it is statistically more probable that private substantive evidence of private respondent's
respondent was born a Filipino citizen rather than as a foreigner. He submitted parentage:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
the following table is support of his statistical inference:196 (1) Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo;
NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN THE (2) She was only an infant when she was found, practically a newborn;
PHILIPPINES: 1965-1975 and 2010-2014 (3) She was-found sometime in September 1968;
FOREIGN CHILDREN BORN IN FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN (4) Immediately after she was found, private respondent was registered as
YEAR
THE PHILIPPINES THE PHILIPPINES a foundling;
1965 1,479 795,415 (5) There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo; and
1966 1,437 823,342 (6) Private respondent's physical features are consistent with those of
1967 1,440 840,302 typical Filipinos.
1968 1,595 898,570 Petitioner's refusal to account for these facts demonstrates an imperceptive
1969 1,728 946,753 bias. As against petitioner's suggested conclusions, the more reasonable
1970 1,521 966,762 inference from these facts is that at least one of private respondent's parents is
1971 1,401 963,749 a Filipino.
1972 1,784 968,385 VII
1973 1,212 1,045,290 Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen consistent
1974 1,496 1,081,873 with a reading that harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's definition of natural-born
1975 1,493 1,223,837 citizens and Section 1(2)'s reference to parentage, the Constitution sustains a
2010 1,244 1,782,877 presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either
2011 1,140 1,746,685 a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless there is
2012 1,454 1,790,367 substantial proof otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such
2013 1,315 1,751,523 countervailing proof must show that both—not just one—of a foundling's
2014 1,351 1,748,782 biological parents are not Filipino citizens.
VII. A
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority [illegible] 197chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro's
Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or Dissenting Opinion to the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision, petitioner
0.18% newborns were foreigners. This translates to roughly 99.8% probability intimates that no inference or presumption in favor of natural-born citizenship
that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen. may be indulged in resolving this case. 203 He insists that it is private
respondent's duty to present incontrovertible proof of her Filipino parentage.
Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of identifying her parents
after half a century, a range of substantive proof is available to sustain a Relying on presumptions is concededly less than ideal. Common sense dictates
reasonable conclusion as to private respondent's parentage. that actual proof is preferable. Nevertheless, resolving citizenship issues based
VI on presumptions is firmly established in jurisprudence.
Before a discussion on how private respondent's natural-born status is sustained
by a general assumption on foundlings arising from a comprehensive reading In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of presumptions. Ruling on the
and validated by a contemporaneous construction of the Constitution, and allegations that former presidential candidate Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly
considering that we have just discussed the evidence pertaining to the known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) was not a natural-born Filipino citizen, this Court
circumstances of private respondent's birth, it is opportune to consider proceeded from the presumptions that: first, Fernando Poe Jr.'s grandfather,
petitioner's allegations that private respondent bore the burden of proving— Lorenzo Pou, was born sometime in 1870, while the country was still under
through proof of her bloodline—her natural-born status. Spanish colonial rule;204 and second, that Lorenzo Pou's place of residence, as
indicated in his dearth certificate, must have also been his place of residence whole, so as to "effectuate [its] whole purpose."211chanrobleslaw
before death, which subjected him to the "en masse Filipinization," or sweeping
investiture of Filipino citizenship effected by the Philippine Bill of 1902. 205 This As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV,
Court then noted that Lorenzo Pou's citizenship would have extended to his son Section 1(2), constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be taken in
and Fernando Poe Jr.'s father, Allan F. Poe. Based on these, Fernando Poe. Jr. isolation. They must be read in light of the constitutional mandate to defend the
would then have been a natural-born Filipino as he was born while the 1935 well-being of children, to guarantee equal protection of the law and equal access
Constitution, which conferred Filipino citizenship to those born to Filipino fathers, to opportunities for public service, and to respect human rights. They must also
was in effect:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary be read in conjunction with the Constitution's reasons for requiring natural-born
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been status for select public offices. Further, this presumption is validated by
committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative enactments,
not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on executive and administrative actions, and international instruments.
whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been
a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution require
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative the state to enhance children's well-being and to project them from conditions
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be prejudicial to or that may undermine their development. Fulfilling this mandate
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, when the includes preventing discriminatory conditions and, especially, dismantling
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place mechanisms for discrimination that hide behind the veneer of the legal
of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, apparatus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo ARTICLE II
Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine ....
Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would State Policies
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 ....
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual,
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.206chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism,
It is true that there is jurisprudence—Paa v. Chan207 and Go v. Ramos208 (which and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
merely cites Paa)—to the effect that presumptions cannot be entertained in ....
citizenship cases. ARTICLE XV
The Family
Paa, decided in 1967, stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary ....
It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove SECTION 3. The State shall defend:
to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be
indulged in favor of the claimant, of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt (2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.209 (Emphasis special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
supplied) and other conditions prejudicial to their development[.] (Emphasis supplied)
These pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of this Court's more Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to natural-born citizens of the
recent ruling in Tecson. Philippines. The 1987 Constitution makes the following offices exclusive to
natural-born citizens:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that "no presumption can be (1) President;212
indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship." This reference to "the (2) Vice-President;213
claimant" was preceded by a sentence specifically referencing the duty of "the (3) Senator;214
respondent." The syntax of this Court's pronouncement—using the definitive (4) Member of the House of Representatives; 215
article "the"—reveals that its conclusion was specific only to Chan and to his (5) Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court;216
circumstances. Otherwise, this Court would have used generic language. (6) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission; 217
Instead of the definite article "the," it could have used the indefinite article "a" in (7) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections;218
that same sentence: "no presumption can be indulged in favor of a claimant of (8) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit; 219
Philippine citizenship." In the alternative, it could have used other words that (9) Ombudsman and his or her deputies;220
would show absolute or sweeping application, for instance: "no presumption can (10) Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas; 221 and
be indulged in favor of any/every claimant of Philippine citizenship;" or, "no (11) Chairperson and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. 222
presumption can be indulged in favor of all claimants of Philippine citizenship." Apart from these, other positions that are limited to natural-born citizens include,
among others, city fiscals,223 assistant city fiscals,224 Presiding Judges and
The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those of this case. Its Associate Judges of the Sandiganbayan, and other public offices. 225 Certain
statements, therefore, are inappropriate precedents for this case. In Paa, clear professions are also limited to natural-born citizens,226 as are other legally
evidence was adduced showing that respondent Quintin Chan was registered as established benefits and incentives. 227chanrobleslaw
an alien with the Bureau of Immigration. His father was likewise registered as an
alien. These pieces of evidence already indubitably establish foreign citizenship Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to
and shut the door to any presumption. In contrast, petitioner in this case permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then never
presents no proof, direct or circumstantial, of private respondent's or of both of be of service to the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also
her parents' foreign citizenship. tantamount to excluding them from certain means such as professions and state
scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their aspirations. These
Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but revising it to make it appear consequences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through
that the same pronouncement was generally the present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is
applicable:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary merely to exclude a singular politician from office. Concluding that foundlings are
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the not natural-born citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to
satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own.
