FOOTNOTE 301

CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NIEL PIEDAD y CONSOLACION, LITO GARCIA y FRANCISCO and RICHARD
PALMA y IDER, accused.
NIEL PIEDAD y CONSOLACION and LITO GARCIA y FRANCISCO, accused-
appellants.
DATE G.R. No. 131923 December 5, 2002
PONENTE Justice YNARES-SANTIAGO
FACTS 1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

2. The Court finds accused Niel Piedad and Lito Garcia guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder with no modifying circumstances present, and
hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
pursuant to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

3. Subject/Object : Niel, for no apparent reason, struck Mateo with a Tanduay

Rhum bottle on the head. Andrew hurled a plastic chair towards Niel, which
caused the latter to scamper away. ndrew hurled a plastic chair towards Niel,
which caused the latter to scamper away.
Shortly thereafter, Fidel saw Niel returning to the store with several
companions. Upon seeing the approaching group, Mateo and Andrew ran
towards the compound. Mateo was rushed to the East Avenue Medical
Center where he later died because of the injuries he sustained.

Shortly thereafter, Fidel saw Niel returning to the store with several companions.
Upon seeing the approaching group, Mateo and Andrew ran towards the
compound.
4 Accused Niel Piedad y Consolacion, Lito Garcia y Francisco and Richard Palma y
Ider were charged with Murder
5. Accused-appellant Niel Piedad argues that the way that he was identified by
prosecution witnesses was suggestive and fatally flawed. Niel claims that he
should have been put in a police lineup instead of being shoveled into a
"confrontation" with the alleged witnesses and immediately singled out by the
police as suspects. He further claims that he was denied his right of counsel
during the most crucial stage of the police investigation - that is, his
identification as one of the assailants by eyewitnesses.
ISSUE WON accused appellants constitutional rights violated.

RULING No, accused appellants constitutional rights was not violated

Constitution provides that Any person under investigation for the

commission of an offence shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of the counsel, he must
be provided with one. The rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of councel.

In the present case, accused appleant did not make extra judicial confession
or admission with the crime charged. They were not interrogated by the
police authorities much less force to confess to the crime imputed by them.
Accused appellant did place under costudial investigation.

Hence, the cosntitutionsl right of the accused appellant was not violated.
FOOTNOT 302
E

CASE TITLE People v. Dagpin, G.R. No. 149560

DATE June 10, 2004

PONENTE Justice Romeo Callejo Sr.

FACTS 1. Petitioners: Randy Labisig, Rona Labisig, Rena Labisig, nephew and
nieces of the victim.
2. Action of Petitioners: On March 26, 1996 at 1:00 A.M., the killing of the
petitioners’ uncle Nilo Caermare, took place. It was witnessed by the
victim’s nephew, Randy and his sisters Rona and Rena who saw and
recognized the appellant. On March 27, 1996, Randy, Rona and Rena went
to the police station and saw the appellant, whom they pointed to the
police as the person who shot their uncle. It was only then that they
learned the name of their uncle’s assassin, Quirico Dagpin.

3. Subject/Object: The appellant Dagpin, avers that the trial court erred in
convicting him of the crime charged on the basis mainly of his having
been identified by Randy, Rona and Rena at the police station on
March 27, 1996. He was not assisted by counsel when the three
pointed to him as the culprit in the police station. Hence, according
to the appellant, such identification is inadmissible in evidence.

4. Respondent: Quirico Dagpin

5. Action of Respondent: In defense, appellant raised alibi that on the

night the killing incident took place, he was in the house of Pedro
Elcamel and helped the latter in the preparation of a graduation
party for Pedro’s
daughter.

ISSUE Whether or not the appellant was denied of his right under the
Constitution when he was not assisted by counsel at the time the
prosecution witnesses identified him as the culprit?

RULING No, the appellant was not denied of his right under the Constitution when
he was not assisted by a counsel at the time the prosecution witness
identified him as the culprit.

The Constitution provides that, any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

In the instant case, the contention of the appellant that evidence was
inadmissible of convicting him of the crime charged on the basis of his
having been identified by the complainants at the police station without
assistance of a counsel was inappropriate. Even not assisted by a counsel,
the appellant was not subjected to a custodial investigation where he was
identified by the prosecution’s witnesses in a police line-up. Inquest in
police line-up is not a custodial investigation where the guaranteed rights
of an accused exist.

Therefore, the appellant was not denied of his right under the
Constitution when he was not assisted by a counsel at the time the
prosecution witness identified him as the culprit.
FOOTNOTE 303

CASE TITLE People v. Escorial, G.R. Nos. 138934-35

DATE January 16, 2002

PONENTE Justice Jose Mendoza

FACTS 1. Petitioners: The complainant, Michelle Darunday, was living with Erma
Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver.

2. Action of Petitioner: On the night of the incident, Erma was awakened by

the presence of a man. The man had his head covered with a t-shirt to
prevent identification and carried a knife about four inches long and
asked where the money was. Erma Blanca and Michelle Darunday gave
the money because they were threatened by the man to be killed. The
assailant then blindfolded Michelle and began to rape her. After
satisfying his lust, the assailant conversed for a while with complainants.
The accused, threatening to call his companions, then, again, raped the
complainant in the other orifice of the complainant’s nether regions.

3. Subject/Object: Physical description of the assailant was given by the

complainant at the police station. Police found that the descriptions
given by the complainant fit that of a worker in the Coffee Break Corner,
where the accused was employed. The police arrested the accused (w/o
warrant) and proceeded to the police station where he saw the
complainant and inadvertently blushed.

4. Respondent: Anthony Escordial

5. Action of Respondents: Complainant then identified the respondent based

on the marks on the neck and matched other physical descriptions.
Court of first instance ruled that accused is found guilty of robbery and
rape with no mitigating circumstances and is hereby sentenced with
maximum penalty of death.

ISSUE Whether or not the evidence obtained by the prosecution during Escordial’s
subjection to custodial investigation is admissible evidence.

RULING No, the evidence obtained by the prosecution during Escordial’s subjection to
custodial investigation is inadmissible evidence.

The Constitution provides that, any confession or admission obtained in

violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.

In the instant case, the accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention
by the police after he had been pointed by a Ramie as the possible suspect of
the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-of-court
identifications were conducted by the police. This type of identification was
recognized as critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution which
necessitate presence of a counsel. Furthermore, his right to counsel was
violated and all questions answered by accused-appellant is hereby deemed as
hearsay.

Therefore, the evidence obtained by the prosecution during Escordial’s

subjection to custodial investigation is inadmissible evidence.
FOOTNOTE 304

CASE TITLE: People vs. Bolanos

DATE: July 3, 1992; GR. No. 101808 (211 SCRA 262)

PONENTE: Justice Paras

FACTS:

1. Appellant: Ramon Bolanos

2. Appellant was one of the last two companions the previous night on a drinking spree of the
deceased Pagdalian who was found dead in an improvised bed full of blood with stab wounds.
3. A manifestation (in lieu of appellee’s brief) was filed by the Solicitor General’s Office, with the
position that the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the extra-judicial confession of
appellant while on board the police patrol jeep.
4. People of the Philippines
5. Patrolmen Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao testified that they proceeded to the scene of
the crime and found the firearms of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly
seated.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial admission is admissible in evidence

RULING: No. the extra-judicial admission is inadmissible in evidence.

The constitution provides that any confession or admission obtained in violation of this hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

In the case at bar, the appellant investigated, after he was asked by the police if he killed the victim,
answered; he killed the victim because he was abusive. Being already in the custodial investigation while on
board on the way to Police Station for the formal investigation, the appellant must be informed of his
Constitutional rights. And the alleged confession obtained while on board was the only basis on his conviction.
Clearly, the alleged oral admission of the appellant while on board violated the constitutional rights of the
appellant.

Therefore, finding the constitutional rights of the appellant being violated. The evidence is inadmissible.
FOOTNOTE 305

CASE TITLE: Ernesto Navallo vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines

DATE: July 16, 1994; G.R. No. 97214 (234 SCRA 175)

PONENTE: Justice Jose Vitug

FACTS:

1. Petitioner: Ernesto Navallo

2. Petitioner is the collecting and disbursing officer of Numancia National Vocational High School
found to have misappropriated public funds for private benefit after a COA audit.
3. Navallo’s claimed that he signed the cash count only because he was pressured by Macasemo and
admits that the reflected in the Statement of Accountability was not his but those of Macasemo,
his superior. Navallo admitted having received the demand letter, but did not reply because he
was already in Manila looking for another employment. And relying on Macasemo’s assurance
that he would settle the matter.
4. Respondents: Honorable Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines
5. Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original
and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers. A new order for Navallo’s
arrest was issued by Sandiganbayan after the two former alias warrants of arrest.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was under custodial investigation when he signed the certification prepared
by the State Auditing Examiner

RULING: Page 121 , Paragraph 1

No, the petitioner is not under custodial investigation when he signed the certification prepared by the State
Auditing Examiner.

The constitution provides that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice.

Under R.A. 7438, “custodial investigation” shall include the practice of issuing an “invitation” to a person who
is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the “inviting” officer for any violation of law.

In the case at bar, a person under normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit
examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be law enforcement officer. Moreover, it cannot be said that he
has been pressured to sign the auditor’s report, but may have been persuaded only. Taking into consideration
his gratitude and high respect of his superior officer for recommending his position, he would agree signing
the auditor’s report without the opportunity to explain on the alleged shortage.

Therefore, Navallo was not under custodial investigation and was not deprived by his constitutional rights.
FOOTNOTE 306
CASE TITLE: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PETITIONER v. JUDGE
AUGUSTO SUMILANG, INTERPRETER FELICIDAD MALLA, STENO-REPORTER
EDELITA LAGMAY and STENO-REPORTER NIEVA MERCADO, Respondents
DATE: April 18, 1997 A.M. No. MTJ-94-989
PONENTE: ROMERO, J
FACTS:
1. Petitioner: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR
2. Action of the petitioner, an on-the-spot audit examination was conducted by the Fiscal Audit
Division of the Office of Court Administrator. In the course of the examination, several anomalous
transactions were discovered. One involved a managers check deposited in the name of Teodorico
Dizon in connection with Civil Case No. 858, wherein Entero Villarica, on August 7, 1992 during the
tenure of Malla entrusted the amount of P240, 000.00 to said respondent instead of handling it over to
the Clerk of Court pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 13-92.
3. Subject/object: This case arose as an aftermath of an on-the-spot audit examination of the official
cashbook and other documents of the lower court. It appears from the evidence that court interpreter
Malla who was the officer-in-charge from July 1, 1992 to November 15, 1992, took a maternity leave
for one (1) month (November 16, 1992 to December 15, 1992) and reassumed her position on
December 16, 1992, until her resignation on August 31, 1993.
4. Respondent: JUDGE AUGUSTO SUMILANG, INTERPRETER FELICIDAD MALLA,
STENO-REPORTER EDELITA LAGMAY and STENO-REPORTER NIEVA MERCADO
5. Upon further questioning by the examining team, however, Malla admitted that she lent the amount
of P87,000.00 to steno-reporter Lagmay, P40,000.00 to steno-reporter Mercado, and P81,000.00 to
Mrs. Sumilang, wife of Judge Sumilang. She spent P32, 000.00 for the hospitalization of her husband
and the remaining balance for personal purposes. Later on, she executed an affidavit stating that only
Lagmay and Mercado borrowed P55, 000.00 and P40, 000.00, respectively. On the other hand, she
used P100, 000.00 for her personal needs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Malla,s constitutional rights were violated when she signed an affidavit before the
Office of the Court Administrator, where she admitted her misdeed.
RULING:
NO, Malla,s constitutional rights were not violated when she signed an affidavit before the Office of
the Court Administrator, where she admitted her misdeed.

Under the constitution, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice.
In the case at bar, the constitutional provision may be invoked only during custodial investigation or
as in custody investigation which has been defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way. The investigation is defined as an investigation conducted by police authorities
which will include investigation conducted by the Municipal Police, P.C. (now PNP) and the NBI and
such other police agencies in our government. Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator can hardly
be deemed to be the law enforcement authority contemplated in the constitutional provision. Because
the Court Administrator is not a law enforcement officer, an investigation conducted by him
does not constitute custodial investigation within the contemplation of the constitutional
guarantee.

Therefore, the constitutional rights of Malla,s were not violated when she signed an affidavit before
the Office of the Court Administrator, where she admitted her misdeed.

Note: Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement
authority contemplated in the constitutional provision. At any rate, Malla admitted during her
testimony that she received the said check from Villarica covering the amount of P240, 000.00
payable to Dizon. However, when she tried to deposit it with the Municipal Treasurer, the latter
refused because there was no order from Judge Sumilang. Consequently, Villarica entrusted said
check to her. It was at this juncture that she used the money for personal purposes. During the
investigation, Malla repeated what she basically stated in her affidavit i.e., that she used a substantial
amount of the P240, 00.00 for her personal needs. This effectively refutes whatever pressure and
coercion she claims was employed against her. By repeating her confession in open court, Malla
thereby converted it into a judicial confession.
FOOTNOTE 307
CASE TITLE: EDDIE MANUEL, ROMEO BANA, ROGELIO PAGTAMA, JR. and JOEL
REA, petitioners, vs.
N.C. CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, JOHNNY LIM, ANITA SY and NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION), respondents.
DATE: November 28, 1997 G.R. No. 127553
PONENTE: Justice Renato J Puno
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Eddie Manuel, Romeo Bana, Rogelio Pagtama, Jr. and Joel Rea were employed as
drivers at N.C. Construction Supply owned by private respondents Johnny Lim (a.k.a. Lao Ching Eng)
and Anita Sy.
2. Aurelio Guevara, a company driver, and Jay Calso, his helper ("pahinante"), taking out from the
company premises two rolls of electrical wire worth P500.00 without authority. Calso was brought to
the Pasig Police station for questioning. During the investigation, Calso named seven other employees
who were allegedly involved in a series of thefts at respondent company, among them petitioners
Manuel, Bana, Pagtama, Jr. and Rea.
3. Petitioners initially denied the charge. However, after being positively identified by Jay Calso,
petitioners admitted their guilt and offered to resign in exchange for the withdrawal of any criminal
charge against them.3 Petitioners Bana and Rea filed separate resignation letters while petitioners
Manuel and Pagtama, Jr. tendered their resignations orally.
4. Petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents for illegal dismissal. Petitioners alleged
that they were not informed of the charge against them nor were they given an opportunity to dispute
the same. They also alleged that their admission made at the Pasig police station regarding their
involvement in the theft as well as their resignation were not voluntary but were obtained by private
respondents' lawyer by means of threat and intimidation.
5. Respondent: N.C. CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, JOHNNY LIM, ANITA SY and NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION
6. Respondent reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It ruled that petitioners were dismissed for
a just cause. It held that petitioners failed to adduce competent evidence to show a vitiation of their
admission regarding their participation in the theft. It further stated that such admission may be
admitted in evidence because Section 12 Article III of the 1987 Constitution applies only to criminal
proceedings but not to administrative proceedings. The NLRC, however, agreed with the Labor
Arbiter that petitioners were denied due process. Hence, it ordered private respondents to pay
petitioners the amount of P1, 000.00 as indemnity.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the employer observed due process in terminating the employment of the petitioners.

RULING:
No, Employers failed to observe due process in terminating the employment of petitioners.
Under the constitution, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice.
In the instant case, Due process requires that the employer should furnish the worker whose
employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the cause(s) for
termination and afford him ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of
a representative if he so desires. Specifically, the employer must furnish the worker with two written
notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (2) the subsequent
notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him.
Therefore, Employers failed to observe due process in terminating the employment of petitioners.

Note: An employer has a right to terminate the services of an employee subject to both substantive
and procedural limitations. This means that (1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause
provided in the Labor Code, and (2) the employee must be accorded due process before his
employment is terminated.
Footnote 308
CASE: ESTELITO V. REMOLONA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, GR NO. 137473
DATE: August 2, 2001
PONENTE: Justice Reynato Puno
FACTS:

1. Petitioner Estelito V. Remolona is the Postmaster at the Postal Office Service in Infanta,
Quezon.
2. Petitioner claimed that his extra-judicial admission allegedly signed by him during the
preliminary investigation conducted by Civil Service Field Office regarding his responsibility
in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility of his wife is not admissible because he was merely
made to sign a blank form.
3. An administrative action was filed against petitioner and to his wife thereafter, petitioner was
dismissed from the government service for dishonesty.
4. The Civil Service Commission Chairman Sto. Tomas issued an Order to conduct an
investigation on the wife of petitioner for the alleged fake eligibility.
5. The investigation was conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the facts and evidence to form
a belief that an offense cognizable by the CSC has been committed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the extra-judicial admission obtained during the investigation conducted by the Civil
Service Field Office regarding the fake eligibility of petitioner’s wife is valid.

A- Yes. The extra-judicial admission obtained during the investigation conducted by the Civil
Service Field Office regarding the fake eligibility of petitioner’s wife is valid.

L- The Constitution provides that any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

A- In the instant case, petitioner Remolona admitted the facts involving the fake eligibility of his
wife and the investigation was conducted by the CSC field office not by a police investigator
to which it is a form of preliminary investigation of an offense cognizable by the CSC.

C-Thus, The extra-judicial admission obtained during the investigation conducted by the Civil
Service Field Office regarding the fake eligibility of petitioner’s wife was valid.
RULING AT DEAN’S BOOK:
An investigation conducted by the CSC involving fake eligibility is not custodial investigation.
Page: 121 Par: 5

Footnote 309
CASE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ABELARDO SALONGA, G.R. No.
131131
DATE: June 21, 2001
PONENTE: Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes
FACTS:

6. Accused-appellant Abelardo Salonga is an assistant cashier of Metrobank incharge of

managing money market placements and payments of maturing money placement investment
who was charged with the crime of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial
Document.
7. Appellant argued that his extra-judicial confession before the Valentino Elevado [the
Assistant Accountant of Department of Internal Affairs of Metrobank] is inadmissible on the
ground that it was based on speculations, possibilities, suspicions and conjectures.
8. Accused-appellant was invited to an investigation by Benito Cuan [bank officer of
Department of Internal Affairs of Metrobank] upon the orders of his superior because of an
alleged anomaly on the issuance of cashier’s check and in the course of the interview, he
admitted having issued the subject cashier’s check without legitimate transaction. Afterwhich,
accused-appellant executed a written statement which he authenticated by affixing his
signature.
9. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the participation of accused-appellant in
the crime charged that he was the custodian of the blank Metrobank’s cashier check which was
processed and encashed.
10. Accordingly, the extra-judicial confession of appellant was properly admitted considering that
when accused-appellant gave his statement he was not under custodial investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the written confession of accused-appellant in a post-audit interview is

admissible in evidence.

A- Yes. The written confession of accused-appellant in a post-audit interview is admissible in

evidence.

L- The Constitution provides that any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

A- In the case at bar, the person who conducted a post-audit interview was the Assistant
Accountant of Department of Affairs of their company [Metrobank] in which a bank officer is
a private person and not a police officer.

