EVID CASE DIGESTS – MODULE 2

R UL E S O F A D M I S S I B I L I T Y

OBJECT EVIDENCE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONNIE RULLEPA

G.R. No. 131516; March 5, 2003
CARPIO-MORALES, J.

DOCTRINE:
 A person’s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed
to the senses of the court. ( see Section 1, Rule 130)
 A person’s appearance, as evidence of age is usually regarded as relevant; and, if so, the tribunal may
properly observe the person brought before it. x x x the outward physical appearance of an alleged
minor may be considered in judging his age.

FACTS: On 20 November 1995, as Gloria (Cyra’s mother) was about to set the table for dinner at her house in
Quezon City, Cyra May, then only three and a half years old, told her, Mama, si “kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi
niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko.” “Kuya Ronnie” is accused Ronnie Rullepa, the Buenafe’s house boy,
who was sometimes left with Cyra May at home. Cyra told her mother Gloria that Rullepa did that to her many
times inside the room of the accused.

As on the night of 20 November 1995, Rullepa was out with Gloria’s husband Col. Buenafe, she waited until
their arrival at past 11:00p.m. Gloria then sent Rullepa out on an errand and informed her husband about their
daughter’s plaint. Buenafe thereupon talked to Cyra May who repeated what she had earlier told her mother
Gloria.

When Rullepa returned, Buenafe and Gloria verified from him whether what Cyra May had told them was true.
Ronnie readily admitted doing those things but only once, three days earlier. Since it was already midnight, the
spouses waited until the following morning to bring Rullepa to Camp Karingal where he admitted the
imputations against him.

Cyra May declared at the witness stand: “Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga,” thus
causing her pain and drawing her to cry. She added that Rullepa did these to her twice in his bedroom. The
PNP’s the Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Preyra, after examining the victim, stated in her report the conclusion that
“the is in virgin state physically.” By Dr. Preyra’s explanation, the abrasions on the labia minora could have
been caused perhaps by an erect penis.

Defendant’s contention: claimed that prior to the alleged incident, he used to be ordered to buy medicine for
Cyra May who had difficulty urinating. Further, he alleged that after he refused to answer Gloria’s queries if her
husband Buenafe was womanizing, Gloria would always find fault in him. He suggested that Gloria was behind
the filing of the complaint.

The QC-RTC found accused Rullepa guilty reasonable doubt of rape, and he is accordingly sentenced to
death. Hence, this automatic review.

ISSUES: Whether or not

1) the trial court erred in considering as admissible in evidence the accused-appellant’s admission; and
2) the person’s appearance, as evidence of age, may be admissible as object evidence.

HELD: No. The trial court considered his admission merely as an additional ground to convince itself of his
culpability. Even if such admission, as well as the implication of his failure to deny the same, were disregarded,
the evidence suffices to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because:
1) The plain, matter-of-fact manner by which Cyra May described her abuse in the hands of her Kuya
Ronnie is an eloquent testament to the truth of her accusations.
2) This Court cannot believe that a victim of Cyra May’s age could concoct a tale of defloration, allow the
examination of her private parts, and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to mention the
trauma of public trial.
3) Dr. Preya found abrasions in the labia minora, which is directly beneath the labia majora, proving that
there was indeed penetration of the vagina, not just a mere rubbing or scrubbing of the penis against
its surface. In fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not merely acts of
lasciviousness but statutory rape.
 EVID CASE DIGESTS – MODULE 2
The two elements of statutory rape (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the
woman is below twelve years of age; are present in this case. Article 335, RPC, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, provides: xxx Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age. Furthermore, the victim’s age may constitute
a qualifying circumstance, warranting the imposition of the death sentence. The same Article states that the
death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed when the victim is a child below seven (7)
years old.

