Jurisdiction of Courts:

 Dee vs Harvest All Investment

Facts:

Harvest All Investment Limited, Victory Fund Limited, Bondeast Private Limited, Albert Hong Hin
Kay, and Hedy S.C. Yap Chua (Harvest All, et al.) are, in their own capacities, minority
stockholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., with Hedy S.C. Yap Chua acting as a
member of Alliance's Board of Directors. As per Alliance’s bylaws, its Annual Stockholder’s
Meeting is held every June 15. However, a Board Resolution was passed indefinitely postponing
Alliance's 2015 ASM pending complete subscription to its Stock Rights Offering (SRO) consisting
of shares with total value of ₱1 Billion. As per Alliance's Disclosure, such postponement was
made "to give the stockholders of Alliance better representation in the annual meeting, after
taking into consideration their subscription to the [SRO] of Alliance." This prompted Harvest All,
et al. to file the instant Complaint claiming that the subscription to the new shares through the
SRO cannot be made a condition precedent to the exercise by the current stockholders of their
right to vote in the 2015 ASM; otherwise, they will be deprived of their full voting rights
proportionate to their existing shareholdings.

For its part, the Alliance Board raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground of Harvest
All, et al.'s failure to pay the correct filing fees. On the other hand, Harvest All, et al. maintained
that they paid the correct filing fees, considering that the subject of their complaint is the
holding of the 2015 ASM and not a claim on the aforesaid value of the SRO.

Issue:

Whether or not Harvest All, et al. paid insufficient filing fees for their complaint, as the same
should have been based on the P1 Billion value of the SRO

Held:

The petition in G.R. No. 224834 is denied, while the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is partly
granted.

Ratio:

RTC and the CA heavily relied on the Court's pronouncement in Lu where the Court mentioned
that in view of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 which introduced Section 21 (k) to Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, it seemed that "an intra-corporate controversy always involves a
property in litigation" and that "there can be no case of intra-corporate controversy where the
value of the subject matter cannot be estimated.” However, after a careful reading of Lu, it
appears that Harvest All, et al. correctly pointed out29 that the foregoing statements were in the
nature of an obiter dictum.

Certainly, Harvest All, et al.'s prayer for nullity do not involve the recovery of sum of money.
The mere mention of Alliance's impending SRO valued at ₱1 Billion cannot transform the nature
of Harvest All, et al.'s action to one capable of pecuniary estimation, considering that: (a)
Harvest All, et al. do not claim ownership of, or much less entitlement to, the shares subject of
the SRO; and (b) such mention was merely narrative or descriptive in order to emphasize the
severe dilution that their voting interest as minority shareholders would suffer if the 2015 ASM
were to be held after the SRO was completed. If, in the end, a sum of money or anything
capable of pecuniary estimation would be recovered by virtue of Harvest All, et al.'s complaint,
then it would simply be the consequence of their principal action. Clearly therefore, Harvest All,
et al.'s action was one incapable of pecuniary estimation.

In view of the foregoing, Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the appropriate docket fees
in accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 fees for all
other actions not involving property, in conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC. The matter is
therefore remanded to the R TC in order to determine if Harvest, et al.'s payment of filing fees
constitutes sufficient compliance with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC.

 Regalado vs Dela Rama

FACTS:

Respondents (Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and Jaime Antonio (Jaime), all
surnamed de la Pena) herein are registered owners of two parcels of land with an area of
44hectares located in Murcia, Negros Occidental. Allegedly, in 1974, petitioners, without
consent, (petitioner) entered the property and took possession of the sugar canes. In the crop
year 1995-1996, respondents discovered such illegal entry, which prompted them to verbally
demand from petitioner to vacate the properties but to no avail. Upon failure of the verbal
demand and the barangay conciliation, respondents filed for the recovery of possession and
damages against the petitioners before the RTC of Bacolod on March 9, 1998. Petitioner
contends that respondents waived their interest to Jaime who in turn, waived all his rights to
him. Petitioner countered that in 1994, Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, and Jessica executed
their separate Waivers of Undivided Share of Lands renouncing their rights and interests over
the subject properties in favor of Jaime. In turn, Jaime subsequently waived his rights and
interests on the same properties to petitioner. Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case positing that the
complaint being a recovery of physical possession; it should be the MTC who has cognizance of
there being no allegation of the amount of the property in the complaint. RTC denied the
motion to dismiss and granted the petition of the respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE/S:

WoN RTC has jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:

NO. Nonetheless, the Court agrees with petitioner that while this case is an accion
publiciana, there was no clear showing that the RTC has jurisdiction over it.1âwphi1

Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by law. It cannot be presumed or
implied, and must distinctly appear from the law. It cannot also be vested upon a court by the
agreement of the parties; or by the court's erroneous belief that it had jurisdiction over a case.

NEGATIVE. In our jurisdiction, there are three kinds of action for recovery of possession of real
property: 1) ejectment (either for un]awful detainer or forcible entry) in case the dispossession
haslasted for not more than a year; 2) accion publiciana or a plenary action for recovery of real
right of possession when dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, 3) accion
reinvindicatoria or an action for recovery of ownership. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691 (RA
7691), the proper Metropolitan Trial Court (Me TC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment cases. Moreover, jurisdiction of the
MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall include civil actions involving title to or possession of real property,
or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property does not exceed P20, 000.00
(or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila). On the other hand, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction
over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein in case
the assessed value of the property exceeds P.20, 000.00 (or P50, 000.00 in Metro
Manila). Jurisdiction is thus determined not only by the type of action filed but also by
the assessed value of the property. It follows that in accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria, the
assessed value of the real property is a jurisdictional element to determine the court that can
take cognizance of the action. As such, to ascertain the proper court that has jurisdiction,
reference must be made to the averments in the complaint, and the law in force at the
commencement of the action. This is because only the facts alleged in the complaint can be the
basis for determining the nature of the action, and the court that can take cognizance of the
case. The agrees with petitioner that while this case is an accion publiciana.
However, it also ruled that here was no clear showing that the RTC has jurisdiction over it. Well-
settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by law. It cannot be presumed or implied,
and must distinctly appear from the law. It cannot also be vested upon a court by the
agreement of the parties; or by the court's erroneous belief that it had jurisdiction over a case.
The complaint by the respondents failed to specify the assessed value of the subject properties.
Thus, it is unclear if the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction, or the MTC has jurisdiction, over
respondents' action. In the absence of any allegation in the Complaint of the assessed value of
the subject properties, it cannot be determined which court has exclusive original jurisdiction
over respondents' Complaint. Courts cannot simply take judicial notice of the assessed value, or
even market value of the land. Resultantly, for lack of jurisdiction, all proceedings .before the
RTC, including its decision, are void. Petition GRANTED

 Crystal vs Son

FACTS:

Aniana Lawas Son (respondent) instituted an action for reconveyance and damages against
Glynna Foronda-Crystal (petitioner) alleging that, for twelve and a half years, she has been the
lawful owner and possessor of the subject lot. She alleged that she purchased the same from a
certain Eleno T. Arias and that the issuance of the Free Patent in favor of the petitioner’s father
was “due to gross error or any other cause.” In support thereof, the respondent alleged that
“there is no tax declaration in the name of patentee Eddie Foronda” and that this “goes to
show that Eddie Foronda is not the owner of lot 1280 and neither has payment of real estate
taxes been made by him when he was still alive or by his heirs.” According to her, since her
acquisition, she has been religiously paying real property taxes thereon as evidenced by Tax
Declaration No. 16408A, which was issued under her name. On April 13, 1999, herein petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. A week thereafter, the RTC issued
an Order dated April 20, 1999,8 which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. RTC
reconsidered and set aside its earlier ruling based on the property located at Magay,
Compostela, Cebu carries the value more than P20,000.00. CA affirmed in toto.

ISSUE:

(1) whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction

(2) whether or not the RTC’s decision should be rendered void for being issued without
jurisdiction.

HELD:

On the Issue of Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to
hear, try, and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to
dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject
matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and
determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law
and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the
court that it exists.