C-Thus, the written confession of accused-appellant in a post-audit interview is admissible in

evidence.
RULING AT DEAN’S BOOK:
Where, after an audit, the accused was summoned to appear before the Assistant Accountant of
Metrobank and, in the course of the interview, accused admitted having issued the subject cashier’s
check without any legitimate transaction, the written confession was held admissible in evidence
inasmuch as the interview did not constitute custodial investigation.
Page: 121 Par: 6
FOOTNOT 310
E
CASE TITLE Ladiana v People, G.r. no. 144293
DATE December 24,2002
PONENTE Justice Panganiban
FACTS 1. Petitioner: JOSUE R. LADIANA, a public officer, being then a member of the
Integrated National Police (INP now PNP) assigned at the Lumban Police
Station, Lumban, Laguna

2.  Acting in relation to his duty which is primarily to enforce peace and order
within his jurisdiction, taking advantage of his official position confronted
Francisco San Juan why the latter was removing the steel pipes which were
previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P.
Jacinto Street, Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, purposely to insure the safety of
persons passing along the said street and when Francisco San Juan told the
accused that the latter has no business in stopping him, said accused who was
armed with a firearm, with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot Francisco San Juan with the
firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at his head and neck inflicting upon him fatal
wounds thereby causing the death of Francisco San Juan.
3. Petitioner raises the following questions in this appeal: (1) whether the Counter-
Affidavit he executed during the preliminary investigation of this case is
admissible proof showing his complicity in the crime, (2) whether the Sandigang
bayan erred in denying his Motion for Leave to File a Demurrer to Evidence, and
(3) whether he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
4. Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
5. Respondent: The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to
establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The court a quo held
that his Counter-Affidavit, in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal
shots that caused the victim’s death, may be used as evidence against him. It
underscored the admission made by the defense as to the authorship, the
authenticity and the voluntariness of the execution of the Counter-Affidavit. In
short, it ruled that the document had sufficiently established his responsibility
for the death of the victim. However, it found no evidence of treachery; thus, it
convicted him of homicide only.
Whether or not the Counter-Affidavit he executed during the preliminary
ISSUE investigation of this case is admissible proof
RULING Yes, the confession is admissible.

Constitution states that any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice.

In the recent case, If he had been interrogated by the police that would have
stopped at the moment the criminal complaint was filed with the court public
prosecutor's office. As a result, in the case of a defendant in a criminal case already
pending with the public prosecutor's office, there is no need to discuss his rights
while under custodial questioning since he is no longer under custodial
interrogation.
Therefore, the Counter-Affidavit he executed during the preliminary investigation of
this case is admissible proof
FOOTNOTE 311

CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
AUGUSTO MANZANO y REYES, respondent
DATE November 16, 1993
PONENTE Justice Jose C. Vitug
FACTS 1.Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

2. The Regional Trial Court of Manila found Accused Augusto Manzano y

Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Sale and Delivery of
Marijuana, defined and penalized under RA 6425 or (The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972).

3. Respondent: AUGUSTO MANZANO y REYES

4. Accused-appellant firstly anchors his assigned error on the fact that he has
been "investigated, interrogated and made to sign an accomplished
booking sheet and arrest report without the benefit of counsel.

5. In his appeal accused contended that:

a. That the evidence obtained from him was in violation of his rights
under the Constitution.

ISSUE (1st) Whether or not the appellant's contention that he was made to sign and
accomplished a booking sheet and an arrest report without the benefit of
counsel violated his constitutional rights.
RULING No. The appellant's contention that he was made to sign and
accomplished a booking sheet and an arrest report without the benefit of
counsel did not violate his constitutional rights.

The constitution dictates that any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.

In the case at bar, the signing by the accused of the booking sheet and
arrest report is not a part of the custodial investigation which would
otherwise require the presence of counsel to ensure the protection of the
accused's constitutional rights.

Therefore, the signing of booking sheets and an arrest report without the
benefit of counsel did not violate appellant's constitutional rights.
FOOTNOTE 312
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY
GALGARIN alias TOTO
DATE February 20, 2001; G.R. No. 1133026
PONENTE Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
FACTS 1. Petitioner/s: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

2. Action of Petitioner: The trial court convicted him of the crime of mureder.

3. Subject/Object: Gerry Galgarin and Edward Endino were accused of slaying

Dennis Aquino, where the former stabbed him several times and the
latter shot him. This was done in the presence of the victim’s girlfriend.
Galgarin was arrested and interviewed by TV Patrol where he confessed
and begged his nephew Endino to surrender as well.

4. Respondents: EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO

5. Action of Respondent/s: Appellant Galgarin asserted that the videotape

confession infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule
provided in the Constitution.

ISSUE Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the videotape confession as
evidence.
NO.
RULING
According to Art. III, Section 12 of the Constitution, (1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado,
or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and
civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

In the case at bar, The interview and confession does not form part of
custodial investigation since it was not given to the police officers but to the
media in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public.
However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium
for admitting guilt, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme
caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions.

Therefore, We should never presume that all media confessions described as

voluntary have been given freely. It should be thoroughly examined and
scrutinized.
FOOTNOTE 313
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERIC GUILLERMO y GARCIA
DATE January 20, 2004; G.R. No. 147786

PONENTE Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing

FACTS 1. Petitioner/s: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

2. Action of Petitioner: The OSG contends that not every statement made to
the police by a suspect in a crime falls within the ambit of constitutional
protection. If not made under “custodial investigation” or “under
investigation for the commission of the offense,” the statement is not
protected by the Bill of Rights.

3. Subject/Object: Appellant Eric Guillermo killed his employer, Victor

Francisco Keyser by hitting him with a piece of wood and was cut into
pieces using a saw. Appellant then told Campos, the guard on duty, that
he killed Victor Keyser and needed his assistance to carry the corpse to
the garbage dump to burn it. Campos then immediately called the
police. Upon the arrival of the Police, Guillermo then surrendered to
them. The death of Keyser shocked the nation and appellant was the
interviewed by two reporters from ABS-CBN and GMA and was
broadcast nationwide.

4. Respondents: ERIC GUILLERMO y GARCIA

5. Action of Respondent/s: Appellant contends that his conviction was based

on inadmissible evidence and there is no clear showing that he was
informed of his constitutional rights.

ISSUE Whether or not the appellant’s statements to the media are admissible.

RULING YES. The appellant’s statements to the media are admissible.

According to Art. III, Section 12 of the Constitution, (1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado,
or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and
civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

In the case at bar, the TV news reporters’ testimonies on record show that
they were acting as media professionals when they interviewed appellant.
They were not under direction and control of the police. There was no
coercion for appellant to face the TV cameras. The record also shows that the
interviews took place on several occasions, not just once. During each
interviews, the appellant did not protest or insist his innocence. Instead, he
repeatedly admitted what he had done.
Therefore, spontaneous statements or those not elicited through questioning
by law enforcement officers, but given in an ordinary manner by verbally
admitting the crime are admissible.
FOOTNOTE 314
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LINDES PAYNOR, accused-appellant.
DATE G.R. No. 116222 September 9, 1996
PONENTE Justice REGALADO, J.:
FACTS 1. Petitioner/s: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

2. Action of Petitioner: court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of murder.

3. Subject/Object: When a middle-aged teacher, Carmelita Aguinaldo, was

stabbed and killed inside her classroom at the Roxas Central
Elementary School.

4. Respondents: LINDES PAYNOR, accused-appellant.

5. Action of Respondent/s: Appellant sought the reversal of the verdict

claiming that the lower court , erred among others, that there was
violation of the Miranda Doctrine.

ISSUE Whether or not the accused rightfully raised the issue of violation of the
Miranda Doctrine when allegedly the police unceremoniously stripped
him of his clothing and personal items, the latter having been introduced
as evidence during the trial?

RULING YES.

According to Art. III, Section 12 of the Constitution, (1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No
torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The
law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section
as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.

In the case at bar, the court is not persuaded. The protection of accused
under custodial investigation which is invoked by the accused- appellant,
Lindes Paynor, refers to Testimonial Compulsion.

Therefore, accused rightfully raised the issue of violation of the Miranda

Doctrine when allegedly the police unceremoniously stripped him of his
clothing and personal items, the latter having been introduced as evidence
during the trial.
FOOTNOTE 315
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.
DATE G.R. No. L-68969 January 22, 1988
PONENTE Justice SARMIENTO,
FACTS 1. Petitioner/s: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

2. Action of Petitioner: Accused – appellant was convicted of murder.

3. Subject/Object: For stabbing to death one Ramon Pichel Jr.
Jose Samson, lone witness for the prosecution testified that he was with
the victim.

4. Respondents: USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, 

5. Action of Respondent/s: The defense claims that the accused is minor,

considering that the age of the accused could exempt him from
punishment or cause the suspension of his sentence under Article 12
and 80 of the RPC.

ISSUE Whether or not the rights of the accused were violated.

RULING YES.

According to Art. III, Section 12 of the Constitution, (1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No
torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The
law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section
as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was presented alone, not in a

police lineup – and unaccompanied by a counsel to the eyewitness, in the
funeral parlor, and in the presence of grieving relatives to the victims.
Such procedures is as tainted as an uncounseled confession and thus falls
within the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection.

Therefore, rights of the accused were violated.

FOOTNOTE: 316
CASE TITLE: Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642, G.R. No. L-56291
DATE:June 27, 1988
PONENTE: Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla
FACTCS:
1. PETITIONER: Christopher Gamboa
2. ACTION OF PETITIONER: Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the
conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his
constitutional rights to counsel. 
3. SUBJECT/OBJECT: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a
line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion
in a robbery, thereafter he was charged.
4. RESPONDENT: HON. ALFREDO CRUZ, JUDGE of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Br. XXIX
5. ACTION OF THE RESPONDENT: The respondent judge denied the said motion.
ISSUE: Whether or Not petitioner’s right to counsel violated.
HELD:
NO, petitioner’s right to counsel is not violated.
Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution provides that, Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
In the case at bar, The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest. He had not been held
yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said
investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear
innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by
counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence
of counsel. 
Thus, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.
FOOTNOTE: 317
CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ALFREDO ENANORIA
DATE: June 8, 1992
PONENTE: Justice Ricardo Paras
FACTCS:
1.Accused-appellant:
2. This is an appeal interposed by Alfredo Enanoria, from the October 31, 1989 decision
1 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, 11th Judicial Region, Branch II, in Criminal Case
No. 16302-88, which found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping with
Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the sum of P110,000.00 for death and burial expenses, and P100,000.00 as moral
damages, and to pay the costs .
At around 9:00 o’clock in the morning of May 7, 1988, while he was at the Davao
Medical Center where he was brought after his arrest. Enanoria executed an "ante-mortem"
statement before P/Cpl. Cerilo S. Solana, Jr. in the presence of Mayor Duterte and Lt. Col.
Calida. Although he claimed that he would still survive inspite of his wound, he admitted having
been shot because he was involved in the kidnapping of Mrs. Dakudao. He informed the police
that one alias Amil shot Mrs. Dakudao and that they were not able to get the P50,000.00 ransom
they had demanded
3. Accused-appellant action: Enanoria’s counsel asserts that the extrajudicial statement
which was allegedly the only piece of evidence against his client, was obtained under duress and
in violation of the latter’s right to counsel and therefore, it should have been disregarded.

ISSUE: Whether or Not accused-appellant’s right to counsel violated.

HELD: NO, accused-appellant’s right to counsel is not violated.
Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution provides that, Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
In the case at bar, Enanoria’s confession is presumed to be voluntary since there is no force nor
intimidation happen in the hospital. the right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest
coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
Thus, Enanoria’s right to counsel is not violated.
FOOTNOTE 318
CASE TITLE People of the Philippines vs. Benjamin Sayaboc et. al
DATE January 15, 2004 GR No. 147201
PONENTE Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.
FACTS 1. The appellant Benjamin Sayaboc was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of death. Apellant Marlon Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso were also
found guilty as principal and accomplices in the crime of homicide
respectively.
2. At their arraignment, appellants Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso
and Miguel Buenviaje, pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder.
Marlon Buenviaje, also pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment.
3. Appellants argue that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may not
be admitted in evidence against him because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO
lawyer who was his counsel during the custodial investigation, was not
a competent, independent, vigilant, and effective counsel. He was
ineffective because he remained silent during the entire proceedings.
He was not independent as he was formerly a judge in the National
Police Commission, which was holding court inside the PNP Command
of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.
4. Appellee is the People of the Philippines.
5. The OSG further asserts that Sayaboc’s extrajudicial confession is
admissible in evidence against him, since it was made after he was
informed of, and accorded, his constitutional rights, particularly the
right to an independent counsel of his own choice. No evidence was
adduced during the trial to substantiate the claim that Atty. Cornejo
used to be connected with the NAPOLCOM.
ISSUE Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial
confession of the accused when it was taken without the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel.
RULING Yes, the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession of the
accused when it was taken without the assistance of a competent and independent
counsel.

The Constitution provides that any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.

In the case at bar, the Court ruled that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional
right to a competent counsel since Atty. Cornejo did nothing but remained silent
during the entire proceedings. As an officer of the Court, it is an attorney’s duty first
and foremost, to seek the truth. However, counsel should be able, throughout the
investigation, to explain the nature of the questions by conferring with his client and
halting the investigation should the need arise.
Therefore, the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession of
the accused when it was taken without the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel.
FOOTNOTE 319
CASE TITLE People of the Philippines vs. Santiago Peralta et. al
DATE March 30, 2004 GR No. 145176
PONENTE Justice Artemio Panganiban
FACTS 1. Before the Court is an appeal from the decision of the RTC of Manila.
Appellants Ulysses Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito de Leon y Luciano, Librando
Flores y Cruz and Antonio Loyola y Salisi, as well as their co accused, Santiago
Peralta y Polidario and Armando Datuin y Granados were convicted therein of
qualified theft. They committed the said offense with grave abuse of
confidence they being at the time employed as Currency Reviewers, Driver,
Currency Assistant and Money Counter of the offended party and as such
they had free access to the property stolen.
2. Accused appellant Garcia came to know Atty. Francisco Sanchez of the PAO
on November 4, 1992, at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw, when
SPO4 Coronel introduced Atty. Sanchez to accused appellant Garcia and told
him that Atty. Sanchez would be his lawyer. However, accused appellant
Garcia did not agree to have Atty. Sanchez to be his lawyer. Atty Sanchez left
after talking to SPO4 Coronel, and accused appellant had not met Atty.
Sanches anymore since then. Garcia was not present when Atty. Sanchez
allegedly signed the alleged three sworn statements.
3. During the hearing of the case on April 6, 2000, Atty. Sanchez manifested in
open court that he did not assist Garcia when the police investigated him and
that he signed the three sworn statements only as a witness thereto. Accused
appellant Garcia signed the alleged three sworn statements due to SPO4
Coronel’s warning that if he would not do so, he would again be tortured by
water cure.

Appellants aver that the alleged three Sworn Statements of Garcia were
obtained without the assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under Art.
3 of the Constitution.

4. Appellee is the People of the Philippines

5. The OSG contends that counsel, Atty. Francisco Sanchez of the Public
Attorney’s Office, duly assisted Garcia during the custodial investigation.
ISSUE Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three Sworn
Statements of Accused appellant Garcia.
RULING Yes, the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession of the
accused when it was taken without the assistance of a competent and independent
counsel.

The Constitution provides that any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.

In the case at bar, it is clear from a plain reading of the three extrajudicial confessions
that Garcia was not assisted by Atty. Sanchez. The signature of the latter on those
documents was affixed after the word “SAKSI”. Moreover, he appeared in court and
categorically testified that he had not assisted Garcia when the latter was investigated
by the police, and that the former had signed the Sworn Statement only as a witness.

Therefore, the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession of
the accused when it was taken without the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel.
FOOTNOTE 320
CASE TITLE People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo De Guzman et al.
DATE June 30, 1993
PONENTE Justice Jose Melo
FACTS 1. Ricardo de Guzman, Vicente Jimenez, Joseph Cailang, Ruel Baclayon,
Leopoldo Cailang, Alex Bareto, Constantino Villanueva, Victor Nunez and
Celso Bustamante were charged before the RTC of Cebu with three counts of
murder and one count of frustrated murder. However, all were acquitted
except for Victor Nunez who was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of murder.
2. One morning, Major Antonio Carteciano was driving his private jeep Camp
General Arcadio Maxilom in Lahug Cebu City where he was stationed as
medical officer of the PC/INP Provincial Command. In the front seat with him
is his wide Lorna, and at the backseat are his mother in law, son, brother
Francisco, neighbor Bantug and Bantug’s son. Near the intersection, gunshots
were heard from the left side of the street. Major Carteciano took his .45 cal
pistol and fired. However, gunshots were fired in succession, and Major
Carteciano, his brother Francisco, Jose Bantug, and his wife Lorna were hit.
When the jeep stopped, several gunmen approached them. Then, Nunez shot
Major Carteciano’s head point blank. Then the gunmen hijacked another jeep
and took off. Lorna, her mother Juanita Ricaplaza, and her son Reiser
Carteciano positively identified the accused.
3. It is further contended that the accused appellant was deprived of his
constitutional right to counsel when he was subjected to a paraffin test
without the assistance of counsel.
4. Appellee is the People of the Philippines.
5. The court found that the conviction of accused appellant for the crimes
charged has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE Whether or not the accused appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to
counsel when he was subjected to a paraffin test without the assistance of counsel.
RULING No, the accused appellant was not deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.

The Constitution provides that any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.

In the case at bar, accused appellant’s reliance on his constitutional right to counsel at
the time he was given a paraffin test is misplaced for he was not then under custodial
investigation. The right to counsel is not required in a police lineup, inasmuch as
police lineup is not part of the custodial inquest.

Therefore, the accused appellant was not deprived of his constitutional right to
counsel.

.
FOOTNOTE 321
CASE TITLE People of the Philippines vs. Pacito Ordono
DATE June 29, 2000 GR No. 132154
PONENTE Per Curiam
FACTS 1. This case is on automatic review of the December 11, 1997 decision of the
RTC finding both accused Pacito Ordono and Apolonio Medina guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and imposing upon them two (2)
separate death penalties.
2. The records show that on August 5, 1994 the decomposing body of a young
girl was found among the bushes near a bridge in Brgy. Santol, La Union, who
three days before was reported missing. Unidentified sources pointed to
Pacito Ordono and Apolonio Medina as the authors of the crime. Acting on
this lead, the police thereupon invited the two (2) suspects and brought them
to the police station for questioning. However, for lack of evidence then
directly linking them to the crime, they were allowed to go home.
3. On August 10 1994, the accused Pacito Ordono and Apolonio Medina
returned to the police station one after another and acknowledged that they
had indeed committed the crime. Acting on their admission, the police
immediately conducted an investigation and put their confessions in writing,
the investigators however could not at once get the services of a lawyer to
assist the two (2) accused in the course of the investigation because there
were no practicing lawyers in the Municipality of Santol, a remote town of the
Province of La Union. Be that as it may, the statements of the two (2) accused
where nevertheless taken. But before doing so, both accused were apprised
in their own dialect of their constitutional right to remain silent and to be
assisted by a competent counsel of their choice. The investigation was
conducted with the presence of the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the
Chief of Police and other police officers of Santol, La Union, in attendance to
listen to and witness the giving of voluntary statements of the two (2)
suspects.
4. Appellee is the People of the Philippines
5. The December 11, 1997 judgment rendered by the RTC is hereby affirmed.

ISSUE Whether or not the constitutional right to counsel of Ordono and Medina were
violated.
RULING Yes, the constitutional right to counsel of Ordono and Medina were violated.

The Constitution provides that any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.

In the case at bar, the custodial investigation began when Ordono and Medina
voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station to confess and the investigating officer
started asking questions to elicit information and/or confession from them. At such
point, the right of the accused to counsel automatically attached to them. Despite the
presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor as well as the relatives of the
accused, this did not in any way cure the absence of a lawyer during the investigation.

Therefore, the constitutional right to counsel of Ordono and Medina were violated.

.
FOOTNOTE 322 NOT A CASE

FOOTNOTE 323
Case Title: People of the Philippines v. Carlos De La Cruz, G.R. Nos. 91865-66 & G.R.
Nos. 92439-40,224 SCRA 506
Date: July 6, 1993
Ponente: Justice Hilario Davide Jr.
Facts:
1. Petitioner: People of the Philippines.

