The Cyprus Conundrum: The Challenge of the Intercommunal Talks
Author(s): David Souter
Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Apr., 1989), pp. 76-91
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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DAVID SOUTER
The Cyprus conundrum:
the challenge of the
intercommunal talks
In August 1988, Javier Perez de Cuellar began his latest attempt to
resolve one of the United Nations' most intractable problems-the
Cyprus conflict. As Kurt Waldheim's representative on the island in
the 1 970s, he had gained long experience of Cyprus negotiations. Three
fresh initiatives since he became UN Secretary-General had already
ended in deadlock and recrimination. Yet this time many Cypriots were
more optimistic about a settlement than at any time since the Turkish
invasion of Cyprus in 1974. This article examines the reasons for their
optimism, describes the issues under negotiation and assesses prospects
for a lasting resolution of the conflict.
Background to the intercommunal talks
Talks to 'solve' the Cyprus problem have been sponsored by the United
Nations for almost a quarter of a century, since it first accepted a
peacekeeping role on the island in March 1964. One retired UN official
has called them 'the most frustrating negotiations in my experience, . . .
like the gyroscopic stabiliser on a ship in a storm. They go round and
round and produce a certain stability, even if they do not produce
forward motion'.1 No doubt many of his colleagues would agree.
But what makes the Cyprus problem so difficult? The island attained
independence in 1960, rather against the wishes of many of its inhabitants.
Most Greek Cypriots, including the first president of Cyprus, Archbishop
Makarios, had sought enosis, union with Greece, rather than indepen-
dence; while most Turkish Cypriots, reacting to this, had preferred taksim,
partition between Greece and Turkey. Independence was a compromise,
hedged about with elaborate power-sharing constitutional arrangements
that gave the Turkish-Cypriot community exceptional minority rights,
including an effective veto over all significant political decisions;
and guaranteed by a treaty that allowed Britain, Greece and Turkey
1 B Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987, p 259.
76 TWQ 11(2) April 1989/ISSN 0143-6597/89. $1.25
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THE CYPRUS CONUNDRUM
to intervene should the constitutional settlement break down.2
It did so within four years. Proposed changes to the Constitution,
which would have diminished Turkish-Cypriot minority rights, led to
intercommunal fighting, the withdrawal of Turkish-Cypriot repre-
sentatives from political and judicial institutions and the establishment
of quasi-autonomous Turkish-Cypriot enclaves throughout the island.
British, and, from March 1964, UN forces intervened, but fighting con-
tinued in the late 1960s without provoking decisive intervention from
any of the guarantor powers. That came in 1974 when a coup d'etat
against Makarios was inspired by the military government in Greece,
and Turkish troops invaded and occupied the northern third of the
island, handing civil administration over to the Turkish-Cypriot leader,
Rauf Denkta,. The new Turkish-Cypriot entity unilaterally declared its
autonomy in 1975 and proclaimed full independence-as the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNc)-in 1983. Internationally, it is
recognised only by Turkey.3
The 'Cyprus problem'-that is, the search for a settlement that will
reunite the island's two communities in a single state-has two distinct
elements: intercommunal relations, and the island's relationship with its
two different 'motherlands'. Intercommunal talks have continued spas-
modically since the 1960s, with a succession of interlocutors and UN
intermediaries considering proposals for new constitutional arrange-
ments, for local government and (since 1974) for territorial redistribu-
tion.4 Throughout, these talks have been bedevilled by the dominant
influence of one or other 'motherland'-Greece before 1974, and Turkey
since. They have seen several major concessions by the Greek Cypriots-
in particular, the acceptance of a federal rather than a unitary form of
government, and of a bizonal territorial distribution-without re-
ciprocal concessions of equal substance from the Turkish-Cypriot side.
This reflects political reality. For many Turks and Turkish Cypriots,
2 The constitutional settlement can be found in Cyprus, British Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd.
1093, London: Hmso, 1960. It provided for a president to be elected by the Greek-Cypriot
community (then some 470,000 strong) and a vice-president-with veto powers over major
decisions on defence, foreign policy and other issues-to be elected by the 110,000 Turkish
Cypriots. The Council of Ministers had seven Greek-Cypriot and three Turkish-Cypriot min-
isters, while the House of Representatives was divided 35:15 and posts in the civil service, police,
armed forces and judiciary allocated in similar proportions between the communities.
