A.C. No.

11078

VERLITA V. MERCULLO and RAYMOND VEDANO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. MARIE FRANCESE RAMON, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This case concerns the complaint for the disbarment of Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon
for violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Lawyer's Oath for deceiving the complainants in order to obtain the substantial amount
of P350,000.00 on the pretext of having the foreclosed asset of the latter's mother
redeemed.

Antecedents

In the period from 2002 to 2011, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) sent several demand letters to Carmelita T. Vedaño1 regarding her unpaid
obligations secured by the mortgage covering her residential property in Novaliches,
Caloocan City.2 To avoid the foreclosure of the mortgage, Carmelita authorized her
children, Verlita Mercullo and Raymond Vedaño (complainants herein), to inquire from
the NHMFC about the status of the obligations. Verlita and Raymond learned that their
mother's arrears had amounted to P350,000.00, and that the matter of the mortgage
was under the charge of respondent Atty. Ramon, but who was not around at that time.

On June 20, 2012, Carmelita received a letter from the sheriff of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Caloocan City, stating that her property would be put up for auction in
July 2013. Verlita and Raymond thus went to the NHMFC to see the respondent, who
advised them about their right to redeem the property within one year from the
foreclosure.3

In August 2013, Verlita and Raymond called up the respondent, and expressed their
intention to redeem the property by paying the redemption price. The latter agreed and
scheduled an appointment with them on August 30,2013.

On August 30, 2013, the respondent arrived at the designated meeting place at around
1:30 p.m., carrying the folder that Verlita and Raymond had seen at the NHFMC when
they inquired on the status of their mother's property. After the respondent had oriented
them on the procedure for redemption, the complainants handed P350,000.00 to the
respondent, who signed an acknowledgment receipt.4 The respondent issued two
acknowledgment receipts for the redemption price and for litigation
expenses,5 presenting to the complainants her NHMFC identification card. Before
leaving them, she promised to inform them as soon as the documents for redemption
were ready for their mother's signature.6
On September 4, 2013, the respondent met with Verlita and handed a letter7 that she
had signed, along with the special power of attorney (SPA) for Carmelita's
signature.8 The letter reads:

Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff

Regional Trial Court
Caloocan City

Re: Redemption of the property covered by EJF No. 7484-2013

Dear Atty. Dabalos,

Please assist Ms. Carmelita Vedano, through her Attorney-in-Fact in redeeming the
property covered by EJF No. 7484-2013. Please provide the necessary computation as
to the full redemption amount in order for Ms. Vedano to redeem the same.

Thank you.

Truly yours,

(Sgd.) rances E. Ramon

Verlita and Raymond went to the NHMFC on September 9, 2013 to follow up on the
redemption, but discovered that the respondent had already ceased to be connected
with the NHMFC. On September 20, 2013, they met with her at Branch 145 of the
Regional Trial Court in Makati City where she was attending a hearing. She informed
them that the redemption was under process, and that the certificate of redemption
would be issued in two to three weeks time.9

After communicating through text messages with the respondent, Verlita and Raymond
finally went to see the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City On
November 27, 2013 to inquire on the status of the redemption. There, they discovered
that the respondent had not deposited the redemption price and had not filed the letter
of intent for redeeming the property.10

On December 5, 2013, Verlita and Raymond again went to Branch 145 of the Regional
Trial Court in Makati City where the respondent had a hearing, and handed to her their
demand letter requiring her to return the amount she had received for the
redemption.11 She acknowledged the letter and promised to return the money on
December 16, 2013 by depositing the amount in Verlita's bank account. However, she
did not fulfill her promise and did not show up for her subsequent scheduled hearings in
Branch 145.12

With their attempts to reach the respondent being in vain, V erlita and Raymond brought
their disbarment complaint in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).1âwphi1
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

The respondent did not submit her answer when required to do so. She also did not
attend the mandatory conference set by the IBP despite notice. Hence, the investigation
proceeded ex parte.13

IBP Commissioner Arsenio P. Adriano submitted his Report and

Recommendation,14 whereby he found the respondent to have violated Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for engaging in deceitful conduct, and
recommended her suspension from the practice of law for two years, and her return to
the complainants of P350,000.00. with legal interest from December 2, 2013.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted Commissioner Adriano's recommendation as

stated in its Resolution No. XXI-2014-929,15 viz.:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND APPROVED,

the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws,
and for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Marie
Frances E. Ramon is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years
and Ordered to Return the amount of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand
(P350,000.00) Pesos to Complainant.

Ruling of the Court

The Court declares the respondent guilty of dishonesty and deceit.

The Lawyer's Oath is a source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer. Any
violation of the oath may be punished with either disbarment, or suspension from the
practice of law, or other commensurate disciplinary action.16 Every lawyer must at no
time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his
admission to the Bar, but are also essential for his continued membership in the Law
Profession.17 Any conduct unbecoming of a lawyer constitutes a violation of his oath.

The respondent certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving money from the
complainants after having made them believe that she could assist them in ensuring the
redemption in their mother's behalf. She was convincing about her ability to work on the
redemption because she had worked in the NHFMC. She did not inform them soon
enough, however, that she had meanwhile ceased to be connected with the agency. It
was her duty to have so informed them. She further misled them about her ability to
realize the redemption by falsely informing them about having started the redemption
process. She concealed from them the real story that she had not even initiated the
redemption proceedings that she had assured them she would do. Everything she did
was dishonest and deceitful in order to have them part with the substantial sum of
P350,000.00. She took advantage of the complainants who had reposed their full trust
and confidence in her ability to perform the task by virtue of her being a lawyer. Surely,
the totality of her actuations inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal Profession.

As a lawyer, the respondent was proscribed from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct in her dealings with others, especially clients whom she
should serve with competence and diligence.18 Her duty required her to maintain fealty
to them, binding her not to neglect the legal matter entrusted to her. Thus, her neglect in
connection therewith rendered her liable.19 Moreover, the unfulfilled promise of returning
the money and her refusal to communicate with the complainants on the matter of her
engagement aggravated the neglect and dishonesty attending her dealings with the
complainants.

The respondent's conduct patently breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.1âwphi1

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.

Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful act or omission of the
respondent within the coverage of Rule 1. 01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.20The Code exacted from her not only a firm respect for the law and legal
processes but also the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients
and the moneys entrusted by them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship.21

Yet another dereliction of the respondent was her wanton disregard of the several
notices sent to her by the IBP in this case. Such disregard could only be wrong because
it reflected her undisguised contempt of the proceedings of the IBP, a body that the
Court has invested with the authority to investigate the disbarment complaint against
her. She thus exhibited her irresponsibility as well as her utter disrespect for the Court
and the rest of the Judiciary. It cannot be understated that a lawyer in her shoes should
comply with the orders of the Court and of the Court's duly constituted authorities, like
the IBP, the office that the Court has particularly tasked to carry out the specific function
of investigating attorney misconduct.22

The respondent deserves severe chastisement and appropriate sanctions. In this

regard, the IBP Board of Governors recommended her suspension for two years from
the practice of law, and her return of the amount of P350,000.00 to the complainants.
The recommended penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the misconduct
committed. She merited a heavier sanction of suspension from the practice of law for
five years. Her professional misconduct warranted a longer suspension from the
practice of law because she had caused material prejudice to the clients' interest.23 She
should somehow be taught to be more ethical and professional in dealing with trusting
clients like the complainants and their mother, who were innocently too willing to repose
their utmost trust in her abilities as a lawyer and in her trustworthiness as a legal
professional. In this connection, we state that the usual mitigation of the recommended
penalty by virtue of the misconduct being her first offense cannot be carried out in her
favor considering that she had disregarded the several notices sent to her by the IBP in
this case. As to the return of the P350,000.00 to the complainant, requiring her to
restitute with legal interest is only fair and just because she did not comply in the least
with her ethical undertaking to work on the redemption of the property of the mother of
the complainants. In addition, she is sternly warned against a similar infraction in the
future; otherwise, the Court will have her suffer a more severe penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS ATTY. MARIE FRANCES E.

RAMON guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath; SUSPENDS HER FROM THE PRACTICE OF
LAW FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with the STERN
WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely; ORDERS her to return to the complainants the sum of P350,000.00 within 30
days from notice, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment; and DIRECTS her to promptly submit to this Court written
proof of her compliance within the same period of 30 days from notice of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon's personal record as an attorney; to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 8172, April 12, 2016

ALEX NULADA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO S. PAULMA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment by

reason of dishonesty and conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude filed by
Complainant Alex Nulada (complainant) against respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma
(respondent).

The Facts

Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005, respondent issued in his favor a
check in the amount of P650,000.00 as payment for the latter's debt. Because of
respondent's standing as a respected member of the community and his being a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Miagao,2 Province of Iloilo,
complainant accepted the check without question.3

Unfortunately, when he presented the check for payment, it was dishonored due to
insufficient fluids. Respondent failed to make good the amount of the check despite
notice of dishonor and repeated demands, prompting complainant to file a criminal
complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 224 against respondent,5 before
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Province of Iloilo, docketed as I.S. No. 2006-
637,6 which issued a Resolution7 dated May 26, 2006 recommending the filing of the
appropriate information against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Miagao,
Province of Iloilo (MTC).8 Subsequently, said information was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2604.9

After due proceedings, the MTC rendered a Decision10 dated October 30, 2008 finding
respondent guilty of violation of BP 22 and ordering him to pay the amount of
P150,000.00 as fine, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay.
Furthermore, he was ordered to pay: (1) the sum of P650,000.00 representing the
amount of the check with interest pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
computed from the time of the filing of the complaint; (2) filing fees in the amount of
P10,000.00; and (3) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 plus appearance fees
of P1,500.00 per hearing.11

Records show that respondent appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court of
Guimbal, Iloilo, Branch 67 (RTC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 346.12 In a
Decision13 dated March 13, 2009, the RTC affirmed in toto the MTC ruling. On April 16,
2009, the RTC Decision became final and executory.14

Prior to the promulgation of the RTC Decision, or on February 12, 2009, complainant
filed this administrative complaint before the Court, through the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

In his defense,15 respondent denied that he committed dishonesty against complainant,

as prior to September 30, 2005, he informed the latter that there were insufficient funds
to cover the amount of the check. Respondent claimed that he merely issued the check
in order to accommodate a friend in whose favor he obtained the loan, stressing that he
did not personally benefit from the proceeds thereof.16 Unfortunately, said friend had
died and respondent had no means by which to pay for the amount of the check.17 He
also claimed that complainant threatened him and used his unfunded check to the
latter's personal advantage.18

Thereafter, the Court, in its Resolution dated November 14, 2011,19 referred this
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation,
report, and recommendation.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

After conducting mandatory conferences, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of

the IBP issued a Report and Recommendation20 dated June 26, 2013, recommending
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for
violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well
as for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.21

It found that the offense for which respondent was found guilty of, i.e., violation of BP
22, involved moral turpitude, and that he violated his lawyer's oath and the CPR when
he committed the said offense. Stressing the importance of the lawyer's oath, the IBP
held that by his conviction of the said crime, respondent has shown that he is "unfit to
protect the administration of justice or that he is no longer of good moral
character"22 which justifies either his suspension or disbarment.23

Subsequently, or on October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Notice of
Resolution24 adopting and approving with modification the IBP's Report and
Recommendation dated June 26, 2013, suspending respondent from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years for having violated the lawyer's oath and the CPR, as well
as for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.25cralawred

The Issue Before the Court

The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be
administratively disciplined for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral
turpitude.