2. Yes. People v. Pruna established a set of guidelines in appreciating age as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate
and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother OR a member
of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother
or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is
expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

When the trier of facts observes the appearance of a person to ascertain his or her age, he is not taking judicial
notice of such fact; rather, he is conducting an examination of the evidence, the evidence being the
appearance of the person. Such a process militates against the very concept of judicial notice, the object of
which is to do away with the presentation of evidence. This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by
the Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does. A person’s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object
evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the court. Section 1, Rule 130 provides:

SECTION 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When
an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined, or viewed by the court.

There can be no question as to the admissibility of a person’s appearance in determining his or her age. As to
the weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape cases, Pruna laid down guideline number 3. Under
this guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute
proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In such cases, the disparity between the
allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim
the veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relative’s testimony.

For the extreme penalty of death to be upheld, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime must be substantiated. Verily, the minority of the victim should be not only
alleged but likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Be it remembered that the
proof of the victim’s age in the present case spells the difference between life and death.

In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victim’s certificate of live birth OR similar
authentic documents in evidence. The victim and her mother, however, testified that she was only
three years old at the time of the rape.
 Whether the victim was below 12 years of age : Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age
(3yo) and the age sought to be proved (below 12yo), the trial court would have had no difficulty
ascertaining the victim’s age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt exists that the second
element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was below 12yo at the time of the commission of the
offense, is present.
 EVID CASE DIGESTS – MODULE 2
 Whether the victim was below seven years old: Here, reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and
a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the
victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the
mother is, by itself, insufficient.

As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven years old at the
time of the commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the death
penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.

Dispositive Ruling: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the QC-RTC is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to
penalty. Rullepa is found GUILTY of Statutory Rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
_____________________________________________________________________________________

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

SPO2 JOSE B. YAP v. JUDGE AQUILINO A. INOPIQUEZ, JR.

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1431; May 9, 2003
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

DOCTRINE: Between documentary and oral evidence, the former carries more weight.

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint filed by petitioner Yap of Matag-ob, Leyte Police Station against
Judge Inopiquez, Jr. of the MCTC of Kananga-Matag-ob for grave abuse of authority and acts unbecoming a
judge.

Complainant alleged that on 06 March 1999 (Saturday), pursuant to an alias arrest warrant, he arrested
Antonio Laurente, Jr., the accused in Criminal Case No. 8458 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, pending in the
MTCC-Ormoc City. Complainant claimed that respondent judge issued the two (2) Orders of Release on 06
March 1999 although there was yet no cash bond or property bond, for actually the cash bond was posted on
March 8, while the property bond was filed on March 10. Clearly, respondent judge ordered the release of the
accused prematurely. Complainant finally alleged that the accused is the relative of respondent’s wife.

The Judge denied the charges, asserting that the relationship of his wife to the accused has no bearing to his
judicial duties of approving the bail and issuing the Order of Release. He alleged that it was Clerk of Court
Veloso who altered the date of the O.R. from March 6 to March 8. Veloso, out of apparent loyalty to him,
admitted having changed the date.

Executive Judge Madrona of RTC-Ormoc City recommended the dismissal of the charges for lack of merit.
However, it was recommended that respondent judge be reprimanded for his failure to avoid the appearance of
impropriety in the performance of his official duties, considering that accused is his relative by affinity. The OCA
adopted the findings of Executive Judge Madrona. In the same Report, the Deputy Court Administrator stated
that respondent judge was previously adjudged guilty of abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law,
fined, and suspended without pay for 3 months.

Respondent Judge’s optional retirement was approved but his retirement benefits were withheld pending the
resolution of the instant case.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge ordered the release of accused Laurente, Jr. although the cash or
property bond for his temporary liberty had not yet been posted and approved.

HELD: Yes. The SC observed that the property bond was subscribed and sworn to by bondsman Antonio
Laurente, Sr. before respondent judge on March 10, 1999 (Wednesday). However, very clear to the naked eye
is that 6 was superimposed on 10th (day of March) to make it appear that the bail was accomplished and filed
on March 6. The jurat positively shows that the property bond, in lieu of the cash bond, was filed, not on March
6, but on March 10, 1999 (4 days after respondent judge issued his second Order of Release on March 6,
1999).