3More detailed accounts of the development of the Cyprus problem can be found in D Souter,
'An island apart: a review of the Cyprus problem', Third World Quarterly 6 (3) 1984, pp 657-
74; and K Kyle, Cyprus, London: Minority Rights Group, 1984 (revised edition forthcoming).
4 They are described in detail from the Greek-Cypriot viewpoint in P Polyviou, Cyprus: Conflict
and Negotiation, 1960-1980, London: Duckworth, 1980, and from the Turkish-Cypriot side by
N M Ertekun, The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,
Nicosia: K Rustem. second edition. 1984.
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including Denkta,, the Cyprus problem has essentially been resolved
by partition.5 While residual problems of international recognition and
intercommunal relations could be resolved by a comprehensive settle-
ment, they have little incentive to pursue this so long as Turkey provides
full military, political and economic backing for the Turkish-Cypriot
regime. Greek Cypriots have more to gain from the reintegration of the
Cypriot state, including renewed access to the whole island, and perhaps
guaranteed security against further Turkish military action. Their nego-
tiators have made substantial concessions over constitutional federation
in recognition of the Greek-Cypriot community's weakness vis-a'-vis
Turkey and in the hope, so far vain, of stimulating counter-concessions
from the Turkish-Cypriot side.
In practice, therefore, Greek Cypriots emphasise the international
aspect of the problem, notably the continued presence of Turkish
troops, while Turkish Cypriots stress the intercommunal dimension. In
reality, any lasting solution must resolve both intercommunal and inter-
national elements. Yet, by definition, intercommunal talks can deal only
with the former: the best they can achieve is a framework which would
also facilitate Turkish military withdrawal.
United Nations initiatives, 1984-86
The current intercommunal talks are Perez de Cuellar's fourth attempt
to solve the Cyprus problem since he became UN Secretary-General in
1982. His first proposals for narrowing the gap between the two sides
foundered when Rauf Denkta, unilaterally declared the independence
of his 'Turkish Republic' in November 1983. Later efforts were no
more successful.
Perez de Cuellar's second initiative began in August 1984, with a
series of 'working points' derived from earlier negotiations. Three
rounds of 'proximity talks' followed in New York in the autumn, during
which the Secretary-General held separate meetings with President
Kyprianou and Mr Denktas, gradually piecing together the agenda for a
'high-level' (ie summit) meeting. These talks focused on detailed con-
stitutional matters-for example, whether the presidency should rotate
between the communities-in a search for formulae, however vague,
that were acceptable to both sides. New Turkish-Cypriot proposals, offer-
5 See, for example, a press conference given by the former Turkish foreign minister, Vahit Hale-
foglu, on 22 March 1986. Denktas's own account of the recent history of Cyprus is in
R R Denkta?, The Cyprus Triangle, Nicosia: K Rustem, second edition, 1988.
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THE CYPRUS CONUNDRUM
ing significant territorial adjustments, restrictions on the Turkish-
Cypriot legislative veto and other constitutional concessions, eventually
enabled Perez de Cuellar to arrange a high-level meeting in New York
from 17-20 January 1985.
This meeting collapsed in acrimony. A 'preliminary draft agreement'
had been prepared by the UN Secretariat, setting out the framework
for a settlement but leaving a number of crucial points open-notably
the extent of territorial adjustments and the timetable for the with-
drawal of Turkish troops. Kyprianou regarded the draft as a basis for
negotiation, and refused to sign without clarification of these points
and the nature of any international guarantees. Denkta?, by contrast,
saw it as an agreement for signature and declined to negotiate further.
A conference intended to resolve outstanding points of difficulty turned
into a fruitless argument about the status of preparatory documents.6
The resulting confusion continued after the high-level debdcle. In
April 1985, UN officials presented a revised document incorporating
the concessions offered by the Turkish Cypriots in November 1984.
This 'consolidated draft' proved acceptable to Kyprianou but not to
Denkta?.7 Discussions then continued between UN officials and exper
from both communities and, in March 1986, a new 'draft framework
agreement' was drawn up. This was Perez de Cuellar's third attempt to
reconcile the outstanding differences between the communities.8
In fact, it satisfied neither. In several significant areas, including ter-
ritorial redistribution, the balance of power between the federal govern-
ment and the federated states and the timetable for the withdrawal of
Turkish troops, Kyprianou felt that it reversed points he had accepted
as a final bargaining position in April 1985. In his response, he stressed
the international aspect of the problem-the presence of Turkish
troops-and urged the Secretary-General to consider an international
conference or a further high-level meeting as a possible way forward.
