Daf Ditty Yoma 66: ‫ִאישׁ ִﬠִתּי‬, a “man for the hour”

They said it with so much enthusiasm, such ecstasy, that they could not stop. They were no
longer in Warsaw or Brisk: they were transported to a different reality. Although I am not a
musician or musicologist, all one had to do was hear the nigun of "Hakohanim Veha'am" to

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understand. One did not even need to hear the words in order to feel the nostalgia for what once
existed and is no longer.

Similarly, "V'kach haya moneh: achas, achas v'achas". Towards the end of the avoda, when
the scarlet thread turned white, the piyut describes how the nation exuded happiness, expressing
pleasure and delight, a feeling of closeness to Hashem: He is right beside me...

Why the happiness in reciting "mar'eh kohen"? Why was it sung with such a happy tune? The
answer is that the Kohen Gadol reflected the radiance of the shechina. Through witnessing the
radiant appearance of the Kohen Gadol, there could be no doubt about Hashem's acceptance
of klal yisrael's prayers...

Suddenly the payettan and the reader of the piyut are rudely awakened from a dream. They cry
'This is no longer the reality in which we live'. It existed once, yes, but is no more. One finds
himself alone in a stormy night, dark, lost, and yells 'all this occurred while the temple was in
existence: happy the eye which saw all these things' - but not our eyes." While reciting the
avoda, the Jew was transported to a different, beautiful world. He is now rudely awakened to
find himself in a bitter exile. The detail we just discussed: "vekach haya moneh, vekach haya
omer, hakohanim veha'am..." we no longer have.

Rav Soloveitchik, 1979 RCA Lecture

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3
MISHNA: The Yom Kippur service continues: The High Priest comes over to the scapegoat,
places both his hands upon it, and confesses. And he would say as follows: Please, God, Your
people, the house of Israel, have sinned, and done wrong, and rebelled before You. Please,

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God, grant atonement, please, for the sins, and for the wrongs, and for the rebellions that
they have sinned, and done wrong, and rebelled before You, Your people, the house of Israel,
as it is written in the Torah of Moses Your servant, saying:

‫ ְלַטֵהר‬,‫ַביּוֹם ַהֶזּה ְיַכֵפּר ֲﬠֵליֶכם‬-‫ל ִכּי‬ 30 For on this day shall atonement be made for you, to
,‫ ִלְפֵני ְיהָוה‬,‫ ַחטּ ֹאֵתיֶכם‬,‫ ִמֹכּל‬:‫ֶאְתֶכם‬ cleanse you; from all your sins shall ye be clean before
.‫ִתְּטָהרוּ‬ the LORD.
Lev 16:30

“For on this day atonement shall be made for you to cleanse you of all your sins; before the
Lord you shall be purified”

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And the priests and the people standing in the Temple courtyard, when they would hear the
Explicit Name emerging from the mouth of the High Priest, when the High Priest did not use
one of the substitute names for God, they would kneel and prostrate themselves and fall on
their faces, and say: Blessed is the name of His glorious kingdom forever and ever. After the
confession over the scapegoat, the priest passed the goat to the one who was to lead it to the
wilderness. According to the halakha, everyone is eligible to lead it, but the High Priests
established a fixed custom and did not allow an Israelite to lead it.

Rabbi Yosei said: That was not always the case. There was an incident where a person named
Arsela led the goat to the wilderness, and he was an Israelite. And they made a ramp for the
goat due to the Babylonian Jews who were in Jerusalem, who would pluck at the goat’s hair
and would say to the goat: Take our sins and go, take our sins and go, and do not leave them
with us.

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GEMARA: In the confession over the scapegoat, the High Priest confessed the sins of the Jewish
people, whereas he did not say: The children of Aaron, Your sacred people, in order to confess
the sins of the priests. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna that taught this mishna? Rabbi
Yirmeya said: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, for if it
were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, didn’t Rabbi Yehuda say: The priests
receive atonement through the scapegoat, which indicates that their sins must be mentioned in
the confession over the scapegoat?

It was taught in the mishna that the priest passed the goat to the one who was to lead it to the
wilderness. The Sages taught, with regard to the verse:

‫ ַﬠל‬,‫ְשֵׁתּי ָיָדו‬-‫ ַאֲהֹרן ֶאת‬T‫כא ְוָסַמ‬ 21 And Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the
-‫ ְוִהְתַוָדּה ָﬠָליו ֶאת‬,‫ר ֹאשׁ ַהָשִּׂﬠיר ַהַחי‬ live goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of the children
-‫ָכּל‬-‫ ְוֶאת‬,‫ֲﬠ ֹו ֹנת ְבֵּני ִיְשָׂרֵאל‬-‫ָכּל‬ of Israel, and all their transgressions, even all their sins; and
-‫ַחטּ ֹאָתם; ְוָנַתן ֹאָתם ַﬠל‬-‫ִפְּשֵׁﬠיֶהם ְלָכל‬ he shall put them upon the head of the goat, and shall send him
‫ִאישׁ ִﬠִתּי‬-‫ ְוִשַׁלּח ְבַּיד‬,‫ר ֹאשׁ ַהָשִּׂﬠיר‬ away by the hand of an appointed man into the wilderness.
.‫ַהִמְּדָבָּרה‬
Lev 16:21

“And he shall send it away with an appointed man into the wilderness”, that the halakhic midrash
interprets the word man as mentioned in order to qualify a non-priest for this task. The word
appointed indicates

that he should be designated the day before. The word appointed also indicates that the
scapegoat is always sent away at the appointed time, and even on Shabbat. Similarly, the word
appointed indicates that the scapegoat is always sent away at the appointed time, and even when
the appointed man is in a state of ritual impurity.

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The baraita stated that the word appointed indicates that the service is performed even on
Shabbat. The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha is this stated? There is no apparent
desecration of Shabbat by escorting the goat, since the halakha of Shabbat boundaries is merely
Rabbinic. Rav Sheshet said: It is mentioned in order to state that if the goat were ill and could
not walk the whole way, the one who escorts the goat carries it on his shoulder.

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Summary
A new Mishna speak of the sins of the people being placed on a goat's Head by the High Priest.1
The Gemara wonders: why is the Mishna phrased in a way that speaks only of the sins of the
Jewish people and not those of the High Priest? But perhaps it is assumed that a priest is in charge,
as atonement is granted through the rituals performed by priests. And if the scapegoat is
designated before Shabbat, and it becomes ill, can the priest carry it? The scapegoat is a living

1 https://dafyomibeginner.blogspot.com/search?q=yoma+66

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being, after all, which are allowed to be carried on Shabbat. The rabbis then debate whether the
laws of Shabbat regarding eiruvin and carrying apply on Yom Kippur.

What happens when the scapegoat is pushed from the cliff but does not die? The rabbis argue
whether the goat should be killed or whether it should be left to die. Here is another example of a
less than exemplary model of minimizing the suffering of animals.

In asking questions about the scapegoat, we move into a fascinating section of Talmud regarding
interactions with Rabbi Eliezer. In a note, we learn that Rabbi Eliezer was a Sage from before the
destruction of the second Temple. He was said to be a descendant of Moses with a wealthy family
who came to learn Torah only after his teenage years. When it came to halachic rulings, Rabbi
Eliezer did not answer questions directly unless he had learned the answer from one of his
teachers. He was innovative and forthcoming in other matters.

He is asked about a number of things and his responses seem to be diversions. However, Rabbi
Eliezer is interpreted as in fact answering questions through metaphor and creative
referencing. One of the interactions is with a "wise woman" who wants to know why all people
shared equally in the sin of the golden calf and yet they were punished with different ailments. To
this, Rabbi Eliezer tells us that women should be spinning and not asking such questions. The
wise woman's questions are answered, however, by both Rav and Levi.

One of our notes explains that perhaps this wise woman should not have asked such a question to
a Sage; a lesser authority could have answered. But this is not in line with our usual understanding
of Jewish thought: aren't all children supposed to ask questions, whether wise or not knowing how
to ask? Or perhaps this was only meant to apply to male children on Pesach.

I find it particularly interesting that the Talmud notes that this is a "wise woman". She was not
simply a woman, and she was not described in any other way: young or old, beautiful or plain. Her
question was important enough to be answered and to have those answers recorded in our oral
Torah. So why Rabbi Eliezer's disdain?

Perhaps there have been arguments about the role of women in Judaism from the times of the
Temple - or even earlier. Perhaps there were some rabbis, like Rabbi Eliezer, who wanted women
to maintain only roles of service in the home. And other rabbis, like Rav and Levi, might have

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been interested in hearing women's voices and having their questions inform the narrative of our
tradition.

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:2

MISHNAH: The Mishnah continues with the procedure of the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur: He
then came to the Azazel goat and leans his two hands upon it and he made a confession. And this
is what he would say:

Please Hashem, Your people, the House of Israel have sinned inadvertently, sinned willfully
and sinned rebelliously before You. Please Hashem! Please atone for the inadvertent sins, the
willful sins and the rebellious sins which Your people, the House of Israel, have committed
inadvertently, committed willfully and committed rebelliously before You, as it is written in the
Torah of Moshe, Your servant, to say: for on this day shall atonement be made for you, to purify
you; from all your sins before Hashem shall you be purified.

