Reason and Knowledge in the Epistemology of Paul Tillich

Thomas Schick

The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review, Volume 30, Number 1, January

1966, pp. 66-79 (Article)

Published by The Catholic University of America Press

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REASON AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY
OF PAUL TILLICH

P AUL TILLICH'S name or a discussion of his opinions in

a philosophical paper hardly needs justification. Al-
though professedly a theologian, the late Dr. Tillich
has equal right to be called a philosopher. He received the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Breslau
in 1911; in 1933, when he was dismissed by the Nazis, he
was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Frankfurt;
and, when he came to Union Theological Seminary, he be-
came Professor of Philosophical Theology. But, more impor-
tantly, his very theological method-the method of correla-
tion-demands that he be a philosopher, since the theologian
must answer the problems presented by the philosopher and
must investigate the philosopher's analyses.
It is precisely by this procedure that Dr. Tillich established
his epistemology. The theologian's "answer" of revelation is
correlated to the philosophical problems and analyses of rea-
son.1 He must establish in what sense theology is a rational
endeavor and how religious knowledge is true knowledge. The
present paper, however, does not undertake to pursue Dr. Til-
lich's theological correlation; it does not even attempt to dis-
cuss his entire epistemology, but only seeks to clarify two
notions basic to every epistemology: reason and knowledge.

Reason as the Structure of the Human

I£ we say man is rational, or theology is a rational enter-
prise, we imply a connection with reason. But what is reason?
This must be our first consideration, as it is for Tillich. Rea-
son, he finds, is too often understood in our day in the re-
1 This is done primarily in " Reason and Revelation," Part I of his Systematic

Theology. This will be our principal source for the discussion in this paper; other
works by Dr. Tillich will be used to confirm and clarify the ideas therein presented.

66
 REASON AND KNOWLEDGE IN PAUL TILLICH 67
duced sense of the mere capacity for "reasoning"; it is under-
stood " in the sense of scientific method, logical strictness and
technical calculation." 2 Thus limited, it can be called "tech-
nical reason." This notion, "though always present in pre-
philosophical and philosophical thought, has become predomi-
nent since the breakdown of German classical idealism and in
the wake of English empiricism." 3 " Only the cognitive side
of the classical concept of reason remains, and within the cogni-
tive realm only those cognitive acts which deal with the dis-
covery of means for ends." 4 This "reason" is functioning
when a physicist works out laws to determine the path neces-
sary to send a multi-ton rocket toward the moon; it functions
when a lawyer searches for arguments and arranges them; it
functions when a teacher adopts a new procedure for pre-
senting the Bellum Gallicum. Technical reason works from
the known to the unknown, in order to achieve some end; but
it accepts these ends from " somewhere else," and this is dan-
gerous if technical reason is our only notion of reason. Ends
are then determined by non-rational forces-traditions or arbi-
trary decisions-and man is dehumanized. " Technical reason
always has an important function. . . . But technical reason
is adequate and meaningful only as an expression of ontological
reason and as its companion." 5
What, then, is "ontological reason? " First: it is not a divi-
sion of reason parallel to technical reason; rather it is the whole,
of which technical reason is a part or an aspect. Ontological
reason is " the structure of the mind which enables the mind to
grasp and to transform reality." 6 It is "the source of meaning,
of structure, of norms and principles." 7 So, Tillich concludes
that "reason is identical with the humanity of man in contrast
2Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York, 1957), p. 75.
3
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago, 1951, 1957, 1963), I, 72. This
work will be cited simply as S. T.
• Ibid., 73.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 72; cf. also p. 75, where the mind is said to "grasp and shape reality."
7 Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, p. 75.
68 THOMAS SCHICK