Denktaq accepted the new document in principle, but made firm pro-
posals on troop withdrawals and international guarantees that were
bound to prove unacceptable to the Greek-Cypriot side.9
As in the case of earlier intercommunal talks, these UN initiatives
focused on detailed constitutional proposals, leaving unresolved funda-
6The 'preliminary draft agreement' is reprinted in Republic of Cyprus, Turkish Policy
on Cyprus and Efforts to Solve the Cyprus Problem, Nicosia: Press and Information Office,
1988, pp 43-9.
7 Ibid, pp 50-7.
8 Ibid, pp 83-91.
9 Ibid, pp 94-120.
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THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY
mental differences of view on the nature of the Cypriot state. The nego-
tiations barely deviated from ideas and even phrases which had pro-
duced only deadlock in the past. This central weakness was com-
pounded by the attempt to formulate answers to difficult constitutional
and territorial questions in advance of face-to-face negotiations be-
tween Kyprianou and Denkta?. This prevented the development o
any negotiating momentum which might have led to the two com-
munity leaders trading new concessions. The talks failed because they
provided no scope for new ideas, no opportunities to develop them
and no new incentives for the community leaders to risk established
positions in the hope of achieving progress.
The impact on Greek-Cypriot politics
The talks nevertheless had a marked impact on internal Greek-Cypriot
politics, ultimately leading to Kyprianou's removal from the presidency.
He had inherited this when Archbishop Makarios died in 1977, and
had been re-elected in 1983 with the support of the Greek-Cypriot
communist party, AKEL. His own centrist Democratic Party (DIKO) was
regularly placed third in national elections, while AKEL'S support was
essentially negative-based on the strategy that if it could not win a
presidential election itself it was determined to exclude the leader of the
conservative Democratic Rally (DISY), Glafcos Clerides.
Kyprianou's handling of the 1984-86 initiatives was a major factor
ending his alliance with AKEL and marked the start of a new era in
Greek-Cypriot politics. Despite ideological differences, AKEL and DISY
had consistently shared a more conciliatory approach to the Cyprus
problem than either Kyprianou or the smaller EDEK party.I0 Both
strongly criticised Kyprianou's conduct in the proximity talks and the
high-level meeting, accusing him of paying more attention to the Greek
Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, than to more moderate Greek-
Cypriot opinion. They welcomed Perez de Cuellar's 'working points'
and claimed that Kyprianou had handed Denkta? a diplomatic victor
in New York by refusing to sign the 'preliminary draft agreement'.
A full-scale challenge to the President's authority ensued. AKEL and
DISY used their majority in the House of Representatives to demand
that either he endorse the 'preliminary draft agreement' or call an early
presidential election. Failing that, they demanded a government of
national unity capable of imposing decisions about intercommunal
1o EDEK combines socialist ideology with a strong current of Hellenic nationalist rhetoric.
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THE CYPRUS CONUNDRUM
negotiations on the President. Eventually, in November 1985, the House
dissolved itself in order to allow new elections to be held; an election
which amounted to a referendum on Kyprianou's handling of the
talks.I1 These established new lines of political division, between op-
ponents and supporters of a conciliatory approach to the 'national ques-
tion', which remain fundamental to Greek-Cypriot politics today. The
former, 'rejectionist', parties won under 38 per cent of the vote, giving
a substantial majority to the 'non-rejectionist' parties, DISY and AKEL.12
The failure of the 1986 initiative reinforced this trend. For the first
time in many years Greek Cypriots found themselves, rather than Turk-
ish Cypriots, criticised for obstructing progress towards a settlement.
This helped the 'non-rejectionist' camp to attract new support from the
political centre. George Vassiliou, a businessman not associated with
past political failures, ran an impressive campaign as an independent
candidate in the 1988 presidential elections (with AKEL's backing), of-
fering a fresh approach to the national question. In the first round, in
February 1988, he and Clerides both defeated Kyprianou, eliminating
him from the final ballot. A week later, Vassiliou narrowly won the
decisive poll. 13
Vassiliou's election marked the victory of the 'non-rejectionist' ap-
proach which had been in a clear majority since the failure of the high-
level meeting in January 1985. From the outset he made it clear that his
candidature and presidency were principally aimed at resolving the
national question, that he was not overly concerned about re-election,
and that he could therefore promote initiatives that more conventional
politicians might find difficult. He began his administration with a degree
of support from the two main Greek-Cypriot political parties that the
outgoing president had never mustered.