indulged hi favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state. 210 (Emphasis If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is.
supplied)
Thus, Paa's essential and pivotal nuance was lost in proverbial translation. In The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and equal access to
any case, Go was decided by this Court sitting in Division. It cannot overturn opportunities for public service:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Tecson, which was decided by this Court sitting En Banc. Likewise, Go's factual ARTICLE II
and even procedural backdrops are different from those of this case. Go ....
involved the deportation of an allegedly illegal and undesirable alien, not an State Policies
election controversy. In Go, copies of birth certificates unequivocally showing ....
the Chinese citizenship of Go and of his siblings were adduced. SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
VII. B public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least ....
either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-born, unless ARTICLE III
there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when one reads the Constitution as a Bill of Rights
 Consistent with this statute is our ratification 230 of the United Nations Convention
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due on the Rights of the Child. This specifically requires the states-parties' protection
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the of: first, children's rights to immediate registration and nationality after birth;
laws. second, against statelessness; and third, against discrimination on account of
.... their birth status.231 Pertinent portions of the Convention
ARTICLE XIII read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Social Justice and Human Rights Preamble

SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of The State Parties to the present Convention,
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
common good. (Emphasis supplied) inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that "persons under like freedom, justice and peace in the world,
circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of
'privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee against 'undue Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter,
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and
oppression of inequality.'"228chanrobleslaw worth of the human person, and have determined to promote social progress
and better standards of life in larger freedom,
Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial distinction 229
differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino parents. They are both Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human
entitled to the full extent of the state's protection from the moment of their birth. Rights and in the International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and
Foundlings' misfortune in failing to identify the parents who abandoned them— agreed that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth
an inability arising from no fault of their own—cannot be the foundation of a rule therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
that reduces them to statelessness or, at best, as inferior, second-class citizens religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
who are not entitled to as much benefits and protection from the state as those other status,
who know their parents. Sustaining this classification is not only inequitable; it is
dehumanizing. It condemns those who, from the very beginning of their lives, Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations
were abandoned to a life of desolation and deprivation. has proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,
....
This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional organ, mandated to
effect the Constitution's dictum of defending and promoting the well-being and Have agreed as follows:
development of children. It is not our business to reify discriminatory classes Article 2
based on circumstances of birth. 1. State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in
the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction
Even more basic than their being citizens of the Philippines, foundlings are without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the
human persons whose dignity we value and rights we, as a civilized nation, child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race,
respect. Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
ARTICLE II national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability,
.... birth or other status.
State Policies 2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to
.... ensure that the child is protected against all forms of
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status,
guarantees full respect for human rights. (Emphasis supplied) activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's
VII. C parents, legal guardians, or family members.
Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively within the confines of Article 3
constitutional text, the presumption that foundlings are natural-born citizens of 1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
the Philippines (unless substantial evidence of the foreign citizenship of both of public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
the foundling's parents is presented) is validated by a parallel consideration or administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
contemporaneous construction of the Constitution with acts of Congress, interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
international instruments in force in the Philippines, as well as acts of executive 2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such
organs such as the Bureau of Immigration, Civil Registrars, and the President of protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-
the Philippines. being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her
parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally
Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise that foundlings are responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all
Filipino citizens at birth. It has adopted mechanisms to effect the constitutional appropriate legislative and administrative measures.
mandate to protect children. Likewise, the Senate has ratified treaties that put Article 7
this mandate into effect. 1. The child, shall be registered immediately after birth and
shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to
Act of 2006, provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary know and be cared for by his or her parents.
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State policies shall be 2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these
observed at all times: rights in accordance with their national law and their
obligations under the relevant international instruments in
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary. . . . this field, in particular where the child would otherwise
be stateless. (Emphasis supplied)
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through measures The Philippines likewise ratified232 the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
that will ensure the observance of international standards of child Political Rights. As with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, this treaty
protection, especially those to which the Philippines is a party. Proceedings requires that children be allowed immediate registration after birth and to acquire
before any authority shall be conducted in the best interest of the child and in a a nationality. It similarly defends them against
manner which allows the child to participate and to express himself/herself discrimination:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
freely. The participation of children in the program and policy formulation and Article 24. . . .
implementation related to juvenile justice and welfare shall be ensured by the
concerned government agency. (Emphasis supplied) 1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex,
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the "best interest of the child" language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such
as the "totality of the circumstances and conditions which are most congenial to measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of
the survival, protection and feelings of security of the child and most his family, society and the State.
encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional development."
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a
name. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary    a) Child study;

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.     b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;

....     c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of

parents;
Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall     d) Medical evaluation/history;
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,     e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and cralawlawlibrary
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status. (Emphasis supplied)     f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied)
Treaties are "international agreements] concluded between state| in written form In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be presented in lieu of
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or authenticated birth certificates to satisfy the requirement for the issuance of
in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation." 233 passports, which will then facilitate their adoption by
Under Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, treaties require foreigners:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
concurrence by the Senate before they became SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted person, he must present a certified
binding:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary true copy of the Court Order of Adoption, certified true copy of his original and
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective amended birth certificates as issued by the OCRG. If the applicant is a minor, a
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Clearance from the DSWD shall be required. In case the applicant is for
The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and binding by adoption by foreign parents under R.A. No. 8043, the following, shall be
transformation. It then has the force and effect of a statute enacted by required:
Congress. In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. a) Certified true copy of the Court Decree of Abandonment of Child, the
Duque III, et al.:234 Death Certificate of the child's parents, or the Deed of Voluntary
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of Commitment executed after the birth of the child.