2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner filed an information against accused-appellant; a

complaint for murder of Virgie Trangia and a complaint for rape of Blessi Marie
Veri her daughter.

3. Accused-appellant allegedly raped Blessi Marie Veri in her home and for the
killing of Virgie Trangia. Furthermore, during investigation at the police station
accused allegedly volunteered the information that he buried his wife along the
seashore.

4. Accused- appellant is Carlos De La Cruz, the live-in partner of Virgie Trangia the
victim.

5. Act of Respondent: The accused raised the defense of alibi. He claimed that he has
no knowledge of the cases filed against him but was arrested and detained and was
made to confess to the killing of his live-in partner Virgie Trangia.
Issue: Whether or not, the accused’s alleged admission that he killed Virgie Trangia is
inadmissible as evidence.
Ruling:
Yes, the accused’s alleged admission that he killed Virgie Trangia is inadmissible as
evidence.
The Constitution provides that any person under an investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have a
competent and independent counsel. If the person cannot afford the services of a counsel
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of a counsel.
In the instance case, the accused was not informed of his right to remain silent and to
counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be provided
with one.
Thus, the accused’s alleged admission that he killed Virgie Trangia is inadmissible as
evidence.
Page: 125 Paragraph: 1
Notes: SC decision : Accused appellants was acquitted from the crime of homicide but
was convicted of the crime of rape with modification.
FOOTNOTE 324

CASE People V. Bagnate

TITLE
DATE May 20, 2004, G.R No. 133685-86
PONENTE
FACTS 1. Appellant: AMADO BAGNATE

2. Action of the Appellant:

When arraigned on December 1, 1997, Bagnate pleaded not guilty to both
charges against him,4 and joint trial on the merits ensued.

3. Subject/Object :
Appellant repudiated his extra-judicial confession before the trial court and
assailed its admissibility alleging that it was executed in violation of his
constitutional rights, particularly his right to a competent and independent
counsel of his own choice; and that he was not fully apprised of the
consequences of his confession. He testified that the real perpetrators of the
crime were his brother-in-law, Roberto Angeles, and a certain Carlito Begil,
and that he was only forced into owning up to the crimes because Angeles
threatened to harm him or his sister, Angeless wife, if he did not do so.

(Additional Info: Atty. Brotamonte failed to apprise appellant of the

imposable penalty of the crimes he was to admit. This gives ground for the
appellant to claim that his constitutional right to have a competent and
independent counsel was violated.)

4 Appellee: People of the Philippines

5. Actions of Respondents:
Before the onset of the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte privately conferred
with appellant to ascertain the voluntariness of his confession and to make
sure that no force or duress was employed by the police authorities on the
latter to make him admit the crimes charged. He informed appellant of his
constitutional rights and was clear in explaining to him the questions
propounded by SPO2 Ambion.
Since the appellant have no counsel of his choice, the investigator provided a
competent counsel for the appellant in the name of Atty. Paterno Brotamonte
in which the appellant agree. The investigator again reminded the appellant
that anything he say in the investigation may be used in favor or against him
in any court proceedings in the entire Philippines.

ISSUE 1. WON the appellants constitutional right to remain silent, or, without
having been given competent and independent counsel, preferably his
own choice, or if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he was not
provided with one; or the waiver of his rights was not in writing and
not in the presence of counsel was violated.
2. WON the appellant extrajudicial confession is an inadmissible
evidence
RULING No. the appellants constitutional right to remain silent, or, without
having been given competent and independent counsel, preferably his
own choice, or if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he was not
provided with one; or the waiver of his rights was not in writing and
not in the presence of counsel was violated and the appellants
extrajudicial confession is an admissible evidence.
The constitution provides that any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
 (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or

hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

In the case at bar, the appellants counsel was able to state thehis
constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel. Clearly the counsel is
competent and independent since he was able to safeguard the constitutional right.
It contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just
the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle. The appellant confession was  vitiated by his free will and it was
obtain without violence. There is also nothing in the Constitution that mandates a
counsel to inform an accused of the possible penalty for the crime he committed.
Neither would a presumption arise that the counsel is incompetent or not
independent just because he failed to apprise the accused that the imposable penalty
for the crime he was about to admit is death. After all, the imposable penalty is
totally immaterial to the resolve of an accused to admit his guilt in the commission
of a crime.
Hence, there is no violation of the appellants constitutional right to remain
silent, or, without having been given competent and independent counsel,
preferably his own choice, or if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he
was not provided with one; or the waiver of his rights was not in writing and
not in the presence of counsel and the appellants extrajudicial confession is
an admissible evidence.
FOOTNOTE 325
People of the Philippines v. ALEJANDRO LUCERO, GR No. 97936 (May 29, 1995)
Ponente: Justice Reynato Puno
FACTS:
1. Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe,
Richard Doe, and John Doe were charged with the crime of Robbery with
homicide against Dr. Demetrio Z. Madrid, complainant;
2. During the trial, it was found out that Lucero had no lawyer/counsel
during his custodial investigation in Investigation Department of
Central Intelligence Service. The CIS provided Atty. Peralta as his
counsel;
3. When the investigators started asking the preliminary questions, Atty.
Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend. The next day, Atty.
Peralta came to see for the Lucero’s signature to be ascribed and to
explain the legal implication of Lucero’s investigation;
4. In decision handed by the trial court, Lucero was convicted but the
rest of his co-accused were acquitted. The court declared that he had
direct participation with the crime of robbery with homicide. Meted
with a penalty of reclusion perpetua, he appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the constitutional right to counsel by Lucero has been
violated?
HELD:
Yes, the constitutional right to a counsel by Lucero was violated.
The constitution provides that free access to the courts and quasi-
judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to
any person by reason of poverty.
In the case at bar, Lucero was only given a counsel but he was not
afforded his constitutional rights. The counsel must be effective and
vigilant. He was denied of his right when the counsel left the
appellant to the custody of the CIS during the actual investigation and
returned a day after to witness the signing and to explain the legal
implication of Lucero’s statements.
Thus, Lucero’s constitutional rights were grossly violated.
FOOTNOTE 326
People of the Philippines v. EDWIN MORIAL and LEONARDO MORIAL (Aug. 15, 2001)
Ponente: Per curiam
(Latin for "by the court." An opinion from an appellate court that
does not identify any specific judge who may have written the opinion.
See Legal Information Institute.)
FACTS:
1. Petitioners were sentenced to death by RTC of Southern Leyte for
Robbery with Homicide. Paula Bandibas was seen pleading for her life.
She was slapped by Nonelito Abiñon and was stabbed to death by Edwin
Morial. Situated near the incident, Leonardo Morial just stood outside
their house. Prosecution eye witness Gabriel Guilao witnessed the said
killing.
2. The police found Edwin and Leonardo Morial in the house of Nonelito
Abiñon. They were invited to come to the police station where they were
turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez. An extra-judicial confession was
to be extracted from Leonardo Morial.
3. Upon confession, it was learnt that Leonardo Morial did not have any
counsel and was provided one by police investigators. Atty. Tobias
Aguilar came to the police station. The initial investigation started
where material questions were raised, then Atty. Aguilar left for some
important reason. He asked the accused if it would be alright for him
to answer the questions without him, to which the accused conceded.
Atty. Aguilar then instructed the police investigators to come to his
office after their interrogation. When they came to the counsel’s
office, Leonardo was read again by Atty. Aguilar about the legal
implications of his confession. He signed the document, then Atty.
Aguilar notarized the confession.
4. Upon trial, Leonardo disclosed that he was beaten by police
investigators to extract confession from him, impugning Nonelito Abiñon
and Edwin Morial. He also confessed that he was not physically examined
by Atty. Aguilar and was coerced by the police that his statements in
his extra-judicial confession were all true or else he will suffer
torment.
5. Prosecution presented witnesses to belie the statements made by
Leonardo.

ISSUE:
Whether the constitutional right to competent counsel by Leonardo
Morial has been violated?
HELD:
Yes, the constitutional right to a competent counsel by Leonardo Morial
was violated.
The constitution provides that free access to the courts and quasi-
judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to
any person by reason of poverty.
In the case at bar, Atty. Aguilar left the accused for some important
matter after the “material” points of the investigation had been
complied. A counsel should be present during the entire investigation,
especially when the investigation goes from general inquiry to
incriminating line of questioning. Such vigilance from the counsel is
required by the constitution to prevent the extraction of false
confession by slightest coercion.
Thus, the constitutional right of the accused, Leonardo Morial, to a
competent counsel was grossly violated.
FOOTNOTE 327

CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.RUFINO MIRANDILLA BERMAS, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 120420
DATE April 21, 1999

PONENTE VITUG, J.

FACTS 1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

2. Action of the plaintiff-appellee
The plaintiff-appellee filed a complaint for the crime of rape to appellant Rufino
Bermas
(That on or about the 3rd day of August 1994, Rufino Mirandilla Bermas while
armed with a knife and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
complainant against her will).1

3.Object/Subject:
Evidence was adduced during trial by the parties at the conclusion of which
the lower court, presided over by Hon. Amelita G. Tolentino, rendered its
decision, dated 02 May 1995, finding the accused guilty of the offense charged
and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
4. RUFINO MIRANDILLA BERMAS, accused-appellant.
5. Action of the Accused-appellant:

Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty before the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, Branch 274, Metro Manila, to the crime of rape under a criminal
complaint. The accused told the Court that in charging him of the crime of
rape, the complainant might have been motivated by ill-will or revenge in view
of the numerous scoldings that she has received from him on account of her
frequent coming home late at night. The accused stressed that he knew of no
other reason as to why his daughter, the complainant, would ever charge him
of the crime of rape except probably in retaliation for being admonished by him
whenever she comes home late in the night.

Additional Facts:

Defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva (in collaboration with the

Anti-Death Penalty Task Force), detailed several errors allegedly committed by
the court a quo; thus: 1. The trial court did not observe the correct selection
process in appointing the accused's counsel de officio;
2. The Public Attorney could not give justice to the accused; ( Attys. Rosa
Elmina Villamin)
The first counsel of the accused ask to court to relieve her as counsel de
officio because she could not also give justice to the accused .

3. The Vanishing Second Counsel de Officio. (Roberto Gomez)

Has repeatedly failed to appear in the Court.

4. The Reluctant Third Counsel de Officio(Nicanor Lonzame)

On hearing scheduled for that day was reset to 16 January 1995 upon the
request of Atty. Lonzame. On even date, Atty. Lonzame himself asked to be
relieved as counsel de officio but later, albeit reluctantly, retracted.

ISSUE WHETHER THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

TO EFFECTIVE AND COMPETENT COUNSEL.
RULING Yes, the accussed was denied by his constitutional right to have an effective
and competent counsel.
The Constitution states that any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
In the case at bar, the first counsel of the accused ask to court to relieve her
as counsel de officio because she could not also give justice to the accused.
The second Counsel de Officio also has repeatedly failed to appear in the
Court and the third counsel de officio on hearing scheduled for that day was
reset to 16 January 1995 upon the request of Atty. Lonzame. On even date,
Atty. Lonzame himself asked to be relieved as counsel de officio but later,
albeit reluctantly, retracted. The performance of all three counsels de
officio was ineffective and prejudicial to the accused.
If the counsel de officio fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused
results condemnation. Hence there is a violation of constitutional right to have
an effective and competent counsel.
FOOTNOTE 328
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AURELIO BANDULA y
LOPEZ, accused-appellant.The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Saleto J.
Erames for accused-appellant. G.R. No. 89223
DATE May 27, 1994
PONENTE BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS 1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee (Represented by The
Solicitor General)
2. Action of the Plaintiff-appellee :
The trial court considered the alleged confession of accused Bandula that after the
incident he gave his .38 cal. revolver for safekeeping to Jovito Marimat, Jr.,
from whom three handguns were recovered by the police, i.e., a .38 cal.
revolver with four (4) live ammunitions and one (1) empty shell, a .22 cal.
"paltik" revolver, and a revolver with M16 bullets. It likewise took into account
the supposed admission of accused Victoriano Ejan that he kept a 12-gauge
Winchester shotgun, a tape recorder, a bayonet and a pair of binoculars in the
house of his relative Emilio Rendora who was found to have the goods in his
possession. The court also noted that a sum of money suspected to be part of
the loot was recovered from accused Pantaleon Sedigo.
3.Object/Subject:
Admitted also in evidence were the alleged extrajudicial confessions of accused
Bandula and Dionanao that they were merely forced to participate in the
commission of the crime by "Boy Tall" and "Boy Short." "These extrajudicial
confessions made by accused Teofilo Dionanao and Aurelio Bandula
extracted during custodial investigation," the trial court ruled, "have all the
qualities and have complied with all the requirements of an admissible
confession, it appearing from the confession itself that accused were informed
of their rights under the law regarding custodial investigation and were duly
represented by counsel (Atty. Ruben Zerna)."
4. AURELIO BANDULA y LOPEZ, accused-appellant
5. Action of the Accused-appellant:
Appellant Bandula argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused
Dionanao executed suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in
evidence considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation,
and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by the
nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of
their choice. Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the
prosecution is left without sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime
charged.
ISSUES 1. Whether the accused-appellant was deprived to have an independent
counsel preferably of his own choice during the extrajudicial
confessions
2. Whether the investigators violates paragraph 2 of Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution.
(No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited).
RULING Yes, the accused-appellant was deprived to have an independent counsel
preferably of his own choice during the extrajudicial confessions and the
investigators violates paragraph 2 of Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution.
The Constitution provides that any person under investigation for an
commission of an offense shall have the right to have an independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. It also states that n o torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
In the case at bar, the admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without
the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence
of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. The Constitution also requires
that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel, public or
private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted accused
Dionanao and Bandula when they executed their respective extrajudicial
confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence considering that
Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the
municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the
municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including
the maintenance of peace and order. It is thus seriously doubted whether he can
effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of
interests. Based on the records, we are strongly drawn to the belief that violence
indeed attended the extraction of statements from the accused since the accused
get his "black eye" which even
Pat. Baldejera admitted and also suffer a fractured rib.
Therefore since Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel and the
mere fact that the accused appellant have a black eye and broken ribs after the
interrogation it its clear that the accused-appellant was deprived to have an
independent counsel preferably of his own choice and during the the
extrajudicial confessions torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation was use the
accused-appellant was deprived to have an independent counsel preferably of
his own choice during the extrajudicial confessions and the investigators
violates paragraph 2 of Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution.
FOOTNOTE 329
CASE TITLE People vs. Januario, 267 SCRA 608, G.R. No. 98252
DATE February 07, 1997
PONENTE Justice Artemio Panganiban
FACTS 1.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

2. The NBI team took the statements of appellant’s one at a time with the
help of Atty. Carlos Saunar. In convicting accused-appellants, the trial
court relied upon the extrajudicial confessions of the accused, extracted
and signed in the presence and with the assistance
of a lawyer, Atty. Saunar, who was applying for work in the NBI.

3. Subject/Object: Accused-appellants Rene Januario and Efren Canape,

together with their co-accused were charged with violation of Republic
Act No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Law) for stealing one Isuzu passenger
type jeepney after killing its driver and conductor.

4. RENE JANUARIO y ROLDAN, EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, ELISEO SARITA @

TOTO, EDUARDO SARINOS and SANTIAGO CID, accused.
RENE JANUARIO Y ROLDAN and EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, accused-
appellants.

5. Counsels for appellants alleged that the extra-judicial confessions of the

appellants are inadmissible in evidence for having been extracted in
violation of their constitutional right to counsel. The appellants contend
that the trial court erred in allowing the presentation of Saunar as a
witness after the prosecution had closed its case and offered its
documentary evidence.

ISSUE Whether or not accused constitutional right to counsel was violated.

RULING Yes, the accused constitutional right to counsel was violated.

Section 12 of Art. III of the Constitution states that any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

In the case at bar, the counsel who assisted the accused during the custodial
investigation conducted by the NBI was an applicant for employment with
NBI and even joined their office a few months later.

Therefore, the accused constitutional right to counsel was violated.

FOOTNOTE 330

CASE TITLE People v Velarde, G.r no. 139933

DATE   July 18,2002

PONENTE Justice Artemio Panganiban

FACTS 1. CRISPIN VELARDE y BANDOJO, appellant

2. Velarde was found guilty of rape with homicide by theRTC of Malolos

Bulacan and was sentenced to death. Hence,automatic review by SC.
3.  Petitioner avers the trial court erred in relying merely on the weight and
sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution
and the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession of the accused
contained in his Sworn Statement made before the police authorities of
Malolos.
4. People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee

5.Bulacan and that the trial court erred in finding and declaring that there
was nothing irregular or objectionable in Atty. Domingo's
representation who is a lawyer of good standing and being the local
chief executive of Malolos, Bulacan, to serve as counsel for the accused

ISSUE Whether or not Mayor Domingo can be considered as an independent

counsel?

RULING No, Mayor Domingo cannot be considered as an independent counsel.

Constitution provides that any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice.

In the case at bar,  Atty. Domingo cannot be considered as

an independent counsel. He was the mayor of Malolos at the time. As such,
he exercised "operational supervision and control" over the PNP unit in that
municipality. His powers included the utilization of the elements thereof for
the maintenance of peace and order, the prevention of crimes, the arrest of
criminal offenders and the bringing of offenders to justice. Serving as counsel
of appellant placed him in direct conflict with his duty of "operational
supervision and control" over the police. "What the Constitution requires in
Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence of competent and independent
counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client's defense without any
intervening conflict of interest." 20 Evidently Atty. Domingo, being the mayor
of the place where the investigation was taken, could not act as counsel,
independent or otherwise, of appellant.
Therefore, Mayor Domingo cannot be considered as an independent counsel.
FOOTNOTE 331
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v Elias Barasina y Layneza
DATE January 21, 1994; G.R. No. 109993
PONENTE Justice Jose Melo
FACTS 1. Accused-appellant is Elias Barasina y Layneza. He was charged with and
convicted of the murder of Fiscal Lino Mayor of Olongapo City and for the
unlicensed .45 caliber handgun used to gun down the fiscal.
2. Appellant questioned the manner the extrajudicial confession and waiver
were extracted. He averred that he procured the services of one Atty.
Mendoza but it turned out that it was Atty. Torres who assisted him upon
the directive of Police Lt. Surara.
3. Subject/Object: Appellant contended that the extrajudicial statement
cannot be utilized against him for want of competent, independent
counsel of his own choice.
4. Plaintiff-appellee is the State.
5. Appellee, through the solicitor general, disputed that there was no
indication that accused-appellant did in fact choose Atty. Mendoza to
assist him while in the process of offering the inculpatory statements to
the exlusion of other lawyers.
Whether or not the phrase “preferably of his own choice” conveys the
ISSUE message that the choice of a lawyer is exclusive.

RULING No, the phrase “preferably of his own choice” does not convey the message
that the choice of a lawyer is exclusive.

Under the Constitution, any person under investigation shall have the right to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.

In the present case, during the custodial investigation, the appellant failed to
indicate in any manner that he wishes to consult with an attorney of his own
preference before giving any statement. Indeed, there is no showing that he
manifested any resistance when he was assisted by Atty. Torres. Withal, the
word “preferably” does not convey exclusivity precluding other equally
competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule
were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in
the hands of the accused who can impede, nay obstruct the progress of the
interrogation by simply selecting lawyer who for one reason or another, is not
available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been
contemplated by the framers of the charter.