Intercommunal talks, 1988-89
Vassiliou's offer to talk without preconditions gave Perez de Cuellar an
The Greek-Cypriot political crisis is described by K Watkins, 'Greek Cypriot political crisis and
elections', Friends of Cyprus Report 28, 1986, pp 12-16.
12 Voting figures were DISY 33.6 per cent (up 1.7 per cent on 1981) and nineteen seats; DIKO 27.7
per cent (up 8.2 per cent) and sixteen seats; AKEL 27.4 per cent (down 5.4 per cent) with fifteen
seats; and EDEK 11.0 per cent (up 2.9 per cent) and six seats. DIKO'S gain included votes regained
from three centrist splinter parties which had been set up before the 1981 election, but did not
contest that in 1985.
13 Voting in the first round was: Glafcos Clerides (DIsY) 33.2 per cent, Georgios Vassiliou (in-
dependent) 30.11 per cent, Sypros Kyprianou (DIKo) 27.29 per cent and Vassos Lyssarides
(EDEK) 9.22 per cent; in the second round Vassiliou took 51.63 per cent to Clerides' 48.37
per cent.
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THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY
opportunity to revive intercommunal negotiation. He invited the new
president and Denktas to discussions in Geneva on 24 August 1988,
and emerged with an agreement for frequent meetings between them,
aimed at a negotiated settlement of 'all aspects' of the Cyprus problem
by 1 June 1989. They also agreed to review progress with the Secretary-
General before the end of 1988.14
This fourth initiative was greeted with more optimism than Perez de
Cuellar's earlier efforts. Partly, this was due to international
developments-the success surrounding UN initiatives in the Gulf and
elsewhere, and the new rapprochement between Greece and Turkey-
but there were also reasons internal to Cyprus. Vassiliou was the first
interlocutor not directly involved in the island's earlier intercommunal
conflicts. He had declared himself willing to discuss new ideas, opening
up the possibility of new concessions on both sides. He was rightly
thought to be a far better match than Kyprianou for Denktaa's tough
negotiating style.
Nevertheless, the talks failed to make significant progress in late 1988.
Despite good personal relations and positive gestures by Vassiliou, he
and Denktas achieved little beyond reasserting established views on the
main intercommunal differences. The first review meeting with Perez de
Cuellar, held on 22-23 November 1988, was therefore widely expected
to fail; but in the event it gave renewed impetus to the negotiations.
Denkta, arrived direct from discussions with the Turkish government
to announce what he called a new initiative minor proposals on the
freedom of settlement and property ownership within Cyrpus, and on
the long-term presence of Turkish troops. Although these were not
formally discussed, Vassiliou and Denkta, agreed to continue their regu-
lar meetings by 'exploring ... a wide range of options for each of the
issues that make up the Cyprus problem and ... evaluating them in the
light of the interests and concerns of both sides'.'5 The second round
of talks began in December 1988 and a further review meeting was
agreed for March 1989.
Issues in the intercommunal talks
The issues facing the negotiators have barely changed since 1974. The
following pages identify the main points at issue, and examine some
options available to break the deadlock.
14 Statement by the UN Secretary-General, 24 August 1988.
15 Statement by the Spokesman for the UN Secretary-General, 23 November 1988.
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THE CYPRUS CONUNDRUM
Constitutional structure
At the heart of the discussion lie different conceptions of the Cypriot
state. The Turkish-Cypriot case is based on their view that the Republic
of Cyprus was established by the 1960 Constitution as an equal partner-
ship of the two communities. It therefore dissolved when the constitu-
tional settlement broke down in 1963: the Greek-Cypriot administration
which remained should not be internationally recognised as the Cyprus
government, and should recognise the equal status of the TRNC as a
precondition for re-establishing a Cypriot state. That state must be a
confederation of two equal regions, one Greek-Cypriot and one
Turkish-Cypriot, in which central government powers are extremely
limited and where individual citizens have no right to live or work in
the region which is not their ethnic homeland. 16
The Greek Cypriot view also encompasses bizonal federation, but is
otherwise very different. Greek Cypriots regard the Turkish-Cypriot
withdrawal from political institutions in 1963 as irrelevant to constitu-
tional legitimacy, so that a settlement today would merely restore
Turkish-Cypriot participation in the continuing Cypriot state. In the
Greek-Cypriot view, the equality of individual citizens takes precedence
over that of federal regions. They must, for example, have the right to
live and work throughout the island, and central government must have
sufficient overriding powers to guarantee the integrity of the state.