The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and conclusions of the CBD of the IBP, as approved,
adopted, and modified by the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, Or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar "to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law x x x." Rule 1.01 thereof specifically provides that "[a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By taking the
lawyer's oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument
for the orderly administration of justice.26 As such, he can be disciplined for any conduct,
in his professional or private capacity, which renders him unfit to continue to be an
officer of the court.27cralawred

In Enriquez v. De Vera,28 the Court discussed the purpose and nature of a violation of

BP 22 in relation to an administrative case against a lawyer, as in this case, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and
the legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and
punished by [BP] 22 [x x x] is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any
check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation;
the law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious
practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice
is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.

xxxx

Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the objectives and coverage of [BP] 22. If
he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in
character and application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein
knowingly violated [BP] 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect
of his illegal act to public interest and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's
Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the
laws.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates a lawyer's
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal
honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and
constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.30

In this case, respondent's conviction for violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral
turpitude, had been indubitably established. Such conviction has, in fact, already
become final. Consequently, respondent violated the lawyer's oath, as well as Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, as aptly found by the IBP and, thus, must be subjected to
disciplinary action.

In Heenan v. Espejo,31 the Court suspended therein respondent from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due
to insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio,32 the same penalty
was imposed by the Court to respondent who issued worthless checks to pay off her
loan. Likewise, in Dizon v. De Taza,33 the Court meted the penalty of suspension for a
period of two (2) years to respondent for having issued bouncing checks, among other
infractions. Finally, in Wong v. Moya II,34 respondent was ordered suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years, because aside from issuing worthless
checks and failure to pay his debts, respondent also breached his client's trust and
confidence to his personal advantage and had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP's
Orders in the course of its proceedings. Accordingly, and in view of the foregoing
instances when the erring lawyer was suspended for a period of two (2) years for the
same violation, the Court finds it appropriate to mete the same penalty to respondent in
this case.

As a final word, it should be emphasized that membership in the legal profession is a

privilege burdened with conditions.35 A lawyer is required to observe the law and be
mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or private capacity.36 Any
transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer
but would also erode the public's faith in the legal profession as a whole.37 In this case,
respondent's conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a member
of the bar, for which he must suffer the necessary [Link]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma is hereby SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution.
He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Paulma's personal record with the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and copies be served to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in
the land.

SO [Link]
A.C. No. 9387               June 20, 2012
(Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562)

EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her lawyer,
Atty. Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law Offices, for his
alleged negligence in the handling of her case.

The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the respondents in an
ejectment case filed against them with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).

In a Decision1 dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge

Carandang), the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant
be cancelled; and that the latter pay the complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan),
attorney’s fees and moral damages.

Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the
Court of Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants’ Brief. They chose
respondent to represent them in the case. On their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on
Appeal instead of an Appellants’ Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution2 dated 16 December 2003.

No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was filed
by the couple. Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the Resolution, he
acted with "deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of law."3 Complainant and
her husband failed to file an appeal, because respondent never informed them of the
adverse decision. Complainant further claims that she asked respondent "several times"
about the status of the appeal, but "despite inquiries he deliberately withheld response
[sic]," to the damage and prejudice of the spouses.4

The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004. Complainant was
informed of the Resolution sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC came to
her house and informed her of the Resolution.

On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint5 with the Committee

on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment
of respondent on the following grounds: deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct.
Complainant prays for moral damages in the amount of ₱ 350,000.
Through an Order6 dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar Discipline Rogelio A.
Vinluan ordered respondent to submit an answer to the Complaint. In his Counter-
Affidavit/Answer,7 respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the Complaint.

Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He averred that prior
to the mandatory conference set by the IBP on 13 December 2005, he had never met
complainant, because it was her husband who had personally transacted with him.
According to respondent, the husband "despondently pleaded to me to prepare a
Memorandum on Appeal because according to him the period given by the CA was to
lapse within two or three days."8 Thus, respondent claims that he filed a Memorandum
on Appeal because he honestly believed that "it is this pleading which was required."9

Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainant’s husband to settle the
case. The latter allegedly "gestured approval of the advice."10

After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing, respondent
never saw or heard from him again and thus assumed that the husband heeded his
advice and settled the case. When respondent received an Order from the CA requiring
him to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Duigan, he "instructed his office
staff to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available means of communication, but to no
avail."11 Thus, when complainant’s husband went to the office of respondent to tell the
latter that the Sheriff of the RTC had informed complainant of the CA’s Resolution
dismissing the case, respondent was just as surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, "KALA
KO BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO."12

In his 5 January 2009 Report,13 IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.

found that respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (the Code). He recommended that respondent be suspended from
practicing law from 3 to 6 months.

The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28 August
2010. Therein, they resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law
for six months.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.14 He prayed for the relaxation of the
application of the Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP board of governors
passed Resolution No. XX-2012-1715 partly granting his Motion and reducing the penalty
imposed to one-month suspension from the practice of law.

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar Discipline Dennis
A.B. Funa, through a letter16 addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona,
transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against respondent.

We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court, however,
disagrees with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month suspension. We thus
affirm the six-month suspension the Board originally imposed in its 28 August 2010
Resolution.

Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory
conference set for the disbarment Complaint she filed against him. However, a perusal
of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court revealed that he had signed
as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein, including complainant and her
husband.17 The pleading starts with the following sentence: "DEFENDANT[S]-
APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court submit the Memorandum and
further allege that: x x x."18 Nowhere does the document say that it was filed only on
behalf of complainant’s husband.

It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and
complainant’s husband cannot be treated as a "client-lawyer" relationship, viz:

It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared by a lawyer for
a fee. Under the factual milieu and circumstances, it could not be said that a client
entrusted to a lawyer handling and prosecution of his case that calls for the strict
application of the Code; x x x19

As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client relationship, he
also alleges that complainant’s husband never contacted him after the filing of the
Memorandum of Appeal. According to respondent, this behavior was "very unusual if he
really believed that he engaged" the former’s services.20

Complainant pointed out in her Reply21 that respondent was her lawyer, because he
accepted her case and an acceptance fee in the amount of ₱ 7,000.

According to respondent, however, "[C]ontrary to the complainant’s claim that he

charged ₱ 7,000 as acceptance fee," "the fee was only for the preparation of the
pleading which is even low for a Memorandum of Appeal: x x x."22

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives

rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause.23 Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case,
it is that lawyer’s duty to serve the client with competence and diligence.24 Respondent
has failed to fulfill this duty.

According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that complainant’s husband

asked from him. Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum of Appeal,
because he "honestly believed" that this was the pleading required, based on what
complainant’s husband said.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner’s observation on this matter, in the 5 January 2009
Report, is correct. Regardless of the particular pleading his client may have believed to
be necessary, it was respondent’s duty to know the proper pleading to be filed in
appeals from RTC decisions, viz:
Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court, respondent should have
known that the mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals for said Decision is by ordinary
appeal under Section 2(a) Rule 41 of the1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In all
such cases, Rule 44 of the said Rules applies.25

When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of
Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or
Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellant’s brief be
filed after the records of the case have been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a
litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads:

CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in

continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law
schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating
information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been

expounded in Dulalia, Jr. v. Cruz,26 to wit:

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the
forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it
the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of
the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that the reason
for his failure to file the proper pleading was that he "did not have enough time to
acquaint himself thoroughly with the factual milieu of the case." The IBP reconsidered
and thereafter significantly reduced the penalty originally imposed.

Respondent’s plea for leniency should not have been granted.

The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the
case does not excuse his negligence.

Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without
adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainant’s lawyer
from the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty to
diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough time
to study the pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by complainant’s
husband only two days before the expiration of the period for filing the Appellant’s Brief,
respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the proper pleading
instead of whatever pleading he could come up with, just to "beat the deadline set by
the Court of Appeals."27

Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed
the wrong pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by filing a comment, as
ordered by the appellate court, he chose to ignore the CA’s Order. He claims that he
was under the presumption that complainant and her husband had already settled the
case, because he had not heard from the husband since the filing of the latter’s
Memorandum of Appeal.

This explanation does not excuse respondent’s actions.

First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed himself of,
from the moment he received the Notice from the CA to the moment he received the
disbarment Complaint filed against him. But because of his negligence, he chose to sit
on the case and do nothing.

Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their
case. His failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which
reads:

18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent
could have done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as
counsel. He could have thus explained why he was no longer the counsel of
complainant and her husband in the case and informed the court that he could no
longer contact them.28 His failure to take this measure proves his negligence.

Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigan’s
Motion to Dismiss is negligence on his part.1âwphi1 Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer
is liable for negligence in handling the client’s case, viz:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence
in fulfilling their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action.29

Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his
duties to his client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he
should be held accountable.30

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules

18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a
member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for
their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6368               June 13, 2012

FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G. Bengco (Fidela) and

Teresita N. Bengco (Teresita) against respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Atty. Bernardo)
for deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation of his
duties and oath as a lawyer.

The acts of the respondent which gave rise to the instant complaint are as follows:

That sometime on or about the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo
Bernardo with the help and in connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat
[wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent act with intent to defraud herein
complainants Fidela G. Bengco and Teresita N. Bengco by using false pretenses,
deceitful words to the effect that he would expedite the titling of the land belonging to
the Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are the acquaintance of complainants herein
and they convinced herein complainant[s] that if they will finance and deliver to him the
amount of [₱]495,000.00 as advance money he would expedite the titling of the subject
land and further by means of other similar deceit like misrepresenting himself as lawyer
of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the subject land, who is the owner of
Plastic City at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and he is the one handling
William Gatchalian’s business transaction and that he has contracts at NAMREA,
DENR, CENRO and REGISTER OF DEEDS which representation he well knew were
false, fraudulent and were only made to induce the complainant[s] to give and deliver
the said amount ([₱]495,000.00) and once in possession of said amount, far from
complying with his obligation to expedite and cause the titling of the subject land,
[wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said
amount to his personal use and benefit and despite demand upon him to return the said
amount, he failed and refused to do so, which acts constitute deceit, malpractice,
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and Violation of Duties and Oath as a
lawyer.2

In support of their complaint, the complainants attached thereto Resolutions dated

December 7, 19983 and June 22, 19994 of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga and the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga, respectively, finding probable cause for the
filing of the criminal information5 against both Atty. Bernardo and Andres Magat (Magat)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48,
charging them with the crime of Estafa punishable under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code.

The respondent was required to file his Comment.6 On September 24, 2004, the
respondent filed an undated Comment,7 wherein he denied the allegations against him
and averred the following:

2. He had not deceived both complainants between the period from April 15,
1997 to July 22, 1997 for purposes of getting from them the amount of
[₱]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat whom they contacted and who in turn sought
the legal services of the respondent. It was Andy Magat who received the said
money from them.

3. There was no connivance made and entered into by Andy Magat and
respondent. The arrangement for titling of the land was made by Teresita N.
Bengco and Andy Magat with no participation of respondent.

4. The acceptance of the respondent to render his legal service is legal and
allowed in law practice.8

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.