Hence, the phrase “preferably of his own choice” does not convey the
message that the choice of a lawyer is exclusive.
Footnote 332
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RIZAL ESPIRITU y
Case Title
KINAO, accused-appellant.
Date February 2, 1999; G.R. No. 128287
Ponente Justice Artemio Panganiban
1. Rizal Espiritu y Kinao, accused-appellant.

2. Rizal Espiritu y Kinao appeals the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 6, Baguio City, convicting him of murder.

3. The right to counsel does not mean that the accused must personally
hire his own counsel.— At the outset, the Court clariied that the right to
counsel does not mean that the accused must personally hire his own
counsel. The constitutional requirement is satisfied when a counsel is (1)
engaged by anyone acting on behalf of the person under investigation or
(2) appointed by the court upon petition of the said person or by someone
on his behalf. Thus, that Atty. Mangallay was retained not by the appellant
personally but by his uncle, Alfredo Kinao, is not proof of counsel
deprivation. The fact remains that Kinao, in hiring the counsel, acted on
behalf of Appellant Espiritu. Besides, Espiritu did not object when Atty.
Facts
Mangallay represented him during the investigations before the police and
the city prosecutor. In fact, he expressly acknowledged Atty. Mangallay as
his counsel.

4. People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee.

5. The trial court convicted Espiritu on the basis of his confession and
corroborating evidence of corpus delicti. The confession was admitted in
evidence, because the Court believed that the appellant voluntarily
executed it while being assisted by a competent and independent
counsel. Further, during the investigation conducted by Assistant
Prosecutor Romeo Carbonell, Espiritu affirmed that he had voluntarily
executed the extrajudicial confession before the police, and he even
reenacted how Sanad was killed.

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in admitting evidence the
Issue uncounselled extra-judicial confession of the accused-appellant.

Ruling No. The trial court did not gravely erred in admitting evidence the
uncounselled extra-judicial confession of the accused-appellant.

The Constitution provides that if the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one.

In the present case, appellant invokes paragraphs 1 and 3 of Section 12,

Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He insists that his confession was
obtained in violation of his rights (1) to have an independent and
competent counsel and (2) to be informed of such right. Further, he
argues that he was not advised by Atty. Mangallay of the consequences
of the execution of a confession. On the other hand, the defense contends
that Atty. Mangallay was retained by Alfredo Kinao and not by appellant. It
is also argued that the said lawyer was unable to advise or to explain the
contents of the extrajudicial confession to the appellant before the latter
signed it. The Court clarified that the right to counsel does not mean that
the accused must personally hire his own counsel. The competent or
independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to
end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution
reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the
interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he
may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.
The assistance rendered to appellant by Atty. Mangallay met the
standards that had been set in Deniega for the purpose of safeguarding
the right of the accused against involuntary confession. The counsel was
vigilant in informing Espiritu of his rights. He was clear in explaining to his
client every question propounded by the investigating officer. And he was
not negligent in relating to the appellant the legal consequences of the
latter's extrajudicial confession.

Therefore, the trial court gravely erred in admitting evidence the

uncounselled extra-judicial confession of the accused-appellant.
FOOTNOTE 333
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EFREN JEREZ
DATE January 29, 1998; G.R. No. 114385

PONENTE Flerida Ruth Romero

FACTS 1. Petitioner/s: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

2. Action of Petitioner: the appellant was given another lawyer since his
counsel of choice would not be available as he is due to depart for
Manila on the same day at the time the extrajudicial confession was
executed.

3. Subject/Object: Respondent along with three other accused were alleged

to have killed and stolen from the seller of carabaos they posed to be
interested in purchasing and was then charged with robbery and double
homicide.

4. Respondents: EFREN JEREZ

5. Action of Respondent/s: Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it
denied his right to have an independent counsel of his own choice.

ISSUE Whether or not the trial court erred when it denied his right to have an
independent counsel of his own choice.

RULING NO. He agreed to the substitute.

According to Art. III, Section 12 of the Constitution, (1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado,
or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and
civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

In the case at bar, a lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged

by the accused where he never raised any objection against the formers
appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing
officer.

Therefore, appellant’s constitutional right to counsel was not breached when

he agreed to be represented by Atty. Scheider.
FOOTNOTE 334
CASE TITLE: People vs Alberto, G.R. No. 132374.
DATE: August 22, 2002
PONENTE: Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing

FACTS:

1. Plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

2. Teresa Semic was robbed, attacked, and stabbed by one Lucio Alberto y Danao on or about the 18th
day of October 1993 at about 7:30 o’clock in the evening at Barangay Gandiangan, Municipality of
Imelda, Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines.

3. Teresa Semic thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused her death immediately
thereafter.

4. Accused-appellant: LUCIO ALBERTO y DANAO

5. Accused-appellant Lucio Alberto was charged of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
In the police station, accused-appellant brought with him a bag which inside was a pair of short pants
with bloodstain near the zipper, a bandana, and a medallion necklace. He was then asked to take off his
shoes wherein an envelope was found containing P950 in different blood-stained denominations. .
ATTY. PACIFICO T. CIMAFRANCA, of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), testified that he assisted
appellant at the time he executed his extrajudicial confession on January 14, 1994. He identified said
extrajudicial confession which was placed into the record of the trial by the court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession was admissible against the appellant.

RULING:
No. The extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against the appellant.
Under the Constitution, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
In the case at bar, the assistance rendered by Atty. Cimafranca during the custodial investigation
failed to meet the exacting tests. It is essential that the person making the confession must be assisted
by a “competent” counsel. The lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as
reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer, were one
furnished in the accused’s behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e.,
that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one
who would be merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual’s
constitutional rights.
Thus, the so-called extrajudicial confession of appellant is inadmissible as evidence for the
prosecution.
FOOTNOTE 335
CASE TITLE People v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289
DATE October 31, 1919
PONENTE Justice Johnson
FACTS 1. Petitioner: The petitioner is People of the Philippines represented by the
Drug Enforcement Unit Police Station No. 5, Western Police District.
2. Action of Petitioner: The Drug Enforcement Unit of Police Station No. 5,
Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force, Manila, received
complaints from concerned citizens regarding the illegal sale of
prohibited drugs by one alias 'Nel' in the Commodore Pension House at
Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila. lt was also informed that the use of
prohibited drugs in said place was rampant.
3. Subject/Object: According to Pat. Joves, he informed appellant of her
constitutional rights when she was under custodial investigation. What
specific rights he mentioned to appellant, he did not say. Neither did he
state the manner in which the appellant was advised of her
constitutional rights so as to make her understand them.
4. Respondents: The respondent is Nelia Nicandro y Velarma.
5. Action of Respondents: The said respondent, not having been authorized
by law to sell deliver, give away to another or distribute any prohibited
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly sell or offer
for sale four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarettes, marijuana flowering tops
wrapped in a piece of newspaper, one (1) roach marijuana cigarette and
marijuana seeds and ashes contained in a white plastic bag, which are
prohibited drugs.

ISSUE Whether or not there was a violation of the accused constitutional rights to
be informed of her rights?

RULING Yes, there was a violation of the accused constitutional rights to be informed
of his rights.

The Constitution provides that, any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.

In the instant case, the Constitution requires a person under investigation “to
be informed” of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed
to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just
the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle. The arresting police officer is not only duty-bound to tell the person
the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in
practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do,
and in a language the subject fairly understands. 

Therefore, there was a violation of the accused constitutional rights to be

informed of his rights.
FOOTNOTE 336
CASE TITLE: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
vs.
EDGARDO CANELA Y ARANETA, respondent
DATE: May 8, 1992 G.R. No. 97086
PONENTE: Justice Rodolfo A. Nocon
FACTS:
1. Petitioner: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
2. Acting on an information that a certain Edgar was peddling marijuana at the corner of Claro
M. Recto St., Lucena City, a team of Narcotics Command (hereinafter referred to as NARCOM)
agents composed of Sgts. Dominador Cruz, Elpidio Anasta, Ramoncito Yeban and Iluminado
Evangelista was formed to conduct a "buy-bust" operation on May 17, 1988.
3. A mission order was accordingly issued by Captain Rodolfo Basco of the Quezon NARCOM
wherein Sgt. Dominador Cruz was to act as a poseur-buyer. A dragnet was set up where a team
was deployed at different strategic places near the Supreme Transit Terminal where the intended
sale was to take place.
4. Respondent: EDGARDO CANELA Y ARANETA, 
5. On May 17, 1988, respondent went to the billiard hall fronting the Supreme Transit bus
terminal along C.M. Recto in Lucena City for a meeting with his business partner Antonio
Guevarra, which had been scheduled previously. Respondent arrived early for the meeting, he sat
on the long bench on the site of the billard hall where two persons were already seated to his
right. As the unidentified person ran past the latter, the former dropped the folded money and
two (2) articles wrapped in a plastic bag at or near the respondent’s feet, or approximately less
than a foot away. Respondent then reasoned to the agents that the marijuana was not passed to
him but instead dropped by the unidentified person, and that the same was picked up by Angeles.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arresting officers had violated respondent’s rights when they failed to inform
of his rights as mandated by that Constitution?
Yes, the arresting officers had violated the respondent’s rights when they failed to inform of his
rights as mandated by that Constitution.
Under the constitution, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right, to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
In the instant case, there is no showing that respondent was properly informed of his
constitutional rights. While Sgt. Atienza claimed that he informed the accused-appellant of his
constitutional rights when he prepared the booking sheet and arrest report, a perusal of said
document failed to show that accused-appellant was informed of said rights. And this was
eventually admitted by Sgt. Atienza on cross-examination. Not only did he not inform accused-
appellant of his rights, he also failed to explain said rights to him. He simply made the accused
read the same. The failure of the arresting officers to follow established procedure in dealing
with persons they, may have arrested engenders doubts as to the veracity of their claim that they
arrested the respondent after he had tried to sell them marijuana.
Therefore, arresting officers had violated respondent’s rights when they failed to inform of his
rights as mandated by that Constitution.
FOOTNOTE 337
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN,
WILFREDO "SONNY QUIAÑO, MANUEL "JUN" ABENOJA, JR., and
FREDDIE "BOY" CARTEL, accused. JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN
DATE
PONENTE
FACTS 1. Accused-appellant:
JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, WILFREDO "SONNY QUIAÑO,
MANUEL "JUN" ABENOJA, JR., and FREDDIE "BOY"
CARTEL, accused. JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, accused-appellant

2. He argues that the lawyer who assisted him, Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, was
not of his own choice but was foisted upon him by the city Fiscal. Worse,
the said lawyer is a law partner of the private prosecutor, Atty. Arthur
Galace, and conferred with him in English and Tagalog although he
understood only Ilocano. Moreover, when Atty. Cajucom briefly
conferred with him and when the city Fiscal interrogated him, his
military escorts were present.

3. Subject/Object:
It is at once observed that the appellant was not explicitly told of his right
to have a competent and independent counsel of his choice, specifically
asked if he had in mind any such counsel and, if so, whether he could
afford to hire his services, and, if he could not, whether he would agree
to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not categorically
informed that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel
and that this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel.
He had, in fact, waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be
investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such right appears in the
transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to prove its
existence.

4. Plaintiff- appellee : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

5. Upon these premises, the accused Jaime Agustin is found GUILTY of two
(2) counts of murder, the prosecution having proven his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In each of the criminal cases aforesaid, he should be
sentenced to the maximum penalty of Death, there being two
aggravating circumstances. However, since the death penalty is not
imposable at this time, the accused is sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua.
He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victims; Anna
Theresa Francisco the sum of sixty Three Thousand Pesos (P63,000.00)
as actual damages (Exhibits "F," "I" and "G"); and Dr. Napoleon
Bayquen, the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). With costs
against the accused, Jaime Agustin.
ISSUE 1. Whether or not accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements admissible
as evidence?

2. Whether or not the accused-appellants right to have an independent

counsel preferably of his own choice was violated?

RULING 1. No. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession and is not

admissible as evidence.
The constitution provides that any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.

In the case at bar, the extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in

twenty-two pages appear to be signed by him and Atty. Cajucom but for
reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of the notes which
consists of twelve pages was not signed by the appellant. Since the court
cannot even read or decipher the stenographic notes it cannot be expected
that appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to
read or decipher its contents. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of
guilt of the accused, while an admission is a statement direct or implied of
facts pertinent to the issue. The rule on inadmissibility, however expressly
includes admissions, not just confessions.

Therefore, the accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements is not an

admissible as evidence.

2. Yes, the accused-appellants right to have an independent counsel

preferably of his own choice was violated.

The Constitution states that any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

In the case at bar, he was not fully and properly informed of his rights.
The appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have a competent
and independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had in
mind any such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his
services, and, if he could not, whether he would agree to be assisted by
one to be provided for him. He was not categorically informed that he
could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this
waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in
fact, waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated.
Yet, no written waiver of such right appears in the transcript and no
other independent evidence was offered to prove its existence. In short,
after the appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the
City fiscal, through suggestive language, immediately informed him
that Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him. Moreso said counsel is not
independent since he is an associate of the private prosecutor.

Therefore, the accused appellants right to have an independent counsel

preferably of his own choice was violated.
Footnote 338
Case Title PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. AMADO BAGNATE, appellant.
Date May 20, 2004; G.R. No. 133685-86
Ponente Per Curiam
1. Amado Bagnate, appellant.

2. Appellant repudiated his extra-judicial confession before the trial court and
assailed its admissibility alleging that it was executed in violation of his
constitutional rights, particularly his right to a competent and independent
counsel of his own choice; and that he was not fully apprised of the
consequences of his confession. He testified that the real perpetrators of the
crime were his brother-in-law, Roberto Angeles, and a certain Carlito Begil, and
that he was only forced into owning up to the crimes because Angeles
threatened to harm him or his sister, Angeles’s wife, if he did not do so.

3. The main issue in this case is the admissibility of appellant’s confession.

Appellant claims that Atty. Brotamonte was not a competent and independent
counsel as he failed to advise him of the penalty to be imposed on the crimes he
Facts
was accused of committing; hence, he was not aware of the consequences of
his admissions.

4. People of the Philippines, appellee

5. The confession of appellant being admissible in evidence and corroborated by

evidence of corpus delicti, the trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder and Rape with Homicide.

In imposing the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No. T-2874, the trial
court considered the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, treachery,
superior strength, and disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of
age and sex, as alleged in the Information, thus qualifying the killing of Aurea to
murder.
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial
Issue
confession of the accused-appellant.
No. The trial court did not erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial
confession of the accused-appellant.

The Constitution provides that any confession or admission obtained in violation

of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

In the present case, the main issue in this case is the admissibility of appellant’s
confession. To be admissible in evidence, an extra-judicial confession must be
express and voluntarily executed in writing with the assistance of an
independent and competent counsel, and a person under custodial investigation
must be continuously assisted by counsel from the very start thereof. The
presence of counsel is intended to secure the voluntariness of the extra-judicial
Ruling confession, and the assistance given must be independent and competent, that
is, providing full protection to the constitutional rights of the accused. The
assistance rendered by Atty. Brotamonte is more than perfunctory. Before the
onset of the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte privately conferred with appellant to
ascertain the voluntariness of his confession and to make sure that no force or
duress was employed by the police authorities on the latter to make him admit
the crimes charged. He informed appellant of his constitutional rights and was
clear in explaining to him the questions propounded by SPO2 Ambion. The
testimony of Atty. Brotamonte during cross-examination leaves no room for
doubt that he adequately assisted appellant during the investigation

Therefore, the trial court did not erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial
confession of the accused-appellant.
FOOTNOTE 339

CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NICOMEDES FABRO, FRANCISCO DIMALANTA, AMADO ALCALA, WILLIAM
HOGE and "JOHN DOE," accused, NICOMEDES FABRO, accused-appellant.
DATE August 11, 1997
PONENTE Justice Artemio Panganiban
FACTS 1. Plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

2. The Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72 in Crim. Case No.
364-87, find the accused guilty of the murder of Dionisio Joaquin
through a gunshot perpetrated by NICOMEDES FABRO and in
conspiracy with FRANCISCO DIMALANTA, AMADO ALCALA, WILLIAM
HOGE et al. thereby sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.

3. Subject/Object: The admissibility of NICOMEDES FABRO's confession as to

the death of Dionisio Joaquin.

4. Accused-appellant: Only the appeal of NICOMEDES FABRO as Dimalanta

and Alcala jumped bail.

5. The defense maintains FABRO's confession as inadmissible for the following

reasons:
a. Appellant's confession was extracted under threat and intimidation;

b. The lawyer's (Atty. Jungco's) participation was only as a witness during

the signing of the prepared confession and not during the investigation
or interrogation itself; and

c. Appellant was made to sign the confession without having read it and
without the presence of counsel.

Whether or not appellant's confession is admissible in evidence against him.

ISSUE
Yes. Appellant's confession is admissible in evidence against him.
RULING
Constitution dictates that any confession or admission obtained in
violation of Section 12 par (1) or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

In the case at bar, appellant has miserably failed to present any convincing
evidence to prove the use of force or intimidation on his person to secure his
confession. Further, the records show that appellant's confession was sworn
and subscribed to before Fiscal Jesus Dorante, to whom he could have and
should have voiced his objection. That the appellant's failure to voice out his
complaints is tantamount to a manifestation that indeed he waived his right
to counsel in the presence of Atty. Jungco in accordance with the
Constitution.

Therefore, satisfying the constitutional requirements appellant's

confession is admissible in evidence against him.
FOOTNOTE 340

CASE TITLE THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO @ PUKE, accused-appellant.

DATE  May 9, 2002

PONENTE Per Curiam
FACTS 1. Plaintiff-appellee: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

2. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, sentenced Gerrico Vallejo
y Samartino to death by rape-slaying a 9-year old child, Daisy Diolola, in
Rosario, Cavite and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim.

3. Subject/Object: The admissibility of GERRICO VALLEJO's oral and extra

judicial confession.

4. Accused-appellant: GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO @ PUKE

5. Appellant contends the following:

a. That the trial court gravely errred in giving evidentiary weight to the
alleged oral confessions of the accused-appellant despite its being
hearsay in nature; and

b. That the trial court committed reversible error in giving probative value
to the written extra judicial confession of the accused-appellant despite
the fact that the same was obtained through force and intimidation.

ISSUE (1) Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in giving evidentiary weight to
the alleged oral confessions of the accused-appellant despite its being
hearsay in nature.
No. The trial court did not gravely erred in giving evidentiary weight to
RULING the alleged oral confessions of the accused-appellant despite its being
hearsay in nature.

Constitution dictates that any confession or admission obtained in

violation of Section 12 par (1) or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

In the case at bar, the testimony of Atty. Leyva is not only corroborated by
the testimony of Mayor Renato Abutan it is also confirmed by accused-
appellant manifesting the spontaneous, free, and voluntary admissions of the
latter's guilt.

Therefore, the trial court did not gravely erred in giving evidentiary
weight to the alleged oral confessions of the accused-appellant.

ISSUE (2) Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error in giving probative
value to the written extra judicial confession of the accused-appellant despite
the fact that the same was obtained through force and intimidation.

RULING No. The trial court did not commit a reversible error in giving probative
value to the written extra judicial confession of the accused-appellant despite
the fact that the same was obtained through force and intimidation.
 Constitution dictates that any confession or admission obtained in
violation of Section 12 par (1) or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

In the case at bar, accused-appellant's claim that he was tortured and

subjected to beatings by policemen in order to extract the said confession
from him is unsupported by any proof thereby sustaining his confession. Such
absence of conclusive evidence showing that the declarant's consent in
executing the same has been vitiated, appellant's extrajudicial confessions are
presumed to be voluntary and consequently admissible in evidence against
him.