In here, the respondent failed to allege in her complaint the assessed value of the subject
property. Rather, what she included therein was an allegation of its market value amounting to
P200,000.00.[47] In the course of the trial, the petitioner asserted that the assessed value of the
property as stated in the tax declaration was merely P1,030.00, and therefore the RTC lacked
jurisdiction.

The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, requires the allegation of the real
property’s assessed value in the complaint. That the complaint in the present case did not aver
the assessed value of the property is a violation of the law, and generally would be dismissed
because the court which would exercise jurisdiction over the case could not be identified.

However, a liberal interpretation of this law, as opined by the Court in Tumpag, would
necessitate an examination of the documents annexed to the complaint perusal of the Tax
Declaration would reveal that the property was valued at P2,826.00.

On this basis, it is clear that it is the MTC, and not the RTC (RTC takes cognizance of property
that exceeds 20k) that has jurisdiction over the case. The RTC should have upheld its Order
dated November 8, 2006 which dismissed the same. Consequently, the decision that it
rendered is null and void.

Cañero v. University of the Philippines: A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded
to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in
which effect is sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any
purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to
enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. In other words, a
void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there was
no judgment.

Thus, considering the foregoing, it would be proper for the Court to immediately dismiss this
case without prejudice to the parties' filing of a new one before the MTC that has jurisdiction
over the subject property. Consequently, the other issues raised by the petitioner need not be
discussed further.

 Heirs of Bautista vs Lindo, et al.

FACTS:
Alfredo Bautista sold his free-patent land to several vendees, including respondent Lindo.
Three years after the sale, Bautista filed a case in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in the
exercise of his right to repurchase the land within five years under Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act 141 or the Public Land Act. Respondents Lindo later ceded to Epifania
Bautista, Alfredo’s successor-in-interest, a portion of the land through a compromise
agreement. However, other respondents moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the selling
price of the land is only ₱16,500, which is below the ₱20,000 jurisdictional threshold of the RTC.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, finding that Bautista failed to allege
that the value of the land exceeds ₱20,000.

Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista), petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land

On August 1994, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before the RTC,
anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141, otherwise
known as the “Public Land Act,” which reads:

“SECTION 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs, within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.”

During the pendency of the action, Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner, Efipania.
Respondents, Sps. Lindo entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, whereby they
agree to cede to Epifania 3,230 sq.m..portion of the property as well as to waive, abandon,
surrender, and withdraw all claims and counterclaims against each other. RTC approve the
compromise agreement on January 2011.

Other respondents, filed a Motion to Dismissed on February 2013 alleging lack of jurisdiction of
the RTC on the ground that the complaint failed to state the value of the property sought to be
recovered and alleges that the total value of the properties in issue is only P16,500 pesos. RTC
ruled in favor of the respondent dismissing the case.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC correctly dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction on the subject matter.
HELD:

NO. The complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, it being one for specific performance. In Russel v. Vestil, it was held that if the
complaint is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or the RTCs would
depend on the amount of the claim. But where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, such actions are cases where the subject of the litigation may
not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.
These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs. Bautista sold his land covered by a free
patent. The right to repurchase in CA 141 was implicitly integrated and made part of the
deeds of sale, thus being a binding prestation which he can enforce. He did file a case to
enforce this right, thus making his action one for specific performance

 Spouses Pajares vs Remarkable Laundry

Facts:

Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning filed a Complaint denominated as "Breach of Contract
and Damages" against spouses Romeo and Ida Pajares before the RTC of Cebu City. Respondent
alleged that it entered into a Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract with petitioners whereby the
latter, acting as a dealer outlet, shall accept and receive items or materials for laundry which
are then picked up and processed by the former in its main plant or laundry outlet; that
petitioners violated Article IV (Standard Required Quota & Penalties) of said contract, which
required them to produce at least 200 kilos of laundry items each week, when they ceased
dealer outlet operations on account of lack of personnel; that respondent made written
demands upon petitioners for the payment of penalties imposed and provided for in the
contract, but the latter failed to pay; and, that petitioners' violation constitutes breach of
contract. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Respondent filed its Motion for Reconsideration to Court of Appeals. And the CA rendered the
assailed Decision setting aside the Order of the RTC and remanding the case to the court a quo
for further proceedings.