It is a basic rule of evidence that between documentary and oral evidence, the former carries more
weight. The cash bond was posted on March 8 (Monday), not on March 6, 1999, as shown by O.R. No.
9215725. The property bond, in substitution of the cash bond, was filed, not on March 6, but on March 10
(Wednesday), as shown by the jurat. Both Orders of Release were issued on March 6 (Saturday). Therefore,
 EVID CASE DIGESTS – MODULE 2
there is no doubt that respondent judge ordered the release of the accused despite the fact that there was yet
no bail filed and approved for his provisional liberty.

That respondent judge issued the release orders prematurely, is not difficult to understand. He admitted that
accused Laurente, Jr. is his wife’s relative.

Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that an accused may
only be released on bail after the corresponding cash or property bond has been properly posted. Respondent
judge violated this Rule when he issued the two Orders of Release despite the fact that the corresponding cash
or property bond was posted only thereafter.

Dispositive Ruling: WHEREFORE, Judge INOPIQUEZ, JR. is declared GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT and
is FINED in the amount of P30,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
_____________________________________________________________________________________

a. ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RULE

BPI v. AMADO MENDOZA and MARIA MARCOS VDA. DE MENDOZA

G.R. No. 198799
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

DOCTRINE: Best Evidence Rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
 General rule: the original copy of the document must be presented whenever the content of the
document is under inquiry
 Exception: “when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror.”

FACTS: This case stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money with Application for Writ of Attachment filed by
BPI against respondents before the RTC. BPI alleged that on 08 April 1997, respondents:
a) opened a foreign currency savings account at BPI-Gapan Branch and deposited therein the total
amount of US$16,264.00 payable to "Ma. Marcos Vda. de Mendoza" (subject check); and
b) placed the amount of US$2,000.00 in a time deposit account.

After the lapse of the thirty (30) day clearing period on 9 and 13 May 1997, respondents withdrew the amount
of US$16,244.00 from the US savings account, leaving only US$20.00 for bank charges. However, on 26 June
1997, BPI received a notice from its correspondent bank, Bankers Trust, that the subject check was dishonored
due to "amount altered," as evidenced by:
1) an electronic mail advice from Bankers Trust, and
2) a photocopy of the subject check with a notation "endorsement cancelled" by Bankers Trust as the
original copy of the subject check was allegedly confiscated by the US government.
This prompted BPI to inform respondents of such dishonor and to demand reimbursement.

RTC Ruling: ruled in BPI's favor, and accordingly, ordered respondents to pay the withdrawn amounts by
respondents. Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA. The RTC declared that BPI was able to sufficiently
establish by preponderance of evidence that respondents were duly notified of the dishonor of the subject
check, rendering them liable to refund what they had withdrawn from BPI.
CA Ruling: reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling, and consequently, dismissed BPI's complaint for lack of
merit. It held that BPI failed to prove the dishonor of the subject check, since:
a) the presentation of a mere photocopy of the subject check is in violation of the Best Evidence
Rule; and
b) the e-mail advice from Bankers Trust was not properly authenticated in accordance with the Rules on
Electronic Evidence as the person who sent the e-mail advice was neither identified nor presented in
court.

MR by BPI was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed BPI's complaint for sum of money against respondents.

HELD: No. The SC, a judicious review of the records, including a re-evaluation of the evidence presented by
the parties, is inclined to sustain the findings of the RTC over that of the CA.

BPI has proven by the required quantum of proof, i.e., preponderance of evidence, (it only requires that
evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence) the existence of respondents' obligation
 EVID CASE DIGESTS – MODULE 2
in its favor. Verily, Amado acknowledged its existence and expressed his conformity thereto when he
voluntarily:
a) affixed his signature in his letters where he acknowledged the dishonor of the subject check, and
subsequently, allowed BPI to apply the proceeds of their US time deposit account to partially offset
their obligation to the bank; and
b) executed a Promissory Note wherein he undertook to pay BPI in installments of ₱l,000.00 per month
until the remaining balance of his obligation is fully paid.