Therefore, the trial court did not commit a reversible error in giving
probative value to the written extra judicial confession of the accused-
appellant despite the fact that the same was obtained through force and
intimidation.
Footnote 341

CASE TITLE: NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION VS. JUDGE RAMON B. REYES, A.M. No. MTJ-97-1120.
DATE: February 21, 2000
PONENTE: PER CURIAM

FACTS:

1. Complainant is the National Bureau of Investigation.

2. On November 12, 1996, barangay officials of Barangay Majuben, Mabini, Batangas, arrested Reynaldo
Magday, Rex Cordero and Primo Evangelista, who were caught using shabu, during a drug session. The
four were detained at the local police station and were charged of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.
3. On November 20, 1996, Nenita Dalangin, Marina Cordero, Nelia Evangelista, the mothers of the
accused, approached respondent to plead for the release of their sons. For the sum of 240,000.00, the
respondent allegedly promised to dismiss the case against all the accused. The amount was lowered to
15,000.00. Three days before the pay-off, the mothers reported the alleged extortion to the NBI. After
the mothers executed separate sworn statements, the NBI planned an entrapment. They marked the
money to be used and dusted it with fluorescent powder.
4. Respondent is Judge Ramon B. Reyes.
5. On the appointed date, respondent gave Evangelista a piece of yellow pad paper on which to write a
motion for reconsideration. Dalangin, on the other hand, was instructed to enter to enter the adjoining
latrine to place the envelope containing the marked money on top of a rag mop. The entrapment
ensued. The agents were unable to locate the envelope. Ultraviolet testing on respondent’s hands
yielded a negative result, although the rag mop handle showed traces of the fluorescent powder. Since
the agents were not armed with a search warrant, they instead asked respondent to accompany them
to the regional office. During the questioning, respondent confessed that he had taken the envelope
containing the marked money using a handkerchief and placed it inside his desk.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge was deprived of his right to counsel during the
investigation in the NBI Regional Office.

RULING:
No, respondent Judge was not deprived of his right to counsel during the investigation in the NBI
Regional Office.
Under the Constitution, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. However, the alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of
the accused while under custodial investigation is relevant and material only where an extrajudicial
confession or admission from the accused becomes the basis of his conviction.
In the case at bar, there is sufficient evidence on record, consisting principally of the testimonies
of the witnesses presented by complainant, to warrant the imposition of the property penalty on
respondent.
Hence, respondent’s claim for deprivation of his constitutional right to counsel during the
investigation is inadmissible.
FOOTNOTE 342
CASE TITLE People of the Philippines v Teodoro Bonola y Dela Cruz
DATE June 19, 1997; G.R. No. 116394
PONENTE Justice Reynato Puno
FACTS 1. Subject/Object: Subject of this petition is the extrajudicial confession of
the appellant which was obtained without the assistance of counsel and
the circumstantial evidence against him cannot support his conviction.
2. Accused-appellant is Teodoro Bonola y Dela Cruz. He was accused of and
eventually convicted of robbery with homicide by the RTC and sentenced
to suffer the penalty of death. He pleads for his acquittal on the ground of
his uncounselled confession.
5. Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He was mauled and forced
to admit his participation. He was tortured and confessed when he could
no longer take the maltreatment by the Marikina Police Station. He signed
the extrajudicial confession believing that it was for the purpose of
transferring him to the provincial jail as he does not know how to read.
4. Plaintiff-appellee is the State. The victims were spouses Flaviano and
Illuminada Justiniano who owned the cash and jewellery for a total of
₱63,500.00 and sustained multiple stab and hack wounds on different
parts of the bodies.
5. Jose Berania, one of the witnesses, positively identified appellant from a
police line-up as one of the three (3) men he saw near the house of the
victims several hours before the robbery-slaying incident. However, after
the trial, the RTC acquitted the other two accused who were also at large.

Whether or not the uncounselled extrajudicial confession is admissible.

ISSUE
RULING No, the uncounselled extrajudicial confession is not admissible.

Under the Constitution, any confession or admission obtained in violation of

Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is inadmissible.

In this case, and in light of the constitutional proscription, the Court holds
that appellant’s extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. The
doctrine on waiver of the rights of an accused to remain silent and to counsel
has evolved over the years that uncounselled confessions are inadmissible.
When the accused is not assisted by counsel, his statement, in
contemplation of the law, becomes “involuntary” even if it were otherwise
voluntary, in a technical sense. Appellant Bonola was immediately placed
under custodial investigation verbally admitting his complicity. His
incriminating statements were made without the presence and assistance
of counsel. What is sought to be avoided is “the evil of extorting from the
very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of
an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter
convict him.

The need for counsel is even more pronounced in this case. Appellant is 19
years old, unschooled, barely literate. He was a stranger to the niceties of
law, ignorant of the rituals of police investigation. It is difficult to believe he
made an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.

Hence, the uncounselled extrajudicial confession is not admissible.

FOOTNOTE 343
CASE TITLE People of the Philippines v Rey Bernardino y Molina
DATE January 28, 1991; G.R. No. 83810
PONENTE Justice Isagani Cruz

FACTS 1. Subject/Object: Subject of this petition is the verbal confession of the

accused-appellant which was made by the latter without properly being
informed of the Miranda rights.

2. Accused-appellant is Rey Bernardino y Molina. He was accused for selling

three (3) sticks of marijuana but denied the charge. He was the only
witness for the defense. He was convicted by the RTC and is asking the SC
for its reversal.

5. Appellant claimed that the trial court should not have given credence to
the prosecution’s evidence, in fact, his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. That there were many differences in the recollection of
details relating to the buy-bust incident.

4. Plaintiff-appellee is the State acting through the police officers of Marikina.

The police station received an informant’s telephone tip an acted on its
information.

5. Officers successfully conducted a buy-bust operation. During Patrolman

Balauitan’s testimony, he professed that the accused-appellant verbally
admitted the sale of the marijuana Patrolman Jocson which is the reason
why prosecution’s evidence should be given credence.

Whether or not confession made by the accused without being informed of

ISSUE Miranda rights is admissible.

RULING No, confession made by the accused without being informed of Miranda
rights is not admissible.

Under the Constitution, any confession or admission obtained in violation of

accused’s rights is inadmissible.

In the case at bench, verbal admission of the sale of marijuana to Jocson is

inadmissible as it is violative of accused’s constitutional right especially of his
not being properly informed. Nevertheless, even if that testimony was
discarded, the rest of the prosecution evidence still would suffice to sustain
Bernardino’s conviction. Minor matters do not impair the essential integrity
of the prosecution evidence as a whole that even without the confession, the
prosecution’s evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt against the
appellant.

Therefore, confession made by the accused without being informed of

Miranda rights is not admissible.
FOOTNOTE 344

CASE TITLE People v Morada, G.r. No. 129723

DATE   May 19,1999

PONENTE Justice Mendoza

FACTS 1. DANILO MORADA y TUMLOD, accused-appellant

2. Danilo Morada was charged, tried and convicted of the crime of murder
for the killing of one Jonalyn Navidad in the Municipality of Imus, Cavite.
The victim, Jonalyn Navidad, 17, was found, with several hack wounds
on the head, near a creek. "he was taken to the hospital, but she died
shortly after
3.  Accused- appellant his confession was not taken down into writing
allegedly because there was no available lawyer to assist accused-
appellant at that time Moradas defense, he testified that he had no
knowledge of the crime and interposed an alibi. He also assails
the admissibility of the police’s statement as to his “confession” saying
that he was beaten up to make him admit to the killing of Jonalyn
Navidad
4. People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee

5. The court convicted the ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER AND

SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF DEATH BASED ON
PURELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

ISSUE Whether or not the verbal confession of the accused to Barangay Captain is
admissible?

RULING No, the verbal confession to barangay captain is an inadmissible.

Constitution provides that any confession or admission obtained in violation

of this or Sec.17 hereof shall ne inadmissible in evidence against him.

In the case at bar, It would appear that Barangay Captain Manimbao's

conversation with accused-appellant was part of the then ongoing police
investigation. In fact, he said it as SPO3 Gomez who told him about the
alleged desire of accused-appellant to see him (Manimbao). Since the
confession was admittedly given without the safeguards in Art. III, Sec. 12 and
the additional ones provided in R.A. No. 7438, particularly the requirement
that the confession be in writing and duly signed by the suspect in the
presence of counsel, we hold that accused-appellant's confession is
inadmissible the verbal confession of the accused to Barangay Captain
Manimbao was made in the course of custodial investigation
Therefore, the verbal confession to barangay captain is an inadmissible.
FOOTNOTE 345

CASE TITLE People v Salmonde, G.r No. 128551

DATE July 31,200

PONENTE Justice Mendoza

FACTS 1. RAMIL SAMOLDE Y TAMBUNTING, accused-appellant

2. Accused-appellant Ramil Samolde was charge with the crime of murder
3.  Accused- appellant when arraigned, pleaded not guilty. Accused-appellant
Samolde claimed that he was beaten up by the police. He testified that
during his detention, he was not allowed to be seen, lest visitors notice
his swollen face. As regards his counsel, accused-appellant stated that,
contrary to what was stated in his extrajudicial confession; his lawyer
did not really assist him. He was not informed of his constitutional rights
when he executed his extrajudicial confession, and he did so only after
he had been subjected to some brutality by the police.
4. People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee

5. The Court finds Ramil Samolde y Tambunting GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of Murder, and hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of Reclusion Perpetua,

ISSUE Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant

admissible in evidence

RULING No. The extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is not admissible in

evidence

Constitution provides that any confession or admission obtained in violation

of this or Sec.17 hereof shall ne inadmissible in evidence against him.

In the case at bar, accused-appellant was not properly appraised of his

constitutional rights. Under Art. III, Sec. 12(1) of the Constitution, a suspect in
custodial investigation must be given the following warnings: "(1) He must be
informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he
says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a
right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him." As the above quoted portion of the extrajudicial confession
shows, accused-appellant was given no more than a perfunctory recitation of
his rights, signifying nothing more than a feigned compliance with the
constitutional requirements. This manner of giving warnings has been held to
be "merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to
the suspect."
Therefore, the verbal confession to barangay captain is an inadmissible.
FOOTNOT 346
E
CASE TITLE People v. Andan, GR No. 116437
DATE March 3,1997
PONENTE Per curiam
FACTS 1. Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

2. Action of Plaintiff-appellee: The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the
testimonies of the three policemen of the investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and four
news reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was also based
on photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and re-enactments of the
commission of the crime.

3. Subject/Object/Summary of the case: Accused-appellant and two other suspects were

rounded up in connection with a rape with homicide case. In the presence of Mayor
Trinidad, the police, representatives of the media and appellant’s own wife and son,
appellant confessed his guilt, disclosed how he killed Marianne Guevarra y Reyes and
volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. The confession was captured
on videotape. The Trial Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death. Supreme
Court held that the extrajudicial oral confession unassisted by a counsel is admissible in
evidence

4. Accused-appellant: PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ “Bobby”

5. Action of Accused-appellant: Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies

of the policemen, the mayor and the news reporters because they were made during
custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel.

ISSUE Whether or not the accused-appellant extrajudicial confession unassisted by a counsel is

admissible in evidence.

RULING Yes, the accused-appellant extrajudicial confession unassisted by a counsel is admissible in

evidence.

Under the Constitution, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice.

In the case at bar, the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. It was the
accused-appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a
private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to
him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement
officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. His
confessions to the media also were made in response to questions by news reporters, not
by the police or any other investigation officer.

Therefore, the accused-appellant extrajudicial confession unassisted by a counsel is

admissible in evidence.
FOOTNOT 347
E
CASE TITLE People v. Ordono, G.R. No. 132154
DATE June 29, 2000
PONENTE Per curiam
FACTS 1. Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

2. Action of Plaintiff-appellee: The police conducted an investigation and put the accused
confessions into writing. They however could not at once get the services of a lawyer to
assist the 2 accused in the course of the investigation because there were no practicing
lawyers in the Municipality. They assure that they have understood their right to remain
silent and to be assisted by a competent counsel of their choice. They assure that they
understood their rights and did not require the services of a counsel, hence, the
investigation was conducted with the Parish Priest, Municipal Mayor, Chief of Police, other
police officers and the suspect’s wife and mother, in attendance to listen to and witness the
giving of the voluntary statements of the 2 suspects who admitted their participation in the
crime.

Roland Almoite, leading radio announcer, visited and interviewed them. In the interview
which was duly tape-recorded both accused admitted again their complicity in the crime
and narrated individually the events surrounding their commission.

3. Subject/Object: The accused-appellant went to the police station and acknowledged that
they had committed the crime to Shirley Victore, fifteen (15) years old who was believed to
be raped and strangled to death.

4. Accused-appellant: PACITO ORDOÑO Y NEGRANZA alias ASING and APOLONIO MEDINA Y

NOSUELO alias POLING

5. Action of Accused-appellant: Accused-appellant assails their conviction on the ground

that constitutional infirmities attended the execution of their extrajudicial confessions,
mainly the lack of counsel to assist them during custodial investigation thereby making their
confessions inadmissible in evidence.

ISSUE Whether or not the confessions of the accused-appellant on a tape interview is admissible
in evidence?

RULING Yes, the confessions of the accused-appellant in a tape interview is admissible in evidence.

Under the Constitution, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice.

In the case at bar, the taped interview taken by DZNL radio announcer, offered as part of
the testimony of the said announcer, where admissions were made by the accused who
even expressed remorse for having committed the crime, was admitted in evidence. On the
strength of such testimony, the accused were convicted.

Therefore, the confessions of the accused-appellant in a tape interview is admissible in

evidence.
FOOTNOTE 348

CASE TITLE THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appelle

vs.
Edna Malngan y Mayo
DATE G.R. No. 170470         September 26, 2006
PONENTE JUSTICE MINITA CHICO NAZARIO
FACTS 1. The People of the Philippines, Appelle

2. Action of Appelle: On 9 January 2001, an Information[4] was filed before

the RTC of Manila, Branch 41, charging accused-appellant with the
crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 01-188424.

3. Subject/Object: Accused-appellant, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto

Separa, Sr., hurriedly leaving the house of her employer. Barangay
Chairman Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the other tanods proceeded to
Balasan Street and found the accused-appellant. Mercedita Mendoza,
neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was also burned,
identified the woman as accused-appellant, EDNA confessed to
Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry
residents outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employers house on
fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that
she wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to
just ride a broomstick in going home. Accused-appellant was then
turned over to arson investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan,
who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila
where she was further investigated and then detained. When Mercedita
Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn
statement, she had the opportunity to ask accused-appellant at the
latters detention cell why she did the burning of her employers house.

4. Defendant : Edna Malngan y Mayo, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto

Separa, Sr.

5. Action of Respondents: accused-appellant filed a Motion to Admit

Demurrer to Evidence and the corresponding Demurrer to
Evidence[with the former expressly stating that said Demurrer to
Evidence. (a) that she is charged with crime not defined and penalized
by law; (b) that circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (c) that the testimonies given by the
witnesses of the prosecution were hearsay,
Whether the all confession without the assistance of
ISSUE
competent and independent counsel of the appellant-
accused is inadmissible as evidence.

RULING Yes. all confession without the assistance of competent and independent
counsel of the appellant-accused is inadmissible as evidence.

According to the Law,

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offence shall have
the right to be inform his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent councel preperably of his own choice

In the case at bar, Accused-appellants confession to Barangay Chairman

Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the interrogation made by the
latter admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her
rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this
reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman
Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are
inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in violation of her
constitutional rights.

Therefore, all confession without the assistance of competent and

independent counsel of the appellant-accused is inadmissible as evidence.
FOOTNOTE 349

CASE TITLE JUANITA A. AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA B. PAISTE, respondent.

DATE G.R. No. 147782             June 25, 2008

PONENTE Justice Presbitero Velasco Jr
FACTS 1. Juanita A Aquino, petitioner, one who sold fake gold bars

2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner ascribes error to the CA when it gave due

weight and consideration to the amicable settlement with waiver of
right to counsel that she signed in the NBI during the custodial
investigation. She claims she executed the agreement under threat and
not freely and voluntarily, in violation of Sec. 12(1)9 of the Constitution
which guarantees her rights under the Miranda Rule.

3. Subject/Object: petitioner Juanita Aquino, Elizabeth Garganta, and another

woman identified only as "Adeling," went to the house of respondent
Teresita Paiste at 611 Peñalosa St., Tondo, Manila. After the usual
pleasantries, petitioner started to convince respondent to buy a gold
bar owned by a certain Arnold, an Igorot. After respondent was shown a
sample of the gold bar, she agreed to go with them to a pawnshop in
Tondo to have it tested. She was told that it was genuine. However, she
told the three that she had no money. Petitioner continued to press her
that buying the gold bar would be good investment. On March 18, 1991,
the two went to Angeles City and bought the gold bar for PhP 50,000.
On March 19, 1991, respondent had the gold bar tested and she was
informed that it was fake. On March 27, 1991, respondent brought
petitioner to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)-NCR in the
presence of a certain Atty. Tolentino where petitioner amicably
promised respondent they would locate Garganta, and the document
they both signed would be disregarded should they locate Garganta.
4. Defendant : MRS. TERESITA PAISTE

5. Action of Respondents:
Respondent filed a criminal complaint from which an Information against
Garganta, petitioner, and three others for the crime of estafa in Criminal Case
No. 92-99911 was filed before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Whether or not the amicable settlement executed in the NBI is admissible

ISSUE as evidence
 Yes. amicable settlement executed in the NBI is admissible as evidence.
RULING According to the Law,
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offence shall have
the right to be inform his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent councel preperably of his own choice

In the case at bar, when petitioner engaged Atty. Uy as her lawyer, she
undoubtedly executed the amicable settlement. Verily, she was provided with
an independent counsel and such "right to counsel is intended to preclude
the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. An
amicable settlement is not and does not partake of the nature of an
extrajudicial confession or admission but is a contract between the parties
within the parameters of their mutually recognized and admitted rights and
obligations. The amicable settlement is in the nature of an admission, the
document petitioner signed would still be admissible since none of her
constitutional rights were violated.
Therefore, amicable settlement executed in the NBI is admissible as evidence
FOOTNOTE 350
CASE TITLE People v Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216
DATE July 7, 1989
PONENTE Justice Andres Narvasa
FACTS 1. Petitioners: Petitioner is the People of the Philippines represented by the
private prosecutors.
2. Action of Petitioner: Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written
admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the
confession was taken without the accused being represented by a
lawyer.
3. Subject/Object: Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused
was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was
denied. Hence an appeal was made by the private prosecutors.
4. Respondents: Hon. Judge Ruben Ayson, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional
Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City, and Felipe
Ramos, respondents.
5. Action of Respondents: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the
Philippine Airlines and was allegedly involved in irregularities in the
sales of plane tickets. A letter admission was sent by Ramos stating his
willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. In an investigation,
conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City, he proffered a
compromise however this did not ensue.

ISSUE Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as

evidence the admission and statement of accused.

RULING No, the respondent Judge is incorrect in making inadmissible as evidence the
admission and statement of accused.

The Constitution provides that, any confession or admission obtained in

violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.

In the instant case, the judge should admit the evidence in court as the
accused was not under custodial investigation when his statements were
taken. The right to self-incrimination and custodial investigation are accorded
only when the accused is subjected to custodial inquest which involves the
questioning initiated by police authorities after a person is taken in custody or
deprived of his freedom in any way, inasmuch as the statements were
obtained beyond the purview of custodial investigation the evidence should
be admitted in court.