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation b) Endorsement of child to the Intercountry Adoption Board by the DSWD.
method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law c) Authenticated Birth or Foundling Certificate. 238 (Emphasis supplied)
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings' Filipino
method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is citizenship on account of their birth. They benefit from this without having to do
deemed to have the force of domestic law. any act to perfect their citizenship or without having to complete the
naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are natural-born citizens.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to
Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of executive organs have
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at recognized her natural-born status. This status was never questioned
least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional throughout her life; that is, until circumstances made it appear that she was a
international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it viable candidate for President of the Philippines. Until this, as well as the
to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts. 235 proceedings in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares, private respondent's
(Emphasis supplied) natural-born status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through various official
Following ratification by the Senate, no further action, legislative or otherwise, is public acts.
necessary. Thereafter, the whole of government—including the judiciary—is
duty-bound to abide by the treaty, consistent with the maxim pacta sunt First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate and benefitted from
servanda. the domestic adoption process. Second, on July 18, 2006, she was granted an
order of reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the object the Bureau of Immigration. Third, on October 6, 2010, the President of the
of discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be registered and granted Philippines appointed her as MTRCB Chairperson—an office that requires
nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship, natural-born citizenship. 239chanrobleslaw
and render them stateless is to unduly burden them, discriminate them, and VIII
undermine their development. As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar to natural-
born citizenship, petitioner's proposition as to her inability to benefit from
Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born Filipino
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights effect the constitutional citizen, re-acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship when, following her
dictum of promoting the well-being of children and protecting them from naturalization as a citizen of the United States, she complied with the requisites
discrimination. Other legislative enactments demonstrate the intent to treat of Republic Act No. 9225.
foundlings as Filipino citizens from birth. VIII. A
"Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by
Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as the Domestic Adoption Act law."240 Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when private respondent
of 1998, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on was naturalized an American citizen on October 18, 2001, provided in Section
Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and for Other Purposes. It was enacted 1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a
as a mechanism to "provide alternative protection and assistance through foster foreign country." Thus, private respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when
care or adoption of every child who is neglected, orphaned, or she was naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took
abandoned."236chanrobleslaw her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before the
Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children" covered by Republic Act Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her
No. 8552:237 Philippine citizenship. Shortly after, this Petition was granted. 241chanrobleslaw
SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). — It shall be the duty of the
Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody of the Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63242 and Republic
child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such Act No. 8171243 specifically "to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act
efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared become naturalized citizens of other countries." 244chanrobleslaw
abandoned. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to as the Inter-Country The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is designed, in its
Adoption Act of 1995, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules to own words, to ensure "that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
Govern Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children, and for Other Purposes. country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." 245 This
As with Republic Act No. 8552, it expressly includes foundlings among "Filipino Court shed light on this in Calilung v. Commission on Elections:246 "[w]hat Rep.
children" who may be adopted:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who
SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be the have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
subject of inter-country adoption, hi order that such child may be considered for foreign country."247chanrobleslaw
placement, the following documents must be submitted: to the Board:
Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status permanent and
immutable despite naturalization as citizens of other countries. To effect this, satisfied.250chanrobleslaw
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, 251
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of
foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections.252chanrobleslaw
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
"I _________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath." 253 This,
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws along with satisfying the other qualification requirements under relevant laws,
and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the makes one eligible for elective public office.
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; As explained in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,254 this required
and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental sworn renunciation is intended to complement Article XI, Section 18 of the
reservation or purpose of evasion." Constitution in that "[p]ublic officers and employees owe the State and this
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who seeks
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
taking the aforesaid oath. country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law."255 It is also in view of this
Section 3's implications are clear. Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after that Section 5(5) similarly bars those who seek or occupy public office
Republic Act 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries "retain," that elsewhere and/or who are serving in the armed forces of other countries from
is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and being appointed or elected to public office in the Philippines.
the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this status are VIII. C
subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First, on July 7,
specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. 256
those who became citizens of another country before the effectivity of Republic Second, on August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter of Barangay Santa
Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant Lucia, San Juan.257 This evidences her compliance with Article V, Section 1 of
rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities. Read in the 1987 Constitution. Since she was to vote within the country, this dispensed
conjunction with Section 2's declaration of a policy of immutability, this with the need to comply with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly,
reacquisition is not a mere restoration that leaves a vacuum in the intervening on October 20, 2010, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to
period. Rather, this reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as though the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship. 258 This
it was never lost at all. was complemented by her execution of an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
VIII. B Nationality of the United States 259 before Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of natural- on July 12, 2011,260 which was, in turn, followed by Vice Consul Jason Galian's
born citizenship. It also facilitates the enjoyment of civil and political rights, issuance of a Certificate of Loss of Nationality on December 9, 2011261 and the
"subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities."248 However, other approval of this certificate by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State,
conditions must be met for the exercise of other on February 3, 2012.262chanrobleslaw
faculties:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural-born
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and citizenship; she has also complied with all of the other requirements for eligibility
be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of to elective public office, as stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225.
the Philippines and the following conditions: VIII. D
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to comply with
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "the Overseas Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a natural-
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws; born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act
No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship.
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence and
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the immutability as articulated in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9225 and as
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to erroneously assume that a natural-born
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any Filipino citizen's naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible termination of his or
public officer authorized to administer an oath; her natural-born status.