AS TO THE SUBJECT CHECK; BEST EVIDENCE RULE EXCEPTIONS

Anent the subject check, while the Best Evidence Rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states
that generally, the original copy of the document must be presented whenever the content of the document is
under inquiry, the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as “when the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror.”

In order to fall under the aforesaid exception, it is crucial that the offeror proves: the existence or due execution
of the original; the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and the
absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.

In this case, BPI sufficiently complied with the foregoing requisities.

 First, the existence or due execution of the subject check was admitted by both parties.
 Second, the reason for the non-presentation of the original copy of the subject check was justifiable as
it was confiscated by the US government for being an altered check. The subject check, being a US
Treasury Warrant, is not an ordinary check, and practically speaking, the same could not be easily
obtained.
 Lastly, no bad faith can be attributed to BPI for its failure to present the original of the subject check.

Thus, applying the exception to the Best Evidence Rule, the presentation of the photocopy of the
subject check as secondary evidence was permissible.

As to the e-mail advice, while it may not have been properly authenticated in accordance with the Rules on
Electronic Evidence, the same was merely corroborative evidence; thus, its admissibility or inadmissibility
should not diminish the probative value of the other evidence proving respondents' obligation towards BPI.

Besides, it should be pointed out that respondents did not proffer any objection to the evidence presented by
BPI, as shown by their failure to file their comment or opposition to the latter's formal offer of evidence. It is
well-settled that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may validly be considered by the
court in arriving at its judgment, as what the RTC did in this case.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The CA Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
_____________________________________________________________________________________

ENGR. BAYANI MAGDAYAO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 152881; August 17, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.

DOCTRINE: Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifically provides that when the subject
of inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original thereof.

FACTS: An Information was filed charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on 16 September 1993. It
was alleged that on 30 September 1991, at Dipolog City the accused, knowing fully well that he did not have
sufficient funds in OR credit with the drawee bank, PNB-Dipolog Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make, draw, issue, and deliver to one RICKY OLVIS, in payment of his obligation to the latter,
PNB Check No. 399967 in the amount of P600,000.00, which check, however, when presented for payment
with PNB-Dipolog Branch, was dishonored and refused payment for the reason that it was drawn against
insufficient funds, and despite repeated demands made by the private complainant on the accused, the latter,
failed to make good the check's value.

When arraigned, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. When the case for trial was
called for the prosecution to adduce its evidence, the petitioner and his counsel were absent. Hence, when
Olvis was presented for direct examination, he could not identify the accused as the drawer because the latter
was absent. The trial was set on another date.
 EVID CASE DIGESTS – MODULE 2
After several postponements, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear before the court for continuation of
trial. The prosecution offered in evidence the photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967, which the court
admitted.

RTC: issued an Order declaring the case submitted for decision. MR by petitioner was denied. He then filed an
Omnibus Supplemental Motion and to Allow Him to Adduce Evidence. In a Special Manifestation, the petitioner
insisted that the photocopy of the subject check was inadmissible in evidence because of the prosecution's
failure to produce the original thereof. This was likewise denied by the trial court. It rendered judgment
convicting petitioner of the crime charged.

CA: affirmed the decision of the trial court. MR by petitioner was likewise denied. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused of the crime charged solely on the basis
of a machine or photostatic copy of PNB Check No. 399967.

HELD: No. To warrant the petitioner's conviction of the crime charged, i.e., of BP Blg. 22, the prosecution was
burdened to prove the following essential elements thereof:
1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.

The gravamen of the offense is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon presentment for payment.