Essentially, Greek Cypriots see the Turkish-Cypriot case as a ration-
alisation of partition, while Turkish Cypriots fear their Greek com-
patriots aim to restore Greek-Cypriot domination throughout the
island. Intercommunal talks have rarely tackled this fundamental con-
tradiction, but have been preoccupied with ways of restructuring the
power-sharing arrangements of 1960 in a form consistent with bizonal
federation. The 1984-86 UN documents, for example, sought agreement
on such detailed matters as the proportional share-out of cabinet posts
and the use of national and regional flags.17 Other issues considered at
length during intercommunal negotiations include the structure and
ethnic proportionality of the federal legislature, the roles of federal and
regional police, and the procedure for resolving intercommunal dead-
lock. While these are important matters and need to be discussed, they
cannot substitute for consensus on the fundamental nature of the federa-
tion in which they operate.
16 The basic Turkish-Cypriot view was put most clearly in the 'Explanatory note of the Turkish-
Cypriot proposals for the solution of the Cyprus problem', 1978, reprinted in N M Ertekun,
The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, pp 321-33.
17 1986 'draft framework agreement', clauses 1 and 2.
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Territorial arrangements
The area occupied by Turkish troops in 1974 amounted to 37 per cent
of Cyprus. It did not correspond to any pre-existing Turkish-Cypriot
zone-historically both communities were dispersed throughout the
island-but it did give the Turkish Cypriots substantially more land
than was proportionate to their population.18 It also brought under
Turkish control a good deal of the best agricultural land and most of
the island's tourist accommodation.
Much of the argument over territory centres on a 1977 agreement
between Denkta~ and the late President Makarios that 'the territory
under the administration of each community should be discussed in the
light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership'.'9 To
the Turkish-Cypriot administration, 'economic viability' justifies re-
tention of sufficient land and resources to maintain an independent
economy, consistent with an exceptional degree of constitutional
autonomy. Greek Cypriots regard this as inherently impractical and a
denial of justice to the 180,000 Greek-Cypriot refugees who fled from
the north in 1974.
For Greek Cypriots, therefore, 'land ownership' is a more important
criterion. Indeed, once the principle of bizonality was accepted in the
late 1970s, the exact proportion of territory in each region became less
important than the number of refugees who could return home under
Greek-Cypriot administration. Relatively small territorial adjustments
could accommodate many. The recovery of Varosha, for example (a
Greek-Cypriot suburb of Famagusta now in the UN buffer zone) would
account for some 65,000, and further adjustments could easily be made
around Morphou in the west.
Greek-Cypriot negotiators may now have moved closer to accepting
something like the 29 per cent minimum territory that Denkta? de-
manded in 1984, provided that the boundary line is drawn to allow the
maximum number of refugees to return home. If problems over propor-
tions persist, one way to resolve them might be the creation of 'federal
districts' technically outside both communal regions. Nicosia, as the
national capital, would be a suitable candidate; so might the area
around Nicosia airport,20 the port of Famagusta, and the site of any
future federal university.
18 18 per cent at the last reliable census in 1960.
19 N M Ertekiin, The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,
p 278.
20 Currently in the UN buffer zone.
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THE CYPRUS CONUNDRUM
The 'three freedoms'
Greek-Cypriot negotiators insist on full and immediate implementation
of the 'three freedoms' of movement, settlement and property ownership
throughout the island, including the right of all refugees to return to
their homes. The Turkish Cypriots claim that this would restore
Greek-Cypriot domination in 'their' region, render separate regional
government impossible and pose an unacceptable security risk to
their community.
In reality, the numbers involved are not so large. Probably half the
refugees could be accommodated in the Greek-Cypriot region through
territorial adjustment. Many older refugees have died since 1974, and
their children often have established businesses or hold secure jobs in
the south. Greek teachers and civil servants would probably have diffi-
culty finding work in a culturally Turkish region. It is difficult to say
how many Greek Cypriots would seek to resettle permanently in the
Turkish region immediately after a settlement, but it is unlikely to be
so many as to threaten the region's cultural identity, particularly if
substantial compensation for lost assets were offered by the inter-
national community as part of a settlement deal. Ironically, there might
be as strong a flow of Turkish Cypriots southwards. In recent months,
several hundred have crossed the 'green line' regularly, attracted by
high wages available on construction sites hit by a Greek-Cypriot
labour shortage. Many more might follow, at least on a daily basis, if
restrictions were removed following a settlement.