Therefore, the respondent Judge is incorrect in making inadmissible as

evidence the admission and statement of accused.
FOOTNOTE 351
CASE TITLE People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465
DATE March 20, 1985
PONENTE Justice Roberto Concepcion Jr.
FACTS 1. Petitioners: The petitioner is the People of the Philippines represented by
the National Bureau of Investigation.
2. Action of Petitioner: In the NBI’s contention, agent Flores conducted a
preliminary interview of the suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers
to his questions.  The following day Francisco Galit voluntarily executed
a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the crime.  As a
result, he was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in an
information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal.
3. Subject/Object: Respondent Galit had been detained and interrogated
almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently
maintained his innocence. The investigating officers began to maul him
and to torture him physically, still the prisoner insisted on his innocence.
His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. They
continued to maltreat and beat him. His will had been broken until he
admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he
signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for
pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a
reenactment.
4. Respondents: Respondent is Francisco Galit, a prisoner was arrested for
killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery.
5. Action of Respondents: The respondent on the other hand, denied
participation in the commission of the crime. He claimed that he was in
his house in Marikina, Rizal, when the crime was committed in
Montalban, Rizal. He also assailed the admissibility of the extra-judicial
confession extracted from him through torture, force and intimidation
as described earlier, and without the benefit of counsel.

ISSUE Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him.

RULING No, the accused was not informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against
him.

The Constitution provides that, any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice.

In the instant case, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend.  His statement does not
even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation
he was not assisted by one. Even waiver of right to counsel and to remain
silent are present, it will still not be given any legal effect.

Therefore, the accused was not informed of his constitutional rights to

remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him.
FOOTNOTE 352

CASE TITLE: Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan and The People of the Philippines

DATE: October 16, 1996 ; GR. No. 79543 (263 SCRA 222)

PONENTE: Justice Artemio Panganiban

FACTS:

1. Petitioner: Jose D. Filoteo, Jr.

2. Petitioner was a police investigator of the Western Police District in Metro Manila.
3. The petitioner was one of the suspects charged for violating the Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law for hijacking a postal delivery van.
4. Respondents: Sandiganbayan and The People of the Philippines
5. The respondents found him guilty as co-principal beyond reasonable doubt of the violation
of Section 2 in relation to Section 3 of the Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as
the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 3, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should apply to the accused
retroactively

RULING: Page 132 Paragraph 3

No. Article 3, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should not be applied to the accused
retroactively, even more favorable.

The constitution provides that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.

In the case at bar, the petitioners claim that the rights of an accused under Article 3, Section 12
of the 1987 Constitution which includes the rights against an uncounselled waiver of the right to
counsel is applicable to him retroactively.

The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel remains silent must not given
any legal effect. Initially, a judge-made one, that eventually becomes part of Sec. 12, Art.3, the
requirements and restrictions therein have no retroactive effect. They do not reach the waivers
made before April 26, 1983.

Therefore, constitutional mandates should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect.
FOOTNOTE 353

CASE TITLE: People of the Philippines vs. Felicisimo Jara, Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas

DATE: September 30, 1986; G.R.No. L-61356-57 (144 SCRA 516)

PONENTE: Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr.

FACTS:

1. Plaintiff: People of the Philippines

2. The victims Amparo Vda. De Bantigue and Luisa Jara were killed while they were soundly
sleeping inside their room.
3. Two of the accused-appellants (Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas) executed extra-
judicial confessions when apprehended by the police. They confessed to the killing of the
victims and stated that the mastermind was Felicisimo Jara, the husband of Luisa Jara.
4. Defendants: Felicisimo Jara, Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas
5. They all pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. Jara alibi that he was at his step-
daughter’s house and could not have committed the murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial confession must be admitted as evidence

RULING: Page 132 Paragraph 4

No. The extra-judicial confession must not be admitted as evidence

The constitution provides that no torture, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him.

In the case at bar, the court considered in determining the absence of voluntariness of the confession,
that there is a probability of lighted cigarettes and other means of persuasion which leave physical
marks were also utilized to secure the confessions.

Therefore, the confession was made by means of torture, force, violence and intimidation which vitiate
the free will of the defendants.
FOOTNOTE 354
CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REYNALDO
PAULE y DONATO, Accused-Appellant.
DATE: September 11, 1996 G.R. Nos. 118168-70
PONENTE: Justice Ricardo Puno
FACTS:
1. Plaintiff-Appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
2. Accused-Appellant: REYNALDO PAULE y DONATO
3. The prosecution evidence reveals that at about 10 a.m. of October 18, 1990, Amos Manalo
was with a lady friend in the vicinity of the public market along Brill Street, Bajac-Bajac,
Olongapo City. Carlos Tabangbanua passed by and Manalo made a sales pitch to him saying:
"Mamimili ka na naman.
4. Manalo noticed three (3) men following Tubongbanua, one of whom was accused Reynaldo
Paule. The three (3) men exchanged signals with each other. They separately positioned
themselves a few meters away from Tubongbanua after the latter stopped in front of a store. One
of them nodded at Paule who was about three (3) or four (4) meters behind Tubongbanua.Paule
then drew a .38 caliber revolver and fired at Tubongbanua. The bullet hit the back of
Tubongbanua's head. As Tubongbanua turned holding his nape, Paule shot him a second time
near the right temple of his head. Tubongbanua slumped on the ground. Paule approached him,
held his wrist and took his gold necklace. The dastardly deed done, Paule ran towards the nearby
tricycle parking lot while his companions fled towards the 23rd Street.5
5. The trial court found Paule guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the legal heirs of Carlos Tubongbanua the
amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) for moral
damages, plus the costs of suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Paule’s constitutional rights was violated?
RULLING:
NO, Paule’s constitutional rights was not violated.
Under the constitutional, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice.
In the instant case, Paule was brought back to Police Station A. He was informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel, Atty. Norberto Dela Cruz,
when he executed an extrajudicial confession, dated October 18, 1990, admitting that he and a
certain "Glenn" were hired by Conrado Matawaran, Jr. to kill Tubongbanua for a fee of
P5,000.00. He pointed to "Glenn" as the triggerman. The confession was taken and signed in the
presence of Lieutenant Leonardo Esteban, Chief of the Investigation Division of Olongapo City
Police Station A and Atty. Norberto Dela Cruz. 12 It was duly acknowledged by Assistant City
Prosecutor Carmelita Gutierrez Fruelda.
Therefore, the constitutional rights of Paule was not violated.
FOONOTE 355
CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY
MAHINAY Y AMPARADO, Accused-Appellant.
DATE: February 1, 1999 G.R. No. 122485
PONENTE: PER CURIAM
FACTS:
1. PLAINTIFF: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 
2. APPELLANT: LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO
3. APPELLANT: Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on November 20,
1993. He stayed and slept in an apartment also owned by Isip, located 10 meters away from the
unfinished house.
4. Appellant was charged with rape with homicide for the sexual assault and death of Maria
Victoria Chan, 12 years old.  Evidence disclosed that Maria, on that fateful afternoon, went to the
second floor of the house where appellant was staying. Appellant pulled her hand and her head
hit the table causing her to become unconscious.  At this stage, appellant, who was then drunk,
had sexual intercourse with her.  He then dumped the still unconscious victim inside the septic
tank and thereafter took flight.
5. Appellant’s extrajudicial confession containing details consistent with the post mortem
findings on the victim that she was raped.  The trial court, notwithstanding the absence of
direct evidence relative to the commission of the crime, rendered judgment of conviction. It
based its judgment on circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mahinay’s rights to lawful custodial investigation was violated?
RULLING:
NO, Mahinay’s rights to lawful custodial investigation was not violated.
Under the Constitution, Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice.
In the case at bar, Atty. Restituto Viernes, assisted the appellant in executed an extra-judicial
confession wherein he narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim. He must also
informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any the
foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
Therefore, the rights of Maninay to lawful custodial investigation was not violated.
Footnote 356
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO GOMEZ
Case Title and FELIPE IMMACULATA, accused, FELIPE IMMACULATA, accused-
appellant.
Date March 26, 1997; G.R. No. 101817
Ponente Justice Jose C. Vitug
1. Eduardo Gomez and Felipe Immaculata, accused.

2. In his appeal, Accused insists that the trial court has erred in including
him in the drug conspiracy and in admitting in evidence his sworn statement
taken, without the assistance of counsel, by an NBI agent at the Stanley
Prison in Hongkong

3. Accused Eduardo Gomez, a bartender, and Felipe Immaculata, a former

bus driver, were implicated in the crime of transporting twenty (20)
kilograms of heroin, estimated to be worth $40,000,000.00, contained in two
golfbags. Arraigned, tried and ultimately convicted, Gomez and Immaculata
were each meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay a
P20,000.00 fine by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, in
Criminal Case No. 90-4717.
Facts
Gomez and Immaculata entered a plea of “not guilty” to the accusation.

4. People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee.

5. The prosecution moved to discharge Gomez so that he could be a state

witness. The motion was strongly opposed by Immaculata. Eventually, the
trial court refused to discharge Gomez holding that, among other things, “it
(was) evident throughout his affidavit that his only purpose in executing the
same was to exculpate himself and (to) lay the blame on his co-accused.”

The judgment of the trial court convicting appellant Felipe Immaculata of the
crime charged is hereby reversed and set aside on the basis of reasonable
doubt. His immediate release from the New Bilibid Prisons is ordered unless
he is detained for any other lawful cause.
Whether or not the sworn statement executed by the accused and his
Issue waiver of his constitutional rights without any assistance of a competent and
independent counsel can be admitted as evidence in court.
Ruling No. The sworn statement executed by the accused and his waiver of his
constitutional rights without any assistance of a competent and independent
counsel cannot be admitted as evidence in court.

Then Constitution provides that any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.

In the present case, while the sworn statement taken from appellant by an
NBI agent in Hongkong during his incarceration was not made the basis for
accused’s conviction by the court a quo, a word could be said about the
manner in which it was procured. It would seem that appellant was merely
apprised in general terms of his constitutional rights to counsel and to
remain silent. He then was asked if he would be willing to give a statement.
Having answered in the affirmative, the NBI investigating agent asked him
whether he needed a lawyer which he answered “Sa ngayon po ay hindi na
at totoo lang naman ang aking sasabihin. Kung mayroon po kayong tanong
na hindi ko masasagot ay sasabihin ko na lang po sa inyo” which after that
response, the investigation forthwith proceeded. This procedure hardly was
in compliance with Section 12(1), Article III, of the Constitution which
requires the assistance of counsel to a person under custody even when he
waives the right to counsel. It is immaterial that the sworn statement was
executed in a foreign land. Appellant, a Filipino citizen, should enjoy these
constitutional rights, like anyone else, even when abroad.

Therefore, the sworn statement executed by the accused and his waiver of
his constitutional rights without any assistance of a competent and
independent counsel cannot be admitted as evidence in court.
FOOTNOTE 357-A

CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

GUILLERMO EGLIPA, accused-appellant.
DATE June 5, 1989
PONENTE Justice Ricardo M Paras
FACTS 1. Plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

2. The Regional Trial Court Branch 19 in Bacoor Cavite convicted appellant

Guillermo Eglipa of Murder. The trial Court convicted appellant on the
basis of his two separate extra-judicial confessions at the Bacoor Police
Station and at Criminal Investigation Service, Camp Crame Quezon City.

3. Subject/Object: The admissibility of appellant's two extrajudicial

confessions.

4. Accused-appellant: GUILLERMO EGLIPA

5. Appellant contend that he was able to prove that he was compelled

under duress and force to execute the extra-judicial confession.
Whether or not appellant's two extrajudicial confessions made is admissible in
ISSUE evidence against him.

No. Appellant's two extrajudicial confessions made is inadmissible in

RULING evidence against him.

Constitution dictates that any confession or admission obtained in

violation of Section 12 par (1) or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

In the case at bar, the two extra judicial confessions made by

accusedappellant Guillermo Eglipa was made without the presence of a
counsel and that he was compelled under duress and force to execute said
extra judicial confession at the Criminal Investigation Service, Camp Crame
Quezon City making it inadmissible in evidence against him.

Therefore, appellant's two extrajudicial confessions made is inadmissible in

evidence against him.
FOOTNOTE 357-B

CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. TEODORO BASAY @ "DORO" and JAIME RAMIREZ @ "NEBOY", accused
JAIME RAMIREZ @ "NEBOY", accused-appellant
DATE March 3, 1993
PONENTE Justice Hilario Davide Jr.
FACTS 1. Plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

2. The Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental acquitted Teodoro Basay but
convicted accused Jaime Ramirez for the crime of Multiple Murder and
Frustrated Murder with Arson.

3. Subject/Object: The admissibility of appellant's extra-judicial confession.

4. Accused-appellant: JAIME RAMIREZ @ "NEBOY"

5. Appellant contends that his so-called extra judicial confession was

executed in blatant disregard of his constitutional right to counsel and to
remain silent during custodial investigation.

Whether or not appellant's extrajudicial confession made is admissible in

ISSUE evidence against him.

No. Appellant's extrajudicial confession made is inadmissible in evidence

RULING against him.

Constitution dictates that any confession or admission obtained in

violation of Section 12 par (1) or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

In the case at bar, when the interrogation was conducted the confession
was written in English, a language the appellant cannot understand. That the
appellant was not told that he could retain a counsel of his own choice.
Further he was not assisted by any counsel during the investigation instead
certain Elpidio Catacutan claiming to have appeared for him as a friend
counsel but in reality the latter was only acting as a witness not as a counsel
making the confession inadmissible in evidence against him.

Therefore, appellant's extrajudicial confession made is inadmissible in

evidence against him.
FOOTNOTE 358
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES
DATE December 12, 1995; G.R. No. 117487, 251 SCRA 293

PONENTE Justice Reynato Puno

FACTS 1. Petitioner/s: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

2. Action of Petitioner: The trial court found the appellant guilty and was
convicted then sentenced to death.

3. Subject/Object: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with

homicide of a four-year old girl. He was arrested and during the
interrogation, he verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of a
counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession, the police
come to know where to find the evidence to support a case against him.

4. Respondents: ARNEL ALICANDO

5. Action of Respondent/s: He pleaded guilty during the arraignment.

Whether or not the evidence obtained through appellant’s uncounselled

ISSUE verbal confession may be admitted in evidence.
NO. The evidence are inadmissible.
RULING
According to Art. III, Section 12 of the Constitution, (1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado,
or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and
civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

In the case at bar, due process was not observed in the conduct of custodial
investigation for the accused. He was not informed of his right to a counsel
upon making his extrajudicial confession and the information against him was
written in a language he could not understand and was not explained to him.
Once the primary source (the “tree”) is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the “fruit”) derived from it is
also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a
direct result of the illegal act, whereas the “fruit of the poisonous tree” is the
indirect result of the same illegal act.

Therefore, an evidence that were gathered as a result of the uncounselled

confession are inadmissible.
FOOTNOTE: 359

CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

BENJAMIN PERALTA DE GUZMAN, accused-appellant.

DATE: March 4, 1991

PONENTE: Justice Isagani Cruz

FACTS:
1. BENJAMIN PERALTA DE GUZMAN, accused-appellant

2. Benjamin de Guzman, who claimed he was a chicharon vendor, was arrested for

selling marijuana. Charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, he was
convicted after trial by the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan and sentenced to life
imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.

3.  In the appeal, he asks for a reversal of his conviction on the ground that the
evidence against him was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
4. He was detained without informing him, his constitutional right since right after
the buy-bust,  they first dumped him in a fishpond and then in a "tarima" where
they left him until the following morning, when he signed the Receipt of Seized
Property because he was afraid of further punishment.

5. The trial judge regarded as tell-tale signs of De Guzman's guilt his

submissiveness when he was arrested and the fact that he signed without objection
the Receipt of Seized Property.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the Receipt of Seized Property Signed by the accused is
admissible as evidence.

HELD:
NO, the Receipt of Seized Property Signed by the accused is not admissible as
evidence.

Section 12, Article 3 of the Constitution provides that any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of a counsel,
he must be provided with one. The rights cannot be waive except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.

In the case at bar, the signing of the receipt of Seized Property is without the
assistance of a counsel and the accused was not informed of his constitutional
right.
Thus, the Receipt of the Seized property is totally inadmissible.
FOOTNOTE: 360

CASE TITLE: People vs. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182

DATE: 1996

PONENTE:

FACTS:
1. Appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung are both British
(Hongkong) nationals, who together with 9 other Malaysian nationals.

2. They were charged with unlawfully transporting into the country, shabu. All of
the accused pleaded not guilty at their arraignments.
3. Customs examiner Danilo Gomez examine the luggages of the foreign nationals
and he became suspicious to the Alpen Cereal boxes and decided to open one of
the boxes with his cutter. The box contained white crystalline substance. Gomez
immediately called the attention of Appraiser Oreganan Palala and Duty Collector
Zenaida Bonifacio. Gomez bundled these boxes together with a masking tape and
handed them to Bonifacio, who in turn called out the names of the accused, one by
one, and ordered them to sign on the masking tape placed on the boxes allegedly
recovered from their respective baggages.
4. As for the accused-appellants Wong Chuen and Au Wing, they denied that the
boxes were recovered from their baggages. They claimed that they were forced
into signing the boxes by the police authorities who were present inside the
collector’s office. Only Wong Chuen and Au Wing appealed (the others neither
filed a notice of appeal nor filed their appellant’s brief.

ISSUE: Whether or not the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the
plastic bags containing shabu, are admissible in evidence.

HELD:
NO, the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags
containing shabu, are not admissible in evidence.

Section 12, Article 3 of the Constitution provides that any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of a counsel,
he must be provided with one. The rights cannot be waive except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
In the case at bar, that accused were never informed of their fundamental rights
during the entire time that they were under investigation. Specifically, accused
were not informed of their Miranda rights. By affixing their signatures on the
boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags, accused in effect made a tacit
admission of the crime charged for mere possession of "shabu" is punished by law.
These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial
confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights.
Thus, the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags
containing shabu, are not admissible in evidence.
FOOTNOTE 361
CASE TITLE People vs. Saturnina Salazar
DATE GR No. 98060 January 27, 1997
PONENTE Justice Artemio Panganiban
FACTS 1. Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines
2. The RTC of Oroquieta, Branch 13 found appellant Saturnina Salazar guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4, Article 2 of RA No.
6425 (The Dangerous Drug Act of 1972), as amended by PD No. 1675, and
imposing upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and payment of
P20,000.00 as fine, with costs.
3. While on search, Cubillan one of the NARCOM agents, could not find
marijuana in the appellant’s house. He pulled out his pistol and told her
that should she refuse to tell him where the marijuana was, he would
“salvage” her. Appellant was then brought to the headquarters where she
was investigated by Cubillan. She was not informed of her right to counsel
nor her right to remain silent. However, she kept silent, not answering
any of Cubillan’s question. Later, they held her right hand and forced her
to sign something. They also asked her to affix her thumbmark to a piece
of paper, telling her that she could refuse to do so only if she would
divulge to them the names of drug pushers in the area. She just signed
and affixed her thumbmark to a piece of paper the contents of which she
was not even allowed to read.
4. Accused-appellant: Saturnina Salazar
5. As her defense is this appeal, appellant alleges violation of her
constitutional right against warrantless search and seizure, and to counsel
during custodial investigations.
ISSUE Whether or not the paper where the appellant signed is admissible as evidence.
RULING No, the paper where the appellant signed is not admissible as evidence.

The Constitution provides that any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.

In the case at bar, the appellant conformance to the said documents were
obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation there
being no records to show that she was assisted by counsel.