As to the second element, knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of the
funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment refers to the state of mind of the
drawer; hence, it is difficult for the prosecution to prove. The law creates a prima facie knowledge on the
insufficiency of funds or credit, coincidental with the attendance of the two other elements.

We agree with the petitioner that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce in evidence the original
copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove the contents thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence specifically provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original thereof. The purpose of the rule requiring the production by the
offeror of the best evidence is the prevention of fraud.

As long as the original evidence can be had, the court should not receive in evidence that which is
substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the original writing has
been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. Such photocopies must be disregarded, being
inadmissible evidence and barren of probative weight.

Furthermore, under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the said Rules, secondary evidence of a writing may be admitted
when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice. To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence
when the original of “a writing” is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130
provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the
same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence:

The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody/control of the party against whom it is offered
does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his
power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice may
be in the form of a motion for the production of the original OR made in open court in the presence of
the adverse party OR via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has
sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not
voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.

The petitioner, however, never produced the original of the check, much less offered to produce the
same. The petitioner deliberately withheld the original of the check as a bargaining chip for the court to
grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, which he failed to do following his
numerous unjustified postponements as shown by the records.
 EVID CASE DIGESTS – MODULE 2
Considering the facts and circumstances attendant in this case, we find the petitioner's plea to be barren of
merit. The records show that despite the numerous opportunities given to him by the trial court, the petitioner
refused to adduce any evidence in his behalf.

Ruling: The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE

G.R. No. 170604; September 02, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:

DOCTRINE: The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the subject of the
inquiry. In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that
purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the
defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other than the original document.

FACTS: In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon, the respondents averred
that:
 their parents, the late spouses Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, were the registered owners
of that parcel of land covered by TCT No. 84797 of the Register of Deeds of Manila;
 their parents had been in possession of the property during their lifetime;
 upon their parents’ deaths, they had continued the possession of the property as heirs, paying the real
property taxes due thereon;
 they could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but the original copy of TCT
No. 84797 on file with the RD-Manila was intact;
 the original copy contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to defendant
Prodon subject to the right of repurchase; and
 the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon because the deed of sale with right to
repurchase covering the property did not exist.

Consequently, they prayed that the entry be cancelled, and that Prodon be adjudged liable for damages.

During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.

RTC Ruling: rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. CA: reversed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had been complied with.

HELD: No. Best Evidence Rule was not applicable herein. The CA and the RTC both misapplied the Best
Evidence Rule to this case, and their misapplication diverted the attention from the decisive issue in this action
for quieting of title. The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When
the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence/execution/delivery of the
writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary
evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original.

The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought
before the court. The rule further acts as an insurance against fraud. Lastly, the rule protects against
misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger
set of writings.

This case involves an action for quieting of title , a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt
or uncertainty on the title to real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. This action does not involve the terms or contents of
the deed of sale with right to repurchase. The principal issue raised by the respondents as the
plaintiffs, which Prodon challenged head on, was whether or not the deed of sale with right to
repurchase, duly executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed.

ERROR OF THE RTC: In the course of the trial, however, a question was propounded to Prodon as to who had
signed or executed the deed, and the question was objected to based on the Best Evidence Rule. The RTC
then sustained the objection. The RTC should have outrightly overruled the objection because the fact sought
to be established by the requested testimony was the execution of the deed, not its terms. It found in its
 EVID CASE DIGESTS – MODULE 2
judgment that Prodon had complied with the requisites for the introduction of secondary evidence, and gave full
credence to the testimony of Jose Camilon explaining the non-production of the original, alleging that he had
given the original to her lawyer, Atty. Lacanilao, but that he could not anymore retrieve the original because
Atty. Lacanilao had been recuperating from his heart ailment.

ERROR OF THE CA: The CA seconded the RTC’s mistake by likewise applying the Best Evidence Rule,
except that the CA concluded differently, in that it held that Prodon had not established the existence/execution
and loss of the original document as the pre-requisites for the presentation of secondary evidence.

Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the deed of sale with
right to repurchase were not the issue, the CA did not have to address and determine whether the
existence, execution, and loss, as pre-requisites for the presentation of secondary evidence, had been
established by Prodon’s evidence. It should have simply addressed and determined whether or not the
“existence” and “execution” of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by preponderance of
evidence.

Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to prove the existence and due execution of the deed of sale with right
to repurchase, the presentation of evidence other than the original document would have sufficed even without
first proving the loss or unavailability of the original of the deed.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, we concur with the CA that the respondents preponderantly, proved
that the deed of sale with right to repurchase executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in fact.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the CA decision.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION v. ANTONIO LAGMAN

G.R. No. 165487; July 13, 2011
PEREZ, J.

DOCTRINE:
 A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is
unavailable.
 A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for the non-
production of the original instrument. When more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all
of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be
given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other originals.

FACTS: Nelson Santos applied for a license with the NFA to engage in the business of storing not more than
30,000 sacks of palay valued at ₱5,250,000.00 in his warehouse in Camiling, Tarlac.

Under Act No. 3893 or the General Bonded Warehouse Act, as amended, the approval for said license was
conditioned upon posting of a cash bond, a bond secured by real estate, or a bond signed by a duly authorized
bonding company. Accordingly, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation issued:
 Warehouse Bond No. 033044 for ₱1,749,825.00 on 5 November 1989 and
 Warehouse Bond No. 023555 for ₱749,925.00 on 13 December 1989
through its agent, Antonio Lagman. Santos was the bond principal, Lagman was the surety and the Republic of
the Philippines, through the NFA was the obligee. In consideration of these issuances, corresponding
Indemnity Agreements were executed by Santos, as bond principal, together with Ban Lee Lim, Reguine, and
Lagman, as co-signors.

Santos then secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as collateral. When the loan matured, Santos
defaulted in his payment. The sacks of palay covered by the warehouse receipts were no longer found
in the bonded warehouse. By virtue of the surety bonds, Country Bankers was compelled to pay
₱1,166,750.37.10 Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum of money before the RTC.

The bond principals, Santos and Ban Lee Lim, were not served with summons because they could no longer
be found.

RTC: rendered judgment declaring Reguine and Lagman to jointly and severally liable to pay Country Bankers.
CA: reversed the RTC Decision; MR by Country Bankers was denied. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 1990 Bond presented by Lagman is admissible in evidence.
 EVID CASE DIGESTS – MODULE 2

HELD: No. Lagman presented a mere photocopy of the 1990 Bond. We rule as inadmissible such copy. Under
the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced whenever its contents are the subject of
inquiry. A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the
original is unavailable.

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must
prove the following:
1) the existence or due execution of the original;
2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and
3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.

In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned during the direct examination that there are actually four (4) duplicate
originals of the 1990 Bond:
 the first is kept by the NFA,
 the second is with the Loan Officer of the NFA in Tarlac,
 the third is with Country Bankers and
 the fourth was in his possession.

A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for the non-
production of the original instrument. When more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all
of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be
given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other originals.

Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of these duplicate originals, Lagman merely presented a
photocopy. He admitted that he kept a copy of the 1990 Bond but he could no longer produce it because he
had already severed his ties with Country Bankers. However, he did not explain why severance of ties is by
itself reason enough for the non-availability of his copy of the bond considering that, as it appears from the
1989 Bonds, Lagman himself is a bondsman. Neither did Lagman explain why he failed to secure the original
from any of the three other custodians he mentioned in his testimony. While he apparently was able to find the
original with the NFA Loan Officer, he was merely contented with producing its photocopy. Clearly, Lagman
failed to exert diligent efforts to produce the original.

Lagman is bound by the Indemnity Agreements. Lagman, being a solidary debtor, is liable for the entire
obligation. The surety bonds in question cannot be unilaterally cancelled by Lagman.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed CA Decision is SET ASIDE and the RTC
Decision is hereby REINSTATED.
________________________________________________________________________________________

PO2 JESSIE FLORES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 222861
GESMUNDO, J.