A second demographic problem before the interlocutors concerns
some 35,000 Anatolian settlers now living in northern Cyprus.21 They
provide important political support for the Denkta? regime, but have
largely failed to integrate into Turkish-Cypriot society. Denkta, champ-
ions their right to stay (often in the former homes of Greek-Cypriot
refugees); Greek Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriot opposition insist
that most should leave. What happens to them in the event of a settle-
ment may well depend on the extent of international compensation
made available.
Security issues
Security is a vital issue for both communities. Turkish Cypriots recall
the intercommunal strife from 1963-74, when their community was
subject to periodic attacks from Greek-Cypriot extremists. Almost all
21 The Cyprus government estimates 60,000, while the Turkish-Cypriot administration admits to
15,000. The figure used is generally accepted by diplomatic missions on the island.
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of them welcomed the Turkish invasion in 1974, not just as a response
to the immediate political crisis but as a long-term release from fear
and insecurity. The Turkish forces remain with their overwhelming sup-
port. Greek Cypriots, by contrast, recall the invasion as a time when
thousands of their compatriots died and many more fled into internal
exile. Many fear that Turkey's real intention is the occupation of the
entire island. Greek-Cypriot negotiators insist on the total withdrawal
of Turkish troops and favour demilitarisation of the reconstituted state.
In practice, no solution that fails to address these security fears in both
communities can hope to succeed.
There are currently some 27,000 Turkish troops in Cyprus, far more
than necessary to defend the 'green line'; they can be reinforced within
hours from the Turkish mainland. A phased reduction in troop numbers
would therefore have no practical effect on Turkey's ability to intervene
in a crisis, but would have a dramatic impact on Greek-Cypriot percep-
tions of Turkey's commitment to a settlement. Yet by the end of 1988
there had been no sign of such a development. The most Denktas has
proposed is an eventual reduction to a balance of Cypriot and 'non-
Cypriot' (ie 'motherland') forces in both regions following the establish-
ment of an interim federal government.22
This dispute extends to the provision of international guarantees for
any constitutional settlement. Denkta? insists that Turkey should
remain as a guarantor, even though in practice proximity to the Turk-
ish mainland provides the most effective guarantee possible. Greek
Cypriots cannot accept this, and would prefer independent
guarantors-possibly organised through the UN-who could take action
against Turkey itself if necessary.
Confidence-building measures
Greek and Turkish Cypriots have lived apart for almost twenty-five
years. The traditional pattern of settlement, with Greek, Turkish and
mixed villages intermingled across the island, broke down in the inter-
communal violence of December 1963. Since 1974, there has been
little contact across the 'green line' dividing the communities. This separ-
ation has led to a dramatic divergence in their economic fortunes. The
booming Greek-Cypriot economy has a gross domestic product per
head some three times that in the north of Cyprus, where Turkey pro-
vides two-thirds of government finance and business is hampered by
international non-recognition. Younger Cypriots, meanwhile, now
22 In his proposals of November 1988.
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know little of each others' culture, language or politics, and have little
understanding of each other's fears and aspirations for the future.
Two kinds of confidence-building measures are proposed to resolve
these problems: immediate steps to promote understanding in advance
of a settlement, and transitional arrangements to assist subsequent
social and economic reintegration.
Few initiatives to promote intercommunal understanding have so far
taken place. Occasional conferences of Cypriot politicians and profes-
sionals have been held outside the island23 and a few Turkish-Cypriot
politicians have recently visited south Nicosia. Such events, though gen-
erally successful, are rare. The most important initiative to date is a
joint sewerage scheme and municipal development plan for Nicosia
sponsored by the UN Development Programme (UNDP). This involves
continuous cooperation between the city's two civic administrations, and
has ensured that Nicosia could be readily reintegrated following a settle-
ment of the national problem.24 Vassiliou has strongly endorsed this
initiative, but Denkta? is more equivocal; the council leader in Turkish
Nicosia is, significantly, a prominent opposition figure.25
These informal confidence-building measures lie outside the intercom-
munal talks, which in this context are concerned primarily with specific
issues that might be resolved in advance of a comprehensive settlement.