On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the respondent to submit a verified comment
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of Court as it appeared that the
respondent’s undated comment filed with the Court was not verified.9

On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel requested for an additional fifteen (15)
days from March 17, 2005, or until April 1, 2005, within which to comply due to his
medical confinement.10

Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed a second motion11 for extension

praying for another 20 days, or until April 22, 2005, alleging that he was still recovering
from his illness.

On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference.12 The respondent failed
to appear; thus, the IBP considered the respondent in default for his failure to appear
and for not filing an answer despite extensions granted. The case was then submitted
for report and recommendation.13

Based on the records of the case, Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-

Maala made the following findings:

[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, respondent with the help
and in connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat ("Magat"), by using false
pretenses and deceitful words, [wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent acts to the
effect that respondent would expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda
family of Tagaytay City, who were the acquaintance of complainants.

Respondent and Magat convinced complainants that if they finance and deliver to them
the amount of [₱]495,000.00 as advance money, they would expedite the titling of the
subject land. Respondent represented himself to be the lawyer of William Gatchalian,
the owner of Plastic City located at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, who
was allegedly the buyer of the subject land once it has been titled. Respondent and
Magat also represented that they have contacts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and the
Register of Deeds which representation they knew to be false, fraudulent and were only
made to induce complainants to give and deliver to them the amount of [₱]495,000.00.
Once in possession of the said amount, far from complying with their obligation to
expedite and cause the titling of the subject land, respondent and Magat [wilfully],
unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to
their personal use and benefit and despite demand upon them to return the said
amount, they failed and refused to do so.

In view of the deceit committed by respondent and Magat, complainants filed a

complaint for Estafa against the former before the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court, of
Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. In the preliminary investigation
conducted by the said court, it finds sufficient grounds to hold respondent and Magat for
trial for the crime of Estafa defined under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. The case was transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Pampanga for appropriate action as per Order dated 7 December 1998.

The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of

Pampanga conducted a re-investigation of the case. During the re-investigation thereof,
Magat was willing to reimburse to complainants the amount of [₱]200,000.00 because
according to him the amount of [₱]295,000.00 should be reimbursed by respondent
considering that the said amount was turned over to respondent for expenses incurred
in the documentation prior to the titling of the subject land. Both respondent and Magat
requested for several extensions for time to pay back their obligations to the
complainants. However, despite extensions of time granted to them, respondent and
Magat failed to fulfil their promise to pay back their obligation. Hence, it was resolved
that the offer of compromise was construed to be an implied admission of guilt. The
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor believes that there was no reason to disturb the findings of
the investigating judge and an Information for Estafa was filed against respondent and
Magat on 8 July 1999 before the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.

The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice on
several occasions and appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting
resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his despiciency for his oath of
office as a lawyer which deserves disciplinary sanction x x x.

From the facts and evidence presented, it could not be denied that respondent
committed a crime that import deceit and violation of his attorney’s oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility under both of which he was bound to ‘obey the laws of the
land.’ The commission of unlawful acts, specially crimes involving moral turpitude, acts
of dishonesty in violation of the attorney’s oath, grossly immoral conduct and deceit are
grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers (Rule 138, Section 27, RRC).

The misconduct complained of took place in 1997 and complainants filed the case only
on 16 April 2004. As provided for by the Rules of Procedure of the Commission of Bar
Discipline, as amended, dated 24 March 2004, "A complaint for disbarment, suspension
or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional
misconduct" (Section 1, Rule VIII).14

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

x x x [R]espondent ATTY. PABLO A. BERNARDO be SUSPENDED for a period of

TWO YEARS from receipt hereof from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as
a member of the Bar. 15

On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2007-
065, viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED

with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is hereby ordered, the restitution of
the amount of [₱]200,000.00 within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice with Warning
that if he does not return the amount with in sixty days from receipt of this Order then he
will be meted the penalty of Suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.16

On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 of the
aforesaid Resolution of the IBP. The respondent averred that: (1) the IBP resolution is
not in accord with the rules considering that the complaint was filed more than two (2)
years from the alleged misconduct and therefore, must have been dismissed outright;
(2) he did not commit any misrepresentation in convincing Fidela to give him money to
finance the titling of the land; (3) he was hired as a lawyer through Magat who
transacted with Teresita as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement18 signed by the
latter; (4) he was denied due process when the Investigating Commissioner considered
him as in default after having ignored the representative he sent during the hearing on
August 3, 2005; and (5) he long restituted the amount of ₱225,000.00 not as an offer of
compromise but based on his moral obligation as a lawyer due to Teresita’s declaration
that he had to stop acting as her legal counsel sometime in the third quarter of 1997.
The respondent pointed out the admission made by Fidela in her direct testimony before
the RTC that she received the amount, as evidenced by photocopies of receipts.

In an Order19 dated May 17, 2007 issued by the IBP, the complainant was required to
comment within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
In her Comment,20 Fidela explained that it took them quite some time in filing the
administrative case because they took into consideration the possibility of an amicable
settlement instead of a judicial proceeding since it would stain the respondent’s
reputation as a lawyer; that the respondent went into hiding which prompted them to
seek the assistance of CIDG agents from Camp Olivas in order to trace the
respondent’s whereabouts; that the respondent was duly accorded the opportunity to be
heard; and finally, that no restitution of the ₱200,000.00 plus corresponding interest has
yet been made by the respondent.

On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation21 stating that the RTC rendered a
decision in the criminal case for Estafa finding the accused, Atty. Bernardo and Magat
"guilty of conspiracy in the commission of Estafa under Article 315 par. 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code and both are sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of
Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal
as maximum."22

In a Letter23 dated March 23, 2009, addressed to the IBP, Fidela sought the resolution of
the present action as she was already 86 years of age. Later, an Ex-parte Motion to
Resolve the Case24 dated September 1, 2010 was filed by the complainants. In another
Letter dated October 26, 2011, Fidela, being 88 years old, sought for Atty. Bernardo’s
restitution of the amount of ₱200,000.00 so she can use the money to buy her medicine
and other needs.

The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the IBP.

It is first worth mentioning that the respondent’s defense of prescription is untenable.

The Court has held that administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The
lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of
the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer.
Otherwise, members of the bar would only be emboldened to disregard the very oath
they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant
would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated
from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.25

Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he himself pleaded for several
extensions of time to file the same, the respondent failed to appear during the
mandatory conference, as ordered by the IBP. As a lawyer, the respondent is
considered as an officer of the court who is called upon to obey and respect court
processes. Such acts of the respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on
the court’s authority which can not be countenanced.

It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice.
As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so
doing, the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may
be disciplined – whether in their professional or in their private capacity – for any
conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.26

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding
his qualifications or legal services.

There is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admitted in his answer that his legal services were hired by the complainants through
Magat regarding the purported titling of land supposedly purchased. While he begs for
the Court’s indulgence, his contrition is shallow considering the fact that he used his
position as a lawyer in order to deceive the complainants into believing that he can
expedite the titling of the subject properties. He never denied that he did not benefit
from the money given by the complainants in the amount of ₱495,000.00.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.
The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.27

It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a

criminal action filed against a lawyer despite having involved the same set of facts.
Jurisprudence has it "that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result
in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the respondent’s acquittal
does not necessarily exculpate him administratively."28

In Yu v. Palaña,29 the Court held that:

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against
lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings. Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a
criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this
Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and continuing
membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is
pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly
disparate. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and
for preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice
law. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court.30 (Citations omitted)

As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for the crime of
Estafa for which he was meted the penalty of sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one
(1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum. Such criminal conviction clearly undermines the respondent’s
moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Rule 138, Section 27 provides that:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.

– A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.

In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option but to accord him the punishment
commensurate to all his acts and to accord the complainants, especially the 88-year old
Fidela, with the justice they utmost deserve.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found

guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice
hereof.

Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount of
₱200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt
of this Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to the Court, through
the Office of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10) DAYS therefrom; with a STERN
WARNING that failure to do so shall merit him the additional penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for one (1) year.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4973               March 15, 2010

SPOUSES MANUEL C. RAFOLS, JR. and LOLITA B. RAFOLS, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and
discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice
by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove
from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath has
proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the
bar. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

– Rivera v. Corral, A.C. No. 3548, July 4, 2002, 384 SCRA 1.

By its Board Resolution No. 1 dated March 7, 1998, the South Cotabato-Sarangani-
General Santos City (SOCSARGEN) Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) resolved to refer to the IBP Board of Governors in Manila, for appropriate action
and investigation, the purported anomaly involving Judge Teodoro Dizon Jr. and Atty.
Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr.1 Thus, on March 24, 1998, Atty. Joeffrey L. Montefrio, the
SOCSARGEN IBP Chapter President, transmitted the referral to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA).

The matter involving Judge Dizon, Jr., which was docketed as Administrative Matter
(AM) No. RTJ-98-1426 entitled Manuel C. Rafols and Lolita C. Rafols v. Judge Teodoro
Dizon, Jr., RTC, General Santos City, Branch 37,2 was resolved in a per curiam
decision promulgated on January 31, 2006,3 whereby the Court dismissed Judge Dizon,
Jr. from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with
prejudice to re-employment in the government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned and government -controlled
corporations.

In the same per curiam decision, the Court reiterated its resolution of October 21, 1998
for the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to conduct an investigation of the actuations of
Atty. Barrios, Jr. (respondent), and to render its report and recommendation.

Hence, this decision.

Antecedents
The anomaly denounced by the SOCSARGEN IBP Chapter was narrated in the joint
affidavit dated March 3, 1998 of Spouses Manuel C. Rafols, Jr. and Lolita B. Rafols
(complainants),4 whose narrative was corroborated by the affidavit dated March 11,
1998 of Larry Sevilla;5 the affidavit dated March 16, 1998 of Allan Rafols;6 and the
affidavit dated March 16, 1998 of Daisy Rafols,7 all of which were attached to the letter
of the IBP Chapter President. Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa, then Deputy Clerk of Court and
Bar Confidant, referred for appropriate action a copy of the letter and affidavits to then
Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo.

In turn, then Senior Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez filed with the Court
an Administrative Matter for Agenda, recommending in relation to Atty. Barrios, Jr., as
follows:

xxx

5. The Office of the Bar Confidant be FURNISHED with a copy of the letter-note and its
attachments so that it may conduct its own investigation in the matter with respect to the
actuations of Atty. Ricardo Barrios, Jr.8

xxx

In the resolution dated October 21, 1998, the Court approved the
recommendations,9 and directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to investigate the
actuations of the respondent, and to render its report and recommendation thereon.

Proceedings of the OBC

Only the respondent appeared during the hearing before the OBC. Denying the charges
against him, he sought the dismissal of the complaint and re-affirmed the contents of his
comment. Despite notice, the complainants did not appear before the OBC. However,
the complainants and the respondent had testified during the administrative hearing
involving Judge Dizon, Jr. before Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose Sabio Jr. as
the Investigating Justice. Also testifying thereat were the complainants’ witnesses,
namely: Allan Rafols, Daisy Rafols and Larry Sevilla.

A. Evidence for the Complainants

The complainants were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6209 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in General Santos City, wherein they sought the cancellation of a deed of sale.
Civil Case No. 6209 was assigned to Branch 37 of the RTC, presided by Judge Dizon,
Jr. The complainants were represented by the respondent, paying to him ₱15,000.00 as
acceptance fee.