Therefore, the paper where the appellant signed is not admissible as evidence.
FOOTNOTE 362
CASE TITLE People vs. de Lara
DATE GR No. 94953 September 5, 1994
PONENTE Justice Camilo D. Quiason
FACTS 1. Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines
2. The was appellant found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 4, Art. 2 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended and was sentenced
to suffer a penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00
3. After the search, the appellant and his wife were brought to the
headquarters. He claimed that in spite of his protestation that he would
wait for his lawyer before giving any statement, the police continued
their interrogation. The appellant denied that the twenty-peso bill was
given to him by the poseur-buyer. He claimed that he was merely forced
to sign his name on the photocopy of the twenty-peso bill.
4. Accused-appellant: Armando de Lara
5. In his appeal, appellant questions the legality of his arrest and the seizure
of prohibited drugs inside his house, he also claims hat he was not
assisted by counsel during his custodial investigation.
ISSUE Whether or not the signed photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill was
admissible as evidence.
RULING No, the signed photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill is not admissible as
evidence.

The Constitution provides that any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.

In the case at bar, since upon signing of the photocopy of the marked twenty-
peso bill, there was no showing that the appellant was then assisted by counsel
nor his waiver thereto put into writing.

Therefore, the signed photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill is not admissible
as evidence.
FOOTNOTE 363
CASE TITLE Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan
DATE GR No. 109242 January 26, 1999
PONENTE Justice Jose Mendoza
FACTS 6. Petitioner is Lito Mendoza. He filed a petition for review from a decision
of the Sandiganbayan convicting him and two others of qualified theft.
7. The accused Arnold Pasicolan, a public officer, being then and Emergency
Laborer assigned as bag opener at the printed matters section of Makati
Central Post Office, and taking advantage of his official position by having
access to the mail matter in conspiracy with accused Ronnie Romero and
Lito Marcelo, both private individuals, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with grave abuse of confidence, and with intent
of gain and without the consent of the owners thereof, take, steal and carry
away from the Central Post office of Makati one bag containing assorted
mail matters some of them containing US Dollar Bills.
8. Petitioner contends that the respondent Honorable court erred in admitting
as evidence of petitioner’s guilt the letters signed by the accused during
custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel, in utter disregard
of his constitutional right.
9. Respondent is the Hon. Sandiganbayan (First Division) and the People of
the Philippines.

ISSUE Whether or not the envelopes seized from the accused were admissible as
evidence.
RULING Yes, the envelopes seized from the accused were admissible as evidence.

The Constitution provides that any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.

In the case at bar, the envelopes (subject of the mail theft) were validly seized from
the petitioner and Romero and incident of a valid arrest. the purpose of the
petitioner’s signatures on the envelope, when coupled with the testimony of
prosecution witnesses, undoubtedly help establish the guilt of the petitioner.

Therefore, the envelopes seized from the accused were admissible as evidence.
FOOTNOTE 364
CASE TITLE People vs. Linsangan
DATE GR No. 88589 April 16, 1991
PONENTE Justice Carolina Grino-Aquino
FACTS 1. Plaintiff appellee: People of the Philippines
2. The RTC of Manila found the accused guilty of the crime violation of RA
6425 as amended, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 plus costs.
3. Appellant was charged with the illegal sale of a prohibited drug. After he
was apprehended in a buy-bust operation, he was frisked and retrieved
from him the marked ten-peso bills used in the operation tucked in his
waist which he was asked to sign thereafter.
4. Accused appellant: Carlito Linsangan
5. The accused appealed to the Court alleging that the lower court erred in
not holding that when the policemen required him to initial the P10-bills,
they violated his constitutional right to counsel, to remain silent and not to
incriminate himself while under custodial investigation.
ISSUE Whether or not his constitutional right to counsel, self-incrimination and his rights
guaranteed by the Miranda doctrine were violated while under custodial
investigation.
RULING No, his constitutional right to counsel, self-incrimination and his rights guaranteed
by the Miranda doctrine were not violated while under custodial investigation.

The Constitution provides that any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.

In the case at bar, although the accused was not assisted by counsel when he
initialled the P10 bills that the police found tucked in his waist, it was held that
neither his right against self-incrimination nor his rights guaranteed by the Miranda
doctrine was violated, because his possession of the marked bills did not constitute
a crime, the subject of the prosecution being his act of selling marijuana cigarettes.

Therefore, his constitutional right to counsel, self-incrimination and his rights

guaranteed by the Miranda doctrine were not violated while under custodial
investigation.
FOOTNOTE 365

CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIXTO

MORICO, accused-appellant.
DATE
PONENTE
FACTS 1. Accused-appellant : Sixto Morico
2. Action of the Accused- Appellant:
Appellant claims that the trial court erroneously convicted him of an offense
which is not charged in the information.

3. Subject/Object:
Appellant also claimed that when he signed the Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report (Exh. "D"), the same was never explained to him nor was he assisted
by counsel.
The Court reiterates, that when an arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and
Arrest Report at a police station, he does not admit the commission of an
offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance. The Booking Sheet is
merely a statement of the accused's being booked and of the date which
accompanies the fact of an arrest. It is a police report and maybe useful in
charges of arbitrary detention against the police themselves. It is not an extra-
judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction"
Appellant's contention that his signature on the Receipt of Property Seized
(Exh. "C") is inadmissible as evidence, as it was given without the assistance
of counsel. In People v. Mauyao, 207 SCRA 732 (1992), we stated that
appellant's signature on this document is a declaration against his interest and a
tacit admission of the crime charged. Any admission taken from appellant, as a
result of a violation of his constitutional right, is inadmissible in evidence
against him.
Additional Info: (In case mag ask si Dean for further facts)
The information only charged appellant with violating Section 4, Article II of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended. However, he was convicted of violating Sections
4 and 15 of the same law. Section 4 and Section 15 are two separate and
distinct offenses. Section 4 penalizes any person who, unless authorized by
law, sells, administers delivers, distributes and transports any prohibited drugs.
Section 15 penalizes any person who without authority of law, sells,
administers, distributes and transports any regulated drugs.
An accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged in the information.
To do so would constitute a violation of his constitutional rights, i.e., to be
informed of the charges against him and his right to due process
4. Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

5. The information only charged appellant with violating Section 4, Article II

of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. However, he was convicted of violating
Sections 4 and 15 of the same law. Section 4 and Section 15 are two separate
and distinct offenses. Section 4 penalizes any person who, unless authorized
by law, sells, administers delivers, distributes and transports any prohibited
drugs. Section 15 penalizes any person who without authority of law, sells,
administers, distributes and transports any regulated drugs.
An accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged in the information.
To do so would constitute a violation of his constitutional rights, i.e., to be
informed of the charges against him and his right to due process.
ISSUE Whether signing booking sheet or arrest report even without counsel is
violative to the Constitution?

RULING No, signing booking sheet or arrest report even without counsel is not violative
to the Constitution.

The Constitution provides that any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice.

In the case at bar, when an arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report at a police station without the benefit of counsel does not admit the
commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance. The
Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the accused's being booked and of the
date which accompanies the fact of an arrest. It is a police report and maybe
useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the police themselves. It is not
an extra-judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of
conviction.

Therefore, the signing of the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report without the
benefit of counsel does not violate the Constitution because it is not an
admission of guilt.
FOOTNOTE 366
People of the Philippines v. ERNESTO LUVENDINO y COTAS
PONENTE: JUSTICE FELICIANO
GR. No. L-69971, July 03, 1992
I. FACTS:

1. Accused: ERNESTO LUVENIDO;

2. Ernesto Luvendino was accused for crime of rape with murder
against Rowena Capcap. Per records, the conviction of the accused
grounded heavily on the re-enactment of the crime as well as his
written admission of guilt. In his conviction in the trial court,
he was sentenced to death and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim Rowena in the amount of ₱50,000.00;
3. On appeal, accused-appellant Ernesto Luvenido alleges that his
“demonstration” or re-enactment of the crime as well as his
subsequent written admission of guilt is inadmissible, it being
without any benefit of counsel;
4. Plaintiff: STATE (People of the Philippines, thru the
Prosecution);
5. The handling prosecutor opposed and asserts the validity of the
extra-judicial confession and admission of guilt of the accused.
Hence, the petition before the Supreme Court.

II. ISSUE: Whether the extra-judicial confession and the written

admission of guilt by the accused inadmissible, it being
without any benefit of counsel?

III. HELD:

No, the extra-judicial confession and the written admission of

guilt by the accused is ADMISSIBLE.

The constitution provides that any confession or admission

obtained in violation of the rights of the accused shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

In the case at bar, the records cannot show whether the

accused had been informed of his constitutional rights or that
he had validly waived such right before proceeding with the
demonstration. However, he was fully aware when he signed his
confession in front of the Fiscal in the presence of his
mother while assisted by Atty. Eustacio Flores. Even if Atty.
Flores was not present during the initial stage of the
investigation, there was no rule of doctrine prescribing that
waiver of the right of counsel may be validly made only with
the assistance of a counsel, especially when extra-judicial
confession and waivers were made voluntarily and
intelligently.

Thus, the extra-judicial confession and the written admission

of guilt by ERNESTO LUVENIDO is admissible, he being convicted
for the crime of rape with murder.
!!! NOTICE (YOU MAY NOT COPY THIS PART): During the period
when Luvenido committed the crime, the doctrine of
inadmissibility of evidence was not yet established. The
doctrine, “the waiver of the right of a counsel is not valid
unless made with an assistance of a counsel” (see People vs.
Gait), was not yet in effect during the pendency of the
appeal. Such doctrine, under Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973
Constitution, was made to apply prospectively). !!!
FOOTNOTE 367

People of the Philippines v. Bryan Ferdinand Dy y La Madrid and Giovan

Bernandino y Garcia
GR No. 115236-37 January 29, 2002
Ponente: Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago
I. Facts

1. Accused-appellants Bryan Dy and Giovan Bernardino were charged with

Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness in a complaint initiated by Gina Marie
Mobley. The complaint alleges that Bryan Dy feloniously had carnal
knowledge of one Gina Marie Mobley. Beforehand, he and Giovan
Bernardino drugged the complainant after checking in a hotel in Baguio,
where both accused advanced their felonious schemes.
2. Both accused denied the allegation. Bryan Dy asserts that Gina was not
deprived of her reason when she had intercourse with him.
3. Complainant Gina Marie Mobley described the situation as if she had no
control of herself. She alleges to have drank a soda with a weird taste
and a gritty texture. Moments later, she was on her bed unconscious
until he was awoken by Bryan Dy who started touching her private parts.
Subconsciously understanding the gravity of the situation, she sucked
the genitalia of the Bryan Dy in fear of greater injury if she resists.

II. ISSUE
Whether the crime committed should be dismissed by Gina’s act of
submission, as part of res gestae?
III. HELD

No. Gina’s act of submission should not dismiss the crime of rape
and acts of lasciviousness.

The constitution provides that any confession or admission obtained

in violation of this Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

In the case at bar, the complainant’s acts and statements, as part

of res gestae, indicate that she was indeed molested and raped. The
behavior and reaction of every person cannot be predicted with
accuracy. Her acts of actually giving in to the felonious schemes of
the accused does not amount to consent, she becoming suggestive due
to psychotic drugs. No logical woman, if untrue, will tell that she
was raped, unless there is a promise of gain. However, attendant to
that confession is the shame it brings to her reputation and her
family. The court is convinced that her acts and testimonies would
only lead to a conclusion that Gina Marie Mobley was indeed raped.

Thus, Gina’s act of submission should not dismiss the crimes

committed.
FOOTNOTE 368
CASE TITLE People of the Philippines v Guillermo Samus
DATE September 17, 2002; G.R. Nos. 135957-58
PONENTE Justice Artemio Panganiban

FACTS 1. Subject/Object: Subject of this petition is the uncounselled confession and

admission made by the appellant which was inadmissible but due to
appellant’s failure to make timely objections, defense is deemed to have
waived objection to its admissibility.
2. Appellant is Guillermo Samus, a farmer, charged with 2 counts of murder
before RTC Branch 36 of Calamba. After he was suspected of the killings,
he was brought to the PNP, was informed of his constitutional rights.
3. Appellant contended that the police operatives did not have warrant when
he was arrested. That when brought by PNP, he was tortured until he lost
consciousness, forced to admit the killing and to sign a document of
admission. He was interviewed by media and professed that he did not
have capacity to hire the services of a lawyer.
4. Plaintiff-appellee is the State. Victims were 62-year-old Dedicacion Balisi
and her 6-year-old grandson John Ardee Balisi who were killed inside their
house. The victims were neighbors of appellant’s father.
5. Arresting officers reasoned that they arrest appellant without warrant
because he tried to evade them by jumping from the roof of a 2-storey
building to escape. That they did not conduct interrogations when
accused admitted the commission; it was his friend Vallejo who
interviewed him.

ISSUE Whether or not the uncounselled admission has deemed waived its
exclusionary rule when it is not objected to during the trial.

RULING Yes, the uncounselled admission has deemed waived its exclusionary rule
when it is not objected to during the trial.

Under the Constitution, any confession or admission obtained in violation of

accused’s constitutional rights is inadmissible.

In the case at bar, the uncounselled admission elicited from the accused by
the law enforcers during the custodial investigation are normally inadmissible
in evidence. Indeed, the admission is inadmissible because it was given under
custodial investigation and was made without assistance of a counsel.
Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, this Court cannot rule it out
because of appellant’s failure to make timely objections. The defense failed
to object to its presentation during the trial, with the result that the defense
is deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility. Having made no
objection before the trial court, appellant cannot raise this question for the
first time on appeal. The evidence having been admitted without objection,
we are not inclined to reject it.

Therefore, the uncounselled admission has deemed waived its exclusionary

rule when it is not objected to during the trial.

FOOTNOTE 369 NOT A CASE

FOOTNOTE 370
CASE TITLE People v Fitzgerald, G.r. No. 149723
DATE October 27,2006
PONENTE Justice Austria- Martinez
FACTS 1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
2. An information filed with the RTC, Branch 75, Olangapo City; charging
Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, alleging that sometime in the month of
September, 1993 the accused induced complainant “AAA” a minor13
years old to engage in prostitution by then and there showering said
“AAA” with gift clothes and food and after having carnal knowledge of
her.
3.  The People (petitioner) filed this Petition to have the August 31, 2001 CA
Resolution annulled and set aside. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in
granting respondent Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail despite the fact that
the latter was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua and the evidence of his guilt is strong. It also questions the
jurisdiction of the CA to act on said Motion, considering that the case
had been remanded to the RTC for new trial.
4. VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD, respondent.

5. Respondent counters that the grant of new trial negated the previous
findings of the existence of strong evidence of his guilt; and justifies his
provisional release on humanitarian grounds, citing as an extraordinary
circumstance his advanced age and deteriorating health.

ISSUE Whether or not the CA erred when it allowed respondent to bail.

RULING Yes. The CA erred when it allowed respondent to bail.

Constitution provides all persons, except those charged with offenses

punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided bt law.

In the case at bar, the CA made no specific finding that respondent suffers
from an ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial
will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. It merely declared
respondent not in the best of health even when the only evidence on record
as to the latter's state of health is an unverified medical certificate. It is bad
enough that the CA granted bail on grounds other than those stated in the
Motion filed by respondent; it is worse that it granted bail on the mere claim
of the latter's illness. Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or
prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of
illness is not a ground for bail. The right to bail emenates from of the right to
be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the law
who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys, be allowed
provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his appearance
before any court, as required under specified conditions.
Therefore, the CA erred when it allowed respondent to bail
FOOTNOTE 371
CASE TITLE Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil 634 (1945)
DATE December 20, 1945
PONENTE Justice Emilio Hilado
FACTS
1. Petitioner: Herras Teehankee, political detainee delivered by the Counter
Intelligence Corps, United States Army, to the Commonwealth Government,
pursuant to the Proclamation of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur,
dated December 29, 1944

2. Action of Petitioner: The petitioner through her husband, Alberto

Teehankee, filed with the People's Court a petition wherein, invoking the
provisions of Executive Order No. 65, promulgated by the President of the
Philippines, dated September 3, 1945.

3. Subject/Object: The petitioner prayed that her immediate release be

ordered on the ground that no evidence exists upon which she could be
charged with any act punishable by law, or, alternatively, that the People's
Court fix the bail for her provisional liberty, in conformity with the aforesaid
executive order, and upon approval of such bail, that an order be forthwith
issued directing the officer having official custody of her person to
immediately release her.

4. Respondent: LEOPOLDO ROVIRA, ANTONIO QUIRINO, and POMPEYO DIAZ

5. Action of Respondent: One of the Associate Judges ordered her provisional

release under a bond of P50, 000. However, the presiding judge and the other
Associate Judge entered an order to deny the same.

ISSUE Whether or not the petition for provisional release under bail be denied.

RULING No, the petition for provisional release under bail shall not be denied.

The Constitution states that all persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.

In the case at bar, upon application by a political prisoner or detainee to the

People's Court for provisional release under bail, a hearing, summary or
otherwise, should be held with due notice to the Office of Special
Prosecutors, as well as to the prisoner or detainee.
While it is true that the Solicitor General recommended Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000) as a reasonable bail "on the strength of the evidence at hand," it
may happen that thereafter his office may have secured additional evidence
which, in addition to or in connection with that he already possessed, in his
opinion is sufficiently strong to prove petitioner's guilt for a capital offense, in
which case, he may yet decide to oppose the application for bail filed by the
petitioner at the hearing.

Therefore, the petition for provisional release under bail shall not be denied.
FOOTNOTE 372

CASE TITLE Enrile v. Salazar, 187 SCRA 214

DATE June 5, 1990

PONENTE Justice Andres Narvasa

FACTS 1. Petitioners: Petitioner is Juan Ponce Enrile

2. Action of Petitioner: Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Said crime arose from the failed coup attempts against then
president Corazon Aquino.

3. Subject/Object: There was no bail set for Enrile due to the seriousness of
the crime charged against him. Enrile later filed a habeas corpus case
questioning his detention and alleging that the crime being charged
against him is nonexistent. He insists that there is no such crime
as rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Enrile
invoked the ruling in the landmark case of People vs Hernandez where it
was ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes
such as murder as such, the proper crime that should have been
charged against him is simple rebellion which is bailable.

4. Respondents: Judge Jaime Salazar (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial

Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe,
Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis, and Assistant City Prosecutor
Eulogio Manangquil, National Bureau of Investigation Director Alfredo
Lim, BRIG. Gen. Edgar Dula Torres (Superintendent of the Northern
Police District) and/ or any and all persons who may have actual custody
over the Person of Juan Ponce Enrile.

5. Action of Respondents: Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of

Quezon City Branch 103. The warrant had issued on an information
signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand
R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr.
charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and
Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder. 

ISSUE Whether or not, the petitioners are entitled to bail before final conviction?

RULING Yes, the petitioners are entitled to bail before final conviction.

The Constitution provides that, all persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient securities, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.

In the instant case, holding that Hernandez doctrine is applicable in the case
and that the information filed against the petitioners must be read as
charging simple rebellion which is a bailable offense.

Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to bail before final conviction.