And when the Kohanim and the people standing in the Courtyard heard the Ineffable Name come
forth from the mouth of the Kohen Gadol, they kneeled, prostrated themselves, and fell on their
faces, and called out: Blessed be the Name of His glorious kingdom forever and ever! They handed
it (the Azazel goat) over to the one who was to lead it away. All were permitted to lead it away,
but the Kohanim made it a definite rule, and they did not permit a non-Kohen to lead it. Rabbi
Yosi said: It once happened that Arsela led it away, although he was a non-Kohen. And they made
a ramp for him, because of the Babylonians, who would pull its hair, saying to him: Take it and
leave, take it and leave.

The Gemora notes: But he (the Kohen Gadol) did not say (in his confession): “The sons of Aaron,
Your holy people”. Which Tanna is of this opinion? Rabbi Yirmiyah said: This is not in accordance
with Rabbi Yehudah, for if it were in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah, surely he said: They (the
Kohanim) as well, obtain atonement thru the Azazel goat. Abaye said: You might even say that it
is in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah: Are the Kohanim not included in ‘Your people, Israel’?

The Mishnah had stated: They handed it (the Azazel goat) over to the one who was to lead it away.
The Gemora cites a Baraisa: And he (the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur) shall send it (the Azazel
goat) away with a designated man; ‘man’ implies that also a non-Kohen is qualified; ‘designated’
(iti) implies that it should be someone who was designated for it; ‘iti’ – even on Shabbos, and ‘iti’
- even in tumah.

The Gemora notes the novelty of teaching that a non-Kohen is allowed to send it away; for you
might have thought that since the term ‘atonement’ is written in connection with it (perhaps a
Kohen is required); therefore he informs us otherwise.

The Mishnah had stated: ‘Iti’ - even on Shabbos. For what law was this needed? Rav Sheishes said
that this teaches us the law that if it (the Azazel goat) is sick, he may carry it on his shoulder
(although it is “carrying” on Shabbos).

2
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The Gemora asks: According to whose view is this? Seemingly, it is not according to Rabbi
Nassan, for Rabbi Nassan said: A living being carries itself (and one who carries a living creature
does not violate the melachah of “carrying”). The Gemora answers: You may even say that this is
in accordance with Rabbi Nassan, for when it is sick, it is different (for then, it will not support its
own weight).

Rafram remarked: This proves that the laws concerning eruv and transferring apply to Shabbos
and do not apply to Yom Kippur(for otherwise, why would it be necessary to teach that the goat
may be carried on Shabbos; if it may be carried on Yom Kippur, then it can be carried on Shabbos
as well)!

The Baraisa had stated: ‘Iti’ - even in tumah. For what law was this needed? Rav Sheishes said: It
is teaching us that if he who is to carry it away became tamei, he may enter the Courtyard while
tamei and carry it away.

Rabbi Eliezer was asked: What about his carrying it on his shoulder (if it became sick)? He said:
It (was so strong and healthy that it) could carry you and me. They asked him: If he who is to take
it away became sick, may he send it away through someone else? He replied: I and you shall be in
peace! [We will never need to accompany the hegoat.] They asked him: If he pushed it down and
it did not die, must he go down after it and kill it? He said to them: So may all your enemies go
lost, O Hashem. But the Sages said: If it became sick, he may carry it on his shoulder; if the one
who was designated to send it became sick, he should send it through another person; if he pushed
it down and it did not die, he shall go down and kill it.

"Ki ba'yom ha'zeh y'cha'peir a'leichem l'ta'heir es'chem mikole chato'seichem lifnei Hashem
tit'horu" –

Because on this day He will forgive you to purify you from all your sins in front of Hashem you
will become purified - What do the last three words of this phrase add to our understanding? The
verse tells us that on this special day of Yom Kippur Hashem readily accepts our contrition and
repentance. One might then put aside any efforts at repenting before Yom Kippur.

This is why the verse adds on, "lifnei Hashem tit'horu." Even before we will experience Hashem,
the Holy Name of mercy, which readily forgives, nevertheless, "lifnei Hashem tit'horu," earlier,
before the day of Hashem's merciful atonement we should begin our purification process.

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 "AND UPON HEARING THE NAME OF HASHEM THE
PEOPLE BOWED"

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:3

The Mishnah states that when the Kohen Gadol mentioned the Name of Hashem during the
recitation of the Viduy on the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach (the third Viduy of the day), all of the people
who were gathered in the Mikdash bowed down.

By bowing upon hearing the Name of Hashem, the people gave honor to Hashem. (The Yerushalmi
says that when they heard the Name of Hashem, the people near the Kohen Gadol bowed down,
and the people who were far away proclaimed, "Baruch Shem Kevod Malchuso....")

The Kohen Gadol uttered the Name of Hashem at other times during the Yom Kippur service. The
Mishnah earlier (35b) states that he uttered the Name of Hashem during the first Viduy on the Par.
Similarly, the Mishnah (39a) states that he uttered the Name of Hashem during the second Viduy
on the Par. Another Mishnah (41b) states that he uttered the Name of Hashem when he performed
the Goral to choose the Sa'ir la'Shem.

The Beraisa (39b) summarizes and says that the Name of Hashem was uttered ten times on Yom
Kippur -- three times during each of the three Viduyim and once during the Goral.

Why does the Mishnah in all of those places omit mention of the people's prostration at the time
of the Kohen Gadol's utterance of the Name of Hashem?

(a) The VILNA GA'ON emends the text of the Mishnah here so that it makes no mention of the
people's prostration. (The DIKDUKEI SOFRIM #100 points out that a number of early
manuscripts do not include these words in the Mishnah.) Even though it is true that the people
bowed down (as the Beraisa and Gemara mention), the Mishnah does not mention it because it is
not a detail in the laws of Yom Kippur, but rather in the laws of Hazkaras Hashem, mentioning the
Name of Hashem, and thus it does not belong in the Mishnayos which discuss the Avodos of Yom
Kippur.

The Mishnah in Sotah (37b-38a) mentions the differences between the recitation of Birkas
Kohanim in the Beis ha'Mikdash and the recitation of Birkas Kohanim everywhere else. The
Mishnah there says that in the Beis ha'Mikdash, the Birkas Kohanim included the actual
pronouncement of the Name of Hashem. The GEVURAS ARI here (see also Insights to Yoma
37:1) asks that the Mishnah in Sotah should also mention as a difference the prostration that was
performed when the Name of Hashem was uttered, since it was performed in the Beis ha'Mikdash
(because the Name of Hashem was pronounced) and nowhere else. According to the Vilna Ga'on's
understanding, the answer to this question is that there is no need for the Mishnah in Sotah to

3
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mention the prostration as a difference, because that is not a Halachah which relates specifically
to Birkas Kohanim.

(b) In the RAMBAM's text of the Mishnah, the people's prostration is mentioned only in the
earlier Mishnah (35b) with regard to the first Viduy, which is the first time that the Mishnah
mentions that the Kohen Gadol uttered the Name of Hashem. Thereafter the Mishnah does not
need to mention that the people bowed, because the first Mishnah already mentioned it.

(c) RAV YOSEF DOV SOLOVEITCHIK (Avodas Yom ha'Kipurim, 37a) writes that perhaps
the reason why the people bowed at the mention of Hashem's name was not in order to honor the
Name of Hashem. Rather, it was an act related specifically to the Viduy recited over the Sa'ir
ha'Mishtale'ach. Accordingly, it is fitting that only the Mishnah here mentions it and not the earlier
Mishnayos.

RASHI (21a, DH Mishtachavim) writes that the people used to bow when they recited Viduy in
the Beis ha'Mikdash. If bowing indeed is related specifically to Viduy, then it makes sense that
the people bowed only when the Name of Hashem was said during "the people's Viduy" (the
Viduy recited over the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach on behalf of atonement for the sins of the entire
nation). Even though the Name of Hashem was mentioned during the Goral, the Goral was not a
Viduy and thus the people did not bow at that time. When the Name of Hashem was uttered during
the first and second Viduyim, the people did not bow because those two Viduyim were for the
Kohen Gadol himself (although all of the Kohanim gained atonement through the second Viduy,
their atonement was only "b'Kufya" -- secondary to the Kohen Gadol's atonement -- as the Gemara
(50b) explains). In contrast, the Viduy of the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach was for all of the Jewish people,
and therefore the people bowed when they heard the Name of Hashem.4

As an aside, Rav Soloveitchik points out that during the Avodah prayer of Yom Kippur, it is
customary to bow down four times -- three times during the description of the three Viduyim, and
one time during the description of the Goral (the latter according to the Nusach Sefard text of the
Avodah). Why do we bow down four times? If we do not accept Rav Soloveitchik's understanding
of the Mishnah, we should bow down ten times, just as the people bowed down in the Beis
ha'Mikdash ten times on Yom Kippur when the Kohen Gadol uttered the Name of Hashem (three
times during each Viduy, and once at the time of the Goral). According to Rav Soloveitchik's
understanding, we should bow down only once, during the Viduy of the Sa'ir.