On December 22, 1997, at 9:30 a.m., the respondent visited the complainants at their
residence and informed complainant Manuel that the judge handling their case wanted
to talk to him. The respondent and Manuel thus went to the East Royal Hotel’s coffee
shop where Judge Dizon, Jr. was already waiting. The respondent introduced Manuel to
the judge, who informed Manuel that their case was pending in his sala. The judge
likewise said that he would resolve the case in their favor, assuring their success up to
the Court of Appeals, if they could deliver ₱150,000.00 to him. As he had no money at
that time, Manuel told the judge that he would try to produce the amount. The judge
then stated that he would wait for the money until noon of that day. Thus, Manuel left
the coffee shop together with the respondent, who instructed Manuel to come up with
the money before noon because the judge badly needed it. The two of them went to a
lending institution, accompanied by Allan Rafols, but Manuel was told there that only
₱50,000.00 could be released the next day. From the lending institution, they went to
the complainants’ shop to look for Ditas Rafols, Allan’s wife, who offered to withdraw
₱20,000.00 from her savings account.

On their way to the bank, Manuel, Allan and Ditas dropped off the respondent at the
hotel for the latter to assure Judge Dizon, Jr. that the money was forthcoming.
Afterwards, Ditas and Manuel withdrew ₱20,000.00 and ₱30,000.00 from their
respective bank accounts, and went back to the hotel with the cash. There, they saw the
judge and his driver, who beckoned to them to go towards the judge’s Nissan pick-up
then parked along the highway in front of the hotel. Manuel alighted from his car and
approached the judge. Manuel personally handed the money to the judge, who told
Manuel after asking about the amount that it was not enough. Thereafter, Manuel
entered the hotel’s coffee shop and informed the respondent that he had already
handed the money to the judge.

On December 24, 1997, at about 6:00 a.m., the respondent again visited the
complainants. He was on board the judge’s Nissan pick-up driven by the judge’s driver.
The respondent relayed to the complainants the message that the judge needed the
balance of ₱100,000.00 in order to complete the construction of his new house in time
for the reception of his daughter’s wedding. However, the complainants managed to
raise only ₱80,000.00, which they delivered to the respondent on that same day.

On January 20, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. called up the complainants’ residence and
instructed their son to request his parents to return his call, leaving his cell phone
number. When Manuel returned the call the next day, the judge instructed Manuel to
see him in his office. During their meeting in his chambers, the judge demanded the
balance of ₱30,000.00. Manuel clarified to the judge that his balance was only
₱20,000.00 due to the previous amount given being already ₱80,000.00. The judge
informed him that the amount that the respondent handed was short. Saying that he
badly needed the money, the judge insisted on ₱30,000.00, and even suggested that
the complainants should borrow in order to raise that amount.

On January 22, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. called the complainants to inquire whether the
₱30,000.00 was ready for pick up. After Manuel replied that he was ready with the
amount, the judge asked him to wait for 20 minutes. The judge and his driver later
arrived on board his Nissan pick-up. Upon instructions of the judge’s driver, the
complainants followed the Nissan pick-up until somewhere inside the Doña Soledad
Estate, Espina, General Santos City. There, the judge alighted and approached the
complainants and shook their hands. At that point, Manuel handed ₱30,000.00 to the
judge. The judge then told Manuel that the RTC judge in Iloilo City before whom the
perpetuation of the testimony of Soledad Elevencionado-Provido was made should still
testify as a witness during the trial in his sala in order for the complainants to win. The
judge persuaded the complainants to give money also to that judge; otherwise, they
should not blame him for the outcome of the case.

The complainants were forced to give money to the judge, because they feared that the
judge would be biased against them unless they gave in to his demands. But when they
ultimately sensed that they were being fooled about their case, they consulted Larry
Sevilla, their mediamen friend, and narrated to Sevilla all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case. They agreed that the details should be released to the media.
The exposẻ was published in the Newsmaker, a local newspaper.

Thereafter, the respondent and Judge Dizon, Jr. made several attempts to appease the
complainants by sending gifts and offering to return a portion of the money, but the
complainants declined the offers.

According to the complainants, the respondent demanded ₱25,000.00 as his expenses

in securing the testimony of Soledad Elevencionado-Provido in Iloilo City to be used as
evidence in their civil case. In addition, the respondent requested the complainants to
borrow ₱60,000.00 from the bank because he wanted to redeem his foreclosed Isuzu
Elf, and because he needed to give ₱11,000.00 to his nephew who was due to leave for
work abroad.

B. Evidence for the Respondent

In his verified comment dated March 22, 2006,10 the respondent confirmed that the
complainants engaged him as their counsel in Civil Case No. 6209. His version follows.

On December 22, 1997, the respondent introduced Manuel to Judge Dizon, Jr. inside
the East Royal Hotel’s coffee shop. The respondent stayed at a distance, because he
did not want to hear their conversation. Later, Manuel approached the respondent and
gave him ₱2,000.00. When the respondent asked what the money was for, Manuel
replied that it was in appreciation of the former’s introducing the latter to the judge. The
respondent stated that Manuel did not mention what transpired between the latter and
the judge; and that the judge did not tell him (respondent) what transpired in that
conversation.

Two days later, the respondent again visited the complainants at their house in General
Santos City on board the judge’s Nissan pick-up driven by the judge’s driver, in order to
receive the ₱80,000.00 from the complainants. The amount was being borrowed by the
judge for his swimming pool. Later on, the judge told the respondent to keep
₱30,000.00 as a token of their friendship. After Manuel handed the ₱80,000.00, the
respondent and the judge’s driver headed towards Davao City, where, according to the
judge’s instruction, they redeemed the judge’s wristwatch for ₱15,000.00 from a
pawnshop. The driver brought the remaining amount of ₱35,000.00 to the judge in his
home.

On January 27, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. visited the respondent at the latter’s house to
ask him to execute an affidavit. Declining the request at first, the respondent relented
only because the judge became physically weak in his presence and was on the verge
of collapsing. Nonetheless, the respondent refused to notarize the document.

In that affidavit dated January 27, 1998,11 the respondent denied that Judge Dizon, Jr.
asked money from the complainants; and stated that he did not see the complainants
handing the money to the judge. He admitted that he was the one who had requested
the judge to personally collect his unpaid attorney’s fees from the complainants with
respect to their previous and terminated case; and that the judge did not ask money
from the complainants in exchange for a favorable decision in their case.

On January 28, 1998, the respondent returned to the complainants’ residence, but was
surprised to find complainant Lolita crying aloud. She informed him that the judge was
again asking an additional ₱30,000.00 although they had given him ₱30,000.00 only the
week before. She divulged that the judge had told her that their case would surely lose
because: (a) they had engaged a counsel who was mahinang klase; (b) the judge
hearing Civil Case No. 5645 in Iloilo and the woman who had testified in Civil Case No.
6029 had not been presented; and (c) they would have to spend at least ₱10,000.00 for
said judge’s accommodations in General Santos City.12

On January 31, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. went to the house of the respondent, but the
latter was not home. The judge left a note addressed to the complainants, and
instructed the respondent’s secretary to deliver the note to the complainants along with
a gift (imported table clock).13 According to the respondent, the complainants
consistently refused to accept the gift several times; it was later stolen from his house in
Cebu City.

On February 1, 1998, the respondent delivered the note and gift to the complainants,
but the latter refused to receive it, telling him that they were no longer interested to
continue with the case. At the same time, the complainants assured him that they bore
no personal grudge against him, because they had a problem only with Judge Dizon, Jr.

On February 24, 1998, the respondent went to the National Bureau of Investigation
Regional Office, Region XI, and the Philippine National Police Regional Office, Region
XI, both in Davao City, to request the investigation of the matter.14

On March 2, 1998, the respondent paid Judge Dizon, Jr. a visit upon the latter’s
request. In that meeting, the respondent told the judge about the refusal of the
complainants to accept the judge’s gift and about their decision not to continue with the
case.15
On the next day, Judge Dizon, Jr. sent a note to the respondent to inform him that the
judge had raised the amount that he had borrowed from the complainants.16 The judge
requested the respondent to tell the complainants that he (Judge Dizon, Jr.) was going
to return whatever he had borrowed from them. However, the complainants informed
the respondent that he should tell the judge that they were no longer interested in
getting back the money.

The respondent made a follow-up at the NBI and PNP Regional Offices in Davao City of
his request for assistance after Manuel mentioned to him that he (Manuel) knew of
many armed men ready at any time to help him in his problem with the judge.

Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In its Report and Recommendation dated May 15, 2008,17 the OBC opined that the
administrative case against the respondent could not be dismissed on the ground of
failure to prosecute due to the complainants’ failure to appear in the scheduled hearing
despite due notice.

Based on the facts already established and identified, as rendered in the decision dated
January 21, 2006 in Manuel Rafols and Lolita B. Rafols v. Judge Teodoro A.
Dizon,18 the OBC rejected the respondent’s denial of any knowledge of the transaction
between his clients and the judge.

The OBC recommended:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended

that respondent ATTY. RICARDO BARRIOS, Jr. be SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) years with a stern warning that a repetition of similar act in the future
will be dealt more severely."

Ruling of the Court

We approve and adopt the report and recommendations of the OBC, which we find to
be fully and competently supported by the evidence adduced by the complainants and
their witnesses, but we impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, which we believe is
the proper penalty.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which governs the disbarment and
suspension of attorneys, provides:

Section 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers constitute malpractice.

The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the
shoulders of the complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the
complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that warrants
the imposition of the harsh penalty.19 As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption
that he is innocent of the charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An
attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in
accordance with his oath.20

Here, the complainants successfully overcame the respondent’s presumed innocence

and the presumed regularity in the performance of his duties as an attorney of the
complainants. The evidence against him was substantial, and was not contradicted.

To begin with, the respondent’s denial of knowledge of the transaction between the
complainants and Judge Dizon, Jr. was not only implausible, but also unsubstantiated. It
was the respondent himself who had introduced the complainants to the judge. His act
of introducing the complainants to the judge strongly implied that the respondent was
aware of the illegal purpose of the judge in wanting to talk with the respondent’s clients.
Thus, we unqualifiedly accept the aptness of the following evaluation made in the
OBC’s Report and Recommendation, viz:

xxx Being the Officer of the Court, he must have known that meeting litigants outside
the court is something beyond the bounds of the rule and that it can never be justified
by any reason. He must have known the purpose of Judge Dizon in requesting him to
meet the complainants-litigants outside the chamber of Judge Dizon. By his overt act in
arranging the meeting between Judge Dizon and complainants- litigants in the Coffee
Shop of the East Royal Hotel, it is crystal clear that he must have allowed himself and
consented to Judge Dizon’s desire to ask money from the complainants-litigants for a
favorable decision of their case which was pending before the sala of Judge Dizon.21

Secondly, the respondent’s insistence that he did not see the complainants’ act of
handing the money to the judge is unbelievable. In his comment, the respondent even
admitted having himself received the ₱80,000.00 from the complainants, and having
kept ₱30,000.00 of that amount pursuant to the instruction of the judge as a token of the
friendship between him and the judge.22 The admission proved that the respondent had
known all along of the illegal transaction between the judge and the complainants, and
belied his feigned lack of knowledge of the delivery of the money to the judge.

Thirdly, his attempt to explain that the complainants had given the money to the judge
as a loan, far from softening our strong impression of the respondent’s liability,
confirmed his awareness of the gross impropriety of the transaction. Being the
complainants’ attorney in the civil case being heard before the judge, the respondent
could not but know that for the judge to borrow money from his clients was highly
irregular and outrightly unethical. If he was innocent of wrongdoing, as he claimed, he
should have desisted from having any part in the transaction. Yet, he did not, which
rendered his explanation unbelievable. Compounding the unworthiness of his
explanation was his admission of having retained ₱30,000.00 of the "borrowed" money
upon the judge’s instruction.

And, lastly, the OBC has pointed out that the respondent’s act of requesting the NBI
Regional Office in Davao City to investigate was an afterthought on his part. We agree
with the OBC, for the respondent obviously acted in order to anticipate the
complainants’ moves against him and the judge. To be sure, the respondent sensed
that the complainants would not simply forgive and forget the mulcting they had suffered
at the hands of the judge and their own attorney from the time that the complainants
assured him that they were no longer interested to get back their money despite their
being very angry at the judge’s greed.

Overall, the respondent’ denials were worthless and unavailing in the face of the
uncontradicted evidence showing that he had not only personally arranged the meeting
between Manuel and Judge Dizon, Jr., but had also communicated to the complainants
the judge’s illegal reason for the meeting. It is axiomatic that any denial, to be accepted
as a viable defense in any proceeding, must be substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. This need derives from the nature of a denial as evidence of a negative and
self-serving character, weightless in law and insufficient to overcome the testimony of
credible witnesses on affirmative matters.23

II

The practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions.24 The attorney is a

vanguard of our legal system, and, as such, is expected to

maintain not only legal proficiency but also a very high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing in order that the people’s faith and confidence in the legal
system are ensured.25 Thus, he must conduct himself, whether in dealing with his clients
or with the public at large, as to be beyond reproach at all times.26 Any violation of the
high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition on the attorney of
the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.27

Specifically, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins an attorney from engaging

in unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful conduct.28 Corollary to this injunction is the rule that
an attorney shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.291avvphi1

The respondent did not measure up to the exacting standards of the Law Profession,
which demanded of him as an attorney the absolute abdication of any personal
advantage that conflicted in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of his clients.
For monetary gain, he disregarded the vow to "delay no man for money or malice" and
to "conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion,
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients" that he made when he took
the Lawyer’s Oath.30 He also disobeyed the explicit command to him as an attorney "to
accept no compensation in connection with his client’s business

except from him or with his knowledge and approval."31 He conveniently ignored that the
relation between him and his clients was highly fiduciary in nature and of a very
delicate, exacting, and confidential character.32

Verily, the respondent was guilty of gross misconduct, which is "improper or wrong
conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden
act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere
error of judgment."33 Any gross misconduct of an attorney in his professional or private
capacity shows him unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the
imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good moral character is
an essential qualification for the admission of an attorney and for the continuance of
such privilege.34

The conclusion that the respondent and the disgraced Judge Dizon, Jr. were
conspirators against the former’s own clients, whom he was sworn to protect and to
serve with utmost fidelity and morality, is inevitable for the Court to make in this
administrative case. And, being conspirators, they both deserve the highest penalty.
The disbarment of the respondent is in order, because such sanction is on par with the
dismissal of Judge Dizon, Jr.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is disbarred.

This decision shall be entered in the records of Atty. Barrios, Jr. as a member of the
Philippine Bar.

Copies of the decision shall be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for record purposes; and to the Court Administrator, for circulation to all
courts nationwide.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN,
FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE,
MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by
TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG
CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO,
JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG,
ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP.,
ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC
HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP.,
GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS
AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING
SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP.,
NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC.,
SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on

one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service
and on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to
defend its interests.

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial

difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account
with the Central Bank.1 It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had
approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling
₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and ₱0.505 million as
uncollectible.2 As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to
GENBANK which reached a total of ₱310 million.3 Despite the mega loans,
GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central
Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation.4 A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26 to 28,
1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.5 Subsequently, former
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First
Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s
liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the
first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the
PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against respondents Lucio
Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan
Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos,
Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel
Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim,
Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing
and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms,
Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries,
Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and
Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant,
Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings &
Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar
Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.6 In connection therewith, the
PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the
above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with
former President Marcos.

Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by
the PCGG.7 After the filing of the parties’ comments, this Court referred the cases to
the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their
counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his
private practice of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as

counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in
Civil Case Nos. 00058 and 0096-0099.9 The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza,
as then Solicitor General10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the
liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et
al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly
"intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his
capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank’s officials on
the procedure to bring about GENBANK’s liquidation and appeared as counsel for the
Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of
GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify
invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a

resolution denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No.
0005.11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did
not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term
as Solicitor General.12 It further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s appearance as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the
year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing
his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within
one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office.13 The PCGG
did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.14

It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from

the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division to the Fifth Division.15 In its resolution dated July
11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza.16 It adopted the resolution of its Second
Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in
substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought
reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December
5, 2001.17

Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11,
2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.18 The
PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer
from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the
prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the
objection to respondent Mendoza’s appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the
resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.19

The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of
the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the
legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the
substantive issue.

Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies
to respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were

pervasive in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did
not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one
source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the
standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the
central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client.
The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including specific
pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore
settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence,
loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the
litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's
practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did

not differ markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths,
statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The
difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The
standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far
greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from
colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some standards of conduct,
but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three
of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal,
positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness,
competency and reasonable fees.20

The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the

United States. By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two
ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York "Field
Code," introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise
statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of
the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and
George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline
of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail
and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-
nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer
behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations – e.g., the "do no falsehood" oath and the
deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or
indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency
recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property.
Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege
and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely
exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial
and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide
a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more
comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new
era in American legal ethics.21

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to
guide lawyers in their practice — the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes
were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the
two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic
discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty
and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however, the bar association
codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the
bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding
rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar
associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial
period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth
century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial
predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama
State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of
drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members.22

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of
ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states’ codes, and
it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.23

In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient
to attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In
that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics.24

As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the
canons. Among their concerns was the "revolving door" or "the process by which
lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then
leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts,
and influence garnered in government service."25 These concerns were classified
as adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse-
interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer
represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer
dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former
are adverse.26 On the other hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are
unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers.27 For
several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new
canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended
one canon and added thirteen new canons.28 To deal with problems peculiar to former
government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for "adverse-
interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest representation conflicts."29 The rationale for
disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer’s largely discretionary
actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the
government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later
become private practice clients.30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits
of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ
should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any
matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added
Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.31

In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of

the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.32

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA
Canons needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis
Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the "adequacy and effectiveness"
of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed substantial
revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational
and the proscriptive" and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession
in the United States likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible
participation in matters during their employment with the government.

The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility.33 The basic ethical principles in the Code of
Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined
minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere.34 In the case of Canon
9, DR 9-101(b)35 became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee
reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in
August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Code.36

Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and
indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules
of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format,"
where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule.
The new format was intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement
"because the only enforceable standards were the black letter Rules." The Model Rules
eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative
discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the
content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive
improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests.37 In particular, the ABA
did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of
impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm’s
indefinite nature.38

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted

a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this
Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and
practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court
promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former government lawyers, and
provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of
paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the
expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the word "intervened." It is,
therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-
interest conflicts."

The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted
as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents
Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists
a "congruent-interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents Tan, et al.

I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning

of "matter" referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of
the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter." The
American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any discrete,
isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular
situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law.

Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention

by respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the
following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the "matter" where he intervened
as a Solicitor General, viz:40

The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth

Division) in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001
denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al.
The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in
the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said
bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by
certain key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado
R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General
Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P.
Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they
averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty.
Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The
pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he
advised that the following procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that

studies and evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of
August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a
condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors
and creditors and the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of
the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing
decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the
liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary
Board where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent
documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition
for assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

...

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated
March 29, 1977, together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the

Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of
Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated
March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the

Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No.
265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank,
together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for
his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor

General involved in the case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to
proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the
Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the
concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black
and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head of

the appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into
the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or
that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or
creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to
inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements
of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines
and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized
competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets
and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and
administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary
for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages
in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions.

...

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank
or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or
cannot resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it
shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor
General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have
been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution.
The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims
against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions
and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to
preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved
by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central
Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who
shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board
under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of
the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and
other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the
name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect
and recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary
Board under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be
final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof
that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or
injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its
actions under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless
there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and
made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in
which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount
to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if
granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in
the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the
bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the
petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The
provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution
of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as
they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this
shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary
demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or
financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of
a receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the
provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended
by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is not the "matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that
the "drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations
or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope
of the term "matter" and cannot disqualify.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of
respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No.
342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is
the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from
the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for
themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of
the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the
sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in
informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru
the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court
of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the
same nor is related to but is different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No.
0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by
respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The
case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank
are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of
GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the
alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of
the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It
goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot
apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor
General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the
matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by

Rule 6.03. "Intervene" means, viz.:

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to

occur, fall, or come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by
way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things
(Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)41

On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the
interests of others.42

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under

the first interpretation, "intervene" includes participation in a proceeding even if the
intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence.43 Under the second
interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the power to
influence the subject proceedings.44 We hold that this second meaning is more
appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the
Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as
innocuous such as "x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law."

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon

36 provided that a former government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase
"which he has investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former
government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the
prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government
service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules further constricted
the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a private
client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a public officer or employee."

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special
proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent
Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to
the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed,
the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for
its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks
the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the
court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of
creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice
but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such
a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the
usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.

II

Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a

commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the
government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by
the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the
United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.

In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure
that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end without
necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not
interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent.
At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered by the
private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that situation.
The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to
recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and
contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice.45 Rightly,
Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too
great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the
practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the
firm with which they become associated to be disqualified.46 Indeed, "to make
government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter."47

In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation
tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal
representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing
counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
noted "the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings,
deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the
opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so prevalent in large civil cases in recent
years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary."48 Even the United
States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals’ description of
disqualification motions as "a dangerous game."49 In the case at bar, the new attempt to
disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent
Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years
and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent
Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was
filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to
the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.50 At the very least,
the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled
put petitioner’s motive as highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the
prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted
that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of
choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence.51 The client
with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by
the latter.52 The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel
cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading
of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government service.
According to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can
find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously,
challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal
demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private employment
does not enjoy such freedom."53 He adds: "Any system that affects the right to take a
new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits
official independence."54 The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General,
the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed
that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of
independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend
acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to
defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the
independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.

No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government

lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law,
the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law
firm.55 Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal
profession.

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and
loss of public confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging
public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best56 which can lead to untoward
results.57 No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to
former government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of
information between the government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to
protect.58 Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the
1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct59 and some courts have
abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of
interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government,
the witnesses in the case, and the public.60

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it
correctly disfavors lawyers who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides"
carries the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential
official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the
case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central
Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the
subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of
respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential
official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no
inconsistent "sides" to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question
that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working
against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the
validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied
Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central
Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No.
0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two
sides are involved.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to
avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a
conflict of loyalties while still in government service.61 The example given by the
proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he
or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less
vigorously.62 In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960:
"The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well
occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive
administration of government policies."63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern
as "probably excessive."64 He opines "x x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm would
feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client – the
government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the ‘best’
government lawyers – the ones who were hardest to beat – not the least qualified or
least vigorous advocates."65 But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the
case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central
Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et
al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank
and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as
the "excessive influence of former officials" or their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan again
warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his
warning, viz: "Much of what appears to be an employee’s influence may actually be the
power or authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure
from government x x x."67 More, he contends that the concern can be demeaning to
those sitting in government. To quote him further: "x x x The idea that, present officials
make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about
the present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or
talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores
the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even
the appearance of favoritism."68

III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent
interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject
to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively
to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that
(1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted
by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent
Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard,
qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the
rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is
legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on
Revision of the Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-
0099 is denied.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4018             March 8, 2005

OMAR P. ALI, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a verified petition for disbarment1 filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having
been found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of
Marawi City.

It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case

earlier filed by complainant against respondent. In said case, which was initially
investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent
with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah,2 Ambobae Bauduli Datu,
Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and
manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others
for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali
Datus are relatives of respondent.3

The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating
officer, Enrique Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus:

It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his
case but that he has no case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong.
Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the
complaint against respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence.4

The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report
dated 08 September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated
respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents.
He, however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of
TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting
Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter's co-accused. As a result
of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondent's dismissal from service.

On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No.
41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering
respondent's dismissal from government service. Respondent subsequently questioned
said administrative order before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition5 claiming that the Office of the President did not have the authority and
jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that respondents6 in that petition
violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the
administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated
his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).

In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition "for failure on the
part of petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned order."7 Respondent thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied with finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994.

On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us,
seeking the disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious
that respondent had "proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an
attorney"8 and that he poses a "serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession."9

In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his
issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both
law10 and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the
Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the
basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli
Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion,
hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.

Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal
complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad
Abdullah and the latter's co-defendants. Respondent explains that his participation in
said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating
prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles involved in said dispute.
He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice
was based solely on the evidence presented by the parties. Complainant's allegation,
therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified.

Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,11 this Court referred this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit.
On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued the following order
relative to the transfer of venue of this case. The pertinent portion of this order provides:

ORDER

When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent
appeared.

The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the
reception of evidence vis-à-vis this case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur
before the president of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly,
 transmit the records of this case to the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate
action.12

On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving

Commissioner Fernandez's recommendation for the transfer of venue of this
administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region governor to designate
the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report, and
recommendation.13 The IBP Resolution states:

Resolution No. XII-96-153

Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong

RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C.

Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the
Western Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido to designate the local
IBP Chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report and recommendation.

Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline,
wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido,
President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to receive the evidence in this
case and to submit his recommendation and recommendation as directed by the IBP
Board of Governors.14

In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter15 informed the

IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that the investigating panel16 had sent notices
to both complainant and respondent for a series of hearings but respondent consistently
ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five years.

On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the
transmittal of the records of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the
IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner Fernandez's Order
dated 23 February 1996.

Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato

Chapter to comment on respondent's motion.17 Complying with this directive, the panel
expressed no opposition to respondent's motion for the transmittal of the records of this
case to IBP Marawi City.18 On 25 September 1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered
the referral of this case to IBP Marawi City for the reception of respondent's
evidence.19 This order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said
resolution provides:

RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the

transmittal of the case records of the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather
 he is directed to re-evaluate the recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter
and report the same to the Board of Governors.20

Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October

1998 a motion praying that the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be
stricken from the records.21 Respondent insists that the investigating panel constituted
by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the investigation of this case
since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and Commissioner Fernandez's Order of 23 February
1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this case. Moreover,
he claims that he was never notified of any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP
Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due process.

Complainant opposed22 this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches.

According to complainant, the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato
Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly notified of the hearings conducted
by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did nothing to defend himself.
He also claims that respondent did not even bother to submit his position paper when
he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City
Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of respondent is
possible. Finally, complainant contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would
only entail a duplication of the process which had already been completed by IBP
Cotabato Chapter.

In an Order dated 15 October 1999,23 Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato

Chapter to submit proofs that notices for the hearings conducted by the investigating
panel as well as for the submission of the position paper were duly received by
respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP Cotabato Chapter
investigating panel, furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a copy of the panel's order
dated 4 August 1997.24 Attached to said order was Registry Receipt No. 3663 issued by
the local post office. On the lower portion of the registry receipt was a handwritten
notation reading "Atty. Mosib A. Bubong."

On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman

of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and
recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive had the approval of
the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30 June
2001, to wit:

RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez

for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the CBD
Mindanao to conduct an investigation, re-evaluation, report and recommendation
within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice.25

Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar
P. Ali, complainant in this case. According to her, her father passed away on 12 June
2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was requesting the
withdrawal of this case.26

Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct
the chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and
authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct an investigation of this
case.27 This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated
19 July 2002.28 According to Atty. Castillo –

After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made
on the report of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-
Affidavit of respondent, the undersigned sees no need for any further
investigation, to be able to make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the
Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato City.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City,

Zamboanga del Norte is hereby denied. The undersigned will submit his Report
to the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days
from date hereof.

In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and
conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows:

The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of
the President in Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein
herein respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in:

a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,

b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting

law.

And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi
City. In the Comment filed by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his
defense is good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the
charge of manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting
law, which by the way, was filed against respondent's relatives. Going over the
Decision of the Office of the President in Administrative Case No. 41, the
undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into account and fully
explained, before the Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the finding
of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the President was
fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in
considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present case.
 In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or
disturbing the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South
Cotabato.29

In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved, with modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty.
Castillo. The modification pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice
of law which should be imposed on respondent – whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the
earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP
Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.

On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which
the latter denied as by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.30

The issue thus posed for this Court's resolution is whether respondent may be disbarred
for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the government. We
resolve this question in the affirmative.

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply
because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of
Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's
misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the
bar on such grounds.31 Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he
committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his
misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.32

Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,33 we ordered the

disbarment of respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government service
because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we
declared –

[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to
impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the
court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in
the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the
court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the
only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given
the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to
paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-
speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the
strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility – all of which, throughout the
centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character.34
Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,35 this Court found sufficient
basis to disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the
Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the Commission on Higher Education. As we had
explained in that case –

… [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a
lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with
high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice.36 (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the
President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a
lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and
employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his
relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the
functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:

Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position
to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with
his public duties.

Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the public

office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-
conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than
the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.

As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant's daughter, requesting for
the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as
proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same."37 As we have previously explained in the case
of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:38

… A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or

lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the
facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a
civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
 justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administrative of justice.39

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in the respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 7332               June 18, 2013

EDUARDO A. ABELLA, Complainant,
vs.
RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Far the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by

Eduardo A. Abella (complainant) against Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. (respondent) based on
the latter's violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.Q2, Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

The Facts

On January 21, 1999, complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (PT&T) before the Cebu City Regional Arbitration
Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as RAB-
VII-01-0128-99. Finding merit in the complaint, Labor Arbiter (LA) Ernesto F. Carreon,
through a Decision dated May 13, 1999,2 ordered PT&T to pay complainant
₱113,100.00 as separation pay and ₱73,608.00 as backwages. Dissatisfied, PT&T
appealed the LA’s Decision to the NLRC. In a Decision dated September 12, 2001,3 the
NLRC set aside LA Carreon’s ruling and instead ordered PT&T to reinstate complainant
to his former position and pay him backwages, as well as 13th month pay and service
incentive leave pay, including moral damages and attorney’s fees. On reconsideration, it
modified the amounts of the aforesaid monetary awards but still maintained that
complainant was illegally dismissed.4 Consequently, PT&T filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals (CA).

In a Decision dated September 18, 2003 (CA Decision),5 the CA affirmed the NLRC’s
ruling with modification, ordering PT&T to pay complainant separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. Complainant moved for partial reconsideration, claiming that all his years
of service were not taken into account in the computation of his separation pay and
backwages. The CA granted the motion and thus, remanded the case to the LA for the
same purpose.6 On July 19, 2004, the CA Decision became final and executory.7

Complainant alleged that he filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the
Cebu City RAB on October 25, 2004. At this point, the case had already been assigned
to the new LA, herein respondent. After the lapse of five (5) months, complainant’s
motion remained unacted, prompting him to file a Second Motion for Execution on
March 3, 2005. Eight (8) months thereafter, still, there was no action on complainant’s
motion. Thus, on November 4, 2005, complainant proceeded to respondent’s office to
personally follow-up the matter. In the process, complainant and respondent exchanged
notes on how much the former’s monetary awards should be; however, their
computations differed. To complainant’s surprise, respondent told him that the matter
could be "easily fixed" and thereafter, asked "how much is mine?" Despite his shock,
complainant offered the amount of ₱20,000.00, but respondent replied: "make it
₱30,000.00." By force of circumstance, complainant acceded on the condition that
respondent would have to wait until he had already collected from PT&T. Before
complainant could leave, respondent asked him for some cash, compelling him to give
the latter ₱1,500.00.8

On November 7, 2005, respondent issued a writ of execution,9 directing the sheriff to

proceed to the premises of PT&T and collect the amount of ₱1,470,082.60, inclusive of
execution and deposit fees. PT&T moved to quash10 the said writ which was, however,
denied through an Order dated November 22, 2005.11 Unfazed, PT&T filed a
Supplemental Motion to Quash dated December 2, 2005,12 the contents of which were
virtually identical to the one respondent earlier denied. During the hearing of the said
supplemental motion on December 9, 2005, respondent rendered an Order13 in open
court, recalling the first writ of execution he issued on November 7, 2005. He confirmed
the December 9, 2005 Order through a Certification dated December 14, 200514 and
eventually, issued a new writ of execution15 wherein complainant’s monetary awards
were reduced from ₱1,470,082.60 to ₱114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit
fees.

Aggrieved, complainant filed on December 16, 2005 a Petition for Injunction before the
NLRC. In a Resolution dated March 14, 2006,16 the NLRC annulled respondent’s
December 9, 2005 Order, stating that respondent had no authority to modify the CA
Decision which was already final and executory.17

Aside from instituting a criminal case before the Office of the

Ombudsman,18 complainant filed the instant disbarment complaint19 before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility for (a) soliciting money from complainant in exchange for a
favorable resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to give benefit and advantage to
PT&T.

In his Comment,20 respondent denied the abovementioned accusations, maintaining

that he merely implemented the CA Decision which did not provide for the payment of
backwages. He also claimed that he never demanded a single centavo from
complainant as it was in fact the latter who offered him the amount of ₱50,000.00.

The Recommendation and Action of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 2008,21 Investigating Commissioner

Rico A. Limpingco (Commissioner Limpingco) found that respondent tried to twist the
meaning of the CA Decision out of all logical, reasonable and grammatical context in
order to favor PT&T.22 He further observed that the confluence of events in this case
shows that respondent deliberately left complainant’s efforts to execute the CA Decision
unacted upon until the latter agreed to give him a portion of the monetary award thereof.
Notwithstanding their agreement, immoral and illegal as it was, respondent later went as
far as turning the proceedings into some bidding war which eventually resulted into a
resolution in favor of PT&T. In this regard, respondent was found to be guilty of gross
immorality and therefore, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that he be
disbarred.23

On July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-345
(IBP Resolution),24 adopting and approving Commissioner Limpingco’s
recommendation, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and for Respondent’s violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Code of Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is hereby
DISBARRED.25

Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his
violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco
as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

The pertinent provisions of the Code provide:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF

THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

xxxx

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.

CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT

SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.
 xxxx

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.

The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the
lawyer’s responsibility to society: Rule 1.01 engraves the overriding prohibition against
lawyers from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule
1.03 proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying any man’s
cause for any corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to
lawyers in government service, enjoining them from using one’s public position to: (1)
promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to
interfere with public duties.26 It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a government
office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.27

In this light, a lawyer’s compliance with and observance of the above-mentioned rules
should be taken into consideration in determining his moral fitness to continue in the
practice of law.

To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the
legal profession."28 This proceeds from the lawyer’s duty to observe the highest degree
of morality in order to safeguard the Bar’s integrity.29 Consequently, any errant behavior
on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, which tends to
show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to
warrant suspension or disbarment.30

In this case, records show that respondent was merely tasked to recompute the
monetary awards due to the complainant who sought to execute the CA Decision which
had already been final and executory. When complainant moved for execution – twice
at that – respondent slept on the same for more than a year. It was only when
complainant paid respondent a personal visit on November 4, 2005 that the latter
speedily issued a writ of execution three (3) days after, or on November 7, 2005. Based
on these incidents, the Court observes that the sudden dispatch in respondent’s action
soon after the aforesaid visit casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of his denial, i.e., that
he did not extort money from the complainant.

The incredulity of respondent’s claims is further bolstered by his complete turnaround

on the quashal of the November 7, 2005 writ of execution.

To elucidate, records disclose that respondent denied PT&T’s initial motion to quash
through an Order dated November 22, 2005 but later reversed such order in open court
on the basis of PT&T’s supplemental motion to quash which was a mere rehash of the
first motion that was earlier denied. As a result, respondent recalled his earlier orders
and issued a new writ of execution, reducing complainant’s monetary awards from
₱1,470,082.60 to ₱114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit fees.

To justify the same, respondent contends that he was merely implementing the CA
Decision which did not provide for the payment of backwages. A plain and cursory
reading, however, of the said decision belies the truthfulness of the foregoing assertion.
On point, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of public

respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated September 12, 2001 and
October 8, 2002 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION, ordering petitioner PT&T to
pay private respondent Eduardo A. Abella separation pay (as computed by the Labor
Arbiter) in lieu of reinstatement.31

Noticeably, the CA affirmed with modification the NLRC’s rulings dated September 12,
2001 and October 8, 2002 which both explicitly awarded backwages and other unpaid
monetary benefits to complainant.32 The only modification was with respect to the order
of reinstatement as pronounced in both NLRC’s rulings which was changed by the CA
to separation pay in view of the strained relations between the parties as well as the
supervening removal of complainant’s previous position.33 In other words, the portion of
the NLRC’s rulings which awarded backwages and other monetary benefits subsisted
and the modification pertained only to the CA’s award of separation pay in lieu of the
NLRC’s previous order of reinstatement. This conclusion, palpable as it is, can be easily
deduced from the records.

Lamentably, respondent tried to distort the findings of the CA by quoting portions of its
decision, propounding that the CA’s award of separation pay denied complainant’s
entitlement to any backwages and other consequential benefits altogether. In his
Verified Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Resolution,34 respondent stated:

From the above quoted final conclusions, the Court is very clear and categorical in
directing PT&T to pay complainant his separation pay ONLY in lieu of reinstatement.
Clearly, the Court did not direct the PT&T to pay him his backwages, and other
consequential benefits that were directed by the NLRC because he could no longer be
reinstated to his previous position on the ground of strained relationship and his
previous position had already gone, and no equivalent position that the PT&T could
offer. x x x.

Fundamental in the realm of labor law is the rule that backwages are separate and
distinct from separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and are awarded conjunctively to an
employee who has been illegally dismissed.35 There is nothing in the records that could
confound the finding that complainant was illegally dismissed as LA Carreon, the NLRC,
and the CA were all unanimous in decreeing the same. Being a labor arbiter, it is hardly
believable that respondent could overlook the fact that complainant was entitled to
backwages in view of the standing pronouncement of illegal dismissal.1âwphi1 In this
regard, respondent’s defense deserves scant consideration.
Therefore, absent any cogent basis to rule otherwise, the Court gives credence and
upholds Commissioner Limpingco’s and the IBP Board of Governor’s pronouncement of
respondent’s gross immorality. Likewise, the Court observes that his infractions
constitute gross misconduct.

Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable members of the community.36 It treads the line of grossness when it is so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as
to shock the community’s sense of decency.37 On the other hand, gross misconduct
constitutes "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment."38

In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when a lawyer is
found guilty of gross immoral conduct or gross misconduct, he may be suspended or
disbarred:

SEC. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A

member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Thus, as respondent’s violations clearly constitute gross immoral conduct and gross
misconduct, his disbarment should come as a matter of course.1âwphi1 However, the
Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had already been disbarred in a previous
administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr.,39 which therefore
precludes the Court fromduplicitously decreeing the same. In view of the foregoing, the
Court deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the amount of ₱40,000.0040 in order
to penalize respondent’s transgressions as discussed herein and to equally deter the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future.

As a final word, the Court staunchly reiterates the principle that the practice of law is a
privilege41 accorded only to those who continue to meet its exacting qualifications.
Verily, for all the prestige and opportunity which the profession brings lies the greater
responsibility to uphold its integrity and honor. Towards this purpose, it is quintessential
that its members continuously and unwaveringly exhibit, preserve and protect moral
uprightness in their activities, both in their legal practice as well as in their personal
lives. Truth be told, the Bar holds no place for the deceitful, immoral and corrupt.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross
immoral conduct and gross misconduct in violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1,
and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
ordered to pay a FINE of ₱40,000.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the
courts.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6622               July 10, 2012

MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar
Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S.
'L1halingcos (resrondent) with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or
Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross
immorality for marrying two other women while respondent’s first marriage was
subsisting.1

In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required

respondent to file a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005.3 The Complaint was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the record.4

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a
Notice5 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005.
During the conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and
respondent. They submitted for resolution three issues to be resolved by the
Commission as follows:

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by

nonpayment of fees to complainant

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and

3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married

thrice.6

The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers.
Respondent filed his verified Position Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while complainant
submitted his on 01 August 2005.8

Complainant’s Accusations

Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a

financial consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latter’s
numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant
claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱ 50,000 for
every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten
percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged that, from February to
December 2002, respondent was able to rake in millions of pesos from the corporate
rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant also claimed that he
was entitled to the amount of ₱ 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as
a result of his work with respondent, and a total of ₱ 4,539,000 from the fees paid by
their clients.9 Complainant appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the
computation of the fees he believes are due him.

Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in

violation of Section 27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent
set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel
Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit
cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the
Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients signed by
respondent on various dates11 and proofs of payment made to the latter by their
clients.12

On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing

two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was
subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the
Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S.
Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with
Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28
September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon in the City of Manila; and the third on
07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila.13

Respondent’s Defense

In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that
complainant was not an employee of his law firm – Tabalingcos and Associates Law
Office14 – but of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a major
stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and
incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in the latter’s
dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court cases.16 Respondent
also alleged that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment
of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents
showing that the salary of complainant had been paid.17

As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He

contended that his law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.,
whereby the firm would handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and
that the latter would attend to the financial aspect of the case’ such as the preparation of
the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To support this contention, respondent
attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005
entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for
Operations of the said company.19

On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by

William Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having
no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself.20 Respondent did
not specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with
two other women.

On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage

Contracts.21 To the said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage
Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO.22 The appended Marriage
Contracts matched the dates, places and names of the contracting parties indicated in
the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three marriages entered into by
respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that took place
between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980.23 The
second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Piñon, and it
took place at the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September
1987.24 The third Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and
Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the
second and third Marriage Contracts, respondent was described as single under the
entry for civil status.

On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed
by complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory
conference or submitted during the hearing of the case.25 Thus, respondent was
supposedly deprived of the opportunity to controvert those documents.26 He disclosed
that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent further informed the Commission
that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena
Piñon at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan, Laguna, where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. B-3271.28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered
that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and
allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He
prayed for their annulment, because they were purportedly null and void.

On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a

clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007.29 While complainant manifested to the
Commission that he would not attend the hearing,30 respondent manifested his
willingness to attend and moved for the suspension of the resolution of the
administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed with
the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to
be bearing his name.31
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original
copies of two (2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."32 The first criminal case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage contracted
by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was
still valid.33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged
respondent with having committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane
Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting.34 Each of the
Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as
accused in the criminal cases.35

On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same
proceeding, the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the
outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with the RTC–Laguna. Thus, the
Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for
resolution.36

IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and

Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent.37 The first

charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed
for lack of merit. The Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the
proper courts since it was only empowered to determine respondent’s administrative
liability. On this matter, complainant failed to prove dishonesty on the part of
respondent.38 On the second charge, the Commission found respondent to have
violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services and
unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It
failed, though, to point out exactly the specific provision he violated.39

As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross
immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to
prove through documentary evidence that respondent committed bigamy twice by
marrying two other women while the latter’s first marriage was subsisting.40 Due to the
gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred,
and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.41

On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
154, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.42 On 01 August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature. He contends that the
Commission should have suspended the disbarment proceedings pending the
resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the marriage
contracts bearing his name as having entered into those contracts with other women.
He further contends that the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that the
latter committed bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment.
Thus, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and
likewise moved to archive the administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the
Petitions he separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage
Contracts.43

On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration
and affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondent’s
disbarment.44

The Court’s Ruling

The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.

First Charge:

Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees

While we affirm the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not
concur with the rationale behind it.

The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the former’s
share in the fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule
9.0245 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to
divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed
to practice law. Based on the allegations, respondent had agreed to share with
complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant solicited for the respondent.
Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence of
that agreement.

We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a

layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and
void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering
that complainant’s allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly
dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.

Second Charge:

Unlawful solicitation of clients

Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal
services through various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary
evidence to prove that Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc.
were owned and used as fronts by respondent to advertise the latter’s legal services
and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and
ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to
point out the specific provision that was breached.

A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities
mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to
be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he
violated Rule 2.0347 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the
purpose of profit.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation.

Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in
such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar.
This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the
procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak
for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a
lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.48

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a
vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment;
specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C"49 of the Complaint is a
letterhead of Jesi & Jane

Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services.
The letter clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees,
respondent would render legal services related to the former’s loan obligation with a
bank. This circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the Code, because
the letter is signed by respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and
not as partner or associate of a law firm.

Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client
whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in
those occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical
considerations governing the attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and
not in the other.51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether
respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.

Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this
practice by respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for
violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.

Third Charge:

Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To
substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage
Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected
to the introduction of these documents, claiming that they were submitted after the
administrative case had been submitted for resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to
controvert them.52 We are not persuaded by his argument.

We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the
qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the
procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing
of affidavits of desistance by the complainant — do not apply in the determination of a
lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the
past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of
law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest
because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack
of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal
cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.1âwphi1 For

the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by convincing and satisfactory proof.54 In this case, complainant submitted
NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the
latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the
second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a
negative pregnant. He did not dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but
denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies of the two
Petitions he had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna – one in Biñan and the other in
Calamba – to declare the second and the third Marriage Contracts null and void.55

We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.

We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed
the authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the
Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to prove the former’s marriages to two
other women aside from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these
Marriage Contracts bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing
evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a
member of the bar. The documents were certified by the NSO, which is the official
repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a
person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded
much evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case,
respondent has not presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages,
he filed civil actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions
for Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated the second and the third
marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as special contracts
contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any
grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family
Code. Respondent’s regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates
either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law
on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code
provisions.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into
marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v.
Alejandro,56 we held thus:

We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them
not only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their
continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the
misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life.
This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and
reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private
affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in
doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment
of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the
lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of
intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may rightly
repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a

member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court.58

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his
name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos as follows:

1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and

solicitation.
 3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly
immoral conduct.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the
Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 9226 (Formerly CBD 06-1749), June 14, 2016

MA. CECILIA CLARISSA C, ADVINCULA, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEONARDO C.

ADVINCULA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from the complaint for disbarment dated June 16,
2006 brought to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Leonardo C.
Advincula (Atty. Advincula) by no less than his wife, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C.
Advincula (Dr. Advincula).

In her complaint,1 Dr. Advincula has averred that Atty. Advincula committed unlawful
and immoral acts;2 that while Atty. Advincula was still married to her, he had extra-
marital sexual relations with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga (Ms. Gonzaga);3 that the extra-
marital relations bore a child in the name of Ma. Alexandria Gonzaga Advincula
(Alexandria);4 that Atty. Advincula failed to give financial support to their own children,
namely: Ma. Samantha Paulina, Ma. Andrea Lana, and Jose Leandro, despite his
having sufficient financial resources;5 that he admitted in the affidavit of late registration
of birth of Alexandria that he had contracted another marriage with Ms. Gonzaga;6 that
even should Atty. Advincula prove that his declaration in the affidavit of late registration
of birth was motivated by some reason other than the fact that he truly entered into a
subsequent marriage with Ms. Gonzaga, then making such a declaration was in itself
still unlawful;7 that siring a child with a woman other than his lawful wife was conduct
way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer;8 that contracting a
subsequent marriage while the first marriage had not been dissolved was also an
unlawful conduct;9 that making a false declaration before a notary public was an
unlawful conduct punishable under the Revised Penal Code;10 and that the failure of
Atty. Advincula to provide proper support to his children showed his moral character to
be below the standards set by law for every lawyer.11 Dr. Advincula prayed that Atty.
Advincula be disbarred.12chanrobleslaw

In his answer,13 Atty. Advincula denied the accusations. He asserted that during the
subsistence of his marriage with Dr. Advincula but prior to the birth of their youngest
Jose Leandro, their marital relationship had deteriorated; that they could not agree on
various matters concerning their family, religion, friends, and respective careers; that Dr.
Advincula abandoned the rented family home with the two children to live with her
parents; that despite their separation, he regularly gave financial support to Dr.
Advincula and their children; that during their separation, he got into a brief relationship
with Ms. Gonzaga; and that he did not contract a second marriage with Ms.
Gonzaga.14chanrobleslaw

Atty. Advincula further acknowledged that as a result of the relationship with Ms.
Gonzaga, a child was bom and named Alexandra;15 that in consideration of his moral
obligation as a father, he gave support to Alexandra;16 that he only learned that the birth
of Alexandra had been subsequently registered after the child was already enrolled in
school;17 that it was Ms. Gonzaga who informed him that she had the birth certificate of
Alexandria altered by a fixer in order to enroll the child;18 that he strived to reunite his
legitimate family, resulting in a reconciliation that begot their third child, Jose Leandro;
that Dr. Advincula once again decided to live with her parents, bringing all of their
children along; that nevertheless, he continued to provide financial support to his family
and visited the children regularly; that Dr. Advincula intimated to him that she had
planned to take up nursing in order to work as a nurse abroad because her medical
practice here was not lucrative; that he supported his wife's nursing school
expenses;19 that Dr. Advincula left for the United States of America (USA) to work as a
nurse;20 that the custody of their children was not entrusted to him but he agreed to
such arrangement to avoid further division of the family;21 that during the same period
he was also busy with his law studies;22 that Dr. Advincula proposed that he and their
children migrate to the USA but he opposed the proposal because he would not be able
to practice his profession there;23 that Dr. Advincula stated that if he did not want to join
her, then she would just get the children to live with her;24 that when Dr. Advincula came
home for a vacation he was not able to accompany her due to his extremely busy
schedule as Chief Legal Staff of the General Prosecution Division of the National
Bureau of Investigation;25cralawred and that when they finally met arguments flared out,
during which she threatened to file a disbarment suit against him in order to force him to
allow her to bring their children to the USA.26 Atty. Advincula prayed that the disbarment
case be dismissed for utter lack of merit.27chanrobleslaw

Findings and Recommendations of the IBP-CBD

After exhaustive hearings, Commissioner Angelito C. Inocencio of the IBP Commission

on Bar Discipline (CBD) rendered the following findings and observations, and
recommended the following sanctions, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Based on Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers comes

this provisions (sic): "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."

This means that members of the bar ought to possess good moral character.
Remember we must (sic) that the practice of law is a mere privilege. The moment that a
lawyer no longer has the required qualifications foremost of which is the presence of
that character earlier mentioned, the Honorable Supreme Court may revoke the said
practice.

No doubt, Respondent Leanardo (sic) C. Advincula, probably due to the weakness of

the flesh, had a romance outside of marriage (sic) with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga. This
he admitted.

From such affair came a child named Ma. Alexandria. He supported her as a moral
obligation.

How, then, must we categorize his acts? It cannot be denied that he had committed an
adulterous and immoral act.

Was his conduct grossly immoral?

Before answering that, let us recall what the highest Court of the Land defined as
immoral conduct: "that conduct which is willful, flagrant or shameless and which shows
a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community."28chanrobleslaw

xxxx

It is the Commissioner's view that what he did pales when compared to Respondent Leo
Palma's case earlier cited.

In that case, the Honorable Supreme Court stressed that Atty. Palma had made a
mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.

The highest Court of the Land intoned in the same case: "But what respondent forgot is
that he has also duties to his wife. As a husband, he is obliged to live with her; observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity: and render help and support."

Deemed favorable to Respondent's cause were the various exhibits he presented

evidencing the fact that he supported their children financially. Such conduct could not
illustrate him as having championed a grossly immoral conduct.

Another factor to consider is this: Complainant should share part of the blame why their
marriage soured. Their constant quarrels while together would indicate that harmony
between them was out of the question.

The possibility appears great that she might have displayed a temper that ignited the
flame of discord between them.

Just the same, however, while this Commissioner would not recommend the supreme
penalty of disbarment for to deprive him of such honored station in life would result in
irreparable injury and must require proof of the highest degree pursuant to the
Honorable Supreme Court's ruling in Angeles vs. Figueroa, 470 SCRA 186 (2005), he
must be sanctioned.

And the proof adduced is not of the highest degree.

VI. RECOMMENDATION

In the light of the foregoing disquisition, having, in effect, Respondent's own admission
of having committed an extra-marital affair and fathering a child, it is respectfully
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for at least one month with
the additional admonition that should he repeat the same, a more severe penalty would
be imposed.

It would be unjust to impose upon him the extreme penalty of disbarment. What he did
was not grossly immoral.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted the findings and recommendations
of the Investigating Commissioner with slight modification of the penalty,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent's admission of engaging in a
simple immorality and also taking into account the condonation of his extra-marital affair
by his wife, Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for two (2) months.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Advincula accepted the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors as final and
executory, and manifested in his compliance dated February 26, 2013, as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. That on 28 November 2011 this Honorable Court issued a resolution suspending

the undersigned Attorney from the practice of law for two (2) months under "A.C.
No. 9226 (formerly CBD Case No. 06-1749) (Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula
vs. Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula) x x x

2. That on 30 October 2012 in faithful compliance with the above order, the
undersigned attorney applied for Leave for two (2) months starting November up
to December thereby refraining himself from the practice of law as Legal Officer
on the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x

3. That the undersigned Attorney would like to notify this Honorable Court of his
compliance with the above resolution/order so that he may be able to practice his
law profession again.31

Ruling of the Court

The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time of their
application for admission to the Bar, and must be maintained until retirement from the
practice of law. In this regard, the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

xxxx
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only
be in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character
and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to
refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself
as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic
ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles
but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of
good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning.32chanrobleslaw

Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless
as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency.33chanrobleslaw

On different occasions, we have disbarred or suspended lawyers for immorality based

on the surrounding circumstances of each case. In Bustamante-Alejandro v.
Alejandro,34 the extreme penalty of disbarment was imposed on the respondent who
had abandoned his wife and maintained an illicit affair with another woman. Likewise,
disbarment was the penalty for a lawyer who carried on an extra-marital affair with a
married woman prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage was null and void,
while he himself was also married.35 In another case we have suspended for two years,
a married attorney who had sired a child with a former client.36 In Samaniego v.
Ferrer,37 suspension of six months from the practice of law was meted on the
philandering lawyer.

Yet, we cannot sanction Atty. Advincula with the same gravity. Although his siring the
child with a woman other than his legitimate wife constituted immorality, he committed
the immoral conduct when he was not yet a lawyer. The degree of his immoral conduct
was not as grave than if he had committed the immorality when already a member of
the Philippine Bar. Even so, he cannot escape administrative liability. Taking all the
circumstances of this case into proper context, the Court considers suspension from the
practice of law for three months to be condign and appropriate.
As a last note, Atty. Advincula manifested in his compliance dated February 26, 2013
that he had immediately accepted the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
suspending him from the practice of law for two months as final and executory; that he
had then gone on leave from work in the NBI for two months starting in November and
lasting until the end of December, 2012; and that such leave from work involved
refraining from performing his duties as a Legal Officer of the NBI.

The manifestation of compliance is unacceptable. A lawyer like him ought to know that it
is only the Court that wields the power to discipline lawyers. The IBP Board of
Governors did not possess such power, rendering its recommendation against him
incapable of finality. It is the Court's final determination of his liability as a lawyer that is
the reckoning point for the service of sanctions and penalties. As such, his supposed
compliance with the recommended two-month suspension could not be satisfied by his
going on leave from his work at the NBI. Moreover, his being a government employee
necessitates that his suspension from the practice of law should include his suspension
from office. A leave of absence will not suffice. This is so considering that his position
mandated him to be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing. The suspension
from the practice of law will not be a penalty if it does not negate his continuance in
office for the period of the suspension. If the rule is different, this exercise of reprobation
of an erring lawyer by the Court is rendered inutile and becomes a mockery because he
can continue to receive his salaries and other benefits by simply going on leave for the
duration of his suspension from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND DECLARES ATTY. LEONARDO C.

ADVINCULA GUILTY of immorality; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a
period of THREE MONTHS EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE HEREOF, with a STERN
WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same
offense or a similar offense; DIRECTS ATTY. ADVINCULA to report the date of his
receipt of the Decision to this Court; and ORDERS the Chief of the Personnel Division
of the National Bureau of Investigation to implement the suspension from office
of ATTY. ADVINCULA and to report on his compliance in order to determine the date of
commencement of his suspension from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be made part of the records of the respondent in the Office
of the Bar Confidant; and furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil
Service Commission for their information and guidance.

SO [Link]