Additional info on Hernandez Doctrine:
People of the Philippines v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. Rep 515 (1956), was a case
decided by the Philippine Supreme Court which held that the crime of
rebellion under the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines is charged as a
single offense, and that it cannot be made into a complex crime. While it was
decided on an almost divided opinion, it nevertheless became a stable
doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence.
FOOTNOTE 97, 373
CASE TITLE Youself Al-Ghoul, et. al. v CA and the People of the Philippines
DATE November 24, 1998; G.R. No. 126859
PONENTE Justice Leonardo Quisumbing
FACTS 1. Subject/Object: Subject of this petition is the Motion for the petitioners to
bail. It was held in abeyance by the trial court on the ground that the
law under which petitioners are charged prescribed a penalty of
reclusion perpetua.1
2. Petitioners are Yousef Al-Ghoul, Isam Mohammad Abdulhadi, Wail Rashid
Al-Khatib, Nabeel Nasser Al-Riyami, et. al. They are detained prisoners
who were arrested and charged with illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions, and explosives.
3. Petitioners maintained that due to the enactment of RA 8294, 2 the penalty
for the offenses under which petitioners are being charged has been
reduced to only the penalty ranging from prision mayor to reclusion
temporal which makes petitioners entitled to bail regardless of the
strength of evidence.
4. Respondents are the CA and the State represented by the police officers of
Kalookan City. The latter applied for search warrants for the search and
seizure of items in Apt 2 at Kalookan City.
5. Upon the conduct of the search, several firearms, ammunitions, explosives,
and incendiary devices were seized by the operatives. The trial court
denied the motion to bail because the evidence of guilt against the
petitioners is strong.

ISSUE Whether or not bail is a matter of right before final conviction in a case.

RULING Yes, bail is a matter of right before final conviction in a case.

Under the Constitution, the right to bail shall not be impaired.

In the case at hand, consequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the penalty

prescribed in Section 1 and 3 of P.D. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions and explosives under which petitioners were charged, has
now been reduced to prision mayor in its minimum period and prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal, respectively. Evidently,
petitioners are now entitled to bail as a matter of right prior to their
conviction by the trial court pursuant to Section 4 of SC Administrative
Circular No. 12-94 which provides as follows: Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right. —
. . .(b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment be admitted to
bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule.

Hence, bail is a matter of right before final conviction in a case.

1
SEC.4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court--Bail, a Matter of Right. – All persons in custody shall: (a) before
or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule. (3a)
2
RA 8294, an Act amending PD 1866 entitled, “Codifying the laws on illegal/unlawful possession,
manufacture, dealing in, acquisition or disposition of firearms, ammunition or explosives or instruments used in
the manufacture of firearms, ammunition or explosives, and imposing stiffer penalties for certain violations
thereof.
FOOTNOTE 374
CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander Bilog, respondents.
DATE:  June 5, 1991 G.R. No. 79269    
PONENTE: JUSTICE HILARION DAVIDE, JR., 
FACTS:
1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
2. The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice,
the City Fiscal of Manila and the Judge Advocate General, filed the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction, to set
aside the order of respondent Judge.
3. Respondent: HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander Bilog
4.   Private respondent and his co-accused were in military custody following their arrest. An
information was filed charging them for the crime of rebellion. A petition for habeas corpus
Private respondent and his co-accused was filed but was dismissed on the basis of the agreement
of the parties under which herein private respondent will remain in legal custody and will face
trial before the court having the custody over his person and the warrant of arrest of his co-
accused are deemed recalled and they shall immediately release but submit themselves to court
having jurisdiction over their person.
5. Private respondent filed a petition for bail which respondent judge granted.
ISSUE:
Where or not the right to bail may be waived?
RULLING:
Yes, the right to bail may be waived
Under the constitution, the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended.
In the instants case, the right to bail cannot be denied to the one who was charged with rebellion.
It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law,
public order, public policy, moral and good costums or prejudicial to third person with a right
recognized by law.
Therefore, the right to bail may be waived.
FOOTNOTE 375

MANOLET O. LAVIDES, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

Respondents.
Gr No. 129670, February 1, 2000
Ponente: Justice Jose-Catral Mendoza
FACTS:
1. Petitioner: Manolet O. Lavides;
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner was arrested on April 03, 1997
for child abuse under RA No. 7610. She filed for Omnibus Motion
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, and accused be
allowed to bail as matter of right. The trial court rendered its
decision, entitling the petitioner the right to post bail, where
one of the condition is that the approval thereof be made only
after arraignment to enable the court to acquire jurisdiction.
Upon pre-trial, the motion to quash was dismissed by the trial
court;
3. Cause of Action: Petitioner appealed the dismissal of motion to
quash to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA, in its decision, held
that the right to bail be suspended, and orders pertaining to the
quashal of information be maintained;
4. Respondent: Court of Appeals and RTC Branch 107, Quezon City;
5. Action of Respondent: CA avers that arraignment should be a
prerequisite before the approval of bail bonds to prevent delay
in the trial, as they believe that herein complainants will get
tired and lose interest in the prosecution of the case.
ISSUE: Whether the arraignment should be a prerequisite to the
approval of bail bond?
HELD:
No, the arraignment should not be a prerequisite to the approval of
a bail bond.
The constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be
impaired.
In the case at bar, the CA upheld the need for arraignment before
the approval of bail bond. Herein accused will be forced either to
wait for her release after the resolution of her motion to quash or
foregoing her motion to quash in order for the petitioner to be
arraigned and be released on bail. Such condition will run contrary
to the constitutional rights of the accused not to be put on trial
upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a
crime and his right to bail.
Thus, the arraignment should not be a prerequisite to the approval
of a bail bond.
FOOTNOTE 376
FOOTNOTE 377

CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

CRESENCIA C. REYES, accused-appellant. G.R. Nos. 101127-31
DATE: August 7, 1992
PONENTE: Justice Florenz D. Regalado

FACTS:
1. Accused-Appellant: Cresencia Reyes
2.  The First Division of this Court referred en consulta to the Court En Banc the
question as to whether herein accused-appellant who was convicted, inter alia, of
estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced
therefor to serve twenty-two years of reclusion perpetua, with its accessory
penalties and liability for indemnification, may be allowed to remain on bail during
the pendency of her appeal from said conviction.
3. Appellant was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, in
three cases for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and two cases of
estafa.  These cases were jointly tried and a decision thereon was rendered by
Judge Angelina S. Gutierrez on March 12, 1991. 
4. On the two indictments for estafa, in Criminal Case No. 86-51209 she was found
guilty and sentenced to twenty-two years of reclusion perpetua with its accessory
penalties, to indemnify the complaining witness in the sum of P80,540.00 and to
pay the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not Appellants constitutional right was violated.

HELD:
NO, Appelants Constitutional right was not violated.
Sec. 13, Art. 3 of the Constitution provides that all person, except those charge
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or elease in
recognizance as may be provided by law.
In the case at bar, Cresencia Reyes has been convicted by the trial court and
sentenced to the penalty of imprisonment for 22 years, the penalty imposed
imposed is classified as reclusion perpetua; and while the case is on appeal, bail
may be denied, because the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua and the
evidence of the guilt is strong.
Thus, Cresencia Reyes’s Constitutional right was not violated.
FOOTNOTE 378

B/Gen. Jose Comendador, et. al v. Gen. Renato De Villa, et.al

August 2, 1991

Justice Isagani Cruz

Facts:

1. Petitioners are B/Gen. Jose Comendador, et. al, officers of the AFP
2. The petitioners were questioning the conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a motion
to bail was filed but was denied.
3. Petitioners, officers of the AFP, were facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed
coup d’ etat.
4. Respondents are Gen. Renato De Villa, et.al
5. Respondent De Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty pending the resolution of the
appeal they have taken before the court invoking that military officers are an exemption from the
right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution.

Issue: WON military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail.

Ruling: Yes. Military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail. The
Constitution provides that all persons, except those are charged with reclusion perpetua when
evidence is strong, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law.

Here, it involves the unique structure of the military and national security considerations which
may result to damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving
them the chance to continue their plot in overthrowing the government.

Thus, Military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail.
FOOTNOTE 379
FOOTNOTE 380
FOOTNOTE 381
FOOTNOTE 382
FOOTNOTE 383
FOOTNOTE 384
FOOTNOTE 385
CASE TITLE Serapio vs Sandiganbayan, GR No 148468
DATE January 28, 2003
PONENTE Justice Romeo Callejo Sr.
FACTS 1. Petitioner: Atty. Edward Serapio was charged with the crime of plunder
together with Former President Joseph Estrada and son Jinggoy Estrada
among others. Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and
legal counsel of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. He allegedly received,
on behalf of the said foundation, millions of pesos coming from illegal
activities.

2. Action of Petitioner: The petitioner filed two petitions in the SC; these are:
1. A petition for certiorari assailing the resolutions of the Third division
of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for
reinvestigation and motion to quash; 2. Petition for Habeas Corpus.

3. Subject/Object: Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus for the reason
that the prosecution has waived their right to present evidence in
opposition to his petition for bail; the prosecution launched an endless
barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves to prevent the conduct of the
bail hearings; and, on the failure of the People to adduce strong
evidence of his guilt. For the said reasons, he is still being deprived of his
liberty.

4. Respondents: Sandiganbayan (Third Division), People of the Philippines,

and Philippine National Police Director-General Leandro Mendoza

5. Action of Respondents: The Ombudsman recommended the filing of a case

against him before the Sandiganbayan. A warrant for his arrest was
issued. Upon learning of the said warrant he voluntarily surrendered to
the PNP.

ISSUE Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his
petition for bail may be conducted?

RULING No, petitioner should not first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for
bail may be conducted.

The Constitution provides that, all persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient securities, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.

In the instant case, arraignment of an accused is not a pre-requisite to the

conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for
bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender.

Therefore, petitioner should not first be arraigned before hearings of his

petition for bail may be conducted.
FOOTNOTE 386
FOOTNOTE 387
FOOTNOTE 388 (NOT A CASE)
FOOTNOTE 389 (NOT A CASE)
FOOTNOTE 390
FOOTNOTE 391
CASE TITLE: FELISA TABORITE and LUCY T. GALLARDO, Complainants, vs.
JUDGE MANUEL S. SOLLESTA, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, SURALLAH, SOUTH COTABATO,
Respondent, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1388
DATE: August 12, 2003
PONENTE: Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez

FACTS:
1. Petitioner is Felisa Taborite.
2. The administrative case was filed with the Office of Court Administrator by Felisa Taborite and
Lucy
Gallardo against Judge Sollesta as acting presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC)
Because of his unjust judgement in a criminal case for murder.
3. Felisa Taborite and Lucy Gallardo is the widow and sister of the deceased Bienvenido Taborite
who was killed by Reynaldo Divino. The complaint for murder was filed with the said MCTC and
the accused was arrested but then file a petition for bail. The hearing was set but the PNP-CIG
received no subpoena and on the 2 nd hearing they were notified but the public prosecutor was
not.
4. Respondent is Judge Manuel Sollesta.
5. The respondent Judge granted petition for bail which resulted to the complaint that the
release of accused was without the requisite hearing and recommendation from the prosecutor.
Court Administrator Velasco found that the bail was granted without notice to the prosecution
depriving opportunity to oppose bail.

ISSUE:
Wether or not respondent Judge erred in granting petition for bail without recommendations
from the prosecutor.

RULING:
Yes, respondent Judge erred in granting petition for bail without recommendations from the
prosecutor.
Under the law, granting bail to non-bailable offenses without hearing is ignorance of the law.
Before a judge may grant an application for bail, the prosecutor must be given reasonable notice of
hearing or he must be asked to submit his recommendations.
In the case at bench, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco found that respondent granted
bail to the accused without notice to the prosecution, depriving it the opportunity to oppose the
petition for bail.
Thus, respondent be fined in the amount of P20,000.00, with a warning that the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
FOOTNOTE 392
CASE TITLE Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla v CA and the People of the Philippines
DATE March 12, 1997; G.R No. 121917
PONENTE Justice Ricardo J. Francisco

FACTS 1. Subject/Object: Subject of this petition is the motion to cancel petitioner’s

bail bond which was filed by the Solicitor-General on the ground that
RTC Judge David Rosete found the accused guilty of the crime charged
sentencing him to a penalty of reclusion temporal pending his appeal.

2. Petitioner is Robin Cariño Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla. He was charged

with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions, such as armalite,
live ammunitions, pieces of pistols of various calibers, before RTC of
Angeles City.

3. Petitioner invoked his right to bail as a matter of right as proved by the

bailbond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty in the amount
of P200,000.00 which he paid even before the arraignment of the case.

4. Respondents are the CA and the State represented by Manarang and Cruz
who were both members of the Brgy Disaster Coordinating Council, and
the police officers who apprehended the petitioner.

5. The Solicitor-General contended that Petitioner’s failure to participate in

the trial, having waived in writing his right to be present in any and all
stages of the case, placed him in estoppel to assail the motion to cancel
his bail bond.

ISSUE Whether or not bail is a matter of right or discretion when accused is charge
with capital offenses.

RULING No. Bail is not a matter of right nor it is discretionary when accused is charge
with capital offenses.

Under the Constitution, the right to bail shall not be impaired.

In the instant case, when the accused is charged with an offense which
attaches a penalty of capital punishment or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or higher and evidence of guilty is strong, then bail shall
be denied as it is neither a matter of right or of discretion.

Therefore, bail is not a matter of right nor it is discretionary when accused is

charge with capital offenses.
FOOTNOTE 393
CASE TITLE People of the Philippines v Agustin Fortes y Garra
DATE June 25, 1993; G.R No. 90643
PONENTE Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.

FACTS 1. Subject/Object: Subject of this petition is the conviction of the appellant

for rape of a 13-year-old girl and the denial by the trial court of his
application for bail pending his appeal from the judgment of conviction
2. Accused-appellant is Agustin Fortes y Garra. He was charged with rape,
was apprehended, was able to bond for P25,000. Later, he was
convicted by the RTC Branch 55 of Irosin, Sorsogon to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.
3. Appellant sought to annul the order of the trial court denying his
application for bail, filed after his conviction, to secure his provisional
liberty pending the resolution of his appeal in the Supreme Court.
4. Plaintiff-appellee is the State. The victim is Merelyn Gine, a 13-year-old 6 th
grader, and a bred in a barangay atmosphere in Sorsogon.
5. The RTC denied the request for bail for appellant’s provisional liberty
pending appeal on the ground that the accused has already been found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense.

ISSUE Whether or not bail is a matter of right or discretion when accused is

convicted with capital offense, pending appeal.

RULING No. Bail is not a matter of right nor it is discretionary when accused is
convicted with capital offenses, pending appeal.

Under the Constitution, the right to bail shall not be impaired.

In the instant case, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of
discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by
any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is
absolute. Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable
by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if
the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. The clear
implication, therefore is that if an accused who is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and
sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part
of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation,
the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is
strong — which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before
conviction — it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the
accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Hence, bail is not a matter of right nor it is discretionary when accused is

convicted with capital offenses, pending appeal.
FOOTNOTE 394
FOOTNOTE 395

CASE TITLE: ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV vs HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., et al., (GR NO
179817)

DATE: June 27, 2008

PONENTE: Justice Carpio Morales

FACTS:
1. The petitioner of the case was Antonio F. Trillanes IV, who was charged along with his
comrades, with coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati on the event dubbed as “Oakwood Incident”

2. Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention,2 threw his hat in the political
arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
The petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests"

3. The present petition (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff, resource persons and
guests from meeting with him or transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii)
direct respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and guests and permit
him to attend all sessions and official functions of the Senate.

4.  The respondents of the case are Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. AFP Chief of Staff, Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navy’s Flag Officer-in-Command, Vice Admiral Rogelio
Calunsag; Philippine Marines’ Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine
Barracks Manila Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obeña (Obeña).

5.  The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE: Whether or Sen. Trillanes is correct in his contention that he should be allowed to bail since he
is non-flight risk

RULING: No. Sen. Trillanes is not correct in his contention that he should be allowed to bail since he
is non-flight risk.
Under the Constitution, all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
In the instant case, the petitioner’s contention that he is not a flight risk is irrelevant as it is only material
in ascertaining the amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of bail. Sen. Trillanes charged
with coup d’ etat, where the offense charged is a non-bailable offense, what is controlling is the
determination by the trial court that the evidence of guilt is strong. This accentuates the proviso that the
denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such
justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants.
Thus, Sen. Trillanes is not correct in his contention that he should be allowed to bail since he is non-flight
risk.

FOUND ALREADY IN THE BOOK OF DEAN NAVAL

PAGE: 143 PARAGRAPH __3__
FOOTNOTE 396
Obosa vs CA and PP GR no 114350

January 16, 1997

Panganiban, J.:

Facts:

1 Jose T. Obosa, who was charged with two (2) counts of murder but who was convicted only of
two (2) counts of homicide by the trial court, may be granted bail after such conviction for
homicide, a non-capital offense.
2 petitioner applied for bail and was granted by the RTC
3 The accused bail bond was cancelled and that lower court’s order dated may 31, 1990
granting bail bond to accuse was nullified.
4 Court of Appeals and People of the Phil represented by Solicitor General
5 Solicitor General argues that petitioner was convicted of the lesser offense of homicide, the
fact that he has appealed resultantly throws the whole case open for review and reverts him
back to his original situation as a person charged with the capital offense of murder on two (2)
counts against whom a strong evidence of guilt exists as initially found by the trial court during
the bail proceedings.
Issue: WON the bail bond approved by the Regional trial court was valid?

Ruling: No, the bail bond approved by the Regional trial court was invalid

As stated in the constitution, all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.

In the case at hand, Petitioner Obosa was charged with a lesser offense but a strong evidence of guilt
exists as initially found by the trial court during the bail proceedings making Obosas’ case non
bailable.
Therefore, the bail bond approved by the Regional trial court was invalid
FOOTNOTE 397 (NOTE: SECTION 6, RULE 114 OF THE RULES OF COURT)
Ricardo De La Camara, petitioner, vs. Hon. Manuel Lopez Enage, Presiding Judge of the Court of the First
Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City (Branch II), respondents.

September 17, 1971, G. R. Nos. L-32951-2

Ponente: Fenando, J.

Facts:

1. Ricardo de la Camara, petitioner, the Municipal Mayor of Ramon Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental was
arrested and detained at Provincial Jail of Agusan for alleged participation in the killing of fouteen and
wounding twelve laborers of the Tirador Logging Co.

2. Then, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Norte filed a case in the Court of First Instance for a multiple
frustrated murder and and multiple murder against the petitioner.

3. The defense failed to present an evidence, thus, the Respondent Judge issued an order granting the
petitioner's application for bail.

4. Respondent Judge established the fact that the petitioner would not flee if he had the opportunity,
thus, the bail bond amounting to P1,195,200.00 is set. The sum of P840,000.00 for the information
charging multiple murder, there being fourteen victim, and the sum of P355,200 for the other offense of
multiple frustrated murder.

5. After then, Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos suggested of lowering the bail bond to
P40,000.00 because the former bail bond was too excessive. But the respondent Judge was adamant on
his decision. Hence, the petition. Although this case is considered moot and academic because rhe
petitioner had escaped from the jail.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner's constitutional right was not observed regarding the excessive bail bond.

Ruling:

The excessive amount of bail bond is clearly a violative to the petitioner's constitutional right.

Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the evidence of
guilt is strong. It is established that the bail bond should not exceed to P50,000.00 for the information
for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder.

In this case, the amount of bail bond is way beyond the established amount of bail bond.

Clearly, the respondent judge's decision is not valid.

FOOTNOTE 398
Yap v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001

Ponente: Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes

Facts: 

1. Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for

misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,5 Million.

2. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed
a motion to fix bail pending appeal.

3. The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,5
Milion on condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of
the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain
to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must
be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.”

4. He sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the
SC. He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively
denied him his right to bail. 5.

5. He also contested the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a

certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and
travel.

Issues: 

Whether or not the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right
against excessive bail.

Ruling:

Yes. The proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against
excessive bail.

Under the Constitution, All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.

In the case at bar, setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive,

and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail.

Therefore, proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 constitutes violative of petitioner's right

against excessive bail.
FOOTNOTE 399
FOOTNOTE 400 (NOTE A CASE)