He answers that the prostrations during Musaf on Yom Kippur are not for the sake of giving honor
to the Name of Hashem, but rather they commemorate what was done during the Avodah of Yom
Kippur in the Beis ha'Mikdash. It suffices to bow once during each Viduy to demonstrate what
was done in the Beis ha'Mikdash. (See also PERISHAH OC 621.)

He suggests further, based on the Rambam in Hilchos Tefilah (9:1), that when a prayer involves a
series of responses (such as a series of prostrations or "Amen"s), it suffices to respond once at the

4
See TOSFOS YOM TOV (DH veha'Kohanim), who alludes to such an approach but eventually rejects it, asserting that the
people bowed to honor the Name of Hashem and not because of the Viduy. The premise of the Tosfos Yom Tov is borne out by
the Avodah prayer recited on the Yom Kippur, which mentions three (Nusach Ashkenaz) or four (Nusach Sefard) bowings.

14
end of the prayer rather than to respond at various points in the prayer. Thus, it was sufficient to
bow once at the end of each Viduy, even though the Name of Hashem was mentioned three times
in each Viduy.

"TITHARU" -- THE COMMON PRACTICE TODAY

The Mishnah describes the procedure of the Viduy with the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach. The Kohen
Gadol approached the Sa'ir, laid his hands upon it, and uttered the confession on behalf of the
Jewish people. The description of the procedure is incorporated into the Chazan's repetition of
Musaf on Yom Kippur recited today. However, there is a difference between the way the Chazan
recites the text of the Viduy of the Kohen Gadol, and the way the Kohen Gadol actually said it.
The common practice is that when the Chazan reaches the words "Lifnei Hashem" in the verse,
"Ki ba'Yom ha'Zeh Yechaper Aleichem... Lifnei Hashem Titharu," he pauses while the
congregation recites the next words in the Mishnah, "veha'Kohanim veha'Am... Hayu
Mishtachavim," and everyone bows down (in some communities, only the Chazan recites those
words and bows down). After everyone has bowed down, the Chazan continues and says "Titharu,"
the last word of the verse he started before the pause. (This is also the order printed in most editions
of the Yom Kippur Machzor.)

Why does the Chazan pause before he recites the word "Titharu"? The Mishnah makes no mention
of such an interruption. Rather, it says that the Kohen Gadol recited the verse in its entirety, and
afterwards it describes how the people and the other Kohanim bowed down when they heard the
Name of Hashem.

RAV SHALOM SHVADRON zt'l, the Magid of Yerushalayim (who served as the Ba'al Tefilah
on Yom Kippur for many years in the Chevron Yeshiva in Givat Mordechai, Yerushalayim) said
that although the people in the Beis ha'Mikdash bowed down immediately when they heard the
Name of Hashem, there indeed is no reason for the Chazan to split up the verse and mention the
last word of the verse ("Titharu") after he says the other words of the Mishnah that describe the
people's prostration. Rav Shalom asserted that there is absolutely no source for interrupting the
verse. Therefore, when he would serve as Chazan he would complete the verse and say, "Lifnei
Hashem Titharu" before he continued with the words, "veha'Kohanim veha'Am...." This is also the
practice in a number of congregations.

Perhaps the source of the common practice to divide the verse is as follows. The TUR (OC 621)
quotes RAV SA'ADYAH GA'ON who says that when the Chazan recounts the Viduy that the
Kohen Gadol said ("Ana ha'Shem..."), he should not say the actual Name of Hashem when he
quotes the verse, "Lifnei Hashem Titharu." Rather, he should the say the word "ha'Shem" ("the
Name"). When the custom of Rav Sa'adyah Ga'on was introduced, the Chazan no longer recited
the Name of Hashem in the verse, but rather the word "ha'Shem." Since the Name of Hashem was
not recited, there was nothing wrong with interrupting in the middle of the verse. Later, as the Tur
relates in the name of RABEINU YITZCHAK IBN GE'AS, the practice was changed again and
the Name of Hashem was recited by the Chazan when he said the verse. However, the printers of
the Yom Kippur Machzor neglected to correct the corresponding change in the Machzor and did

15
not remove the interruption between the first part of the verse and the word "Titharu." (M.
Kornfeld)

Other Possible Scapegoat Situations

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:5

A series of questions on our daf are directed at Rabbi Eliezer, who appears to make a serious
attempt to avoid answering them directly.

When asked whether the scapegoat could be carried if it became sick, Rabbi Eliezer answered “the
scapegoat can carry both me and you.” When asked whether a replacement for the person who
escorted the scapegoat to the cliff could be inserted if the first person became ill, he answered
“both you and I should remain in peace.”

When asked whether the person who escorts the scapegoat should go down and kill it in the event
that it did not die in the fall off the cliff, he answered by quoting a passage in Sefer Shoftim
(Judges) (5:31) “So should all of God’s enemies be destroyed.”

Perhaps the simplest way of understanding Rabbi Eliezer’s answers is that he was suggesting that
these situations would never occur, and therefore there was no need to discuss them in a serious
way.

Many of the commentaries argue that Rabbi Eliezer was not avoiding the questions, rather he chose
to express his opinion on them in an indirect manner. His answer that the scapegoat could carry
the people hinted that such carrying would be permissible on Shabbat. Saying that they should
remain in peace indicated that anyone could step in and be a fitting substitute for the designated
person who became ill. Finally, quoting the passage in Sefer Shoftim showed that he felt that once
the commandment was fulfilled and the scapegoat was thrown from the cliff, no further
involvement was necessary. In fact, the Jerusalem Talmud reports that the scapegoat
occasionally escaped into the desert.

The Gemara recounts several other questions that were presented to Rabbi Eliezer, about which
he gives unclear responses, and explains that he was not simply trying to avoid the questions, rather
he was abiding by his personal position of never offering a ruling that he did not have a tradition
on from his teachers (see Sukkah 27b, where Rabbi Eliezer explains this position). Nevertheless
it should be noted that this holds true only for questions of a final legal ruling. With regard to the
arguments and discussions that took place in the bet midrash, he certainly played an active role
that included his own original suggestions.

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The “timely man” was accompanied along his way toward the cliff, until he reached the last two
mil. The last hut was stationed at this distance from the cliff, beyond the range of ‫ שבת תחום‬to
ensure that no one would join him during this final stage of his journey.6

Tosafos Yom Tov explains that the reason he had to travel alone was to fulfill the Torah’s
description that the cliff be in an ‫—גזירה ארץ‬a land which is cut off. It had to be forlorn and desolate,
uninhabited and deserted. Sefer ‫ אש גחלי‬notes that in contrast to the multitudes who joined this man
along his way, the Mishnah uses the singular form in describing this final stretch: “[The observer]
stands at a distance and watches the event.” ‫ יצחק שיח‬points out that the verse indicates that only a
“timely man” shall take the goat to the desert. This, he feels, is the source from which we learnt
that no one else should accompany this man to the final destination.

Gaon Ya’avetz, in his Sefer ‫שמים לחם‬, explains that the goat for Azazel was a form of homage
given to Satan. We do not want to accord any form of honor to Satan by having this tribute
presented with a full delegation of representatives. Therefore, the Torah scales back the entourage
to the one individual man in order to deny any additional importance to this event. The Mishnah
reported that the delegation which set out from Yerushalayim comprised the most important
personalities of the city.

Yet Rambam (Yom HaKippurim 3:7) omits this detail. In fact, he writes that perhaps only one or
two people would accompany the timely man. Aruch HaShulchan (Kodoshim 161:14) wonders
why Rambam leaves this detail out. Perhaps Rambam understood that the groups along the way
were not there to honor the mitzvah, but simply in order that this man not be frightened to travel
to the desert by himself as the day wanes. This loneliness and fear could be dissipated with one or
two escorts.

Sara Ronis writes:7

The mishnah on today’s daf points out a challenge with gathering Jews from all over the world
on Yom Kippur, with their different expectations and attitudes toward ritual life. Culture clash
becomes somewhat inevitable — like this:

And they made a ramp for the goat due to the Babylonian Jews who were in Jerusalem, who
would pluck at the goat’s hair and would say to the goat: Take our sins and go, take our sins
and go.

6
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Yoma%20067.pdf
7
Myjewishlearning.com

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The goat designated for Azazel, who bore the sins of the community into the wilderness, had to be
led out of the Temple through the crowds that had arrived for the Day of Atonement. It seems that
the Babylonian Jews would touch the goat and pull on its hair in order to spur it to leave Jerusalem
faster. The Jews of Jerusalem, on the other hand, felt that the goat should pass through unpestered
— so they built a ramp that would keep the goat out of reach. Were they concerned about possible
pain caused to the goat by the hair-pulling? Were they concerned that this kind of overwhelming
attack on the goat might lead to its death before it ever got to the wilderness? Did they just think
that the Babylonian Jews’ behavior was undignified? The mishnah doesn’t tell us.