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to To belabor the point, those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire natural-born citizenship. The prefix "re"
duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of signifies reference to the preceding state of affairs. It is to this status quo ante
office; Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the that one returns. "Re"-acquiring can only mean a reversion to "the way things
country where they took that oath; were." Had Republic Act No. 9225 intended to mean the investiture of an entirely
new status, it should not have used a word such as "reacquire." Republic Act
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall No. 9225, therefore, does not operate to make new citizens whose citizenship
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in commences only from the moment of compliance with its requirements.
such practice; and
Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of repatriation, ruled that
(5) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office repatriation involves the restoration of former status or the recovery of one's
in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those original nationality:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
who: Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
b. are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will
officers in the armed forces of the country which they are be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.263 (Emphasis
naturalized citizens. (Emphasis supplied) supplied)
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in force,
run for elective public office must comply with all of the following requirements: its ruling is in keeping with Republic Act No. 9225 's policy of permanence and
immutablity: "all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryFirst, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. have lost their Philippine citizenship." 264 In Bengson's words, the once
This effects the retention or reacquisition of one's status as a natural-born naturalized citizen is "restored" or brought back to his or her natural-born status.
Filipino.249 This also enables the enjoyment of full civil and political rights, subject There may have been an interruption in the recognition of this status, as, in the
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the interim, he or she was naturalized elsewhere, but the restoration of natural-born
solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are status expurgates this intervening fact. Thus, he or she does not become a
 22
Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration and moving forward. He or Id. at 9 and 682.
23
she is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the Id. at 9.
24
intervening fact may have consequences de facto. Id. at 682-683.
25
cralawred Id. at 228.
Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the 27 Id. at 9.
28
Oath of Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but Id. at 683.
30
these are for facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not for Id. at 9.
32
effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship itself. Therefore, it is Id. at 683.
markedly different from naturalization as there is no singular, extended process 33 Id. at 9.
35
with which the former natural-born citizen must comply. Id. at 683.
36
IX Id. at 10.
265 40
To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private respondent is stateless is not only Id. at 684.
to set a dangerous and callous precedent. It is to make this Court an accomplice 41 Id. at 228.
42
to injustice. Id. at 684.
44
Id. at 685.
47
Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual, and social justice Id. at 228.
48
are the bedrocks of our constitutional order. By the unfortunate fortuity of the Id. at 10.
49
inability or outright irresponsibility of those gave them life, foundlings are Id. at 685.
compelled to begin their very existence at a disadvantage. Theirs is a continuing 50 Id. at 228.
51
destitution that can never be truly remedied by any economic relief. Id. 686.
52
Id. at 228.
53
If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then we an never tolerate Id. at 686.
56
an interpretation that condemns foundlings to an even greater misfortune Id. at 686-687.
57
because of their being abandoned. The Constitution cannot be rendered inert Id. at 687.
59
and meaningless for them by mechanical judicial fiat. Id. at 256.
62
Id. at 10.
63
Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be deployed against Id. at 687.
64
other reasonable interpretations of our basic law. It does command us to Id. at 687-688.
65
consider legal text, but always with justice in mind. Id. at 688.
66
Id. at 229.
67
It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the Constitution that we Id. at 689, Poe Comment.
68
must always sustain. Not only will this manner of interpretation edify the less Id. at 229.
78
fortunate; it establishes us, as Filipinos, as a humane and civilized people. Id. at 230.
88
Id. at 231.
99
The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds of its constitutional Id. at 257.
100
competence when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen Id. at 253-257.
101
qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic. Contrary to petitioner's arguments, Id. at 84-100.
102
there is no basis for annulling its assailed Decision and Resolution. Id. at 80, SET Resolution No. 15-12.
103
Id. at 81.
104
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public respondent Id. at 80-83.
105
Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or Id. at 82.
106
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in Id. at 7.
107
rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Id. at 7-8.
108
Resolution. Id. at 647, SET Comment.
110
Id. at 669.
111
Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino Id. at 677-828.
112
citizen qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic. A counterpart electoral tribunal for the positions of President and Vice-
President was also created by the seventh paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 of
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary the 1987 Constitution.

Sereno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Perez, and Caguioa, JJ., concur. CONST., art. VII, sec. 4 provides:
Carpio, J., no part. SECTION 4 . . . .
Leonardo-De Castro, J., no part. ....
Brion, J., no part. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
Del Castillo, J., not natural born until proven otherwise. relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
Mendoza, J., with some reservation. President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Reyes, J., dissenting.
113
Perlas-Bernabe, J., please see dissenting opinion. Trial courts and the Commission on Elections still exercise jurisdiction over
Jardeleza, J., in result. contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of local elective
Endnotes: offices.
1
Rollo, pp. 3-76. The Petition was filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. CONST., art. IX-C, sec. 2(2) provides:
2
Id. at 73
3
Id. at 227-258. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall
4
CONST., art. VI, sec. 3 provides: exercise the following powers and functions:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
5
Rollo, pp. 80-83. officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective
6
Id. at 8. barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
7
Id. See also rollo, p. 227, SET Decision.
9
Id. at 227. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
10
Id. at 681, Poe Comment. involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and
11
Id. at 8. not appealable.
12
Id. at 681.
17 114
Id. at 9. The term "contest" refers to post-election disputes. In Tecson v. Commission
20
Id. at 228. on Elections, 468 Phil. 421 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc], this Court referring to
21
Id. at 682. the counterpart electoral tribunal for the President and Vice President — the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal - explained: "Ordinary usage would characterize a October 14, 2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
"contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of file=/jurisprudence/2015/october2015/212096.pdf> 7 [Per J. Brion, Second
eitheir an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct Division].
127
remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e. to dislodge the whining Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753, 777-778, 782 (2010) [Per J.
candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Brion, En Banc].
128
Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" promulgated by the Id. at 787.
129
Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise. . . . Id. at 778. In Mitra, this Court faulted the Commission on Elections for relying
on very select facts that appeared to have been appreciated precisely in such a
"The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests manner as to make it appear that the candidate whose residence was in
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice- question was not qualified. Viewing these facts in isolation indicated a practically
President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice- deliberate, ill-intentioned intent at sustaining a previously-conceived myopic
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action conclusion:
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a "In considering the residency issue, the [Commission on Elections] practically
public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post- focused solely on its consideration of Mitra's residence at Maligaya Feedmill, on
election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have the basis of mere photographs of the premises. In the [Commission on
received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election Elections'] view (expressly voiced out by the Division and fully concurred in by
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. the En Banc), the Maligaya Feedmill building could not have been Mitra's
residence because it is cold and utterly devoid of any indication of Mitra's
"It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court [sitting as the personality and that it lacks loving attention and details inherent in every home
Presidential Electoral Tribunal], defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 to make it one's residence. This was the main reason that the [Commission on
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the Elections] relied upon for its conclusion.