Greek Cypriots, for example, have long sought the early resettlement
of Varosha, which would enable many refugees to return home, and
provide opportunities for Greek-Cypriot business. Turkish Cypriots
have sought reciprocal concessions, principally the lifting of the 'econ-
omic embargo' (restrictions imposed on Turkish-Cypriot trade and tour-
ism through the Cyprus government's membership of international
organisations) and the reopening of Nicosia airport as an entry-point to
both parts of the island. Some reciprocal steps along these lines might
be implemented during a phased normalisation, but it is unlikely that
this could be achieved outside a comprehensive and timetabled settle-
ment.
Beyond these specific problems, the interlocutors might seek to iden-
tify projects to promote social and economic cohesion along the lines
pioneered by Nicosia's 'mayors'. The need for an economic develop-
ment plan, focused on the Turkish-Cypriot region, is already recognised
23 See, for example, 'Report on "Friends of Cyprus" intercommunal conference, London, lst-6th
December 1986', Friends of Cyprus Report 29, 1987, pp 3-6.
24 Little has been written about this initiative, but for a brief account see D Souter, 'Civil co-
operation unites divided city', Local Government Chronicle (London), 7 October 1988.
25 Mustafa Akinci, leader of the Communal Liberation Party.
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and should provide scope for Cypriot capital as well as international
aid. Joint medical and social security provision obviously make sense
in a small island with limited resources. An intercommunal university
has also been proposed by President Vassiliou's government. The pros-
pect of measures such as these could significantly increase public interest
in an overall settlement.
Prospects for the future
The two community leaders were due to review their 'evaluation of
options' on these issues with Perez de Cuellar in March 1989. At the
time of writing (December 1988), it was impossible to predict whether
they will have made significant progress or remained deadlocked on
key subjects. Few Greek Cypriots, at least, expected an early break-
through from this second round of talks.
How long the process could be sustained without significant results
is also unclear. Certainly in the Greek-Cypriot community Vassiliou
retains majority support, including that of both main parties, for his
approach, and made a point of discussing his strategy for the second
round with the National Council of party leaders. There are signs of
problems ahead for him, however. Leaders of the 'rejectionist' parties,
including Kyprianou, refused to accompany him to the New York
review meeting in November 1988; and a 'rejectionist' demonstration
that month briefly brought Greek-Cypriot students face to face with
Turkish-Cypriot soldiers. Any more such incidents (roundly condemned
by Vassiliou) could jeopardise future negotiations, no matter how large
the majority behind the president.
On the Turkish-Cypriot side, there has been no political change com-
mensurate with that in the south. Since the 1950s Denkta? has sought
to secure ever greater Turkish-Cypriot autonomy. While he retains
the full support of the Turkish government (which has no alternative
candidate for the Turkish-Cypriot leadership) he has little incentive
to relinquish any of the independence he has secured. He is unlikely,
therefore, to offer concessions acceptable to the Greek-Cypriot leader-
ship without a change of policy on the Turkish mainland.
This is not to say that Turkish-Cypriot opinion is undivided. Denkta?
won his last 'presidential' election in 1985 easily enough, but he did so
largely through his personal authority. His majority in the Turkish-
Cypriot assembly depends on the support of Turkish settlers' repre-
sentatives. Left-wing opposition parties won twenty-two of the fifty
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THE CYPRUS CONUNDRUM
assembly seats in the 1985 elections. Their leaders, Ozker Ozgur and
Mustafa Akinci, are enthusiastic advocates of intercommunal dialogue
and support the eventual reintegration of the Greek- and Turkish-
Cypriot communities.26 While they have no immediate prospect of dis-
placing Denkta?, the growth of support for them must be a factor
in Ankara's long-term calculations.
The international dimension
Those calculations are important. One major difference between the
latest Cyprus initiative and successful UN involvement elsewhere is that
one of the leading military and political actors is not directly involved
in negotiations. No agreement can be reached without Turkey's military
presence being addressed, yet the intercommunal talks provide no
forum to discuss this with the Turkish government. Wider UN dip-
lomacy may be needed, or even the international conference advocated
by President Vassiliou.
Successive Greek-Cypriot governments have sought to bring inter-
national (and particularly US) pressure on the Turkish government to
withdraw from Cyprus, and for a time in the 1970s secured an embargo
on US arms sales. This has consistently failed to achieve results. Today,
however, there are more positive reasons why at least partial withdrawal
may prove attractive to decision makers in Ankara.