If we picture the rabbis of the Babylonian Talmud reciting this mishnah and then discussing it
together, we can imagine just how awkward that experience might have been. While the Mishnah
was compiled and edited by rabbis who lived in the north of Israel, in the Galilee, and collects the
teachings of men who lived throughout the land of Israel, the Babylonian Talmud records the
rabbinic thinking of the Jewish community in Babylon — the very place whose people are being
called out here as inappropriate!

Fun fact: There is actually a second version of this mishnah, found in the Tosefta (a collection of
rabbinic teachings that closely parallels our Mishnah). Interestingly, the Tosefta’s version
identifies the goat hair-pulling rabble not as Babylonian but as Alexandrian. In the time of the
Second Temple, the Jewish community of Alexandria was wealthy, politically integrated into the
Roman world (though not always in positive ways!) and their Judaism was vibrant and innovative,
producing both awe-inspiring synagogues and Jewish texts like the Septuagint. The stunning
golden gates commissioned for the Temple that we read about on Yoma 38 were crafted in
Alexandria. It’s not hard to imagine a kind of rivalry existed between the Jews of Jerusalem, the
ritual center of Jewish life, and the Jews from Alexandria which was home to so much Jewish
innovation.

But were these folks pestering the Yom Kippur scapegoat in fact Babylonian or Alexandrian? The
daf attempts to resolve that question:

Rabba bar bar Hana said: They were not actually Babylonians, rather they were Alexandrians
from Egypt. And since (in the land of Israel) they hate the Babylonians, they would call all
foreigners who acted inappropriately by their name as an insult.

Clearly, these culture clashes ran deep and, at least according to this Babylonian, the Jews in the
land of Israel felt that Jews from both Alexandria and Babylonia didn’t know how to act properly
when it came to Temple rituals.

The Jews of Jerusalem were probably correct — after all, locals are going to be far more familiar
with local customs and appropriate patterns of behavior than visitors. But the Gemara still reminds
us of the human cost of this kind of name-calling:

Rabbi Yehuda says: They were not Babylonians, rather they were Alexandrians.

Rabbi Yosei (whose family was from Babylonia) said to him: May your mind be at ease, since
you have put my mind at ease.

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Two thousand years later, being part of the stigmatized group causes no less anxiety and shame.
But let’s not oversell the message — the Gemara doesn’t reject the stereotypes entirely but does
insist that they only apply to other people.

A Scent of Truth
Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:8

Our daf (Yoma 66b) relates how Rabbi Eliezer was asked a number of questions which he evaded
answering, and as the Gemara then proceeds to explain, ‘it was not that Rabbi Eliezer was trying
to avoid the topic, but instead, because he was not say anything that he had never heard from his
teacher’ (see Sukkah 28a where Rabbi Eliezer says this explicitly about himself). However, as
many of the commentaries observe, this is clearly not the case since Rabbi Eliezer proposed and
taught many original Torah insights. So what are we to make of this statement?

Rav Chaim Shmuelevitz offers a stunning answer to this question in a talk which he delivered in
5731 (1971) about the teacher-student relationship, where he speaks of the ‘scent of truth’ that one
can receive from one’s teacher. As he explains:

‘a student receives from their teacher this sense of ‘the scent of truth’ with respect to their
understanding of Torah and the words of the Sages, and even if the student may not have been
able to fully grasp the Torah insights of their teacher (given the greatness of their teacher),
nevertheless they can sense, in their soul, what their teacher would say about a topic. This is
what an authentic student is, for if it were to be that they literally never say anything that they
did not hear from their teacher, this doesn’t make them a student, but instead, just a
mouthpiece… Thus, Rabbi Eliezer most certainly expounded and ruled on matters that he had
not previously heard (from his teacher), but he would not rule on a matter prior to probing and
clarifying to himself that this is what his teacher would have ruled.’

As someone who was blessed to have some truly remarkable teachers, almost every day I endeavor
to tap into that ‘scent of truth’ that I was fortunate to receive from them. Admittedly, it is nigh
impossible to know with certainty whether they would rule as I do in particular cases. At the same
time, in a way that is equally impossible to describe, I often have an intuitive sense that they may
have done so, which means that when approaching challenging questions even when sitting alone,
I know I am not alone in my thinking and reasoning.

However, there is one thing that is different between a scent and a teacher-student relationship,
which is that while a scent dissipates over time, it is often only after a period of time that a student
begins to truly comprehend the lessons they learnt from their teacher, as the Gemara remarks, ‘it
may take a person forty years to understand their teacher’ (Avodah Zara 5b), which is perhaps why
our Sages compared wise teachers to old wine (Avot 4:20), because like both, our appreciation of
them increases with age.

8
www.rabbijohnnysolomon.com

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 Between the Lines

Rabbi Jay Kelman writes:9

One of great and tragic figures in our Talmudic corpus is that of Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrkanus.
Hailed by his teacher, Rabbi Yochanan ben Zackai, as a “cemented cistern that does not lose one
drop”, his greatness was such that “if all the scholars of Israel would be on side of the scale and
Eliezer ben Hyrkanus on the other, he would weigh them all down” (Avot 2:8).

9 https://torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/yoma-66-between-the-lines

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In a most famous and tragic story (see here), Rabbi Eliezer refused to accept the will of Sages in
the case of the “oven of achnai”, regarding an obscure law of purity and impurity. While in theory,
he was correct—as attested by a heavenly voice declaring that the law is like Rabbi Eliezer—his
refusal to accept the ruling of the Sages that “Torah is not in heaven” led to his excommunication
(Bava Metzia 59b). He lived his life in lonely isolation, unable to fully interact with his colleagues;
and only as his soul departed was the decree of excommunication lifted (Sanhedrin 68a).
His fierce independence is all the more striking in light of his response when he was asked a
question for which he had no tradition. “He said to them, do you force me to say something I have
not heard from my teachers? In all my days, I never said anything I did not hear from my master”
(Sukkah 28a). In several places, the Talmud records how questions posed to Rabbi Eliezer were
answered with non sequiturs, lest he be forced to say something he did not hear from his master.
In a discussion regarding how the shair le’azazel was led to the desert, the Talmud records three
questions the Sages asked Rabbi Eliezer. “If the animal is sick, may one carry it on their
shoulders—a possible violation of carrying? If the one leading the goat was sick, may he appoint
another in his stead? If they pushed the animal off the mountain but it did not die, should one go
down and kill it? (Yoma 66b). Instead of clearly answering these queries,[1] he cryptically
responded, “he can carry me and you; there should be peace with me and you”; and by quoting the
verse “So perish all Thine enemies, O Lord” (Shoftim 5:31).
After a few more incomprehensible answers to some other questions—such as responding to a
question of what the law is regarding a mamzer inheriting property with another question, asking
what the law is regarding his performing Yibum—the Gemara notes, “not because he pushed them
aside with words, but rather because he never said anything he did not hear from his teacher”.
Yet like all self-assessments, there is much that is missing. Rabbi Eliezer taught much that was
original; his views on the oven of achnai were his, and his alone. Even more startling is to read
the following: “Then Rabbi Eliezer sat down and taught things that had not been said to Moshe on
Mt. Sinai, and his face radiated light like the sun and emitted light like the rays of Moshe, and no
one could tell whether it was day or night. Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Shimon Ben-Netanel went
and told Rabban Yohanan Ben-Zakkai: ‘Come see Rabbi Eliezer sitting and teaching more things
than were said to Moshe on Mt. Sinai’ (Avot de Rabbi Natan). Was Rabbi Eliezer the great
traditionalist, refusing to say something he had not heard from his teachers, or was he the great
innovator, the most original mind that the Jewish people had yet seen?
Maybe he was both. Being faithful to one’s teachers often requires great innovation. Life stands
still for no one, and different situations require the same teaching to be applied differently.
Yitzchak Avinu mimicked his father at every turn. When famine struck, he—following in his
father’s footsteps—began to journey to Egypt. However, times were different; and G-d appeared
to Yitzchak, telling him not to go.
As G-d does not speak directly to us, it is often most difficult to discern when and how we must
change our response so that we actually are following in the footsteps of those who came before
us. Rabbi Eliezer understood his teachers so well that he could apply their teachings to new
situations. He was able at the same time to be totally faithful to their teachings as he said things
that no one had heard before[2].

 Rav Soloveitchik was once asked how he was able to come
up with such original and creative ideas through the reading of text before him. He responded that

21
his father taught him how to read between the lines[3]. 

We all live between the lines. We
must work hard so that we are able to be faithful to our lives.

[1] The ability to clearly express oneself is so crucial to teaching that one was not allowed to give semicha to those who were hard
to follow. Knowledge improperly communicated can actually be quite dangerous (see Sanhedrin 5b).
[2] The above is based on an idea I heard from Rav Herschel Schachter in the name of Rav Kuk. 