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held." "Such assessment, in our view, based on the interior design and furnishings of a
dwelling as showm by and examined only through photographs, is far from
115
Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 250 Phil. 390, 399 reasonable; the [Commission on Elections] thereby determined the fitness of a
(1988). [Per J. Cortes, En Banc]. dwelling as a person's residence based solely on very personal and subjective
116
CONST. (1935), art. VI, sec. 4 provides: assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that can be used.
SECTION 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence - i.e., the dwelling where a person
Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six permanently intends to return to and to remain - his or her capacity or inclination
Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated to decorate the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial."
by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having
130
the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the In Varias v. Commission on Elections, 626 Phil. 292, 314-315 (2010) [Per J.
Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole Brion, En Banc], this Court, citing Pecson v. Commission on Elections, 595 Phil.
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the 1214, 1226 (2008) [Per J. Brion, En Banc] stated: "[A] court abuses its discretion
Members of the National Assembly. when it lacks jurisdiction, fails to consider and make a record of the factors
relevant to its determination, relies on clearly erroneous factual findings,
117
CONST. (1935 amended), art. VI, sec. 11 provides: considers clearly irrelevant or improper factors, clearly gives too much weight to
SECTION 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an one factor, relies on erroneous conclusions of law or equity, or misapplies its
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the factual or legal conclusions."
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral 131 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 5.
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of 132 CONST., art. IV, sec. 1(2):
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines[.]
having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second
133
largest numbers of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 412 Phil.
shall be its Chairman. 308, 338 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
118 134
250 Phil. 390 (1988) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc]. See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709
119
Id. at 399-400. Phil. 478, 501-523 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
120 135
347 Phil. 797 (1997) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc]. Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 885 (2003) [Per J.
121
Id. at 804-805. Carpio Morales, En Banc], citing J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
122
See J. Leonen, Concurring Opinions in Rappler v. Bautista, G.R. No. 222702, Administration, 142 Phil. 393 (1970) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division]. This
April 5, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html? was also cited in Saguisag v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016
file=/jurisprudence/2016/april2016/222702.pdf> 2-3 [Per J. Carpio, En Banc] and <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
in Villanueva v. Judicial Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015 file=/jurisprudence/2016/january2016/212426.pdf> [Per C.J. Sereno, En Banc].
136
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html? Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 886 (2003) [Per J.
file=/jurisprudence/2015/april2015/211833_leonen.pdf> 4-5 [Per J. Reyes, En Carpio Morales, En Banc].
137
Banc]. La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos (Resolution), 486 Phil. 754,
123
RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. 1 provides: 773 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc] states that "[t]he Constitution should
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer be read in broad, life-giving strokes."
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or 138 272 Phil. 147 (1991) [Per C.J. Fernan, En Banc].
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of 139 Id. at 162, as cited in Atty. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 650
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy Phil. 326, 341 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
140
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified CIVIL CODE, art. 8.
141
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 100 Phil. 501, 504 (1956) [Per J. J. B. L. Reyes,
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, En Banc].
142
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may The adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, otherwise known as the Philippine
require. Organic Act of 1902, crystallized the concept of "Philippine citizens." See
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 467-468 (2004) per J. Vitug,
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order En Banc].
or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and 143 For example, the Civil Code of Spain became effective in the jurisdiction on
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in December 18, 1889, making the first categorical listing on who were Spanish
the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. citizens. See Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 465 (2004)
124
Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753, 777 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
144
Banc]. G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015
125
Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation v. National Labor Relations <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
Commission (First Division) and Arnulfo R. Flores, 670 Phil. 136, 151 (2011) file=/jurisprudence/2015/april2015/208062.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
145
[Per J. Brion, Second Division]. Id. at 26.
126 146
Nightowl Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. v. Lumahan, G.R. No. 212096, Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, 692 Phil. 407, 421 (2012) [Per
J. Reyes, En Banc]: "Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or Islands.
more things at the same time. For a statute to be considered ambiguous, it must
admit of two or more possible meanings." (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
147
See, for example, In the Matter of Save the Supreme Court Judicial
Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
Development Fund, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015 age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/january2015/15143.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, En Banc], (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
citing J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566,
November 19, 2013, 710 SCRA 1, 278-279 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. SECTION 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner
148
Cf. what was previously discussed regarding previous judicial decisions on the provided by law.
175
very same text. See Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the United States: The
149
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 887 [Per J. Carpio Unresolved Enigma, 28 Md. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1968).
176
Morales, En Banc], citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. Id. at 3-4.
147, 169-170 (1991) [Per C.J. Fernan, En Banc].
150 177
The 1935 Constitution was in effect when petitioner was born. However, the Id. at 5.
178
provisions are now substantially similar to the present Constitution, except that 409 Phil. 633 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
179
the present Constitution provides clarity for "natural born" status. For Id. at 651.
180
comparison, the 1935 provisions state: Id. at 656.
181
See Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), sec. 5 provides:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines. SECTION 5. Petition for Citizenship. — (1) Any person desiring to acquire
Philippine, citizenship under this Act shall file with the Special Committee on
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of Naturalization created under Section 6 hereof, a petition of five (5) copies legibly
this Constitution. typed and signed, thumbmarked and verified by him/her, with the latter's
passport-sized photograph attached to each copy of the petition, and setting
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the forth the following:
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands. Com. Act No. 473, sec.7 provides:
SECTION 7. Petition for Citizenship. — Any person desiring to acquire
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent court, a petition in triplicate,
accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the surname; his present and former places of residence; his occupation; the place
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. and date of his birth; whether single or married and if the father of children, the
name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and of the children; the
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. approximate date of his or her arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of
debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of the ship on which he came; a
SECTION 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the
provided by law. same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of
this Act; that he has complied with the requirements of section five of this Act;
151
C.J. Warren, Dissenting Opinion in Perez v. Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958). and that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing
152
Go v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. 202809, July 2, 2014, 729 SCRA 138, of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The
149 [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division], citing BERNAS, THE 1987 petition must be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and be
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they are
COMMENTARY (2009 ed.). citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of
153
Id. the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good
154
468 Phil. 421 (2004) [Per J.Vitug, En Banc]. repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in then opinion all
155
Id. at 464-470. the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in
156
Id. at 464. any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set
157
Id. forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner
158
Id. at 465. may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case. The certificate of arrival, and
159
Id. the declaration of intention must be made part of the petition.