to all other beings." 8 Reason is not a power by which man

knows, but a structure through which he knows. We might try
to give a diagram or picture of this: Man, defined as " finite
freedom," 9 is a power, or force, that flows into activity; but-
as in any being-this happens only through essential struc-
tures. The essential structure proper to man is reason.10
When Salvador Dali creates his "Crucifixion of St. John of
the Cross," he acts through reason; when Martin Luther King
chafes at the social injustice to Negroes in the United States,
he acts through reason; when Albert Einstein formulates the
theory of relativity, he acts through reason. Reason thus "is
effective in the cognitive, aesthetic, practical, and technical
functions of the human mind." 11 And, as Tillich says else-
where, reason includes all meaningful functions of the human
mind, " the ethical and aesthetic as well as the cognitive, not
because ethics and aesthetics have also a cognitive element
(which they certainly have), but because they create mean-
ingful expressions of the ground of being." 12 Thus we can call
every human act a rational act; man can be irrational, but not
non-rational.13
This has been the traditional view of reason from Parmenides
to Hegel. It is found in Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza.
" Classical reason is logos, whether it is understood m a more
8 Ibid.
9 Paul Tillich, "Human Nature Can Change: a Symposium," in The Nature of
Man in Theological and Psychological Perspective, ed. Simon Doniger (New York,
1962), p. 179.
10 Perhaps a more " homey " analogy will be helpful. Man is like icing in a
spreader with force behind it; as it flows through the top, the design will be deter-
mined by the form (the structure) of the top.
11 Tillich, S. T., p. 72.

12 Paul Tillich, "Reply to Interpretation and Critieinn," in The Theology of

Paul Tillich, eds. Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York, 1952),
p. 333.
13 Tillich says: " In theology one must distinguish not only ontological from
technical reason but also ontological reason in its essential perfection from its
predicament in different stages of its actualization in existence, life, and history "
(8. T., p. 75). Since we, however, are undertaking a philosophical investigation,
we will limit ourselves to the essential nature of reason, and, in the following
section, to the essential nature of knowledge.
 REASON AND KNOWLEDGE IN PAUL TILLICH 69

intuitive or a more critical way. Its cognitive nature is one

element in addition to others; it is cognitive and aesthetic, theo-
retical and practical, detached and passionate, subjective and
objective." 14 This broader notion of reason, in the judgment
of Walter Leibrecht, is a " concept of reason which tends to
break the traditional compartments of naturalism and super-
naturalism, idealism and materialism." 15
But ontological reason itself must be distinguished. It is
primarily the structure of the mind, as indicated above. As
such it can be called " subjective reason." But nearly all phi-
losophers have assumed that the functioning of the mind is
possible because there is a corresponding structure in reality
according to which the mind can grasp and shape it. " From
the time of Parmenides it has been the common assumption of
all philosophers that the logos, the word which grasps and
shapes reality, can do so only because reality itself has a logos
character." 16 This can be called "objective reason." The re-
lation between the objective and subjective reason" is the basic
epistemological problem"; 17 and it has been given various
explanations, of which there are four main types: the realistic,
the idealistic, the dualistic, the monistic. As a theologian, Til-
lich does not feel obliged to make a decision about the inter-
pretations, but he does consider the " common presupposi-
tions " of alP 8
It is also necessary to note the close connection Tillich makes
between reason and emotion. He seems to think of emotional
life as something distinct, for he says, " Even emotional life is
not irrational in itself." 19 But " an emotional element is present
in every rational act." 20 And, "In its essential structure rea-
son unites formal and emotional elements." 21 He does not say
emotion is rational, but in any one rational act there is an
14 Tillich, S. T., p. 72.
15 Walter Leibrecht, "The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich," in Religion and Cul-
ture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich, ed. Walter Leibrecht (London, 1959), p. 6.
16 Tillich, S. T., p. 75. 19 Ibid., 72.

17 Tillich, "Reply," p. 333. 20 Ibid., 77.

18 Tillich, S. T., pp. 75-76. 21 Ibid., 89.

70 THOMAS SCHICK

interplay between emotion and reason. This observation will

be important for our next section.
We might conclude this section, however, with the criticism
of J. H. Randall, Jr. He says," That the mind has the power-
or, more precisely, is the power 22-to do what he assigns to
' ontological reason,' as well as what he calls ' technical reason,'
is undoubtedly true. Tillich himself is inclined to stop short
with these facts, rather than to pursue the analysis of what is
a more complex process than he often suggests." 23 A reader is
left with precisely this feeling: Tillich has not gone far enough
in his explanation; but the fact remains, he has not gone fur-
ther, he has committed himself only to this point, and we must
agree with Randall's added comment: "Perhaps this is suffi-
cient for his purpose as a theologian." 24

Knowledge as the Unity of Participation and Separation

" Knowledge " as an every-day word has many meanings,
and we must specify in what sense it will be the subject of our
discussion. It is not the store of accumulated learning and
experience; nor is it the act of knowing. For our discussion it is
the state of knowledge, the situation in which one knows.
Rather easily, we can point to the experience of knowledge,
the situation in which I say: "I know." But what is going
on? What is my state in this moment? The present section
will present Tillich's explanation of this state.
We might locate ourselves with regard to the previous sec-
tion by saying that we are merely narrowing the field of inquiry.
In reason, we saw," its cognitive nature is one element in addi-
tion to others . . . ." 25 We center, now, on this one function;
and knowledge is the operation of this function. It is the state
of man operating through the cognitive function of subjective,
22 This does not contradict what we said when we denied that Reason was a

power.
23 John Herman Randall, Jr., "The Ontology of Paul Tillich," in The Theology

of Paul Tillich, p. 148.

24 Ibid.

25 Tillich, S. T., p. 72.

 REASON AND KNOWLEDGE IN PAUL TILLICH 71
ontological reason. But, in order to determine and describe
the state of man when he knows, we must begin on a much
broader scale. We must begin with the ontological considera-
tions which are found in all reality and all being, and then
place the reality of knowing into this context.
The basic and all-embracing structure of reality is self and
world. Since man is the being " in whom all levels of being are
united and approachable," 26 and since he is the unique being
"who asks the ontological question and in whose self-aware-
ness the ontological answer can be found," 27 Tillich begins
with man, to derive the basic structure of reality. "Man ex-
periences himself as having a world to which he belongs." 28
This is the primary experience: man-in-a-world. From this
complex dialectical relationship, this experience of self-related-
ness, is derived-by analysis-the self-world structure. This is
then attributed to living beings and by analogy to all indi-
vidual Gestalten. 29
Within this basic structure there are other polar elements,
of which individualization and participation are one pair. 30
" Individualization is not characteristic o£ a special sphere o£
beings; it is an ontological element and therefore a quality o£
everything." 31 It is implied in and constitutive of the notion
of the self, and is true o£ every being. However, only man is
completely a self and completely an individual; and in man
alone is individuality truly significant. In non-human being
the individual is £or the species and £or man; but even in col-
lectivistic societies the individual man is ultimately what is
important. When individuality is perfect we have a" person." 32
26 Ibid., 168.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 169.

•• Ibid.
80 Ibid., 174-178. The other two elemental polarities are dynamics and form,

freedom and destiny.

81 Ibid., 175-176.

32 Cf. Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chi-

cago, 1955), p. 17; where Tillich answers empiricism: "Being, according to this
vision of reality, is characterized by individualization and not by participation.
72 THOMAS SCHICK

Polar to this is participation, which means " taking part."

It can mean a " sharing," as participation in the duties of a
sheriff; or "having in common," as participation in human
nature; or "becoming a part," as participation in a political
movement.0 3 " In all three cases participation points to an ele-
ment of identity in that which is different or of a togetherness
of that which is separated." 34 The individual participates in
the rational structure of the universe, in the universal logos; 35
he participates in his environment and is part of the total web,
part of the totum, 36 of the universe.
Man participates in this totum in various ways. He par-
ticipates in all levels of life, but only man can reach the perfec-
tion of participation which is " communion "-the mutual par-
ticipation of completely centered and completely individual
selves, the participation of persons. Between the absolute
individual and persons in communion there is a complete spec-
trum of varying proportions of individualization and participa-
tion. " Individualization and participation are interdependent
on all levels of being." 37

All individual things, including men and their minds, stand alongside each other,
looking at each other and at the whole of reality, trying to penetrate step by step
from the periphery toward the center, but having no immediate approach to it,
no direct participation in other individuals and in the universal power of being
which makes for individualization."
33 Paul Tillich, "Participation and Knowledge: Problems of an Ontology of
Cognition," Sociologica, Vol. I of Frankfurter Beitrage zur Soziologie, eds. Theodor
W. Adorno and Walter Dirks (Stuttgart, 1955), p. ~01.
34 Ibid.
35 Tillich, S. T., p. 176.
36 Cf. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, trans. Bernard Wall

(New York, 1959), especially pp. 44-45. On first reading Volumes I & II of the
Systematic Theology, I felt Tillich and Teilhard were very close on many points
and observed that " Tillich and Teilhard would combine to give man a clearer
picture of his origins." Imagine, then, my gratification when I read Tillich's
statement in the Introduction to the recently published third volume: " . . . I
happened to read Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's book The Phenomenon of Man.
It encouraged me greatly to know that an acknowledged scientist had developed
ideas about the dimensions and processes of life so similar to my own" (S. T.,
III, 5).
37 Tillich, S. T., p. 177.
 REASON AND KNOWLEDGE IN PAUL TILLICH 73

Let us turn, at last, to knowledge, which is founded in the

basic ontological structure.38 "The primary phenomenon is
the understanding of the situation of encounter in which both
oneself and others participate, but not as separated subject and
object." 39 Encounter is the basic experience, and from it we
derive the subject-object relation, which is the polarity of self
and world in a cognitional context.40 There is a relation of two
centered selves, participating in a common situation.41 Thus
Randall's objection seems to be inaccurate. He says: "The
analysis [of the subject-object distinction] makes no attempt
to explore the emergence of that distinction from the larger
context of organic and social life, and of their natural condi-
tions." 42 But a discussion of the primacy of encounter does
seem to do this.
What, then, is knowledge, or knowing? "Knowing is a form
of union. In every act of knowledge the knower and that which
is known are united; the gap between subject and object is
overcome. The subject 'grasps ' the object, adapts it to itself,
and, at the same time, adapts itself to the object." 43 Or, as
Tillich says later, "The knower participates in the known .
• • • • " 44 The state of knowledge is the participation in an-
other, union with another. "But to be able to encounter cogni-
tively subject and object must be open for each other. The
knower and the known must receive each other." 45
But what is this participation? Can it be merely biological,
38 The process, however, is circular, since Tillich admits that the universal struc-

ture, at least in part, is analysed from the phenomenon of knowing. Cf. S. T., p.
176; also "Participation and Knowledge," p. ~0~.
39 Tillich, "Participation and Knowledge," p. ~06.

•• Ibid., ~01.
u Cf. Tillich, Biblical Religion, pp. ~~-~5, where religious encounter is discussed,
and where Tillich says the person " is established in the encounter of an ego-self
with another self, often called the '1-thou' relationship, and it exists only in com-
munity with other persons " (p. ~8) .
•• Randall, p. 153.
•• Tillich, S. T., p. 94.
"Ibid., 177.
•• Tillich, "Participation and Knowledge," p. ~02; Cf. also S. T., p. 95.
74 THOMAS SCHICK

man participating in the totum? Tillich says, "Man partici-

pates in the universe through the rational structure of mind
and reality." 46 He can participate in the reality because he
knows it and, vice versa, he can know it because he partici-
pates. But this is precisely the point to be explained. One
feels, however, that Tillich has given a good phenomenological
description of the fact and has demonstrated a necessity for
his point. Knowledge is participation.
" But the union of knowledge is a peculiar one; it is a union,
through separation. Detachment is the condition of cognitive
union. In order to know, one must 'look' at a thing, and, in
order to look at a thing, one must be ' at a distance.'" 47 The
subject must be "over against" what is known. "If this were
not the case, the structure of that which is known would be
invaded and destroyed by the dynamics of the knower. There
is no knowledge where there is no separation. Man can have
knowledge because he has a world and is, in this respect, sepa-
rated from his environment.'' 48 Cognition is a relation of cen-
tered selves.49
" The unity of distance and union is the ontological problem
of knowledge." 50 Tillich admits that most philosophers have
seen both sides, both poles; but they have erred in clinging
to one or the other. Indeed, "cognitive reason is subject to
the conflict between union and detachment in every act of
knowledge." 51 Really knowledge is had in a unity of these two
elements of participation and separation. However, in respect
to the most essential note of knowledge, "participation seems
to be absolutely predominant over separation." 52 In various
examples, Tillich trys to demonstrate the interplay of these

•• Tillich, S. T., p. 176.

47 Ibid., 94.

48 Tillich, " Participation and Knowledge," p. ~03.

•• Ibid., ~01.
50 Tillich, S. T., p. 94.
51 Ibid., 97.

52 Til!ich, "Participation and Knowledge," p. ~04.

 REASON AND KNOWLEDGE IN PAUL TILLICH 75

two: knowledge fulfills; it heals; it transforms. But in all

these he seems to emphasize the element of participation.53
"The element of union and the element of detachment ap-
pear in different proportions in the different realms of knowl-
edge. But there is no knowledge without the presence of both
elements." 54 So, Tillich sets up a scale of their relations: at
one end is " controlling knowledge," at the other is " receiving
knowledge." 55 He recognizes his indebtedness for this distinc-
tion to Max Scheler's division of cognition into Heilwissen,
Bildungwissen, Herrschaftswissen. 56 Of these he accepts the
first, " saving knowledge," but extends the concept to include
all " existential knowledge." He rejects the second, "educa-
tional knowledge," as not being really distinct; and he accepts
the third, "controlling knowledge." Thus he establishes " a
scale on the one pole of which we have controlling knowledge,
on the other pole existential knowledge. Between these poles
which correspond to the elements of separation and participa-
tion lie different combinations of controlling and existential
knowledge of reality." 57
Controlling knowledge is characterized by the predominance
of the element of detachment. Tillich calls it " the outstand-
ing, though not the only, example of technical reason." 58 This
does not mean that it is a subdivision of technical reason;
rather, the procedure of controlling knowledge is an instance
of technical reason being used. 59
Controlling knowledge transforms the object into a com-
pletely calculable " thing," to control it. But there is also
58 Tillich, S. 1'., pp. 95-96; cf. also Biblical Religion, pp. 11-1'2, on knowledge as

fulfilling.
•• Ibid., 97.
55 Ibid., 97-98.

56 Tillich, " Participation and Knowledge," p. '204; Scheler's division was pro-

posed in his book Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissoos (Munich, 19'24).
""Ibid.
58 Tillich, S. T., p. 97.
59
We must question Randall's remark that controlling knowledge is "the product
of technicaL instrumental reason." Randall, op cit., p. 145.
76 THOMAS SCHICK

participation at two points. First, since the object shares the

categorical structure of all being, it has elements of self-related-
ness-what might loosely be called subjectivity. Because of
this, it can meet the subject in an encounter. Second, the
object of knowledge is "taken in thoroughly," as is indicated
by the "per-" in perception. So, even here we have union,
though detachment is the characteristic. " Controlling knowl-
edge is one side of cognitive reason and an essential element
in every cognitive act." 60
But when we encounter man, we may not use technical,
controlling reason; to do so destroys the human reality .61 Cer-
tainly there are physical and psychic levels where controlling
knowledge can be used to learn about man; but this is not the
way to know a human person. For this, there must be greater
stress on the element of union, which is characteristic of "re-
ceiving knowledge." This gives us knowledge of the person in
the moment of communion. This is what must prevail in the
knowledge of life processes.
These are the two poles, and Tillich explains every act of
knowledge as a relation of these in a different proportion. This,
he says, is the meaning of the word "understanding." "Its
literal meaning, to stand under the place where the object of
knowledge stands, implies intimate participation. . . . Under-
standing . . . involves an amalgamation of controlling and
receiving knowledge, of union and detachment, of participation
and analysis." 62
An excellent example of the interplay between the two ex-
tremes is had in historical knowledge. It is objective and de-
tached in the consideration of the evidence, the documents and
records. But, in order to interpret this as significant history,
the historian must participate in the event, he must " recon-
struct" and "re-live " the event. 63
Tillich, S. T., p. 89.
60

Ibid., 73.
61

62 Ibid., 98; cf. also "Participation and Knowledge," p. 205.

63 Ibid., 103-104; cf. also "Participation and Knowledge," p. 207; Dynamics of

Faith, pp. 85-85. Also Gerald A. McCool, "The Primacy of Intuition," Thought,
 REASON AND KNOWLEDGE IN PAUL TILLICH 77
We are now pointed in the direction of religious knowledge,
Tillich's goal in undertaking this whole discussion of knowl-
edge. Here, we can merely indicate what religious knowledge
is. It is committed knowledge, existential knowledge; it is
Faith. It is on the pole of participation, and it is received in
the most intense participation-ecstasy. "It means rather the
participation of the whole personality in that which transcends
objectivity as well as subjectivity." 64
We have seen participation and separation in their various
relations in different kinds of knowledge; but what conclusions
can we draw? Certainly we must agree with Randall when he
observes that for Tillich "the object of knowledge and the
object of love are one and the same, and knowledge is ulti-
mately a "participation" in true being." 65 But still we have
an uneasy feeling. As noted above, 66 Tillich does not seem to
have explained what this " participation " really means. He
has only emphasized that participation is necessary for all
knowledge. " I believe," he has said, " that in every cognitive
relation an element of participation is involved. But it is less
obvious in controlling knowledge than in what I have called
uniting or receiving knowledge. . . . The way of participa-
tion shapes the character of the knowledge itself, and is not
only an external precondition of it." 67
As we saw, 68 "an emotional element is present in every
rational act." Participation, thus, seems to be precisely this
emotional element. Fr. McLean has drawn this conclusion.
XXXVII (Spring 196~). He is explaining the position of Carlos Cirne-Lima; and,
on the role of the historian, he says his methodology must be that " of compre-
hension rather than the methodology of discursive scientific knowledge . . . ."
The historian must strive for " a comprehension of an historical personage; he
must try within the limits of his evidence, to place himself within the conscious-
ness of the historical character whom he is trying to understand and endeavor to
grasp the world of that personage as it appeared to him."
•• Tillich, "Participation and Knowledge," p. ~09; cf. also S. T., pp. 117, 1~9,
153-155; Biblical Religion, p. 55; Dynamics of Faith, p. 76.
65 Randall, p. 134.

66 See ftn. 46.

67 Tillich, "Reply," p. 33~.

68 See ftn. ~0.

78 THOMAS SCHICK

Tillich, he thinks, is dissatisfied with the existential irrelevance

of controlling knowledge.
For this reason receiving knowledge is added to provide the ele-
ment of union or participation in reality. Unfortunately the vehicle
for this type of knowledge is emotion, though Tillich attempts to
retain the rational by referring to it as " a criticizing and accepting
agape which is detached and involved at the same time." 69 With-
out wishing to give in to complete subjectivism he would seem to
hold that objective rationality by itself is incapable of grasping the
real with its basic self-world content. This implies the necessity
of a subjective element of participation by emotion which alter-
nates with the moments of objectivity which are insufficient in
themselves. In this way an element of subjectivity is introduced
into every meaningful encounter with reality and is placed at the
focal point of union and participation.70
McLean's conclusion seems substantiated by Tillich's own
words:
It is the time difference between the moment of uniting participa-
tion and separating objectivation which makes ... -in some de-
gree-all knowledge possible. This does not mean that a former
participation is remembered and made an object of cognition. But
it does mean that the moment is present in the cognitive moment
and vice versa. Participation still persists in the moment of cogni-
tive separation; the cognitive encounter includes moments of pre-
dominant participation, which I have called the perceptive mo-
ments, as well as moments of predominant separation, which I have
called the cognitive moments. They alternate and establish in their
totality a cognitive encounter.11
Thus, we seem forced to conclude that participation is sub-
jective, emotional (and not rational) involvement, and that
the real moment of knowledge lies in the moment of separation.
However, have we noticed that Tillich distinguishes emo-
•• Tillich, " Participation and Knowledge," p. 206.
•• George F. McLean, 0. M. 1., "Man's Knowledge of God According to Paul
Tillich: a Thomistic Critique," The Catholic University of America Philosophical
Studies, CLXXX (1958), 14-15. In passing, it might be mentioned that hints in
the passage quoted indicate McLean has an inaccurate understanding of Tillich's
notion of subjective and objective reason.
71 Tillich, "Participation and Knowledge," p. 209.
 REASON AND KNOWLEDGE IN PAUL TILLICH 79

tional participation from the participation, or union, involved

in knowledge? He says: "No union of subject and object is
possible without emotional participation." 72 Though emotional
participation is simultaneously present with cognitive union, it
precedes cognitive union; and Tillich calls it the vehicle of the
cognitive. 73 The participation of knowledge is not mere emo-
tion; contrary to McLean, it is truly rational. It is an intui-
tion; and, if Tillich cannot get better hold on it, it is because
this kind of knowledge is vague and unformed, unconceptu-
alized. Tillich can only restate his opinion: Knowledge is
rational; it is the union of two rational elements-participation
and separation.
This study has attempted to summarize Paul Tillich's under-
standing of reason and knowledge-two concepts basic to any
epistemology. At times his vocabulary is strange and his
thought is very complicated; but no penetration is possible
without a sympathetic effort to grasp him in his own terms. 74
This brief presentation does not pretend to be adequate to
Dr. Tillich's thought; but, if the reader now has a sympathetic
appreciation of reason as structure and knowledge as participa-
tion, this study will have achieved its purpose.

THOMAS ScHicK
Loyola University,
Chicago, Illinois

72 Cf. again the article by McCool; Tillich's ideas seems very close to those of

Cirne-Lima.
73 Tillich, S. T., p. 98 .

.. Here we might mention David Hugh Freeman, Rece;nt Studies in Philosophy

and Theology (Philadelphia, 1962) as a violation of this procedure. Of the
sources available, this included one of the more extensive treatments of Tillich;
but the unsympathetic interpretation from a basis of logical positivism made it
unuseable for this paper.