[3] This, too, I heard from Rav Schachter.

How to send a goat away

Mark Kerzner writes:10

The High Priest would then go to the goat sent to Azazel, lean on it with both his hands, and say another
confession, similar to the one above "Please, God, forgive your nation.

He handed the Azazel goat to the person appointed to lead it to the cliff. Anyone could lead it, but the
custom was that only a Kohen did it. They have built a ramp that led from the Temple Courtyard to outside
the city of Jerusalem, for leading the goat. It was constructed because of the Babylonians who would pull
his hair and say to him, "Take our sins and go!"

They asked Rabbi Eliezer, "If the goat became sick, can the Kohen carry him" (given the prohibition to
carry on Yom Kippur)? He answered, "The goat can carry you and me together!" They asked him, "If the
Kohen shoved the goat off the cliff but it did not die, should he descend and kill it?" He answered, "May
all the enemies of God perish!" The Talmud gives more evasive replies by Rabbi Eliezer but comments that
he simply did not want to reply when he did not have definite knowledge of the matter. However, the Sages
give a positive answer to both questions.

‫ִאישׁ ִﬠִתּי‬, a “man for the hour”

‫ ַﬠל ר ֹאשׁ‬,‫ְשֵׁתּי ָיָדו‬-‫ ַאֲהֹרן ֶאת‬V‫כא ְוָסַמ‬ 21 And Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live
‫ֲﬠ ֹו ֹנת‬-‫ָכּל‬-‫ ְוִהְתַוָדּה ָﬠָליו ֶאת‬,‫ַהָשִּׂﬠיר ַהַחי‬ goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of the children of
-‫ִפְּשֵׁﬠיֶהם ְלָכל‬-‫ָכּל‬-‫ ְוֶאת‬,‫ְבֵּני ִיְשָׂרֵאל‬ Israel, and all their transgressions, even all their sins; and he shall
,‫ר ֹאשׁ ַהָשִּׂﬠיר‬-‫ַחטּ ֹאָתם; ְוָנַתן ֹאָתם ַﬠל‬ put them upon the head of the goat, and shall send him away by
.‫ִאישׁ ִﬠִתּי ַהִמְּדָבָּרה‬-‫ְוִשַׁלּח ְבַּיד‬ the hand of an appointed man into the wilderness.

10 http://talmudilluminated.com/yoma/yoma66.html

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 Rashi Lev 16:21

As it states in the Zohar:

This man would not survive long after and the precise word indicating this is “iti” since it appears
from this use that he had fulfilled his entire purpose (in this world) and there was no need for any
further completion (of his earthly mission) in this world. (therefore he did not survive long after).

23
Zohar II 63b Acharei Mos

Matok Mi’dvash

24
 Tosefta Kifshutah on Yoma

From these sources it appears that the ‫ ִאישׁ ִﬠִתּי‬was also facing a short lifespan and would not
survive the year and who time had come to die as well.

Rabbi Yonah Ibn Janach (995-1050) in Sefer Hashorashim gives the following explanation, based
on other pesukim in Tanach in which the word is used associated with people:

‫איש עתי‬: ‫ יודע מה שיעשה בשעה‬,‫חכם ובקי בדינים‬

‫ ל״ג( וכן יודעי‬,‫ מל׳ יודע בינה לעתים )דה״א י״ב‬,‫ההיא‬
361 ‫ )סה״ש‬.(‫)העתים )אסתר א׳ י״ג‬.

"‫ איש עתי‬-- a scholar and expert in the laws, who knows what to do at the time, from the language
of [I Divrei Hayamim 12:33]:

25
 ‫ יוְֹדֵﬠי ִביָנה‬,‫לג וִּמְבֵּני ִיָשּׂשָכר‬ 33 And of the children of Issachar, men that had
--‫ַיֲּﬠֶשׂה ִיְשָׂרֵאל‬-‫ ַמה‬,‫ ָלַדַﬠת‬,‫ַלִﬠִתּים‬ understanding of the times, to know what Israel ought to do;
-‫ֲאֵחיֶהם ַﬠל‬-‫ ְוָכל‬,‫ָראֵשׁיֶהם ָמאַת ִים‬ the heads of them were two hundred; and all their brethren
{‫ }ס‬.‫ִפּיֶהם‬ were at their commandment. {S}

The “timely man” was accompanied along his way toward the cliff, until he reached the last two
mil. The last hut was stationed at this distance from the cliff, beyond the range of ‫ שבת תחום‬to
ensure that no one would join him during this final stage of his journey...

The Mishnah reported that the delegation which set out from Yerushalayim comprised the most
important personalities of the city....Perhap the groups along the way were not there to honor the
mitzvah, but simply in order that this man not be frightened to travel to the desert by himself as
the day wanes. This loneliness and fear could be dissipated with one or two escorts.

I cannot help but imagine his loneliness and fear as he realizes the honor accorded him came with
a mortal price. As we face our own mortality we too need the help and encouragement of. those
who care for us along the way through this last milestone.

I will never forget the kindness of my twin sister who received a call from our dying mother in a
panic as she faced the realization she was dying soon...she rushed to Shaarei Zedek hospital and
climbed into her bed and held her for 9 hours until she calmed down.

Maybe we can label him "Lonely Man of Time" (not Faith!)

We are all this lonely man of time...

Based on a lecture by Harav Aharon Lichtenstein11

DIFFERENTIATED AND UNDIFFERENTIATED REPENTANCE12

11 https://www.etzion.org.il/en/holidays/yom-kippur/kalot-and-chamurot-gradation-sin-repentance
12 Adapted by Rav Reuven Ziegler Transcribed by Myles Brody

26
 Many of our sources note the existence of different levels within the world of mitzva
observance. I wish to examine the extent, if any, to which we are sensitive to these gradations
within the context of teshuva (repentance). Let me open by citing two classic texts relating
to teshuva. The Rambam opens his Hilkhot Teshuva as follows:

With regard to all the precepts in the Torah, positive commands or negative ones,
whenever a person transgresses one of them, either willfully or unknowingly, and
subsequently repents and turns away from his sin, it is his duty to confess before God,
blessed be He, as it is said, "When a man or woman shall commit any sin that men
commit, to do a trespass against the Lord, and that person be guilty, then they shall
confess their sin which they have done" (Bamidbar 5:6-7). This means to confess in
words, and this confession is an affirmative precept.
How does one confess? One says, "I beseech You, O Lord, I have sinned, I have acted
perversely, I have transgressed before You, and have done thus and thus, and lo, I repent
and am ashamed of my deed and will never do this again." This constitutes the essence
of confession. The more one elaborates and the more detailed the confession one makes,
the more he is praiseworthy.

The Rambam's presentation here is comprehensive and undifferentiated. He makes a

sweeping statement about "all the precepts in the Torah, positive commands or negative
ones." There is no hint of weighing the significance or substance of a particular sin. The process
is more or less uniform, the formulation identical, except for the fact that a person must mention
exactly what he has done – slandered someone, shaved with a razor, lent with interest, etc.

In contrast, the third section of Rabbeinu Yona's Sha'arei Teshuva opens with an
exhortation for penitents to distinguish between the various levels of commandments and
prohibitions:

The penitent is exhorted to search his ways to discover how many transgressions and
sins he is guilty of; and after having performed a diligent examination, he is further
exhorted to determine the severity of each of his sins, as it said, "Let us examine and
scrutinize our ways" (Eikha 3:40). He must do this to appraise himself of the degree of
sin involved in every one of his misdeeds. There are cases of guilt so great that they
approach Heaven, and instances of evil that are as weighty as many great sins. The
magnitude of one's repentance will be commensurate with the magnitude of his soul-
searching. His spirit will be broken to the extent of his awareness of the magnitude and

27
 gravity of his transgression – and then his uncircumcised heart will be humbled and he
will requite his transgression.

According to Rabbeinu Yona, it is important to distinguish between gradations of sin for a

number of reasons. First, this is necessary in order that the requisite repentance be commensurate
with the misdeed. Second, it is required so that the sense of guilt and shame - two different yet
interactive responses - be of the proper dimensions.

Clearly, Rabbeinu Yona's presentation differs substantially from the Rambam's. Although
in Hilkhot Teshuva 1:1, quoted above, the Rambam speaks not of the stages of teshuva, but rather
of the viddui (confession) that comes at its end, his discussion of the stages of teshuva in chapter
2 does not highlight the need for inquiry into the different levels or grades of sin. Rabbeinu Yona,
on the other hand, devotes the third section of his book to a very detailed catalogue of different
levels of sin, listed in ascending order.

In terms of our own experience, goals and directions, ought to assume, like the Rambam,
that there is a uniform sense of teshuva, or, like Rabbeinu Yona, that differentiation is critical in
order to undergo teshuva properly? If the latter, what kind of differentiation do we have in mind,
and what kind of categories can we think of?