160
Id. at 465-466, citing The Civil Code of Spain, art. 17.
161
Id. at 466-467, citing RAMON M. VELAYO, PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND 182See Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), sec. 3 provides:
NATURALIZATION 22-23 (1965). SECTION 3. Qualifications. — Subject to the provisions of the succeeding
162
Id. at 466, citing RAMON M. VELAYO, PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND section, any person desiring to avail of the benefits of this Act must meet the
NATURALIZATION 22-23 (1965). following qualifications:
163
Id. at 467.
164
Id. at 467-468. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines
165
Id. and residing therein since birth;
166
Id. at 468.
167
Id. (b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of
168
Id. at 469. filing of his/her petition;
169
Id.
170
Id. (c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying
171
CONST. (1973), art. III, secs. 1 and 2. principles of the Constitution, and must have conducted himselfherself in a
172
CONST. (1973), art. III, sec. 4. proper and irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence in
173
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 470 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, the Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted government as well as
En Banc]. with the community in which he/she is living;
174
The 1935 Constitution was in effect when petitioner was born. However, the
provisions are now substantially similar to the present Constitution, except that (d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education
the present Constitution provides clarity for "natural born" status. For in any public school or private educational institution duly recognized by the
comparison, the 1935 provisions state: Department of Education, Culture and Sports, where Philippine history,
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines. government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the school
curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of Provided, That should he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must
this Constitution. have enrolled them in similar schools;

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the (e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful
occupation, from which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and doctrines opposing all organized governments;
if he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family: Provided,
however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college degree holders (b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
but are unable to practice their profession because they are disqualified to do so personal assault or assassination for the success and predominance of their
by reason of their citizenship; ideas;

(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the (c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
dialects of the Philippines; and cralawlawlibrary
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino (e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
people.
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
Comm. Act No. 473, sec. 2 provides: mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to
learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 2. Qualifications. — Subject to section
four of this Act, any person having the following qualifications may become a (g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the
citizen of the Philippines by naturalization: Philippines are at war, during the period of such war;

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryFirst. He must be not less than twenty-one years of (h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose
age on the day of the hearing of the petition; laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects
thereof.
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not
184
less than ten years; The Civil Code states:
Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death.
underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in may be lost.
the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living. Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
profession, or lawful occupation;
Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty,
principal Philippine languages; prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The
consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes,
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account
public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of religious belief or political opinion.
of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil
residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for life, except in cases specified by law.
naturalization as Philippine citizen.
183 185
Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), sec. 4 provides: 571 Phil. 170 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 4. Disqualifications. — The following are 186 Id. at 189-190, citing Lack County v. Neilon, 44 Or. 14, 21, 74, p. 212; State
not qualified to be naturalized as Filipino citizens under this Act: v. Avery, 113 Mo. 475, 494, 21 S.W. 193; and Reynolds Trial Ev., Sec. 4, p. 8.
187
374 Phil. 810 (1999) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
188
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Those opposed to organized government or Id. at 822.
189
affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach See Lua v. O'Brien, et al., 55 Phil. 53 (1930) [Per J. Street, En Banc]; Vda. De
doctrines opposing all organized governments; Laig, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 172 Phil. 283 (1978) [Per J. Makasiar, First
Division]; Baloloy v. Hular, 481 Phil. 398 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second
(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, Division]; and Heirs of Celestial v. Heirs of Celestial, 455 Phil. 704 (2003) [Per J.
personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
190
ideas; Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940) [Per J. Laurel,
En Banc]. Also, Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states:
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySection 5. Substantial evidence. — In cases filed
(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; before administrative or quasi-judicial bodie's, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases; evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.
191
(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not Rollo, p. 8.
mingled socially with Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn 192See J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on
and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos; Elections, G.R. No. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of file=/jurisprudence/2016/march2016/221697_leonen.pdf> 83 [Per J. Perez, En
such war; and cralawlawlibrary Banc].
193
Id.
194
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos Id.
195
the right to be naturalized citizens or subjects thereof. G.R. No. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
Com. Act No. 473 (1939), sec. 4 provides: file=/jurisprudence/2016/march2016/221697.pdf>
196
J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on
SECTION 4. Who are Disqualified. — The following can not be naturalized as Elections, G.R. No. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
Philippine citizens: <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/march2016/221697_leonen.pdf> 83 [Per J. Perez, En
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Persons opposed to organized government or Banc].
197
affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach Id. at 84.
198
Uytengsu III v. Baduel, 514 Phil. 1 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. D. Commission on Audit
199
Jison v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 138 (1998) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First
Division]. SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman
200
Id. and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
201
Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc]. and, at the time of men-appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, certified
202
RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 5. public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing experience, or
203
Rollo, pp. 56-58. members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for
204
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 473-474 (2004) [Per J. at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
Vitug, En Banc]. in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all
205
Id. at 473-474 and 488. Members of the Commission beloiig to the same profession.
206
Id. at 487-488.
207 220
128 Phil. 815 (1967) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc]. CONST., art. XI, sec.8 provides:
208
614 Phil. 451, 479 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]. ARTICLE XI. Accountability of Public Officers
209
128 Phil. 815, 825 (1967) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc]. ....
210
Go v. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451, 479 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]. SECTION 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of
211
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. 147, 162 (1991) [Per the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of
C.J. Fernan, En Banc]. recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and
212
CONST., art. VII, sec. 2 provides: must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately
ARTICLE VII. Executive Department preceding election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or more been a
.... judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
221
SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born CONST., art. XII, sec. 20 provides:
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty ARTICLE XII. National Economy and Patrimony
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at ...
least ten years immediately preceding such election. SECTION 20. The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary
authority, the members of whose governing board must be natural-born Filipino
213
CONST., art. VII, sec. 3. citizens, of known probity, integrity, and patriotism, the majority of whom shall
214
CONST., art. VI, sec. 3 provides: come from the private sector. They shall also be subject to such other
ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department qualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The authority shall
.. . provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall have
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory powers
the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, as may be provided by law over the operations of finance companies and other
able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for institutions performing similar functions.
222
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election. CONST., art. XIII, sec. 17(2) provides:
ARTICLE XIII. Social Justice and Human Rights
215
CONST., art. VI, sec. 6 provides: ....
ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department Human Rights
....
SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives SECTION 17. . . .
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the
election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except (2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who
the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of
immediately preceding the day of the election. the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.
223
Rep. Act No. 3537 (1963), sec. 1. Section thirty-eight of Republic Act
216
CONST., art. VIII, sec. 7(1) provides: Numbered Four hundred nine, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Eighteen
ARTICLE VIII. Judicial Department hundred sixty and Republic Act Numbered Three thousand ten, is further
.... amended to read as follows:
SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or
any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Sec. 38. The City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscals. — There shall be in the
Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must Office of the City Fiscal one chief to be known as the City Fiscal with the rank,
have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the salary and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, an assistant chief
practice of law in the Philippines. to be known as the first assistant city fiscal, three second assistant city fiscals
217
CONST., art. LX-B, sec. 1(1) provides: who shall be the chiefs of divisions, and fifty-seven assistant fiscals, who shall
ARTICLE IX. Constitutional Commissions discharge their duties under the general supervision of the Secretary of Justice.
.... To be eligible for appointment as City Fiscal one must be a natural born citizen
B. The Civil Service Commission of the Philippines and must have practiced law in the Philippines for a period of
not less than ten years or held during a like period of an office in the Philippine
SECTION 1. (1) The Civil Service shall be administered by the Civil Service Government requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable
Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be requisite. To be eligible for appointment as assistant fiscal one must be a natural
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at born citizen of the Philippines and must have practiced law for at least five years
least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and prior to his appointment or held during a like period an office in the Philippine
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections Government requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable
immediately preceding their appointment. requisite. (Emphasis supplied)
218 224
CONST., art. IX-C, sec. 1(1) provides: Rep. Act No. 3537 (1963).
225
ARTICLE IX. Constitutional Commissions Examples of these are: the Land Transportation Office Commissioner, the
.... Mines and Geosciences Bureau Director, the Executive Director of Bicol River
C. The Commission on Elections Basin, the Board Member of the Energy Regulatory Commission, and the
National Youth Commissioner, among others.
226
SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Examples of these are pharmacists and officers of the Philippine Coast
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Guard, among others.
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, 227 Among these incentives are state scholarships in science and certain
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective investment rights.
228
position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, Sameer v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014, 732 SCRA 22, 57 [Per
including the Chairman, shall be Members of the Philippine Bar who have been J. Leonen, En Banc].
229
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939) [Per J. Moran, First Division].
230
Ratified on August 21, 1990.
219 231
CONST., art. IX-D, sec. 1(1) provides: See United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Rights of the Child
ARTICLE IX. Constitutional Commissions (visited March 7, 2016).
232
.... Ratified on October 23, 1986.
233 250
See Bayan v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 657-660 (2000) [Per J. Buena, En Banc], Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 5 provides:
citing the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties. Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-
234
561 Phil. 386 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc]. acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
235
Id. at 397-398. rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
236
Rep. Act No. 8552 (1998), sec. 2(b) provides: laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
251
Section 2 (b). In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, CONST., art. V, sec. 1 provides:
his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration in accordance with the chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySection 1. Suffrage maybe exercised by all citizens
tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen
Child; UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year,
and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months
Adoption, Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague Convention on the immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
252
Toward this end, the State shall provide alternative protection and assistance Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 5(1) provides:
through foster care or adoption for every child who is neglected, orphaned, or Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-
abandoned. acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
237
See also Rep. Act No. 9523 (2009), An Act Requiring the Certification of the rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to Declare a "Child laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
Legally Available for Adoption" as a Prerequisite for Adoption Proceedings,
Amending for this Purpose Certain Provision of Rep. Act No. 8552, otherwise chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Those intending to exercise their right of
known as the Inter-country Adoption Act of 1995, Pres. Decree No. 603, suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and for Other Purposes. Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
253
Rep. Act No. 9523 (2009), sec. 2 provides: Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 5(2) provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySection 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities -
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy
Act, the following terms shall mean: full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
(1) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) is the agency responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
charged to implement the provisions of this Act and shall have the sole authority conditions:
to issue the certification declaring a child legally available for adoption. (2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
.... for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
(3) Abandoned Child refers to a child who has no proper parental care or and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
guardianship, or whose parent(s) have deserted him/her for a period of at least sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
three (3) continuous months, which includes a foundling. authorized to administer an oath;
238
DFA Order No. 11-97, Implementing Rules and Regulations for Rep. Act No. 254 692 Phil. 407 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
255
8239 (1997), Philippine Passport Act. Id. at 428.
239 256
Pres. Decree No. 1986, sec. 2 provides: Rollo, p. 10.
257
Section 2. Composition; qualifications; benefits. - The BOARD shall be Id. at 687.
258
composed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and thirty (30) members, who shall Id.
259
all be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Chairman, the Vice- Id. at 229.
260
Chairman, and the members of the BOARD, shall hold office for a term of one Id.
(1) year, unless sooner removed by the President for any cause; Provided, That 261 Id.
262
they shall be eligible for re-appointment after the expiration of their term. If the Id.
Chairman, or the Vice-Chairman or any member of the BOARD fails to complete 263Bengson v. Bouse of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 409 Phil. 633, 649
his term, any person appointed to fill the vacancy shall serve only for the (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
264
unexpired portion of the term of the BOARD member whom he succeeds. Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 2.
265
Rollo, p. 35.
No person shall be appointed to the BOARD, unless he is a natural-born citizen DISSENTING OPINION
of the Philippines, not less than twenty-one (21) years of age, and of good moral
character and standing in the community; Provided, That in the selection of the PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
members of the BOARD due consideration shall be given to such qualifications I dissent.
as would produce a multi-sectoral combination of expertise in the various areas I respectfully submit that the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) committed grave
of motion picture and television; Provided, further, That at least five (5) members abuse of discretion in ruling that private respondent Mary Grace Poe-
of the BOARD shall be members of the Philippine Bar. Provided, finally That at Llamanzares (respondent) was a natural-born citizen and, thus, qualified to hold
least fifteen (15) members of the BOARD may come from the movie and office as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. 1chanrobleslaw
television industry to be nominated by legitimate associations representing the
various sectors of said industry. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as committed with grave
abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise
The Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the other members of the BOARD shall of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be entitled to transportation, representation and other allowances which shall in be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
no case exceed FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) per month. virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
240
CONST, art. IV, sec. 3. of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
241
Rollo, pp. 685-686. reason of passion and hostility.2 In this relation, "grave abuse of discretion
242
An Act Providing for the Ways in which Philippine Citizenship may be Lost or arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the
Reacquired. law or existing jurisprudence."3chanrobleslaw
243
An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women who have Lost their
Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and Natural-born Filipinos. The advent of the 1935 Constitution established the principle of jus sanguinis as
244
See Calilung v. Commission on Elections, 551 Phil. 110, 117-18 (2007) [Per basis for acquiring Philippine citizenship. 4 Following this principle, citizenship is
J. Quisumbing, En Banc] in which this Court stated that this was the clear intent conferred by virtue of blood relationship to a Filipino parent.5chanrobleslaw
of the legislature when it enacted Republic Act No. 9225.
245
Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 2. It was admitted that respondent was a foundling with unknown facts of birth and
246
551 Phil. 110 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, En Banc]. parentage. On its face, Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution - the
247
Id. at 118. applicable law to respondent's case - did not include foundlings in the
248
Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 5. enumeration of those who are considered Filipino citizens. It reads:
249
Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 3, par. 2: Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - . . . (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
taking the aforesaid oath. Philippine Islands.
 (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. auspices of the 1935 Constitution, respondent could not be considered a
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon natural-born Filipino citizen. As worded, the provisions of Section 1, Article IV of
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. the 1935 Constitution are clear, direct, and unambiguous. This Court should
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. therefore apply the statutory construction principles of expressio unius est
This case was originally a quo warranto proceeding before the SET.6 The initial exclusio alterius and verba legis non est recedendum. Consequently, it would be
burden, thus, fell upon petitioner Rizalito Y. David to show that respondent unnecessary to resort to the constitutional deliberations or to examine the
lacked the qualifications of a Senator. However, upon respondent's voluntary underlying intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution. In Civil Liberties Union
admission that she was a foundling, the burden of evidence was shifted to her. v. The Executive Secretary,11 this Court remarked
In his Dissenting Opinion before the SET, Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
pertinently explains: Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of
[I]n quo warranto, the petitioner who challenges the respondent's qualification to the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but
office carries the burden of proving, by preponderance of evidence, the facts they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much
constituting the disqualification. Upon such proof, the burden shifts to the less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
respondent who must now present opposing evidence constituting his or her instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it [is] safer to construe the
defense or establishing his or her affirmative defense. constitution from what appears upon its face."12
In fact, it should be pointed out that the 1935 Constitution, as it was adopted in
xxxx its final form, never carried over any proposed provision on foundlings
being considered or presumed to be Filipino citizens. Its final exclusion is
In the present case, the petitioner has alleged that the respondent is a foundling. therefore indicative of the framers' prevailing intent. 13 The ponencia's theorized
He posits that, as a foundling has no known parents from whom to trace the "harmonization"14 of the constitutional provisions on citizenship with the
origins of her citizenship, the respondent is not a Filipino citizen and is, provisions on the promotion of children's well-being, 15 equal protection,16 public
therefore, not eligible for the position of senator. service,17 and even human dignity and human rights18 appears to be a tailor-
fitted advocacy for allowing foundlings to run for key national posts that, quite
Significantly, the respondent admitted her status as a foundling, thus, lifting the frankly, stretches the import of these distinct provisions to the separate and
petitioner's burden of proving his claim that she is a foundling. With the unique matter of citizenship. There seems to be an evident logical problem with
admission, the fact necessary to establish the petitioner's claim is considered the argument that since the Constitution protects its children, and respects
established.7 human rights and equality to run for office, then ergo, foundlings should be
In this case, respondent failed to present competent and sufficient evidence to presumed to be natural-born. It appears that this approach aims to collate all
prove her blood relation to a Filipino parent which is necessary to determine possibly related constitutional text, albeit far-flung, just to divine a presumption
natural-born citizenship pursuant to the jus sanguinis principle. This when unfortunately, there is none.
notwithstanding, the ponencia concludes that the following circumstances are
substantial evidence justifying the inference that respondent's biological parents Moreover, as Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) aptly
are Filipino:8chanrobleslaw pointed out in his Dissenting Opinion before the SET, it would be insensible to
suppose that the framers of the 1935 Constitution intended that foundlings be
(a) Circumstances of abandonment: Respondent was found as a newborn considered as natural-born citizens:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
infant outside the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968. In 1968, [N]one of the framers of the 1935 Constitution mentioned the term natural-born
Iloilo, as did most if not all other Philippine provinces, had a predominantly in relation to the citizenship of foundlings. Again, under the 1935 Constitution,
Filipino population. In 1968, there was also no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo. only those whose fathers were Filipino citizens were considered natural-born
citizens. Those who were born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were still
(b) Physical features: She is described as having "brown almond-shaped eyes, required to elect Philippine citizenship, preventing them from being natural-born
a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face." She stands at citizens. If, as respondent would like us to believe, the framers intended that
only 5 feet and 2 inches tall. foundlings be considered natural-born Filipino citizens, this would create an
absurd situation where a child with unknown parentage would be placed in a
(c) Statistical inference: in