One is Turkey's recent rapprochement with Greece. After years of
hostility, the Greek and Turkish prime ministers established a new dia-
logue in Davos, Switzerland, in January 1988. Despite recent setbacks,
this Graeco-Turkish detente has opened up new possibilities-for the
settlement of airspace and sovereignty disputes in the Aegean, for the
long-term reduction of military and political tension in Thrace, and for
Greek acceptance of Turkey's application to join the European Com-
munity (EC). The Turkish government may well consider such advances
to be worth the price of a settlement in Cyprus, provided that the long-
term security of the Turkish Cypriots was guaranteed.
Turkey's application for membership of the EC, formally submitted
in April 1987, could also induce a change in Turkish policy. Greek-
Cypriot officials argue that withdrawal from Cyprus should be a pre-
26 Voting figures in the 'presidential' election were: Rauf Denkta? 70.5 per cent, Ozgur (Republican
Turkish Party) 18.4 per cent, Durduran (Communal Liberation Party) 9.2 per cent; assembly
elections-National Unity Party (pro-Denktas) 36.0 per cent and twenty-four seats, Republican
Turkish Party 21.0 per cent and twelve seats, Communal Liberation Party 16.0 per cent and ten
seats, New Birth Party (principally representing Turkish settlers) 8.7 per cent and four seats.
No other parties secured representation.
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condition for Turkish entry. In reality, EC member-states have many
other reasons to resist Turkey's application, not least the difficulty of
integrating an economy so relatively underdeveloped into Western
Europe's trade and migration systems. Turkey's application is therefore
likely to be deferred for reasons other than Turkey's presence in Cyprus.
It remains the case, however, that progress towards Turkish member-
ship would require major changes in policy regarding Cyprus, par-
ticularly if the island's own application were processed simultaneously
with that from Ankara. It would be incompatible with EC membership
for a member-state to maintain hostile forces in another's territory. It
would also be impossible to sustain any future restrictions on the move-
ment of capital and labour within Cyprus which would be inadmissible
between member-states. For these reasons, progress towards Turkish
membership of the EC may assist a settlement more than any delay
caused by the continuing stalemate on the island.
Long-term prospects
If a settlement is reached, either through the present talks or any sub-
sequent initiative, it is unlikely to spell the end of UN involvement
in Cyprus. In the short term, UN peacekeeping forces would almost
certainly remain to monitor new security arrangements including what-
ever agreement is reached about military withdrawal. UNDP could
well extend its Nicosia experience to Famagusta, the other city divided
by the 'green line'. Resettlement and compensation arrangements for
refugees and displaced persons would need supervision, which again
could probably be most effectively organised by the UN.
Nor is an agreement certain to remove Cyprus from the UN's long-
term agenda. The key problem with the 1960 Constitution was that it
sought to reconcile the communities to united independence by entrench-
ing communal rights and privileges in such a way that every political
issue became a matter of ethnic competition. When a major dispute
arose, in December 1963, there was little cohesion remaining in the
elaborate institutions devised to keep the two communities together.
Most constitutional discussion in the intercommunal talks since the
1960s has been concerned with finding mutually acceptable reformula-
tions of the same communal rights and privileges that proved ineffective
(and in practice divisive) between 1960 and 1963; for example the strict
division of powers between the Greek-Cypriot president and the
Turkish-Cypriot vice-president, the proportions of Greek and Turkish
Cypriots in the island's representative assembly, the extent of the
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Turkish-Cypriot veto. The constitutional challenge for today's inter-
locutors is to place these necessary constitutional safeguards in a
context that will encourage cooperation rather than competition be-
tween the communities; in which it becomes normal, for example, for
Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot parties with similar ideologies to cooperate
with one another on important policy issues.
This constitutional problem is much more difficult to resolve than
the redistribution of territory or the re-establishment of freedoms of
movement, settlement and property ownership (constraints which
would be unlikely to survive the attraction of Turkish-Cypriot labour
and Greek-Cypriot capital across the intercommunal border). Unless
more attention is paid by the interlocutors to confidence-building meas-
ures and unifying elements within the Constitution before a settlement,
however, the danger is that any agreement they reach will be just as
vulnerable to early crisis as the 1960 Constitution. Cyprus could not
afford another failure like that. Whatever the outcome of the present
negotiations, Perez de Cuellar's Cyprus problem will be with him for
some time to come.
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