Petitioners sought to reconsider, but were denied. Hence, appealed the Petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in declaring that the RTC had jurisdiction over respondent's
Complaint which, although denominated as one for breach of contract, is essentially one for
simple payment of damages.

Ruling:

The Court grants the Petition. The RTC was correct in categorizing Civil Case as an action for
damages seeking to recover an amount below its jurisdictional limit.

In ruling that respondent's Complaint is incapable of pecuniary estimation and that the RTC has
jurisdiction, the CA comported itself with the following ratiocination: A case for breach of
contract [sic] is a cause of action either for specific performance or rescission of contracts. An
action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an action for specific performance, is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Then in Administrative Circular No. 09-94 this Court declared that "where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim
shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court." In other words, where the
complaint primarily seeks to recover damages, all claims for damages should be considered in
determining which court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case regardless of
whether they arose from a single cause of action or several causes of action.

 Roldan vs Spouses Barrios

FACTS:
 Anama executed a PN in favor of Citibank after obtaining a loan, and a chattel mortgage
over several machineries and equipments.
 On February 3, 2014, petitioner Alona G. Roldan filed an action for foreclosure of real
estate mortgage against respondents spouses Clarence I. Barrios and Anna Lee T. Barrios
and respondent Romel D. Matorres, docketed as Civil Case No. 9811.
 That on October 13, 2008, defendants borrowed from plaintiff the sum of Two Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱250,000.00), Philippine Currency, payable within the period of
one (1) year from said date, with an interest thereon at the rate of 5% per month; and
to secure the prompt and full payment of the principal and interest, defendants made
and executed on October 13, 2008 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of plaintiff
upon a parcel of land and improvements thereon described as follows:
  A parcel of land (Lot 5891-A-4) situated in Baybay, Makato, Aklan, containing an area of
four hundred seventy-eight (478) square meters, more or less x x x declared in the name
of Spouses Clarence Barrios and Anna Lee T. Barrios, assessed in the sum of ₱13,380.00,
tax effectivity for the year 2008. Said land is covered by OCT No. P-5561 pt
 That the time for payment of said loan is overdue and defendants failed and refused to
pay both the principal obligation and the interest due starting from February 2011 to
the present notwithstanding repeated demands;
 That there are no other persons having or claiming interest in the mortgaged property
except Romel D. Matorres whom plaintiff recently discovered that the defendants
mortgaged again to the said person the same property subject of this suit for One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos, (₱150,000.00) on June 11, 2012 x x x The said Romel D.
Matorres is however a mortgagee in bad faith.
 [ RTC DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT B/C LACK OF JURISDICTION ] It appearing from the
complaint that the assessed value of the property mortgaged is only ₱13,380.00 and the
instant cases being a real action, the assessed value of the property determines the
jurisdiction.1âwphi1 The assessed value of the property involved being below
₱20,000.00, it is the first level court that has jurisdiction over the cases. Premises
considered, for lack of jurisdiction, Civil Cases Nos. 9642 and 9811 are ordered
DISMISSED without prejudice.
 The RTC dismissed the foreclosure cases finding that being a real action and the
assessed value of the mortgaged property is only ₱13,380.00, it is the first level court
which has jurisdiction over the case and not the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the foreclosure
cases filed with it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

HELD: NO, in this case MTC has jurisdiction

[RTC JURISDICTION]
From the foregoing, the RTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in civil actions where the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. It also has jurisdiction in civil cases
involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest in it where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds ₱20,000.00, and if it is below 1!20,000.00, it is the first level
court which has jurisdiction. An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiffs
cause of action is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal right to
have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same
[PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT]
Petitioner cites Russell v. Vestil to show that action for foreclosure of mortgage is an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC. We are not
persuaded

[COURT’S EXPLANATION WHY MTC STILL HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE FORECLOSURE CASE]
I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial
Courts).

Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance,
support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the
validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and
for rescission, which is a counterpart of specific performance.

While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law
specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed
value of the real property involved does exceed ₱20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or ₱50,000.00, if
located elsewhere. If the value exceeds ₱20,000.00 or ₱50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the
Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). However, the subject matter of
the complaint in this case is annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF
HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION.20

Clearly, the last paragraph clarified that while civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein, are also incapable of pecuniary estimation as it is not
for recovery of money, the court's jurisdiction will be determined by the assessed value of the
property involved.