SINS AGAINST GOD AND AGAINST MAN

Let us start with the familiar distinction between aveirot bein adam la-Makom and aveirot
bein adam le-chavero, sins man commits against God and sins against his fellow man. The mishna
at the end of Yoma (65b) speaks of the need to attain forgiveness from one's fellow in order for
Yom Kippur to atone for an interpersonal sin, whereas with regard to aveirot bein adam la-Makom,
it is sufficient if someone makes his peace, as it were, with the Almighty. This distinction can be
variously understood.

(1) In a pragmatic sense, the Rosh (Yoma 8:17) and others say that interpersonal sins
undermine the solidarity of Klal Yisrael. If this is the case, then interpersonal forgiveness is
valuable in its own right, but is not directly related to the quality of the teshuva involved. Rather,
in addition to the person repenting, something else can be attained – Jewish unity.

(2) The Gemara in Rosh Ha-shana (17b) suggests a different explanation.

28
 Beloria the convert once asked Rabban Gamliel: "It is written in your Torah [that God]
'does not show favor' (Devarim 10:17). Yet it is also written, 'May God show favor to
you' (Bamidbar 6:26)!"
R. Yosi the Kohen joined the conversation and said to her, "I will give you a parable
which will illustrate the matter. A man lent his neighbor an amount of money and fixed
a time for payment in the presence of the king, while the other swore to pay him by the
life of the king. When the time arrived, he did not pay him, and he went to excuse himself
to the king. The king, however, said to him, 'The wrong done to me I excuse you, but go
and obtain forgiveness from you neighbor.' So too here, one verse speaks of offences
committed by man against God, and the other of offences committed by man against his
fellow man."

With regard to bein adam la-Makom, God is willing to shower His grace upon
us. However, forgiveness for aveirot bein adam le-chavero is not up to God. The reason one must
placate his fellow is that God is not the proper address; you have to pay the person from whom
you borrowed, or placate the person against whom you transgressed.

(3) Perhaps the most obvious interpretation is that without placating your fellow, there is a
problem with the quality of your teshuva. The most basic premise of teshuva is azivat ha-chet,
abandoning the sin. If one does not do this, it is like plunging into a mikveh while gripping a
continuous source of impurity. With regard to aveirot she-bein adam la-Makom, one confesses to
God, and that constitutes azivat ha-chet. With regard to bein adam le-chavero, if a person has
offended someone and has not taken pains to placate him, then the offense is continuing; it is a
festering sore. That being the case, the teshuva is inadequate to attain the communal atonement
offered by Yom Kippur, because one has not repented properly.

INTENTION AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Apart from classification of mitzvot, there are additional factors that affect the quality of a
transgression. The Gemara in Yoma (36b) speaks about a multiple confession –
"Chatati, aviti, pashati" – which distinguishes between different levels of rebelliousness. Though
Chakhamim and R. Meir disagree regarding the sequence and the interpretation, they agree that
one should distinguish between sins committed rebelliously, sins committed willfully but not out
of a sense of rebellion, and sins performed out of carelessness.

Other contexts draw a contrast between transgressions done le-hakhis, to spite God, and
those done le-te'avon, to quench a desire. If a person commits a sin in order to anger God or rebel
against Him, then, apart from the particular sin, he also transgresses the prohibition of chillul ha-
Shem, desecration of God's name (see Rambam, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah 5:10). However, if

29
person is impelled by appetite, not rebellion, then, although his sin may be intentional, it is not
committed out of a desire to fight God, but rather out of weakness of the flesh.

In addition to these factors, there is the question of habituation. In certain contexts, if

person commits a sin repeatedly, the punishment is commensurate.

Then there is the matter of mitigating circumstances. Chazal, by and large, did not take
the view of many modern penologists, criminologists, sociologists, and psychologists that
somehow everything can be ascribed to nurture and nature, and that, to a great extent, one can be
divested of personal responsibility. The sense of personal responsibilities and liabilities is central
for us, and is related to our faith in humanity and to our belief in free will, in the ability of a person
to act if he so desires. Nonetheless, there is some recognition of circumstances which can either
inhibit or mitigate certain actions. The Gemara in Berakhot (32a) speaks of a father grooming his
son and leaving him with a purse of money in front of a brothel. In such circumstances, the sin is
much harder to avoid than under normal conditions.

SEVERITY OF THE ACT

Beyond all this, we have the distinction, addressed by Rabbeinu Yona, between different
levels of the severity of the act. The differentiation between kalot and chamurot, less and more
severe infractions, is itself dual. The Gemara in Yoma (83a) says that if a person is suddenly
seized on Yom Kippur with a consuming passion to eat, and otherwise his health will be in danger,
then you must feed him. But what do you feed him if no kosher food is available? You feed him
whatever constitutes a lesser degree of aveira (transgression). For instance, if you
have tevel or neveila, untithed produce or an animal that died without proper slaughtering, you
feed him the latter, because eating it is a prohibition punished by lashes, while the former entails
death at the hands of Heaven. The sugya goes on to elaborate what is more chamur and
less chamur, and R. Yona expands upon this.

This kind of kalot and chamurot refers to different gradations along the same
continuum. Within the realm of prohibitions, there are those punished by lashes and those
punished by death. The Rambam (Hilkhot Teshuva 1:2) describes the sin of taking a false oath as
being among the chamurot, even though it is only punished with lashes, because it entails a
desecration of God's name. Within positive precepts, too, there are some that are singled out as
being particularly weighty. "The mitzva of tzitzit is equivalent to the entire
Torah" (Nedarim 25a, Shevuot 29a). To take another example, the Rambam (Hilkhot Matenot
Aniyim 10:1) says that a person needs to observe the mitzva of tzedaka, charity, more than any
other positive commandment. The Rambam (Hilkhot Matenot Aniyim 8:10) also describes
redemption of captives as a mitzva rabba, a great mitzva.

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 Yet there is another kind of distinction between kalot and chamurot. The Mishna
in Yoma (85b) teaches:

The sin-offering and the guilt-offering [for the] undoubted commission of

certain offences procure atonement.
Death and the Day of Atonement procure atonement together with penitence.
Penitence [alone] procures atonement for lighter transgressions (kalot): [the
transgressions of] positive commandments and prohibitions.
In the case of more severe transgressions (chamurot), penitence suspends [the
Divine punishment], until the Day of Atonement comes to procure atonement.

The Gemara (Yoma 86a), the Mekhilta (Yitro, Ba-Chodesh, 7) and

the Yerushalmi (Yoma 8:7 and elsewhere) cite the famous classification of chilukei kappara, levels
of atonement:

R. Mattia ben Cheresh asked R. Eleazar ben Azaria in Rome: Have you heard about the
four kinds of sins, concerning which R. Yishmael has lectured?
He answered: They are three, and repentance is connected with each. If one
transgressed a positive commandment, and repented, then he is forgiven on the spot...
If he has transgressed a prohibition and repented, then repentance suspends [the
punishment] and the Day of Atonement procures atonement…
If he has committed [a sin to be punished with] excision or death at the hands of the
court, and repented, then repentance and the Day of Atonement suspend [the
punishment], and suffering finishes the atonement…
But if he has been guilty of the profanation of the Name, then penitence has no power
to suspend punishment, nor the Day of Atonement to procure atonement, nor suffering
to finish it, but all of them together suspend the punishment and only death finishes it…

The Rambam (Hilkhot Teshuva 1:2) cites this Gemara, stating the se'ir ha-
mishtaleach (scapegoat) provides atonement for all sins accompanied by repentance; but if one
does not repent, the se'ir provides atonement only for kalot. He then provides a definition
of kalot and chamurot:

Which are the light sins, and which are the severe ones? The severe sins are those for
which one is liable for execution by the court or for karet (excision). False and
unnecessary oaths are also considered severe sins, even though they are not [punished

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 by] karet. [The violation of] the other prohibitions, and [the failure to perform] positive
commandments that are not punishable by karet, are considered light [sins].

Rambam explains that kalot are everything short of sins punished by karet or death, as well
as false oaths, which entail a chilul ha-Shem. There is not a continuum of sin, but rather two
groups starkly separated in terms of atonement. The group of kalot achieves atonement by means
of the scapegoat alone, even without repentance; and where there is repentance, kalot receive
atonement immediately, while chamurot must wait.

Are we to regard kalot and chamurot as fundamentally different categories, as would seem
implicit in the Mishna and the Rambam, or as different points along a spectrum of severity, along
the lines of the Gemara (Yoma 83a) which distinguishes between the different foods to feed
someone on Yom Kippur? We can get guidance on this from a striking statement of the Ramban.

RAMBAN: TWO ELEMENTS OF ATONEMENT

Regarding a person who brings a korban ola, a freewill offering wholly burnt on the altar,
the verse (Vayikra 1:4) says, "Ve-nirtza lo lechapper alav, It shall be favorably accepted, to atone
for him." Chazal ask: we know what sins a chatat (sin-offering) or asham (guilt-offering) atone
for, but for which sins does an ola atone? Rashi (ad loc.) quotes the answer found in
the Torat Kohanim (4, 5):

For what kind of sins does [the freewill burnt-offering] effect atonement? Should you
say, for sins [where punishment if willfully committed] is excision, or any of the [four]
deaths imposed by a court, or death by the hands of Heaven, or lashes - the punishment
for all these sins is already stated, [and atonement is effected by those punishments, and
not by this offering]! You must conclude that [the freewill burnt-offering] effects
atonement only for transgressions of a positive commandment, and for the violation of
a negative commandment that is juxtaposed to a positive commandment.

Ramban (ad loc.) explains why Chazal were motivated to give this explanation. Regarding
capital crimes and sins entailing karet, the Torah specified the punishments for willful commission
and the sacrifices brought for unwillful commission. Regarding sins punished by lashes or by
death at the hands of Heaven (if committed willfully), the Torah does not mention that any sacrifice
needs to be brought for unwillful commission. Since it does not make sense for the Torah to
mention the punishments for willful and unwillful commission of some sins, and the punishment
only for willful commission of other sins, Ramban concludes that, regarding the latter category,
"there is no burden of sin at all if they are committed unwillfully, and they do not need any
atonement." We are left with a third category - transgressions of a positive commandment and
violation of a negative commandment juxtaposed to a positive one – for which the Torah mentions
no punishment even for willful commission. Since it is impossible that no atonement is needed

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for willful commission of these sins, Chazal conclude that the olat nedava, freewill burnt offering,
atones for these.

Ramban himself goes beyond this approach:

It is possible to say that because, in the case of freewill offering, [God] did not use the
expression "to make atonement for him concerning the error which he committed" (as
He said with reference to the offering brought for other sins committed unwillfully), and
instead He said, "it shall be favorably accepted," it appeared to our Rabbis that [the
burnt-offering] effects atonement for those who willfully commit certain sins, seeing that
these persons are not [hitherto] "favorably accepted" by Him. For he who commits a
sin unwillfully is yet, in spite of the sin, considered "favorably accepted" by God. If,
then, [the burnt-offering procures atonement for willful sinners,] it must refer to those
who willfully transgress a positive commandment or a negative commandment that is
juxtaposed to a positive commandment. For regarding these transgressions, no
punishment is mentioned in the Torah; yet, [clearly,] those who violate them are not
pleasing to God, because they have violated His commandment. How, then, shall these
people become favorably accepted by their Master? By bringing this gift [i.e., the olat
nedava].

In other words, if person sins in error (be-shogeg), he is nevertheless favored by God (retzui
Hashem); but if he sins intentionally (be-mezid), he is not favored. Therefore, the verse "ve-nirtza
lo, it shall be favorably accepted" cannot refer to sin committed be-shogeg, for such a person
is retzui Hashem even without bringing an offering. The verse must, then, refer to one who sins
intentionally. Since we already know the punishments meted out to those who sin intentionally, it
must be that the verse refers to an intentional sinner who receives no punishment but is nevertheless
not favored by God, i.e., those who transgress a positive commandment or a negative
commandment that is juxtaposed to a positive commandment.

Ramban's comment is remarkable in two respects. First, it invites the obvious question
which R. Meir Arik asked: Are we to understand that someone who sins be-shogeg is retzui
Hashem, and that he does not require repentance or atonement? Second, we know that one must
offer a chatat (sin-offering) if he unintentionally commits a sin that would be punished
with karet if it were performed intentionally. But if we adopt what seems to be the
Ramban's assumption, that an unintentional sinner does not require atonement because he is retzui
Hashem, then why does someone who unintentionally transgresses a sin punishable by karet have
to bring a sin-offering? Isn't he retzui Hashem?

There are two possible explanations of Ramban's comment. One is that the second
question answers the first. The extent to which we would say that negligence is culpable depends
on how serious the infraction is. If it is a relatively minor matter, so that even if done willfully it

33
isn't much of a sin, then it can be overlooked if it is done through negligence. Yet a graver
infraction entails a greater degree of responsibility and culpability, and one would not be
considered a retzui Hashem if he committed these acts unwillfully.

I believe we can offer another explanation if we take into account a different purpose of
the sacrifice, apart from its function in regaining divine favor for the sinner. Ramban draws a
sharp line between kalot and chamurot. When committed unwillfully, ordinary prohibitions
(chayvei lavin) do not require kappara. However, severe prohibitions (chayvei kritut u-mita),
which would require karet or death if committed intentionally, require kappara even when
committed unintentionally. This distinction has important implications.

With regard to kalot, i.e. chayvei lavin, the seriousness of the aveira has less to do with the
nature of the deed than with the character with person who is sinning. In his willful confrontation
with the Almighty, he chose to prioritize his own desire over God's. Leaving aside certain moral
considerations, it is not the deed that needs to be redeemed, but the person. Consequently, if the
person has not been pervaded by sinful desire and instead committed the deed be-shogeg, in error,
he himself does not require redemption, and remains a retzui Hashem. However, with regard
to chamurot, i.e. chayvei kritot, it is not only the person who requires redemption; the event needs
to be redeemed, and the world within which that sin has been committed needs to be redeemed.

We need, therefore, to consider the nature of teshuva in two separate contexts. There is
the teshuva of kalot, with regard to which what is critical and central is the redemption and
purgation of the self. With regard to chamurot, however, it is not sufficient that a person repent
and thereby regain the status of retzui Hashem; rather, a korban is required to cleanse the social
and metaphysical orders of the consequences of that sin. The quality of an aveira chamura is that
it defiles, not only in the sense that every sin defiles through the sinner's subjective disobedience,
but it also defiles objectively. Therefore, this objective defilement needs to be
confronted. The teshuva of chamurot thus needs to be considered both in terms of one's personal
redemption, and in terms of righting that which a person has defiled.

NULLIFYING MAN'S WILL BEFORE GOD'S

Coming back to our original question of Rambam's approach vs. R. Yona's, are we to think
of sin as a uniform phenomenon, or are we to differentiate and classify both categories and
circumstances of sin?

This question applies to avodat Hashem generally and teshuva particularly. I think the answer is
clear: we need both Rambam's formulation and R. Yona's.

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 On the one hand, there is a common denominator to all sins, and we need to confront this
if we want to improve ourselves. Every time a person fails in the realm of Torah, Halakha and
morality, he stands before the question of what kind of person he is and what kind of life he
leads. Does he give preference to his own will or to God's? Does he think in egocentric terms or
in theocentric terms? Every time a person is confronted by God's will, Prospero's question arises:
"My foot, my tutor?" (The Tempest, Act 1, Scene 2) - will he be led by his head or by his foot?

At this plane, when one considers the question of nullifying his will before God's
(see Avot 2:4), the differentiations of kalot and chamurot fall away. All sins, in this sense, are
severe. In his Life of Solon (XVII, 4), Plutarch writes: "Draco himself, when asked why he had
decreed the death penalty for the great majority of offenses, replied that he considered the minor
ones deserved it, and for the major ones no heavier punishment was left." There is substance to
this approach. The Yerushalmi (Makkot 2:6) recounts, "Prophecy was asked: A sinner – what is
his punishment? She answered: 'The soul that sins shall die' (Yechezkel 18:4, 20)." No question
is raised as to which sin it was, whether major or minor, kalot or chamurot. If a person sheds the
role of metzuveh (one who commanded) and instead usurps the role of metzaveh (commander),
that is the ultimate rebellion! Though sometimes the severity is mitigated by circumstances, and
some sins are committed through weakness rather than rebellion, nevertheless, the bottom line is
one gave preference to his own will over that of the Almighty.

In this sense, when a person confronts not just a particular aveira but the critical existential
question of whose will is to prevail, his or God's, the proper confession is simply, "Chatati, aviti,
pashati lefanekha!" I stood before You, I was at that juncture, and I took the wrong turn. This is
one aspect of teshuva.

DETAIL AND RELATIONSHIP

But it is not the only one. Teshuva entails a plethora of aspects because sin is
multifaceted. At least five different aspects of sin that can be singled out. One is the wrong per
se, the choice of doing evil. Second is the fact that the evil which a person has done transgresses
the will of God; over and above murder being murder, it is also something which God has
proscribed. Third, one must consider the ramifications of sin, the contamination of the self, the
defilement and impurity. Fourth, defying God's will is a "personal" affront to Him; it is spitting in
His face, so to speak. That being the case, there is a fifth result: one's relationship to God has been
impaired. Sin opens a chasm or sets up a barrier between oneself and the Almighty. "Your
iniquities have separated between you and your God" (Yeshayahu 59:2).

If a person wants to engage in teshuva, he needs to relate to all these elements and effect
a tikkun (repair) in each. There needs to be a tikkun ha-chet (repair of the sin), a tikkun of one's

35
relationship with God, and a tikkun of the self. Each of these three types of tikkun should be
examined independently, and in order to do so, we need to distinguish between two veins
of teshuva: teshuva from and teshuva to. The former is exemplified by the verses, "Turn, turn
from your evil ways" (Yechezkel 33:11), and "Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous
man his thoughts" (Yeshayahu 55:7). The latter is exemplified by verses that discuss not what a
person is leaving, but where he is headed: "Return to Me, and I will return to You" (Hoshea 14:2),
and "Israel, return to the Lord Your God" (Malakhi 3:7).

Tikkun ha-chet is a matter of "turn[ing] from your evil ways." As such, one must consider,
along the lines of R. Yona, the gravity and specifics of his sin, and, as Ramban implied, how to
repair the damage which the sin brought upon the world. This requires great attention to detail.

There are religious traditions and schools of thought that not only neglect attention to detail,
but even scorn it. The Lutheran tradition, for example, believes that one is so suffused with sin
that the only thing to do is to try to make peace with God, whether actively or passively, waiting
for divine grace or seeking it. But acting to fix minor or major failings is not relevant. Some call
this a "religious," as opposed to a "moral," view of divine service, where "religious" refers to
focusing upon one's relationship with God, and "moral" refers to the righting of wrongs. If one
adopts this focus, then indeed he does not need to differentiate. Neither the quality nor the quantity
of sin is as important as the existence of barrier between God and oneself, and one must focus on
transcending that barrier, pleading for grace, throwing oneself at God's mercy.

There is something to be said for an approach that does not content itself solely with picking
up the pieces, with trying to adjust and repair, but rather seeks rehabilitation by establishing anew
a bridge to the Almighty – a bridge allowing one to find his way to God, and enabling God to come
to him. Yet, though we understand that one cannot focus solely on detail
in avodat Hashem generally, and in teshuva particularly, surely we believe that there is a "moral"
element of teshuva and of avodat Hashem, a need to right the wrong and terminate its
perpetuation. Our whole conception of avodat Hashem rests upon two pillars: an awareness of the
overpowering importance of our relationship with God - "But as for me, the nearness of God is my
good" (Tehillim 73:28); "As the hart yearns for water brooks, so my soul yearns for You, O
God" (Tehillim 42:2) – and, at the same time, attention to a disciplined life and its minute details,
which suffuses the world of Halakha.

We reject totally the view that when one pursues the overarching relationship and the quest
for intimacy and rehabilitation, all of the minutiae simply disappear into insignificance. On the
other hand, we also reject the view that only the specific actions and details - weighted, graded,
comprehended properly - will suffice. We do not - we dare not - focus exclusively on one of these
two pillars. Our world is built in a multi-faceted and multi-planed way by relating to and
integrating both aspects. The ability to relate to God is the most fundamental and basic aspect of
human existence, and also its overarching, ultimate, beatific attainment. At the same time, the

36
attention to detail, to every se'if katan, and the ability to integrate the poetry and the prose of avodat
Hashem, is central to our conception and our experience.

This dual focus is, consequently, central to our view of teshuva. The teshuva of chamurot,
which concentrates on actions and the desire to right them, requires that we weigh, grade,
prioritize, and emphasize. The teshuva of kalot, which concentrates not on what we have done but
on trying to reestablish our relationship with God, allows a focus on overarching goals, expressed
in universal categories and uniform viddui. (I refer to kalot and chamurot not as types of sin, but
rather as signifying different approaches to teshuva.)

While tikkun ha-chet and tikkun of one's damaged relationship with God are characterized
by different approaches to teshuva – the chamurot mode and the kalot mode, respectively - the two
approaches interact and coalesce in the third element of repair, namely, tikkun of the self which
has been contaminated by sin. To repair and purify oneself means to reaffirm and reestablish one's
relationship with God, as well as a spiritual and moral purgation that takes into account actions
and details.

TWO CONFESSIONS
Historically, we encounter two types of confession. The Gemara in Yoma (87b) speaks of
various formulae of viddui stated by a number of Amoraim, and then the Gemara adds,

Mar Zutra said: [The preceding confessions are necessary] only when he did not say, "Aval
anachnu chatanu, But we have sinned." But if he had said "Aval anachnu chatanu," no
more is necessary. For Bar Hamdudi said, "Once I stood before Shemuel, who was
sitting, and when the prayer leader came up and said 'Aval anachnu chatanu,' he rose." We
learn from here that those words are the quintessential viddui.

Aval anachnu chatanu: simple, uniform, undifferentiated confession. It is simply an

acknowledgment, with bowed head, with shame and guilt, that we have gone astray. Whether our
sin is minor or major, it is still a sin: "But we have sinned."

Today, however, we have expanded this simple confession into an entire aleph-bet of
sin: Ashamnu, bagadnu, gazalnu, etc. The Geonim added even more: a double aleph-bet of "Al

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chet," concluding with a list of sins categorized according to the gravity of their punishment –
"sins punishable by the court, sins punishable by karet, etc." And if that isn't enough, some people
have taken each line of Al Chet and elaborated much further. Rambam's viddui was enough for
the Gemara, but Rabbeinu Yona's viddui entered the mainstream of our life and our experience on
Yom Kippur.

Yet that experience on Yom Kippur is itself differentiated. Broadly speaking, we stand on
Yom Kippur with a dual sense and a dual charge. We stand with the Rambam, trying to eradicate
the roots of sin, to eliminate the desire for sin, to uproot completely the inclination and tendency
for sin. Reciting the viddui of Aval anachnu chatanu, we confront where we are and where
the Almighty is, and try to reach out to Him, hoping that He will reach out to us. On the other
hand, we stand with Rabbeinu Yona in following the advice of Eikha (3:40), "Let us search and
examine our ways." Detailing our sins one after another, we examine what we have done and how
we have done it, weighing its severity, so that we know not just whether we are sinners, but exactly
what kind of sinners we are. On Yom Kippur, we engage in a highly religious enterprise and a
highly moral enterprise; that is Yom Kippur as a whole.

But at the end of the day, when we come to Ne'ila, we change our tune a bit. Starting on
Erev Yom Kippur, through the first four prayer services, we say Aval anachnu chatanu and then
we go through the whole list of Al chet. However, as dusk approaches and night begins to fall,
when the conclusion of the day and its atonement is on the horizon, we turn to God and say: Master
of the Universe, we have been working on ourselves all year, and especially since the beginning
the Elul, weighing and measuring our sins, and all of Yom Kippur we have been striving and
groping and hoping. But now, at the end of the day, we have only one thing left, and that is to cast
our hopes and prayers upon You. We look to You after we have gone the extra mile, and maybe
it isn't enough. Now it is too late in the day, and we cannot involve ourselves again in this calculus,
identifying and grading sins, pinning down each one. Now it is our very selves encountering You,
and we implore You, we beg for Your forgiveness, for selicha, mechila, kappara!

At Ne'ila, we do not say Al chet, and content ourselves with saying Aval anachnu
chatanu. We do so in the hope that what we have done over the course of the year, what we have
done during Elul, during Selichot, during Aseret Yemei Teshuva, during the first four prayers of
Yom Kippur - following Rabbeinu Yona, trying to right wrongs as best as we could, trying to
grope and to inquire – makes us worthy and deserving of forgiveness. But now we look for
something more: for tahara, purification – "Lifnei Hashem titharu, Before God you shall be
purified" (Vayikra 16:30).

This purification has a dual character. When a person is purified in a mikveh, each part of
him is immersed in the mikveh, and the whole of him is in the mikveh. Similarly, on Yom Kippur
we strive for tahara which comes from moral purgation, from the confrontation with sin, from the
attempt to eradicate and overcome it. This is an aspect of tikkun atzmi and of tikkun ha-chet. We

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also strive for the tahara of "Mikveh Yisrael Hashem" (Yirmiyahu 17:13 – translated homiletically
as "God is the mikveh of Israel"). This second type of tahara refers to our rehabilitation, to the
reestablishment of our relationship with God, which springs not solely from below, but from
above.

"Lifnei Hashem titharu," Rabbeinu Yona said, means that there is a special mitzva to repent
on Yom Kippur (Sha'arei Teshuva 4:17). Here we encounter purification as a charge, a mandate,
which entails "Nachpesa derakhenu ve-nachkora," the specific, detailed, calculating aspect
of teshuva. Yet "Lifnei Hashem titharu" is also to be understood not as a charge or a mandate, but
as a hope, aspiration and promise, that if we have confronted "mi-kol chatoteichem," all our sins,
then God, for His part, will proclaim "Titharu" – You shall be purified!

For all our sins, may the Force that makes forgiveness possible forgive us,

pardon us, and make atonement possible.

For the sins we have committed before you and in our communities by being

so preoccupied with ourselves that we ignore the large problems of the world

in which we live;

And for the sins we have committed by being so directed toward outward realities
that we have ignored our spiritual development.

For the sins of accepting the current distribution of wealth and power as
unchangeable;

And for the sins of giving up on social change and focusing exclusively on
personal advancement and success;

For the sins of feeling so powerless when we hear about oppression that we
finally close our ears

And for the sins of dulling our outrage at the continuation of poverty,
oppression, and violence in this world.

And for the sins we have committed by allowing our food and our air to be
poisoned;

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From R. Michael Lerner, Tikkun

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