DOCTRINE: In this case, the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of
establishing its existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitute evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is
admissible without the need of accounting for the original.

FACTS: On 29 June 2000, petitioner was arrested via an entrapment operation conducted by the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) pursuant to a complaint lodged by private complainant Roderick
France. The latter categorically testified that that petitioner demanded and eventually received from him the
amount of Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00) in exchange for the release of his driver's license due to the fact
that the driven taxi of France figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney and the said accused
confiscated his Driver's License then issued a Traffic Violation Receipt

Sensing that something was not right, France went to the headquarters of the PAOCTF in Camp Crame to file
a complaint against PO2 Flores. The PAOCTF team proceeded to Station 10, Kamuning Police Station
together with France. When France entered the station, PO2 Flores asked him if he brought with him the
money. After an hour, PO2 Flores called France to his table. He opened a drawer and told France to drop the
money inside. PO2 Flores then counted the money inside the drawer using his left hand. As soon as France
asked for his driver's license, the PAOCTF team then went to the scene and arrested PO2 Flores and
confiscated the things inside his drawer including the marked money. The team subsequently proceeded to
 EVID CASE DIGESTS – MODULE 2
Camp Crame where PO2 Flores was turned over for ultraviolet examination. Upon arraignment, petitioner
entered a plea of “not guilty.” Flores interposed the defense of denial and "frame-up".

RTC: found petitioner guilty of simple robbery (extortion). It ruled that the prosecution established all the
elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. MR by petitioner denied. He appealed before the CA.
CA: denied the appeal. MR by petitioner was likewise denied. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA grievously erred and abused its prerogatives when it affirmed the petitioner's
conviction, despite that it is glaring from the evidence on record that the respondent miserably failed to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: No. The non-presentation of the original pieces of the marked money is not fatal to the cause of the
prosecution.

Petitioner’s contention: a mere photocopy of the alleged marked money is inadmissible for not conforming to
the basic rules of admissibility. Hence, he must be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to present the original
pieces of marked money which is the property subject of this criminal offense.

In this case, the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of
establishing its existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitute evidence, like a xerox copy
thereof, is admissible without the need of accounting for the original.

NOTES:
PRESENCE OF ULTRAVIOLET FLUORESCENT POWDER IS NOT AN INDISPENSIBLE EVIDENCE TO
PROVE RECEIPT OF MARKED MONEY: Petitioner also assails the failure of the prosecution to produce the
forensic chemist who actually conducted the testing for fluorescent powder. There is no rule requiring that the
police officers must apply fluorescent powder to the buy-bust money to prove the commission of the offense. In
fact, the failure of the police operatives to use fluorescent powder on the boodle money is not an indication that
the entrapment operation did not take place.

TESTIMONY IN OPEN COURT IS GIVEN MORE WEIGHT THAN STATEMENTS IN AFFIDAVITS: The Court
has held that discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in court will not instantly result in the
acquittal of the accused.

EXONERATION IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY CAUSE THE DISMISSAL

OF THE CRIMINAL CASE. It is hornbook doctrine in administrative law that administrative cases are
independent from criminal actions for the same acts or omissions. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is
not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. Given the differences in the quantum of evidence
required, x x x the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.

PETITIONER IS CONVICTED OF THE CRIME CHARGED: In robbery, there must be an unlawful taking, which
is defined as the taking of items without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. Taking is considered complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he did not have the opportunity to dispose of the same. In this
case, when the marked money was placed inside petitioner's drawer, who counted it afterwards, he was
deemed to have taken possession of the money. This amount was unlawfully taken by petitioner from France
with intent to gain and through intimidation. There is no doubt that the prosecution successfully established all
the elements of the crime charged.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The CA Decision is AFFIRMED.