Venue
  Ley Construction vs Sedano

FACTS:

A Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages against respondent Marvin Medel Sedano,
respondent, was instituted by the defendant, Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC).
PNCC subleased a parcel of land to the respondent, however, the latter failed to pay the rent due for the
period August 2011 to December 2011 amounting to P 8 828 025. 46 and despite demands, refused to
settle his obligation, hence the complaint. In his Answer with Third-Party Complaint, respondent pointed
out that the venue was improperly laid pursuant to a stipulation in the lease contract which provided
that “"[a]ll actions or case[s] filed in connection with this case shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City, exclusive of all others." In its Comment/Opposition-- to respondent's affirmative defense
of improper venue, petitioner argued that Section 21 of the lease contract is not a stipulation as to
venue, but a stipulation on jurisdiction which is void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Valenzuela-RTC erred in ruling that venue was improperly laid. (NO)

RULING:

Valenzuela-RTC did not err in ruling that the venue was improperly laid. The law provides that the venue
for personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie with the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff
or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, parties may, through a written
instrument, restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue. In this case, it is undisputed
that petitioner's action was one for collection of sum of money in an amount that falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. Since the lease contract already provided that all actions or cases
involving the breach thereof should be filed with the RTC of Pasay City, and that petitioner’s complaint
purporting the said breach fell within the RTC's exclusive original jurisdiction, the latter should have then
followed the contractual stipulation and filed its complaint before the RTC of Pasay City…; hence, the
same is clearly dismissible on the ground of improper venue, without prejudice, however, to its refiling
in the proper court.

 Radiowealth vs Pineda

FACTS:

In its Complaint dated October 12, 2015, petitioner alleged that on October 23, 2014, it
extended a loan o respondents, as evidenced by a Promissory Note, in the amount of
P557,808.00 payable in 24 equal monthly installments of P23,242.00, which was secured by a
Chattel Mortgage constituted on a vehicle owned by respondents. Notably, the Promissory
Note states that "[a]ny action to enforce payment of any sums due under this Note shall
exclusively be brought in the proper court within [the] National Capital Judicial Region or in any
place where Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. has a branch/office, a[t] its sole option. "Due
to respondents' default, petitioner demanded payment of the whole remaining balance of the
loan, which stood at P510,132.00 as of June 8, 2015, excluding penalty charges. As the demand
went unheeded, petitioner filed a suit for sum of money and damages with application for a
Writ of Replevin before the RTC, further alleging that it has a branch in San Mateo, Rizal. The
RTC issued a Writ of Replevin. However, in an Amended Order, the RTC recalled the Writ of
Replevin and ordered the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. It pointed out that since: (a) petitioner's principal place of business is in
Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila; and (b) respondents' residence isin Porac, Pampanga, it has
no jurisdiction over any of the party-litigants, warranting the dismissal of the complaint.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

WoN the RTC correctly dismissed petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:

NO. In this case, petitioner filed a complaint for, inter alia, sum of money involving the amount
ofP510,132.00. Pursuant to Section 19 (8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as amended by
Section 5 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7691, the RTC irrefragably has jurisdiction over petitioner's
complaint. Thus, it erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint on the ground of its purported lack
of jurisdiction. Clearly, the RTC confused the concepts of jurisdiction and venue which are not
synonymous with each other.

In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject Promissory Note which reads "
[a]nyaction to enforce payment of any sums due under this Note shall exclusively be brought in
the proper court within [the] National Capital Judicial Region or in any place where Radiowealth
Finance Company, Inc. has a branch/office, a[t] its sole option" is indeed restrictive in nature,
considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of:
(a)the National Capital Judicial Region; or (b) any place where petitioner has a branch/office. In
light of petitioner's standing allegation that it has a branch in San Mateo, Rizal, it appears that
venue has been properly laid, unless such allegation has been disputed and successfully
rebutted later on.

Finally, even if it appears that venue has been improperly laid, it is well-settled that the courts
may not motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue