BENJAMIN VICTORIANO v.

ELIZALDE ROPE WORKER’S UNION AND ELIZALDE

ROPE FACTORY INC.

G.R. No. L-25246, 12 September, 1974, SECOND DIVISION (Zaldivar, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract

rights. In case of conflicts, the latter must yield to the former.

FACTS

Petitioner is a member of Iglesia ni Kristo, which prohibits its members from

joining labor organizations. He is employed under respondent’s factory wherein a

closed-shop agreement exists with respondent union. Petitioner expressed his

resignation from the Union. However, because of the closed shop agreement the factory

expressed petitioner would be dismissed if it would not have a compromise with the

union.

ISSUE

WON RA No. 3350 excluding employees belonging to religious sects from joining

labor unions violates the freedom of association.

RULING

NO. The Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognizes the right to form

and join labor unions, and this includes the right to not join. However, this right is not

applicable when there is a closed shop agreement between the company and the union.

However, Republic Act No. 3350 provides for an exception against the close shop
agreement, particularly employees who are members of religious sects that cannot be

compelled to join labor unions.

In the case at bar, nothing in RA No. 3350 violates the freedom of association.

What the law provides is that employees who are members of religious sect cannot be

compelled to join labor unions in spite of the closed shop agreement, and that said

employees cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole

ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union.
FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HONORABLE CRESENCIO

B. TRAJANO

G.R. No. 75039, 28, January, 1988, FIRST DIVISION, (Paras, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The test of supervisory and managerial status depends on whether a

person possesses authority to act in the interest of his employer in the matter

specified in Article 212 (k) of the Labor Code and Section 1 (m) of its

implementing Rules and whether such authority is not merely routinary or clerical

in nature, but requires the use of independent judgement

FACTS

Respondent Franklin Baker Brotherhood Association filed a petition for

certification election. It alleges that petitioner had in its employ 90 regular technical and

official employees, separate from the rank and file employees and is excluded from the

CBA. Petitioner argues that 74 of the 90 employees are managerial employees while 2

members are confidential employees, hence they must be excluded from the

certification election and the bargaining unit.

ISSUE

WON respondents are managerial employees?

RULING

NO. A managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to

lay down and execute management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall
and discharge, assign and discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such

managerial actions. In the case at bar, the respondents, as their ultimate power, may

only recommend the hiring and firing, or as the case may be, rests upon the plant

personnel manager. Also the powers exercised by the respondents are subject to

evaluation, review, and final action by department heads and other high executives,

which concludes that these respondent do not exercise independent judgement as

required by law in order to qualify the test of supervisory and managerial status.

Otherwise stated, respondents are not managerial employees, since they do not

participate in policy making but are given ready policies to execute and standard

practices to observe, thus having little freedom of action.

 KAPATIRAN SA MEAT AND CANNING DIVISION (TUPAS) v. THE HONORABLE

BLR DIRECTOR PURA FERRER CALLEJA et al

G.R. No. 82914, 20 June, 1988, FIRST DIVISION, (Grino-Aquino J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In Victoriano and Elizalde Rope Worker’s Union, the Court recognized the

right of the members of the INC sect not to join a labor union for being contrary

to their religious beliefs, does not bar the members of that sect from forming their

own union.

FACTS

The CBA between petitioner and respondent company was about to expire. NEW

ULO which is the new labor union composed of employees belonging to the INC sect

filed a certification election. In the end, petitioner was able to negotiate a new 3 year

CBA, however he assailed the petition for certification election by NEW ULO for being

defective since most of the members belong to INC sect.

ISSUE

WON NEW ULO was an invalid labor organization for being mostly composed of

INC believers.

RULING

NO. In Victoriano and Elizalde Rope Worker’s Union, the Court recognized the

right of the members of the INC sect not to join a labor union for being contrary to their

religious beliefs, does not bar the members of that sect from forming their own union.
The fact that petitioner was able to negotiate a new CBA with the company does not

foreclose the right of the rival union NEW ULO to challenge petitioner’s claim to majority

status.
 JOHNSON AND JOHNSON LABOR UNION-FFW et al v. DIRECTOR OF LAND

LABOR RELATIONS et al.

G.R. No. 76427, 21 February, 1989, THIRD DIVISION, (Gutierrez, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The union’s constitution and by-laws govern the relationship between and

among its members. As in the interpretation of contracts, if the terms are clear

and leave no doubt, as to the intention of parties, the literal meaning of the

stipulation shall control.

FACTS

Respondent Oscar Pili was dismissed from his work for non-disclosure in his job

application form that he had a relative in the company which is in violation of company

policies. He argues that, as stated in the petitioner-union’s Constitution and By-laws, he

is entitled to financial aid from the compulsory contributions of the members of the

union. Petitioner-union argues that Oscar is not entitled to the financial aid since it was

only conditioned to be given in cases of termination or suspension without any

reasonable cause, and that the union has the prerogative to determine what constituted

reasonable cause for termination.

ISSUE

WON respondent is entitled to the financial aid?

RULING

YES. Section 5, Article 8 of the Constitution and By-laws of the petitioner-union is

self-executory. The nature of the contributions, being compulsory and it is for mutual

aid, indicates that individual pay roll authorizations is not necessary. Thus, petitioner

can be compelled by the Court to release its funds.

Also, the grant of financial aid to Oscar Pili does not amount to lack or excess of

jurisdiction. The union constitution is a covenant between the union and its members

and among the members. But the constitution leaves no legal interpretation of terms

unilaterally to the union or its officers or even general membership. Thus, since there

was no appointed authority in the union to indicate whether a suspension is for a

reasonable cause or not, it was appropriate for the court to take cognizance of the duty

to interpret the union constitution.

SAN JOSE CITY ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE, INC v. MINISTRY OF LABOR

AND EMPLOYMENT et al.

G.R. No. 77231, 31 May, 1989, FIRST DIVISION, (Medialdea, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

An employee therefore of such cooperative who is a member and co-owner

of a cooperative cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an

owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners. However, in so far as it

involves cooperatives with employees who are not members or co-owners

therefor, they are entitled to the rights of all workers to organization, collective

bargaining, negotiations etc.

FACTS

Respondent labor union filed for a certification election. Petitioner countered the

petition since the members of the labor union member-consumer of the Cooperative

and at the same time, composed of the General Assembly and pursuant to the by-laws,

the same is also the final arbiter of any dispute arising from the Cooperative.

ISSUE

WON employee-members of the cooperative can organize themselves for

purposes of collective bargaining?

RULING

NO. Pursuant to a number of decided cases by the Court, employees who are

member-co-owner of the cooperative do not have the right to collective bargaining,

because an owner cannot bargain with himself. However, employees who are not

member-consumers may form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of

collective bargaining.

Thus, rank and file employees of petitioner who are not its members-consumer

are entitled to self-organizations, collective bargaining, negotiations while other

employees who are member-consumers cannot enjoy such rights

ASSOCIATED WORKERS UNION-PTGWO v. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION et al.

G.R. No. 87266-69, 30 July, 1990, THIRD DIVISION, (Felciano, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A labor union may disaffiliate from the mother union to form a local or

independent union only during the 60-day freedom period immediately preceding

the expiration of the CBA. Even before the onset of the freedom period, and

despite the closed-shop provision in the CBA between the mother union and

management, disaffiliation may still be carried out, but such disaffiliation must be

effected by a majority of its members in the bargaining unit. The CBA continues

to bind the members of the new disaffiliated and independent up to the expiration

of the CBA.

FACTS

Petitioner union demanded the termination of respondent employees for having

organized the AWUM, which is alleged by the respondent employees to be the local

chapter of AWU without its permission. The said organization was composed of the rank

and file employees of the company. AWU moved for the removal of the employees

because such acts constitutes loyalty against the labor union. However, respondent

argues that the respondent employees have the right to organize themselves into a

local chapter, and that such formation is considered a protected activity and should not

be considered disloyalty.

ISSUE
 WON the formation of the AWUM is valid?

RULING

NO. While it is true that AWUM, as a labor union, is free to serve the interest of

its members, and enjoys the freedom to disaffiliate, such right to disaffiliate may be

exercised only when warranted by circumstances.

In the case at bar, respondents did not show that they disaffiliated during the

freedom period. What the record shows is that only 11 out of the whole number of

employees have disaffiliated from the petitioner union. Petitioner then failed to muster

the necessary majority in order to justify their disaffiliation.

 CARMELITO L. PALACOL et al v. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA et al.

G.R. No. 85333, 26 February, 1990, FIRST DIVISION, (Gancayco, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Employees are protected by law from unwarranted practices that diminish

their compensation without their knowledge and consent.

FACTS

Respondent Union entered into a new CBA with respondent Company. The

President of the Union submitted the ratification of the CBA and allowed the Company

to deduct union dues by way of special assessment. The Authorization and the CBA

ratification was obtained through a secret referendum out of separate local membership

meetings. Some of the members of the Union expressed their withdrawal from

authorizing the Company to deduct any amount from their CBA Lump Sum. Petitioner

assailed the 10% special assessment as a violation of Article 241 (o) and Article 222 (b)

of the Labor Code.

ISSUE

WON the CBA violated the provisions of the Labor Code?

RULING

YES. Failure of the Union to comply strictly with the requirements stated by law

invalidates the questioned special assessment. Substantial compliance is not enough in

view of the fact that the special assessment will diminish the compensation of the union
members. Their express consent is required and this consent must be obtained in

accordance with the steps set out by law.

Both Article 241 (n) and (o) apply to the case at bar. In the case at bar, the Union

failed to comply with the requirements as it held local membership meetings on

separate occasions on different dates, and at various venues contrary to the express

requirement that there must be a general membership meeting. Respondent Union only

submitted only the minutes of the local membership when what was required was a

written resolution adopted at the general meeting. As it is clear that the Union did not

comply with the requirements stated in Article 421 (n), there is no valid levy of the

special assessment

As regards to the violation of paragraph (o) of Article 421, it requires an individual

written authorization duly signed every employee in order that a special assessment

may be validly checked off. In the case at bar, the withdrawal of the individual

authorizations is equivalent to no authorization at all, hence the special assessment is

likewise invalid.
 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HONORABLE PURA FERRER-CALLEJA

G.R No. 96189, 14 July, 1992, SECOND DIVISION, (Narvasa, C.J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised

of all or less than all of the entire body of employees which the collective interest

of all employees, consistent with the equity of the employer, indicate to be the

best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the

collective bargaining provisions of the law.

FACTS

The Organization for Non-Academic Personnel of UP, a registered union filed

before the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition to conduct certification election. All UP

Worker’s Union, representing academic and non-academic workers of UP intervened in

the petition and prayed that in order for the certification election to pursue, the

appropriate organizational unit must first be defined. Respondent Director Calleja stated

that there is an appropriate organization unit must embrace all regular and rank and file

employees, including teaching and non-teaching. Petitioner then filed a Manifestation to

exclude from the organizational unit those professors occupying the position of

Assistant Professor as they are considered high level employees involved in policy

making, and managerial matters. Calleja then promulgated the decision stating the
those professors occupying the position of Assistant Professor and above are not high-

level employees, since the policy making powers that they possess are only limited to

academic matters

ISSUE

1. WON the assailed teachers are considered managerial e or high level

employees?

2. WON the assailed teachers should comprise of a CBU distinct from the non-

academic employees?

RULING

NO. As held in Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines v. Trajano, it was held

that the power to recommend, in order to qualify an employee as a supervisor or

managerial employee, must not only be effective, but the exercise of such authority

should not be merely of a routinary or clerical nature, but should require the use of

independent judgement. In the case at bar, said professors form part of the Academic

Personnel Committee which is tasked with formulating policies, rules and standards,

respecting the selection, compensation and promotion of members. However, such

recommendatory powers are subject to evaluation, review and final action by the

department heads and other higher executives, which indicates the lack of exercise of

independent judgement. Thus, they are not high-level employees, but rank and file

employees.
 YES. Citing Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Company Inc, it

was held that there are four factors in determining the proper constituency of a

bargaining unit: (1) Will of the employees; (2) Affinity of unit of employee’s interest such

as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working

conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; (4) employment status, such as

temporary, seasonal and probationary employees. Furthermore, in the same case, the

Court held that in grouping is community or mutuality of interest or the community or

mutuality of interest test.

In the case at bar, it is clear that one group is composed of employees whose

function are non-academic, i.e. janitors, messengers, typists, clerks, receptionists, etc,.

and the other group is composed of those performing academic functions like full

professors, associate professors, assistant professor. It is clear from the foregoing that

little mutuality on interest can be found from both groups which could justify the

formation of a single collective bargaining unit. The dichotomy between interest suggest

the formation of two separate bargaining units.

 PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD NG MANILA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et al

G.R. No. 107590, 21 February, 1995, EN BANC (Vitug, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The non-renewal of an employment contract with a term, it is true, is

ordinarily a valid mode of removal at the end of each period. The rule must

however yield to the superior constitutional right of employees, permanent or

temporary to self-organization. While temporary employment may be ended with

or without cause, it certainly may not, however be terminated for an illegal cause

FACTS

Private respondents, members of the PLMFO Union, were full time instructors of

PLM under a temporary contract of employment. Notices of termination were served

against them by petitioner with a statement that their contracts will not be renewed.

When the complaint reached the Public Sector Labor Management Council (PSLMC),

the latter decided that petitioner committed illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.

Upon reaching the CSC, the Commission affirmed that PLM is guilty of illegal dismissal.

Petitioner then argues that CSC violated the due process when it adopted entirely the
findings of the PSLMC without according the opportunity to be heard. In addition

petitioner states that since the PSLMC and CSC are both perfoming quasi-judicial

actions, they only acquire original jurisdiction over certain issues, the PSLMC over ULP

and CSC for illegal dismissal,

ISSUE

WON the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion when adopting the rulings of

the PSLMC?

RULING

NO. The two supposed independent issues, ULP and illegal dismissal are in fact

unavoidably interlinked. The non-renewal of an employment contract with a term, it is

true, is ordinarily a valid mode of removal at the end of each period. The rule must

however yield to the superior constitutional right of employees, permanent or temporary

to self-organization. While temporary employment may be ended with or without cause,

it certainly may not, however be terminated for an illegal cause

From the findings of the PSLMC, while there is merit that employees who hold a

temporary contract may not expect a renewal of appointment, as a matter of right, the

decision being management prerogative. However, when the exercise of such privilege

is allege to be the means by which management hinders unionism, or outrightly bust

unions, and such allegations is supported by evidence the acts needs to be examined

and studied.
 METROLAB INDUSTRIES v. HONORABLE MA. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR et

al.

G.R. No. 108855, 28 February, 1996, FIRST DIVISION, (Kapunan, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Confidential employees are those, by the very nature of their functions,

assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters

of, persons who exercise managerial function in the field of labor relations. As

such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form,

assist or join union equally applies to them.

FACTS

The CBA between respondent Union and petitioner have expired. In the

negotiations in the new CBA, it ended in a deadlock between the two parties. In 1992,

the parties entered into a new CBA. However, respondent Labor Secretary took

cognizance of the case and declared that executive secretaries are excluded from the

closed-shop provision of the CBA, and not from the bargaining unit.
ISSUE

WON the executive secretaries are excluded both from the bargaining unit and

from the closed provisions of the CBA?

RULING

YES. Based from jurisprudence, Article 245 of the Labor Code extends the

prohibition of joining, forming and assisting labor organizations not only to managerial

employees, but also to confidential employees. By reason of their position, confidential

employees they are requires to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial

employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly classified records. If

these employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter may not be

assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evidence conflict of interest. The danger

sought to be eliminated are not eliminated by non-membership of confidential

employees to the Union, as forming part of the bargaining unit can also give rise to

potential conflict of interest.

 HOLY CROSS OF DAVAO COLLEGE, INC v. HONORABLE JEROME JOAQUIN

G.R. No. 110007, 18 October, 1996, THIRD DIVISION, (Narvasa, C.J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

No provision of law makes the ER directly liable for the payment to the

labor organization of union dues and assessments that the former fails to deduct

from its EE’s salaries and wages pursuant to a check-off stipulation The ER’s

failure to make the requisite deductions may constitute a violation of contractual

commitment for which it may incur unfair labor practice. But it does not by that

omission, incur liability to the union for the aggregate dues or assessment

uncollected from the union members or agency fees for non-union employees

FACTS

A CBA was entered into by petitioner College, an educational institution, and

respondent union KAMAPI. While there was a union to union conflict, petitioner stopped

deducting from the salaries and wages of its employees the corresponding special
assessment and union dues. Petitioner argues that that it could not comply with the

check-off provisions in the CBA for respondent unions failure to submit on every 8 th day

of the month a list of EEs from whom union dues are the corresponding agency fees

were to be deducted.

ISSUE

WON petitioner College is liable to pay the Union the amounts it failed to deduct

from their salaries?

RULING

NO. A check off is a process or device whereby the ER, on agreement with the

union recognized as the proper exclusive bargaining representative or on prior

authorization from its EEs, deducts union dues or agency fees from the latter’s wages

and remits them directly to the union.

No provision of law makes the ER directly liable for the payment to the labor

organization of union dues and assessments that the former fails to deduct from its EE’s

salaries and wages pursuant to a check-off stipulation The ER’s failure to make the

requisite deductions may constitute a violation of contractual commitment for which it

may incur unfair labor practice. But it does not by that omission, incur liability to the

union for the aggregate dues or assessment uncollected from the union members or

agency fees for non-union employees.

Moreso, check-offs in truth impose an additional burden on the ER. But the

obligation to pay union dues and agency fees obviously devolves not upon the ER but

the individual EE. It is a personal obligation not demandable from the ER upon default
or refusal of the EE to consent to a check off. The only obligation of the ER under a

check-off is to effect the deductions and remit the collections to the union.

Hence, in the case at bar petitioner College cannot be faulted to be liable to pay

for the union dues and special assessments, and agency fees that it had failed to

deduct from its EEs salaries on its defense that respondent Union failed to submit to the

College on every 8th day a list of EEs from whose pay union dues and the

corresponding agency fees were to be deducted.

TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION v. TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES

CORPORATION AND LABOR UNION et al.

G.R. No. 121084, 19 February, 1997, FIRST DIVISION, (Kapunan, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A collective bargaining unit is the legal collectivity for collective

bargaining purposes whose members have substantially mutual bargaining

interest in terms and conditions of employment as will assure to all employees

their collective bargaining rights.

FACTS

Respondent labor union filed a petition for certification election. However,

petitioner argued that respondent’s petition should not be granted as they are not

considered a legitimate labor organization as of the date of filing, and that the union was

composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees.

ISSUE
 WON the respondent union was a legitimate labor union?

RULING

NO. The purpose of the certification election is to determine the exclusive

representative of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of

collective bargaining. Moreover, pursuant to Article 245 of the Labor Code, a labor

organization composed of both rank and file and supervisory employee is no labor

organization at all. It cannot be considered a legitimate labor organization. Not being a

valid labor organization, it cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor

organization, including the right to file a certification election for the purpose of collective

bargaining.

In the case at bar, some of the members of the union occupy a level five position

in the company which consists of overseeing the production of new models but also

determine the man power requirements, thereby influencing important hiring decisions

at the highest levels. This determination is neither clerical but involves independent

judgement. The use of independent judgement in making the decision to hire, fire and

transfer in the identification of manpower requirements would be greatly impaired if the

employee’s loyalties are torn between the interests of the union and the interest of the

management.
 PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION-PIZZA HUT v. HONORABLE

BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA et al.

G.R. No. 115077, 18 April, 1997, FIRST DIVISION, (Kapunan, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Once a labor organization attains the status of a legitimate labor

organization. It begins, to possess all of the rights and privileges granted by law

to such organizations. As such rights and privileges ultimately affect areas which

are constitutionally protected, the activities in which labor organizations,

associations, and unions are engaged directly affect the public interest and

should be zealously protected. A strict enforcement of the Labor Code’s

requirements for the acquisition of the status of a legitimate labor organization is

in order.

FACTS
 Respondent Union filed a PCE in behalf of its rank and file employees of the

Progressive Development Corporation (Pizza Hut). Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss

against the PCE of the respondent Union, on the grounds that the Union’s registration

was tainted with false, forged and that the date of the charter certificate was falsified.

Respondent Union argues that once a labor organization has filed the necessary

documents and papers and the same has been certified under oath and attested to, the

labor organization becomes clothed with the character of a LLO.

ISSUE

WON after the necessary papers and documents have been filed by a labor

organization, recognition by the BLR merely becomes a ministerial function?

RULING

NO. Pursuant to Article 234, the requirements embodied therein are intended as

preventive measures against the commission of fraud. The registration requirements

specifically afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting EEs who may be lured into

joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds

or use the labor organization for illegitimate ends. Such requirements are a valid

exercise of police power. Moreover, Article 235 the thirty period ensures that any action

taken by the BLR is made in consonance with the mandate of the Labor Code, which, it

bears emphasis, specifically requires that the basis for the issuance of a certificate of

registration should be in compliance with the requirements for recognition under Article

234. From the foregoing provisions, recognition of a labor union or labor organization is

not merely a ministerial function.

 SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS et al v. THE HONORABLE

BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA et al.

G.R. No. 110399, 15, August, 1997, SECOND DIVISION, (Romero, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in confidential

capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine and effectuate management

policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative and both

must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee – that is,

confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor

must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.

FACTS

Petitioner union filed before DOLE for a petition of Certification election among

the supervisors and exempt employees from the Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis

branches, which was granted. On appeal, respondent Company argued that grouping
the 3 branches into one bargaining unit was an error since it included employees who

are occupying positions that are confidential in nature.

ISSUE

WON the employees involved in the unified bargaining unit was a confidential

employee?

RULING

NO. Under the confidential employee rule, employees who in the normal course

of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations should

be excluded from bargaining units, because of conflict of interest. Also, based on

decided cases, the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist, or join labor

unions was applicable to confidential employees. The important element of the

confidential employee rule is the employee’s need to use labor relations information.

In the case at bar, the employees argued by petitioner as confidential employees

do not belong to such class, because the confidential information handled by these

question employees relate to product formulation, product standards, or internal

business which by no means is near within the context of labor relations. Also,

assuming that an employee has access to confidential labor relations information, but

such is merely incidental to his duties and knowledge thereof is not necessary in the

performance of such duties, said access does not render an employee a confidential

employee. Furthermore, even assuming that they are confidential employees, there is

no prohibition against confidential employees who are not performing managerial

functions to form or join a union.

 As to the issue of the validity of grouping the three branches into one bargaining

unit, the Court affirms the argument of petitioner. A unit to be considered appropriate

must have substantial mutual interest in wage hours, working conditions, etc. In the

case at bar, the questioned employees have a community or mutuality of interest which

is the standard in determining the proper constituency of a CBU. Regardless of the

distance of these branches, it is material as long as the mutuality of interest is present.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR

LEONARDO QUISUMBING et al

G.R. No. 127598, 27, January, 1999, FIRST DIVISION, (Martinez, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Confidential EEs do not share the same community of interest that might

otherwise make him eligible to join his rank-and-file co-workers, because of a

conflict in those interest.

FACTS

MEWA (Union) is the duly recognized labor organization of the rank-and-file EEs

of petitioner MERALCO. The Union expressed its intention of re-negotiate the terms and

conditions of their existing CBA. The parties reached a deadlock. Petitioner argues that

the inclusion of certain employees should not be allowed because they are considered

as confidential EEs.
ISSUE

WON the concerned EEs are confidential employees?

RULING

YES. Pursuant to the ruling in Pier 8 Arrastre v. Confesor, and General Maritime

and Stevedores Union, confidential EEs do not share the same community of interest

that might otherwise make him eligible to join his rank-and-file co-workers, because of a

conflict in those interest.

ABS-CBN SUPERVISORS EMPLOYEES UNION MEMBERS v. ABS-CBN

BROADCASTING CORP, et al.

G.R. No. 106518, 11, March, 1999, THIRD DIVISION, (Purisima, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A check off is a process or device whereby the employer on agreement

with the Union, recognized as the proper bargaining representative, or on prior

authorization from its employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the

latter’s wages and remits them directly to the union. Its desirability in a labor

organization is quite evident. It is assured thereby of continuous funding.

FACTS

The Union and respondent Company signed and concluded a CBA, which

included a check-off of 10% of the total sum of all salary increases and signing bonuses

of the employees in order to cover the expenses of the Union. Petitioner Union

Members argues that the special assessment of 10% must be declared illegal as it
failed to conform with Article 241, paragraph (g, n, o), and their Constitution and by-

laws.

ISSUE

WON the special assessment by the Company is invalid?

RULING

NO. Article 241 speaks of three requisites that must be complied with in order for

a special assessment, incidental to the Union’s expenses, attorney’s fees and

representation expenses to be considered valid: (1) authorization by a written resolution

of the majority of all members at the general membership meeting called for that

purpose; (2) secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting; (3) individual written

authorization for check-off duly signed by the employee concerned.

In the case at bar, the Court concludes that the three conditions were met.

Petitioner held a general meeting whereat it agreed on the 10% special assessment.

The minutes of the meeting was recorded by the Union’s Secretary. Lastly, majority of

the Union members gave their individual check-off authorizations. Thus all of the

requisites for a valid special assessment. The case of Palacol is not applicable in this

case as the Union members did not withdrew their authorizations.

 UST FACULTY UNION et al. v. DIRECTOR BENEDICTOR ERNESTO R. BITONIO

JR.

G.R. No. 131235, 16 November, 1999, FIRST DIVISION, (Panganiban, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A worker’s organization shall have the right to draw up their constitution

and rules to elect their representatives in full freedom, free from any interference

from public authorities. A union’s CBL is the fundamental law that governs the

relationship between and among the members of the union. Without respect for

the CBL, a union as a democratic institution degenerates into nothing more than

a group of individuals governed by a mob rule.

In a certification election, all EEs belonging to the appropriate bargaining

unit can vote. Therefore, a union member who likewise belongs to the appropriate

bargaining unit is entitled to vote in the election. However, the reverse is not
always the true. An EE belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit who is not a

member of the union cannot vote in the Union election, unless otherwise

authorized by the Constitution and by laws of the union.

FACTS

Respondents are the elected officers of the USTFU (Union). The Union posted a

notice informing its members about an assembly for the purpose of electing a new set of

officers. Despite the temporary restraining order issued against the election, an

assembly was conducted and attended by members and non-members of the union.

Petitioners were elected as the new set of officers. A non-member of the Union called

for the suspension of the existing CBA. Subsequently, a new CBA was established.

Private respondents argue that the said election was a violation of the existing CBL as it

did not comply with the procedural requirements. Petitioner argues that the assailed

election was an exercise of their right to self-organization.

ISSUE

WON the election conducted and the suspension of the existing CBA was valid?

RULING

NO. Citing ILO Convention No, 87, worker’s organization shall have the right to

draw up their constitution and rules to elect their representatives in full freedom, free

from any interference from public authorities. A union’s CBL is the fundamental law that

governs the relationship between and among the members of the union. Without

respect for the CBL, a union as a democratic institution degenerates into nothing more

than a group of individuals governed by a mob rule. In the case at bar, the Court
discredits the claim of the petitioners in stating that the election conducted was justified

because of the numerous anomalies committed by private respondents during their

incumbency.

More so, the election conducted cannot be considered as a union election,

because the procedures laid down in the CBL were not complied. It is confirmed that the

election was tainted with irregularities.

Lastly, the Court finds that the suspension of the CBA as invalid. The general

assembly conducted was not the proper forum to conduct the elections. As some of

those who voted in the election were not even members of the USTFU. Secondly, the

grievances that the petitioners considered as their justification of holding an election,

should have been brought up and resolved within the procedures provided by the CBL

and Labor Code. The Court does not agree with the method petitioners adopted to

rectify the years of inaction on their part as such method was a total disregard of the

USTFU’s CBL and of due process.

 UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION v. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E.

LAGUESMA et al.

G.R. No. 122226, 25 March, 1998, EN BANC, (Mendoza, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

By the very nature of their work, confidential employees assist and act in a

confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who

exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations as such the rationale

behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist, or join a labor

union equally applies to them

FACTS

Petitioner union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route

managers of the respondent company. The petition was denied on the grounds that

route managers are managerial employees, thus they are prohibited for union
membership. Petitioner then argued that the first sentence of Article 245 of the Labor

Code is violative of Section 8, Article 3 of the Constitution.

ISSUE

WON Article 245 of the Labor Code violated the Constitution?

RULING

NO. Firstly, the term manager pertains to a person who is responsible for his

subordinates and other organizational resources. As a class, managers constitute three

levels. Top management (composed of small group of executives, responsible for the

overall management of the organization), Middle Management (direct the activities of

other managers and sometimes also those operating employees, direct the activities

that implement their organization’s policies and balance the demands of superior with

the capacities of their subordinates), and First Line Management (Supervisor; direct

operating employees). Furthermore, Managerial Employees can be distinguished into

two categories: (1) Managers Per se, whose task is to devise, implement and control

strategic and operational policies; (2) Supervisors, whose task is simply to ensure that

such policies are carried out by the rank and file employees.

In the case at bar, based on jurisprudence, route managers are considered

Managers Per se and not mere supervisors as their duties goes beyond of a supervisor

which is only limited to recommendation. Route managers exercise power that consists

of independent judgement which is beyond the powers of what is given to a supervisor.

Hence, Route Managers are considered as Managerial Employees and thus prohibited

from joining any unions.

 Moreover, pursuant to Republic Act No.6715 or the Herrera-Veloso Law, it

provided separate definitions of the terms managerial and supervisory employees. It

also stated the distinction between top and middle managers who set management

policy and front line supervisor who are mere responsible for ensuring that policies are

carried out by the rank and file employees. When read with Article 212 (m) of the Labor

Code, it will be seen that Article 245 faithfully carries out the intent of Section 8, Article 3

of the Constitution.

On whether Article 245 is violative for prohibiting managerial employees from

forming or joining unions, the Court states that there is a rational basis for such reason,

and that is all these employees are confidential employees. By the very nature of their

function, they assist, and act in a confidential capacity to have or have access to

confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor

relations.
 GOLDEN DONUTS, INC v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 113666-68, 19 January, 2000, FIRST DIVISION, (Pardo, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Where the compromise agreement was signed by only three of the five

respondents, the non-signatories cannot be bound by the amicable settlement.

This is so as a compromise agreement is a contract and cannot affect third

persons who are not parties to it.

FACTS

Private respondents are EEs of petitioner Company. The Union expressed their

intent to re-negotiate the expiring CBA with the Company. Members of the Management

failed to appear during the CBA negotiations which prompted the Union to declare the

negotiation to have reached a deadlock. Union members staged a strike to which the

Company filed a petition to declare the strike illegal. In the end, the Company and the
Union reached a compromise agreement wherein, separation pay will be given to the

Union members who participated in the strike and the Company shall drop the charges

against them. Respondent did not agree to the compromise agreement, because it was

entered without their individual consent. Petitioner argues that the compromise

agreement is binding upon those EEs who did not gave their consent, because of the

preponderant majority who agreed with the agreement.

ISSUE

WON the compromise agreement covers the private respondents?

RULING

Citing Rule 138, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Court, the law requires a

special authority before an attorney may compromise his client’s litigation. In the case at

bar, the counsel of the Union was not authorized by the minority union members, as

private respondents, to be part of the compromise agreement.

Moreover, based on decided cases, that a compromise, once approved by final

orders of the court has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be

disturbed. Since the private respondents are not parties to the compromise agreement,

res judicata will not apply to them

Lastly, petitioner failed to prove that private respondents committed any illegal

acts during the strike, and thus petitioner’s failure to reinstate them after the settlement

of the strike amounts to illegal dismissal.

 SUGBUANON RURAL BANK, INC v. HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY

BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA et al.

G.R No. 116194, 2 February, 2000, SECOND DIVISION, (Quisumbing, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A local union maintains its separate personality despite affiliation with a

larger national federation.

FACTS

The Association of Professional, Supervisory, Office, and Technical Employees

Union (APSOTEU) is a legitimate labor organization affiliated with the Trade Unions

Congress of the Philippines (TUCP). Said union filed a certification of election of the

supervisory employees of the bank, to which petitioner bank did not agree because the

members of the said union were managerial or confidential employees. Furthermore,

petitioner argues that the union violated the principle of separation of unions, since

allegedly, the union was represented by ALU-TUCP.

ISSUE

WON members of the respondent union are managerial employees or

confidential employees?

RULING

NO. Based from the evidence presented by petitioner bank, the powers that

members of the union possess are merely recommendatory which are subject to

evaluation, review and final decision by the bank’s management. Hence, they cannot be

considered as managerial employees. Neither are the same employees confidential

employees since petitioner failed to state who among the employees has access to

information specifically relating to labor relation policies. Assuming that they are

confidential employees, the doctrine of necessary implication shall apply to them on the

prohibition against managerial employees from forming or joining into unions.

Moreover, pursuant to Article 242 of the Labor Code, one of the rights of a

legitimate labor organization is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of

all employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.

Since respondent union has complied with the requisites laid down in Article 243, he is

considered to be a legitimate labor union.

Lastly, the Court rules that a local union maintains its separate personality

despite its affiliation with a larger national federation. In the case at bar, there is nothing

in the evidence that suggest that ALU-TUCP seeks to represent both respondent union-
and the rank-and-file union. Therefore, the allegation that respondent union violated the

principle of separation of union cannot be meritorious.

MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA M. GREENFIELD v.

HONORABLE CRESENCIO J. RAMOS

G.R. No. 113907, 28 February, 2000, THIRD DIVISION (Purisima, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

With violence committed on both sides, the management and the

employees , such violence cannot be a ground to declare the strike as illegal.

FACTS

Petitioner local union conducted a general meeting. Not all members were able

to attend the meeting to which the union imposed a deduction on their compensation.

This compensation led to an intra-union conflict between petitioner local union and its

mother federation, which led the former to declare its autonomy from the latter. Taking it

as acts of loyalty, the federation expelled the union officers of the local union as well as

some members of the union. This was immediately approved by the company and
declared those EEs as dismissed from their employment. From this, the local union

staged a strike, on the grounds of ULP, wherein violence occurred. Respondent

company argues that the strike was illegal pursuant to the no-strike/no-lockout clause in

the CBA, and that the source of the strike was that of an intra-union conflict, and lastly,

the strike was attended by violence.

ISSUE

WON the strike was legal?

RULING

YES. When the company dismissed the union officers, along with other members

of the union, the conflict was transformed from an intra-union to a termination dispute.

Petitioners were led to believe in good faith that when the company dismissed the union

officers, upon request of the federation union, the company was guilty of unfair labor

practice. Hence, the strike was based on the company’s act of dismissal. Even if the

allegations of unfair labor practice were found to be untrue, the presumption of legality

of strike prevails. As to the existing no-strike/no-lockout provision of the CBA, the same

provision can only be invoked when there is an economic strike. In the case at bar, the

strike takes of the nature of an ULP strike, hence the no-strike/no-lockout provision will

not apply. Lastly, as to the violence that occurred during the strike, the violence cannot

be solely attributed to the EEs alone for the company hired men to pacify the strikers.

Hence, there was violence on both sides, which makes the defense of violence to

declare the strike illegal unavailable to the company.

 DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY v. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION et al.

G.R. No. 109002, 12 April, 2000, SECOND DIVISION, (Buena, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The express exclusion of the computer operators and discipline officers

from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file units in the 1986 CBA does not bar

any re-negotiation for the future inclusion of the said employees in the bargaining

unit.

FACTS

Petitioner school and respondent Union entered into a CBA which lasted for 3

years. During negotiations of a new CBA, petitioner School argues that the computer

operators assigned at the School’s Service Center as well as discipline officers should

not be part of the of the bargaining unit as had already been established in the expired
CBA. Respondent Union argues that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and

thus its employees must also be part of the bargaining unit of petitioner school

ISSUE

WON the questioned employees are confidential employees?

RULING

NO. The Computer operators and discipline officers are not confidential

employees. The services rendered by the computer operator are basically clerical and

non-confidential in nature. Moreover, the express exclusion of the computer operators

and discipline officers from the CBA does not bar any renegotiation for the future

inclusion of the said employees in the bargaining unit. Members of the union can even

discuss the modification or amendments to the CBA

As regards to respondent union’s argument, the Court rules that the employees

of St. Benilde should be excluded from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file

employees of DLSU, because the two institutions have their own separate judicial

personality and no sufficient evidence was shown to justify the piercing of the veil of

corporate fiction.
 PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HONORABLE

BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA

G.R. No. 101738, 12 April, 2000, SECOND DIVISION, (De Leon, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The mere fact that an EE is designated manager does not ipso facto make

him one. Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of the

EE, for it is the job description that determines the nature of the employment

FACTS

Petitioner Company is engaged in the business of manufacturing of paper and

timber products. A Union filed a PCE in order to determine the SEBA. Petitioner

Company questioned the inclusion of some section heads and supervisors in the list of

voters. Furthermore, these concerned section heads and supervisors are considered to

be managerial EEs because of the decentralization program, and these same EEs had
the power to hire and fire EEs, hence, they cannot be part of the list of eligible voting

EEs for the certification election.

ISSUE

WON the concerned section head and supervisor are considered managerial

EES?

RULING

NO. The concerned section head and supervisory EEs are not actually

managerial EEs, but only supervisory EEs, since they do not lay down and execute

managerial policies. Petitioner Company’s contention that the concerned EEs had the

power to hire and fire EEs is ambiguous and misleading for the reason that such

exercise of authority is merely advisory in nature. Theirs is not a final determination of

the company policies inasmuch as any action taken by them on matters relative to

hiring, promotion, transfer and suspension and termination of EEs is still subject to

confirmation and approval by their respective superior.

 PHILIPPINE SKYLANDERS INC. et al v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION

G.R. No. 127374, 31, January 31, 2002, SECOND DIVISION, (Bellosillo, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Local unions have the right to separate from their mother federation on the

ground that as a separate and voluntary associations, local unions do not owe

their creation and existence to the national federation to which they are affiliated

but, instead, to the will of their members

FACTS

Philippine Skylanders Employees Association (PSEA) disaffiliated itself with

respondent Philippine Association of Free Labor Union (PAFLU) and affiliated itself with

the National Congress of Workers. PAFLU then filed a case against petitioner for unfair

labor practice, because of union’s disaffiliation.

ISSUE

WON the union’s disaffiliation was valid?

RULING

YES. Pursuant to Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, local

unions have the right to separate from their mother federation on the ground that as a

separate and voluntary associations, local unions do not owe their creation and

existence to the national federation to which they are affiliated but, instead, to the will of

their members.

In the case at bar, there is nothing shown in the records that PAFLU forbid the

local union to disaffiliate from the federation nor were there any conditions imposed for

a valid breakaway.
JERRY A. ACEDERA et al. v. INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES

INC (ICTSI) et al.

G.R. No. 146073, 13, January, 2003, THIRD DIVISION, (Carpio-Morales, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

For a member of a class to be permitted to intervene in a representative

action, fraud, or collusion or lack of good faith on the part of the representative

must be proven. It must be based on facts borne on record. Mere assertions as

what petitioners proffer do not suffice.

FACTS

Petitioners are EEs of the respondent Company and Members of the SEBA

Union. The Union filed a case against the Company because of its retrenchment

program. Petitioners filed a motion for intervention. They argued that the Union would

not prosecute the case diligently.

ISSUE

WON the motion for intervention by the EEs is valid?

RULING

NO. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 19 of the Civil Procedure, while a party acting

in a representative capacity, such as a union, may be permitted to intervene in a case,

ordinarily, a person whose interest are already represented will not be permitted do to

the same except when there is a suggestion of fraud or collusion. In the case at bar,

petitioner’s fear that the Union will not prosecute the case diligently did not hold water

as there is the lack of actual fraud or collusion.

 ME SHURN CORPORATION v. ME-SHURN WORKER’S UNION-FSM

G.R. No. 156292, 11, January, 2005, THIRD DIVISION, (Panganiban, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In an unorganized establishment, only a legitimate union may file a petition

for certification election.

FACTS

Respondent union was formed and filed for its registration. Petitioner Company

placed all rank and file employees on forced leave. But later on set a condition that it will

rehire its laid off workers on the conditions that no labor union would be organized.

Upon resumption of operation, respondent filed an action for illegal dismissal against

petitioner, but the latter argued that the reason that it laid off its workers it because of

economic losses, and that it has the management prerogative to close its operation.
Petitioner also asserts that respondent union has no personality since it was held in a

certification election, most for the workers voted for no union

ISSUE

WON the union has personality?

RULING

YES. Respondent union is a legitimate labor organization. DOLE entertained

respondent’s petition for certification of election which suggests that it is a legitimate

labor organization. Although it is not clear from the record that indeed the union is a

legitimate organization, the Court is not precluded to rule otherwise, because of the pro-

labor policies in our Constitution. More so, the union has the personality to sue in its

own name in order to challenge petitioner’s unfair labor practice. Ruled otherwise, then

it would amount to an unwarranted impairment of the right to self organization.

 ST. JAMES SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY v. SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA ST.

JAMES SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY

G.R. No. 151326, 23 November, 2005, FIRST DIVISION, (Capio, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

EEs that belong to the transportation division need to be separated in a

different CBU from the administrative and teaching division of the school

FACTS

Respondent union filed before the DOLE a PCE to determine the SEBA of the

motor pool, construction and transportation EEs of St. James School of Quezon City.

Petitioner School filed an election protest against the CE on the basis that 179 EEs,

none of whom participated in the certification election, hence no quorum. Respondent

argues that the Union only represents the motor pool, construction and transportation
EEs, and not the whole rank and file EEs which is composed of academic and non-

academic EEs.

ISSUE

WON the CE conducted by respondent union is valid?

RULING

YES. Based on upon the reading of the CBL of the respondent Union, it only

seeks to represent, the motor pool, construction and transportation EEs. Hence, the

computation of the votes should be based on the number of the concerned EEs it

represents. In the case at bar 84 out of 149 concerned EEs voted which constituted a

quorum.

SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA HANJIN SHIPYARD v. BUREAU OF LABOR

RELATIONS et al.

G.R. No. 211145, 14 October, 2015, SECOND DIVISION, (Mendoza, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The right to self-organization is not limited to forming unions. Workers may

also form associations for mutual aid and protection, and for other legitimate

purposes other than collective bargaining.

FACTS

Petitioner Samahan filed before the DOLE to register its name “Samahan ng mga

Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard”. Respondent Hanjin prayed for the cancellation of the

registration on the grounds that members of the association do not fall under the types
of workers in the second sentence of Article 243, and that they should have formed a

labor union instead. More so, Hanjin argues that the association is committing

misrepresentation by alleging that all of the members of the concerned association are

EEs of Hanjin. Petitioner argues that their name is derived of the place of their work,

which is Hanjin, Subic, and not because they are EEs of respondent, therefore there is

no misrepresentation.

ISSUE

1. WON a group of EEs who are EEs of respondent and other EEs in the area

may form an association?

2. WON the worker’s association may use the name of Hanjin

RULING

YES. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule II, Book V of the IRR of the Labor Code, it

broadens the coverage of workers who can form, join or assist a worker’s association.

The right to self-organization is not exclusive to unionism. There is nothing that prevents

EEs from forming an association for mutual aid and protection. One cannot force them

to form a union. The EEs mentioned under Article 243 of the Labor Code are not the

only ones who can form worker’s association.

NO. The name “Hanjin Shipyard” must be removed. Pursuant to Section 18 of

the Corporation Code, petitioners must remove the name “Hanjin Shipyard” in their

name so as to remove any confusion and avoidance of fraud. If the name was included,

it would purport that all the members of the worker’s association is an EE of respondent

Hanjin.